@oxy.so/core 7.31.0 → 7.32.0

package/dist/esm/crypto/organizationKeys.js

@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ import { logger } from '../logger/index.js';
 import { groupedKeychainStore, resolveKeychainAccess, } from '../utils/keychainAccessGroups.js';
 import { isAndroid, isIOS, isWeb } from '../utils/platform.js';
 import { registeredIdentitySignerStore } from './identitySigner.js';
-import { ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated } from './keychainGroupMigration.js';
+import { prepareKeychainAccess } from './keychainGroupMigration.js';
+import { retireIdentityKey } from './retiredKeys.js';
 import { ORGANIZATION_ANDROID_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE as ANDROID_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE, ORGANIZATION_INDEX_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE as INDEX_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE, ORGANIZATION_INDEX_STORAGE_KEY as INDEX_STORAGE_KEY, ORGANIZATION_MNEMONIC_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE as MNEMONIC_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE, isOrganizationAccountId, organizationMnemonicName as mnemonicName, organizationPrivateKeyName as privateKeyName, organizationPublicKeyName as publicKeyName, serializeOrganizationIndex, } from './keychainItems.js';
 export { isOrganizationAccountId };
 const ORGANIZATION_PHRASE_WORDS = 24;
@@ -102,9 +103,7 @@ export async function organizationKeyFromPhrase(phrase) {
 async function secureStore(item) {
     const raw = await loadSecureStore();
     const access = await resolveKeychainAccess();
-    if (access.mode === 'grouped' && access.role === 'holder') {
-        await ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated();
-    }
+    await prepareKeychainAccess(access);
     return groupedKeychainStore(raw, access, item);
 }
 const pairStore = () => secureStore('spending-key');
@@ -195,8 +194,10 @@ async function readLocalPair(accountId) {
  * it; on iOS only Commons holds the groups it writes (any other app throws).
  *
  * Refuses a pair whose public key does not derive from its private key, and a
- * phrase that does not derive the pair. Overwrites whatever this device held for
- * the organization (a replaced key is the caller's decision, ADR 0061 D7).
+ * phrase that does not derive the pair. A DIFFERENT key this device already
+ * held for the organization is first kept in the organization's retired ring
+ * (ADR 0061 D7 as amended; R4-12): coins under it still need it. When that
+ * cannot be confirmed nothing is overwritten and this throws.
  */
 export async function storeOrganizationKey(accountId, key) {
     assertAccountId(accountId);
@@ -218,6 +219,18 @@ export async function storeOrganizationKey(accountId, key) {
         throw new Error('On Android only Commons holds organization keys; this app has no identity signer store for them.');
     }
     const store = await pairStore();
+    const previous = await heldPrivateKey(store, accountId);
+    if (previous) {
+        const previousPublic = deriveSecp256k1PublicKey(previous);
+        if (previousPublic !== publicKey) {
+            try {
+                await retireIdentityKey({ privateKey: previous, publicKey: previousPublic }, { accountId });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw new Error(`organization key: the key this device held could not be kept as a previous key, so it was not replaced (${error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'unknown'})`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
     await store.setItemAsync(privateKeyName(accountId), privateKey, pairOptions(store, true));
     await store.setItemAsync(publicKeyName(accountId), publicKey, pairOptions(store, false));
     if (signer?.writeOrganization &&
@@ -298,6 +311,21 @@ export async function listOrganizationKeys() {
         return [];
     return readIndex(await indexStore());
 }
+/**
+ * The private key this device holds for `accountId`, whatever its public half
+ * says (an unhealthy pair is still a key coins may sit under): the slot, then
+ * on Android the signer store's copy. `null` when there is none.
+ */
+async function heldPrivateKey(store, accountId) {
+    const local = await store.getItemAsync(privateKeyName(accountId), pairOptions(store, false));
+    if (local && isValidSecp256k1PrivateKey(local))
+        return normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey(local);
+    const signer = isAndroid() ? registeredIdentitySignerStore() : null;
+    const mirrored = (await signer?.readOrganization?.(accountId)) ?? null;
+    return mirrored && isValidSecp256k1PrivateKey(mirrored.privateKey)
+        ? normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey(mirrored.privateKey)
+        : null;
+}
 /** Forget an organization key on this device: its pair, its phrase, its signer copy and its index entry. */
 export async function deleteOrganizationKey(accountId) {
     assertAccountId(accountId);

package/dist/esm/crypto/retiredKeys.js

@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ import { logger } from '../logger/index.js';
 import { groupedKeychainStore, resolveKeychainAccess } from '../utils/keychainAccessGroups.js';
 import { isAndroid, isIOS, isWeb } from '../utils/platform.js';
 import { registeredIdentitySignerStore } from './identitySigner.js';
-import { ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated } from './keychainGroupMigration.js';
-import { isOrganizationAccountId } from './organizationKeys.js';
+import { isOrganizationAccountId } from './keychainItems.js';
+import { prepareKeychainAccess } from './keychainGroupMigration.js';
 const PERSONAL_SCOPE = 'personal';
 /** Android, Commons-local: its own Keystore-backed slot, shared with no other key. */
 const ANDROID_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = 'oxy_retired_identity';
@@ -61,15 +61,15 @@ const PUBLIC_KEY = /^04[0-9a-f]{128}$/;
  * The secure store for the ring. On iOS every item is a `spending-key`
  * (ADR 0062): the private keys AND the index live in the wallet group, which
  * only Commons and the Peable wallet can read, never the shared one. In
- * Commons every access first awaits the access-group migration. On Android
- * the grouping is a no-op and Commons' own services below apply.
+ * Commons every access first awaits the access-group migration (`gate: false`
+ * is the migration itself, keeping a pre-split copy). On Android the grouping
+ * is a no-op and Commons' own services below apply.
  */
-async function ringStore() {
+async function ringStore(gate = true) {
     const raw = await loadSecureStore();
     const access = await resolveKeychainAccess();
-    if (access.mode === 'grouped' && access.role === 'holder') {
-        await ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated();
-    }
+    if (gate)
+        await prepareKeychainAccess(access);
     return groupedKeychainStore(raw, access, 'spending-key');
 }
 /** The ring a selector names: `personal`, or the organization's account id. */
@@ -161,13 +161,24 @@ function toListed(entry) {
         ? { publicKey: entry.publicKey, retiredAt: entry.retiredAt }
         : { publicKey: entry.publicKey, accountId: entry.scope, retiredAt: entry.retiredAt };
 }
-/** Whether this app writes the ring: Commons (Android: the signer store it registers; iOS: native). */
-function assertMayWrite() {
+/**
+ * Whether this app writes the ring: Commons only (Android: the signer store it
+ * registers; iOS: the keychain role `holder`). The Peable wallet holds the
+ * wallet group too, but only reads, derives and signs: a key the wallet could
+ * add to the ring is a key it could choose (R4-14).
+ */
+async function assertMayWrite() {
     if (isWeb())
         throw new Error('retired key: only a native device holds one');
     if (isAndroid() && !registeredIdentitySignerStore()?.writeRetired) {
         throw new Error('On Android only Commons holds retired keys; this app has no identity signer store for them.');
     }
+    if (isIOS()) {
+        const access = await resolveKeychainAccess();
+        if (access.mode === 'grouped' && access.role !== 'holder') {
+            throw new Error('On iOS only Commons writes retired keys; this app may only read them.');
+        }
+    }
 }
 /**
  * Keep `key` in the ring of `selector`'s account. Commons only. Idempotent: a
@@ -177,16 +188,27 @@ function assertMayWrite() {
  * caller about to replace the key can stop before anything is lost.
  */
 export async function retireIdentityKey(key, selector) {
+    await keepRetired(key, selector, true);
+}
+/**
+ * {@link retireIdentityKey} from inside the iOS access-group migration, which
+ * keeps a replaced pre-split copy before deleting it from the shared group and
+ * cannot await itself. @internal
+ */
+export async function retireIdentityKeyDuringMigration(key, selector) {
+    await keepRetired(key, selector, false);
+}
+async function keepRetired(key, selector, gate) {
     const scope = retiredKeyScope(selector);
     if (!scope)
         throw new Error('retired key: accountId must be a 24-hex or uuid account id');
-    assertMayWrite();
+    await assertMayWrite();
     if (!isHealthyPair(key.privateKey, key.publicKey)) {
         throw new Error('retired key: the public key does not derive from the private key');
     }
     const privateKey = normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey(key.privateKey);
     const publicKey = normalizeSecp256k1PublicKey(key.publicKey);
-    const store = await ringStore();
+    const store = await ringStore(gate);
     await store.setItemAsync(privateKeyName(scope, publicKey), privateKey, privateOptions(store, true));
     const readBack = await store.getItemAsync(privateKeyName(scope, publicKey), privateOptions(store, false));
     if (readBack !== privateKey) {
@@ -284,7 +306,7 @@ export async function forgetRetiredIdentityKey(publicKey, selector) {
     const canonical = canonicalPublicKey(publicKey);
     if (!scope || !canonical)
         throw new Error('retired key: invalid selector or public key');
-    assertMayWrite();
+    await assertMayWrite();
     const store = await ringStore();
     await store.deleteItemAsync(privateKeyName(scope, canonical), privateOptions(store, false));
     const signer = isAndroid() ? registeredIdentitySignerStore() : null;
@@ -292,10 +314,12 @@ export async function forgetRetiredIdentityKey(publicKey, selector) {
     await writeIndex(store, (await readIndex(store)).filter((entry) => !(entry.scope === scope && entry.publicKey === canonical)));
 }
 /**
- * Forget every retired key of one ring (the person's, or an organization's):
- * called when the identity itself is deleted from this device, so a phone
- * handed on keeps none of the person's old keys. Commons only. Resolves how
- * many it removed.
+ * Forget every retired key of one ring (the person's, or an organization's).
+ * Commons only, and only when the person deletes their Oxy ACCOUNT (Commons'
+ * delete-account flow), which tells them the coins go with it. Deleting the
+ * identity from this device — "Start over", a forced delete — never calls it:
+ * the ring is money, and the same person restoring their identity later must
+ * find it (R4-4). Resolves how many it removed.
  */
 export async function forgetRetiredIdentityKeys(selector) {
     const scope = retiredKeyScope(selector);
@@ -342,6 +366,41 @@ export async function syncRetiredKeys() {
     }
     return mirrored;
 }
+/**
+ * Every retired key of `selector`'s ring WITH its private half, for the
+ * encrypted identity backup (`oxy.identity.backup.create`), which carries them
+ * under the CURRENT phrase so a lost phone costs no more than the current
+ * phrase does (R4-4). Commons only; an entry whose private half is missing or
+ * does not derive its public key is left out. Never log or transmit the result
+ * except inside that encrypted envelope.
+ */
+export async function exportRetiredIdentityKeys(selector) {
+    const scope = retiredKeyScope(selector);
+    if (!scope || isWeb())
+        return [];
+    await assertMayWrite();
+    const out = [];
+    for (const entry of await listRetiredIdentityKeys(selector)) {
+        const privateKey = await getRetiredPrivateKey(entry.publicKey, selector);
+        if (privateKey)
+            out.push({ privateKey, publicKey: entry.publicKey, retiredAt: entry.retiredAt });
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * The pair a previous key's raw PRIVATE KEY gives (64 hex, an optional `0x`),
+ * for a person whose old identity was imported as a private key and so has no
+ * phrase to re-enter. Stores nothing: the caller checks the public key against
+ * the account's key history and only then calls {@link retireIdentityKey}.
+ */
+export function retiredKeyFromPrivateKey(privateKeyHex) {
+    const trimmed = privateKeyHex.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(trimmed) || !isValidSecp256k1PrivateKey(trimmed)) {
+        throw new Error('retired key: not a valid private key');
+    }
+    const privateKey = normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey(trimmed);
+    return { privateKey, publicKey: publicKeyOf(privateKey) };
+}
 /**
  * The pair a previous recovery phrase derives (`seed[0:32]`, the personal-root
  * and organization-key derivation; 12–24 words). Stores nothing: the caller

package/dist/esm/utils/keychainAccessGroups.js

@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@ export const KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS = {
     wallet: 'so.oxy.wallet',
     shared: 'group.so.oxy.shared',
 };
+/**
+ * The suffix a DEVELOPMENT build's restricted groups carry (`so.oxy.commons.dev`,
+ * `to.peable.app.dev`: `so.oxy.identity.dev`, `so.oxy.wallet.dev`). A dev build
+ * sits beside the production app on the same phone, is signed by the same team
+ * and runs JavaScript from a dev server, so it never shares a restricted group
+ * with production (`@oxy.so/app-preset` enforces the entitlements). The shared
+ * group has no variant: it holds nothing secret.
+ */
+export const DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX = '.dev';
 /** Thrown while the probe cannot answer (before first unlock). Transient. */
 export class KeychainAccessUnavailableError extends Error {
     constructor(cause) {
@@ -69,6 +78,16 @@ export function keychainGroupFor(item) {
             return 'app';
     }
 }
+/**
+ * Whether `role` may WRITE `item`. Only Commons writes a secret: the Peable
+ * wallet reads, derives and signs with spending keys (and the retired ring)
+ * but never adds one — a key the wallet could add is one the wallet could
+ * choose. (The keychain itself lets every app in the wallet group write it;
+ * this is the SDK's half, and readers check what they find, ADR 0062.)
+ */
+export function mayWriteKeychainItem(role, item) {
+    return role === 'holder' || item === 'shared' || item === 'app';
+}
 /** Whether `role` holds the group `item` lives in. */
 export function mayHoldKeychainItem(role, item) {
     switch (role) {
@@ -92,14 +111,18 @@ export function keychainAccessFromDefaultGroup(defaultGroup, appGroup) {
     }
     const prefix = defaultGroup.slice(0, dot + 1);
     const group = defaultGroup.slice(dot + 1);
-    const role = group === KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.identity
+    const dev = group.endsWith(DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX);
+    const base = dev ? group.slice(0, -DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX.length) : group;
+    const role = base === KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.identity
         ? 'holder'
-        : group === KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.wallet
+        : base === KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.wallet
             ? 'wallet'
             : 'member';
+    // A `.dev` suffix on anything but a restricted group is not a variant.
+    const variant = dev && role !== 'member' ? { variant: DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX } : {};
     return appGroup?.startsWith(prefix)
-        ? { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role, appGroup }
-        : { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role };
+        ? { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role, appGroup, ...variant }
+        : { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role, ...variant };
 }
 let resolvedAccess = null;
 /**
@@ -152,9 +175,11 @@ export async function resolveKeychainAccess() {
     resolvedAccess = keychainAccessFromDefaultGroup(probe.accessGroup, own.state === 'resolved' ? own.accessGroup : undefined);
     return resolvedAccess;
 }
-/** Forget the memoized access. Tests only. @internal */
+/** Forget the memoized access and the fallback state. Tests only. @internal */
 export function resetKeychainAccessForTests() {
     resolvedAccess = null;
+    holderSharedFallback = false;
+    walletSharedFallbackClosed = false;
 }
 /**
  * The full `kSecAttrAccessGroup` value of `group`, or `undefined` for "no
@@ -172,17 +197,54 @@ export function keychainAccessGroupValue(access, group) {
         // default is the shared group: no group, the calls it always made.
         return access.appGroup ?? (access.role === 'member' ? undefined : access.defaultGroup);
     }
-    return `${access.prefix}${KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS[group]}`;
+    const variant = group === 'shared' ? '' : (access.variant ?? '');
+    return `${access.prefix}${KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS[group]}${variant}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether a SECRET read may still fall back to the pre-split shared group
+ * (R4-7). Every Oxy app can write that group, and keychain items survive an
+ * uninstall, so a secret found there is one Commons did not necessarily write.
+ *
+ * - Commons (`holder`): CLOSED, except while its one-shot migration has proved
+ *   the shared copies are its own (they carry the key its sandbox marker
+ *   records) and could not move them all yet; the migration opens it for that
+ *   launch only ({@link setHolderSharedSecretFallback}).
+ * - The Peable wallet: open until Commons' migration has finished (the
+ *   completion record Commons mirrors into the wallet group), because until
+ *   then an upgraded phone's keys are still in the shared group; closed for
+ *   good once it has seen that record ({@link closeWalletSharedSecretFallback}).
+ */
+let holderSharedFallback = false;
+let walletSharedFallbackClosed = false;
+/** The migration's switch for Commons' fallback. @internal */
+export function setHolderSharedSecretFallback(open) {
+    holderSharedFallback = open;
+}
+/** The wallet saw Commons' completion record: no shared fallback again in this process. @internal */
+export function closeWalletSharedSecretFallback() {
+    walletSharedFallbackClosed = true;
+}
+function sharedFallbackOpen(access) {
+    switch (access.role) {
+        case 'holder':
+            return holderSharedFallback;
+        case 'wallet':
+            return !walletSharedFallbackClosed;
+        case 'member':
+            return false;
+    }
 }
 function option(value) {
     return value === undefined ? {} : { accessGroup: value };
 }
 /**
- * The option bags a READ of `item` tries, in order: its own group, then, for
- * an identity secret or a spending key, the shared group, where those lived
- * before the split (release 4 of the doc drops that fallback). Empty when this
- * app may not hold the item: the caller answers `null` without touching the
- * keychain. An app's own items (`app`) take {@link ownKeychainItemPlan}.
+ * The option bags a READ of `item` tries, in order: its own group, then — for
+ * an identity secret or a spending key, and only while
+ * {@link sharedFallbackOpen} says so — the shared group, where those lived
+ * before the split. Empty when this app may not hold the item: the caller
+ * answers `null` without touching the keychain. Evaluated per read: the
+ * fallback closes during a process's life. An app's own items (`app`) take
+ * {@link ownKeychainItemPlan}.
  */
 export function keychainReadPlan(access, item) {
     if (access.mode === 'ungrouped') {
@@ -193,18 +255,29 @@ export function keychainReadPlan(access, item) {
     }
     const own = keychainGroupFor(item);
     const plan = [option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, own))];
-    if (own === 'identity' || own === 'wallet') {
-        // Where the split moved these items from.
+    if ((own === 'identity' || own === 'wallet') && sharedFallbackOpen(access)) {
         plan.push(option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, 'shared')));
     }
     return plan;
 }
 /**
- * Every place a DELETE of `item` must reach: the read plan, so a delete never
- * leaves a pre-split copy behind in the shared group.
+ * Every place a DELETE of `item` must reach: its own group AND the shared
+ * group, whatever the read fallback says, so a delete never leaves a copy
+ * behind where every Oxy app can read it.
  */
 export function keychainDeletePlan(access, item) {
-    return keychainReadPlan(access, item);
+    if (access.mode === 'ungrouped') {
+        return [{}];
+    }
+    if (!mayHoldKeychainItem(access.role, item)) {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const own = keychainGroupFor(item);
+    const plan = [option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, own))];
+    if (own === 'identity' || own === 'wallet') {
+        plan.push(option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, 'shared')));
+    }
+    return plan;
 }
 /**
  * The option a WRITE of `item` carries. THROWS when this app may not hold the
@@ -215,8 +288,8 @@ export function keychainWriteOption(access, item) {
     if (access.mode === 'ungrouped') {
         return {};
     }
-    if (!mayHoldKeychainItem(access.role, item)) {
-        throw new Error(`This app (keychain role "${access.role}") may not hold a ${item} keychain item; only Commons writes the identity.`);
+    if (!mayWriteKeychainItem(access.role, item)) {
+        throw new Error(`This app (keychain role "${access.role}") may not write a ${item} keychain item; only Commons writes the identity and the keys the wallet spends.`);
     }
     return option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, keychainGroupFor(item)));
 }
@@ -284,19 +357,29 @@ export async function deleteThroughPlan(store, key, options, plan) {
 }
 /**
  * `store` with every call routed to `item`'s groups for this app: reads walk
- * the read plan, writes carry the write option (throwing for a role that may
- * not hold the item), deletes reach every location. The constants of the
- * wrapped store are kept, so `store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY` still reads.
+ * the read plan (evaluated per read), writes carry the write option (throwing
+ * for a role that may not write the item), deletes reach every location. A
+ * secret WRITE also deletes the item's copy in the shared group (R4-6): a value
+ * Commons writes replaces whatever any app could read there, and a copy that
+ * cannot be removed fails the write instead of staying readable. The constants
+ * of the wrapped store are kept, so `store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY` still
+ * reads.
  */
 export function groupedKeychainStore(store, access, item) {
-    const plan = keychainReadPlan(access, item);
+    const sharedCopy = access.mode === 'grouped' && (item === 'identity-secret' || item === 'spending-key')
+        ? option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, 'shared'))
+        : null;
     const wrapped = {
-        getItemAsync: (key, options) => readThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, plan),
+        getItemAsync: (key, options) => readThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, keychainReadPlan(access, item)),
         setItemAsync: async (key, value, options) => {
             const group = keychainWriteOption(access, item);
             await store.setItemAsync(key, value, { ...(options ?? {}), ...group });
+            if (sharedCopy) {
+                const { keychainAccessible: _accessible, ...rest } = (options ?? {});
+                await store.deleteItemAsync(key, { ...rest, ...sharedCopy });
+            }
         },
-        deleteItemAsync: (key, options) => deleteThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, plan),
+        deleteItemAsync: (key, options) => deleteThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, keychainDeletePlan(access, item)),
     };
     return Object.assign(Object.create(store), wrapped);
 }

package/dist/types/api/identity.d.ts

@@ -67,6 +67,14 @@ export interface RotateKeyResult {
      * should surface a recovery prompt. Omitted on full success.
      */
     localPersistFailed?: true;
+    /**
+     * Whether the encrypted identity backup was re-created under the NEW phrase,
+     * carrying the retired ring with the key just replaced (R4-4). The server
+     * deletes the old backup in the rotation's transaction; `false` (native, the
+     * upload failed) means the caller should offer "Create backup" again, or the
+     * replaced key lives only on this phone. Absent on web.
+     */
+    backupRefreshed?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Derive a user's Oxy DID from their stable account id.
@@ -268,6 +276,34 @@ export declare class IdentityBackupApi {
      * from SecureStore.
      */
     create(phrase: string): Promise<BackupStatusResponse>;
+    /**
+     * The retired ring this device holds for the person, limited to keys Oxy's
+     * key history names as THIS account's retired keys (the ring's iOS group is
+     * writable by the wallet app too, and a previous person's ring can outlive a
+     * "Start over"). Empty where no ring is held (web, any app but Commons).
+     * Throws when the history cannot be read while a ring exists, so a backup
+     * never silently drops keys it should carry.
+     */
+    private retiredKeysToCarry;
+    /**
+     * Fetch and open the backup the phrase locates, checking it is the phrase's
+     * own identity. With `missingIsNull`, `null` when there is none (404);
+     * otherwise the request's own error propagates.
+     */
+    private open;
+    /**
+     * Keep every retired key a backup carries in this device's ring. Each pair
+     * must be healthy and must not be the current key; the envelope itself is
+     * authenticated by the phrase. Commons only (the ring refuses elsewhere).
+     * Resolves how many keys are now held; a key that fails is skipped.
+     */
+    private keepCarriedRetiredKeys;
+    /**
+     * Restore ONLY the retired keys the phrase's backup carries into this
+     * device's ring (Commons, after a phrase import or a silent device-backup
+     * restore). Resolves how many were kept; 0 when there is no backup.
+     */
+    restoreRetiredKeys(phrase: string): Promise<number>;
     /**
      * Whether the signed-in user has a stored backup, plus its non-sensitive hint
      * and timestamp. Returns no ciphertext and no locator.

package/dist/types/crypto/identityMarker.d.ts

@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ export interface WriteIdentityMarkerInput {
  * rest.
  */
 export declare function readIdentityMarker(): Promise<IdentityMarker | null>;
+/**
+ * Read the marker, THROWING when the storage cannot answer (instead of the
+ * fail-open `null` of {@link readIdentityMarker}). For a caller that must not
+ * mistake "unreadable" for "never written": the iOS keychain migration, which
+ * adopts a pre-split secret only when this marker vouches for it, and records
+ * once that there is nothing to adopt.
+ */
+export declare function readIdentityMarkerStrict(): Promise<IdentityMarker | null>;
 /**
  * Write (create/replace) the marker. Returns `true` when it durably landed,
  * `false` when storage was unavailable or the write threw. Callers treat a

package/dist/types/crypto/index.d.ts

@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ export type { IdentityDeviceBackupStore } from './deviceBackup';
 export type { IdentitySignerStore } from './identitySigner';
 export { generateOrganizationKey, organizationKeyFromPhrase, storeOrganizationKey, getOrganizationPublicKey, getOrganizationPrivateKey, getOrganizationRecoveryPhrase, listOrganizationKeys, deleteOrganizationKey, syncOrganizationKeys, isOrganizationAccountId, isHealthyOrganizationKeyPair, } from './organizationKeys';
 export type { OrganizationKeyPair, GeneratedOrganizationKey, StoredOrganizationKey, } from './organizationKeys';
-export { KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS, KeychainAccessUnavailableError, keychainGroupFor, mayHoldKeychainItem, resolveKeychainAccess, keychainAccessGroupValue, keychainReadPlan, keychainDeletePlan, keychainWriteOption, ownKeychainItemPlan, readThroughPlan, deleteThroughPlan, groupedKeychainStore, } from '../utils/keychainAccessGroups';
+export { KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS, KeychainAccessUnavailableError, keychainGroupFor, mayHoldKeychainItem, mayWriteKeychainItem, DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX, resolveKeychainAccess, keychainAccessGroupValue, keychainReadPlan, keychainDeletePlan, keychainWriteOption, ownKeychainItemPlan, readThroughPlan, deleteThroughPlan, groupedKeychainStore, } from '../utils/keychainAccessGroups';
 export type { KeychainAccess, KeychainAccessGroupName, KeychainGroup, KeychainGroupOption, KeychainItemClass, KeychainRole, KeychainStoreLike, OwnKeychainItemNames, } from '../utils/keychainAccessGroups';
-export { ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated } from './keychainGroupMigration';
+export { ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated, getPreSplitExposure, } from './keychainGroupMigration';
 export type { KeychainGroupMigrationReport, KeychainItemMigrationOutcome, } from './keychainGroupMigration';
-export { retireIdentityKey, listRetiredIdentityKeys, forgetRetiredIdentityKey, forgetRetiredIdentityKeys, syncRetiredKeys, retiredKeyFromPhrase, } from './retiredKeys';
+export { retireIdentityKey, listRetiredIdentityKeys, forgetRetiredIdentityKey, forgetRetiredIdentityKeys, syncRetiredKeys, retiredKeyFromPhrase, retiredKeyFromPrivateKey, exportRetiredIdentityKeys, } from './retiredKeys';
 export type { RetiredIdentityKey, RetiredKeyPair, RetiredKeySelector } from './retiredKeys';
 export { SignatureService } from './signatureService';
 export type { SignedMessage, AuthChallenge } from './signatureService';

package/dist/types/crypto/keychainGroupMigration.d.ts

@@ -1,20 +1,42 @@
+import { type KeychainAccess } from '../utils/keychainAccessGroups';
 /** What happened to one item (or pair) in a run. */
-export type KeychainItemMigrationOutcome = 'absent' | 'moved' | 'conflict' | 'unhealthy' | 'failed' | 'deferred';
+export type KeychainItemMigrationOutcome = 'absent' | 'moved' | 'retired' | 'discarded' | 'failed' | 'deferred';
 export interface KeychainGroupMigrationReport {
     /**
      * - `not-applicable`: not Commons on a split-aware iOS build; nothing to move.
-     * - `complete`: nothing secret is left in the shared group.
-     * - `incomplete`: something stayed (`conflict`, `unhealthy` or `failed`);
-     *   retried next launch.
-     * - `deferred`: the keychain could not be read (locked); retried on the next
-     *   storage access.
+     * - `complete`: the completion record exists; the shared group is never
+     *   read again for a secret.
+     * - `incomplete`: a copy or delete failed; retried next launch.
+     * - `deferred`: the keychain or the marker could not be read (locked);
+     *   retried on the next storage access.
      */
     state: 'not-applicable' | 'complete' | 'incomplete' | 'deferred';
     /** Outcome per item label (`primary`, `phrase`, `organization-1`, …). */
     items: Record<string, KeychainItemMigrationOutcome>;
+    /** Whether this device's marker vouched for the shared copies (absent before a run). */
+    proven?: boolean;
 }
 /** Run the migration once. Exported for tests; production code awaits the gate. */
 export declare function runKeychainGroupMigration(): Promise<KeychainGroupMigrationReport>;
+/**
+ * What every keychain-backed identity access awaits first, by role: Commons
+ * runs (or has run) the migration; the Peable wallet checks once whether
+ * Commons' completion record is in the wallet group, and from then on never
+ * falls back to the shared group for a secret. Never throws.
+ */
+export declare function prepareKeychainAccess(access: KeychainAccess): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Commons: whether this device's identity keys sat in the shared keychain
+ * group before the split, where every Oxy iOS app could read them. `publicKey`
+ * is the personal key that was exposed (recommend a rotation while it is still
+ * the current key), `organizations` the organization accounts whose key was.
+ * `null` when nothing was exposed, the migration has not finished, or this is
+ * not Commons on iOS.
+ */
+export declare function getPreSplitExposure(): Promise<{
+    publicKey: string | null;
+    organizations: string[];
+} | null>;
 /**
  * The gate every Commons identity-storage access awaits. One run per process
  * (`complete`, `incomplete` and `not-applicable` are kept; `incomplete` is

package/dist/types/crypto/organizationKeys.d.ts

@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ export declare function organizationKeyFromPhrase(phrase: string): Promise<Organ
  * it; on iOS only Commons holds the groups it writes (any other app throws).
  *
  * Refuses a pair whose public key does not derive from its private key, and a
- * phrase that does not derive the pair. Overwrites whatever this device held for
- * the organization (a replaced key is the caller's decision, ADR 0061 D7).
+ * phrase that does not derive the pair. A DIFFERENT key this device already
+ * held for the organization is first kept in the organization's retired ring
+ * (ADR 0061 D7 as amended; R4-12): coins under it still need it. When that
+ * cannot be confirmed nothing is overwritten and this throws.
  */
 export declare function storeOrganizationKey(accountId: string, key: StoredOrganizationKey): Promise<void>;
 /**

package/dist/types/crypto/retiredKeys.d.ts

@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ export declare function retiredKeyScope(selector?: RetiredKeySelector): string |
  * caller about to replace the key can stop before anything is lost.
  */
 export declare function retireIdentityKey(key: RetiredKeyPair, selector?: RetiredKeySelector): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * {@link retireIdentityKey} from inside the iOS access-group migration, which
+ * keeps a replaced pre-split copy before deleting it from the shared group and
+ * cannot await itself. @internal
+ */
+export declare function retireIdentityKeyDuringMigration(key: RetiredKeyPair, selector?: RetiredKeySelector): Promise<void>;
 /**
  * The retired keys of `selector`'s account this app can reach, oldest first.
  * iOS and Commons: the ring's index. Android elsewhere: Commons' identity host
@@ -93,10 +99,12 @@ export declare function getRetiredPrivateKey(publicKey: string, selector?: Retir
  */
 export declare function forgetRetiredIdentityKey(publicKey: string, selector?: RetiredKeySelector): Promise<void>;
 /**
- * Forget every retired key of one ring (the person's, or an organization's):
- * called when the identity itself is deleted from this device, so a phone
- * handed on keeps none of the person's old keys. Commons only. Resolves how
- * many it removed.
+ * Forget every retired key of one ring (the person's, or an organization's).
+ * Commons only, and only when the person deletes their Oxy ACCOUNT (Commons'
+ * delete-account flow), which tells them the coins go with it. Deleting the
+ * identity from this device — "Start over", a forced delete — never calls it:
+ * the ring is money, and the same person restoring their identity later must
+ * find it (R4-4). Resolves how many it removed.
  */
 export declare function forgetRetiredIdentityKeys(selector?: RetiredKeySelector): Promise<number>;
 /**
@@ -106,6 +114,24 @@ export declare function forgetRetiredIdentityKeys(selector?: RetiredKeySelector)
  * Resolves how many it mirrored. Elsewhere 0.
  */
 export declare function syncRetiredKeys(): Promise<number>;
+/**
+ * Every retired key of `selector`'s ring WITH its private half, for the
+ * encrypted identity backup (`oxy.identity.backup.create`), which carries them
+ * under the CURRENT phrase so a lost phone costs no more than the current
+ * phrase does (R4-4). Commons only; an entry whose private half is missing or
+ * does not derive its public key is left out. Never log or transmit the result
+ * except inside that encrypted envelope.
+ */
+export declare function exportRetiredIdentityKeys(selector?: RetiredKeySelector): Promise<Array<RetiredKeyPair & {
+    retiredAt: number;
+}>>;
+/**
+ * The pair a previous key's raw PRIVATE KEY gives (64 hex, an optional `0x`),
+ * for a person whose old identity was imported as a private key and so has no
+ * phrase to re-enter. Stores nothing: the caller checks the public key against
+ * the account's key history and only then calls {@link retireIdentityKey}.
+ */
+export declare function retiredKeyFromPrivateKey(privateKeyHex: string): RetiredKeyPair;
 /**
  * The pair a previous recovery phrase derives (`seed[0:32]`, the personal-root
  * and organization-key derivation; 12–24 words). Stores nothing: the caller