@opengsd/gsd-core 1.11.0 → 1.12.0

package/gsd-core/bin/lib/codex-agent-toml.cjs

@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
  * it imports `stripBOM`/`scanTomlLines` from here and its regression suite
  * (`tests/agent-install-check.test.cjs`) is the proof.
  *
+ * #3897 rung 3 amendment: `deriveCodexSandboxMode`/`CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS`/
+ * `validateCodexSandboxHolds` also live here now (moved from `bin/install.js`).
+ * That IS a policy (which `sandbox_mode` a role's tool contract derives), a
+ * narrow exception to this module's "document model, not policy" charter above
+ * — made because `bin/install.js` cannot be the shared owner: requiring it for
+ * its side effect on `require()` (the CLI banner print) corrupts every
+ * stdout-JSON caller (`agent-install-check.cts`'s `checkCodexSandboxPosture`).
+ * This module was already the single fs/path-free-parsing home both callers
+ * shared; `fs`/`path` are imported below ONLY for `validateCodexSandboxHolds`'s
+ * roster check — still node builtins only, no third-party or bin/lib dependency.
+ *
  * ── The reconciliation (40-design.md) ──────────────────────────────────────
  *
  * Phase 2's reader and this phase's writer disagree on how to handle an
@@ -31,8 +42,11 @@
  * One block-range detector, two call sites, two policies — never two detectors
  * that could silently drift from each other.
  */
+var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
+    return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
+};
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.PARSE_REASON = void 0;
+exports.CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS = exports.PARSE_REASON = void 0;
 exports.stripBOM = stripBOM;
 exports.unquoteTomlValue = unquoteTomlValue;
 exports.findDeveloperInstructionsBlockRange = findDeveloperInstructionsBlockRange;
@@ -41,6 +55,13 @@ exports.parseCodexAgentToml = parseCodexAgentToml;
 exports.renderCodexAgentToml = renderCodexAgentToml;
 exports.stripModel = stripModel;
 exports.stripReasoningEffort = stripReasoningEffort;
+exports.normalizeSandboxIdentity = normalizeSandboxIdentity;
+exports.isSandboxHeld = isSandboxHeld;
+exports.extractToolsValue = extractToolsValue;
+exports.deriveCodexSandboxMode = deriveCodexSandboxMode;
+exports.validateCodexSandboxHolds = validateCodexSandboxHolds;
+const node_fs_1 = __importDefault(require("node:fs"));
+const node_path_1 = __importDefault(require("node:path"));
 /** Frozen reason enum for a failed {@link parseCodexAgentToml}. */
 exports.PARSE_REASON = Object.freeze({
     UNTERMINATED_BLOCK: 'unterminated_block',
@@ -108,11 +129,15 @@ function findDeveloperInstructionsBlockRange(lines) {
 // lenient reader, boolean-only for reasoning effort) and parseCodexAgentToml
 // (the strict writer, which also needs the effort's value and both keys' line
 // indices so stripModel/stripReasoningEffort can remove exactly one line).
+// `sandbox_mode` (#3897 rung 4 MINOR finding 2) rides the same block-aware
+// pass as `model`/`model_reasoning_effort` — one scanner, never a second,
+// naive whole-file regex that could match prose inside the block.
 function scanHeaderLines(lines, blockStart, blockEnd) {
     let model = null;
     let modelLineIndex = null;
     let reasoningEffort = null;
     let reasoningEffortLineIndex = null;
+    let sandboxMode = null;
     for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
         if (blockStart !== -1 && i >= blockStart && i <= blockEnd)
             continue;
@@ -132,8 +157,11 @@ function scanHeaderLines(lines, blockStart, blockEnd) {
             reasoningEffort = unquoteTomlValue(rawValue);
             reasoningEffortLineIndex = i;
         }
+        else if (key === 'sandbox_mode') {
+            sandboxMode = unquoteTomlValue(rawValue);
+        }
     }
-    return { model, modelLineIndex, reasoningEffort, reasoningEffortLineIndex };
+    return { model, modelLineIndex, reasoningEffort, reasoningEffortLineIndex, sandboxMode };
 }
 /**
  * The LENIENT reader entry point (Phase 2, moved verbatim in behavior). Never
@@ -144,8 +172,8 @@ function scanHeaderLines(lines, blockStart, blockEnd) {
 function scanTomlLines(content) {
     const lines = content.split(/\r?\n/);
     const { start, end } = findDeveloperInstructionsBlockRange(lines);
-    const { model, reasoningEffort } = scanHeaderLines(lines, start, end);
-    return { model, hasReasoningEffort: reasoningEffort !== null };
+    const { model, reasoningEffort, sandboxMode } = scanHeaderLines(lines, start, end);
+    return { model, hasReasoningEffort: reasoningEffort !== null, sandboxMode };
 }
 // Splits `content` into `{lines, terminators}` where `terminators[i]` is the
 // terminator that FOLLOWS `lines[i]` (`'\r\n'`, `'\r'`, `'\n'`, or `''` for a
@@ -327,3 +355,381 @@ function stripReasoningEffort(doc) {
         return doc;
     return removeLine(doc, doc.reasoningEffortLineIndex, 'reasoningEffort');
 }
+// ── Codex sandbox_mode derivation (#3897 rung 3, ADR-3473 §8.3) ────────────
+//
+// Moved here from `bin/install.js` (fix for the CAUSE A regression this rung
+// introduced): `agent-install-check.cts`'s `checkCodexSandboxPosture` used to
+// lazily `require(bin/install.js)` to reach this derivation — but requiring
+// `bin/install.js` runs its whole top-level script, including the ASCII
+// banner print to stdout, which corrupted every stdout-JSON caller downstream
+// of `checkCodexSandboxPosture` (`gsd-tools validate agents`). This module is
+// a genuine leaf with no top-level side effects, so both `bin/install.js` and
+// `agent-install-check.cts` import the derivation from here instead — ONE
+// owner, no second predicate (routing `src/` through `bin/install.js` was
+// backwards layering to begin with).
+//
+// This module does NOT parse frontmatter (there is no third copy of that
+// extraction here — two already exist, `bin/install.js` and
+// `runtime-artifact-conversion.cts`). `deriveCodexSandboxMode` below takes
+// the already-resolved `tools:` value as a plain string parameter: every
+// caller already has it (or the raw frontmatter to pull it from) in hand
+// before calling in, so this module stays a pure predicate over data
+// supplied by the caller — never a document reader itself. This also means
+// the module never needs the full YAML-backed `frontmatter.cts` engine
+// (vendored js-yaml + anchor/alias refusal + comment-channel plumbing, built
+// for a much broader contract than a single `tools:` line lookup) — it has
+// no frontmatter-parsing need at all anymore.
+/**
+ * The 17 roles measured as widening under derivation (declare Write/Edit,
+ * never in the pre-#3897 `CODEX_AGENT_SANDBOX` map, so the old
+ * `|| 'read-only'` fallback silently under-granted them). Pinned to
+ * `read-only` pending the open question of whether Codex enforces
+ * `sandbox_mode` or treats it as advisory (HALT.md). This list is CLOSED and
+ * SHRINK-ONLY: a new writing role never lands here (S6, T26); it is validated
+ * against the live tool contract every time it is consulted
+ * ({@link _deriveCodexSandboxModeFromTools}) and against the real
+ * `agents/` roster by a dedicated test (`tests/codex-config.test.cjs` T24/T25)
+ * so a stale or orphaned entry fails loudly instead of being silently
+ * honored forever.
+ *
+ * `gsd-nyquist-auditor` is the 17th entry, added by the list-form `tools:`
+ * parse fix (#3897 follow-up): its `tools:` frontmatter uses YAML block-list
+ * form (`tools:` + indented `- Item` lines) and declares both Write and
+ * Edit, but the original `extractToolsLine`/`extractFrontmatterField`
+ * readers only ever saw the first list item (`- Read`) and derived
+ * `read-only` by accident, not by design. {@link extractToolsValue} now
+ * parses the list correctly, so this role genuinely derives
+ * `workspace-write` from its tool contract — HALT.md's original 16-role
+ * count measured against the pre-fix (single-line) readers and undercounted
+ * this role. It is held here for the same reason as the other 16: pending
+ * Codex's `sandbox_mode` enforcement decision, not because the derivation is
+ * wrong.
+ */
+exports.CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS = Object.freeze({
+    'gsd-ai-researcher': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-code-fixer': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-code-reviewer': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-debug-session-manager': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-doc-classifier': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-doc-synthesizer': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-doc-verifier': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-doc-writer': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-dom-verifier': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-domain-researcher': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-eval-auditor': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-eval-planner': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-intel-updater': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-pattern-mapper': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-ui-auditor': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-ui-researcher': 'declares Write/Edit; pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+    'gsd-nyquist-auditor': 'declares Write/Edit (YAML list-form tools:, surfaced by the list-form parse fix); pending Codex sandbox_mode enforcement decision',
+});
+// True iff a `tools:` frontmatter value declares Write or Edit as a whole
+// token (never a substring match, so a hypothetical "Edith"-named tool could
+// never collide). Single predicate owner for both the emitter
+// ({@link _deriveCodexSandboxModeFromTools}) and the posture check
+// (`agent-install-check.cts`'s `checkCodexSandboxPosture`, via
+// {@link deriveCodexSandboxMode}).
+//
+// #3897 security review F5: a negation form — `All tools except Agent,
+// Write, Edit` — used to derive `workspace-write` because the plain
+// comma-tokenizer below saw the literal token `Write` and never noticed it
+// was named as an EXCLUSION, not a grant. That is fail-OPEN: the value's
+// stated meaning is "everything except these", so a `Write`/`Edit` name
+// after `except` means the role does NOT get them. No shipped roster agent
+// uses this form today, but a wrong answer here widens silently, so it is
+// handled: once the literal word `except` (case-insensitive) appears
+// anywhere in the value, this is a "<grant> except <exclusions>" statement
+// and only the tokens AFTER `except` decide the verdict — `Write`/`Edit`
+// declare broader iff `except` is ABSENT, or present but does not name them.
+function _codexToolsDeclareWriteOrEdit(toolsRaw) {
+    const raw = String(toolsRaw || '');
+    const exceptIndex = raw.search(/\bexcept\b/i);
+    if (exceptIndex !== -1) {
+        const exclusionsText = raw.slice(exceptIndex).replace(/^\S*\s*except\b/i, '');
+        const exclusions = exclusionsText.split(',').map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+        const excludesWriteOrEdit = exclusions.includes('Write') || exclusions.includes('Edit');
+        return !excludesWriteOrEdit;
+    }
+    const tokens = raw.split(',').map((t) => t.trim());
+    return tokens.includes('Write') || tokens.includes('Edit');
+}
+// #3897 security review F1/F3: control-character/whitespace class used by
+// {@link normalizeSandboxIdentity} to trim more than plain ASCII whitespace
+// from BOTH edges of a candidate identity before it is compared against the
+// hold set. A bare .trim() only strips the ASCII whitespace \s already
+// covers; the hold bypass this closes (a trailing space, \n/\r, or NBSP
+// after `gsd-doc-writer`) is exactly a value that survives .trim() untouched.
+// Spelled entirely as \u escapes (never a literal invisible codepoint in
+// the source), matching this module's own BOM_CHAR convention above: NBSP
+// (U+00A0), the zero-width space/non-joiner/joiner + LTR/RTL marks
+// (U+200B-U+200F), the BOM/ZWNBSP (U+FEFF), and the full C0 control range
+// + DEL (U+0000-U+001F, U+007F), alongside ASCII whitespace (\s).
+const SANDBOX_IDENTITY_EDGE_RE = new RegExp('^[\\s\\u0000-\\u001f\\u007f\\u00a0\\u200b-\\u200f\\ufeff]+' +
+    '|[\\s\\u0000-\\u001f\\u007f\\u00a0\\u200b-\\u200f\\ufeff]+$', 'g');
+// Anything outside this set, AFTER normalization, is "suspicious" — see
+// {@link isSandboxHeld}'s docblock for why fail-closed (never enumerate
+// confusables) is the only tractable answer here.
+const SANDBOX_IDENTITY_SUSPICIOUS_RE = /[^a-z0-9._-]/;
+/**
+ * Canonicalizes a single candidate sandbox-hold identity (a source filename
+ * stem OR a frontmatter-derived `name:` value) into the same lowercase ASCII
+ * shape {@link CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS}'s keys are written in, so both candidate
+ * identities for one emitted artifact (see {@link isSandboxHeld}) can be
+ * compared against the hold set on equal footing.
+ *
+ * #3897 security review F1/F3 — pipeline, in this exact order:
+ *   1. basename it (strip through the LAST `/` or `\`) — a value carrying a
+ *      path separator (`../agents/x`, `./x`) is reduced to its final segment
+ *      before anything else runs, so a path-traversal-shaped candidate can
+ *      never dodge the hold lookup by hiding behind a directory prefix.
+ *   2. trim ASCII whitespace AND the NBSP/zero-width/control-char class
+ *      ({@link SANDBOX_IDENTITY_EDGE_RE}) from both ends.
+ *   3. strip trailing dots (`gsd-doc-writer.` collapses to the same key).
+ *   4. `String.prototype.normalize('NFKC')` — canonicalizes compatibility
+ *      variants (e.g. fullwidth `ｇ` U+FF47 folds to ASCII `g`) to their
+ *      standard form so a widened-by-Unicode-lookalike name collapses onto
+ *      the real held key instead of merely looking similar to it.
+ *   5. lowercase — ASCII recasing already matched the hold set before this
+ *      rung; this keeps that property after the above steps.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` (never throws) for a non-string input or when the fully
+ * normalized result is empty, so callers can treat `null` as "not a real
+ * identity, cannot be held, but see the `suspicious` companion signal".
+ */
+function normalizeSandboxIdentity(raw) {
+    if (typeof raw !== 'string')
+        return null;
+    const lastSlash = Math.max(raw.lastIndexOf('/'), raw.lastIndexOf('\\'));
+    let value = lastSlash === -1 ? raw : raw.slice(lastSlash + 1);
+    value = value.replace(SANDBOX_IDENTITY_EDGE_RE, '');
+    value = value.replace(/\.+$/, '');
+    value = value.normalize('NFKC');
+    value = value.toLowerCase();
+    return value === '' ? null : value;
+}
+/**
+ * `held` is true iff ANY candidate identity, once normalized, names a real
+ * {@link CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS} entry. `suspicious` is true iff any candidate,
+ * after normalization, still contains a character outside `[a-z0-9._-]`.
+ *
+ * #3897 security review F1 (the blocker): the sandbox decision must be safe
+ * for the ARTIFACT IT LANDS ON, not for whichever single identity happens to
+ * be handy at the call site. `bin/install.js`'s emit loop has TWO candidate
+ * identities for one `.toml` artifact — the source filename stem (what the
+ * hold lookup used to be keyed on) and the frontmatter `name:` value (what
+ * the OUTPUT PATH is actually keyed on) — and an attacker who controls
+ * frontmatter can make them disagree (rename the file, or plant a sibling
+ * file whose `name:` collides with a held role). Deciding over only one of
+ * the two and applying the result to whichever path the OTHER one names is
+ * exactly the regression this closes: this predicate takes every candidate
+ * that can influence either the derivation or the emitted path and takes the
+ * MOST RESTRICTIVE answer — `held` if any one of them is held.
+ *
+ * #3897 security review F3: `suspicious` is the fail-CLOSED half of this
+ * predicate, and it is deliberately not an attempt to enumerate Unicode
+ * confusables (Turkish dotted/dotless I, fullwidth forms, NFD combining
+ * marks, ...). Every one of the 35 shipped roster files is pure ASCII
+ * (`gsd-[a-z-]+`), so a non-ASCII-after-normalization identity cannot be a
+ * legitimate shipped role — flagging it `suspicious` (which
+ * {@link deriveCodexSandboxMode} turns into `read-only`) has zero false
+ * positives against real content, and refuses to widen on anything this
+ * module does not recognize instead of chasing an open-ended confusables
+ * list that will always be one codepoint behind the next lookalike.
+ */
+function isSandboxHeld(...candidates) {
+    let held = false;
+    let suspicious = false;
+    for (const candidate of candidates) {
+        const values = Array.isArray(candidate) ? candidate : [candidate];
+        for (const value of values) {
+            const normalized = normalizeSandboxIdentity(value);
+            if (normalized === null)
+                continue;
+            if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(exports.CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS, normalized)) {
+                held = true;
+            }
+            if (SANDBOX_IDENTITY_SUSPICIOUS_RE.test(normalized)) {
+                suspicious = true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return { held, suspicious };
+}
+// #3897 CAUSE A fix: a single-purpose `tools:`-VALUE reader, NOT a general
+// frontmatter parser (`extractFrontmatterAndBody`/`extractFrontmatterField`
+// were deliberately deleted from this module's ancestor — see the module
+// header's "document model, not policy" charter). This module is the one
+// genuinely side-effect-free leaf `agent-install-check.cts`'s
+// `checkCodexSandboxPosture` already imports from for
+// {@link deriveCodexSandboxMode}; giving it this reader too avoids importing
+// `runtime-artifact-conversion.cjs` there just to pull one frontmatter field
+// — that module's own dependency chain (`command-roster.cjs` →
+// `scripts/fix-slash-commands.cjs`, a dev-only repo script) does not resolve
+// from an installed tree, which is exactly what broke
+// `tests/agent-install-check.test.cjs` against a synthetic install dir.
+// Scoped to ONLY the `tools:` key: finds the leading `---`-delimited
+// frontmatter block and returns its `tools:` value (quotes stripped), or
+// `''` when there is no frontmatter block or no `tools:` key at all.
+//
+// #3897 rung 4/list-form fix: handles BOTH shapes a `tools:` key can take —
+// (a) inline: `tools: Read, Write, Edit` on the same line as the key, and
+// (b) YAML block-list form: `tools:` alone, followed by indented `- Item`
+// lines (`agents/gsd-nyquist-auditor.md`, `agents/gsd-security-auditor.md`
+// are the only two roster files using this shape today). The former
+// implementation was a single `/^tools:\s*(.+)$/m` regex — `\s*` swallows the
+// newline after a bare `tools:` key, so it silently matched into the FIRST
+// list item's own line and returned just `"- Read"`, reading a real
+// Write/Edit DECLARATION as an absence. List items are joined with `, ` so
+// the result feeds {@link _codexToolsDeclareWriteOrEdit}'s comma-tokenizer
+// unchanged. The list terminates at the first line that is not an indented
+// `- Item` (a new frontmatter key, `---`, a blank line, or EOF) — it never
+// grows into a general YAML parser (that boundary is deliberate, see above).
+//
+// #3897 security review F4: TOTAL for any input, not just a well-formed
+// string — a Buffer, `undefined`, or `null` returns `undefined` rather than
+// throwing on `.startsWith`, matching this module's "never throws" charter
+// (see {@link deriveCodexSandboxMode}'s own totality note).
+function extractToolsValue(agentContent) {
+    if (typeof agentContent !== 'string')
+        return undefined;
+    if (!agentContent.startsWith('---'))
+        return '';
+    const endIndex = agentContent.indexOf('---', 3);
+    if (endIndex === -1)
+        return '';
+    const frontmatter = agentContent.substring(3, endIndex);
+    const lines = frontmatter.split(/\r?\n/);
+    const toolsLineIndex = lines.findIndex((line) => /^tools:/.test(line));
+    if (toolsLineIndex === -1)
+        return '';
+    const inlineMatch = lines[toolsLineIndex].match(/^tools:[ \t]*(\S.*)$/);
+    if (inlineMatch) {
+        return inlineMatch[1].trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '');
+    }
+    // Bare `tools:` key (nothing but optional trailing whitespace on its own
+    // line) — read the YAML block-list form that follows: indented `- Item`
+    // lines, one item per line, stopping at the first line that is not one.
+    const items = [];
+    for (let i = toolsLineIndex + 1; i < lines.length; i++) {
+        const itemMatch = lines[i].match(/^[ \t]+-[ \t]*(.+)$/);
+        if (!itemMatch)
+            break;
+        items.push(itemMatch[1].trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, ''));
+    }
+    return items.join(', ');
+}
+/**
+ * The single owner of `sandbox_mode` derivation: `workspace-write` iff the
+ * role's own frontmatter `tools:` declares Write/Edit, UNLESS the role is
+ * held ({@link CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS}) at `read-only`.
+ *
+ * #3897 CAUSE C fix: this function is TOTAL — it never throws, for any
+ * (identity, toolsValue) pair. It used to throw when a held role's CONTENT
+ * (whatever the caller handed it) did not derive broader than its pin, on
+ * the theory that a stale hold should "fail loudly at the point the
+ * derivation runs". That reasoning does not survive contact with this
+ * function's actual contract: it is a pure predicate over whatever content
+ * the caller supplies, and tests legitimately pass synthetic fixtures for
+ * held role names, so the throw fired on arbitrary input, not just the real
+ * roster. It is also redundant even for real input — if a held role's
+ * content does not derive broader, applying the hold pins `read-only` and
+ * derivation would return `read-only` anyway; the hold is a no-op, so there
+ * is nothing to fail about at derivation time. The STALENESS invariant (S4)
+ * is a property of the real `agents/` roster, not of an arbitrary call's
+ * input, so it belongs — and stays enforced — only at the roster level: see
+ * {@link validateCodexSandboxHolds} and `tests/codex-config.test.cjs`
+ * T24/T25, which assert it against the real roster directly.
+ *
+ * `agentName` here MUST be every identity the content's own frontmatter
+ * could disagree with — i.e. the source `.md` FILENAME stem AND (when the
+ * caller has one) the frontmatter-derived `name:` display value, passed
+ * together as an array. Accepting only one of the two and applying the
+ * result to an ARTIFACT keyed on the other is the #3897 security review F1
+ * regression this function closes: `bin/install.js`'s emit loop decides
+ * `sandbox_mode` for the filename stem but writes the `.toml` at a path keyed
+ * on `name`, so a renamed file (stem drifts, `name:` stays pinned) or a
+ * sibling file whose `name:` collides with a held role could make the two
+ * identities disagree and land a held role's own artifact with
+ * `workspace-write`. See {@link isSandboxHeld} for the most-restrictive-wins
+ * rule across every candidate identity.
+ *
+ * `toolsRaw` is the already-resolved `tools:` frontmatter VALUE (e.g.
+ * `"Read, Write, Edit"`), not the frontmatter block or the full agent
+ * content — see {@link deriveCodexSandboxMode}'s doc for why.
+ */
+function _deriveCodexSandboxModeFromTools(agentName, toolsRaw) {
+    const derivesBroader = _codexToolsDeclareWriteOrEdit(toolsRaw || '');
+    const { held, suspicious } = isSandboxHeld(agentName);
+    if (held || suspicious) {
+        // A held (or unrecognizable/"suspicious", per F3) identity always pins
+        // read-only, whether or not its supplied content still derives broader
+        // (see #3897 CAUSE C note above the docstring for this function's
+        // caller-facing counterpart): if it no longer derives broader, the pin is
+        // a no-op and there is nothing to fail about here — the staleness
+        // invariant lives at the roster level instead
+        // ({@link validateCodexSandboxHolds}).
+        return 'read-only';
+    }
+    return derivesBroader ? 'workspace-write' : 'read-only';
+}
+/**
+ * Exported form for external callers (`checkCodexSandboxPosture`,
+ * `generateCodexAgentToml`). Takes the already-resolved `tools:` frontmatter
+ * VALUE, not raw agent content or a frontmatter slice — this module does no
+ * frontmatter parsing at all (there is no third copy of that extraction
+ * here; see the module-header note above `CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS`). Both
+ * callers already have (or can trivially get) `tools:` in hand via this
+ * module's own {@link extractToolsValue} — the single shared extractor both
+ * `bin/install.js`'s `generateCodexAgentToml` and `agent-install-check.cts`'s
+ * `checkCodexSandboxPosture` route through (#3897 CAUSE A fix, and the
+ * #3897 list-form parse fix's Fix 3: `bin/install.js` used to read `tools:`
+ * via its own private `extractFrontmatterField`, a second single-line-only
+ * copy that disagreed with this module's reader on YAML block-list form —
+ * NOT `runtime-artifact-conversion.cts`'s general-purpose extractors either;
+ * that module's dependency chain does not resolve from an installed tree) —
+ * so this stays a pure predicate over data the caller already holds, never a
+ * document reader.
+ *
+ * `agentName` is one or more HOLD-LOOKUP IDENTITIES: pass the agent's
+ * canonical source filename stem (e.g. `gsd-doc-writer` for
+ * `agents/gsd-doc-writer.md`) as a plain string for the single-identity call
+ * sites this signature always supported, OR an array of every identity that
+ * can influence the emitted artifact (filename stem AND frontmatter `name:`)
+ * when the caller — like `bin/install.js`'s per-agent emit loop — has both
+ * (see the F1 security note on {@link _deriveCodexSandboxModeFromTools}
+ * above). TOTAL for any value here, including `undefined`, `null`, `[]`, and
+ * an array containing non-string members — none of those throw; they simply
+ * contribute nothing to the hold/suspicious check (see {@link isSandboxHeld}
+ * / {@link normalizeSandboxIdentity}).
+ */
+function deriveCodexSandboxMode(agentName, toolsRaw) {
+    return _deriveCodexSandboxModeFromTools(agentName, toolsRaw || '');
+}
+/**
+ * (S5) Every {@link CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS} key must still name a real
+ * `<agentsSrcDir>/<role>.md`. A hold for a role that no longer exists is
+ * stale and must fail loudly, not be silently ignored — else the hold list
+ * only ever grows/rots instead of shrinking to zero.
+ *
+ * NOT called from the install runtime path ({@link deriveCodexSandboxMode} /
+ * `bin/install.js`'s `installCodexConfig`): the shrink-to-zero invariant it
+ * checks is a REPO invariant about the canonical roster in `agents/`, not a
+ * property of whatever directory an install happens to read from — a
+ * partial/synthetic install source (a test fixture, a `--config-dir`
+ * subset) legitimately contains only a few agents, and a hold whose role is
+ * simply absent from THAT source dir must be inert, not fatal. The invariant
+ * is enforced instead as a test over the real `agents/` roster
+ * (`tests/codex-config.test.cjs` T24/T25). This function is kept, exported,
+ * for any caller that specifically wants to validate the CANONICAL roster
+ * (pass `agents/` itself, never an arbitrary install source).
+ */
+function validateCodexSandboxHolds(agentsSrcDir) {
+    for (const role of Object.keys(exports.CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS)) {
+        const agentFile = node_path_1.default.join(agentsSrcDir, `${role}.md`);
+        if (!node_fs_1.default.existsSync(agentFile)) {
+            throw new Error(`CODEX_SANDBOX_HOLDS: stale hold for "${role}" — no ${agentFile} exists. The hold list is ` +
+                'closed and shrink-only (ADR-3473 §8.3 / HALT.md); remove this entry.');
+        }
+    }
+}

package/gsd-core/bin/lib/command-arg-projection.cjs

@@ -2,41 +2,171 @@
 /**
  * Command Argument Projection Module (ADR-457 build-at-publish: the
  * hand-written bin/lib/command-arg-projection.cjs collapsed to a TypeScript
- * source of truth). Behaviour is preserved byte-for-behaviour from the prior
- * hand-written .cjs; only types are added.
+ * source of truth).
+ *
+ * ADR-3473 §8.4 ("failure is a value"): `parseNamedArgs` is now strict and
+ * returns a `Result` instead of silently accepting unrecognized or stray
+ * positional tokens. See .gsd/phase/feat-3884-failure-is-a-value/40-design.md
+ * for the full behavior table (A1-A18) and negative-space section (N1-N8).
  *
  * Shared helpers for command-family adapters to project argv tokens into
  * typed named values and multi-word segments.
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.isFlagToken = isFlagToken;
 exports.parseNamedArgs = parseNamedArgs;
+exports.parseNamedArgsOrExit = parseNamedArgsOrExit;
 exports.parseMultiwordArg = parseMultiwordArg;
+// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
+const io = require("./io.cjs");
+const { ERROR_REASON, formatDiagnosticToken } = io;
+// ─── Internal helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function isPlainObject(v) {
+    return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
+}
 /**
- * Extract named --flag <value> pairs from an args array.
- * Returns an object mapping flag names to their values (null if absent).
- * Flags listed in `booleanFlags` are treated as booleans.
+ * ADR-3473 Decision 2: both ends of this seam are gsd-core's own source, so a
+ * malformed spec (a stale call site still using the legacy
+ * `parseNamedArgs(args, valueFlags, booleanFlags)` shape, or a missing spec
+ * entirely) is an internal invariant violation, not user input — it throws
+ * loudly instead of destructuring `undefined` off a Result.
+ */
+function assertValidSpec(spec) {
+    if (!isPlainObject(spec)) {
+        throw new TypeError('parseNamedArgs: spec must be an object of shape ' +
+            '{ valueFlags?: string[], booleanFlags?: string[], positionals: number | "rest" }. ' +
+            'Received a missing, array, or non-object value — this is the legacy ' +
+            'parseNamedArgs(args, valueFlags, booleanFlags) call shape, retired by ADR-3473 §8.4.');
+    }
+    const positionals = spec.positionals;
+    const positionalsValid = positionals === 'rest' ||
+        (typeof positionals === 'number' && Number.isInteger(positionals) && positionals >= 0);
+    if (!positionalsValid) {
+        throw new TypeError('parseNamedArgs: spec.positionals must be a non-negative integer or the literal "rest" ' +
+            `— received ${JSON.stringify(positionals)}.`);
+    }
+}
+// Single predicate reused for both extraction (a value beginning with a
+// single `-` is a value, not a flag) and validation (negative space N5).
+// Exported for init-command-router's #3865 --phase alias normalization,
+// which needs the same flag-shape test before deciding whether args[2] is a
+// phase positional or a flag token.
+function isFlagToken(tok) {
+    return tok.startsWith('--');
+}
+// ─── parseNamedArgs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Project argv tokens into typed named values, then strictly validate every
+ * token past the caller's declared positional boundary.
+ *
+ * Extraction (unchanged semantics, #312): first occurrence wins; a value
+ * flag whose next token is absent or starts with `--` yields `null` (this is
+ * NOT a validation error — see the value-flag branch below); boolean flags
+ * and optional-value flags (`optionalValueFlags`, #2932's `--wave` shape) are
+ * presence tests. Kept as a single first-index Map so the flag loops don't
+ * each re-scan argv — O(argv + flags) instead of O(flags * argv).
+ *
+ * Validation (skipped entirely when `positionals === 'rest'`): a single
+ * left-to-right cursor walk from `spec.positionals`, per the design doc's
+ * Kernighan's Law note — debuggable over clever, never a set-difference.
  */
-function parseNamedArgs(args, valueFlags = [], booleanFlags = []) {
-    // Index each token's first position once (firstIndex.get(t) ?? -1 === args.indexOf(t),
-    // firstIndex.has(t) === args.includes(t)) so the flag loops below don't each re-scan
-    // argv — O(argv + flags) instead of O(flags * argv). Semantics are unchanged. (#312)
+function parseNamedArgs(args, spec) {
+    assertValidSpec(spec);
+    const valueFlags = spec.valueFlags ?? [];
+    const booleanFlags = spec.booleanFlags ?? [];
+    const optionalValueFlags = spec.optionalValueFlags ?? [];
     const firstIndex = new Map();
     for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
         if (!firstIndex.has(args[i]))
             firstIndex.set(args[i], i);
     }
-    const result = {};
+    const data = {};
     for (const flag of valueFlags) {
         const idx = firstIndex.has(`--${flag}`) ? firstIndex.get(`--${flag}`) : -1;
-        result[flag] =
-            idx !== -1 && args[idx + 1] !== undefined && !args[idx + 1].startsWith('--')
+        data[flag] =
+            idx !== -1 && args[idx + 1] !== undefined && !isFlagToken(args[idx + 1])
                 ? args[idx + 1]
                 : null;
     }
     for (const flag of booleanFlags) {
-        result[flag] = firstIndex.has(`--${flag}`);
+        data[flag] = firstIndex.has(`--${flag}`);
+    }
+    // Optional-value flags (#2932: `--wave`-shaped) — presence-only, exactly
+    // like booleanFlags. The value (if any) is deliberately not surfaced here;
+    // see the NamedArgSpec.optionalValueFlags JSDoc.
+    for (const flag of optionalValueFlags) {
+        data[flag] = firstIndex.has(`--${flag}`);
+    }
+    if (spec.positionals === 'rest') {
+        return { ok: true, data };
+    }
+    const valueFlagSet = new Set(valueFlags);
+    const booleanFlagSet = new Set(booleanFlags);
+    const optionalValueFlagSet = new Set(optionalValueFlags);
+    const flagList = [
+        ...valueFlags.map((f) => `--${f} <value>`),
+        ...booleanFlags.map((f) => `--${f}`),
+        ...optionalValueFlags.map((f) => `--${f} [value]`),
+    ];
+    let i = spec.positionals;
+    while (i < args.length) {
+        const tok = args[i];
+        if (isFlagToken(tok)) {
+            const name = tok.slice(2);
+            if (valueFlagSet.has(name)) {
+                // A value flag whose next token is absent or flag-shaped resolves to
+                // `null` in `data` (see the extraction loop above) — this is NOT an
+                // error (#3180/behavior-lock: emptyPrdValueIsFalsyAndTreatedAsAbsent,
+                // section-manifest-init-facts.test.cjs "flag-shaped value"). Advance
+                // by 1 so the following flag token is validated on its own merits on
+                // the next iteration.
+                const next = args[i + 1];
+                i += next !== undefined && !isFlagToken(next) ? 2 : 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (booleanFlagSet.has(name)) {
+                i += 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (optionalValueFlagSet.has(name)) {
+                const next = args[i + 1];
+                i += next !== undefined && !isFlagToken(next) ? 2 : 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            const reason = flagList.length > 0
+                ? `unknown flag ${formatDiagnosticToken(tok)}; accepted: ${flagList.join(', ')}`
+                : `unknown flag ${formatDiagnosticToken(tok)}; this command accepts no flags`;
+            return { ok: false, kind: 'InvalidArgs', arg: tok, reason, exitReason: ERROR_REASON.USAGE };
+        }
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            kind: 'InvalidArgs',
+            arg: tok,
+            reason: `unexpected positional argument ${formatDiagnosticToken(tok)}`,
+            exitReason: ERROR_REASON.USAGE,
+        };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, data };
+}
+/**
+ * Thin projection over `parseNamedArgs`: on `ok:false` it calls
+ * `fail(result.reason, result.exitReason)` and then throws.
+ *
+ * The trailing throw exists for two reasons: (1) TypeScript's control-flow
+ * analysis needs a `never`-returning path so callers can destructure the
+ * return value without a null check; (2) it is a fail-closed backstop — the
+ * `fail` callbacks in this repo are `never`-returning at runtime (`io.error`
+ * calls `process.exit(1)`) but are typed `void`, so if a caller ever passes a
+ * `fail` that actually returns, this still halts instead of falling through
+ * with a half-built `ParsedNamedArgs`.
+ */
+function parseNamedArgsOrExit(args, spec, fail) {
+    const result = parseNamedArgs(args, spec);
+    if (!result.ok) {
+        fail(result.reason, result.exitReason);
+        throw new Error(`parseNamedArgsOrExit: fail() returned instead of exiting (arg: ${result.arg})`);
     }
-    return result;
+    return result.data;
 }
 /**
  * Collect all tokens after --flag until the next --flag or end of args.