@oxyhq/core 3.10.1 → 3.12.0

package/src/mixins/OxyServices.civic.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,956 @@
+/**
+ * Civic Methods Mixin (Commons "Oxy ID" — Fase 1; anti-gaming — Fase 2)
+ *
+ * Provides typed access to the public, verifiable citizen-identity ("Oxy ID")
+ * card a Commons user shows and others scan, plus the Fase 2 anti-gaming surfaces
+ * (real-life counterparty attestation + the validator/jury flow):
+ *
+ *  - {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.getPublicCard} fetches a user's signed card
+ *    (`GET /civic/:userId/card`) and verifies the Oxy custodial attestation
+ *    CLIENT-SIDE, so a scanner can trust the card OFFLINE (e.g. a cached card
+ *    replayed without network) instead of re-trusting the transport.
+ *  - {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.getMyIdPayload} builds the QR payload the user
+ *    displays. The QR encodes ONLY the DID (`oxycommons://card?did=…&v=1`) — never
+ *    trust data — so the card cannot be spoofed by crafting a QR; the scanner
+ *    resolves the signed card server-side and re-verifies it.
+ *  - {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.buildAttestQrPayload} builds the high-value
+ *    real-life-attestation QR the person BEING attested (A) shows; the SCANNER
+ *    (B) parses it with {@link parseAttestPayload} and signs a self-issued
+ *    counterparty attestation via
+ *    {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.submitRealLifeAttestation}.
+ *  - {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.getValidatorInbox} /
+ *    {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.submitValidationVote} /
+ *    {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.denyValidation} drive a randomly-selected
+ *    juror's medium-weight peer-validation duties.
+ *
+ * The wire shapes (`PublicCard`, `SignedPublicCard`, `ExportAttestation`,
+ * `RealLifeAttestationResult`, `ValidationRequestSummary`, `ValidationVoteResult`,
+ * `SignedRecordEnvelope`) come from `@oxyhq/contracts` — the single source of
+ * truth the API validates its output against — so producer and consumer cannot
+ * drift. The public Oxy ID card's attestation is an `ES256K-DER-SHA256` signature
+ * over `canonicalize(card)` (the exact bytes the server signed, with ONLY the
+ * present keys), so a consumer re-canonicalizes the `card` it received and checks
+ * the signature against `attestation.publicKey`.
+ *
+ * Card verification NEVER throws on a bad/absent signature — it returns
+ * `verified: false` so the UI can render a forged/unsigned card as visibly
+ * untrusted rather than silently trusting it. A transport/network failure (the
+ * fetch itself) still rejects, as everywhere else in the SDK.
+ *
+ * The Fase 2 writes (`submitRealLifeAttestation`, `submitValidationVote`) sign a
+ * v2 self-issued signed-record envelope with the on-device identity key (so they
+ * are NATIVE-ONLY — they throw on web, where `KeyManager` has no key) on the
+ * caller's own per-subject hash chain: each fetches the caller's chain head
+ * (`GET /identity/records/:userId/chain/head`) to set `seq`/`prev` before signing
+ * with {@link SignatureService.signRecordV2}.
+ *
+ * Reading a public card and building/parsing the QR payloads are
+ * platform-agnostic; deriving the current user's DID requires an authenticated
+ * session.
+ */
+import type {
+  CredentialIssueResult,
+  CredentialListResult,
+  CredentialStatus,
+  CredentialVerifyResult,
+  ExportAttestation,
+  PersonhoodStatusResult,
+  PublicCard,
+  RealLifeAttestationResult,
+  SignedPublicCard,
+  SignedRecordEnvelope,
+  SignedRecordType,
+  ValidationRequestSummary,
+  ValidationVerdict,
+  ValidationVoteResult,
+  VerifiableCredentialResponse,
+  VouchResult,
+} from '@oxyhq/contracts';
+import type { OxyServicesBase } from '../OxyServices.base';
+import { canonicalize } from '../crypto/canonicalJson';
+import { SignatureService } from '../crypto/signatureService';
+import { buildUserDid } from './OxyServices.identity';
+import { CACHE_TIMES } from './mixinHelpers';
+
+/**
+ * Validity window of a real-life-attestation QR (`oxycommons://attest?…exp=…`),
+ * matching the server's `REAL_LIFE_NONCE_MAX_AGE_MS` ceiling: the QR must be
+ * scanned and submitted within this window. The server is authoritative on
+ * freshness; this is the client-issued `exp`.
+ */
+const ATTEST_QR_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+
+/** AtProto-style collection for a real-life counterparty attestation record. */
+const ATTEST_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.attestation';
+
+/** AtProto-style collection for a validator's signed verdict record. */
+const VALIDATION_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.validation';
+
+/** AtProto-style collection for a personhood vouch record. */
+const VOUCH_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.vouch';
+
+/**
+ * AtProto-style collection (NSID) for a verifiable credential record — matches
+ * the server's `CREDENTIAL_COLLECTION`. Each credential is its own chain entry,
+ * so the per-credential `rkey` MUST be unique (a fresh nonce), unlike the
+ * one-per-subject vouch keyed on the subject DID.
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_COLLECTION = 'app.oxy.credential';
+
+/**
+ * The W3C base VC type (`CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE` on the server) that MUST be
+ * present in every credential's `types`. The client prepends it when the caller
+ * omits it; the server rejects a credential record lacking it (`missing_base_type`).
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE = 'VerifiableCredential';
+
+/**
+ * Cache-key prefix of every credential read — the holder list
+ * (`GET /civic/credentials/:holderUserId`) and the by-record verify
+ * (`GET /civic/credentials/by-record/:recordId/verify`) both start with it.
+ * Swept after an issue / revoke so a re-read reflects the new credential set /
+ * status instead of a stale cached one. The identity tag is a key SUFFIX, so
+ * this prefix invalidates the resource for every cached identity.
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_CACHE_PREFIX = 'GET:/civic/credentials/';
+
+/**
+ * Cache-key prefix of every personhood-status read (`GET /civic/personhood/:userId`).
+ * Swept after a vouch / withdraw so a re-read reflects the recomputed snapshot
+ * instead of a stale cached one. The identity tag is a key SUFFIX, so this
+ * prefix invalidates the resource for every cached identity.
+ */
+const PERSONHOOD_CACHE_PREFIX = 'GET:/civic/personhood/';
+
+/**
+ * Cache-key prefix of the current user's `GET /users/me`. Swept after a vouch /
+ * withdraw because a subject crossing the personhood threshold flips their
+ * mirrored `User.verified` flag.
+ */
+const USERS_ME_CACHE_PREFIX = 'GET:/users/me';
+
+/**
+ * A {@link SignedPublicCard} augmented with the client's verification verdict.
+ *
+ * - `card` / `attestation` are echoed straight from the API response.
+ * - `verified` is `true` ONLY when `attestation` is present and its signature
+ *   over `canonicalize(card)` checks out against `attestation.publicKey`. It is
+ *   `false` for an unsigned card (dev, `attestation === null`), a tampered card,
+ *   or a signature made with a different key.
+ *
+ * `verified` confirms the attestation's signature is internally consistent with
+ * its embedded `publicKey` (and that the card bytes were not mutated). It does
+ * NOT, on its own, establish that `publicKey` is Oxy's custodial key — that trust
+ * anchor is the Oxy API the card was fetched from (over TLS) and, for the
+ * pinning-conscious, `attestation.issuer` (the Oxy DID). The UI shows a trust
+ * indicator from `verified`; a `false` verdict MUST be surfaced as untrusted.
+ */
+export interface CivicCardResult extends SignedPublicCard {
+  verified: boolean;
+}
+
+/** The DID extracted from a scanned `oxycommons://card?did=…` Oxy ID payload. */
+export interface IdCardRef {
+  /** The subject's Oxy DID (`did:web:oxy.so:u:<userId>`). */
+  did: string;
+}
+
+/** URI scheme/host that introduces a Commons Oxy ID card payload. */
+const CARD_MATCHER = /^oxycommons:\/\/card(?:[/?#]|$)/i;
+
+/** URI scheme/host that introduces a real-life counterparty attestation payload. */
+const ATTEST_MATCHER = /^oxycommons:\/\/attest(?:[/?#]|$)/i;
+
+/**
+ * Minimal, allocation-light query-string parser (no `URL` / `URLSearchParams`)
+ * so it runs identically under Hermes and jsdom — mirrors the robustness of the
+ * "Sign in with Oxy" approval-link parser. Shared by every `oxycommons://…`
+ * payload parser in this module.
+ */
+function parseCommonsQuery(raw: string): Map<string, string> {
+  const params = new Map<string, string>();
+  const qIndex = raw.indexOf('?');
+  if (qIndex < 0) return params;
+
+  let query = raw.slice(qIndex + 1);
+  const hashIndex = query.indexOf('#');
+  if (hashIndex >= 0) query = query.slice(0, hashIndex);
+
+  for (const pair of query.split('&')) {
+    if (pair.length === 0) continue;
+    const eq = pair.indexOf('=');
+    const rawKey = eq < 0 ? pair : pair.slice(0, eq);
+    const rawValue = eq < 0 ? '' : pair.slice(eq + 1);
+    try {
+      params.set(
+        decodeURIComponent(rawKey),
+        decodeURIComponent(rawValue.replace(/\+/g, ' ')),
+      );
+    } catch {
+      // Malformed percent-encoding — keep the raw token rather than throwing, so
+      // a single bad field doesn't sink an otherwise valid payload.
+      params.set(rawKey, rawValue);
+    }
+  }
+  return params;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a scanned / deep-linked Oxy ID payload (`oxycommons://card?did=…`) into
+ * the referenced DID. Pure + dependency-free (Hermes-safe, no `URL` global) so
+ * Commons (and any scanner) can reuse it without an OxyServices instance.
+ *
+ * @param raw - The raw scanned string or deep-link URL.
+ * @returns `{ did }` when a usable DID is present; `null` for anything else (a
+ *   non-card scheme, a missing/empty `did`, or non-string input).
+ */
+export function parseIdPayload(raw: string): IdCardRef | null {
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.trim().length === 0) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const value = raw.trim();
+  if (!CARD_MATCHER.test(value)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const did = parseCommonsQuery(value).get('did');
+  if (!did || did.length === 0) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return { did };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The fields decoded from a scanned real-life-attestation QR
+ * (`oxycommons://attest?subject=…&ctx=…&nonce=…&exp=…`). The SCANNER feeds these
+ * to {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.submitRealLifeAttestation}.
+ */
+export interface ParsedAttestPayload {
+  /** The DID of the person being attested (A) — becomes the record's `about`. */
+  subjectDid: string;
+  /** Opaque interaction id (`ctx`); `''` when the QR omitted it. */
+  context: string;
+  /** Single-use replay-guard nonce. */
+  nonce: string;
+  /** Nonce expiry (epoch ms); the server re-checks freshness authoritatively. */
+  exp: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The QR a person shows to be attested in real life, plus the fresh nonce/exp it
+ * embeds so the displaying app can track which scan completed it.
+ */
+export interface AttestQrPayload {
+  /** The `oxycommons://attest?subject=…&ctx=…&nonce=…&exp=…` string to encode as a QR. */
+  payload: string;
+  /** The single-use nonce embedded in the payload. */
+  nonce: string;
+  /** The nonce expiry embedded in the payload (epoch ms). */
+  exp: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a scanned / deep-linked real-life-attestation payload
+ * (`oxycommons://attest?subject=…&ctx=…&nonce=…&exp=…`). Pure + dependency-free
+ * (Hermes-safe, no `URL` global), mirroring {@link parseIdPayload}, so Commons
+ * (and any scanner) can reuse it without an OxyServices instance.
+ *
+ * @param raw - The raw scanned string or deep-link URL.
+ * @returns `{ subjectDid, context, nonce, exp }` when the required fields are
+ *   present and `exp` is a positive finite number; `null` otherwise (a non-attest
+ *   scheme, a missing `subject`/`nonce`/`exp`, an unparseable `exp`, or non-string
+ *   input). `context` defaults to `''` when the QR omits `ctx`.
+ */
+export function parseAttestPayload(raw: string): ParsedAttestPayload | null {
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.trim().length === 0) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const value = raw.trim();
+  if (!ATTEST_MATCHER.test(value)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const params = parseCommonsQuery(value);
+  const subjectDid = params.get('subject');
+  const nonce = params.get('nonce');
+  const expRaw = params.get('exp');
+  if (!subjectDid || !nonce || expRaw === undefined || expRaw.length === 0) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const exp = Number(expRaw);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(exp) || exp <= 0) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return { subjectDid, context: params.get('ctx') ?? '', nonce, exp };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify the Oxy custodial attestation on a public card.
+ *
+ * Re-canonicalizes the received `card` (so the order of the JSON keys on the
+ * wire is irrelevant; `canonicalize` also omits any `undefined`-valued optional
+ * key, matching the server which omits absent keys entirely) and checks the
+ * `ES256K-DER-SHA256` signature against `attestation.publicKey`.
+ *
+ * NEVER throws: `SignatureService.verify` already swallows malformed-input
+ * errors and returns `false`, and an absent attestation short-circuits to
+ * `false`. A pure, reusable helper (Commons can call it on a cached card).
+ *
+ * @param card - The card to verify (exactly as received).
+ * @param attestation - The card's attestation, or `null` (unsigned ⇒ `false`).
+ */
+export async function verifyPublicCardAttestation(
+  card: PublicCard,
+  attestation: ExportAttestation | null,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!attestation) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const { signature, publicKey } = attestation;
+  if (!signature || !publicKey) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return SignatureService.verify(canonicalize(card), signature, publicKey);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Input for {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.submitRealLifeAttestation} — the fields
+ * the SCANNER (B) carries over from a parsed {@link ParsedAttestPayload}, plus
+ * the optional co-location / biometric support signals B contributes.
+ */
+export interface SubmitRealLifeAttestationInput {
+  /** The DID of the person being attested (A); becomes the record's `about`. */
+  subjectDid: string;
+  /** Opaque interaction id from the QR. */
+  context: string;
+  /** Single-use nonce from the QR (also the record's `rkey`). */
+  nonce: string;
+  /** Nonce expiry from the QR (epoch ms). */
+  exp: number;
+  /** Coarse co-location proof (optional). */
+  geohash?: string;
+  /** Whether B's device biometric gate fired before signing (optional). */
+  biometricOk?: boolean;
+}
+
+/** Result of {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.denyValidation}. */
+export interface DenyValidationResult {
+  denied: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Input for {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.vouchForPerson} — the SUBJECT (A) the
+ * current user (B) is vouching for, plus B's optional stake and biometric
+ * support signal.
+ */
+export interface VouchForPersonInput {
+  /** A's DID (`did:web:oxy.so:u:<userId>`); becomes the vouch record's `about`. */
+  subjectDid: string;
+  /**
+   * B's chosen stake (the `stake` wire field). Omitted ⇒ the server applies its
+   * default; the server clamps any value into its `[min, max]` and echoes the
+   * recorded amount back as `VouchResult.stakeAmount`.
+   */
+  stakeAmount?: number;
+  /** Whether B's device biometric gate fired before signing (optional signal). */
+  biometricOk?: boolean;
+}
+
+/** Result of {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.withdrawVouch}. */
+export interface WithdrawVouchResult {
+  withdrawn: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Input for {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.issueCredential} — the HOLDER the
+ * caller (issuer) attests a claim about, the VC type tags, the issuer's claim
+ * set, and an optional ISO-8601 expiry.
+ */
+export interface IssueCredentialInput {
+  /** The holder's Oxy DID (`did:web:oxy.so:u:<userId>`); becomes the record's `about`. */
+  holderDid: string;
+  /**
+   * The VC type tags. `'VerifiableCredential'` is the required base type and is
+   * prepended automatically when the caller omits it; provide at least one
+   * specific type alongside (e.g. `'EmploymentCredential'`).
+   */
+  types: string[];
+  /** The arbitrary, issuer-asserted claim set about the holder (signed verbatim). */
+  claims: Record<string, unknown>;
+  /**
+   * Optional expiry as an ISO-8601 date string; absent = non-expiring. Converted
+   * to epoch milliseconds in the signed record (the wire/storage unit), so a
+   * holder cannot extend validity after the fact. Must be a parseable date and,
+   * per the server, in the future.
+   */
+  expiresAt?: string;
+}
+
+/** Result of {@link OxyServicesCivicMixin.revokeCredential} (`POST …/:id/revoke`). */
+export interface RevokeCredentialResult {
+  revoked: boolean;
+  credential: VerifiableCredentialResponse;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The current chain head as returned by `GET /identity/records/:userId/chain/head`.
+ * `headRecordId` is `null` and `seq` is `-1` when the subject has no chain yet,
+ * so the next record's coordinates are always `seq: head.seq + 1` (genesis = 0)
+ * and `prev: head.headRecordId` (genesis = null).
+ */
+interface ChainHeadResponse {
+  headRecordId: string | null;
+  seq: number;
+  recordCount: number;
+}
+
+export function OxyServicesCivicMixin<T extends typeof OxyServicesBase>(Base: T) {
+  return class extends Base {
+    constructor(...args: any[]) {
+      super(...(args as [any]));
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Fetch a user's signed public Oxy ID card and verify the Oxy attestation
+     * client-side. Public (no auth required); short-TTL cached.
+     *
+     * Resolves to `{ card, attestation, verified }`. A bad/absent signature does
+     * NOT reject — it yields `verified: false` so the UI can warn. Only a
+     * transport failure (the fetch itself) rejects.
+     *
+     * @param userId - The subject account's Mongo `_id`. URL-encoded into the path.
+     */
+    async getPublicCard(userId: string): Promise<CivicCardResult> {
+      try {
+        const signed = await this.makeRequest<SignedPublicCard>(
+          'GET',
+          `/civic/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/card`,
+          undefined,
+          { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT },
+        );
+        const verified = await verifyPublicCardAttestation(signed.card, signed.attestation);
+        return { card: signed.card, attestation: signed.attestation, verified };
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Build the Oxy ID QR payload for the current user:
+     * `oxycommons://card?did=<did>&v=1`, where `<did>` is the user's Oxy DID
+     * (`did:web:oxy.so:u:<userId>`). The QR encodes ONLY the DID (anti-spoof — no
+     * trust data); a scanner resolves the signed card via {@link getPublicCard}.
+     * Round-trips through {@link parseIdPayload}.
+     *
+     * Throws if no user is authenticated (no DID to derive).
+     */
+    getMyIdPayload(): string {
+      const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+      if (!userId) {
+        throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot build an Oxy ID payload.');
+      }
+      return `oxycommons://card?did=${buildUserDid(userId)}&v=1`;
+    }
+
+    // =========================================================================
+    // FASE 2 — real-life counterparty attestation (HIGH weight)
+    // =========================================================================
+
+    /**
+     * Build the real-life-attestation QR the current user (A) shows to be
+     * attested by a counterparty (B):
+     * `oxycommons://attest?subject=<A.did>&ctx=<context>&nonce=<fresh>&exp=<now+10m>`.
+     *
+     * A fresh crypto-random nonce is minted per call (single-use replay guard);
+     * `exp` is `now + 10min` (matching the server ceiling — scan promptly). The
+     * QR carries NO trust data; B re-signs and the server is authoritative. The
+     * returned `nonce`/`exp` let the displaying screen track which scan completed.
+     *
+     * Async because a crypto-secure nonce requires the platform RNG (async on
+     * native via expo-crypto). Throws if no user is authenticated.
+     *
+     * @param input.context - An opaque interaction id describing the encounter.
+     */
+    async buildAttestQrPayload(input: { context: string }): Promise<AttestQrPayload> {
+      const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+      if (!userId) {
+        throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot build an attestation QR.');
+      }
+      const subject = buildUserDid(userId);
+      const nonce = await SignatureService.generateChallenge();
+      const exp = Date.now() + ATTEST_QR_TTL_MS;
+      const payload =
+        `oxycommons://attest?subject=${subject}` +
+        `&ctx=${encodeURIComponent(input.context)}` +
+        `&nonce=${nonce}&exp=${exp}`;
+      return { payload, nonce, exp };
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Submit a real-life counterparty attestation as the SCANNER (B): sign a
+     * self-issued `real_life_attestation` v2 record on B's own chain
+     * (`subject === issuer === B.did`), referencing A via `record.about`, then
+     * `POST /civic/attestations`. The server enforces nonce single-use,
+     * freshness, graph-exclusion (B is not A's puppet), and the per-pair
+     * cooldown, then awards A the HIGH-weight points.
+     *
+     * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no
+     * identity or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+     * `collection: 'app.oxy.attestation'`, `rkey: <nonce>`.
+     *
+     * @param input - The parsed QR fields ({@link ParsedAttestPayload}) plus B's
+     *   optional `geohash` / `biometricOk` support signals.
+     */
+    async submitRealLifeAttestation(
+      input: SubmitRealLifeAttestationInput,
+    ): Promise<RealLifeAttestationResult> {
+      try {
+        const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2(
+          'real_life_attestation',
+          {
+            about: input.subjectDid,
+            context: input.context,
+            nonce: input.nonce,
+            exp: input.exp,
+            ...(input.geohash !== undefined ? { geohash: input.geohash } : {}),
+            ...(input.biometricOk !== undefined ? { biometricOk: input.biometricOk } : {}),
+          },
+          ATTEST_COLLECTION,
+          input.nonce,
+        );
+        return await this.makeRequest<RealLifeAttestationResult>(
+          'POST',
+          '/civic/attestations',
+          envelope,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // =========================================================================
+    // FASE 2 — validator / jury (MEDIUM weight)
+    // =========================================================================
+
+    /**
+     * List the current user's pending jury duties (`GET /civic/validations/inbox`).
+     * Auth required; never cached (the inbox is a live queue). Returns `[]` when
+     * the caller is on no juries.
+     */
+    async getValidatorInbox(): Promise<ValidationRequestSummary[]> {
+      try {
+        const res = await this.makeRequest<{ requests?: ValidationRequestSummary[] }>(
+          'GET',
+          '/civic/validations/inbox',
+          undefined,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+        return res.requests ?? [];
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Cast a SIGNED verdict on a validation request as a selected juror: sign a
+     * self-issued `validation_verdict` v2 record on the juror's own chain bound
+     * to `requestId` + `payloadHash` (so a verdict cannot be replayed onto a
+     * different request or an altered payload), then
+     * `POST /civic/validations/:id/vote`.
+     *
+     * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no
+     * identity or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+     * `collection: 'app.oxy.validation'`, `rkey: <requestId>`.
+     *
+     * @param requestId - The validation request being voted on.
+     * @param payloadHash - The request's canonical payload hash (from the inbox);
+     *   the server rejects a vote whose hash does not match the stored request.
+     * @param verdict - `'valid'` | `'invalid'` | `'abstain'`.
+     */
+    async submitValidationVote(
+      requestId: string,
+      payloadHash: string,
+      verdict: ValidationVerdict,
+    ): Promise<ValidationVoteResult> {
+      try {
+        const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2(
+          'validation_verdict',
+          { requestId, payloadHash, verdict },
+          VALIDATION_COLLECTION,
+          requestId,
+        );
+        return await this.makeRequest<ValidationVoteResult>(
+          'POST',
+          `/civic/validations/${encodeURIComponent(requestId)}/vote`,
+          envelope,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Recuse from a validation request (`POST /civic/validations/:id/deny`): the
+     * juror is removed from the jury and the request is re-tallied. Auth
+     * required; no signed record (recusal is not an attestation).
+     *
+     * @param requestId - The validation request to recuse from.
+     */
+    async denyValidation(requestId: string): Promise<DenyValidationResult> {
+      try {
+        return await this.makeRequest<DenyValidationResult>(
+          'POST',
+          `/civic/validations/${encodeURIComponent(requestId)}/deny`,
+          undefined,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // =========================================================================
+    // FASE 3 — proof-of-personhood web-of-trust (staked vouch)
+    // =========================================================================
+
+    /**
+     * Vouch that another user is a real person as the VOUCHER (B): sign a
+     * self-issued `personhood_vouch` v2 record on B's own chain
+     * (`subject === issuer === B.did`), referencing the subject (A) via
+     * `record.about`, then `POST /civic/personhood/vouch`. The server verifies
+     * it, enforces the voucher-eligibility (personhood ≥ τ) + graph-exclusion
+     * gates, stakes B, awards A `personhood_vouched`, and recomputes A's
+     * personhood. The voucher id is resolved server-side from the session — never
+     * from the body.
+     *
+     * The signed record matches the API schema: `{ about, stake?, … }` — note the
+     * wire field is `stake` (the caller's `stakeAmount` request), distinct from
+     * the server-clamped `VouchResult.stakeAmount` it returns. The optional
+     * `biometricOk` is carried as a signed support signal.
+     *
+     * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no identity
+     * or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+     * `collection: 'app.oxy.vouch'`, `rkey: <subjectDid>` (one vouch per subject
+     * on the voucher's chain — last-writer-wins). After a successful vouch the
+     * personhood + `/users/me` GET caches are swept.
+     *
+     * @param input - The subject DID plus B's optional stake / biometric signal.
+     */
+    async vouchForPerson(input: VouchForPersonInput): Promise<VouchResult> {
+      try {
+        const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2(
+          'personhood_vouch',
+          {
+            about: input.subjectDid,
+            ...(input.stakeAmount !== undefined ? { stake: input.stakeAmount } : {}),
+            ...(input.biometricOk !== undefined ? { biometricOk: input.biometricOk } : {}),
+          },
+          VOUCH_COLLECTION,
+          input.subjectDid,
+        );
+        const result = await this.makeRequest<VouchResult>(
+          'POST',
+          '/civic/personhood/vouch',
+          envelope,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+        this._sweepPersonhoodCaches();
+        return result;
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Withdraw the current user's active vouch for a subject
+     * (`DELETE /civic/personhood/vouch/:subjectUserId`). The vouch flips to
+     * `withdrawn` server-side and the subject is recomputed (which may demote
+     * them below θ). Auth required; no signed record (withdrawal is not an
+     * attestation). After a successful withdraw the personhood + `/users/me` GET
+     * caches are swept.
+     *
+     * @param subjectUserId - The subject account's Mongo `_id` (NOT a DID) — the
+     *   id the server keys the vouch on. URL-encoded into the path.
+     */
+    async withdrawVouch(subjectUserId: string): Promise<WithdrawVouchResult> {
+      try {
+        const result = await this.makeRequest<WithdrawVouchResult>(
+          'DELETE',
+          `/civic/personhood/vouch/${encodeURIComponent(subjectUserId)}`,
+          undefined,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+        this._sweepPersonhoodCaches();
+        return result;
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Fetch a user's public personhood status snapshot
+     * (`GET /civic/personhood/:userId`). Read-only: the server returns the cached
+     * snapshot, or a zeroed `unverified` shape (`breakdown`/`updatedAt` null) when
+     * none exists yet. Public (no auth required); short-TTL cached.
+     *
+     * @param userId - The subject account's Mongo `_id`. URL-encoded into the path.
+     */
+    async getPersonhood(userId: string): Promise<PersonhoodStatusResult> {
+      try {
+        return await this.makeRequest<PersonhoodStatusResult>(
+          'GET',
+          `/civic/personhood/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}`,
+          undefined,
+          { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Fetch the CURRENT user's personhood status ({@link getPersonhood} for the
+     * authenticated user's id). Throws if no user is authenticated.
+     */
+    async getMyPersonhood(): Promise<PersonhoodStatusResult> {
+      const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+      if (!userId) {
+        throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot resolve personhood status.');
+      }
+      return this.getPersonhood(userId);
+    }
+
+    // =========================================================================
+    // FASE 4 — verifiable credentials
+    // =========================================================================
+
+    /**
+     * Issue a verifiable credential as the ISSUER: sign a self-issued
+     * `credential` v2 record on the caller's own chain
+     * (`subject === issuer === issuer.did`) whose `record.about` is the HOLDER's
+     * DID (the W3C `credentialSubject`), then `POST /civic/credentials`. The
+     * server verifies the signature + the issuer's CURRENT verification method +
+     * chain continuity, stores the signed record, and projects a queryable
+     * credential row. All claim data comes from the SIGNED envelope — the issuer
+     * id is resolved server-side from the session, never from the body.
+     *
+     * `'VerifiableCredential'` is ensured present as the base type (prepended
+     * when the caller omits it; the server rejects a record missing it). An
+     * `expiresAt` ISO string is converted to the epoch-ms the signed record
+     * carries (the server rejects a past expiry).
+     *
+     * NATIVE-ONLY (signs with the on-device key; throws on web / when no identity
+     * or no authenticated user). The record is keyed
+     * `collection: 'app.oxy.credential'`, `rkey: <fresh unique nonce>` (each
+     * credential is a distinct chain entry, so the rkey must be unique per
+     * credential). After a successful issue the credential GET caches are swept.
+     *
+     * @param input - The holder DID, VC types, claims, and optional ISO expiry.
+     */
+    async issueCredential(input: IssueCredentialInput): Promise<CredentialIssueResult> {
+      try {
+        const types = input.types.includes(CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE)
+          ? input.types
+          : [CREDENTIAL_BASE_TYPE, ...input.types];
+
+        let expiresAtMs: number | undefined;
+        if (input.expiresAt !== undefined) {
+          const parsed = Date.parse(input.expiresAt);
+          if (Number.isNaN(parsed)) {
+            throw new Error('Invalid expiresAt — must be an ISO 8601 date string.');
+          }
+          expiresAtMs = parsed;
+        }
+
+        const record: Record<string, unknown> = {
+          about: input.holderDid,
+          types,
+          claims: input.claims,
+          ...(expiresAtMs !== undefined ? { expiresAt: expiresAtMs } : {}),
+        };
+
+        // A fresh crypto-random rkey: every credential is its own chain entry, so
+        // (unlike the one-per-subject vouch keyed on the subject DID) the rkey
+        // must be unique per credential or a second credential would collide.
+        const rkey = await SignatureService.generateChallenge();
+        const envelope = await this._signMyCivicRecordV2(
+          'credential',
+          record,
+          CREDENTIAL_COLLECTION,
+          rkey,
+        );
+        const result = await this.makeRequest<CredentialIssueResult>(
+          'POST',
+          '/civic/credentials',
+          envelope,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+        this._sweepCredentialCaches();
+        return result;
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * List a holder's verifiable credentials
+     * (`GET /civic/credentials/:holderUserId`), newest first, optionally filtered
+     * by stored `status`. Public (credentials are issuer-signed attestations a
+     * holder collects to SHOW); short-TTL cached and swept after the caller's own
+     * issue / revoke. An unknown holder yields an empty list.
+     *
+     * @param holderUserId - The holder account's Mongo `_id` (NOT a DID). URL-encoded.
+     * @param opts.status - Optional `'active' | 'revoked' | 'expired'` filter.
+     */
+    async listCredentials(
+      holderUserId: string,
+      opts: { status?: CredentialStatus } = {},
+    ): Promise<CredentialListResult> {
+      try {
+        const base = `/civic/credentials/${encodeURIComponent(holderUserId)}`;
+        const url = opts.status ? `${base}?status=${encodeURIComponent(opts.status)}` : base;
+        return await this.makeRequest<CredentialListResult>(
+          'GET',
+          url,
+          undefined,
+          { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * List the CURRENT user's verifiable credentials ({@link listCredentials} for
+     * the authenticated user's id). Throws if no user is authenticated.
+     *
+     * @param opts.status - Optional status filter.
+     */
+    async listMyCredentials(
+      opts: { status?: CredentialStatus } = {},
+    ): Promise<CredentialListResult> {
+      const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+      if (!userId) {
+        throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot list credentials.');
+      }
+      return this.listCredentials(userId, opts);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Verify a credential by its signed-record id
+     * (`GET /civic/credentials/by-record/:recordId/verify`). The server recomputes
+     * the canonical signing input from the STORED envelope and verifies the
+     * signature against a CURRENT verification method of the ISSUER DID (so a
+     * key the issuer has since rotated away no longer verifies), then checks the
+     * credential is neither revoked nor expired. Public; short-TTL cached
+     * (matching the server's `max-age=60`) and swept after the caller's own issue
+     * / revoke.
+     *
+     * A revoked / expired / unverifiable credential yields `valid: false` (NOT a
+     * throw) so the UI can render it as untrusted; `credential` is `null` only
+     * when no credential exists for the record id. Only a transport failure (the
+     * fetch itself) rejects.
+     *
+     * @param recordId - The credential's signed-record id. URL-encoded into the path.
+     */
+    async verifyCredential(recordId: string): Promise<CredentialVerifyResult> {
+      try {
+        return await this.makeRequest<CredentialVerifyResult>(
+          'GET',
+          `/civic/credentials/by-record/${encodeURIComponent(recordId)}/verify`,
+          undefined,
+          { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Revoke a credential the current user originally issued
+     * (`POST /civic/credentials/:id/revoke`). Only the original USER issuer may
+     * revoke; the server flips the credential to `revoked`. After a successful
+     * revoke the credential GET caches are swept.
+     *
+     * @param id - The credential's id (the projection row `_id`, NOT the signed
+     *   record id). URL-encoded into the path.
+     */
+    async revokeCredential(id: string): Promise<RevokeCredentialResult> {
+      try {
+        const result = await this.makeRequest<RevokeCredentialResult>(
+          'POST',
+          `/civic/credentials/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/revoke`,
+          undefined,
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+        this._sweepCredentialCaches();
+        return result;
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Sweep the credential GET caches an issue / revoke invalidates: every
+     * credential read (the holder list + the by-record verify, which share the
+     * `GET:/civic/credentials/` prefix) so a re-read reflects the new credential
+     * set / status. Public rather than `private` for the same TS4094 reason as
+     * {@link _signMyCivicRecordV2}.
+     */
+    _sweepCredentialCaches(): void {
+      this.clearCacheByPrefix(CREDENTIAL_CACHE_PREFIX);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Sweep the GET caches a vouch / withdraw can invalidate: every personhood
+     * status read (the subject's snapshot changed) and `/users/me` (a subject
+     * crossing the threshold flips their mirrored `User.verified`). Public rather
+     * than `private` for the same TS4094 reason as {@link _signMyCivicRecordV2}.
+     */
+    _sweepPersonhoodCaches(): void {
+      this.clearCacheByPrefix(PERSONHOOD_CACHE_PREFIX);
+      this.clearCacheByPrefix(USERS_ME_CACHE_PREFIX);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Sign a self-issued v2 signed-record envelope on the CURRENT user's own
+     * per-subject hash chain. Fetches the caller's chain head fresh (uncached, so
+     * `seq`/`prev` are never stale → no `bad_seq`/`chain_fork`) and signs with
+     * {@link SignatureService.signRecordV2}.
+     *
+     * NATIVE-ONLY (the private key lives in native secure storage). Internal
+     * helper (leading underscore); public rather than `private` because mixins
+     * compose into an exported anonymous class where TypeScript cannot represent a
+     * private member in the emitted declaration file (TS4094).
+     *
+     * @param type - The signed-record category.
+     * @param record - The record payload (canonicalized into the signed bytes).
+     * @param collection - The AtProto-style collection namespace.
+     * @param rkey - The AtProto-style record key within the collection.
+     */
+    async _signMyCivicRecordV2(
+      type: SignedRecordType,
+      record: Record<string, unknown>,
+      collection: string,
+      rkey: string,
+    ): Promise<SignedRecordEnvelope> {
+      const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+      if (!userId) {
+        throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot sign a civic record.');
+      }
+      const subject = buildUserDid(userId);
+      const head = await this.makeRequest<ChainHeadResponse>(
+        'GET',
+        `/identity/records/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/chain/head`,
+        undefined,
+        { cache: false },
+      );
+      return SignatureService.signRecordV2(type, subject, record, {
+        seq: head.seq + 1,
+        prev: head.headRecordId,
+        collection,
+        rkey,
+      });
+    }
+  };
+}