@oxyhq/core 3.10.1 → 3.12.0

package/dist/cjs/mixins/OxyServices.civic.js

@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.parseIdPayload = parseIdPayload;
+exports.parseAttestPayload = parseAttestPayload;
+exports.verifyPublicCardAttestation = verifyPublicCardAttestation;
+exports.OxyServicesCivicMixin = OxyServicesCivicMixin;
+const canonicalJson_1 = require("../crypto/canonicalJson");
+const signatureService_1 = require("../crypto/signatureService");
+const OxyServices_identity_1 = require("./OxyServices.identity");
+const mixinHelpers_1 = require("./mixinHelpers");
+/**
+ * Validity window of a real-life-attestation QR (`oxycommons://attest?…exp=…`),
+ * matching the server's `REAL_LIFE_NONCE_MAX_AGE_MS` ceiling: the QR must be
+ * scanned and submitted within this window. The server is authoritative on
+ * freshness; this is the client-issued `exp`.
+ */
+const ATTEST_QR_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+/** AtProto-style collection for a real-life counterparty attestation record. */
+const ATTEST_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.attestation';
+/** AtProto-style collection for a validator's signed verdict record. */
+const VALIDATION_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.validation';
+/** AtProto-style collection for a personhood vouch record. */
+const VOUCH_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.vouch';
+/**
+ * AtProto-style collection (NSID) for a verifiable credential record — matches
+ * the server's `CREDENTIAL_COLLECTION`. Each credential is its own chain entry,
+ * so the per-credential `rkey` MUST be unique (a fresh nonce), unlike the
+ * one-per-subject vouch keyed on the subject DID.
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.credential';
+/**
+ * The W3C base VC type (`CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE` on the server) that MUST be
+ * present in every credential's `types`. The client prepends it when the caller
+ * omits it; the server rejects a credential record lacking it (`missing_base_type`).
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE = 'VerifiableCredential';
+/**
+ * Cache-key prefix of every credential read — the holder list
+ * (`GET /civic/credentials/:holderUserId`) and the by-record verify
+ * (`GET /civic/credentials/by-record/:recordId/verify`) both start with it.
+ * Swept after an issue / revoke so a re-read reflects the new credential set /
+ * status instead of a stale cached one. The identity tag is a key SUFFIX, so
+ * this prefix invalidates the resource for every cached identity.
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_CACHE_PREFIX = 'GET:/civic/credentials/';
+/**
+ * Cache-key prefix of every personhood-status read (`GET /civic/personhood/:userId`).
+ * Swept after a vouch / withdraw so a re-read reflects the recomputed snapshot
+ * instead of a stale cached one. The identity tag is a key SUFFIX, so this
+ * prefix invalidates the resource for every cached identity.
+ */
+const PERSONHOOD_CACHE_PREFIX = 'GET:/civic/personhood/';
+/**
+ * Cache-key prefix of the current user's `GET /users/me`. Swept after a vouch /
+ * withdraw because a subject crossing the personhood threshold flips their
+ * mirrored `User.verified` flag.
+ */
+const USERS_ME_CACHE_PREFIX = 'GET:/users/me';
+/** URI scheme/host that introduces a Commons Oxy ID card payload. */
+const CARD_MATCHER = /^oxycommons:\/\/card(?:[/?#]|$)/i;
+/** URI scheme/host that introduces a real-life counterparty attestation payload. */
+const ATTEST_MATCHER = /^oxycommons:\/\/attest(?:[/?#]|$)/i;
+/**
+ * Minimal, allocation-light query-string parser (no `URL` / `URLSearchParams`)
+ * so it runs identically under Hermes and jsdom — mirrors the robustness of the
+ * "Sign in with Oxy" approval-link parser. Shared by every `oxycommons://…`
+ * payload parser in this module.
+ */
+function parseCommonsQuery(raw) {
+    const params = new Map();
+    const qIndex = raw.indexOf('?');
+    if (qIndex < 0)
+        return params;
+    let query = raw.slice(qIndex + 1);
+    const hashIndex = query.indexOf('#');
+    if (hashIndex >= 0)
+        query = query.slice(0, hashIndex);
+    for (const pair of query.split('&')) {
+        if (pair.length === 0)
+            continue;
+        const eq = pair.indexOf('=');
+        const rawKey = eq < 0 ? pair : pair.slice(0, eq);
+        const rawValue = eq < 0 ? '' : pair.slice(eq + 1);
+        try {
+            params.set(decodeURIComponent(rawKey), decodeURIComponent(rawValue.replace(/\+/g, ' ')));
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Malformed percent-encoding — keep the raw token rather than throwing, so
+            // a single bad field doesn't sink an otherwise valid payload.
+            params.set(rawKey, rawValue);
+        }
+    }
+    return params;
+}
+/**
+ * Parse a scanned / deep-linked Oxy ID payload (`oxycommons://card?did=…`) into
+ * the referenced DID. Pure + dependency-free (Hermes-safe, no `URL` global) so
+ * Commons (and any scanner) can reuse it without an OxyServices instance.
+ *
+ * @param raw - The raw scanned string or deep-link URL.
+ * @returns `{ did }` when a usable DID is present; `null` for anything else (a
+ *   non-card scheme, a missing/empty `did`, or non-string input).
+ */
+function parseIdPayload(raw) {
+    if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.trim().length === 0) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const value = raw.trim();
+    if (!CARD_MATCHER.test(value)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const did = parseCommonsQuery(value).get('did');
+    if (!did || did.length === 0) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return { did };
+}
+/**
+ * Parse a scanned / deep-linked real-life-attestation payload
+ * (`oxycommons://attest?subject=…&ctx=…&nonce=…&exp=…`). Pure + dependency-free
+ * (Hermes-safe, no `URL` global), mirroring {@link parseIdPayload}, so Commons
+ * (and any scanner) can reuse it without an OxyServices instance.
+ *
+ * @param raw - The raw scanned string or deep-link URL.
+ * @returns `{ subjectDid, context, nonce, exp }` when the required fields are
+ *   present and `exp` is a positive finite number; `null` otherwise (a non-attest
+ *   scheme, a missing `subject`/`nonce`/`exp`, an unparseable `exp`, or non-string
+ *   input). `context` defaults to `''` when the QR omits `ctx`.
+ */
+function parseAttestPayload(raw) {
+    if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.trim().length === 0) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const value = raw.trim();
+    if (!ATTEST_MATCHER.test(value)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const params = parseCommonsQuery(value);
+    const subjectDid = params.get('subject');
+    const nonce = params.get('nonce');
+    const expRaw = params.get('exp');
+    if (!subjectDid || !nonce || expRaw === undefined || expRaw.length === 0) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const exp = Number(expRaw);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(exp) || exp <= 0) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return { subjectDid, context: params.get('ctx') ?? '', nonce, exp };
+}
+/**
+ * Verify the Oxy custodial attestation on a public card.
+ *
+ * Re-canonicalizes the received `card` (so the order of the JSON keys on the
+ * wire is irrelevant; `canonicalize` also omits any `undefined`-valued optional
+ * key, matching the server which omits absent keys entirely) and checks the
+ * `ES256K-DER-SHA256` signature against `attestation.publicKey`.
+ *
+ * NEVER throws: `SignatureService.verify` already swallows malformed-input
+ * errors and returns `false`, and an absent attestation short-circuits to
+ * `false`. A pure, reusable helper (Commons can call it on a cached card).
+ *
+ * @param card - The card to verify (exactly as received).
+ * @param attestation - The card's attestation, or `null` (unsigned ⇒ `false`).
+ */
+async function verifyPublicCardAttestation(card, attestation) {
+    if (!attestation) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    const { signature, publicKey } = attestation;
+    if (!signature || !publicKey) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return signatureService_1.SignatureService.verify((0, canonicalJson_1.canonicalize)(card), signature, publicKey);
+}
+function OxyServicesCivicMixin(Base) {
+    return class extends Base {
+        constructor(...args) {
+            super(...args);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Fetch a user's signed public Oxy ID card and verify the Oxy attestation
+         * client-side. Public (no auth required); short-TTL cached.
+         *
+         * Resolves to `{ card, attestation, verified }`. A bad/absent signature does
+         * NOT reject — it yields `verified: false` so the UI can warn. Only a
+         * transport failure (the fetch itself) rejects.
+         *
+         * @param userId - The subject account's Mongo `_id`. URL-encoded into the path.
+         */
+        async getPublicCard(userId) {
+            try {
+                const signed = await this.makeRequest('GET', `/civic/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/card`, undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: mixinHelpers_1.CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+                const verified = await verifyPublicCardAttestation(signed.card, signed.attestation);
+                return { card: signed.card, attestation: signed.attestation, verified };
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Build the Oxy ID QR payload for the current user:
+         * `oxycommons://card?did=<did>&v=1`, where `<did>` is the user's Oxy DID
+         * (`did:web:oxy.so:u:<userId>`). The QR encodes ONLY the DID (anti-spoof — no
+         * trust data); a scanner resolves the signed card via {@link getPublicCard}.
+         * Round-trips through {@link parseIdPayload}.
+         *
+         * Throws if no user is authenticated (no DID to derive).
+         */
+        getMyIdPayload() {
+            const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+            if (!userId) {
+                throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot build an Oxy ID payload.');
+            }
+            return `oxycommons://card?did=${(0, OxyServices_identity_1.buildUserDid)(userId)}&v=1`;
+        }
+        // =========================================================================
+        // FASE 2 — real-life counterparty attestation (HIGH weight)
+        // =========================================================================
+        /**
+         * Build the real-life-attestation QR the current user (A) shows to be
+         * attested by a counterparty (B):
+         * `oxycommons://attest?subject=<A.did>&ctx=<context>&nonce=<fresh>&exp=<now+10m>`.
+         *
+         * A fresh crypto-random nonce is minted per call (single-use replay guard);
+         * `exp` is `now + 10min` (matching the server ceiling — scan promptly). The
+         * QR carries NO trust data; B re-signs and the server is authoritative. The
+         * returned `nonce`/`exp` let the displaying screen track which scan completed.
+         *
+         * Async because a crypto-secure nonce requires the platform RNG (async on
+         * native via expo-crypto). Throws if no user is authenticated.
+         *
+         * @param input.context - An opaque interaction id describing the encounter.
+         */
+        async buildAttestQrPayload(input) {
+            const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+            if (!userId) {
+                throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot build an attestation QR.');
+            }
+            const subject = (0, OxyServices_identity_1.buildUserDid)(userId);
+            const nonce = await signatureService_1.SignatureService.generateChallenge();
+            const exp = Date.now() + ATTEST_QR_TTL_MS;
+            const payload = `oxycommons://attest?subject=${subject}` +
+                `&ctx=${encodeURIComponent(input.context)}` +
+                `&nonce=${nonce}&exp=${exp}`;
+            return { payload, nonce, exp };
+        }
+        /**
+         * Submit a real-life counterparty attestation as the SCANNER (B): sign a
+         * self-issued `real_life_attestation` v2 record on B's own chain
+         * (`subject === issuer === B.did`), referencing A via `record.about`, then
+         * `POST /civic/attestations`. The server enforces nonce single-use,
+         * freshness, graph-exclusion (B is not A's puppet), and the per-pair
+         * cooldown, then awards A the HIGH-weight points.
+         *
+         * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no
+         * identity or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+         * `collection: 'app.oxy.attestation'`, `rkey: <nonce>`.
+         *
+         * @param input - The parsed QR fields ({@link ParsedAttestPayload}) plus B's
+         *   optional `geohash` / `biometricOk` support signals.
+         */
+        async submitRealLifeAttestation(input) {
+            try {
+                const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2('real_life_attestation', {
+                    about: input.subjectDid,
+                    context: input.context,
+                    nonce: input.nonce,
+                    exp: input.exp,
+                    ...(input.geohash !== undefined ? { geohash: input.geohash } : {}),
+                    ...(input.biometricOk !== undefined ? { biometricOk: input.biometricOk } : {}),
+                }, ATTEST_COLLECTION, input.nonce);
+                return await this.makeRequest('POST', '/civic/attestations', envelope, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        // =========================================================================
+        // FASE 2 — validator / jury (MEDIUM weight)
+        // =========================================================================
+        /**
+         * List the current user's pending jury duties (`GET /civic/validations/inbox`).
+         * Auth required; never cached (the inbox is a live queue). Returns `[]` when
+         * the caller is on no juries.
+         */
+        async getValidatorInbox() {
+            try {
+                const res = await this.makeRequest('GET', '/civic/validations/inbox', undefined, { cache: false });
+                return res.requests ?? [];
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Cast a SIGNED verdict on a validation request as a selected juror: sign a
+         * self-issued `validation_verdict` v2 record on the juror's own chain bound
+         * to `requestId` + `payloadHash` (so a verdict cannot be replayed onto a
+         * different request or an altered payload), then
+         * `POST /civic/validations/:id/vote`.
+         *
+         * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no
+         * identity or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+         * `collection: 'app.oxy.validation'`, `rkey: <requestId>`.
+         *
+         * @param requestId - The validation request being voted on.
+         * @param payloadHash - The request's canonical payload hash (from the inbox);
+         *   the server rejects a vote whose hash does not match the stored request.
+         * @param verdict - `'valid'` | `'invalid'` | `'abstain'`.
+         */
+        async submitValidationVote(requestId, payloadHash, verdict) {
+            try {
+                const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2('validation_verdict', { requestId, payloadHash, verdict }, VALIDATION_COLLECTION, requestId);
+                return await this.makeRequest('POST', `/civic/validations/${encodeURIComponent(requestId)}/vote`, envelope, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Recuse from a validation request (`POST /civic/validations/:id/deny`): the
+         * juror is removed from the jury and the request is re-tallied. Auth
+         * required; no signed record (recusal is not an attestation).
+         *
+         * @param requestId - The validation request to recuse from.
+         */
+        async denyValidation(requestId) {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('POST', `/civic/validations/${encodeURIComponent(requestId)}/deny`, undefined, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        // =========================================================================
+        // FASE 3 — proof-of-personhood web-of-trust (staked vouch)
+        // =========================================================================
+        /**
+         * Vouch that another user is a real person as the VOUCHER (B): sign a
+         * self-issued `personhood_vouch` v2 record on B's own chain
+         * (`subject === issuer === B.did`), referencing the subject (A) via
+         * `record.about`, then `POST /civic/personhood/vouch`. The server verifies
+         * it, enforces the voucher-eligibility (personhood ≥ τ) + graph-exclusion
+         * gates, stakes B, awards A `personhood_vouched`, and recomputes A's
+         * personhood. The voucher id is resolved server-side from the session — never
+         * from the body.
+         *
+         * The signed record matches the API schema: `{ about, stake?, … }` — note the
+         * wire field is `stake` (the caller's `stakeAmount` request), distinct from
+         * the server-clamped `VouchResult.stakeAmount` it returns. The optional
+         * `biometricOk` is carried as a signed support signal.
+         *
+         * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no identity
+         * or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+         * `collection: 'app.oxy.vouch'`, `rkey: <subjectDid>` (one vouch per subject
+         * on the voucher's chain — last-writer-wins). After a successful vouch the
+         * personhood + `/users/me` GET caches are swept.
+         *
+         * @param input - The subject DID plus B's optional stake / biometric signal.
+         */
+        async vouchForPerson(input) {
+            try {
+                const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2('personhood_vouch', {
+                    about: input.subjectDid,
+                    ...(input.stakeAmount !== undefined ? { stake: input.stakeAmount } : {}),
+                    ...(input.biometricOk !== undefined ? { biometricOk: input.biometricOk } : {}),
+                }, VOUCH_COLLECTION, input.subjectDid);
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('POST', '/civic/personhood/vouch', envelope, { cache: false });
+                this._sweepPersonhoodCaches();
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Withdraw the current user's active vouch for a subject
+         * (`DELETE /civic/personhood/vouch/:subjectUserId`). The vouch flips to
+         * `withdrawn` server-side and the subject is recomputed (which may demote
+         * them below θ). Auth required; no signed record (withdrawal is not an
+         * attestation). After a successful withdraw the personhood + `/users/me` GET
+         * caches are swept.
+         *
+         * @param subjectUserId - The subject account's Mongo `_id` (NOT a DID) — the
+         *   id the server keys the vouch on. URL-encoded into the path.
+         */
+        async withdrawVouch(subjectUserId) {
+            try {
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('DELETE', `/civic/personhood/vouch/${encodeURIComponent(subjectUserId)}`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                this._sweepPersonhoodCaches();
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Fetch a user's public personhood status snapshot
+         * (`GET /civic/personhood/:userId`). Read-only: the server returns the cached
+         * snapshot, or a zeroed `unverified` shape (`breakdown`/`updatedAt` null) when
+         * none exists yet. Public (no auth required); short-TTL cached.
+         *
+         * @param userId - The subject account's Mongo `_id`. URL-encoded into the path.
+         */
+        async getPersonhood(userId) {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', `/civic/personhood/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}`, undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: mixinHelpers_1.CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Fetch the CURRENT user's personhood status ({@link getPersonhood} for the
+         * authenticated user's id). Throws if no user is authenticated.
+         */
+        async getMyPersonhood() {
+            const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+            if (!userId) {
+                throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot resolve personhood status.');
+            }
+            return this.getPersonhood(userId);
+        }
+        // =========================================================================
+        // FASE 4 — verifiable credentials
+        // =========================================================================
+        /**
+         * Issue a verifiable credential as the ISSUER: sign a self-issued
+         * `credential` v2 record on the caller's own chain
+         * (`subject === issuer === issuer.did`) whose `record.about` is the HOLDER's
+         * DID (the W3C `credentialSubject`), then `POST /civic/credentials`. The
+         * server verifies the signature + the issuer's CURRENT verification method +
+         * chain continuity, stores the signed record, and projects a queryable
+         * credential row. All claim data comes from the SIGNED envelope — the issuer
+         * id is resolved server-side from the session, never from the body.
+         *
+         * `'VerifiableCredential'` is ensured present as the base type (prepended
+         * when the caller omits it; the server rejects a record missing it). An
+         * `expiresAt` ISO string is converted to the epoch-ms the signed record
+         * carries (the server rejects a past expiry).
+         *
+         * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no identity
+         * or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+         * `collection: 'app.oxy.credential'`, `rkey: <fresh unique nonce>` (each
+         * credential is a distinct chain entry, so the rkey must be unique per
+         * credential). After a successful issue the credential GET caches are swept.
+         *
+         * @param input - The holder DID, VC types, claims, and optional ISO expiry.
+         */
+        async issueCredential(input) {
+            try {
+                const types = input.types.includes(CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE)
+                    ? input.types
+                    : [CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE, ...input.types];
+                let expiresAtMs;
+                if (input.expiresAt !== undefined) {
+                    const parsed = Date.parse(input.expiresAt);
+                    if (Number.isNaN(parsed)) {
+                        throw new Error('Invalid expiresAt — must be an ISO 8601 date string.');
+                    }
+                    expiresAtMs = parsed;
+                }
+                const record = {
+                    about: input.holderDid,
+                    types,
+                    claims: input.claims,
+                    ...(expiresAtMs !== undefined ? { expiresAt: expiresAtMs } : {}),
+                };
+                // A fresh crypto-random rkey: every credential is its own chain entry, so
+                // (unlike the one-per-subject vouch keyed on the subject DID) the rkey
+                // must be unique per credential or a second credential would collide.
+                const rkey = await signatureService_1.SignatureService.generateChallenge();
+                const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2('credential', record, CREDENTIAL_COLLECTION, rkey);
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('POST', '/civic/credentials', envelope, { cache: false });
+                this._sweepCredentialCaches();
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * List a holder's verifiable credentials
+         * (`GET /civic/credentials/:holderUserId`), newest first, optionally filtered
+         * by stored `status`. Public (credentials are issuer-signed attestations a
+         * holder collects to SHOW); short-TTL cached and swept after the caller's own
+         * issue / revoke. An unknown holder yields an empty list.
+         *
+         * @param holderUserId - The holder account's Mongo `_id` (NOT a DID). URL-encoded.
+         * @param opts.status - Optional `'active' | 'revoked' | 'expired'` filter.
+         */
+        async listCredentials(holderUserId, opts = {}) {
+            try {
+                const base = `/civic/credentials/${encodeURIComponent(holderUserId)}`;
+                const url = opts.status ? `${base}?status=${encodeURIComponent(opts.status)}` : base;
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', url, undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: mixinHelpers_1.CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * List the CURRENT user's verifiable credentials ({@link listCredentials} for
+         * the authenticated user's id). Throws if no user is authenticated.
+         *
+         * @param opts.status - Optional status filter.
+         */
+        async listMyCredentials(opts = {}) {
+            const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+            if (!userId) {
+                throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot list credentials.');
+            }
+            return this.listCredentials(userId, opts);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Verify a credential by its signed-record id
+         * (`GET /civic/credentials/by-record/:recordId/verify`). The server recomputes
+         * the canonical signing input from the STORED envelope and verifies the
+         * signature against a CURRENT verification method of the ISSUER DID (so a
+         * key the issuer has since rotated away no longer verifies), then checks the
+         * credential is neither revoked nor expired. Public; short-TTL cached
+         * (matching the server's `max-age=60`) and swept after the caller's own issue
+         * / revoke.
+         *
+         * A revoked / expired / unverifiable credential yields `valid: false` (NOT a
+         * throw) so the UI can render it as untrusted; `credential` is `null` only
+         * when no credential exists for the record id. Only a transport failure (the
+         * fetch itself) rejects.
+         *
+         * @param recordId - The credential's signed-record id. URL-encoded into the path.
+         */
+        async verifyCredential(recordId) {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', `/civic/credentials/by-record/${encodeURIComponent(recordId)}/verify`, undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: mixinHelpers_1.CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Revoke a credential the current user originally issued
+         * (`POST /civic/credentials/:id/revoke`). Only the original USER issuer may
+         * revoke; the server flips the credential to `revoked`. After a successful
+         * revoke the credential GET caches are swept.
+         *
+         * @param id - The credential's id (the projection row `_id`, NOT the signed
+         *   record id). URL-encoded into the path.
+         */
+        async revokeCredential(id) {
+            try {
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('POST', `/civic/credentials/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/revoke`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                this._sweepCredentialCaches();
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Sweep the credential GET caches an issue / revoke invalidates: every
+         * credential read (the holder list + the by-record verify, which share the
+         * `GET:/civic/credentials/` prefix) so a re-read reflects the new credential
+         * set / status. Public rather than `private` for the same TS4094 reason as
+         * {@link _signMyCivicRecordV2}.
+         */
+        _sweepCredentialCaches() {
+            this.clearCacheByPrefix(CREDENTIAL_CACHE_PREFIX);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Sweep the GET caches a vouch / withdraw can invalidate: every personhood
+         * status read (the subject's snapshot changed) and `/users/me` (a subject
+         * crossing the threshold flips their mirrored `User.verified`). Public rather
+         * than `private` for the same TS4094 reason as {@link _signMyCivicRecordV2}.
+         */
+        _sweepPersonhoodCaches() {
+            this.clearCacheByPrefix(PERSONHOOD_CACHE_PREFIX);
+            this.clearCacheByPrefix(USERS_ME_CACHE_PREFIX);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Sign a self-issued v2 signed-record envelope on the CURRENT user's own
+         * per-subject hash chain. Fetches the caller's chain head fresh (uncached, so
+         * `seq`/`prev` are never stale → no `bad_seq`/`chain_fork`) and signs with
+         * {@link SignatureService.signRecordV2}.
+         *
+         * NATIVE-ONLY (the private key lives in native secure storage). Internal
+         * helper (leading underscore); public rather than `private` because mixins
+         * compose into an exported anonymous class where TypeScript cannot represent a
+         * private member in the emitted declaration file (TS4094).
+         *
+         * @param type - The signed-record category.
+         * @param record - The record payload (canonicalized into the signed bytes).
+         * @param collection - The AtProto-style collection namespace.
+         * @param rkey - The AtProto-style record key within the collection.
+         */
+        async _signMyCivicRecordV2(type, record, collection, rkey) {
+            const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+            if (!userId) {
+                throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot sign a civic record.');
+            }
+            const subject = (0, OxyServices_identity_1.buildUserDid)(userId);
+            const head = await this.makeRequest('GET', `/identity/records/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/chain/head`, undefined, { cache: false });
+            return signatureService_1.SignatureService.signRecordV2(type, subject, record, {
+                seq: head.seq + 1,
+                prev: head.headRecordId,
+                collection,
+                rkey,
+            });
+        }
+    };
+}