@oracle-agent/oracle 0.14.1 → 0.15.0

package/src/public-api/connect-agent.mjs

@@ -1,424 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle Public API — connect-agent contract (Slice D).
-//
-// BFF-safe, self-custodial contract that turns a user's "connect my agent"
-// request into an UNSIGNED grant payload the USER signs with their own wallet.
-//
-// Hard boundaries for this file:
-//   - NEVER signs anything. There is no signer, no key material, no signature
-//     field ever populated here. The output hands back the exact bytes the
-//     user must sign themselves; signing happens client-side in the user's
-//     own wallet, never on a server.
-//   - Imports ONLY from the assigned public peers
-//     (src/public-control/policy-schema.mjs, session-key-model.mjs).
-//     Never from the private executor stack (get-signer, keystore,
-//     exec-policy, local-signer/*, adapters/*).
-//   - Oracle Control is deterministic authorization: same input => same
-//     canonical bytes => same grant id. No advisory logic here (that is
-//     Oracle Router's job and Router output never gates anything here).
-//   - Fail-closed no-secret invariant: every object returned from this module
-//     is recursively scanned and the call THROWS if anything shaped like a
-//     private key, session secret, bearer token, keystore path, or signer URL
-//     is present. See assertNoSecretMaterial().
-
-import {
-  GRANT_VERSION,
-  GrantValidationError,
-  normalizeGrant,
-  canonicalizeGrant,
-  grantId,
-  isReadonlyAction,
-} from "../public-control/policy-schema.mjs";
-
-export const CONNECT_REQUEST_KIND = "oracle-connect-request";
-export const UNSIGNED_GRANT_KIND = "oracle-unsigned-grant";
-
-/** Identifier for how the signable bytes are derived: utf-8 encoding of the
- *  canonical grant JSON produced by policy-schema's canonicalizeGrant(). */
-export const SIGNING_SCHEME = "oracle-grant-canonical-json-utf8-v1";
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// No-secret invariant (fail closed)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-export class SecretLeakError extends Error {
-  constructor(path, rule) {
-    super(`secret material must never appear in a public API object (at ${path}, rule: ${rule})`);
-    this.name = "SecretLeakError";
-    this.path = path;
-    this.rule = rule;
-  }
-}
-
-/** Key names that must never appear on any object we return. */
-const FORBIDDEN_KEY_RE =
-  /(private[_-]?key|secret|bearer|keystore|mnemonic|seed[_-]?phrase|passphrase|password|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|signer[_-]?url|signature)/i;
-
-/** Short wallet-export aliases need exact normalized matching. Substring
- * matching `wif`, for example, would incorrectly reject an unrelated key such
- * as `swift`. Removing common separators catches snake/kebab/spaced variants
- * without widening those short aliases into arbitrary words. */
-const FORBIDDEN_KEY_ALIASES = Object.freeze(["privkey", "wif", "xprv", "seed"]);
-
-function isForbiddenKeyName(key) {
-  const text = String(key);
-  const normalized = text.toLowerCase().replace(/[\s._-]+/g, "");
-  return FORBIDDEN_KEY_RE.test(text) || FORBIDDEN_KEY_ALIASES.includes(normalized);
-}
-
-/** String-value shapes that must never appear in any object we return. */
-const FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RULES = Object.freeze([
-  // 32-byte hex — the shape of a raw EVM private key / session secret. Public
-  // grant material never legitimately carries a 0x + 64-hex value (addresses
-  // are 40 hex; the grant id is bare sha256 hex), so this fails closed.
-  { rule: "raw-32-byte-hex-key", re: /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/ },
-  // Same 32 bytes WITHOUT the 0x prefix, as the entire string. A bare-hex
-  // private key (the shape ethers and most wallet exports hand you) must not
-  // pass just because it lacks the prefix.
-  //
-  // Deliberately anchored: an embedded/substring match would flag legitimate
-  // prose that quotes a public sha256 identifier (the human-readable grant
-  // render says "grant <id>"), and a scanner that cries wolf on normal output
-  // gets disabled. Smuggling a key inside a longer string is still caught at
-  // the serialized layer for any non-allowlisted field.
-  { rule: "raw-32-byte-hex-bare", re: /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/ },
-  // BIP-32 private extended keys. Public xpub/tpub/ypub/zpub identifiers are
-  // intentionally not matched; only their private-key counterparts fail.
-  { rule: "extended-private-key", re: /\b(?:xprv|tprv|yprv|zprv)[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{107}\b/ },
-  // Bitcoin WIF (mainnet 5/K/L, testnet uncompressed 9 or compressed c) —
-  // base58, 51-52 chars.
-  { rule: "bitcoin-wif", re: /\b[59KLc][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{50,51}\b/ },
-  // BIP-39 mnemonic: 12/15/18/21/24 lowercase words. Detect a long run of
-  // space-separated short alpha words rather than shipping the wordlist.
-  { rule: "bip39-mnemonic", re: /\b(?:[a-z]{3,8}\s+){11,23}[a-z]{3,8}\b/ },
-  { rule: "bearer-token", re: /bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+/i },
-  { rule: "pem-private-key", re: /-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/ },
-  { rule: "keystore-path", re: /keystore/i },
-  { rule: "signer-url", re: /https?:\/\/\S*sign/i },
-  { rule: "authorization-header", re: /authorization\s*:/i },
-]);
-
-/**
- * Field names whose values are legitimately 64-hex and are NOT secrets:
- * sha256 grant ids, tx hashes, block hashes, canonical digests. These are
- * public identifiers — the whole point of a grant id is that it is quotable.
- *
- * Deliberately EXCLUDED: `nonce` and `salt`. Those are caller-supplied on the
- * public path, so allowlisting them would let anyone launder key material
- * through the scan just by naming the field `nonce`. Oracle's own nonces are
- * short opaque strings, not 32-byte hex, so nothing legitimate is lost.
- */
-const HEX64_ALLOWED_KEYS = Object.freeze([
-  "grantid",
-  "id",
-  "hash",
-  "sha256",
-  "sha256hex",
-  "checksum",
-  "txhash",
-  "transactionhash",
-  "blockhash",
-  "digest",
-  "userophash",
-  "commithash",
-  "prevhash",
-  "intenthash",
-  "canonicalhash",
-  "payloadhash",
-  "requestid",
-]);
-
-/**
- * Strip values that are legitimately 64-hex public identifiers before running
- * the raw-key shape rules, so a sha256 grant id does not read as a private key.
- * Only exact-match 64-hex values on an allowlisted key are removed; a 64-hex
- * string sitting anywhere else still trips the rule.
- */
-function maskAllowedHex64(json) {
-  return json.replace(
-    /"([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)"\s*:\s*"(?:0x)?([0-9a-fA-F]{64})"/g,
-    (match, key) =>
-      HEX64_ALLOWED_KEYS.includes(String(key).toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]/g, ""))
-        ? `"${key}":"<hex64>"`
-        : match
-  );
-}
-/**
- * Scan the SERIALIZED form of a payload.
- *
- * Scanning the object graph alone is not sufficient: `toJSON()`, getters,
- * symbol keys, non-enumerable properties and BigInt coercion all let a value
- * reach the wire in a shape the graph walk never visited. Verified: an object
- * `{ nested: { toJSON: () => "<private key>" } }` passes a graph-only scan and
- * then serializes the raw key into the response body.
- *
- * So the authoritative check runs against the exact bytes we are about to
- * write. Whatever JSON.stringify produces is what the client sees, and that is
- * what we scan. Returns the JSON string when clean; throws SecretLeakError
- * otherwise.
- */
-export function assertSerializedNoSecrets(value) {
-  let json;
-  try {
-    json = JSON.stringify(value);
-  } catch (e) {
-    // A payload we cannot serialize (circular, BigInt, throwing toJSON) must
-    // not be sent at all — fail closed rather than guess.
-    throw new SecretLeakError("$", `unserializable-payload: ${String(e?.message || e)}`);
-  }
-  if (json === undefined) return "null";
-
-  // Public 64-hex identifiers (grant ids, tx/block hashes, sha256 digests) are
-  // masked first so they do not read as raw key material.
-  const scanned = maskAllowedHex64(json);
-
-  for (const { rule, re } of FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RULES) {
-    if (re.test(scanned)) throw new SecretLeakError("$<serialized>", rule);
-  }
-
-  // Embedded key material. The per-string rules are anchored (so human-readable
-  // prose quoting a public grant id does not trip them), but at the serialized
-  // layer a 0x-prefixed 32-byte value has no legitimate reason to appear
-  // anywhere in a public response — addresses are 40 hex, and every public
-  // 64-hex identifier was masked above. This is what catches a key smuggled in
-  // via toJSON(), a getter, or concatenated into a longer string.
-  const embedded = /(?:^|[^0-9a-fA-Fx])0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}(?![0-9a-fA-F])/;
-  if (embedded.test(scanned)) {
-    throw new SecretLeakError("$<serialized>", "raw-32-byte-hex-embedded");
-  }
-  // Parse the exact serialized bytes with a reviver so escaped or toJSON-made
-  // key names receive the same normalization as real object properties. This
-  // avoids maintaining a second, inevitably drifting key-name regex.
-  JSON.parse(json, (key, item) => {
-    if (key && isForbiddenKeyName(key)) {
-      throw new SecretLeakError(`$<serialized>.${key}`, "forbidden-key-name");
-    }
-    return item;
-  });
-  return json;
-}
-
-/**
- * Recursively scan a value (objects, arrays, Maps, Sets, typed arrays) for
- * anything shaped like secret material. Throws SecretLeakError on the first
- * hit — fail closed. Returns the value unchanged when clean, so it can be
- * used inline: `return assertNoSecretMaterial(result)`.
- *
- * `keyHint` carries the property name a string was found under, so a 64-hex
- * value on a known public identifier (grantId, txHash, ...) is not mistaken
- * for raw key material. A 64-hex string under any other key still trips.
- */
-export function assertNoSecretMaterial(value, path = "$", seen = new Set(), keyHint = "") {
-  if (value == null) return value;
-  if (typeof value === "string") {
-    const hex64Ok = HEX64_ALLOWED_KEYS.includes(
-      String(keyHint).toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]/g, "")
-    );
-    for (const { rule, re } of FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RULES) {
-      if (hex64Ok && rule.startsWith("raw-32-byte-hex")) continue;
-      if (re.test(value)) throw new SecretLeakError(path, rule);
-    }
-    return value;
-  }
-  if (typeof value !== "object") return value;
-  if (seen.has(value)) return value;
-  seen.add(value);
-
-  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(value) || value instanceof ArrayBuffer) return value;
-  if (value instanceof Map) {
-    for (const [k, v] of value.entries()) {
-      if (typeof k === "string" && isForbiddenKeyName(k)) {
-        throw new SecretLeakError(`${path}[${JSON.stringify(k)}]`, "forbidden-key-name");
-      }
-      assertNoSecretMaterial(k, `${path}[key]`, seen);
-      assertNoSecretMaterial(v, `${path}[${String(k)}]`, seen);
-    }
-    return value;
-  }
-  if (value instanceof Set) {
-    let i = 0;
-    for (const v of value.values()) assertNoSecretMaterial(v, `${path}[${i++}]`, seen);
-    return value;
-  }
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
-    value.forEach((v, i) => assertNoSecretMaterial(v, `${path}[${i}]`, seen));
-    return value;
-  }
-  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
-    if (isForbiddenKeyName(k)) {
-      throw new SecretLeakError(`${path}.${k}`, "forbidden-key-name");
-    }
-    assertNoSecretMaterial(v, `${path}.${k}`, seen, k);
-  }
-  return value;
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Helpers
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-function deepFreeze(value) {
-  if (value && typeof value === "object" && !Object.isFrozen(value)) {
-    Object.freeze(value);
-    for (const v of Object.values(value)) deepFreeze(v);
-  }
-  return value;
-}
-
-function toUnixSeconds(v, label) {
-  const n = typeof v === "string" ? Number(v.trim()) : Number(v);
-  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n <= 0) {
-    throw new GrantValidationError([{ field: label, message: "must be a positive unix-seconds integer" }]);
-  }
-  return n;
-}
-
-function requiredReferenceNow(opts) {
-  if (opts?.now == null) {
-    throw new GrantValidationError([
-      { field: "opts.now", message: "explicit reference time is required for live grant construction" },
-    ]);
-  }
-  return toUnixSeconds(opts.now, "opts.now");
-}
-
-/** Deterministic UTC ISO string from unix seconds. */
-function isoUtc(unixSeconds) {
-  return new Date(unixSeconds * 1000).toISOString();
-}
-
-/** Deterministic, purely-presentational human render of a normalized grant.
- *  Presentation only — it never adds, removes, or reinterprets authority and
- *  only surfaces public grant material. */
-function renderUnsignedGrant(grant, id) {
-  const readonlyOnly = grant.actions.every((a) => isReadonlyAction(a));
-  return [
-    "ORACLE — CONNECT AGENT (unsigned grant, you sign it, we never do)",
-    "=================================================================",
-    `Grant ID:      ${id}`,
-    `Version:       ${GRANT_VERSION}`,
-    `Chain:         ${grant.chainId}`,
-    `Agent:         ${grant.agentAddress}`,
-    `Your account:  ${grant.accountAddress}`,
-    `Actions:       ${grant.actions.join(", ")}`,
-    `Targets:       ${grant.targets.length ? grant.targets.join(", ") : "(none — read/simulate only)"}`,
-    `Max value:     ${grant.maxValueWei} wei`,
-    `Max gas:       ${grant.maxGasWei} wei`,
-    `Max slippage:  ${grant.maxSlippageBps} bps`,
-    `Expires:       ${isoUtc(grant.expiresAt)} (unix ${grant.expiresAt})`,
-    `Nonce:         ${grant.nonce}`,
-    `Revocation:    ${grant.revocationKey}`,
-    "-----------------------------------------------------------------",
-    readonlyOnly
-      ? "Scope: read/simulate only — this grant cannot move funds."
-      : "Scope: includes state-changing actions bounded by the caps above.",
-    "Self-custodial: this payload is UNSIGNED and contains public data only.",
-    "Sign the bytes below with YOUR wallet; Oracle never holds your keys.",
-  ].join("\n");
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Public contract
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Turn raw user inputs into a validated connect request.
- *
- * Accepts the canonical grant fields (see policy-schema REQUIRED_FIELDS).
- * Every live construction requires explicit `opts.now` (unix seconds).
- * Convenience: instead of `expiresAt` the caller may pass `ttlSeconds`.
- * Determinism requires the library caller to supply `now`; the HTTP boundary
- * overwrites caller time with the server clock.
- *
- * Throws GrantValidationError on any invalid/unknown/missing field (the
- * schema fails closed on unknown fields, wildcard actions, empty targets for
- * state-changing scopes, etc). Never signs anything.
- *
- * @returns frozen { kind, version, grant } where grant is the normalized
- *          canonical grant from policy-schema.
- */
-export function buildConnectRequest(input = {}, opts = {}) {
-  if (input == null || typeof input !== "object" || Array.isArray(input)) {
-    throw new GrantValidationError([{ field: "request", message: "request must be a plain object" }]);
-  }
-  const now = requiredReferenceNow(opts);
-
-  const { ttlSeconds, ...rest } = input;
-  const fields = { ...rest };
-
-  if (ttlSeconds != null) {
-    if (fields.expiresAt != null) {
-      throw new GrantValidationError([
-        { field: "ttlSeconds", message: "pass either ttlSeconds or expiresAt, not both" },
-      ]);
-    }
-    const ttl = toUnixSeconds(ttlSeconds, "ttlSeconds");
-    fields.expiresAt = now + ttl;
-  }
-
-  const grant = normalizeGrant(fields, {
-    now,
-    allowWildcardActions: opts.allowWildcardActions === true,
-  });
-
-  const request = deepFreeze({
-    kind: CONNECT_REQUEST_KIND,
-    version: GRANT_VERSION,
-    grant,
-  });
-  return assertNoSecretMaterial(request);
-}
-
-/**
- * Assemble the UNSIGNED grant payload for a connect request (or raw grant
- * input). Returns everything a BFF/browser needs to show the user what they
- * are approving and exactly which bytes to sign — and nothing else:
- *
- *   payload   — { version, grantId, grant, canonical } canonical grant data
- *   signing   — { scheme, message, bytesHex, byteLength, sha256 } where
- *               `message` is the exact canonical JSON string and `bytesHex`
- *               is the 0x-hex of its utf-8 bytes: THE bytes the user signs.
- *   render    — deterministic human-readable review text
- *   unsigned  — always true; this module never signs and never will.
- *
- * Deterministic: identical grants (any key order / address casing / numeric
- * representation) produce byte-identical canonical/message/bytesHex/grantId.
- *
- * Fail-closed: requires explicit `opts.now`, throws GrantValidationError on bad
- * input, and throws SecretLeakError if the assembled object ever carried
- * secret-shaped material.
- */
-export function assembleUnsignedGrant(requestOrInput = {}, opts = {}) {
-  const now = requiredReferenceNow(opts);
-  const raw =
-    requestOrInput && requestOrInput.kind === CONNECT_REQUEST_KIND
-      ? requestOrInput.grant
-      : requestOrInput;
-
-  const grant = normalizeGrant(raw, {
-    now,
-    allowWildcardActions: opts.allowWildcardActions === true,
-  });
-  const canonical = canonicalizeGrant(grant);
-  const id = grantId(grant);
-  const bytes = Buffer.from(canonical, "utf8");
-
-  const result = deepFreeze({
-    kind: UNSIGNED_GRANT_KIND,
-    unsigned: true,
-    payload: deepFreeze({
-      version: GRANT_VERSION,
-      grantId: id,
-      grant,
-      canonical,
-    }),
-    signing: deepFreeze({
-      scheme: SIGNING_SCHEME,
-      message: canonical,
-      bytesHex: `0x${bytes.toString("hex")}`,
-      byteLength: bytes.length,
-      sha256: id,
-    }),
-    render: renderUnsignedGrant(grant, id),
-  });
-  return assertNoSecretMaterial(result);
-}

package/src/public-api/grants.mjs

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle Public API — grant reads (Slice D).
-//
-// Pure, deterministic read functions over an INJECTED grant store. No DB, no
-// chain, no clock fallback: callers pass an array/Map of grant records plus an
-// explicit `now` (unix seconds). Same inputs always produce the same output.
-//
-// Imports ONLY from the assigned public peers (policy-schema.mjs) and the
-// sibling connect-agent.mjs for the shared no-secret invariant. Never from the
-// private executor stack.
-//
-// Store shape (injected, caller-owned):
-//   - an Array or Map whose entries are either
-//       a) a raw grant object (policy-schema shape), or
-//       b) a wrapper record { grant, revoked?, revokedAt? }.
-//   - revocation may also be supplied out-of-band via opts.revoked: a Set /
-//     array / Map-like of grant ids and/or revocation keys, or a function
-//     (id, grant) => boolean.
-//
-// Fail-closed rules:
-//   - records that do not validate against the public policy schema are
-//     EXCLUDED from active listings (a grant that cannot validate cannot
-//     authorize anything).
-//   - `now` is required for listActiveGrants; without a reference time we
-//     cannot prove liveness, so we refuse rather than guess.
-//   - every returned object passes the no-secret invariant scan.
-
-import { validateGrant, grantId, isExpired } from "../public-control/policy-schema.mjs";
-import { assertNoSecretMaterial } from "./connect-agent.mjs";
-
-export const GRANT_STATUS = Object.freeze({
-  ACTIVE: "active",
-  EXPIRED: "expired",
-  REVOKED: "revoked",
-  INVALID: "invalid",
-});
-
-function toRecords(store) {
-  if (store == null) return [];
-  if (Array.isArray(store)) return store;
-  if (store instanceof Map) return [...store.values()];
-  if (typeof store[Symbol.iterator] === "function") return [...store];
-  throw new TypeError("grant store must be an array, Map, or iterable of grant records");
-}
-
-function unwrap(record) {
-  if (record && typeof record === "object" && !Array.isArray(record) && record.grant != null) {
-    return {
-      grant: record.grant,
-      revoked: record.revoked === true || record.revokedAt != null,
-    };
-  }
-  return { grant: record, revoked: false };
-}
-
-function toSafeNow(now) {
-  const n = typeof now === "string" ? Number(now.trim()) : Number(now);
-  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n < 0) {
-    throw new TypeError("an explicit unix-seconds `now` is required (deterministic liveness, no wall-clock fallback)");
-  }
-  return n;
-}
-
-function isRevokedBy(revoked, id, grant) {
-  if (revoked == null) return false;
-  if (typeof revoked === "function") return revoked(id, grant) === true;
-  const keys = [id, grant.revocationKey];
-  if (revoked instanceof Set) return keys.some((k) => revoked.has(k));
-  if (Array.isArray(revoked)) return keys.some((k) => revoked.includes(k));
-  if (typeof revoked.has === "function") return keys.some((k) => revoked.has(k));
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Classify a single store record. Returns { status, id, grant } where grant
- * is the normalized public grant (null when invalid). Pure + deterministic.
- */
-export function classifyGrant(record, { now, revoked } = {}) {
-  const nowSec = toSafeNow(now);
-  const { grant: raw, revoked: recordRevoked } = unwrap(record);
-  const { ok, grant } = validateGrant(raw);
-  if (!ok) return { status: GRANT_STATUS.INVALID, id: null, grant: null };
-  const id = grantId(grant);
-  // Revocation takes precedence over expiry (matches session-key-model
-  // semantics: a revoked-then-expired grant still reports "revoked").
-  if (recordRevoked || isRevokedBy(revoked, id, grant)) {
-    return { status: GRANT_STATUS.REVOKED, id, grant };
-  }
-  if (isExpired(grant, nowSec)) return { status: GRANT_STATUS.EXPIRED, id, grant };
-  return { status: GRANT_STATUS.ACTIVE, id, grant };
-}
-
-/**
- * List grants that are currently ACTIVE: valid under the public policy
- * schema, not expired at `now`, and not revoked (per record flag or the
- * injected `revoked` source). Invalid records are silently excluded
- * (fail closed — they cannot authorize anything).
- *
- * Optional filters: { agentAddress, accountAddress, chainId }.
- *
- * @returns frozen array of { id, grant } sorted by id (deterministic order).
- */
-export function listActiveGrants(store, { now, revoked, agentAddress, accountAddress, chainId } = {}) {
-  const nowSec = toSafeNow(now);
-  const wantAgent = agentAddress != null ? String(agentAddress).trim().toLowerCase() : null;
-  const wantAccount = accountAddress != null ? String(accountAddress).trim().toLowerCase() : null;
-  const wantChain = chainId != null ? Number(chainId) : null;
-
-  const out = [];
-  for (const record of toRecords(store)) {
-    const { status, id, grant } = classifyGrant(record, { now: nowSec, revoked });
-    if (status !== GRANT_STATUS.ACTIVE) continue;
-    if (wantAgent != null && grant.agentAddress !== wantAgent) continue;
-    if (wantAccount != null && grant.accountAddress !== wantAccount) continue;
-    if (wantChain != null && grant.chainId !== wantChain) continue;
-    out.push(Object.freeze({ id, grant }));
-  }
-  out.sort((a, b) => (a.id < b.id ? -1 : a.id > b.id ? 1 : 0));
-  return assertNoSecretMaterial(Object.freeze(out));
-}
-
-/**
- * Look up a single grant by its public grant id. Returns
- * { id, status, grant } or null when no record in the store matches.
- * Unlike listActiveGrants this also surfaces expired/revoked grants (with
- * their status) so a UI can explain WHY a grant is not active — but invalid
- * records never match (they have no trustworthy id).
- */
-export function getGrant(store, id, { now, revoked } = {}) {
-  const nowSec = toSafeNow(now);
-  const wanted = String(id ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
-  if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(wanted)) return null;
-  for (const record of toRecords(store)) {
-    const res = classifyGrant(record, { now: nowSec, revoked });
-    if (res.status === GRANT_STATUS.INVALID) continue;
-    if (res.id === wanted) {
-      return assertNoSecretMaterial(
-        Object.freeze({ id: res.id, status: res.status, grant: res.grant })
-      );
-    }
-  }
-  return null;
-}