@openzeppelin/miden-multisig-client 0.13.1 → 0.13.2

package/masm/psm_ecdsa.masm

@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-# Private State Manager (PSM) Authentication Component (ECDSA)
-#
-# This component provides PSM signature verification for accounts using
-# ECDSA secp256k1 (k256/keccak) signatures.
-# It can be used standalone or in conjunction with other auth components like multisig.
-
-use miden::active_account
-use miden::native_account
-
-# Type definitions for v0.12 syntax
-type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
-
-# IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTES
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# - The selector in `PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT` controls whether the extra PSM signature
-#   is enforced:
-#     * PSM_ON  => exactly one valid PSM signature is required.
-#     * PSM_OFF => PSM signature is skipped for that call.
-#
-# - `verify_psm_signature` reads the selector from initial storage state.
-#   This means changes made during the same transaction won't affect the check.
-#
-# - `enable_psm` / `disable_psm` procedures allow explicit control over PSM state.
-#
-# - `update_psm_public_key`:
-#     * Installs a new PSM public key in the map at `PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT`.
-#     * Does not itself perform any signature checks.
-#     * To update the key without requiring PSM signature, ensure selector is OFF.
-#
-# Storage Layout
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-#
-# +---------------------+---------------+
-# |     DESCRIPTION     |     SLOT      |
-# +---------------------+---------------+
-# | PSM SELECTOR (word) |       0       |
-# | PSM PUBLIC KEY MAP  |       1       |
-# +---------------------+---------------+
-#
-# - PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT (0):
-#     * Stores a word that is compared against [1, 0, 0, 0] (PSM_ON).
-#     * Any value != PSM_ON is treated as PSM_OFF.
-#
-# - PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT (1):
-#     * A map from a fixed key [0, 0, 0, 0] to the single PSM public key:
-#         [0, 0, 0, 0] => PSM_PUBLIC_KEY
-#     * PSM_PUBLIC_KEY is an ECDSA secp256k1 public key represented as a word.
-
-# CONSTANTS
-# =================================================================================================
-
-# Slot where the PSM selector flag is stored:
-# - PSM_ON  => PSM signature required
-# - PSM_OFF => PSM signature skipped
-const PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT = 0
-
-# Map slot for PSM public key
-# Uses exactly one PSM public key at index [0, 0, 0, 0]
-# [0, 0, 0, 0] => PSM_PUBLIC_KEY
-const PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT = 1
-
-# Selector flag values
-const PSM_ON = [1, 0, 0, 0]
-const PSM_OFF = [0, 0, 0, 0]
-
-# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
-const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT = event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
-
-# PSM PROCEDURES
-# =================================================================================================
-
-#! Enable PSM verification by setting the selector to ON.
-#!
-#! Operand stack inputs: []
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - Sets PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT to PSM_ON (1)
-#! - After this, transactions will require PSM signature verification
-proc.enable_psm
-    push.PSM_ON
-    # => [PSM_ON]
-
-    push.PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT
-    # => [PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT, PSM_ON]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_item
-    # => [OLD_ROOT]
-
-    dropw
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Disable PSM verification by setting the selector to OFF.
-#!
-#! Operand stack inputs: []
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - Sets PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT to PSM_OFF (0)
-#! - After this, transactions will NOT require PSM signature verification
-proc.disable_psm
-    push.PSM_OFF
-    # => [PSM_OFF]
-
-    push.PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT
-    # => [PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT, PSM_OFF]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_item
-    # => [OLD_ROOT]
-
-    dropw
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Update the PSM public key.
-#!
-#! Operand stack inputs: []
-#! Advice stack inputs:  [PUB_KEY]
-#!   - PUB_KEY is the new PSM ECDSA secp256k1 public key
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - Stores PUB_KEY into PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT:
-#!      [0, 0, 0, 0] => PSM_PUBLIC_KEY
-#! - To update the key without requiring PSM signature, ensure
-#!   PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT = 0 (OFF) before calling this.
-pub proc update_psm_public_key
-    exec.disable_psm
-    # ------ Update the PSM public key ------
-    adv_loadw
-    # => [PUB_KEY]
-
-    push.0.0.0.0
-    # => [MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
-    # Note that MAP_KEY is [0, 0, 0, 0] for a single PSM_KEY
-
-    push.PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT
-    # => [index, MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_map_item
-    # => [OLD_MAP_ROOT, OLD_MAP_VALUE]
-
-    dropw dropw
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Conditionally verify a "PSM" signature against a stored public key hash.
-#! The condition is controlled by the selector at PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT.
-#!
-#! Inputs:  [MSG]
-#! Outputs: [MSG]
-#!
-#! Panics if:
-#! - Selector is ON but the provided PSM signature is invalid or missing.
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - MSG is TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT provided by auth procedure
-#! - If selector is OFF (0), PSM verification is skipped
-#! - Selector value is read from initial storage state
-pub proc verify_psm_signature(msg: BeWord)
-    push.PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT
-    exec.active_account::get_item
-    drop drop drop
-    # => [selector, MSG]
-
-    push.1 eq
-    if.true
-        push.1
-        push.PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT
-        exec.::miden::auth::ecdsa_k256_keccak::verify_signatures
-        push.1 neq
-        if.true
-            emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
-            push.0 assert.err="invalid PSM signature"
-        end
-    end
-    # => [MSG]
-    exec.enable_psm
-end