@oxy.so/services 1.0.0

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/browserAuthTransport.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * The single web entry point for third-party "Sign in with Oxy".
+ *
+ * Picks the transport (`popup` or `redirect`), drives it, and returns ONE typed
+ * result — so callers (`OxySignInButton`, and any RP with its own button) never
+ * touch `window.open`, `postMessage`, or the token exchange themselves.
+ *
+ * Popup mode keeps the relying party mounted: its route, scroll position, and
+ * unsaved state survive because the tab never navigates. Redirect mode is the
+ * compatibility fallback, and is also where popup mode lands when the browser
+ * blocks the window — a blocked popup must still sign the user in, not dead-end.
+ *
+ * Native is NOT handled here: `openAuthorizeUrlNative` (an in-app auth session)
+ * remains the native lane and is untouched by this module.
+ */
+import type { OxyServices } from '@oxy.so/core';
+import type { OAuthPopupHandle, OAuthSessionCommitInput, WebAuthMode, WebOAuthSignInResult } from './types.js';
+/** Provider-owned wiring for a web sign-in — everything that is not per-press. */
+export interface WebOAuthTransportContext {
+    /** The provider's `webAuthMode`. */
+    mode: WebAuthMode;
+    oxyServices: OxyServices;
+    /** The app's registered client id; `null` disables third-party sign-in. */
+    clientId: string | null;
+    /** Authorize endpoint override (local/staging deployments). */
+    authorizeBaseUrl?: string;
+    /** `sessionMode: 'identity'` — no third-party OAuth lane exists by design. */
+    identityBound: boolean;
+    /** The provider's session commit funnel. */
+    commitSession: (input: OAuthSessionCommitInput) => Promise<void>;
+}
+/** Per-press inputs for {@link startWebOAuthSignIn}. */
+export interface StartWebOAuthSignInOptions {
+    /** EXACT registered redirect URI for this application. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /**
+     * The popup to drive, when the caller already opened one.
+     *
+     * - omitted — this call opens the window itself, which is only valid when it
+     *   was invoked SYNCHRONOUSLY from the user's click (gesture attribution);
+     * - `null` — the caller tried and the browser blocked it: fall back to a
+     *   full-page redirect;
+     * - a handle — use exactly this window.
+     *
+     * Callers that must `await` before signing in (resolving the application, for
+     * instance) have to open the window in their press handler and pass it here;
+     * a window opened after an `await` is silently blocked by every browser.
+     */
+    popup?: OAuthPopupHandle | null;
+    /** Requested scope; defaults to the SDK's standard sign-in scope. */
+    scope?: string;
+    /** Popup timeout override (ms). */
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+export declare function startWebOAuthSignIn(context: WebOAuthTransportContext, options: StartWebOAuthSignInOptions): Promise<WebOAuthSignInResult>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=browserAuthTransport.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/browserAuthTransport.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/completeOAuthCode.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/**
+ * The ONE path from an OAuth authorization code to a committed session.
+ *
+ * Both web transports end here — the popup with an in-memory handshake, the
+ * redirect lane with one read back from `sessionStorage` — so state validation,
+ * the PKCE exchange, the session commit, and handshake cleanup exist exactly
+ * once. Duplicating any of those per transport is how the two lanes would drift
+ * apart on the security-critical steps.
+ *
+ * Ordering is deliberate and load-bearing:
+ *   1. validate `state` BEFORE anything is sent to the token endpoint,
+ *   2. exchange the code for a session,
+ *   3. run `cleanup` (drop the persisted handshake / strip `?code=` from the
+ *      URL) BEFORE the commit, so a stale code can never re-enter the exchange,
+ *   4. commit the session.
+ *
+ * `cleanup` runs exactly once on EVERY exit path, including a state mismatch
+ * and a failed exchange.
+ */
+import type { OxyServices } from '@oxy.so/core';
+import type { OAuthCompletionResult, OAuthHandshake, OAuthSessionCommitInput } from './types.js';
+/** Inputs for {@link completeOAuthCode}. */
+export interface CompleteOAuthCodeInput {
+    oxyServices: OxyServices;
+    /** The registered `ApplicationCredential` public key (`oxy_dk_…`). */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** The single-use authorization code the IdP issued. */
+    code: string;
+    /** The `state` the IdP returned, or `null` when it sent none. */
+    returnedState: string | null;
+    /**
+     * The handshake this RP started the authorize request with, or `null` when it
+     * is gone (never stored, expired, or a different tab's). A missing handshake
+     * is treated exactly like a mismatched `state`: no exchange is attempted.
+     */
+    handshake: OAuthHandshake | null;
+    /** EXACT redirect URI sent on the authorize request — OAuth requires a match. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** The provider's session commit funnel. */
+    commitSession: (input: OAuthSessionCommitInput) => Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Transport-specific teardown, invoked once after the exchange settles and
+     * before the commit. The redirect lane strips `?code=` and clears the
+     * persisted handshake; the popup lane has nothing persisted and omits it.
+     */
+    cleanup?: () => void;
+}
+export declare function completeOAuthCode(input: CompleteOAuthCodeInput): Promise<OAuthCompletionResult>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=completeOAuthCode.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/completeOAuthCode.d.ts.map

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package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/explicitOAuthConsent.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * Explicit OAuth consent for an already-authenticated Oxy user.
+ *
+ * This is deliberately separate from sign-in routing. First-party applications
+ * normally use the account dialog, but a consent-required scope (for example
+ * `acting-as:offline`) still has to go through the OAuth authorize surface. The
+ * caller must invoke this operation from a real user gesture; it never runs on
+ * mount, retries silently, or grants anything locally.
+ */
+import type { OxyServices } from "@oxy.so/core";
+import type { OAuthSessionCommitInput, WebAuthMode, WebOAuthFailureReason, WebOAuthRedirectReason } from "./types.js";
+export interface RequestOAuthConsentOptions {
+    /** Exact, registered redirect URI. It is never inferred or normalized. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** Exact application scopes to present to the user, in caller-supplied order. */
+    scopes: readonly string[];
+    /** Optional timeout for the web popup lane. */
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+export type OAuthConsentFailureReason = WebOAuthFailureReason | "invalid-redirect-uri" | "invalid-scopes" | "scope-not-configured" | "client-resolution-failed" | "native-callback-invalid" | "state-mismatch" | "exchange-failed" | "subject-mismatch";
+export type OAuthConsentUnsupportedReason = "missing-client-id" | "identity-bound" | "not-authenticated" | "unsupported-platform";
+export type OAuthConsentResult = {
+    status: "consented";
+} | {
+    status: "redirecting";
+    via: WebOAuthRedirectReason;
+} | {
+    status: "cancelled";
+} | {
+    status: "timed-out";
+} | {
+    status: "failed";
+    reason: OAuthConsentFailureReason;
+    description?: string;
+} | {
+    status: "unsupported";
+    reason: OAuthConsentUnsupportedReason;
+};
+export interface OAuthConsentContext {
+    platform: "web" | "native" | "unsupported";
+    mode: WebAuthMode;
+    oxyServices: OxyServices;
+    clientId: string | null;
+    authorizeBaseUrl?: string;
+    identityBound: boolean;
+    /** User who triggered the consent request; a different returned subject is rejected. */
+    expectedUserId: string | null;
+    commitSession: (input: OAuthSessionCommitInput) => Promise<void>;
+}
+/**
+ * Ask the current user to grant exact application scopes through Oxy OAuth.
+ *
+ * Scope syntax is checked before any window opens. After that, the exact client
+ * id resolves its public Application and every requested scope must be present
+ * in that application's configured scope list. Unknown, trimmed, duplicated or
+ * reordered-by-the-SDK values are never sent to the IdP.
+ */
+export declare function requestOAuthConsent(context: OAuthConsentContext, options: RequestOAuthConsentOptions): Promise<OAuthConsentResult>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=explicitOAuthConsent.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/explicitOAuthConsent.d.ts.map

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package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/legacyRedirectLanes.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/**
+ * The legacy, redirect-mode-only lanes that navigate the RP's TOP-LEVEL window
+ * to the IdP without a user gesture.
+ *
+ * `webAuthMode: 'popup'` exists to guarantee exactly one thing: the relying
+ * party never leaves its route. Two mechanics in this SDK break that guarantee,
+ * because each replaces the whole document on its own initiative:
+ *
+ * 1. **Cold-boot silent restore** — a full-page `prompt=none` authorize bounce
+ *    to `auth.oxy.so` when the device-secret mint finds no local session
+ *    (`maybeStartSilentOAuthRestore`, called from `runProviderColdBoot`).
+ * 2. **Post-sign-in hub sync** — a full-page hop to `auth.oxy.so/sync` that
+ *    plants this device's credential on the IdP hub so OTHER origins can later
+ *    run lane 1 (`syncHubAfterSignIn`, called from the `commitSession` funnel).
+ *
+ * Both belong to the redirect transport and are kept only for the migration
+ * window (issue #691, "Cold boot and cross-domain behavior"). In popup mode a
+ * domain with no local credential simply resolves SIGNED OUT, and the user's
+ * next explicit "Continue with Oxy" opens the popup — from a real user gesture,
+ * never automatically.
+ *
+ * NOT covered here, and correctly enabled in BOTH modes: navigations the user
+ * asked for. When the browser blocks the popup, `startWebOAuthSignIn` still
+ * falls back to a full-page redirect rather than dead-ending the sign-in, and
+ * `tryCompleteOAuthReturn` still consumes a `?code=` that is already on the URL.
+ *
+ * PHASE 7b: once the pilot flips the default transport to `'popup'`, this
+ * predicate and BOTH lanes above are deleted outright. Grepping this symbol
+ * finds every site that has to go.
+ */
+import type { WebAuthMode } from './types.js';
+/**
+ * Whether a provider running `webAuthMode` may perform an SDK-initiated,
+ * non-gesture, full-page navigation to the IdP.
+ *
+ * `true` only for `'redirect'` — still the default and the compatibility path,
+ * whose behaviour must stay byte-for-byte unchanged.
+ */
+export declare function allowsAutomaticIdpRedirect(webAuthMode: WebAuthMode): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=legacyRedirectLanes.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/legacyRedirectLanes.d.ts.map

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package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/oauthHandshake.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * The RP half of an OAuth authorize request: a fresh CSRF `state` + PKCE pair,
+ * and the authorize URL built from them.
+ *
+ * Both web transports start here, and the ONLY difference between them is one
+ * parameter: `popup` asks the IdP for `response_mode=web_message` so the result
+ * comes back to `window.opener` instead of navigating the RP's tab. Everything
+ * else — `S256` PKCE, exact registered `redirect_uri`, random `state` — is
+ * identical, which is what lets both lanes converge on one completion path.
+ */
+import type { OAuthHandshake } from './types.js';
+/** Inputs for {@link prepareAuthorizeRequest}. */
+export interface PrepareAuthorizeRequestParams {
+    /** The registered `ApplicationCredential` public key (`oxy_dk_…`). */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** EXACT registered redirect URI. The token exchange must replay this value. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** Authorize endpoint override; defaults to the production Oxy IdP. */
+    authorizeBaseUrl?: string;
+    /** Requested scope; defaults to the SDK's standard sign-in scope. */
+    scope?: string;
+    /**
+     * Ask the IdP to deliver the result to `window.opener` via `postMessage`
+     * instead of redirecting. Set ONLY by the popup transport. It is a request,
+     * not a guarantee — an IdP with no opener still redirects.
+     */
+    responseMode?: 'web_message';
+}
+/** A ready-to-use authorize request plus the secrets that finish it. */
+export interface PreparedAuthorizeRequest {
+    /** Fully-built `auth.oxy.so/authorize` URL. */
+    authorizeUrl: string;
+    /**
+     * Exact origin of {@link authorizeUrl}. The popup transport accepts
+     * `postMessage` from this origin and no other.
+     */
+    authorizeOrigin: string;
+    /** The `state` + PKCE verifier this request is bound to. */
+    handshake: OAuthHandshake;
+}
+/**
+ * Generate a fresh handshake and build the authorize URL around it.
+ *
+ * The verifier is returned to the caller and never stored here: the popup
+ * transport keeps it in memory for the lifetime of the attempt, and the
+ * redirect transport persists it through `persistOAuthHandshake` because a
+ * full-page navigation destroys the running document.
+ */
+export declare function prepareAuthorizeRequest(params: PrepareAuthorizeRequestParams): Promise<PreparedAuthorizeRequest>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauthHandshake.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/oauthHandshake.d.ts.map

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package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/oauthPopup.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * Popup lifecycle for the web OAuth transport.
+ *
+ * Owns the window itself — opening it, navigating it, watching it, and tearing
+ * every listener and timer down — and nothing else: message validation lives in
+ * `oauthPopupMessages.ts`, and the code exchange in `completeOAuthCode.ts`.
+ *
+ * Three browser realities shape this module:
+ *
+ * - **Gesture attribution.** `window.open` only succeeds while the user's click
+ *   is still being handled. Anything awaited first (resolving the application,
+ *   generating PKCE) loses it and the popup is silently blocked. So the window
+ *   is opened EMPTY up front and navigated once the authorize URL exists —
+ *   the same shape as `passkeyHubPopup.ts`.
+ * - **No close event.** A cross-origin popup fires nothing when the user
+ *   dismisses it; polling `closed` is the only mechanism (as in core's
+ *   `AccountDialogController.watchPopup`).
+ * - **No cross-origin reads.** The popup's URL, title, and document are all
+ *   opaque. The authorization result arrives ONLY as a `postMessage`.
+ */
+import type { OAuthPopupHandle, OAuthPopupOutcome } from './types.js';
+/**
+ * Window name for the sign-in popup. Naming the target means a second press
+ * REUSES the same window instead of stacking a new one behind the first.
+ */
+export declare const OXY_OAUTH_POPUP_WINDOW_NAME = "oxy-oauth";
+/**
+ * How long a popup sign-in may stay unanswered (ms).
+ *
+ * Generous on purpose: the IdP surface can involve scanning a QR and approving
+ * on a phone, so this tracks the authorize handle's own ~5-minute lifetime
+ * rather than a UI-scale timeout. It is a backstop against a wedged popup, not
+ * a pace-setter — a user who gives up closes the window and gets the faster
+ * `closed` outcome.
+ */
+export declare const DEFAULT_OAUTH_POPUP_TIMEOUT_MS = 300000;
+/**
+ * Open a new, EMPTY sign-in popup.
+ *
+ * MUST be called SYNCHRONOUSLY from a user-gesture handler, before any `await`.
+ * Returns `null` when the browser blocked it, when `window.open` threw, and on
+ * hosts with no DOM (native / SSR) — never throws, because "no popup" is an
+ * ordinary outcome the caller answers by falling back to a redirect.
+ */
+export declare function openOAuthPopup(): OAuthPopupHandle | null;
+/**
+ * Point an already-open popup at the authorize URL. Returns `false` when the
+ * assignment threw (a window closed between opening and navigating), so the
+ * caller can fall back to a redirect instead of waiting on a dead window.
+ */
+export declare function navigateOAuthPopup(popup: OAuthPopupHandle, url: string): boolean;
+/** Close the popup if it is still open. Idempotent, null-safe, never throws. */
+export declare function closeOAuthPopup(popup: OAuthPopupHandle | null): void;
+/** Inputs for {@link awaitOAuthPopupResult}. */
+export interface AwaitOAuthPopupOptions {
+    /** The exact window reference returned by {@link openOAuthPopup}. */
+    popup: OAuthPopupHandle;
+    /** Exact origin the IdP will post from (`new URL(authorizeUrl).origin`). */
+    expectedOrigin: string;
+    /** The CSRF `state` sent on the authorize request. */
+    expectedState: string;
+    /**
+     * EXACT registered redirect URI for this attempt. When the IdP cannot
+     * `postMessage` (no usable opener) it falls back to redirecting the popup;
+     * if that lands on the same origin, the result is read from the popup URL.
+     */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** @default DEFAULT_OAUTH_POPUP_TIMEOUT_MS */
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Wait for the popup to deliver an authorization result.
+ *
+ * Settles EXACTLY once, with a typed outcome for every path — code, IdP error,
+ * state mismatch, user-closed, timeout — and removes its listener, its close
+ * poll, and both timers before resolving, whatever the outcome. Messages that
+ * arrive after settling reach nothing, so a duplicate delivery is inert.
+ *
+ * Never rejects: closing the window and running out of time are expected
+ * outcomes, not exceptions.
+ */
+export declare function awaitOAuthPopupResult(options: AwaitOAuthPopupOptions): Promise<OAuthPopupOutcome>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauthPopup.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/oauthPopup.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/oauthPopupMessages.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * Runtime validation for the popup OAuth `postMessage` channel.
+ *
+ * Everything arriving on `window`'s `message` event is untrusted: any frame on
+ * the page, any other popup, and any browser extension can post to us. This
+ * module is the ONLY place that decides whether an incoming event is a genuine
+ * authorization response, and it answers with a value — never a thrown error.
+ *
+ * A message is accepted only when ALL of these hold:
+ *   1. `event.origin` is EXACTLY the authorize endpoint's origin,
+ *   2. `event.source` is the exact `Window` reference we opened,
+ *   3. `event.data` matches one of the two frozen message shapes,
+ *   4. the `state` it carries matches the one this RP sent.
+ *
+ * Failing (1)–(3) is indistinguishable from unrelated page traffic, so the
+ * message is IGNORED and the flow keeps waiting. Failing (4) means our own
+ * popup answered a different request than the one in flight, which is terminal:
+ * it is reported as a mismatch rather than left to hang until the timeout.
+ */
+import type { OAuthPopupHandle, OxyOAuthMessage } from './types.js';
+/** `postMessage` discriminator for a successful authorization. */
+export declare const OXY_OAUTH_CODE_MESSAGE_TYPE = "oxy:oauth:code";
+/** `postMessage` discriminator for a typed OAuth failure. */
+export declare const OXY_OAUTH_ERROR_MESSAGE_TYPE = "oxy:oauth:error";
+/** Verdict for one incoming `message` event. */
+export type OAuthPopupMessageVerdict = 
+/** Not ours (wrong origin/source) or not a valid message — keep waiting. */
+{
+    kind: 'ignore';
+} | {
+    kind: 'code';
+    code: string;
+    state: string;
+} | {
+    kind: 'oauth-error';
+    error: string;
+    errorDescription?: string;
+}
+/** Well-formed, from our popup, but bound to a different authorize request. */
+ | {
+    kind: 'state-mismatch';
+};
+/** What {@link readOAuthPopupMessage} validates an event against. */
+export interface OAuthPopupMessageContext {
+    /** Exact origin of the authorize endpoint (`new URL(authorizeUrl).origin`). */
+    expectedOrigin: string;
+    /** The CSRF `state` this RP sent on the authorize request. */
+    expectedState: string;
+    /** The exact popup reference `window.open()` returned. */
+    popup: OAuthPopupHandle;
+}
+/**
+ * Parse untrusted `event.data` into one of the two frozen message shapes, or
+ * `null` when it is anything else (including `null`, primitives, arrays, and
+ * objects with missing/wrong-typed fields).
+ *
+ * Unknown extra properties are tolerated but never read: only the fields below
+ * are ever surfaced, so a hostile sender cannot smuggle values past this point.
+ */
+export declare function parseOAuthPopupMessage(data: unknown): OxyOAuthMessage | null;
+/**
+ * Classify one `message` event against the in-flight authorize request.
+ *
+ * Never throws. See the module header for the acceptance rules.
+ */
+export declare function readOAuthPopupMessage(event: MessageEvent, context: OAuthPopupMessageContext): OAuthPopupMessageVerdict;
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauthPopupMessages.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/oauthPopupMessages.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/types.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/**
+ * Typed contracts shared by the browser "Sign in with Oxy" OAuth transports.
+ *
+ * Two transports deliver the same authorization code to the same completion
+ * path (see `completeOAuthCode.ts`):
+ *
+ * - `redirect` — the historical full-page hand-off to `auth.oxy.so/authorize`.
+ *   The RP tab navigates away and comes back to its registered `redirect_uri`
+ *   with `?code=…&state=…`; cold boot finishes the exchange.
+ * - `popup` — a small `auth.oxy.so` window opened from the user's click. The RP
+ *   stays mounted with its route and unsaved state intact; the IdP delivers the
+ *   result to `window.opener` via `postMessage` and closes itself.
+ *
+ * Only the authorization code, the CSRF `state`, and a typed OAuth error ever
+ * cross the `postMessage` channel. Access tokens, device secrets, and the PKCE
+ * `code_verifier` NEVER do — the opener keeps the verifier and performs the code
+ * exchange itself.
+ */
+/** How a web relying party hands the user to the IdP for third-party sign-in. */
+export type WebAuthMode = 'popup' | 'redirect';
+/**
+ * Minimal structural handle over a popup `Window` — exactly what the popup
+ * transport needs: navigate it once the authorize URL is built, detect the user
+ * closing it (`closed`, polled — there is no cross-origin close event), and
+ * close it programmatically on completion. Satisfied directly by the value
+ * `window.open()` returns.
+ *
+ * Deliberately NOT `Window`: the transport must never read cross-origin
+ * properties off the popup, and a narrow handle makes that impossible to do by
+ * accident (and trivial to fake in tests).
+ */
+export interface OAuthPopupHandle {
+    readonly closed: boolean;
+    close(): void;
+    location: {
+        href: string;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The RP-side OAuth handshake for one authorize request: the CSRF `state` sent
+ * to the IdP and the PKCE `code_verifier` replayed on the token exchange.
+ *
+ * In `redirect` mode it is persisted to `sessionStorage` across the full-page
+ * navigation; in `popup` mode it never leaves memory.
+ */
+export interface OAuthHandshake {
+    /** Opaque CSRF token echoed back by the IdP and validated before any exchange. */
+    state: string;
+    /** The PKCE secret. Never crosses `postMessage`, a URL, or storage in popup mode. */
+    codeVerifier: string;
+}
+/** Successful authorization delivered by the IdP over `postMessage`. */
+export interface OxyOAuthCodeMessage {
+    type: 'oxy:oauth:code';
+    code: string;
+    state: string;
+}
+/** Typed OAuth failure delivered by the IdP over `postMessage`. */
+export interface OxyOAuthErrorMessage {
+    type: 'oxy:oauth:error';
+    error: string;
+    errorDescription?: string;
+    state?: string;
+}
+/** The ONLY two message shapes that may cross the popup channel. */
+export type OxyOAuthMessage = OxyOAuthCodeMessage | OxyOAuthErrorMessage;
+/** Session material handed to the provider's commit funnel after an exchange. */
+export interface OAuthSessionCommitInput {
+    sessionId: string;
+    accessToken?: string;
+    deviceId?: string;
+    deviceSecret?: string;
+    userId: string;
+    expiresAt?: string;
+    user?: {
+        id: string;
+        username?: string;
+        avatar?: string;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Terminal outcome of one popup sign-in attempt. Every expected path — the user
+ * closing the window, a timeout, an IdP error — is a value, never a thrown
+ * exception.
+ */
+export type OAuthPopupOutcome = 
+/** The IdP delivered an authorization code whose `state` matched. */
+{
+    kind: 'code';
+    code: string;
+    state: string;
+}
+/** The IdP delivered a typed OAuth error (`access_denied`, `login_required`, …). */
+ | {
+    kind: 'oauth-error';
+    error: string;
+    errorDescription?: string;
+}
+/** A well-formed message from our popup carried the wrong `state`. */
+ | {
+    kind: 'state-mismatch';
+}
+/** The user dismissed the popup without completing sign-in. */
+ | {
+    kind: 'closed';
+}
+/** No result arrived within the allotted window. */
+ | {
+    kind: 'timed-out';
+}
+/** No DOM message host (SSR / native) — the popup transport does not apply. */
+ | {
+    kind: 'unsupported';
+};
+/** Why the shared completion path could not produce a session. */
+export type OAuthCompletionFailure = 'state-mismatch' | 'exchange-failed';
+/** Result of the ONE completion path both transports run. */
+export type OAuthCompletionResult = {
+    ok: true;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    reason: OAuthCompletionFailure;
+};
+/** Why the transport fell back to a full-page redirect. */
+export type WebOAuthRedirectReason = 
+/** `webAuthMode: 'redirect'` — the configured transport. */
+'redirect-mode'
+/** The browser refused `window.open` (blocker, or no gesture attribution). */
+ | 'popup-blocked'
+/** The popup opened but could not be navigated to the authorize URL. */
+ | 'popup-navigation-failed';
+/** Why a web sign-in attempt failed outright. */
+export type WebOAuthFailureReason = 
+/** The handshake could not be persisted for the redirect return (no/blocked storage). */
+'handshake-storage'
+/** The `state` returned by the IdP did not match the one we sent. */
+ | 'state-mismatch'
+/** `POST /auth/oauth/token` or the session commit failed. */
+ | 'exchange-failed'
+/** The IdP reported a typed OAuth error. */
+ | 'idp-error';
+/** Why a web sign-in attempt was not applicable at all. */
+export type WebOAuthUnsupportedReason = 
+/** Not a browser (native / SSR) — native uses `openAuthorizeUrlNative`. */
+'no-browser'
+/** `sessionMode: 'identity'` has no third-party OAuth lane by construction. */
+ | 'identity-bound'
+/** No `clientId` is configured on the provider. */
+ | 'missing-client-id';
+/** Terminal, typed outcome of a web third-party sign-in attempt. */
+export type WebOAuthSignInResult = 
+/** A session was committed; the RP is authenticated without a reload. */
+{
+    status: 'signed-in';
+}
+/** The tab is navigating to the IdP; nothing else will resolve in this document. */
+ | {
+    status: 'redirecting';
+    via: WebOAuthRedirectReason;
+}
+/** The user dismissed the popup. */
+ | {
+    status: 'cancelled';
+}
+/** No result arrived within the allotted window. */
+ | {
+    status: 'timed-out';
+} | {
+    status: 'failed';
+    reason: WebOAuthFailureReason;
+    description?: string;
+} | {
+    status: 'unsupported';
+    reason: WebOAuthUnsupportedReason;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=types.d.ts.map

package/lib/typescript/module/ui/oauth/types.d.ts.map

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