@opengsd/gsd-core 1.8.0 → 1.9.0

package/hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js

@@ -105,6 +105,109 @@ function isExcludedPath(filePath) {
   );
 }
 
+// Kimi CLI delivers the tool vocabulary the matcher was registered with —
+// the scanner's Kimi matcher is 'ReadFile' (runtime-hooks-surface.cts), so
+// tool_name arrives as 'ReadFile' (possibly module-qualified) and tool_input
+// carries `path` (kimi-cli src/kimi_cli/tools/file/read.py Params), not
+// `file_path`. Without normalization the SCANNED_TOOLS check below never
+// matches on Kimi and the scanner is silently dormant (#2304).
+//
+// SCOPE ON KIMI (#2547): normalization makes this scanner's CHECKS run on
+// Kimi. It does NOT make its block effective there. This is a PostToolUse
+// hook, and kimi-cli's dispatch never inspects PostToolUse hook results —
+// src/kimi_cli/soul/toolset.py fires them via asyncio.create_task() and
+// returns the ToolResult without awaiting, whereas PreToolUse results are
+// awaited and honoured. So `security.injection_blocking` cannot take effect
+// on Kimi regardless of the shape emitted below; reshaping the output would
+// not change that. Blocking prompt injection on Kimi needs a PreToolUse
+// mechanism, or an upstream kimi-cli change. Do not describe this hook as
+// "engaged" or "blocking" on Kimi. This block is
+// kept byte-identical with the copies in gsd-prompt-guard.js,
+// gsd-read-guard.js, and gsd-worktree-path-guard.js — a parity test binds
+// them (tests/kimi-guard-normalization-parity.test.cjs). Inlined per guard
+// (not hooks/lib/): hook scripts are staged as standalone files, and a
+// sibling require is a staging dependency that can fail silently.
+// A Map, not an object literal: bare bracket lookup resolves prototype keys
+// ('constructor', '__proto__', 'toString') to truthy functions/objects, so the
+// !mapped fall-through never fires for them; Map.get returns undefined (same
+// shape as canonicalizeRuntimeName in src/runtime-name-policy.cts).
+const KIMI_TOOL_NAMES = new Map([['WriteFile', 'Write'], ['StrReplaceFile', 'Edit'], ['ReadFile', 'Read'], ['Shell', 'Bash']]);
+function normalizeKimiPayload(data) {
+  // #2595 (review nit): `JSON.parse('null')` is null, and null/primitive
+  // payloads reached the `data.tool_name` read below and threw — falsifying
+  // this function's own "total over the inputs JSON can express" claim, which
+  // property (e) now tests directly. Harmless in practice (a null payload has
+  // nothing to guard, and the throw landed in the same fail-open catch as the
+  // exit-0 it now takes deliberately) but the claim should be true as stated.
+  if (data === null || typeof data !== 'object') return data;
+  const raw = data.tool_name;
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string') return data;
+  const mapped = KIMI_TOOL_NAMES.get(raw.slice(raw.lastIndexOf(':') + 1));
+  if (!mapped) return data;
+  data.tool_name = mapped;
+  if (data.tool_response === undefined && data.tool_output !== undefined) {
+    data.tool_response = data.tool_output;
+  }
+  const input = data.tool_input;
+  if (input && typeof input === 'object') {
+    // #2547 (review): Kimi's `path` is AUTHORITATIVE — it must win outright,
+    // not merely fill in when `file_path` happens to be absent. kimi-cli's file
+    // tools carry no `file_path` field at all (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/write.py,
+    // replace.py, @ 4a550ef — the SHA #2547 pins), and soul/toolset.py hands the
+    // model's raw json-parsed
+    // arguments to PreToolUse verbatim, doing typed validation only later inside
+    // tool.call() — after the hook has already decided. So a `file_path` in a
+    // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, and under the old `=== undefined`
+    // condition it SHADOWED the field kimi-cli actually executes on. A payload
+    // pairing a cross-root `path` with a spurious `file_path: ""` left every
+    // guard reading an empty string and exiting 0, while the identical write
+    // without the extra key blocked — a bypass needing no crash at all. The same
+    // shadowing also preserved a NON-STRING `file_path` (`[]`), which threw
+    // inside gsd-worktree-path-guard's path.isAbsolute() and reached its outer
+    // `catch { process.exit(0) }`: the same crash-to-allow this fix closes
+    // elsewhere, reached through the guard's own read rather than through
+    // normalization. Overwriting can only ever narrow what a guard inspects to
+    // the path that will actually be written, so it cannot under-block.
+    if (typeof input.path === 'string') {
+      input.file_path = input.path;
+    }
+    const edits = Array.isArray(input.edit) ? input.edit
+      : (input.edit && typeof input.edit === 'object') ? [input.edit] : [];
+    if (edits.length) {
+      // #2547: `e?.old`, not `e.old` — `??` guards the value, not the
+      // dereference, so a NULLISH entry (`edit: [null]`) threw a TypeError
+      // here. normalizeKimiPayload runs before any tool dispatch, so that throw
+      // reached each guard's outer `catch { process.exit(0) }` and silently
+      // downgraded a should-BLOCK call into an allow. (A string/number entry
+      // never threw — `('x').old` is a legal read yielding undefined.)
+      //
+      // The String() coercion is guarded for the same reason: `{"toString":
+      // null}` is valid JSON that throws "Cannot convert object to primitive
+      // value", which is the identical crash-to-allow with a different
+      // trigger. Degrading only the non-coercible entry to '' keeps
+      // stringification intact for every value that CAN coerce (numbers,
+      // arrays, plain objects), so nothing downstream — including
+      // gsd-prompt-guard's scan of new_string — loses content it saw before.
+      const editText = (v) => { try { return String(v ?? ''); } catch { return ''; } };
+      // #2595 (review Major 2): reconstruct UNCONDITIONALLY, mirroring the
+      // `path` decision above rather than merely filling in when the field
+      // happens to be absent. kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile schema is `path` +
+      // `edit` only (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/replace.py @ 4a550ef) — it carries
+      // no `old_string`/`new_string` at all, so either field appearing in a
+      // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, exactly like `file_path`. Under
+      // the old `=== undefined` condition a model-supplied `new_string: ""`
+      // SHADOWED the reconstruction, leaving gsd-prompt-guard's injection scan
+      // reading '' and exiting at its `if (!content)` before it ever saw the
+      // real `edit[].new` — a one-key bypass of the very scan this fix's
+      // guarded coercion exists to keep fed. A `typeof` test would NOT close
+      // it: a benign non-empty string shadows just as effectively as ''.
+      input.old_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.old)).join('\n');
+      input.new_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.new)).join('\n');
+    }
+  }
+  return data;
+}
+
 let inputBuf = '';
 const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 5000);
 process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
@@ -112,7 +215,7 @@ process.stdin.on('data', chunk => { inputBuf += chunk; });
 process.stdin.on('end', () => {
   clearTimeout(stdinTimeout);
   try {
-    const data = JSON.parse(inputBuf);
+    const data = normalizeKimiPayload(JSON.parse(inputBuf));
 
     const toolName = data.tool_name;
     const SCANNED_TOOLS = new Set(['Read', 'WebFetch', 'WebSearch']);
@@ -123,7 +226,11 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
     // Source label + path-exclusion (path-exclusion applies to file reads only)
     let source;
     if (toolName === 'Read') {
-      source = data.tool_input?.file_path || '';
+      // #2595 (review Major 3, sibling sweep): typed read — a non-string
+      // threw inside isExcludedPath()'s .replace() into the outer catch.
+      source = typeof data.tool_input?.file_path === 'string'
+        ? data.tool_input.file_path
+        : '';
       if (!source) process.exit(0);
       if (isExcludedPath(source)) process.exit(0);
     } else if (toolName === 'WebFetch') {

package/hooks/gsd-statusline.js

@@ -143,12 +143,15 @@ function readGsdState(dir) {
 function parseStateMd(content) {
   const state = {};
 
-  // YAML frontmatter between --- markers (anchored at file start)
-  const fmMatch = content.match(/^---\n([\s\S]*?)\n---/);
+  // YAML frontmatter between --- markers (anchored at file start).
+  // #2754: \r?\n (not literal \n) so a CRLF STATE.md (Windows-authored) parses
+  // identically to LF — pre-fix the literal-\n fence dropped the ENTIRE block.
+  // Mirrors the CRLF-safe extractFrontmatter in src/frontmatter.cts.
+  const fmMatch = content.match(/^---\r?\n([\s\S]*?)\r?\n---/);
   if (fmMatch) {
     const fm = fmMatch[1];
     // Top-level scalar key: value
-    for (const line of fm.split('\n')) {
+    for (const line of fm.split(/\r?\n/)) {
       const m = line.match(/^(\w+):\s*(.+)/);
       if (!m) continue;
       const [, key, val] = m;
@@ -169,10 +172,10 @@ function parseStateMd(content) {
       const items = npFlowMatch[1].split(',').map(s => s.trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, '')).filter(Boolean);
       state.nextPhases = items.length > 0 ? items : null;
     } else {
-      const npBlockMatch = fm.match(/^next_phases:\s*\n((?:[ \t]*-[ \t]*[^\n]+\n?)*)/m);
+      const npBlockMatch = fm.match(/^next_phases:\s*\r?\n((?:[ \t]*-[ \t]*[^\r\n]+\r?\n?)*)/m);
       if (npBlockMatch) {
         const items = npBlockMatch[1]
-          .split('\n')
+          .split(/\r?\n/)
           .map(line => line.match(/^[ \t]*-[ \t]*(.+)$/))
           .filter(Boolean)
           .map(m => m[1].trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, ''))
@@ -181,7 +184,7 @@ function parseStateMd(content) {
       }
     }
     // progress nested block: completed_phases / total_phases / percent (2-space indent)
-    const progMatch = fm.match(/^progress:\s*\n((?:[ \t]+\w+:.+\n?)+)/m);
+    const progMatch = fm.match(/^progress:\s*\r?\n((?:[ \t]+\w+:.+\r?\n?)+)/m);
     if (progMatch) {
       const cp = progMatch[1].match(/^[ \t]+completed_phases:\s*(\d+)/m);
       const tp = progMatch[1].match(/^[ \t]+total_phases:\s*(\d+)/m);

package/hooks/gsd-workflow-guard.js

@@ -78,6 +78,100 @@ function workflowGuardEnabled(cwd) {
   }
 }
 
+// Kimi CLI delivers the tool vocabulary the matcher was registered with —
+// this guard's Kimi matcher is 'Shell|WriteFile|StrReplaceFile'
+// (runtime-hooks-surface.cts), so tool_name arrives in Kimi vocabulary
+// (possibly module-qualified) and neither the Bash branch nor the
+// Write/Edit/MultiEdit allowlist below ever matched on Kimi (#2304).
+// kimi-cli's Shell.Params names its field `command`
+// (src/kimi_cli/tools/shell/__init__.py), same as Claude's Bash, so the
+// Shell leg needs only the name mapping. This block is kept byte-identical
+// with the copies in gsd-prompt-guard.js, gsd-read-guard.js,
+// gsd-worktree-path-guard.js, and gsd-read-injection-scanner.js — a parity
+// test binds them (tests/kimi-guard-normalization-parity.test.cjs). Inlined
+// per guard (not hooks/lib/): hook scripts are staged as standalone files,
+// and a sibling require is a staging dependency that can fail silently.
+// A Map, not an object literal: bare bracket lookup resolves prototype keys
+// ('constructor', '__proto__', 'toString') to truthy functions/objects, so the
+// !mapped fall-through never fires for them; Map.get returns undefined (same
+// shape as canonicalizeRuntimeName in src/runtime-name-policy.cts).
+const KIMI_TOOL_NAMES = new Map([['WriteFile', 'Write'], ['StrReplaceFile', 'Edit'], ['ReadFile', 'Read'], ['Shell', 'Bash']]);
+function normalizeKimiPayload(data) {
+  // #2595 (review nit): `JSON.parse('null')` is null, and null/primitive
+  // payloads reached the `data.tool_name` read below and threw — falsifying
+  // this function's own "total over the inputs JSON can express" claim, which
+  // property (e) now tests directly. Harmless in practice (a null payload has
+  // nothing to guard, and the throw landed in the same fail-open catch as the
+  // exit-0 it now takes deliberately) but the claim should be true as stated.
+  if (data === null || typeof data !== 'object') return data;
+  const raw = data.tool_name;
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string') return data;
+  const mapped = KIMI_TOOL_NAMES.get(raw.slice(raw.lastIndexOf(':') + 1));
+  if (!mapped) return data;
+  data.tool_name = mapped;
+  if (data.tool_response === undefined && data.tool_output !== undefined) {
+    data.tool_response = data.tool_output;
+  }
+  const input = data.tool_input;
+  if (input && typeof input === 'object') {
+    // #2547 (review): Kimi's `path` is AUTHORITATIVE — it must win outright,
+    // not merely fill in when `file_path` happens to be absent. kimi-cli's file
+    // tools carry no `file_path` field at all (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/write.py,
+    // replace.py, @ 4a550ef — the SHA #2547 pins), and soul/toolset.py hands the
+    // model's raw json-parsed
+    // arguments to PreToolUse verbatim, doing typed validation only later inside
+    // tool.call() — after the hook has already decided. So a `file_path` in a
+    // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, and under the old `=== undefined`
+    // condition it SHADOWED the field kimi-cli actually executes on. A payload
+    // pairing a cross-root `path` with a spurious `file_path: ""` left every
+    // guard reading an empty string and exiting 0, while the identical write
+    // without the extra key blocked — a bypass needing no crash at all. The same
+    // shadowing also preserved a NON-STRING `file_path` (`[]`), which threw
+    // inside gsd-worktree-path-guard's path.isAbsolute() and reached its outer
+    // `catch { process.exit(0) }`: the same crash-to-allow this fix closes
+    // elsewhere, reached through the guard's own read rather than through
+    // normalization. Overwriting can only ever narrow what a guard inspects to
+    // the path that will actually be written, so it cannot under-block.
+    if (typeof input.path === 'string') {
+      input.file_path = input.path;
+    }
+    const edits = Array.isArray(input.edit) ? input.edit
+      : (input.edit && typeof input.edit === 'object') ? [input.edit] : [];
+    if (edits.length) {
+      // #2547: `e?.old`, not `e.old` — `??` guards the value, not the
+      // dereference, so a NULLISH entry (`edit: [null]`) threw a TypeError
+      // here. normalizeKimiPayload runs before any tool dispatch, so that throw
+      // reached each guard's outer `catch { process.exit(0) }` and silently
+      // downgraded a should-BLOCK call into an allow. (A string/number entry
+      // never threw — `('x').old` is a legal read yielding undefined.)
+      //
+      // The String() coercion is guarded for the same reason: `{"toString":
+      // null}` is valid JSON that throws "Cannot convert object to primitive
+      // value", which is the identical crash-to-allow with a different
+      // trigger. Degrading only the non-coercible entry to '' keeps
+      // stringification intact for every value that CAN coerce (numbers,
+      // arrays, plain objects), so nothing downstream — including
+      // gsd-prompt-guard's scan of new_string — loses content it saw before.
+      const editText = (v) => { try { return String(v ?? ''); } catch { return ''; } };
+      // #2595 (review Major 2): reconstruct UNCONDITIONALLY, mirroring the
+      // `path` decision above rather than merely filling in when the field
+      // happens to be absent. kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile schema is `path` +
+      // `edit` only (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/replace.py @ 4a550ef) — it carries
+      // no `old_string`/`new_string` at all, so either field appearing in a
+      // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, exactly like `file_path`. Under
+      // the old `=== undefined` condition a model-supplied `new_string: ""`
+      // SHADOWED the reconstruction, leaving gsd-prompt-guard's injection scan
+      // reading '' and exiting at its `if (!content)` before it ever saw the
+      // real `edit[].new` — a one-key bypass of the very scan this fix's
+      // guarded coercion exists to keep fed. A `typeof` test would NOT close
+      // it: a benign non-empty string shadows just as effectively as ''.
+      input.old_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.old)).join('\n');
+      input.new_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.new)).join('\n');
+    }
+  }
+  return data;
+}
+
 let input = '';
 const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 3000);
 process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
@@ -85,7 +179,7 @@ process.stdin.on('data', chunk => input += chunk);
 process.stdin.on('end', () => {
   clearTimeout(stdinTimeout);
   try {
-    const data = JSON.parse(input);
+    const data = normalizeKimiPayload(JSON.parse(input));
     const toolName = data.tool_name;
     const cwd = data.cwd || process.cwd();
     const isWorkflowGuardEnabled = workflowGuardEnabled(cwd);
@@ -97,12 +191,15 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
       const command = data.tool_input?.command || '';
       for (const gitCwd of forceGitAddCwds(command, cwd)) {
         const branch = currentBranch(gitCwd);
-        if (branch.startsWith('worktree-agent-')) {
-          process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+        if (/^(worktree-)?agent-/.test(branch)) {
+          const output = {
             decision: 'block',
             code: 'WORKTREE_AGENT_FORCE_ADD_FORBIDDEN',
-            reason: 'worktree-agent branches must not run git add -f or git add --force. Respect the SDK skipped_gitignored/skipped_commit_docs_false contract and leave gitignored files untracked.',
-          }));
+            reason: 'agent/worktree-agent branches must not run git add -f or git add --force. Respect the SDK skipped_gitignored/skipped_commit_docs_false contract and leave gitignored files untracked.',
+          };
+          process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(output));
+          // Kimi CLI's exit-2 protocol feeds stderr back to the model (#2304)
+          process.stderr.write(output.reason);
           process.exit(2);
         }
       }
@@ -122,7 +219,14 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
     }
 
     // Check the file being edited
-    const filePath = data.tool_input?.file_path || data.tool_input?.path || '';
+    // #2595 (review Major 3, sibling sweep): typed read on BOTH fields. The
+    // `&& value` keeps the original truthiness fallback intact — an empty
+    // file_path must still fall through to `path`, which a bare typeof test
+    // would have broken.
+    const filePath =
+      (typeof data.tool_input?.file_path === 'string' && data.tool_input.file_path) ||
+      (typeof data.tool_input?.path === 'string' && data.tool_input.path) ||
+      '';
 
     // Allow edits to .planning/ files (GSD state management)
     if (filePath.includes('.planning/') || filePath.includes('.planning\\')) {

package/hooks/gsd-worktree-path-guard.js

@@ -37,6 +37,100 @@ function nearestExistingDir(start) {
   return null;
 }
 
+// #2304: Kimi's native hook bus delivers Kimi's tool vocabulary in the payload
+// (Write → WriteFile, Edit/MultiEdit → StrReplaceFile) while the [[hooks]]
+// matcher is registered pre-translated (runtime-hooks-surface.cts
+// buildKimiHooksTomlBlock) — so without normalizing the payload too, the
+// matcher fires but the tool_name check below exits 0 and the guard is dormant
+// on Kimi. The tool_input field names differ as well (kimi-cli
+// src/kimi_cli/tools/file/{write,replace}.py): WriteFile takes `path`/`content`,
+// StrReplaceFile takes `path` + `edit: Edit | list[Edit]` with `old`/`new` —
+// kimi-cli's hooks/events.py forwards tool_input verbatim, so both layers need
+// mapping. Accepts bare and module-qualified ('kimi_cli.tools.file:WriteFile')
+// names; unknown names fall through untouched. Inlined per guard (not
+// hooks/lib/): hook scripts are staged as standalone files, and a sibling
+// require is a staging dependency that can fail silently.
+// A Map, not an object literal: bare bracket lookup resolves prototype keys
+// ('constructor', '__proto__', 'toString') to truthy functions/objects, so the
+// !mapped fall-through never fires for them; Map.get returns undefined (same
+// shape as canonicalizeRuntimeName in src/runtime-name-policy.cts).
+const KIMI_TOOL_NAMES = new Map([['WriteFile', 'Write'], ['StrReplaceFile', 'Edit'], ['ReadFile', 'Read'], ['Shell', 'Bash']]);
+function normalizeKimiPayload(data) {
+  // #2595 (review nit): `JSON.parse('null')` is null, and null/primitive
+  // payloads reached the `data.tool_name` read below and threw — falsifying
+  // this function's own "total over the inputs JSON can express" claim, which
+  // property (e) now tests directly. Harmless in practice (a null payload has
+  // nothing to guard, and the throw landed in the same fail-open catch as the
+  // exit-0 it now takes deliberately) but the claim should be true as stated.
+  if (data === null || typeof data !== 'object') return data;
+  const raw = data.tool_name;
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string') return data;
+  const mapped = KIMI_TOOL_NAMES.get(raw.slice(raw.lastIndexOf(':') + 1));
+  if (!mapped) return data;
+  data.tool_name = mapped;
+  if (data.tool_response === undefined && data.tool_output !== undefined) {
+    data.tool_response = data.tool_output;
+  }
+  const input = data.tool_input;
+  if (input && typeof input === 'object') {
+    // #2547 (review): Kimi's `path` is AUTHORITATIVE — it must win outright,
+    // not merely fill in when `file_path` happens to be absent. kimi-cli's file
+    // tools carry no `file_path` field at all (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/write.py,
+    // replace.py, @ 4a550ef — the SHA #2547 pins), and soul/toolset.py hands the
+    // model's raw json-parsed
+    // arguments to PreToolUse verbatim, doing typed validation only later inside
+    // tool.call() — after the hook has already decided. So a `file_path` in a
+    // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, and under the old `=== undefined`
+    // condition it SHADOWED the field kimi-cli actually executes on. A payload
+    // pairing a cross-root `path` with a spurious `file_path: ""` left every
+    // guard reading an empty string and exiting 0, while the identical write
+    // without the extra key blocked — a bypass needing no crash at all. The same
+    // shadowing also preserved a NON-STRING `file_path` (`[]`), which threw
+    // inside gsd-worktree-path-guard's path.isAbsolute() and reached its outer
+    // `catch { process.exit(0) }`: the same crash-to-allow this fix closes
+    // elsewhere, reached through the guard's own read rather than through
+    // normalization. Overwriting can only ever narrow what a guard inspects to
+    // the path that will actually be written, so it cannot under-block.
+    if (typeof input.path === 'string') {
+      input.file_path = input.path;
+    }
+    const edits = Array.isArray(input.edit) ? input.edit
+      : (input.edit && typeof input.edit === 'object') ? [input.edit] : [];
+    if (edits.length) {
+      // #2547: `e?.old`, not `e.old` — `??` guards the value, not the
+      // dereference, so a NULLISH entry (`edit: [null]`) threw a TypeError
+      // here. normalizeKimiPayload runs before any tool dispatch, so that throw
+      // reached each guard's outer `catch { process.exit(0) }` and silently
+      // downgraded a should-BLOCK call into an allow. (A string/number entry
+      // never threw — `('x').old` is a legal read yielding undefined.)
+      //
+      // The String() coercion is guarded for the same reason: `{"toString":
+      // null}` is valid JSON that throws "Cannot convert object to primitive
+      // value", which is the identical crash-to-allow with a different
+      // trigger. Degrading only the non-coercible entry to '' keeps
+      // stringification intact for every value that CAN coerce (numbers,
+      // arrays, plain objects), so nothing downstream — including
+      // gsd-prompt-guard's scan of new_string — loses content it saw before.
+      const editText = (v) => { try { return String(v ?? ''); } catch { return ''; } };
+      // #2595 (review Major 2): reconstruct UNCONDITIONALLY, mirroring the
+      // `path` decision above rather than merely filling in when the field
+      // happens to be absent. kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile schema is `path` +
+      // `edit` only (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/replace.py @ 4a550ef) — it carries
+      // no `old_string`/`new_string` at all, so either field appearing in a
+      // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, exactly like `file_path`. Under
+      // the old `=== undefined` condition a model-supplied `new_string: ""`
+      // SHADOWED the reconstruction, leaving gsd-prompt-guard's injection scan
+      // reading '' and exiting at its `if (!content)` before it ever saw the
+      // real `edit[].new` — a one-key bypass of the very scan this fix's
+      // guarded coercion exists to keep fed. A `typeof` test would NOT close
+      // it: a benign non-empty string shadows just as effectively as ''.
+      input.old_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.old)).join('\n');
+      input.new_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.new)).join('\n');
+    }
+  }
+  return data;
+}
+
 let input = '';
 const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 3000);
 process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
@@ -44,7 +138,7 @@ process.stdin.on('data', chunk => input += chunk);
 process.stdin.on('end', () => {
   clearTimeout(stdinTimeout);
   try {
-    const data = JSON.parse(input);
+    const data = normalizeKimiPayload(JSON.parse(input));
     const toolName = data.tool_name;
 
     // Only guard Edit, Write, and MultiEdit tool calls
@@ -72,13 +166,14 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
     }
 
     // #1342: Only enforce inside a GSD-managed isolated executor worktree. Those
-    // are always on a `worktree-agent-*` branch (the positive allow-list enforced
-    // by worktree-branch-check.md, #2924). A manually-created linked worktree (plain
-    // non-GSD work, e.g. Claude Code plan-mode) is on the user's own branch, so the
-    // guard must be a no-op there. Detached HEAD / error → not GSD-managed → no-op.
+    // are always on an `agent-*` or legacy `worktree-agent-*` branch (the positive
+    // allow-list enforced by worktree-branch-check.md, #2924, #1995). A manually-
+    // created linked worktree (plain non-GSD work, e.g. Claude Code plan-mode) is
+    // on the user's own branch, so the guard must be a no-op there. Detached HEAD
+    // / error → not GSD-managed → no-op.
     const branchResult = git(['symbolic-ref', '--short', 'HEAD'], cwd);
     const branch = branchResult.status === 0 && branchResult.stdout ? branchResult.stdout.trim() : '';
-    if (!/^worktree-agent-[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$/.test(branch)) {
+    if (!/^(worktree-)?agent-[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$/.test(branch)) {
       process.exit(0); // not a GSD-managed executor worktree — no-op
     }
 
@@ -91,12 +186,37 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
     }
     const wtTopRaw = wtTopResult.stdout.trim();
 
-    const rawFilePath = data.tool_input?.file_path || '';
+    // #2595 (review Major 3): read the field TYPED. `?.file_path || ''` let a
+    // non-string through — `[]` and `{}` are truthy, so they survived the
+    // `!rawFilePath` check and threw inside path.isAbsolute() below, landing in
+    // this script's outer `catch { process.exit(0) }`. That is the same
+    // crash-to-allow #2547 closes elsewhere, reached through the guard's own
+    // read rather than through normalization, and it is NOT closed by making
+    // `path` authoritative: normalization returns early for native Claude Code
+    // payloads (KIMI_TOOL_NAMES has no 'Edit' entry), so `{"tool_name":"Edit",
+    // "tool_input":{"file_path":[]}}` reached it untouched — this guard's
+    // original #260 surface. Same shape as hooks/gsd-windsurf-pre-write.js:75.
+    const rawFilePath = typeof data.tool_input?.file_path === 'string'
+      ? data.tool_input.file_path
+      : '';
     if (!rawFilePath) {
       process.exit(0);
     }
 
-    // Relative paths are always safe — they resolve relative to CWD inside the worktree
+    // Relative paths resolve against the tool's CWD, which is inside the worktree
+    // — so under the runtime this guard was written for they cannot leave it.
+    //
+    // #2595 (review Minor 5) — state the premise rather than leave it implicit,
+    // because THIS PR is what widened the guard's reach to Kimi. "Always safe"
+    // holds only while every runtime reaching here either rejects relative paths
+    // or resolves them against the worktree CWD. Claude Code's Edit/Write require
+    // an absolute file_path, so the original #260 surface satisfies it by
+    // construction. kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile takes `path` with no documented
+    // absoluteness guarantee, and its resolution behaviour is NOT verified here
+    // (no source available to this repo at 4a550ef beyond the schema). If it
+    // resolves relative paths against anything other than the tool CWD, a
+    // `../`-laden path exits 0 at this line and escapes the worktree. Stating a
+    // mechanism and an unverified premise — not asserting a live bypass.
     if (!path.isAbsolute(rawFilePath)) {
       process.exit(0);
     }
@@ -151,6 +271,8 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
             `absolute path is not permitted from an isolated executor worktree. Use a relative path.`,
         };
         process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(output));
+        // Kimi feeds stderr (not stdout) back to the model on exit 2.
+        process.stderr.write(output.reason);
         process.exit(2);
       }
       // Outside all git repositories — fail open (#1342).
@@ -177,6 +299,8 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
     };
 
     process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(output));
+    // Kimi feeds stderr (not stdout) back to the model on exit 2.
+    process.stderr.write(output.reason);
     process.exit(2);
   } catch {
     // Silent fail — never block valid tool calls due to hook errors

package/hooks/lib/cursor-workspace.js

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// cursor-workspace.js — shared workspace resolution for Cursor lifecycle hooks (#2587).
+//
+// No `gsd-hook-version:` marker, deliberately — matching hooks/lib/git-cmd.js.
+// Neither copy path that stages hooks/lib/*.js substitutes the version
+// placeholder (copyLibDir stamps .sh files only), and the managed-hooks
+// staleness scan covers top-level hooks/ names, not hooks/lib/. A marker here
+// would ship to users as an unsubstituted literal.
+//
+// Cursor invokes hooks with cwd set to the Cursor config dir (~/.cursor) under
+// the cursor-agent CLI, NOT the workspace. Every hook that resolves a project
+// path from process.cwd() therefore missed: sessionStart could only emit its
+// "no .planning/ workflow found" nudge, stop's verify-work reminder never fired,
+// and subagentStart left every subagent without phase context.
+//
+// The hook payload carries the real path in `workspace_roots`. This module is
+// the single place that turns that payload into a project root, so the three
+// hooks cannot drift apart (they previously carried three copies of it).
+//
+// Consumers: gsd-cursor-session-start.js, gsd-cursor-stop.js,
+// gsd-cursor-subagent-start.js. Staged into <config>/hooks/lib/ by
+// writeCursorHooksJson (src/runtime-hooks-surface.cts) alongside the scripts
+// that require it, and registered in the installer's GSD_HOOK_LIB_FILES so
+// uninstall and the manifest manage it.
+
+'use strict';
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the workspace root a Cursor hook should report on.
+ *
+ * Search order:
+ *   1. Each entry of `workspace_roots` that actually carries .planning/STATE.md
+ *      — so a multi-root workspace whose GSD project is not the first root
+ *      still resolves.
+ *   2. process.cwd(), if IT carries .planning/STATE.md. cwd is a CANDIDATE, not
+ *      merely the empty-roots fallback: an IDE invocation can supply
+ *      workspace_roots AND run from the project, and searching roots alone
+ *      would report "absent" for a project sitting right at cwd — narrower than
+ *      the pre-fix always-cwd behavior this replaces.
+ *   3. The first declared root, else cwd — so the "absent" message still names
+ *      a sensible directory when there is genuinely no project.
+ *
+ * Never throws: a malformed payload degrades to cwd rather than wedging the
+ * session. (fs.existsSync itself does not throw — it returns false for NUL
+ * bytes, over-long components, and non-directory ancestors.)
+ *
+ * @param {string} rawInput Raw stdin payload as received by the hook.
+ * @returns {string} Absolute-or-relative directory to resolve .planning/ against.
+ */
+function resolveWorkspaceRoot(rawInput) {
+  let input = {};
+  try { input = JSON.parse(rawInput || '{}'); } catch { /* fall back to cwd */ }
+  const roots = Array.isArray(input.workspace_roots)
+    ? input.workspace_roots.filter((r) => typeof r === 'string' && r.length > 0)
+    : [];
+  for (const root of [...roots, process.cwd()]) {
+    if (fs.existsSync(path.join(root, '.planning', 'STATE.md'))) return root;
+  }
+  return roots[0] || process.cwd();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convenience: the .planning/STATE.md path for the resolved workspace.
+ *
+ * @param {string} rawInput Raw stdin payload as received by the hook.
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+function resolveStatePath(rawInput) {
+  return path.join(resolveWorkspaceRoot(rawInput), '.planning', 'STATE.md');
+}
+
+module.exports = { resolveWorkspaceRoot, resolveStatePath };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@opengsd/gsd-core",
-  "version": "1.8.0",
+  "version": "1.9.0",
   "description": "GSD Core is a meta-prompting, context engineering, and spec-driven development system for AI coding agents.",
   "main": ".opencode/plugins/gsd-core.js",
   "bin": {
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
     "eslint-plugin-no-only-tests": "^3.4.0",
     "fast-check": "^4.8.0",
     "globals": "^16.5.0",
-    "js-yaml": "^4.2.0",
+    "js-yaml": "^4.2.1",
     "typescript": "^6.0.3",
     "typescript-eslint": "^8.60.0"
   },
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@
     "gen:plugin-skills": "node scripts/gen-plugin-skills.cjs --write",
     "gen:capability-registry": "node scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs --write",
     "gen:registry": "node scripts/gen-registry.cjs --write",
-    "gen:golden": "node scripts/gen-golden-install-parity-zcode.cjs && node scripts/gen-install-tree-fixtures.cjs",
+    "gen:install-tree": "node scripts/gen-install-tree-fixtures.cjs",
+    "regen:derived": "npm run build && npm run gen:registry && node scripts/gen-adr-index.cjs --write && node scripts/gen-capability-matrix.cjs --write && node scripts/gen-inventory-manifest.cjs --write && node scripts/sync-manifest-versions.cjs && npm run gen:install-tree",
     "validate:registry": "node scripts/validate-registry.cjs",
     "prepack": "npm run build:lib",
     "prepare": "npm run build:lib",
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@
     "lint": "eslint . --cache --cache-location node_modules/.cache/eslint/",
     "lint:fix": "eslint . --fix",
     "lint:table-schema-drift": "node scripts/lint-table-schema-drift.cjs",
-    "lint:ci": "npm run lint && npm run lint:skill-deps && npm run lint:generated-sync && node scripts/lint-test-file-count.cjs && node scripts/lint-command-contract.cjs && node scripts/lint-pr-check-project-dir.cjs && npm run lint:legacy-name && node scripts/lint-regression-test-names.cjs && node scripts/lint-allow-test-rule-refs.cjs && node scripts/lint-resolution-provenance.cjs && node scripts/lint-portable-timeout.cjs && node scripts/validate-registry.cjs && node scripts/lint-table-schema-drift.cjs",
+    "lint:ci": "npm run lint && npm run lint:skill-deps && npm run lint:generated-sync && node scripts/lint-test-file-count.cjs && node scripts/lint-command-contract.cjs && node scripts/lint-pr-check-project-dir.cjs && npm run lint:legacy-name && node scripts/lint-regression-test-names.cjs && node scripts/lint-allow-test-rule-refs.cjs && node scripts/lint-resolution-provenance.cjs && node scripts/lint-emitted-drift-ack.cjs && node scripts/lint-portable-timeout.cjs && node scripts/validate-registry.cjs && node scripts/lint-table-schema-drift.cjs && node scripts/lint-fix-has-regression-test.cjs",
     "lint:allow-test-rule-refs": "node scripts/lint-allow-test-rule-refs.cjs",
     "lint:regression-names": "node scripts/lint-regression-test-names.cjs",
     "lint:descriptions": "node scripts/lint-descriptions.cjs",
@@ -111,11 +112,10 @@
     "lint:test-file-count": "node scripts/lint-test-file-count.cjs",
     "lint:pr-checks": "node scripts/lint-pr-check-project-dir.cjs",
     "lint:changeset": "node scripts/changeset/lint.cjs",
-    "lint:generated-sync": "node scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-loop-host-contract.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-capability-matrix.cjs --check && node scripts/sync-manifest-versions.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-inventory-manifest.cjs --check && node scripts/generate-package-identity.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-plugin-skills.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-registry.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-adr-index.cjs --check && node scripts/check-glossary-refs.cjs --check",
+    "lint:generated-sync": "node scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-loop-host-contract.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-capability-matrix.cjs --check && node scripts/sync-manifest-versions.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-inventory-manifest.cjs --check && node scripts/generate-package-identity.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-plugin-skills.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-registry.cjs --check && node scripts/gen-adr-index.cjs --check && node scripts/check-glossary-refs.cjs --check && node scripts/lint-compiled-artifact-sync.cjs --check",
     "lint:docs": "node scripts/lint-docs-required.cjs",
     "lint:legacy-name": "node scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs",
     "ci:test-scope": "node scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs",
-    "size:baseline": "node scripts/update-size-baseline.cjs",
     "changeset": "node scripts/changeset/new.cjs",
     "changelog:render": "node scripts/changeset/cli.cjs render",
     "test": "node scripts/run-tests.cjs",
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
     "test:affected": "node scripts/run-affected-tests.cjs",
     "test:coverage": "c8 --check-coverage --lines 70 --branches 60 --reporter text --include 'gsd-core/bin/lib/*.cjs' --exclude 'tests/**' --all node scripts/run-tests.cjs",
     "test:coverage:scripts-floor": "c8 check-coverage --lines 55 --include 'scripts/**/*.cjs' --exclude 'tests/**' --all",
-    "test:coverage:unit": "c8 --check-coverage --lines 70 --branches 60 --reporter text --include 'gsd-core/bin/lib/*.cjs' --exclude 'tests/**' --all node scripts/run-tests.cjs --suite unit && c8 check-coverage --per-file --lines 0 --functions 0 --statements 0 --branches 70 --include 'gsd-core/bin/lib/state.cjs' --include 'gsd-core/bin/lib/phase.cjs' --include 'gsd-core/bin/lib/verify.cjs' --include 'gsd-core/bin/lib/init.cjs' --exclude 'tests/**'",
+    "test:coverage:unit": "c8 --reporter text --reporter json-summary --include 'gsd-core/bin/lib/*.cjs' --exclude 'tests/**' --all node scripts/run-tests.cjs --suite unit && node scripts/check-coverage-gate.cjs",
     "test:coverage:all": "npm run test:coverage",
     "test:mutation": "stryker run",
     "test:mutation:since": "stryker run --incremental --since origin/next"