@oracle-agent/oracle 0.14.1 → 0.15.0

package/src/public-control/build-registry.mjs

@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle BUILD registry — the deploy verb, bounded.
-//
-// Oracle's scope model was built for TRADING: read, watch, prepare:trade,
-// prepare:mint, agent:execute. Every one of those moves value through contracts
-// that ALREADY EXIST. "Build on Stable" is a different verb: it brings a new
-// contract into existence.
-//
-// The danger of a deploy verb is that "deploy" normally means "run arbitrary
-// bytecode", which no policy can meaningfully allowlist — a compromised agent
-// just ships whatever it wants. So this module does NOT implement that.
-//
-// What it implements: deploy-through-a-pinned-factory. Oracle may call ONE
-// allowlisted function on ONE allowlisted factory address per chain. The shape
-// of what gets created, and its economics, live in that factory's audited code,
-// not in anything the agent chooses. Bounded by construction.
-//
-// Hard rules enforced here:
-//   1. No raw bytecode. A request carrying `bytecode`/`initCode`/`data` is
-//      rejected outright — that is the arbitrary-deploy path and it stays shut.
-//   2. Factory must be explicitly allowlisted for that exact chainId.
-//   3. Unknown chain -> reject. Unknown factory -> reject. Fail closed.
-//   4. Building is a PROPOSAL by default. Executing needs a separate scope AND
-//      a separate global arm flag, mirroring how execute is gated today.
-
-import { deployGloballyEnabled } from "../flags.mjs";
-
-const ADDR_RE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;
-
-/** Fields that would smuggle arbitrary-deploy authority through a build request. */
-const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = ["bytecode", "initCode", "init_code", "data", "creationCode", "salt"];
-
-/**
- * Allowlisted build targets, per chain.
- *
- * `address: null` means "capability known, target not yet pinned" — Oracle
- * understands how to build this thing but physically cannot until an operator
- * supplies a verified factory address. Stable's TokenFactory is deliberately
- * null: the contracts exist and are audited, but nothing is deployed to 988
- * mainnet yet, so there is no address to trust.
- */
-export const BUILD_REGISTRY = {
-  988: {
-    chainName: "Stable Mainnet",
-    factories: {
-      "stable.tokenFactory": {
-        address: envAddress("ORACLE_STABLE_TOKEN_FACTORY"),
-        // The ONLY function Oracle may call on it.
-        method: "createLaunch",
-        creates: ["token", "curve", "feeSplitter"],
-        // Economics are fixed in the audited contract, NOT chosen by the agent.
-        fixed: {
-          creatorFeeBps: 7000,
-          protocolFeeBps: 3000,
-          curveFeeBps: 100,
-          graduationReserveBps: 2000,
-          maxReflectionBps: 3000,
-        },
-        description:
-          "Create a bonding-curve token launch. Fee split, curve params, and " +
-          "graduation ratio are hardcoded in the audited factory.",
-      },
-    },
-  },
-};
-
-function envAddress(name) {
-  const v = String(process.env[name] || "").trim();
-  return ADDR_RE.test(v) ? v : null;
-}
-
-/** Every build target Oracle knows about, including unpinned ones. */
-export function listBuildTargets() {
-  const out = [];
-  for (const [chainId, entry] of Object.entries(BUILD_REGISTRY)) {
-    for (const [key, f] of Object.entries(entry.factories)) {
-      out.push({
-        chainId: Number(chainId),
-        chainName: entry.chainName,
-        target: key,
-        method: f.method,
-        creates: f.creates,
-        fixed: f.fixed,
-        description: f.description,
-        address: f.address,
-        // A target with no pinned address cannot be built, by design.
-        available: Boolean(f.address),
-      });
-    }
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate a build request. Returns a normalized plan or throws.
- * Never touches the network. Never signs. Never broadcasts.
- */
-export function validateBuildRequest(input = {}) {
-  if (!input || typeof input !== "object" || Array.isArray(input)) {
-    throw new Error("build request must be an object");
-  }
-
-  // 1. Arbitrary-deploy attempt -> hard reject before anything else.
-  for (const f of FORBIDDEN_FIELDS) {
-    if (f in input) {
-      throw new Error(
-        `arbitrary deploy is not supported: remove "${f}". ` +
-          "Oracle builds only through allowlisted factories.",
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  const chainId = Number(input.chainId);
-  if (!Number.isInteger(chainId)) throw new Error("chainId required");
-
-  const chain = BUILD_REGISTRY[chainId];
-  if (!chain) throw new Error(`chain ${chainId} has no build targets (fail closed)`);
-
-  const targetKey = String(input.target || "").trim();
-  if (!targetKey) throw new Error("target required");
-
-  const factory = chain.factories[targetKey];
-  if (!factory) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `unknown build target "${targetKey}" on chain ${chainId} (fail closed)`,
-    );
-  }
-
-  if (!factory.address) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `build target "${targetKey}" has no pinned factory address on chain ${chainId}. ` +
-        "An operator must supply a verified address before Oracle can build here.",
-    );
-  }
-
-  // 2. Args are validated against the factory's own rules, not free-form.
-  const args = validateLaunchArgs(input.args || {}, factory);
-
-  return {
-    chainId,
-    chainName: chain.chainName,
-    target: targetKey,
-    factory: factory.address,
-    method: factory.method,
-    creates: factory.creates,
-    fixed: factory.fixed,
-    args,
-  };
-}
-
-/** Argument rules for the stable.tokenFactory createLaunch shape. */
-function validateLaunchArgs(args, factory) {
-  const name = String(args.name || "").trim();
-  const symbol = String(args.symbol || "").trim();
-  const creator = String(args.creator || "").trim();
-  const imageURI = String(args.imageURI || "").trim();
-  const socialsURI = String(args.socialsURI || "").trim();
-  const reflectionBps = Number(args.reflectionBps ?? 0);
-
-  if (!name || name.length > 64) throw new Error("args.name required (1-64 chars)");
-  if (!symbol || symbol.length > 16) throw new Error("args.symbol required (1-16 chars)");
-  if (!ADDR_RE.test(creator)) throw new Error("args.creator must be a valid address");
-  if (imageURI.length > 512 || socialsURI.length > 512) throw new Error("args URI too long");
-
-  const maxRefl = factory.fixed?.maxReflectionBps ?? 0;
-  if (!Number.isInteger(reflectionBps) || reflectionBps < 0 || reflectionBps > maxRefl) {
-    throw new Error(`args.reflectionBps must be an integer 0-${maxRefl}`);
-  }
-
-  return { name, symbol, imageURI, socialsURI, creator, reflectionBps };
-}
-
-/**
- * Turn a validated request into a PROPOSAL. This is what `prepare:build`
- * produces: a fully-described, human-readable statement of what would be
- * created. It carries no authority and cannot be executed.
- */
-export function buildProposal(input) {
-  const plan = validateBuildRequest(input);
-  return {
-    kind: "build.proposal",
-    executable: false,
-    chainId: plan.chainId,
-    chainName: plan.chainName,
-    target: plan.target,
-    factory: plan.factory,
-    method: plan.method,
-    creates: plan.creates,
-    args: plan.args,
-    fixedEconomics: plan.fixed,
-    summary: renderBuildProposal(plan),
-  };
-}
-
-/** Plain-English render so a user sees exactly what they authorize. */
-export function renderBuildProposal(plan) {
-  const f = plan.fixed || {};
-  const lines = [
-    `Create "${plan.args.name}" ($${plan.args.symbol}) on ${plan.chainName}.`,
-    `Factory: ${plan.factory} (${plan.method})`,
-    `Creates: ${plan.creates.join(", ")}`,
-    `Creator: ${plan.args.creator}`,
-  ];
-  if (plan.args.reflectionBps > 0) {
-    lines.push(`Reflections: ${(plan.args.reflectionBps / 100).toFixed(2)}% of trade fees to holders`);
-  }
-  lines.push(
-    `Fixed by the audited factory (agent cannot change): ` +
-      `creator ${(f.creatorFeeBps || 0) / 100}% / protocol ${(f.protocolFeeBps || 0) / 100}% of fees, ` +
-      `${(f.curveFeeBps || 0) / 100}% trade fee, ` +
-      `${(f.graduationReserveBps || 0) / 100}% of supply to LP at graduation.`,
-  );
-  lines.push("No arbitrary code is deployed. Only this factory call.");
-  return lines.join("\n");
-}
-
-/**
- * Whether an actual build broadcast is permitted right now.
- * Requires BOTH the explicit scope AND the global arm flag — same
- * belt-and-braces posture as execute.
- */
-export function buildExecutionAllowed(scopes = []) {
-  const hasScope = Array.isArray(scopes) && scopes.includes(BUILD_EXECUTE_SCOPE);
-  return { allowed: hasScope && deployGloballyEnabled(), hasScope, armed: deployGloballyEnabled() };
-}
-
-export const BUILD_PREPARE_SCOPE = "prepare:build";
-export const BUILD_EXECUTE_SCOPE = "build:factory";

package/src/public-control/bundler-client.mjs

@@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle Control — ERC-4337 bundler/paymaster runtime submit path (Slice H).
-//
-// Takes a USER-SIGNED UserOperation (produced off this infrastructure — the
-// user's own wallet signs it, never Oracle) and submits it to an ERC-4337
-// bundler via an INJECTED client. This module never talks to a real network
-// itself: every RPC call goes through a caller-supplied `bundlerClient` /
-// `paymasterClient`, duck-typed to the viem/permissionless BundlerClient
-// action shape ({ sendUserOperation, waitForUserOperationReceipt,
-// estimateUserOperationGas }) or a thin equivalent. Tests inject a fully
-// offline mock; production code injects a real viem/permissionless client.
-//
-// Hard boundaries (same posture as aa-adapter.mjs / connect-agent.mjs):
-//   - This module holds no keys and requests no signature. It only forwards
-//     an ALREADY-SIGNED userOp (or, for estimateAndFill/applyPaymaster, an
-//     unsigned userOp being prepared BEFORE the user signs it) to an
-//     injected client's methods.
-//   - submitUserOperation refuses an unsigned userOp outright — a missing or
-//     placeholder ("0x") signature must never reach a bundler.
-//   - submitUserOperation/estimateAndFill/applyPaymaster all refuse an
-//     entryPoint that does not match ENTRYPOINT_V07 (imported from
-//     aa-adapter.mjs, the single source of truth for the deployed EntryPoint
-//     address this codebase targets) unless the caller explicitly overrides
-//     it, and even then the value must still be a valid checksummed address
-//     — this stops an accidental/mismatched EntryPoint submit.
-//   - Before any payload is handed to an injected client, it is rebuilt from
-//     an explicit field allowlist (canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit) and then
-//     recursively scanned by assertNoSecretPayload() for anything shaped
-//     like a private key, mnemonic, bearer token, keystore path, or signer
-//     URL. Fail closed: throws before the call is ever made.
-//   - Imports ONLY from ./aa-adapter.mjs (ENTRYPOINT_V07, buildUserOperation)
-//     and viem/node builtins. NEVER from the private executor stack
-//     (get-signer.mjs, keystore.mjs, exec-policy.mjs, local-signer/*,
-//     adapters/*, mint-capability.mjs) — this module must never be wired to
-//     private operator wallet, and never makes a live network call of its own.
-
-import { isAddress, isHex, getAddress } from "viem";
-
-import { ENTRYPOINT_V07, buildUserOperation } from "./aa-adapter.mjs";
-
-// Re-exported for convenience so callers of this module don't need a second
-// import from aa-adapter just to read the default EntryPoint constant.
-export { ENTRYPOINT_V07 };
-
-function fail(message) {
-  throw new Error(`bundler-client: ${message}`);
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// No-secret invariant (fail closed) — scoped to what a bundler/paymaster
-// payload could plausibly carry. Mirrors the posture of
-// public-api/connect-agent.mjs's assertNoSecretMaterial without importing
-// across slices.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-export class SecretLeakError extends Error {
-  constructor(path, rule) {
-    super(`secret material must never appear in a bundler/paymaster payload (at ${path}, rule: ${rule})`);
-    this.name = "SecretLeakError";
-    this.path = path;
-    this.rule = rule;
-  }
-}
-
-const FORBIDDEN_KEY_RE =
-  /(private[_-]?key|secret|bearer|keystore|mnemonic|seed[_-]?phrase|passphrase|password|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|signer[_-]?url)/i;
-
-const FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RULES = Object.freeze([
-  // 32-byte hex — the shape of a raw EVM private key / session secret.
-  { rule: "raw-32-byte-hex-key", re: /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/ },
-  { rule: "bearer-token", re: /bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+/i },
-  { rule: "pem-private-key", re: /-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/ },
-  { rule: "keystore-path", re: /keystore/i },
-  { rule: "signer-url", re: /https?:\/\/\S*sign/i },
-  { rule: "authorization-header", re: /authorization\s*:/i },
-]);
-
-/**
- * Recursively scan a value for anything shaped like secret material. Throws
- * SecretLeakError on the first hit — fail closed. Note: this intentionally
- * does NOT flag `signature` as a forbidden key (unlike connect-agent's
- * variant) — a signed userOp's `signature` field is a public, submittable
- * ECDSA/contract signature, not a secret, and this module's whole job is to
- * submit it.
- */
-export function assertNoSecretPayload(value, path = "$", seen = new Set()) {
-  if (value == null) return value;
-  if (typeof value === "string") {
-    for (const { rule, re } of FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RULES) {
-      if (re.test(value)) throw new SecretLeakError(path, rule);
-    }
-    return value;
-  }
-  if (typeof value !== "object") return value;
-  if (seen.has(value)) return value;
-  seen.add(value);
-
-  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(value) || value instanceof ArrayBuffer) return value;
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
-    value.forEach((v, i) => assertNoSecretPayload(v, `${path}[${i}]`, seen));
-    return value;
-  }
-  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
-    if (FORBIDDEN_KEY_RE.test(k)) {
-      throw new SecretLeakError(`${path}.${k}`, "forbidden-key-name");
-    }
-    assertNoSecretPayload(v, `${path}.${k}`, seen);
-  }
-  return value;
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Helpers
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** Explicit field allowlist for an ERC-4337 v0.7 UserOperation, matching the
- *  exact shape aa-adapter.buildUserOperation() returns. Rebuilding from this
- *  allowlist (rather than spreading the caller's object) means any stray
- *  extra property on a hand-built/tampered userOp — however it got there —
- *  is dropped before it can ever reach an injected client. */
-const USEROP_FIELDS = [
-  "sender",
-  "nonce",
-  "factory",
-  "factoryData",
-  "callData",
-  "callGasLimit",
-  "verificationGasLimit",
-  "preVerificationGas",
-  "maxFeePerGas",
-  "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
-  "paymaster",
-  "paymasterVerificationGasLimit",
-  "paymasterPostOpGasLimit",
-  "paymasterData",
-  "signature",
-];
-
-function canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit(userOp) {
-  if (!userOp || typeof userOp !== "object") {
-    fail("userOp must be an object (typically the output of aa-adapter.buildUserOperation)");
-  }
-  const out = {};
-  for (const field of USEROP_FIELDS) out[field] = userOp[field] ?? null;
-  if (typeof out.sender !== "string" || !isAddress(out.sender)) {
-    fail("userOp.sender must be a valid 0x address");
-  }
-  if (typeof out.callData !== "string" || !isHex(out.callData)) {
-    fail("userOp.callData must be 0x-prefixed hex");
-  }
-  return Object.freeze(out);
-}
-
-function requireSignedUserOp(userOp) {
-  const sig = userOp && userOp.signature;
-  if (sig == null || sig === "" || sig === "0x") {
-    fail("refusing to submit a userOp with a missing/placeholder signature — sign it in the user's own wallet first");
-  }
-  if (typeof sig !== "string" || !isHex(sig)) {
-    fail("userOp.signature must be 0x-prefixed hex when present");
-  }
-}
-
-function resolveEntryPoint(entryPoint) {
-  const value = entryPoint ?? ENTRYPOINT_V07;
-  if (typeof value !== "string" || !isAddress(value)) {
-    fail("entryPoint must be a valid 0x address");
-  }
-  const normalized = getAddress(value);
-  if (normalized !== getAddress(ENTRYPOINT_V07)) {
-    fail(
-      `entryPoint ${normalized} does not match the expected EntryPoint ${getAddress(ENTRYPOINT_V07)} ` +
-        "(ENTRYPOINT_V07 from aa-adapter.mjs) — refusing to submit to an unexpected EntryPoint"
-    );
-  }
-  return normalized;
-}
-
-function requireClientMethod(client, methodName, clientLabel) {
-  if (!client || typeof client[methodName] !== "function") {
-    fail(
-      `${clientLabel} must expose an async ${methodName}(...) method (viem/permissionless BundlerClient shape, ` +
-        "or a thin { sendUserOperation, waitForUserOperationReceipt, estimateUserOperationGas } interface) — " +
-        "this module never makes a network call of its own"
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-function toHexIfBigIntLike(value) {
-  if (value == null) return value;
-  if (typeof value === "string") return value;
-  if (typeof value === "bigint") return `0x${value.toString(16)}`;
-  if (typeof value === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(value)) return `0x${BigInt(value).toString(16)}`;
-  fail("gas/fee field returned by client must be a 0x-hex string, bigint, or safe integer");
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Public contract
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Submit an already user-signed UserOperation to an ERC-4337 bundler via an
- * injected client. This is the only function in this module that is allowed
- * to move a userOp onto a bundler's mempool, and it refuses to do so unless
- * the userOp actually carries a real signature.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {object} params.userOp  a signed UserOperation (signature != "0x")
- * @param {object} params.bundlerClient  injected client exposing async
- *   sendUserOperation({ userOperation, entryPoint }) -> userOpHash
- * @param {string} [params.entryPoint]  defaults to ENTRYPOINT_V07; refused
- *   if it does not resolve to ENTRYPOINT_V07
- * @returns {Promise<string>} userOpHash returned by the bundler client
- */
-export async function submitUserOperation(_params = {}) {
-  throw new Error("bundler-client.submitUserOperation refused: @oracle-agent/oracle is prepare-only. Submit UserOps from the user wallet or local operator.");
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Fill gas fields on an UNSIGNED (pre-signature) UserOperation via an
- * injected bundler client's estimateUserOperationGas. Never submits
- * anything and never requires a signature — this runs BEFORE the user
- * signs, so it can supply real gas numbers to sign over. Returns a new
- * frozen userOp; the input is never mutated.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {object} params.userOp  unsigned or placeholder-gas UserOperation
- *   (typically straight out of aa-adapter.buildUserOperation)
- * @param {object} params.bundlerClient  injected client exposing async
- *   estimateUserOperationGas({ userOperation, entryPoint }) -> gas fields
- * @param {string} [params.entryPoint]  defaults to ENTRYPOINT_V07
- * @returns {Promise<object>} frozen userOp with gas fields filled from the
- *   client's estimate (falls back to the input's own values for any field
- *   the client did not return)
- */
-export async function estimateAndFill(params = {}) {
-  const { userOp, bundlerClient, entryPoint } = params;
-  const payload = canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit(userOp);
-  const resolvedEntryPoint = resolveEntryPoint(entryPoint);
-  requireClientMethod(bundlerClient, "estimateUserOperationGas", "bundlerClient");
-
-  assertNoSecretPayload(payload);
-  const estimate = await bundlerClient.estimateUserOperationGas({
-    userOperation: payload,
-    entryPoint: resolvedEntryPoint,
-  });
-  if (!estimate || typeof estimate !== "object") {
-    fail("bundlerClient.estimateUserOperationGas must resolve to a gas-fields object");
-  }
-
-  const filled = {
-    ...payload,
-    callGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.callGasLimit ?? payload.callGasLimit),
-    verificationGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.verificationGasLimit ?? payload.verificationGasLimit),
-    preVerificationGas: toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.preVerificationGas ?? payload.preVerificationGas),
-  };
-  if (payload.paymaster != null) {
-    if (estimate.paymasterVerificationGasLimit != null) {
-      filled.paymasterVerificationGasLimit = toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.paymasterVerificationGasLimit);
-    }
-    if (estimate.paymasterPostOpGasLimit != null) {
-      filled.paymasterPostOpGasLimit = toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.paymasterPostOpGasLimit);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return Object.freeze(assertNoSecretPayload(filled));
-}
-
-/**
- * Attach (or explicitly omit) paymaster sponsorship on an UNSIGNED
- * UserOperation via an injected paymasterClient. If `paymasterClient` is
- * absent/null, this is a no-op that returns the self-funded path — the
- * userOp is returned with its paymaster fields explicitly nulled out, never
- * left ambiguous. This module never holds paymaster credentials; whatever
- * auth the paymaster needs lives inside the injected client, off this file.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {object} params.userOp  unsigned UserOperation
- * @param {object} [params.paymasterClient]  injected client exposing async
- *   getPaymasterData({ userOperation, entryPoint }) -> paymaster fields.
- *   Omit for the self-funded path (no paymaster).
- * @param {string} [params.entryPoint]  defaults to ENTRYPOINT_V07
- * @returns {Promise<object>} frozen userOp with paymaster fields set
- */
-export async function applyPaymaster(params = {}) {
-  const { userOp, paymasterClient, entryPoint } = params;
-  const payload = canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit(userOp);
-  const resolvedEntryPoint = resolveEntryPoint(entryPoint);
-
-  if (paymasterClient == null) {
-    // Self-funded path: no paymaster involved, fields explicitly nulled.
-    return Object.freeze({
-      ...payload,
-      paymaster: null,
-      paymasterData: null,
-      paymasterVerificationGasLimit: null,
-      paymasterPostOpGasLimit: null,
-    });
-  }
-
-  requireClientMethod(paymasterClient, "getPaymasterData", "paymasterClient");
-  assertNoSecretPayload(payload);
-  const sponsorship = await paymasterClient.getPaymasterData({
-    userOperation: payload,
-    entryPoint: resolvedEntryPoint,
-  });
-  if (!sponsorship || typeof sponsorship.paymaster !== "string" || !isAddress(sponsorship.paymaster)) {
-    fail("paymasterClient.getPaymasterData must resolve to an object with a valid paymaster address");
-  }
-
-  const filled = {
-    ...payload,
-    paymaster: getAddress(sponsorship.paymaster),
-    paymasterData: sponsorship.paymasterData ?? "0x",
-    paymasterVerificationGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(sponsorship.paymasterVerificationGasLimit ?? 0n),
-    paymasterPostOpGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(sponsorship.paymasterPostOpGasLimit ?? 0n),
-  };
-
-  return Object.freeze(assertNoSecretPayload(filled));
-}
-
-/**
- * Passthrough to an injected bundler client's receipt-polling method. This
- * module adds no retry/timeout logic of its own — that belongs to the
- * injected client (viem/permissionless already implement polling with
- * backoff); this is a thin, testable seam.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {string} params.hash  userOpHash returned by submitUserOperation
- * @param {object} params.bundlerClient  injected client exposing async
- *   waitForUserOperationReceipt({ hash, ...rest }) -> receipt
- * @param {object} [params.opts]  extra options forwarded verbatim (e.g.
- *   pollingInterval, timeout) — passed through untouched, never inspected
- *   for secrets since this module trusts caller-supplied polling knobs are
- *   not where key material would ever live
- * @returns {Promise<object>} whatever the injected client resolves to
- */
-export async function waitForReceipt(params = {}) {
-  const { hash, bundlerClient, opts = {} } = params;
-  if (typeof hash !== "string" || !isHex(hash)) {
-    fail("hash is required and must be 0x-prefixed hex (the userOpHash from submitUserOperation)");
-  }
-  requireClientMethod(bundlerClient, "waitForUserOperationReceipt", "bundlerClient");
-  return bundlerClient.waitForUserOperationReceipt({ hash, ...opts });
-}
-
-export const _internal = {
-  canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit,
-  requireSignedUserOp,
-  resolveEntryPoint,
-  requireClientMethod,
-  toHexIfBigIntLike,
-};
-
-// Re-exported so callers building a fresh userOp before submit don't need a
-// second import from aa-adapter for the common "build then submit" flow.
-export { buildUserOperation };