@openzeppelin/miden-multisig-client 0.13.1 → 0.13.2

package/src/account/masm.ts

@@ -1,1041 +1,4 @@
+// This file is generated by scripts/generate-masm.mjs from the MASM contract sources.
+// Do not edit it by hand.
 
-export const MULTISIG_MASM = `# Multi-Signature RPO Falcon 512 Authentication Component
-#
-# This component provides multi-signature authentication for accounts.
-# It integrates with the PSM component for optional PSM signature verification.
-
-use miden::protocol::active_account
-use miden::protocol::native_account
-use miden::standards::auth
-use openzeppelin::psm
-
-type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
-
-# CONSTANTS
-# =================================================================================================
-
-# Auth Request Constants
-
-# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
-const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT=event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
-
-# Storage Layout Constants
-#
-# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
-# | THRESHOLD & APPROVERS CONFIG  | PUB KEYS | EXECUTED TXS |  PROC THRESHOLDS  |
-# |           (slot)              |   (map)  |    (map)     |       (map)       |
-# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
-# |              0                |    1     |      2       |         3         |
-# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where the default signature threshold and
-# number of approvers are stored as:
-# [default_threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0].
-# The threshold is guaranteed to be less than or equal to num_approvers.
-const THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::threshold_config")
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where the public keys map is stored.
-# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY
-const PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::signer_public_keys")
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where executed transactions are stored.
-# Map entries: transaction_message => [is_executed, 0, 0, 0]
-const EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::executed_transactions")
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where procedure thresholds are stored.
-# Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]
-const PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::procedure_thresholds")
-
-# Executed Transaction Flag Constant
-const IS_EXECUTED_FLAG=[1, 0, 0, 0]
-
-# ERRORS
-const ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED="failed to approve multisig transaction as it was already executed"
-
-const ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers must be equal to or greater than threshold"
-
-const ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers or threshold must not be zero"
-
-# MULTISIG PROCEDURES
-# =================================================================================================
-
-#! Check if transaction has already been executed and add it to executed transactions for replay protection.
-#!
-#! Inputs:  [MSG]
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Panics if:
-#! - the same transaction has already been executed
-proc assert_new_tx(msg: BeWord)
-    push.IS_EXECUTED_FLAG
-    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed], MSG]
-
-    swapw
-    # => [MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
-
-    push.EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [txs_slot_prefix, txs_slot_suffix, MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
-
-    # Set the key value pair in the map to mark transaction as executed
-    exec.native_account::set_map_item
-    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed]]
-
-    drop drop drop
-    # => [is_executed]
-
-    assertz.err=ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Remove old approver public keys from the approver public key mapping.
-#!
-#! This procedure cleans up the storage by removing public keys of approvers that are no longer
-#! part of the multisig configuration. This procedure assumes that init_num_of_approvers and
-#! new_num_of_approvers are u32 values.
-#!
-#! Inputs: [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Where:
-#! - init_num_of_approvers is the original number of approvers before the update
-#! - new_num_of_approvers is the new number of approvers after the update
-proc cleanup_pubkey_mapping(init_num_of_approvers: u32, new_num_of_approvers: u32)
-    dup.1 dup.1
-    u32assert2 u32lt
-    # => [should_loop, i = init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-    while.true
-        # => [i, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        sub.1
-        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        dup
-        # => [i-1, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        push.0.0.0
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        padw swapw
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        exec.native_account::set_map_item
-        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        dropw
-        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        dup.1 dup.1
-        u32lt
-        # => [should_loop, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-    end
-
-    drop drop
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Update threshold config and add / remove approvers
-#!
-#! Inputs:
-#!   Operand stack: [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
-#!   Advice map: {
-#!     MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH => [CONFIG, PUB_KEY_N, PUB_KEY_N-1, ..., PUB_KEY_0]
-#!   }
-#! Outputs:
-#!   Operand stack: []
-#!
-#! Where:
-#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH is the hash of the threshold and new public key vector
-#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG is [threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0]
-#! - PUB_KEY_i is the public key of the i-th signer
-#!
-#! Locals:
-#! 0: new_num_of_approvers
-#! 1: init_num_of_approvers
-@locals(2)
-pub proc update_signers_and_threshold(multisig_config_hash: BeWord)
-    adv.push_mapval
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
-
-    adv_loadw
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # store new_num_of_approvers for later
-    dup.2 loc_store.0
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    dup.3 dup.3
-    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # make sure that the threshold is smaller than the number of approvers
-    u32assert2.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    dup.3 dup.3
-    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # make sure that threshold or num_approvers are not zero
-    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_item
-    # => [OLD_THRESHOLD_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # store init_num_of_approvers for later
-    drop drop loc_store.1 drop
-    # => [pad(12)]
-
-    loc_load.0
-    # => [num_approvers]
-
-    dup neq.0
-    while.true
-        sub.1
-        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        dup push.0.0.0
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        padw adv_loadw
-        # => [PUB_KEY, [0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        swapw
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        exec.native_account::set_map_item
-        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        dropw
-        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        dup neq.0
-        # => [is_non_zero, i-1, pad(12)]
-    end
-    # => [pad(13)]
-
-    drop
-    # => [pad(12)]
-
-    # compare initial vs current multisig config
-
-    # load init_num_of_approvers & new_num_of_approvers
-    loc_load.0 loc_load.1
-    # => [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]
-
-    exec.cleanup_pubkey_mapping
-    # => [pad(12)]
-end
-
-# Computes the effective transaction threshold based on called procedures and per-procedure
-# overrides stored in PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT. Falls back to default_threshold if no
-# overrides apply.
-#
-#! Inputs:  [default_threshold]
-#! Outputs: [transaction_threshold]
-@locals(1)
-proc compute_transaction_threshold(default_threshold: u32) -> u32
-    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
-    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
-    #   a. check if the procedure was called during the transaction
-    #   b. if called, get the override threshold of that procedure from the config map
-    #   c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, set transaction_threshold = proc_threshold
-    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
-
-    # store default_threshold for later
-    loc_store.0
-    # => []
-
-    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
-    push.0
-    # => [transaction_threshold]
-
-    # get the number of account procedures
-    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures
-    # => [num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
-
-    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
-    dup neq.0
-    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
-    while.true
-        sub.1 dup
-        # => [num_procedures-1, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-        # get procedure root of the procedure with index i
-        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root dupw
-        # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-        # 2a. check if this procedure has been called in the transaction
-        exec.native_account::was_procedure_called
-        # => [was_called, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-        # if it has been called, get the override threshold of that procedure
-        if.true
-            # => [PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
-            # => [PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_prefix, PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_suffix, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            # 2b. get the override proc_threshold of that procedure
-            # if the procedure has no override threshold, the returned map item will be [0, 0, 0, 0]
-            exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item
-            # => [[0, 0, 0, proc_threshold], num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            drop drop drop dup dup.3
-            # => [transaction_threshold, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            u32assert2.err="transaction threshold or procedure threshold are not u32"
-            u32gt
-            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-            # 2c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, update transaction_threshold
-            movup.2 movdn.3
-            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
-            cdrop
-            # => [updated_transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
-            swap
-            # => [num_procedures-1, updated_transaction_threshold]
-        # if it has not been called during this transaction, nothing to do, move to the next procedure
-        else
-            dropw
-            # => [num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-        end
-
-        dup neq.0
-        # => [should_continue, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-    end
-
-    drop
-    # => [transaction_threshold]
-
-    loc_load.0
-    # => [default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
-
-    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
-    dup.1 eq.0
-    # => [is_zero, default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
-
-    cdrop
-    # => [effective_transaction_threshold]
-end
-
-#! Authenticate a transaction using the Falcon signature scheme with multi-signature support.
-#!
-#! This procedure implements multi-signature authentication by:
-#! 1. Computing the transaction summary message that needs to be signed
-#! 2. Verifying signatures from multiple required signers against their public keys
-#! 3. Ensuring the minimum threshold of valid signatures is met
-#! 4. Implementing replay protection by tracking executed transactions
-#! 5. Verifying PSM signature if PSM selector is enabled (via PSM component)
-#!
-#! Inputs:
-#!   Operand stack: [SALT]
-#!   Advice map: {
-#!     h(SIG_0, MSG): SIG_0,
-#!     h(SIG_1, MSG): SIG_1,
-#!     h(SIG_n, MSG): SIG_n
-#!   }
-#! Outputs:
-#!   Operand stack: []
-#!
-#! Where:
-#! - SALT is a cryptographically random nonce that enables multiple concurrent
-#!   multisig transactions while maintaining replay protection. Each transaction
-#!   must use a unique SALT value to ensure transaction uniqueness.
-#! - SIG_i is the signature from the i-th signer.
-#! - MSG is the transaction message being signed.
-#! - h(SIG_i, MSG) is the hash of the signature and message used as the advice map key.
-#!
-#! Panics if:
-#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).
-#! - the same transaction has already been executed (replay protection).
-#! - PSM signature verification fails (if PSM is enabled).
-#!
-#! Invocation: call
-@locals(1)
-pub proc auth_tx_rpo_falcon512_multisig(salt: BeWord)
-    exec.native_account::incr_nonce drop
-    # => [SALT]
-
-    # ------ Computing transaction summary ------
-
-    exec.auth::create_tx_summary
-    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # to build a tx_summary in the host, we need these four words in the advice provider
-    exec.auth::adv_insert_hqword
-    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # the commitment to the tx summary is the message that is signed
-    exec.auth::hash_tx_summary
-    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # ------ Verifying approver signatures ------
-
-    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    exec.active_account::get_initial_item
-    # => [0, 0, num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    drop drop
-    # => [num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    swap movdn.5
-    # => [num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
-
-    push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
-
-    exec.::miden::standards::auth::falcon512_rpo::verify_signatures
-    # => [num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
-
-    # ------ Checking threshold is >= num_verified_signatures ------
-
-    movup.5
-    # => [default_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    exec.compute_transaction_threshold
-    # => [transaction_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    u32assert2 u32lt
-    # => [is_unauthorized, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # If signatures are non-existent the tx will fail here.
-    if.true
-        emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
-        push.0 assert.err="insufficient number of signatures"
-    end
-
-    # ------ Verifying PSM Signature ------
-    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-    call.psm::verify_psm_signature
-
-    # ------ Writing executed transaction MSG to map ------
-    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-    exec.assert_new_tx
-end
-`;
-
-export const MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM = `# Multi-Signature ECDSA secp256k1 Authentication Component
-#
-# This component provides multi-signature authentication for accounts using
-# ECDSA secp256k1 (k256/keccak) signatures instead of RPO Falcon 512.
-# It integrates with the PSM component for optional PSM signature verification.
-
-use miden::protocol::active_account
-use miden::protocol::native_account
-use miden::standards::auth
-use openzeppelin::psm_ecdsa
-
-type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
-
-# CONSTANTS
-# =================================================================================================
-
-# Auth Request Constants
-
-# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
-const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT=event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
-
-# Storage Layout Constants
-#
-# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
-# | THRESHOLD & APPROVERS CONFIG  | PUB KEYS | EXECUTED TXS |  PROC THRESHOLDS  |
-# |           (slot)              |   (map)  |    (map)     |       (map)       |
-# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
-# |              0                |    1     |      2       |         3         |
-# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where the default signature threshold and
-# number of approvers are stored as:
-# [default_threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0].
-# The threshold is guaranteed to be less than or equal to num_approvers.
-const THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::threshold_config")
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where the public keys map is stored.
-# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY
-const PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::signer_public_keys")
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where executed transactions are stored.
-# Map entries: transaction_message => [is_executed, 0, 0, 0]
-const EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::executed_transactions")
-
-# The slot in this component's storage layout where procedure thresholds are stored.
-# Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]
-const PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::procedure_thresholds")
-
-# Executed Transaction Flag Constant
-const IS_EXECUTED_FLAG=[1, 0, 0, 0]
-
-# ERRORS
-const ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED="failed to approve multisig transaction as it was already executed"
-
-const ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers must be equal to or greater than threshold"
-
-const ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers or threshold must not be zero"
-
-# MULTISIG PROCEDURES
-# =================================================================================================
-
-#! Check if transaction has already been executed and add it to executed transactions for replay protection.
-#!
-#! Inputs:  [MSG]
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Panics if:
-#! - the same transaction has already been executed
-proc assert_new_tx(msg: BeWord)
-    push.IS_EXECUTED_FLAG
-    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed], MSG]
-
-    swapw
-    # => [MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
-
-    push.EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [txs_slot_prefix, txs_slot_suffix, MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
-
-    # Set the key value pair in the map to mark transaction as executed
-    exec.native_account::set_map_item
-    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed]]
-
-    drop drop drop
-    # => [is_executed]
-
-    assertz.err=ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Remove old approver public keys from the approver public key mapping.
-#!
-#! This procedure cleans up the storage by removing public keys of approvers that are no longer
-#! part of the multisig configuration. This procedure assumes that init_num_of_approvers and
-#! new_num_of_approvers are u32 values.
-#!
-#! Inputs: [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Where:
-#! - init_num_of_approvers is the original number of approvers before the update
-#! - new_num_of_approvers is the new number of approvers after the update
-proc cleanup_pubkey_mapping(init_num_of_approvers: u32, new_num_of_approvers: u32)
-    dup.1 dup.1
-    u32assert2 u32lt
-    # => [should_loop, i = init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-    while.true
-        # => [i, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        sub.1
-        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        dup
-        # => [i-1, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        push.0.0.0
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        padw swapw
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        exec.native_account::set_map_item
-        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        dropw
-        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-
-        dup.1 dup.1
-        u32lt
-        # => [should_loop, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
-    end
-
-    drop drop
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Update threshold config and add / remove approvers
-#!
-#! Inputs:
-#!   Operand stack: [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
-#!   Advice map: {
-#!     MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH => [CONFIG, PUB_KEY_N, PUB_KEY_N-1, ..., PUB_KEY_0]
-#!   }
-#! Outputs:
-#!   Operand stack: []
-#!
-#! Where:
-#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH is the hash of the threshold and new public key vector
-#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG is [threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0]
-#! - PUB_KEY_i is the public key of the i-th signer
-#!
-#! Locals:
-#! 0: new_num_of_approvers
-#! 1: init_num_of_approvers
-@locals(2)
-pub proc update_signers_and_threshold(multisig_config_hash: BeWord)
-    adv.push_mapval
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
-
-    adv_loadw
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # store new_num_of_approvers for later
-    dup.2 loc_store.0
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    dup.3 dup.3
-    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # make sure that the threshold is smaller than the number of approvers
-    u32assert2.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    dup.3 dup.3
-    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # make sure that threshold or num_approvers are not zero
-    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
-    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_item
-    # => [OLD_THRESHOLD_CONFIG, pad(12)]
-
-    # store init_num_of_approvers for later
-    drop drop loc_store.1 drop
-    # => [pad(12)]
-
-    loc_load.0
-    # => [num_approvers]
-
-    dup neq.0
-    while.true
-        sub.1
-        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        dup push.0.0.0
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        padw adv_loadw
-        # => [PUB_KEY, [0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        swapw
-        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        exec.native_account::set_map_item
-        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        dropw
-        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
-
-        dup neq.0
-        # => [is_non_zero, i-1, pad(12)]
-    end
-    # => [pad(13)]
-
-    drop
-    # => [pad(12)]
-
-    # compare initial vs current multisig config
-
-    # load init_num_of_approvers & new_num_of_approvers
-    loc_load.0 loc_load.1
-    # => [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]
-
-    exec.cleanup_pubkey_mapping
-    # => [pad(12)]
-end
-
-# Computes the effective transaction threshold based on called procedures and per-procedure
-# overrides stored in PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT. Falls back to default_threshold if no
-# overrides apply.
-#
-#! Inputs:  [default_threshold]
-#! Outputs: [transaction_threshold]
-@locals(1)
-proc compute_transaction_threshold(default_threshold: u32) -> u32
-    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
-    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
-    #   a. check if the procedure was called during the transaction
-    #   b. if called, get the override threshold of that procedure from the config map
-    #   c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, set transaction_threshold = proc_threshold
-    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
-
-    # store default_threshold for later
-    loc_store.0
-    # => []
-
-    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
-    push.0
-    # => [transaction_threshold]
-
-    # get the number of account procedures
-    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures
-    # => [num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
-
-    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
-    dup neq.0
-    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
-    while.true
-        sub.1 dup
-        # => [num_procedures-1, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-        # get procedure root of the procedure with index i
-        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root dupw
-        # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-        # 2a. check if this procedure has been called in the transaction
-        exec.native_account::was_procedure_called
-        # => [was_called, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-        # if it has been called, get the override threshold of that procedure
-        if.true
-            # => [PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
-            # => [PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_prefix, PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_suffix, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            # 2b. get the override proc_threshold of that procedure
-            # if the procedure has no override threshold, the returned map item will be [0, 0, 0, 0]
-            exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item
-            # => [[0, 0, 0, proc_threshold], num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            drop drop drop dup dup.3
-            # => [transaction_threshold, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-
-            u32assert2.err="transaction threshold or procedure threshold are not u32"
-            u32gt
-            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-            # 2c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, update transaction_threshold
-            movup.2 movdn.3
-            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
-            cdrop
-            # => [updated_transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
-            swap
-            # => [num_procedures-1, updated_transaction_threshold]
-        # if it has not been called during this transaction, nothing to do, move to the next procedure
-        else
-            dropw
-            # => [num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-        end
-
-        dup neq.0
-        # => [should_continue, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
-    end
-
-    drop
-    # => [transaction_threshold]
-
-    loc_load.0
-    # => [default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
-
-    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
-    dup.1 eq.0
-    # => [is_zero, default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
-
-    cdrop
-    # => [effective_transaction_threshold]
-end
-
-#! Authenticate a transaction using ECDSA secp256k1 with multi-signature support.
-#!
-#! This procedure implements multi-signature authentication by:
-#! 1. Computing the transaction summary message that needs to be signed
-#! 2. Verifying ECDSA signatures from multiple required signers against their public keys
-#! 3. Ensuring the minimum threshold of valid signatures is met
-#! 4. Implementing replay protection by tracking executed transactions
-#! 5. Verifying PSM signature if PSM selector is enabled (via PSM component)
-#!
-#! Inputs:
-#!   Operand stack: [SALT]
-#!   Advice map: {
-#!     h(PUB_KEY_0, MSG): SIG_0,
-#!     h(PUB_KEY_1, MSG): SIG_1,
-#!     h(PUB_KEY_n, MSG): SIG_n
-#!   }
-#! Outputs:
-#!   Operand stack: []
-#!
-#! Where:
-#! - SALT is a cryptographically random nonce that enables multiple concurrent
-#!   multisig transactions while maintaining replay protection. Each transaction
-#!   must use a unique SALT value to ensure transaction uniqueness.
-#! - SIG_i is the ECDSA signature from the i-th signer.
-#! - MSG is the transaction message being signed.
-#! - h(PUB_KEY_i, MSG) is the hash of the public key and message used as the advice map key.
-#!
-#! Panics if:
-#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).
-#! - the same transaction has already been executed (replay protection).
-#! - PSM signature verification fails (if PSM is enabled).
-#!
-#! Invocation: call
-@locals(1)
-pub proc auth_tx_ecdsa_multisig(salt: BeWord)
-    exec.native_account::incr_nonce drop
-    # => [SALT]
-
-    # ------ Computing transaction summary ------
-
-    exec.auth::create_tx_summary
-    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # to build a tx_summary in the host, we need these four words in the advice provider
-    exec.auth::adv_insert_hqword
-    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # the commitment to the tx summary is the message that is signed
-    exec.auth::hash_tx_summary
-    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # ------ Verifying approver signatures ------
-
-    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    exec.active_account::get_initial_item
-    # => [0, 0, num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    drop drop
-    # => [num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    swap movdn.5
-    # => [num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
-
-    push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
-
-    exec.::miden::standards::auth::ecdsa_k256_keccak::verify_signatures
-    # => [num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
-
-    # ------ Checking threshold is >= num_verified_signatures ------
-
-    movup.5
-    # => [default_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    exec.compute_transaction_threshold
-    # => [transaction_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    u32assert2 u32lt
-    # => [is_unauthorized, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-
-    # If signatures are non-existent the tx will fail here.
-    if.true
-        emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
-        push.0 assert.err="insufficient number of signatures"
-    end
-
-    # ------ Verifying PSM Signature ------
-    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-    call.psm_ecdsa::verify_psm_signature
-
-    # ------ Writing executed transaction MSG to map ------
-    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
-    exec.assert_new_tx
-end
-`;
-
-export const PSM_MASM = `# Private State Manager (PSM) Authentication Component
-#
-# This component provides PSM signature verification for accounts.
-# It can be used standalone or in conjunction with other auth components like multisig.
-
-use miden::protocol::active_account
-use miden::protocol::native_account
-
-type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
-
-# IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTES
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# - The selector in \`PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT\` controls whether the extra PSM signature
-#   is enforced:
-#     * PSM_ON  => exactly one valid PSM signature is required.
-#     * PSM_OFF => PSM signature is skipped for that call.
-#
-# - \`verify_psm_signature\` reads the selector from initial storage state.
-#   This means changes made during the same transaction won't affect the check.
-#
-# - \`enable_psm\` / \`disable_psm\` procedures allow explicit control over PSM state.
-#
-# - \`update_psm_public_key\`:
-#     * Installs a new PSM public key in the map at \`PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT\`.
-#     * Does not itself perform any signature checks.
-#     * To update the key without requiring PSM signature, ensure selector is OFF.
-#
-# Storage Layout
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-#
-# +---------------------+---------------+
-# |     DESCRIPTION     |     SLOT      |
-# +---------------------+---------------+
-# | PSM SELECTOR (word) |       0       |
-# | PSM PUBLIC KEY MAP  |       1       |
-# +---------------------+---------------+
-#
-# - PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT (0):
-#     * Stores a word that is compared against [1, 0, 0, 0] (PSM_ON).
-#     * Any value != PSM_ON is treated as PSM_OFF.
-#
-# - PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT (1):
-#     * A map from a fixed key [0, 0, 0, 0] to the single PSM public key:
-#         [0, 0, 0, 0] => PSM_PUBLIC_KEY
-#     * PSM_PUBLIC_KEY is a RPO Falcon 512 public key represented as a word.
-
-# CONSTANTS
-# =================================================================================================
-
-# Slot where the PSM selector flag is stored (using word() for named slot access):
-# - PSM_ON  => PSM signature required
-# - PSM_OFF => PSM signature skipped
-const PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::psm::selector")
-
-# Map slot for PSM public key
-# Uses exactly one PSM public key at index [0, 0, 0, 0]
-# [0, 0, 0, 0] => PSM_PUBLIC_KEY
-const PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::psm::public_key")
-
-# Selector flag values
-const PSM_ON=[1, 0, 0, 0]
-const PSM_OFF=[0, 0, 0, 0]
-
-# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
-const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT=event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
-
-# PSM PROCEDURES
-# =================================================================================================
-
-#! Enable PSM verification by setting the selector to ON.
-#!
-#! Operand stack inputs: []
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - Sets PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT to PSM_ON (1)
-#! - After this, transactions will require PSM signature verification
-proc enable_psm
-    push.PSM_ON
-    # => [PSM_ON]
-
-    push.PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, PSM_ON]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_item
-    # => [OLD_ROOT]
-
-    dropw
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Disable PSM verification by setting the selector to OFF.
-#!
-#! Operand stack inputs: []
-#! Outputs: []
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - Sets PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT to PSM_OFF (0)
-#! - After this, transactions will NOT require PSM signature verification
-proc disable_psm
-    push.PSM_OFF
-    # => [PSM_OFF]
-
-    push.PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, PSM_OFF]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_item
-    # => [OLD_ROOT]
-
-    dropw
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Update the PSM public key.
-#!
-#! Operand stack inputs: []
-#! Advice stack inputs:  [PUB_KEY]
-#!   - PUB_KEY is the new PSM RPO Falcon 512 public key
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - Stores PUB_KEY into PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT:
-#!      [0, 0, 0, 0] => PSM_PUBLIC_KEY
-#! - To update the key without requiring PSM signature, ensure
-#!   PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT = 0 (OFF) before calling this.
-pub proc update_psm_public_key
-    exec.disable_psm
-    # ------ Update the PSM public key ------
-    adv_loadw
-    # => [PUB_KEY]
-
-    push.0.0.0.0
-    # => [MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
-    # Note that MAP_KEY is [0, 0, 0, 0] for a single PSM_KEY
-
-    push.PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
-
-    exec.native_account::set_map_item
-    # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE]
-
-    dropw
-    # => []
-end
-
-#! Conditionally verify a "PSM" signature against a stored public key hash.
-#! The condition is controlled by the selector at PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT.
-#!
-#! Inputs:  [MSG]
-#! Outputs: [MSG]
-#!
-#! Panics if:
-#! - Selector is ON but the provided PSM signature is invalid or missing.
-#!
-#! Notes:
-#! - MSG is TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT provided by auth procedure
-#! - If selector is OFF (0), PSM verification is skipped
-#! - Selector value is read from initial storage state
-pub proc verify_psm_signature(msg: BeWord) -> BeWord
-    push.PSM_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
-    exec.active_account::get_item
-    drop drop drop
-    # => [selector, MSG]
-
-    push.1 eq
-    if.true
-        push.1
-        push.PSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
-        exec.::miden::standards::auth::falcon512_rpo::verify_signatures
-        push.1 neq
-        if.true
-            emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
-            push.0 assert.err="invalid PSM signature"
-        end
-    end
-    # => [MSG]
-    exec.enable_psm
-end
-`;
-
-export const PSM_ECDSA_MASM = PSM_MASM
-  .replaceAll('RPO Falcon 512', 'ECDSA secp256k1')
-  .replace(
-    'exec.::miden::standards::auth::falcon512_rpo::verify_signatures',
-    'exec.::miden::standards::auth::ecdsa_k256_keccak::verify_signatures',
-  );
+export * from './masm/index.js';