@oxy.so/core 7.31.0 → 7.32.0

package/dist/cjs/crypto/organizationKeys.js

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ const keychainAccessGroups_1 = require("../utils/keychainAccessGroups");
 const platform_1 = require("../utils/platform");
 const identitySigner_1 = require("./identitySigner");
 const keychainGroupMigration_1 = require("./keychainGroupMigration");
+const retiredKeys_1 = require("./retiredKeys");
 const keychainItems_1 = require("./keychainItems");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "isOrganizationAccountId", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return keychainItems_1.isOrganizationAccountId; } });
 const ORGANIZATION_PHRASE_WORDS = 24;
@@ -115,9 +116,7 @@ async function organizationKeyFromPhrase(phrase) {
 async function secureStore(item) {
     const raw = await (0, protocol_1.loadSecureStore)();
     const access = await (0, keychainAccessGroups_1.resolveKeychainAccess)();
-    if (access.mode === 'grouped' && access.role === 'holder') {
-        await (0, keychainGroupMigration_1.ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated)();
-    }
+    await (0, keychainGroupMigration_1.prepareKeychainAccess)(access);
     return (0, keychainAccessGroups_1.groupedKeychainStore)(raw, access, item);
 }
 const pairStore = () => secureStore('spending-key');
@@ -208,8 +207,10 @@ async function readLocalPair(accountId) {
  * it; on iOS only Commons holds the groups it writes (any other app throws).
  *
  * Refuses a pair whose public key does not derive from its private key, and a
- * phrase that does not derive the pair. Overwrites whatever this device held for
- * the organization (a replaced key is the caller's decision, ADR 0061 D7).
+ * phrase that does not derive the pair. A DIFFERENT key this device already
+ * held for the organization is first kept in the organization's retired ring
+ * (ADR 0061 D7 as amended; R4-12): coins under it still need it. When that
+ * cannot be confirmed nothing is overwritten and this throws.
  */
 async function storeOrganizationKey(accountId, key) {
     assertAccountId(accountId);
@@ -231,6 +232,18 @@ async function storeOrganizationKey(accountId, key) {
         throw new Error('On Android only Commons holds organization keys; this app has no identity signer store for them.');
     }
     const store = await pairStore();
+    const previous = await heldPrivateKey(store, accountId);
+    if (previous) {
+        const previousPublic = (0, secp256k1_1.deriveSecp256k1PublicKey)(previous);
+        if (previousPublic !== publicKey) {
+            try {
+                await (0, retiredKeys_1.retireIdentityKey)({ privateKey: previous, publicKey: previousPublic }, { accountId });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw new Error(`organization key: the key this device held could not be kept as a previous key, so it was not replaced (${error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'unknown'})`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
     await store.setItemAsync((0, keychainItems_1.organizationPrivateKeyName)(accountId), privateKey, pairOptions(store, true));
     await store.setItemAsync((0, keychainItems_1.organizationPublicKeyName)(accountId), publicKey, pairOptions(store, false));
     if (signer?.writeOrganization &&
@@ -311,6 +324,21 @@ async function listOrganizationKeys() {
         return [];
     return readIndex(await indexStore());
 }
+/**
+ * The private key this device holds for `accountId`, whatever its public half
+ * says (an unhealthy pair is still a key coins may sit under): the slot, then
+ * on Android the signer store's copy. `null` when there is none.
+ */
+async function heldPrivateKey(store, accountId) {
+    const local = await store.getItemAsync((0, keychainItems_1.organizationPrivateKeyName)(accountId), pairOptions(store, false));
+    if (local && (0, secp256k1_1.isValidSecp256k1PrivateKey)(local))
+        return (0, secp256k1_1.normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey)(local);
+    const signer = (0, platform_1.isAndroid)() ? (0, identitySigner_1.registeredIdentitySignerStore)() : null;
+    const mirrored = (await signer?.readOrganization?.(accountId)) ?? null;
+    return mirrored && (0, secp256k1_1.isValidSecp256k1PrivateKey)(mirrored.privateKey)
+        ? (0, secp256k1_1.normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey)(mirrored.privateKey)
+        : null;
+}
 /** Forget an organization key on this device: its pair, its phrase, its signer copy and its index entry. */
 async function deleteOrganizationKey(accountId) {
     assertAccountId(accountId);

package/dist/cjs/crypto/retiredKeys.js

@@ -45,11 +45,14 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.retiredKeyScope = retiredKeyScope;
 exports.retireIdentityKey = retireIdentityKey;
+exports.retireIdentityKeyDuringMigration = retireIdentityKeyDuringMigration;
 exports.listRetiredIdentityKeys = listRetiredIdentityKeys;
 exports.getRetiredPrivateKey = getRetiredPrivateKey;
 exports.forgetRetiredIdentityKey = forgetRetiredIdentityKey;
 exports.forgetRetiredIdentityKeys = forgetRetiredIdentityKeys;
 exports.syncRetiredKeys = syncRetiredKeys;
+exports.exportRetiredIdentityKeys = exportRetiredIdentityKeys;
+exports.retiredKeyFromPrivateKey = retiredKeyFromPrivateKey;
 exports.retiredKeyFromPhrase = retiredKeyFromPhrase;
 const bip39_1 = require("@scure/bip39");
 const english_js_1 = require("@scure/bip39/wordlists/english.js");
@@ -59,8 +62,8 @@ const logger_1 = require("../logger");
 const keychainAccessGroups_1 = require("../utils/keychainAccessGroups");
 const platform_1 = require("../utils/platform");
 const identitySigner_1 = require("./identitySigner");
+const keychainItems_1 = require("./keychainItems");
 const keychainGroupMigration_1 = require("./keychainGroupMigration");
-const organizationKeys_1 = require("./organizationKeys");
 const PERSONAL_SCOPE = 'personal';
 /** Android, Commons-local: its own Keystore-backed slot, shared with no other key. */
 const ANDROID_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = 'oxy_retired_identity';
@@ -71,15 +74,15 @@ const PUBLIC_KEY = /^04[0-9a-f]{128}$/;
  * The secure store for the ring. On iOS every item is a `spending-key`
  * (ADR 0062): the private keys AND the index live in the wallet group, which
  * only Commons and the Peable wallet can read, never the shared one. In
- * Commons every access first awaits the access-group migration. On Android
- * the grouping is a no-op and Commons' own services below apply.
+ * Commons every access first awaits the access-group migration (`gate: false`
+ * is the migration itself, keeping a pre-split copy). On Android the grouping
+ * is a no-op and Commons' own services below apply.
  */
-async function ringStore() {
+async function ringStore(gate = true) {
     const raw = await (0, protocol_1.loadSecureStore)();
     const access = await (0, keychainAccessGroups_1.resolveKeychainAccess)();
-    if (access.mode === 'grouped' && access.role === 'holder') {
-        await (0, keychainGroupMigration_1.ensureKeychainGroupsMigrated)();
-    }
+    if (gate)
+        await (0, keychainGroupMigration_1.prepareKeychainAccess)(access);
     return (0, keychainAccessGroups_1.groupedKeychainStore)(raw, access, 'spending-key');
 }
 /** The ring a selector names: `personal`, or the organization's account id. */
@@ -87,7 +90,7 @@ function retiredKeyScope(selector) {
     const accountId = selector?.accountId;
     if (accountId === undefined)
         return PERSONAL_SCOPE;
-    return (0, organizationKeys_1.isOrganizationAccountId)(accountId) ? accountId : null;
+    return (0, keychainItems_1.isOrganizationAccountId)(accountId) ? accountId : null;
 }
 function canonicalPublicKey(publicKey) {
     try {
@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@ function isIndexEntry(value) {
         return false;
     const entry = value;
     return (typeof entry.scope === 'string' &&
-        (entry.scope === PERSONAL_SCOPE || (0, organizationKeys_1.isOrganizationAccountId)(entry.scope)) &&
+        (entry.scope === PERSONAL_SCOPE || (0, keychainItems_1.isOrganizationAccountId)(entry.scope)) &&
         typeof entry.publicKey === 'string' &&
         PUBLIC_KEY.test(entry.publicKey) &&
         typeof entry.retiredAt === 'number' &&
@@ -171,13 +174,24 @@ function toListed(entry) {
         ? { publicKey: entry.publicKey, retiredAt: entry.retiredAt }
         : { publicKey: entry.publicKey, accountId: entry.scope, retiredAt: entry.retiredAt };
 }
-/** Whether this app writes the ring: Commons (Android: the signer store it registers; iOS: native). */
-function assertMayWrite() {
+/**
+ * Whether this app writes the ring: Commons only (Android: the signer store it
+ * registers; iOS: the keychain role `holder`). The Peable wallet holds the
+ * wallet group too, but only reads, derives and signs: a key the wallet could
+ * add to the ring is a key it could choose (R4-14).
+ */
+async function assertMayWrite() {
     if ((0, platform_1.isWeb)())
         throw new Error('retired key: only a native device holds one');
     if ((0, platform_1.isAndroid)() && !(0, identitySigner_1.registeredIdentitySignerStore)()?.writeRetired) {
         throw new Error('On Android only Commons holds retired keys; this app has no identity signer store for them.');
     }
+    if ((0, platform_1.isIOS)()) {
+        const access = await (0, keychainAccessGroups_1.resolveKeychainAccess)();
+        if (access.mode === 'grouped' && access.role !== 'holder') {
+            throw new Error('On iOS only Commons writes retired keys; this app may only read them.');
+        }
+    }
 }
 /**
  * Keep `key` in the ring of `selector`'s account. Commons only. Idempotent: a
@@ -187,16 +201,27 @@ function assertMayWrite() {
  * caller about to replace the key can stop before anything is lost.
  */
 async function retireIdentityKey(key, selector) {
+    await keepRetired(key, selector, true);
+}
+/**
+ * {@link retireIdentityKey} from inside the iOS access-group migration, which
+ * keeps a replaced pre-split copy before deleting it from the shared group and
+ * cannot await itself. @internal
+ */
+async function retireIdentityKeyDuringMigration(key, selector) {
+    await keepRetired(key, selector, false);
+}
+async function keepRetired(key, selector, gate) {
     const scope = retiredKeyScope(selector);
     if (!scope)
         throw new Error('retired key: accountId must be a 24-hex or uuid account id');
-    assertMayWrite();
+    await assertMayWrite();
     if (!isHealthyPair(key.privateKey, key.publicKey)) {
         throw new Error('retired key: the public key does not derive from the private key');
     }
     const privateKey = (0, secp256k1_1.normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey)(key.privateKey);
     const publicKey = (0, secp256k1_1.normalizeSecp256k1PublicKey)(key.publicKey);
-    const store = await ringStore();
+    const store = await ringStore(gate);
     await store.setItemAsync(privateKeyName(scope, publicKey), privateKey, privateOptions(store, true));
     const readBack = await store.getItemAsync(privateKeyName(scope, publicKey), privateOptions(store, false));
     if (readBack !== privateKey) {
@@ -294,7 +319,7 @@ async function forgetRetiredIdentityKey(publicKey, selector) {
     const canonical = canonicalPublicKey(publicKey);
     if (!scope || !canonical)
         throw new Error('retired key: invalid selector or public key');
-    assertMayWrite();
+    await assertMayWrite();
     const store = await ringStore();
     await store.deleteItemAsync(privateKeyName(scope, canonical), privateOptions(store, false));
     const signer = (0, platform_1.isAndroid)() ? (0, identitySigner_1.registeredIdentitySignerStore)() : null;
@@ -302,10 +327,12 @@ async function forgetRetiredIdentityKey(publicKey, selector) {
     await writeIndex(store, (await readIndex(store)).filter((entry) => !(entry.scope === scope && entry.publicKey === canonical)));
 }
 /**
- * Forget every retired key of one ring (the person's, or an organization's):
- * called when the identity itself is deleted from this device, so a phone
- * handed on keeps none of the person's old keys. Commons only. Resolves how
- * many it removed.
+ * Forget every retired key of one ring (the person's, or an organization's).
+ * Commons only, and only when the person deletes their Oxy ACCOUNT (Commons'
+ * delete-account flow), which tells them the coins go with it. Deleting the
+ * identity from this device — "Start over", a forced delete — never calls it:
+ * the ring is money, and the same person restoring their identity later must
+ * find it (R4-4). Resolves how many it removed.
  */
 async function forgetRetiredIdentityKeys(selector) {
     const scope = retiredKeyScope(selector);
@@ -352,6 +379,41 @@ async function syncRetiredKeys() {
     }
     return mirrored;
 }
+/**
+ * Every retired key of `selector`'s ring WITH its private half, for the
+ * encrypted identity backup (`oxy.identity.backup.create`), which carries them
+ * under the CURRENT phrase so a lost phone costs no more than the current
+ * phrase does (R4-4). Commons only; an entry whose private half is missing or
+ * does not derive its public key is left out. Never log or transmit the result
+ * except inside that encrypted envelope.
+ */
+async function exportRetiredIdentityKeys(selector) {
+    const scope = retiredKeyScope(selector);
+    if (!scope || (0, platform_1.isWeb)())
+        return [];
+    await assertMayWrite();
+    const out = [];
+    for (const entry of await listRetiredIdentityKeys(selector)) {
+        const privateKey = await getRetiredPrivateKey(entry.publicKey, selector);
+        if (privateKey)
+            out.push({ privateKey, publicKey: entry.publicKey, retiredAt: entry.retiredAt });
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * The pair a previous key's raw PRIVATE KEY gives (64 hex, an optional `0x`),
+ * for a person whose old identity was imported as a private key and so has no
+ * phrase to re-enter. Stores nothing: the caller checks the public key against
+ * the account's key history and only then calls {@link retireIdentityKey}.
+ */
+function retiredKeyFromPrivateKey(privateKeyHex) {
+    const trimmed = privateKeyHex.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(trimmed) || !(0, secp256k1_1.isValidSecp256k1PrivateKey)(trimmed)) {
+        throw new Error('retired key: not a valid private key');
+    }
+    const privateKey = (0, secp256k1_1.normalizeSecp256k1PrivateKey)(trimmed);
+    return { privateKey, publicKey: publicKeyOf(privateKey) };
+}
 /**
  * The pair a previous recovery phrase derives (`seed[0:32]`, the personal-root
  * and organization-key derivation; 12–24 words). Stores nothing: the caller

package/dist/cjs/utils/keychainAccessGroups.js

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.KeychainAccessUnavailableError = exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS = void 0;
+exports.KeychainAccessUnavailableError = exports.DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX = exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS = void 0;
 exports.keychainGroupFor = keychainGroupFor;
+exports.mayWriteKeychainItem = mayWriteKeychainItem;
 exports.mayHoldKeychainItem = mayHoldKeychainItem;
 exports.keychainAccessFromDefaultGroup = keychainAccessFromDefaultGroup;
 exports.resolveKeychainAccess = resolveKeychainAccess;
 exports.resetKeychainAccessForTests = resetKeychainAccessForTests;
 exports.keychainAccessGroupValue = keychainAccessGroupValue;
+exports.setHolderSharedSecretFallback = setHolderSharedSecretFallback;
+exports.closeWalletSharedSecretFallback = closeWalletSharedSecretFallback;
 exports.keychainReadPlan = keychainReadPlan;
 exports.keychainDeletePlan = keychainDeletePlan;
 exports.keychainWriteOption = keychainWriteOption;
@@ -65,6 +68,15 @@ exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS = {
     wallet: 'so.oxy.wallet',
     shared: 'group.so.oxy.shared',
 };
+/**
+ * The suffix a DEVELOPMENT build's restricted groups carry (`so.oxy.commons.dev`,
+ * `to.peable.app.dev`: `so.oxy.identity.dev`, `so.oxy.wallet.dev`). A dev build
+ * sits beside the production app on the same phone, is signed by the same team
+ * and runs JavaScript from a dev server, so it never shares a restricted group
+ * with production (`@oxy.so/app-preset` enforces the entitlements). The shared
+ * group has no variant: it holds nothing secret.
+ */
+exports.DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX = '.dev';
 /** Thrown while the probe cannot answer (before first unlock). Transient. */
 class KeychainAccessUnavailableError extends Error {
     constructor(cause) {
@@ -86,6 +98,16 @@ function keychainGroupFor(item) {
             return 'app';
     }
 }
+/**
+ * Whether `role` may WRITE `item`. Only Commons writes a secret: the Peable
+ * wallet reads, derives and signs with spending keys (and the retired ring)
+ * but never adds one — a key the wallet could add is one the wallet could
+ * choose. (The keychain itself lets every app in the wallet group write it;
+ * this is the SDK's half, and readers check what they find, ADR 0062.)
+ */
+function mayWriteKeychainItem(role, item) {
+    return role === 'holder' || item === 'shared' || item === 'app';
+}
 /** Whether `role` holds the group `item` lives in. */
 function mayHoldKeychainItem(role, item) {
     switch (role) {
@@ -109,14 +131,18 @@ function keychainAccessFromDefaultGroup(defaultGroup, appGroup) {
     }
     const prefix = defaultGroup.slice(0, dot + 1);
     const group = defaultGroup.slice(dot + 1);
-    const role = group === exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.identity
+    const dev = group.endsWith(exports.DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX);
+    const base = dev ? group.slice(0, -exports.DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX.length) : group;
+    const role = base === exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.identity
         ? 'holder'
-        : group === exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.wallet
+        : base === exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS.wallet
             ? 'wallet'
             : 'member';
+    // A `.dev` suffix on anything but a restricted group is not a variant.
+    const variant = dev && role !== 'member' ? { variant: exports.DEV_KEYCHAIN_GROUP_SUFFIX } : {};
     return appGroup?.startsWith(prefix)
-        ? { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role, appGroup }
-        : { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role };
+        ? { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role, appGroup, ...variant }
+        : { mode: 'grouped', prefix, defaultGroup, role, ...variant };
 }
 let resolvedAccess = null;
 /**
@@ -169,9 +195,11 @@ async function resolveKeychainAccess() {
     resolvedAccess = keychainAccessFromDefaultGroup(probe.accessGroup, own.state === 'resolved' ? own.accessGroup : undefined);
     return resolvedAccess;
 }
-/** Forget the memoized access. Tests only. @internal */
+/** Forget the memoized access and the fallback state. Tests only. @internal */
 function resetKeychainAccessForTests() {
     resolvedAccess = null;
+    holderSharedFallback = false;
+    walletSharedFallbackClosed = false;
 }
 /**
  * The full `kSecAttrAccessGroup` value of `group`, or `undefined` for "no
@@ -189,17 +217,54 @@ function keychainAccessGroupValue(access, group) {
         // default is the shared group: no group, the calls it always made.
         return access.appGroup ?? (access.role === 'member' ? undefined : access.defaultGroup);
     }
-    return `${access.prefix}${exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS[group]}`;
+    const variant = group === 'shared' ? '' : (access.variant ?? '');
+    return `${access.prefix}${exports.KEYCHAIN_ACCESS_GROUPS[group]}${variant}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether a SECRET read may still fall back to the pre-split shared group
+ * (R4-7). Every Oxy app can write that group, and keychain items survive an
+ * uninstall, so a secret found there is one Commons did not necessarily write.
+ *
+ * - Commons (`holder`): CLOSED, except while its one-shot migration has proved
+ *   the shared copies are its own (they carry the key its sandbox marker
+ *   records) and could not move them all yet; the migration opens it for that
+ *   launch only ({@link setHolderSharedSecretFallback}).
+ * - The Peable wallet: open until Commons' migration has finished (the
+ *   completion record Commons mirrors into the wallet group), because until
+ *   then an upgraded phone's keys are still in the shared group; closed for
+ *   good once it has seen that record ({@link closeWalletSharedSecretFallback}).
+ */
+let holderSharedFallback = false;
+let walletSharedFallbackClosed = false;
+/** The migration's switch for Commons' fallback. @internal */
+function setHolderSharedSecretFallback(open) {
+    holderSharedFallback = open;
+}
+/** The wallet saw Commons' completion record: no shared fallback again in this process. @internal */
+function closeWalletSharedSecretFallback() {
+    walletSharedFallbackClosed = true;
+}
+function sharedFallbackOpen(access) {
+    switch (access.role) {
+        case 'holder':
+            return holderSharedFallback;
+        case 'wallet':
+            return !walletSharedFallbackClosed;
+        case 'member':
+            return false;
+    }
 }
 function option(value) {
     return value === undefined ? {} : { accessGroup: value };
 }
 /**
- * The option bags a READ of `item` tries, in order: its own group, then, for
- * an identity secret or a spending key, the shared group, where those lived
- * before the split (release 4 of the doc drops that fallback). Empty when this
- * app may not hold the item: the caller answers `null` without touching the
- * keychain. An app's own items (`app`) take {@link ownKeychainItemPlan}.
+ * The option bags a READ of `item` tries, in order: its own group, then — for
+ * an identity secret or a spending key, and only while
+ * {@link sharedFallbackOpen} says so — the shared group, where those lived
+ * before the split. Empty when this app may not hold the item: the caller
+ * answers `null` without touching the keychain. Evaluated per read: the
+ * fallback closes during a process's life. An app's own items (`app`) take
+ * {@link ownKeychainItemPlan}.
  */
 function keychainReadPlan(access, item) {
     if (access.mode === 'ungrouped') {
@@ -210,18 +275,29 @@ function keychainReadPlan(access, item) {
     }
     const own = keychainGroupFor(item);
     const plan = [option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, own))];
-    if (own === 'identity' || own === 'wallet') {
-        // Where the split moved these items from.
+    if ((own === 'identity' || own === 'wallet') && sharedFallbackOpen(access)) {
         plan.push(option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, 'shared')));
     }
     return plan;
 }
 /**
- * Every place a DELETE of `item` must reach: the read plan, so a delete never
- * leaves a pre-split copy behind in the shared group.
+ * Every place a DELETE of `item` must reach: its own group AND the shared
+ * group, whatever the read fallback says, so a delete never leaves a copy
+ * behind where every Oxy app can read it.
  */
 function keychainDeletePlan(access, item) {
-    return keychainReadPlan(access, item);
+    if (access.mode === 'ungrouped') {
+        return [{}];
+    }
+    if (!mayHoldKeychainItem(access.role, item)) {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const own = keychainGroupFor(item);
+    const plan = [option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, own))];
+    if (own === 'identity' || own === 'wallet') {
+        plan.push(option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, 'shared')));
+    }
+    return plan;
 }
 /**
  * The option a WRITE of `item` carries. THROWS when this app may not hold the
@@ -232,8 +308,8 @@ function keychainWriteOption(access, item) {
     if (access.mode === 'ungrouped') {
         return {};
     }
-    if (!mayHoldKeychainItem(access.role, item)) {
-        throw new Error(`This app (keychain role "${access.role}") may not hold a ${item} keychain item; only Commons writes the identity.`);
+    if (!mayWriteKeychainItem(access.role, item)) {
+        throw new Error(`This app (keychain role "${access.role}") may not write a ${item} keychain item; only Commons writes the identity and the keys the wallet spends.`);
     }
     return option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, keychainGroupFor(item)));
 }
@@ -301,19 +377,29 @@ async function deleteThroughPlan(store, key, options, plan) {
 }
 /**
  * `store` with every call routed to `item`'s groups for this app: reads walk
- * the read plan, writes carry the write option (throwing for a role that may
- * not hold the item), deletes reach every location. The constants of the
- * wrapped store are kept, so `store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY` still reads.
+ * the read plan (evaluated per read), writes carry the write option (throwing
+ * for a role that may not write the item), deletes reach every location. A
+ * secret WRITE also deletes the item's copy in the shared group (R4-6): a value
+ * Commons writes replaces whatever any app could read there, and a copy that
+ * cannot be removed fails the write instead of staying readable. The constants
+ * of the wrapped store are kept, so `store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY` still
+ * reads.
  */
 function groupedKeychainStore(store, access, item) {
-    const plan = keychainReadPlan(access, item);
+    const sharedCopy = access.mode === 'grouped' && (item === 'identity-secret' || item === 'spending-key')
+        ? option(keychainAccessGroupValue(access, 'shared'))
+        : null;
     const wrapped = {
-        getItemAsync: (key, options) => readThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, plan),
+        getItemAsync: (key, options) => readThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, keychainReadPlan(access, item)),
         setItemAsync: async (key, value, options) => {
             const group = keychainWriteOption(access, item);
             await store.setItemAsync(key, value, { ...(options ?? {}), ...group });
+            if (sharedCopy) {
+                const { keychainAccessible: _accessible, ...rest } = (options ?? {});
+                await store.deleteItemAsync(key, { ...rest, ...sharedCopy });
+            }
         },
-        deleteItemAsync: (key, options) => deleteThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, plan),
+        deleteItemAsync: (key, options) => deleteThroughPlan(store, key, options ?? {}, keychainDeletePlan(access, item)),
     };
     return Object.assign(Object.create(store), wrapped);
 }