@oxy.so/services 1.0.0

package/src/ui/oauth/oauthPopupMessages.ts

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+/**
+ * Runtime validation for the popup OAuth `postMessage` channel.
+ *
+ * Everything arriving on `window`'s `message` event is untrusted: any frame on
+ * the page, any other popup, and any browser extension can post to us. This
+ * module is the ONLY place that decides whether an incoming event is a genuine
+ * authorization response, and it answers with a value — never a thrown error.
+ *
+ * A message is accepted only when ALL of these hold:
+ *   1. `event.origin` is EXACTLY the authorize endpoint's origin,
+ *   2. `event.source` is the exact `Window` reference we opened,
+ *   3. `event.data` matches one of the two frozen message shapes,
+ *   4. the `state` it carries matches the one this RP sent.
+ *
+ * Failing (1)–(3) is indistinguishable from unrelated page traffic, so the
+ * message is IGNORED and the flow keeps waiting. Failing (4) means our own
+ * popup answered a different request than the one in flight, which is terminal:
+ * it is reported as a mismatch rather than left to hang until the timeout.
+ */
+
+import { logger } from '@oxy.so/core';
+import type { OAuthPopupHandle, OxyOAuthMessage } from './types';
+
+/** `postMessage` discriminator for a successful authorization. */
+export const OXY_OAUTH_CODE_MESSAGE_TYPE = 'oxy:oauth:code';
+
+/** `postMessage` discriminator for a typed OAuth failure. */
+export const OXY_OAUTH_ERROR_MESSAGE_TYPE = 'oxy:oauth:error';
+
+/** Verdict for one incoming `message` event. */
+export type OAuthPopupMessageVerdict =
+  /** Not ours (wrong origin/source) or not a valid message — keep waiting. */
+  | { kind: 'ignore' }
+  | { kind: 'code'; code: string; state: string }
+  | { kind: 'oauth-error'; error: string; errorDescription?: string }
+  /** Well-formed, from our popup, but bound to a different authorize request. */
+  | { kind: 'state-mismatch' };
+
+/** What {@link readOAuthPopupMessage} validates an event against. */
+export interface OAuthPopupMessageContext {
+  /** Exact origin of the authorize endpoint (`new URL(authorizeUrl).origin`). */
+  expectedOrigin: string;
+  /** The CSRF `state` this RP sent on the authorize request. */
+  expectedState: string;
+  /** The exact popup reference `window.open()` returned. */
+  popup: OAuthPopupHandle;
+}
+
+function isNonEmptyString(value: unknown): value is string {
+  return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reference equality across two `unknown` values.
+ *
+ * `event.source` is a `WindowProxy` and {@link OAuthPopupHandle} is a narrow
+ * structural type, so comparing them directly is a type error. Widening both to
+ * `unknown` keeps the check a plain identity comparison — which is exactly the
+ * security property we want — without a cast.
+ */
+function isSameWindowReference(a: unknown, b: unknown): boolean {
+  return a === b;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse untrusted `event.data` into one of the two frozen message shapes, or
+ * `null` when it is anything else (including `null`, primitives, arrays, and
+ * objects with missing/wrong-typed fields).
+ *
+ * Unknown extra properties are tolerated but never read: only the fields below
+ * are ever surfaced, so a hostile sender cannot smuggle values past this point.
+ */
+export function parseOAuthPopupMessage(data: unknown): OxyOAuthMessage | null {
+  if (typeof data !== 'object' || data === null || Array.isArray(data)) return null;
+  const record = data as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+  if (record.type === OXY_OAUTH_CODE_MESSAGE_TYPE) {
+    if (!isNonEmptyString(record.code) || !isNonEmptyString(record.state)) return null;
+    return { type: OXY_OAUTH_CODE_MESSAGE_TYPE, code: record.code, state: record.state };
+  }
+
+  if (record.type === OXY_OAUTH_ERROR_MESSAGE_TYPE) {
+    if (!isNonEmptyString(record.error)) return null;
+    return {
+      type: OXY_OAUTH_ERROR_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+      error: record.error,
+      ...(isNonEmptyString(record.errorDescription)
+        ? { errorDescription: record.errorDescription }
+        : {}),
+      ...(isNonEmptyString(record.state) ? { state: record.state } : {}),
+    };
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Classify one `message` event against the in-flight authorize request.
+ *
+ * Never throws. See the module header for the acceptance rules.
+ */
+export function readOAuthPopupMessage(
+  event: MessageEvent,
+  context: OAuthPopupMessageContext,
+): OAuthPopupMessageVerdict {
+  // These two are a PAIR, and the source check is load-bearing rather than
+  // belt-and-braces. `expectedOrigin` is `new URL(authorizeUrl).origin`, and
+  // `authorizeBaseUrl` is app-configurable — a non-http(s) value makes that
+  // expression the literal string `"null"`, the opaque origin, which is also
+  // what a browser reports as `event.origin` for EVERY sandboxed iframe,
+  // `data:` document and `file:` page. The origin check stops discriminating at
+  // that point and the source check is the only thing still refusing them.
+  // Do not collapse them into one, and do not drop the source check as
+  // redundant with the origin check: it is not, in the one case that matters.
+  if (event.origin !== context.expectedOrigin) return { kind: 'ignore' };
+  if (!isSameWindowReference(event.source, context.popup)) return { kind: 'ignore' };
+
+  const message = parseOAuthPopupMessage(event.data);
+  if (!message) {
+    // Origin and source matched, so this came from the IdP window we opened —
+    // a shape we cannot read is worth a breadcrumb, unlike ordinary page noise.
+    logger.debug(
+      'Ignored an unrecognised message from the OAuth popup',
+      { component: 'oauthPopupMessages' },
+    );
+    return { kind: 'ignore' };
+  }
+
+  if (message.type === OXY_OAUTH_CODE_MESSAGE_TYPE) {
+    if (message.state !== context.expectedState) return { kind: 'state-mismatch' };
+    return { kind: 'code', code: message.code, state: message.state };
+  }
+
+  // An error MAY carry `state` (the IdP omits it when the request never got far
+  // enough to bind one). When present it must match: a foreign error must not be
+  // able to end an unrelated in-flight sign-in.
+  if (message.state !== undefined && message.state !== context.expectedState) {
+    return { kind: 'state-mismatch' };
+  }
+  return {
+    kind: 'oauth-error',
+    error: message.error,
+    ...(message.errorDescription ? { errorDescription: message.errorDescription } : {}),
+  };
+}

package/src/ui/oauth/types.ts

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+/**
+ * Typed contracts shared by the browser "Sign in with Oxy" OAuth transports.
+ *
+ * Two transports deliver the same authorization code to the same completion
+ * path (see `completeOAuthCode.ts`):
+ *
+ * - `redirect` — the historical full-page hand-off to `auth.oxy.so/authorize`.
+ *   The RP tab navigates away and comes back to its registered `redirect_uri`
+ *   with `?code=…&state=…`; cold boot finishes the exchange.
+ * - `popup` — a small `auth.oxy.so` window opened from the user's click. The RP
+ *   stays mounted with its route and unsaved state intact; the IdP delivers the
+ *   result to `window.opener` via `postMessage` and closes itself.
+ *
+ * Only the authorization code, the CSRF `state`, and a typed OAuth error ever
+ * cross the `postMessage` channel. Access tokens, device secrets, and the PKCE
+ * `code_verifier` NEVER do — the opener keeps the verifier and performs the code
+ * exchange itself.
+ */
+
+/** How a web relying party hands the user to the IdP for third-party sign-in. */
+export type WebAuthMode = 'popup' | 'redirect';
+
+/**
+ * Minimal structural handle over a popup `Window` — exactly what the popup
+ * transport needs: navigate it once the authorize URL is built, detect the user
+ * closing it (`closed`, polled — there is no cross-origin close event), and
+ * close it programmatically on completion. Satisfied directly by the value
+ * `window.open()` returns.
+ *
+ * Deliberately NOT `Window`: the transport must never read cross-origin
+ * properties off the popup, and a narrow handle makes that impossible to do by
+ * accident (and trivial to fake in tests).
+ */
+export interface OAuthPopupHandle {
+  readonly closed: boolean;
+  close(): void;
+  location: { href: string };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The RP-side OAuth handshake for one authorize request: the CSRF `state` sent
+ * to the IdP and the PKCE `code_verifier` replayed on the token exchange.
+ *
+ * In `redirect` mode it is persisted to `sessionStorage` across the full-page
+ * navigation; in `popup` mode it never leaves memory.
+ */
+export interface OAuthHandshake {
+  /** Opaque CSRF token echoed back by the IdP and validated before any exchange. */
+  state: string;
+  /** The PKCE secret. Never crosses `postMessage`, a URL, or storage in popup mode. */
+  codeVerifier: string;
+}
+
+/** Successful authorization delivered by the IdP over `postMessage`. */
+export interface OxyOAuthCodeMessage {
+  type: 'oxy:oauth:code';
+  code: string;
+  state: string;
+}
+
+/** Typed OAuth failure delivered by the IdP over `postMessage`. */
+export interface OxyOAuthErrorMessage {
+  type: 'oxy:oauth:error';
+  error: string;
+  errorDescription?: string;
+  state?: string;
+}
+
+/** The ONLY two message shapes that may cross the popup channel. */
+export type OxyOAuthMessage = OxyOAuthCodeMessage | OxyOAuthErrorMessage;
+
+/** Session material handed to the provider's commit funnel after an exchange. */
+export interface OAuthSessionCommitInput {
+  sessionId: string;
+  accessToken?: string;
+  deviceId?: string;
+  deviceSecret?: string;
+  userId: string;
+  expiresAt?: string;
+  user?: { id: string; username?: string; avatar?: string };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Terminal outcome of one popup sign-in attempt. Every expected path — the user
+ * closing the window, a timeout, an IdP error — is a value, never a thrown
+ * exception.
+ */
+export type OAuthPopupOutcome =
+  /** The IdP delivered an authorization code whose `state` matched. */
+  | { kind: 'code'; code: string; state: string }
+  /** The IdP delivered a typed OAuth error (`access_denied`, `login_required`, …). */
+  | { kind: 'oauth-error'; error: string; errorDescription?: string }
+  /** A well-formed message from our popup carried the wrong `state`. */
+  | { kind: 'state-mismatch' }
+  /** The user dismissed the popup without completing sign-in. */
+  | { kind: 'closed' }
+  /** No result arrived within the allotted window. */
+  | { kind: 'timed-out' }
+  /** No DOM message host (SSR / native) — the popup transport does not apply. */
+  | { kind: 'unsupported' };
+
+/** Why the shared completion path could not produce a session. */
+export type OAuthCompletionFailure = 'state-mismatch' | 'exchange-failed';
+
+/** Result of the ONE completion path both transports run. */
+export type OAuthCompletionResult =
+  | { ok: true }
+  | { ok: false; reason: OAuthCompletionFailure };
+
+/** Why the transport fell back to a full-page redirect. */
+export type WebOAuthRedirectReason =
+  /** `webAuthMode: 'redirect'` — the configured transport. */
+  | 'redirect-mode'
+  /** The browser refused `window.open` (blocker, or no gesture attribution). */
+  | 'popup-blocked'
+  /** The popup opened but could not be navigated to the authorize URL. */
+  | 'popup-navigation-failed';
+
+/** Why a web sign-in attempt failed outright. */
+export type WebOAuthFailureReason =
+  /** The handshake could not be persisted for the redirect return (no/blocked storage). */
+  | 'handshake-storage'
+  /** The `state` returned by the IdP did not match the one we sent. */
+  | 'state-mismatch'
+  /** `POST /auth/oauth/token` or the session commit failed. */
+  | 'exchange-failed'
+  /** The IdP reported a typed OAuth error. */
+  | 'idp-error';
+
+/** Why a web sign-in attempt was not applicable at all. */
+export type WebOAuthUnsupportedReason =
+  /** Not a browser (native / SSR) — native uses `openAuthorizeUrlNative`. */
+  | 'no-browser'
+  /** `sessionMode: 'identity'` has no third-party OAuth lane by construction. */
+  | 'identity-bound'
+  /** No `clientId` is configured on the provider. */
+  | 'missing-client-id';
+
+/** Terminal, typed outcome of a web third-party sign-in attempt. */
+export type WebOAuthSignInResult =
+  /** A session was committed; the RP is authenticated without a reload. */
+  | { status: 'signed-in' }
+  /** The tab is navigating to the IdP; nothing else will resolve in this document. */
+  | { status: 'redirecting'; via: WebOAuthRedirectReason }
+  /** The user dismissed the popup. */
+  | { status: 'cancelled' }
+  /** No result arrived within the allotted window. */
+  | { status: 'timed-out' }
+  | { status: 'failed'; reason: WebOAuthFailureReason; description?: string }
+  | { status: 'unsupported'; reason: WebOAuthUnsupportedReason };