@openclaw/nostr 2026.5.20-beta.2 → 2026.5.22

package/node_modules/@noble/ciphers/aes.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1281 @@
+/**
+ * [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard)
+ * a.k.a. Advanced Encryption Standard
+ * is a variant of Rijndael block cipher, standardized by NIST in 2001.
+ * We provide the fastest available pure JS implementation.
+ *
+ * `cipher = encrypt(block, key)`
+ *
+ * Data is split into 128-bit blocks. Encrypted in 10/12/14 rounds (128/192/256 bits). In every round:
+ * 1. **S-box**, table substitution
+ * 2. **Shift rows**, cyclic shift left of all rows of data array
+ * 3. **Mix columns**, multiplying every column by fixed polynomial
+ * 4. **Add round key**, round_key xor i-th column of array
+ *
+ * Check out [FIPS-197](https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/197/final/docs/fips-197.pdf),
+ * [NIST 800-38G](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf)
+ * and [original proposal](https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-standards-and-guidelines/documents/aes-development/rijndael-ammended.pdf)
+ * @module
+ */
+import { ghash, polyval } from "./_polyval.js";
+// prettier-ignore
+import { abytes, anumber, clean, complexOverlapBytes, concatBytes, copyBytes, createView, equalBytes, getOutput, isAligned32, overlapBytes, u32, u64Lengths, u8, wrapCipher } from "./utils.js";
+const BLOCK_SIZE = 16;
+const BLOCK_SIZE32 = 4;
+const EMPTY_BLOCK = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE);
+const ONE_BLOCK = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint8Array.from([
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+]);
+const POLY = 0x11b; // 1 + x + x**3 + x**4 + x**8
+function validateKeyLength(key) {
+    if (![16, 24, 32].includes(key.length))
+        throw new Error('"aes key" expected Uint8Array of length 16/24/32, got length=' + key.length);
+}
+// TODO: remove multiplication, binary ops only
+function mul2(n) {
+    return (n << 1) ^ (POLY & -(n >> 7));
+}
+function mul(a, b) {
+    let res = 0;
+    for (; b > 0; b >>= 1) {
+        // Montgomery ladder
+        res ^= a & -(b & 1); // if (b&1) res ^=a (but const-time).
+        a = mul2(a); // a = 2*a
+    }
+    return res;
+}
+// Increments bigint with wrap around
+// NOTE: we cannot use u32 here since it may overflow on carry!
+const incBytes = (data, isLE, carry = 1) => {
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(carry))
+        throw new Error('incBytes: wrong carry ' + carry);
+    abytes(data);
+    for (let i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
+        const pos = !isLE ? data.length - 1 - i : i;
+        carry = (carry + (data[pos] & 0xff)) | 0;
+        data[pos] = carry & 0xff;
+        carry >>>= 8;
+    }
+};
+// AES S-box is generated using finite field inversion,
+// an affine transform, and xor of a constant 0x63.
+const sbox = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => {
+    const t = new Uint8Array(256);
+    for (let i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++, x ^= mul2(x))
+        t[i] = x;
+    const box = new Uint8Array(256);
+    box[0] = 0x63; // first elm
+    for (let i = 0; i < 255; i++) {
+        let x = t[255 - i];
+        x |= x << 8;
+        box[t[i]] = (x ^ (x >> 4) ^ (x >> 5) ^ (x >> 6) ^ (x >> 7) ^ 0x63) & 0xff;
+    }
+    clean(t);
+    return box;
+})();
+// Inverted S-box
+const invSbox = /* @__PURE__ */ sbox.map((_, j) => sbox.indexOf(j));
+// Rotate u32 by 8
+const rotr32_8 = (n) => (n << 24) | (n >>> 8);
+const rotl32_8 = (n) => (n << 8) | (n >>> 24);
+// The byte swap operation for uint32 (LE<->BE)
+const byteSwap = (word) => ((word << 24) & 0xff000000) |
+    ((word << 8) & 0xff0000) |
+    ((word >>> 8) & 0xff00) |
+    ((word >>> 24) & 0xff);
+// T-table is optimization suggested in 5.2 of original proposal (missed from FIPS-197). Changes:
+// - LE instead of BE
+// - bigger tables: T0 and T1 are merged into T01 table and T2 & T3 into T23;
+//   so index is u16, instead of u8. This speeds up things, unexpectedly
+function genTtable(sbox, fn) {
+    if (sbox.length !== 256)
+        throw new Error('Wrong sbox length');
+    const T0 = new Uint32Array(256).map((_, j) => fn(sbox[j]));
+    const T1 = T0.map(rotl32_8);
+    const T2 = T1.map(rotl32_8);
+    const T3 = T2.map(rotl32_8);
+    const T01 = new Uint32Array(256 * 256);
+    const T23 = new Uint32Array(256 * 256);
+    const sbox2 = new Uint16Array(256 * 256);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+        for (let j = 0; j < 256; j++) {
+            const idx = i * 256 + j;
+            T01[idx] = T0[i] ^ T1[j];
+            T23[idx] = T2[i] ^ T3[j];
+            sbox2[idx] = (sbox[i] << 8) | sbox[j];
+        }
+    }
+    return { sbox, sbox2, T0, T1, T2, T3, T01, T23 };
+}
+const tableEncoding = /* @__PURE__ */ genTtable(sbox, (s) => (mul(s, 3) << 24) | (s << 16) | (s << 8) | mul(s, 2));
+const tableDecoding = /* @__PURE__ */ genTtable(invSbox, (s) => (mul(s, 11) << 24) | (mul(s, 13) << 16) | (mul(s, 9) << 8) | mul(s, 14));
+const xPowers = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => {
+    const p = new Uint8Array(16);
+    for (let i = 0, x = 1; i < 16; i++, x = mul2(x))
+        p[i] = x;
+    return p;
+})();
+/** Key expansion used in CTR. */
+function expandKeyLE(key) {
+    abytes(key);
+    const len = key.length;
+    validateKeyLength(key);
+    const { sbox2 } = tableEncoding;
+    const toClean = [];
+    if (!isAligned32(key))
+        toClean.push((key = copyBytes(key)));
+    const k32 = u32(key);
+    const Nk = k32.length;
+    const subByte = (n) => applySbox(sbox2, n, n, n, n);
+    const xk = new Uint32Array(len + 28); // expanded key
+    xk.set(k32);
+    // 4.3.1 Key expansion
+    for (let i = Nk; i < xk.length; i++) {
+        let t = xk[i - 1];
+        if (i % Nk === 0)
+            t = subByte(rotr32_8(t)) ^ xPowers[i / Nk - 1];
+        else if (Nk > 6 && i % Nk === 4)
+            t = subByte(t);
+        xk[i] = xk[i - Nk] ^ t;
+    }
+    clean(...toClean);
+    return xk;
+}
+function expandKeyDecLE(key) {
+    const encKey = expandKeyLE(key);
+    const xk = encKey.slice();
+    const Nk = encKey.length;
+    const { sbox2 } = tableEncoding;
+    const { T0, T1, T2, T3 } = tableDecoding;
+    // Inverse key by chunks of 4 (rounds)
+    for (let i = 0; i < Nk; i += 4) {
+        for (let j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+            xk[i + j] = encKey[Nk - i - 4 + j];
+    }
+    clean(encKey);
+    // apply InvMixColumn except first & last round
+    for (let i = 4; i < Nk - 4; i++) {
+        const x = xk[i];
+        const w = applySbox(sbox2, x, x, x, x);
+        xk[i] = T0[w & 0xff] ^ T1[(w >>> 8) & 0xff] ^ T2[(w >>> 16) & 0xff] ^ T3[w >>> 24];
+    }
+    return xk;
+}
+// Apply tables
+function apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
+    return (T01[((s0 << 8) & 0xff00) | ((s1 >>> 8) & 0xff)] ^
+        T23[((s2 >>> 8) & 0xff00) | ((s3 >>> 24) & 0xff)]);
+}
+function applySbox(sbox2, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
+    return (sbox2[(s0 & 0xff) | (s1 & 0xff00)] |
+        (sbox2[((s2 >>> 16) & 0xff) | ((s3 >>> 16) & 0xff00)] << 16));
+}
+function encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
+    const { sbox2, T01, T23 } = tableEncoding;
+    let k = 0;
+    ((s0 ^= xk[k++]), (s1 ^= xk[k++]), (s2 ^= xk[k++]), (s3 ^= xk[k++]));
+    const rounds = xk.length / 4 - 2;
+    for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+        const t0 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s1, s2, s3);
+        const t1 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s1, s2, s3, s0);
+        const t2 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s2, s3, s0, s1);
+        const t3 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s3, s0, s1, s2);
+        ((s0 = t0), (s1 = t1), (s2 = t2), (s3 = t3));
+    }
+    // last round (without mixcolumns, so using SBOX2 table)
+    const t0 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s0, s1, s2, s3);
+    const t1 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s1, s2, s3, s0);
+    const t2 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s2, s3, s0, s1);
+    const t3 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s3, s0, s1, s2);
+    return { s0: t0, s1: t1, s2: t2, s3: t3 };
+}
+// Can't be merged with encrypt: arg positions for apply0123 / applySbox are different
+function decrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
+    const { sbox2, T01, T23 } = tableDecoding;
+    let k = 0;
+    ((s0 ^= xk[k++]), (s1 ^= xk[k++]), (s2 ^= xk[k++]), (s3 ^= xk[k++]));
+    const rounds = xk.length / 4 - 2;
+    for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+        const t0 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s3, s2, s1);
+        const t1 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s1, s0, s3, s2);
+        const t2 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s2, s1, s0, s3);
+        const t3 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s3, s2, s1, s0);
+        ((s0 = t0), (s1 = t1), (s2 = t2), (s3 = t3));
+    }
+    // Last round
+    const t0 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s0, s3, s2, s1);
+    const t1 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s1, s0, s3, s2);
+    const t2 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s2, s1, s0, s3);
+    const t3 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s3, s2, s1, s0);
+    return { s0: t0, s1: t1, s2: t2, s3: t3 };
+}
+// TODO: investigate merging with ctr32
+function ctrCounter(xk, nonce, src, dst) {
+    abytes(nonce, BLOCK_SIZE, 'nonce');
+    abytes(src);
+    const srcLen = src.length;
+    dst = getOutput(srcLen, dst);
+    complexOverlapBytes(src, dst);
+    const ctr = nonce;
+    const c32 = u32(ctr);
+    // Fill block (empty, ctr=0)
+    let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]);
+    const src32 = u32(src);
+    const dst32 = u32(dst);
+    // process blocks
+    for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length; i += 4) {
+        dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ s0;
+        dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ s1;
+        dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ s2;
+        dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ s3;
+        incBytes(ctr, false, 1); // Full 128 bit counter with wrap around
+        ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]));
+    }
+    // leftovers (less than block)
+    // It's possible to handle > u32 fast, but is it worth it?
+    const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
+    if (start < srcLen) {
+        const b32 = new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]);
+        const buf = u8(b32);
+        for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++)
+            dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
+        clean(b32);
+    }
+    return dst;
+}
+// AES CTR with overflowing 32 bit counter
+// It's possible to do 32le significantly simpler (and probably faster) by using u32.
+// But, we need both, and perf bottleneck is in ghash anyway.
+function ctr32(xk, isLE, nonce, src, dst) {
+    abytes(nonce, BLOCK_SIZE, 'nonce');
+    abytes(src);
+    dst = getOutput(src.length, dst);
+    const ctr = nonce; // write new value to nonce, so it can be re-used
+    const c32 = u32(ctr);
+    const view = createView(ctr);
+    const src32 = u32(src);
+    const dst32 = u32(dst);
+    const ctrPos = isLE ? 0 : 12;
+    const srcLen = src.length;
+    // Fill block (empty, ctr=0)
+    let ctrNum = view.getUint32(ctrPos, isLE); // read current counter value
+    let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]);
+    // process blocks
+    for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length; i += 4) {
+        dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ s0;
+        dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ s1;
+        dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ s2;
+        dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ s3;
+        ctrNum = (ctrNum + 1) >>> 0; // u32 wrap
+        view.setUint32(ctrPos, ctrNum, isLE);
+        ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]));
+    }
+    // leftovers (less than a block)
+    const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
+    if (start < srcLen) {
+        const b32 = new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]);
+        const buf = u8(b32);
+        for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++)
+            dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
+        clean(b32);
+    }
+    return dst;
+}
+/**
+ * **CTR** (Counter Mode): Turns a block cipher into a stream cipher using a counter and IV (nonce).
+ * Efficient and parallelizable. Requires a unique nonce per encryption. Unauthenticated: needs MAC.
+ */
+export const ctr = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 }, function aesctr(key, nonce) {
+    function processCtr(buf, dst) {
+        abytes(buf);
+        if (dst !== undefined) {
+            abytes(dst);
+            if (!isAligned32(dst))
+                throw new Error('unaligned destination');
+        }
+        const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
+        const n = copyBytes(nonce); // align + avoid changing
+        const toClean = [xk, n];
+        if (!isAligned32(buf))
+            toClean.push((buf = copyBytes(buf)));
+        const out = ctrCounter(xk, n, buf, dst);
+        clean(...toClean);
+        return out;
+    }
+    return {
+        encrypt: (plaintext, dst) => processCtr(plaintext, dst),
+        decrypt: (ciphertext, dst) => processCtr(ciphertext, dst),
+    };
+});
+function validateBlockDecrypt(data) {
+    abytes(data);
+    if (data.length % BLOCK_SIZE !== 0) {
+        throw new Error('aes-(cbc/ecb).decrypt ciphertext should consist of blocks with size ' + BLOCK_SIZE);
+    }
+}
+function validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst) {
+    abytes(plaintext);
+    let outLen = plaintext.length;
+    const remaining = outLen % BLOCK_SIZE;
+    if (!pcks5 && remaining !== 0)
+        throw new Error('aec/(cbc-ecb): unpadded plaintext with disabled padding');
+    if (!isAligned32(plaintext))
+        plaintext = copyBytes(plaintext);
+    const b = u32(plaintext);
+    if (pcks5) {
+        let left = BLOCK_SIZE - remaining;
+        if (!left)
+            left = BLOCK_SIZE; // if no bytes left, create empty padding block
+        outLen = outLen + left;
+    }
+    dst = getOutput(outLen, dst);
+    complexOverlapBytes(plaintext, dst);
+    const o = u32(dst);
+    return { b, o, out: dst };
+}
+function validatePCKS(data, pcks5) {
+    if (!pcks5)
+        return data;
+    const len = data.length;
+    if (!len)
+        throw new Error('aes/pcks5: empty ciphertext not allowed');
+    const lastByte = data[len - 1];
+    if (lastByte <= 0 || lastByte > 16)
+        throw new Error('aes/pcks5: wrong padding');
+    const out = data.subarray(0, -lastByte);
+    for (let i = 0; i < lastByte; i++)
+        if (data[len - i - 1] !== lastByte)
+            throw new Error('aes/pcks5: wrong padding');
+    return out;
+}
+function padPCKS(left) {
+    const tmp = new Uint8Array(16);
+    const tmp32 = u32(tmp);
+    tmp.set(left);
+    const paddingByte = BLOCK_SIZE - left.length;
+    for (let i = BLOCK_SIZE - paddingByte; i < BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
+        tmp[i] = paddingByte;
+    return tmp32;
+}
+/**
+ * **ECB** (Electronic Codebook): Deterministic encryption; identical plaintext blocks yield
+ * identical ciphertexts. Not secure due to pattern leakage.
+ * See [AES Penguin](https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/).
+ */
+export const ecb = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 16 }, function aesecb(key, opts = {}) {
+    const pcks5 = !opts.disablePadding;
+    return {
+        encrypt(plaintext, dst) {
+            const { b, o, out: _out } = validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst);
+            const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
+            let i = 0;
+            for (; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
+                const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, b[i + 0], b[i + 1], b[i + 2], b[i + 3]);
+                ((o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3));
+            }
+            if (pcks5) {
+                const tmp32 = padPCKS(plaintext.subarray(i * 4));
+                const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, tmp32[0], tmp32[1], tmp32[2], tmp32[3]);
+                ((o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3));
+            }
+            clean(xk);
+            return _out;
+        },
+        decrypt(ciphertext, dst) {
+            validateBlockDecrypt(ciphertext);
+            const xk = expandKeyDecLE(key);
+            dst = getOutput(ciphertext.length, dst);
+            const toClean = [xk];
+            if (!isAligned32(ciphertext))
+                toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
+            complexOverlapBytes(ciphertext, dst);
+            const b = u32(ciphertext);
+            const o = u32(dst);
+            for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
+                const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, b[i + 0], b[i + 1], b[i + 2], b[i + 3]);
+                ((o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3));
+            }
+            clean(...toClean);
+            return validatePCKS(dst, pcks5);
+        },
+    };
+});
+/**
+ * **CBC** (Cipher Block Chaining): Each plaintext block is XORed with the
+ * previous block of ciphertext before encryption.
+ * Hard to use: requires proper padding and an IV. Unauthenticated: needs MAC.
+ */
+export const cbc = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 }, function aescbc(key, iv, opts = {}) {
+    const pcks5 = !opts.disablePadding;
+    return {
+        encrypt(plaintext, dst) {
+            const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
+            const { b, o, out: _out } = validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst);
+            let _iv = iv;
+            const toClean = [xk];
+            if (!isAligned32(_iv))
+                toClean.push((_iv = copyBytes(_iv)));
+            const n32 = u32(_iv);
+            // prettier-ignore
+            let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
+            let i = 0;
+            for (; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
+                ((s0 ^= b[i + 0]), (s1 ^= b[i + 1]), (s2 ^= b[i + 2]), (s3 ^= b[i + 3]));
+                ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
+                ((o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3));
+            }
+            if (pcks5) {
+                const tmp32 = padPCKS(plaintext.subarray(i * 4));
+                ((s0 ^= tmp32[0]), (s1 ^= tmp32[1]), (s2 ^= tmp32[2]), (s3 ^= tmp32[3]));
+                ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
+                ((o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3));
+            }
+            clean(...toClean);
+            return _out;
+        },
+        decrypt(ciphertext, dst) {
+            validateBlockDecrypt(ciphertext);
+            const xk = expandKeyDecLE(key);
+            let _iv = iv;
+            const toClean = [xk];
+            if (!isAligned32(_iv))
+                toClean.push((_iv = copyBytes(_iv)));
+            const n32 = u32(_iv);
+            dst = getOutput(ciphertext.length, dst);
+            if (!isAligned32(ciphertext))
+                toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
+            complexOverlapBytes(ciphertext, dst);
+            const b = u32(ciphertext);
+            const o = u32(dst);
+            // prettier-ignore
+            let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
+            for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
+                // prettier-ignore
+                const ps0 = s0, ps1 = s1, ps2 = s2, ps3 = s3;
+                ((s0 = b[i + 0]), (s1 = b[i + 1]), (s2 = b[i + 2]), (s3 = b[i + 3]));
+                const { s0: o0, s1: o1, s2: o2, s3: o3 } = decrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
+                ((o[i++] = o0 ^ ps0), (o[i++] = o1 ^ ps1), (o[i++] = o2 ^ ps2), (o[i++] = o3 ^ ps3));
+            }
+            clean(...toClean);
+            return validatePCKS(dst, pcks5);
+        },
+    };
+});
+/**
+ * CFB: Cipher Feedback Mode. The input for the block cipher is the previous cipher output.
+ * Unauthenticated: needs MAC.
+ */
+export const cfb = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 }, function aescfb(key, iv) {
+    function processCfb(src, isEncrypt, dst) {
+        abytes(src);
+        const srcLen = src.length;
+        dst = getOutput(srcLen, dst);
+        if (overlapBytes(src, dst))
+            throw new Error('overlapping src and dst not supported.');
+        const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
+        let _iv = iv;
+        const toClean = [xk];
+        if (!isAligned32(_iv))
+            toClean.push((_iv = copyBytes(_iv)));
+        if (!isAligned32(src))
+            toClean.push((src = copyBytes(src)));
+        const src32 = u32(src);
+        const dst32 = u32(dst);
+        const next32 = isEncrypt ? dst32 : src32;
+        const n32 = u32(_iv);
+        // prettier-ignore
+        let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
+        for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length;) {
+            const { s0: e0, s1: e1, s2: e2, s3: e3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
+            dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ e0;
+            dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ e1;
+            dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ e2;
+            dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ e3;
+            ((s0 = next32[i++]), (s1 = next32[i++]), (s2 = next32[i++]), (s3 = next32[i++]));
+        }
+        // leftovers (less than block)
+        const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
+        if (start < srcLen) {
+            ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
+            const buf = u8(new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]));
+            for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++)
+                dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
+            clean(buf);
+        }
+        clean(...toClean);
+        return dst;
+    }
+    return {
+        encrypt: (plaintext, dst) => processCfb(plaintext, true, dst),
+        decrypt: (ciphertext, dst) => processCfb(ciphertext, false, dst),
+    };
+});
+// TODO: merge with chacha, however gcm has bitLen while chacha has byteLen
+function computeTag(fn, isLE, key, data, AAD) {
+    const aadLength = AAD ? AAD.length : 0;
+    const h = fn.create(key, data.length + aadLength);
+    if (AAD)
+        h.update(AAD);
+    const num = u64Lengths(8 * data.length, 8 * aadLength, isLE);
+    h.update(data);
+    h.update(num);
+    const res = h.digest();
+    clean(num);
+    return res;
+}
+/**
+ * **GCM** (Galois/Counter Mode): Combines CTR mode with polynomial MAC. Efficient and widely used.
+ * Not perfect:
+ * a) conservative key wear-out is `2**32` (4B) msgs.
+ * b) key wear-out under random nonces is even smaller: `2**23` (8M) messages for `2**-50` chance.
+ * c) MAC can be forged: see Poly1305 documentation.
+ */
+export const gcm = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16, varSizeNonce: true }, function aesgcm(key, nonce, AAD) {
+    // NIST 800-38d doesn't enforce minimum nonce length.
+    // We enforce 8 bytes for compat with openssl.
+    // 12 bytes are recommended. More than 12 bytes would be converted into 12.
+    if (nonce.length < 8)
+        throw new Error('aes/gcm: invalid nonce length');
+    const tagLength = 16;
+    function _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, data) {
+        const tag = computeTag(ghash, false, authKey, data, AAD);
+        for (let i = 0; i < tagMask.length; i++)
+            tag[i] ^= tagMask[i];
+        return tag;
+    }
+    function deriveKeys() {
+        const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
+        const authKey = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
+        const counter = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
+        ctr32(xk, false, counter, counter, authKey);
+        // NIST 800-38d, page 15: different behavior for 96-bit and non-96-bit nonces
+        if (nonce.length === 12) {
+            counter.set(nonce);
+        }
+        else {
+            const nonceLen = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
+            const view = createView(nonceLen);
+            view.setBigUint64(8, BigInt(nonce.length * 8), false);
+            // ghash(nonce || u64be(0) || u64be(nonceLen*8))
+            const g = ghash.create(authKey).update(nonce).update(nonceLen);
+            g.digestInto(counter); // digestInto doesn't trigger '.destroy'
+            g.destroy();
+        }
+        const tagMask = ctr32(xk, false, counter, EMPTY_BLOCK);
+        return { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask };
+    }
+    return {
+        encrypt(plaintext) {
+            const { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask } = deriveKeys();
+            const out = new Uint8Array(plaintext.length + tagLength);
+            const toClean = [xk, authKey, counter, tagMask];
+            if (!isAligned32(plaintext))
+                toClean.push((plaintext = copyBytes(plaintext)));
+            ctr32(xk, false, counter, plaintext, out.subarray(0, plaintext.length));
+            const tag = _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, out.subarray(0, out.length - tagLength));
+            toClean.push(tag);
+            out.set(tag, plaintext.length);
+            clean(...toClean);
+            return out;
+        },
+        decrypt(ciphertext) {
+            const { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask } = deriveKeys();
+            const toClean = [xk, authKey, tagMask, counter];
+            if (!isAligned32(ciphertext))
+                toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
+            const data = ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength);
+            const passedTag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength);
+            const tag = _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, data);
+            toClean.push(tag);
+            if (!equalBytes(tag, passedTag))
+                throw new Error('aes/gcm: invalid ghash tag');
+            const out = ctr32(xk, false, counter, data);
+            clean(...toClean);
+            return out;
+        },
+    };
+});
+const limit = (name, min, max) => (value) => {
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value) || min > value || value > max) {
+        const minmax = '[' + min + '..' + max + ']';
+        throw new Error('' + name + ': expected value in range ' + minmax + ', got ' + value);
+    }
+};
+/**
+ * **SIV** (Synthetic IV): GCM with nonce-misuse resistance.
+ * Repeating nonces reveal only the fact plaintexts are identical.
+ * Also suffers from GCM issues: key wear-out limits & MAC forging.
+ * See [RFC 8452](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8452).
+ */
+export const gcmsiv = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16, varSizeNonce: true }, function aessiv(key, nonce, AAD) {
+    const tagLength = 16;
+    // From RFC 8452: Section 6
+    const AAD_LIMIT = limit('AAD', 0, 2 ** 36);
+    const PLAIN_LIMIT = limit('plaintext', 0, 2 ** 36);
+    const NONCE_LIMIT = limit('nonce', 12, 12);
+    const CIPHER_LIMIT = limit('ciphertext', 16, 2 ** 36 + 16);
+    abytes(key);
+    validateKeyLength(key);
+    NONCE_LIMIT(nonce.length);
+    if (AAD !== undefined)
+        AAD_LIMIT(AAD.length);
+    function deriveKeys() {
+        const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
+        const encKey = new Uint8Array(key.length);
+        const authKey = new Uint8Array(16);
+        const toClean = [xk, encKey];
+        let _nonce = nonce;
+        if (!isAligned32(_nonce))
+            toClean.push((_nonce = copyBytes(_nonce)));
+        const n32 = u32(_nonce);
+        // prettier-ignore
+        let s0 = 0, s1 = n32[0], s2 = n32[1], s3 = n32[2];
+        let counter = 0;
+        for (const derivedKey of [authKey, encKey].map(u32)) {
+            const d32 = u32(derivedKey);
+            for (let i = 0; i < d32.length; i += 2) {
+                // aes(u32le(0) || nonce)[:8] || aes(u32le(1) || nonce)[:8] ...
+                const { s0: o0, s1: o1 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
+                d32[i + 0] = o0;
+                d32[i + 1] = o1;
+                s0 = ++counter; // increment counter inside state
+            }
+        }
+        const res = { authKey, encKey: expandKeyLE(encKey) };
+        // Cleanup
+        clean(...toClean);
+        return res;
+    }
+    function _computeTag(encKey, authKey, data) {
+        const tag = computeTag(polyval, true, authKey, data, AAD);
+        // Compute the expected tag by XORing S_s and the nonce, clearing the
+        // most significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the
+        // message-encryption key.
+        for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++)
+            tag[i] ^= nonce[i];
+        tag[15] &= 0x7f; // Clear the highest bit
+        // encrypt tag as block
+        const t32 = u32(tag);
+        // prettier-ignore
+        let s0 = t32[0], s1 = t32[1], s2 = t32[2], s3 = t32[3];
+        ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(encKey, s0, s1, s2, s3));
+        ((t32[0] = s0), (t32[1] = s1), (t32[2] = s2), (t32[3] = s3));
+        return tag;
+    }
+    // actual decrypt/encrypt of message.
+    function processSiv(encKey, tag, input) {
+        let block = copyBytes(tag);
+        block[15] |= 0x80; // Force highest bit
+        const res = ctr32(encKey, true, block, input);
+        // Cleanup
+        clean(block);
+        return res;
+    }
+    return {
+        encrypt(plaintext) {
+            PLAIN_LIMIT(plaintext.length);
+            const { encKey, authKey } = deriveKeys();
+            const tag = _computeTag(encKey, authKey, plaintext);
+            const toClean = [encKey, authKey, tag];
+            if (!isAligned32(plaintext))
+                toClean.push((plaintext = copyBytes(plaintext)));
+            const out = new Uint8Array(plaintext.length + tagLength);
+            out.set(tag, plaintext.length);
+            out.set(processSiv(encKey, tag, plaintext));
+            // Cleanup
+            clean(...toClean);
+            return out;
+        },
+        decrypt(ciphertext) {
+            CIPHER_LIMIT(ciphertext.length);
+            const tag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength);
+            const { encKey, authKey } = deriveKeys();
+            const toClean = [encKey, authKey];
+            if (!isAligned32(ciphertext))
+                toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
+            const plaintext = processSiv(encKey, tag, ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength));
+            const expectedTag = _computeTag(encKey, authKey, plaintext);
+            toClean.push(expectedTag);
+            if (!equalBytes(tag, expectedTag)) {
+                clean(...toClean);
+                throw new Error('invalid polyval tag');
+            }
+            // Cleanup
+            clean(...toClean);
+            return plaintext;
+        },
+    };
+});
+function isBytes32(a) {
+    return (a instanceof Uint32Array || (ArrayBuffer.isView(a) && a.constructor.name === 'Uint32Array'));
+}
+function encryptBlock(xk, block) {
+    abytes(block, 16, 'block');
+    if (!isBytes32(xk))
+        throw new Error('_encryptBlock accepts result of expandKeyLE');
+    const b32 = u32(block);
+    let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, b32[0], b32[1], b32[2], b32[3]);
+    ((b32[0] = s0), (b32[1] = s1), (b32[2] = s2), (b32[3] = s3));
+    return block;
+}
+function decryptBlock(xk, block) {
+    abytes(block, 16, 'block');
+    if (!isBytes32(xk))
+        throw new Error('_decryptBlock accepts result of expandKeyLE');
+    const b32 = u32(block);
+    let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, b32[0], b32[1], b32[2], b32[3]);
+    ((b32[0] = s0), (b32[1] = s1), (b32[2] = s2), (b32[3] = s3));
+    return block;
+}
+/**
+ * AES-W (base for AESKW/AESKWP).
+ * Specs: [SP800-38F](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf),
+ * [RFC 3394](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394),
+ * [RFC 5649](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5649).
+ */
+const AESW = {
+    /*
+    High-level pseudocode:
+    ```
+    A: u64 = IV
+    out = []
+    for (let i=0, ctr = 0; i<6; i++) {
+      for (const chunk of chunks(plaintext, 8)) {
+        A ^= swapEndianess(ctr++)
+        [A, res] = chunks(encrypt(A || chunk), 8);
+        out ||= res
+      }
+    }
+    out = A || out
+    ```
+    Decrypt is the same, but reversed.
+    */
+    encrypt(kek, out) {
+        // Size is limited to 4GB, otherwise ctr will overflow and we'll need to switch to bigints.
+        // If you need it larger, open an issue.
+        if (out.length >= 2 ** 32)
+            throw new Error('plaintext should be less than 4gb');
+        const xk = expandKeyLE(kek);
+        if (out.length === 16)
+            encryptBlock(xk, out);
+        else {
+            const o32 = u32(out);
+            // prettier-ignore
+            let a0 = o32[0], a1 = o32[1]; // A
+            for (let j = 0, ctr = 1; j < 6; j++) {
+                for (let pos = 2; pos < o32.length; pos += 2, ctr++) {
+                    const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, a0, a1, o32[pos], o32[pos + 1]);
+                    // A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i
+                    ((a0 = s0), (a1 = s1 ^ byteSwap(ctr)), (o32[pos] = s2), (o32[pos + 1] = s3));
+                }
+            }
+            ((o32[0] = a0), (o32[1] = a1)); // out = A || out
+        }
+        xk.fill(0);
+    },
+    decrypt(kek, out) {
+        if (out.length - 8 >= 2 ** 32)
+            throw new Error('ciphertext should be less than 4gb');
+        const xk = expandKeyDecLE(kek);
+        const chunks = out.length / 8 - 1; // first chunk is IV
+        if (chunks === 1)
+            decryptBlock(xk, out);
+        else {
+            const o32 = u32(out);
+            // prettier-ignore
+            let a0 = o32[0], a1 = o32[1]; // A
+            for (let j = 0, ctr = chunks * 6; j < 6; j++) {
+                for (let pos = chunks * 2; pos >= 1; pos -= 2, ctr--) {
+                    a1 ^= byteSwap(ctr);
+                    const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, a0, a1, o32[pos], o32[pos + 1]);
+                    ((a0 = s0), (a1 = s1), (o32[pos] = s2), (o32[pos + 1] = s3));
+                }
+            }
+            ((o32[0] = a0), (o32[1] = a1));
+        }
+        xk.fill(0);
+    },
+};
+const AESKW_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(8).fill(0xa6); // A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
+/**
+ * AES-KW (key-wrap). Injects static IV into plaintext, adds counter, encrypts 6 times.
+ * Reduces block size from 16 to 8 bytes.
+ * For padded version, use aeskwp.
+ * [RFC 3394](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394/),
+ * [NIST.SP.800-38F](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf).
+ */
+export const aeskw = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 8 }, (kek) => ({
+    encrypt(plaintext) {
+        if (!plaintext.length || plaintext.length % 8 !== 0)
+            throw new Error('invalid plaintext length');
+        if (plaintext.length === 8)
+            throw new Error('8-byte keys not allowed in AESKW, use AESKWP instead');
+        const out = concatBytes(AESKW_IV, plaintext);
+        AESW.encrypt(kek, out);
+        return out;
+    },
+    decrypt(ciphertext) {
+        // ciphertext must be at least 24 bytes and a multiple of 8 bytes
+        // 24 because should have at least two block (1 iv + 2).
+        // Replace with 16 to enable '8-byte keys'
+        if (ciphertext.length % 8 !== 0 || ciphertext.length < 3 * 8)
+            throw new Error('invalid ciphertext length');
+        const out = copyBytes(ciphertext);
+        AESW.decrypt(kek, out);
+        if (!equalBytes(out.subarray(0, 8), AESKW_IV))
+            throw new Error('integrity check failed');
+        out.subarray(0, 8).fill(0); // ciphertext.subarray(0, 8) === IV, but we clean it anyway
+        return out.subarray(8);
+    },
+}));
+/*
+We don't support 8-byte keys. The rabbit hole:
+
+- Wycheproof says: "NIST SP 800-38F does not define the wrapping of 8 byte keys.
+  RFC 3394 Section 2  on the other hand specifies that 8 byte keys are wrapped
+  by directly encrypting one block with AES."
+    - https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/doc/key_wrap.md
+    - "RFC 3394 specifies in Section 2, that the input for the key wrap
+      algorithm must be at least two blocks and otherwise the constant
+      field and key are simply encrypted with ECB as a single block"
+- What RFC 3394 actually says (in Section 2):
+    - "Before being wrapped, the key data is parsed into n blocks of 64 bits.
+      The only restriction the key wrap algorithm places on n is that n be
+      at least two"
+    - "For key data with length less than or equal to 64 bits, the constant
+      field used in this specification and the key data form a single
+      128-bit codebook input making this key wrap unnecessary."
+- Which means "assert(n >= 2)" and "use something else for 8 byte keys"
+- NIST SP800-38F actually prohibits 8-byte in "5.3.1 Mandatory Limits".
+  It states that plaintext for KW should be "2 to 2^54 -1 semiblocks".
+- So, where does "directly encrypt single block with AES" come from?
+    - Not RFC 3394. Pseudocode of key wrap in 2.2 explicitly uses
+      loop of 6 for any code path
+    - There is a weird W3C spec:
+      https://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/Overview.html#kw-aes128
+    - This spec is outdated, as admitted by Wycheproof authors
+    - There is RFC 5649 for padded key wrap, which is padding construction on
+      top of AESKW. In '4.1.2' it says: "If the padded plaintext contains exactly
+      eight octets, then prepend the AIV as defined in Section 3 above to P[1] and
+      encrypt the resulting 128-bit block using AES in ECB mode [Modes] with key
+      K (the KEK).  In this case, the output is two 64-bit blocks C[0] and C[1]:"
+    - Browser subtle crypto is actually crashes on wrapping keys less than 16 bytes:
+      `Error: error:1C8000E6:Provider routines::invalid input length] { opensslErrorStack: [ 'error:030000BD:digital envelope routines::update error' ]`
+
+In the end, seems like a bug in Wycheproof.
+The 8-byte check can be easily disabled inside of AES_W.
+*/
+const AESKWP_IV = 0xa65959a6; // single u32le value
+/**
+ * AES-KW, but with padding and allows random keys.
+ * Second u32 of IV is used as counter for length.
+ * [RFC 5649](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5649)
+ */
+export const aeskwp = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 8 }, (kek) => ({
+    encrypt(plaintext) {
+        if (!plaintext.length)
+            throw new Error('invalid plaintext length');
+        const padded = Math.ceil(plaintext.length / 8) * 8;
+        const out = new Uint8Array(8 + padded);
+        out.set(plaintext, 8);
+        const out32 = u32(out);
+        out32[0] = AESKWP_IV;
+        out32[1] = byteSwap(plaintext.length);
+        AESW.encrypt(kek, out);
+        return out;
+    },
+    decrypt(ciphertext) {
+        // 16 because should have at least one block
+        if (ciphertext.length < 16)
+            throw new Error('invalid ciphertext length');
+        const out = copyBytes(ciphertext);
+        const o32 = u32(out);
+        AESW.decrypt(kek, out);
+        const len = byteSwap(o32[1]) >>> 0;
+        const padded = Math.ceil(len / 8) * 8;
+        if (o32[0] !== AESKWP_IV || out.length - 8 !== padded)
+            throw new Error('integrity check failed');
+        for (let i = len; i < padded; i++)
+            if (out[8 + i] !== 0)
+                throw new Error('integrity check failed');
+        out.subarray(0, 8).fill(0); // ciphertext.subarray(0, 8) === IV, but we clean it anyway
+        return out.subarray(8, 8 + len);
+    },
+}));
+class _AesCtrDRBG {
+    blockLen;
+    key;
+    nonce;
+    state;
+    reseedCnt;
+    constructor(keyLen, seed, personalization) {
+        this.blockLen = ctr.blockSize;
+        const keyLenBytes = keyLen / 8;
+        const nonceLen = 16;
+        this.state = new Uint8Array(keyLenBytes + nonceLen);
+        this.key = this.state.subarray(0, keyLenBytes);
+        this.nonce = this.state.subarray(keyLenBytes, keyLenBytes + nonceLen);
+        this.reseedCnt = 1;
+        incBytes(this.nonce, false, 1);
+        this.addEntropy(seed, personalization);
+    }
+    update(data) {
+        // cannot re-use state here, because we will wipe current key
+        ctr(this.key, this.nonce).encrypt(new Uint8Array(this.state.length), this.state);
+        if (data) {
+            abytes(data);
+            for (let i = 0; i < data.length; i++)
+                this.state[i] ^= data[i];
+        }
+        incBytes(this.nonce, false, 1);
+    }
+    addEntropy(seed, info) {
+        abytes(seed, this.state.length, 'seed');
+        const _seed = seed.slice();
+        if (info) {
+            abytes(info);
+            if (info.length > _seed.length)
+                throw new Error('info length is too big');
+            for (let i = 0; i < info.length; i++)
+                _seed[i] ^= info[i];
+        }
+        this.update(_seed);
+        _seed.fill(0);
+        this.reseedCnt = 1;
+    }
+    randomBytes(len, info) {
+        anumber(len);
+        if (this.reseedCnt++ >= 2 ** 48)
+            throw new Error('entropy exhausted');
+        if (info)
+            this.update(info);
+        const res = new Uint8Array(len);
+        ctr(this.key, this.nonce).encrypt(res, res);
+        incBytes(this.nonce, false, Math.ceil(len / this.blockLen));
+        this.update(info);
+        return res;
+    }
+    clean() {
+        this.state.fill(0);
+        this.reseedCnt = 0;
+    }
+}
+const createAesDrbg = (keyLen) => {
+    return (seed, personalization = undefined) => new _AesCtrDRBG(keyLen, seed, personalization);
+};
+/**
+ * AES-CTR DRBG 128-bit - CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator).
+ * It's best to limit usage to non-production, non-critical cases: for example, test-only.
+ */
+export const rngAesCtrDrbg128 = /* @__PURE__ */ createAesDrbg(128);
+/**
+ * AES-CTR DRBG 256-bit - CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator).
+ * It's best to limit usage to non-production, non-critical cases: for example, test-only.
+ */
+export const rngAesCtrDrbg256 = /* @__PURE__ */ createAesDrbg(256);
+//#region CMAC
+/**
+ * Left-shift by one bit and conditionally XOR with 0x87:
+ * ```
+ * if MSB(L) is equal to 0
+ * then    K1 := L << 1;
+ * else    K1 := (L << 1) XOR const_Rb;
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Specs: [RFC 4493, Section 2.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4493.html#section-2.3),
+ *        [RFC 5297 Section 2.3](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html#section-2.3)
+ *
+ * @returns modified `block` (for chaining)
+ */
+function dbl(block) {
+    let carry = 0;
+    // Left shift by 1 bit
+    for (let i = BLOCK_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        const newCarry = (block[i] & 0x80) >>> 7;
+        block[i] = (block[i] << 1) | carry;
+        carry = newCarry;
+    }
+    // XOR with 0x87 if there was a carry from the most significant bit
+    if (carry) {
+        block[BLOCK_SIZE - 1] ^= 0x87;
+    }
+    return block;
+}
+/**
+ * `a XOR b`, running in-site on `a`.
+ * @param a left operand and output
+ * @param b right operand
+ * @returns `a` (for chaining)
+ */
+function xorBlock(a, b) {
+    if (a.length !== b.length)
+        throw new Error('xorBlock: blocks must have same length');
+    for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
+        a[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
+    }
+    return a;
+}
+/**
+ * xorend as defined in [RFC 5297 Section 2.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html#section-2.1).
+ *
+ * ```
+ * leftmost(A, len(A)-len(B)) || (rightmost(A, len(B)) xor B)
+ * ```
+ */
+function xorend(a, b) {
+    if (b.length > a.length) {
+        throw new Error('xorend: len(B) must be less than or equal to len(A)');
+    }
+    // keep leftmost part of `a` unchanged
+    // and xor only the rightmost part:
+    const offset = a.length - b.length;
+    for (let i = 0; i < b.length; i++) {
+        a[offset + i] = a[offset + i] ^ b[i];
+    }
+    return a;
+}
+/**
+ * Internal CMAC class.
+ */
+class _CMAC {
+    buffer;
+    destroyed;
+    k1;
+    k2;
+    xk;
+    constructor(key) {
+        abytes(key);
+        validateKeyLength(key);
+        this.xk = expandKeyLE(key);
+        this.buffer = new Uint8Array(0);
+        this.destroyed = false;
+        // L = AES_encrypt(K, const_Zero)
+        const L = new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE);
+        encryptBlock(this.xk, L);
+        // Generate subkeys K1 and K2 from the main key according to
+        // [RFC 4493, Section 2.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4493.html#section-2.3)
+        // K1
+        this.k1 = dbl(L);
+        this.k2 = dbl(new Uint8Array(this.k1));
+    }
+    update(data) {
+        const { destroyed, buffer } = this;
+        if (destroyed)
+            throw new Error('CMAC instance was destroyed');
+        abytes(data);
+        const newBuffer = new Uint8Array(buffer.length + data.length);
+        newBuffer.set(buffer);
+        newBuffer.set(data, buffer.length);
+        this.buffer = newBuffer;
+        return this;
+    }
+    // see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4493.html#section-2.4
+    digest() {
+        if (this.destroyed)
+            throw new Error('CMAC instance was destroyed');
+        const { buffer } = this;
+        const msgLen = buffer.length;
+        // Step 2:
+        let n = Math.ceil(msgLen / BLOCK_SIZE); // n := ceil(len/const_Bsize);
+        // Step 3:
+        let flag; // denoting if last block is complete or not
+        if (n === 0) {
+            n = 1;
+            flag = false;
+        }
+        else {
+            flag = msgLen % BLOCK_SIZE === 0; // if len mod const_Bsize is 0
+        }
+        // Step 4:
+        const lastBlockStart = (n - 1) * BLOCK_SIZE;
+        const lastBlockData = buffer.subarray(lastBlockStart);
+        let m_last;
+        if (flag) {
+            // M_last := M_n XOR K1;
+            m_last = xorBlock(new Uint8Array(lastBlockData), this.k1);
+        }
+        else {
+            // M_last := padding(M_n) XOR K2;
+            //
+            // [...] padding(x) is the concatenation of x and a single '1',
+            // followed by the minimum number of '0's, so that the total length is
+            // equal to 128 bits.
+            const padded = new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE);
+            padded.set(lastBlockData);
+            padded[lastBlockData.length] = 0x80; // single '1' bit
+            m_last = xorBlock(padded, this.k2);
+        }
+        // Step 5:
+        let x = new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE); // X := const_Zero;
+        // Step 6:
+        for (let i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) {
+            const m_i = buffer.subarray(i * BLOCK_SIZE, (i + 1) * BLOCK_SIZE); // M_i
+            xorBlock(x, m_i); // Y := X XOR M_i;
+            encryptBlock(this.xk, x); // X := AES-128(K,Y);
+        }
+        // Step 7:
+        xorBlock(x, m_last); // Y := M_last XOR X;
+        encryptBlock(this.xk, x); // T := AES-128(K,Y);
+        // cleanup:
+        clean(m_last);
+        return x; // T
+    }
+    destroy() {
+        const { buffer, destroyed, xk, k1, k2 } = this;
+        if (destroyed)
+            return;
+        this.destroyed = true;
+        clean(buffer, xk, k1, k2);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * AES-CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code).
+ * Specs: [RFC 4493](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4493.html).
+ */
+export const cmac = (key, message) => new _CMAC(key).update(message).digest();
+cmac.create = (key) => new _CMAC(key);
+/**
+ * S2V (Synthetic Initialization Vector) function as described in [RFC 5297 Section 2.4](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html#section-2.4).
+ *
+ * ```
+ * S2V(K, S1, ..., Sn) {
+ *   if n = 0 then
+ *     return V = AES-CMAC(K, <one>)
+ *   fi
+ *   D = AES-CMAC(K, <zero>)
+ *   for i = 1 to n-1 do
+ *     D = dbl(D) xor AES-CMAC(K, Si)
+ *   done
+ *   if len(Sn) >= 128 then
+ *     T = Sn xorend D
+ *   else
+ *     T = dbl(D) xor pad(Sn)
+ *   fi
+ *   return V = AES-CMAC(K, T)
+ * }
+ * ```
+ *
+ * S2V takes a key and a vector of strings S1, S2, ..., Sn and returns a 128-bit string.
+ * The S2V function is used to generate a synthetic IV for AES-SIV.
+ *
+ * @param key - AES key (128, 192, or 256 bits)
+ * @param strings - Array of byte arrays to process
+ * @returns 128-bit synthetic IV
+ */
+function s2v(key, strings) {
+    validateKeyLength(key);
+    const len = strings.length;
+    if (len > 127) {
+        // see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html#section-7
+        throw new Error('s2v: number of input strings must be less than or equal to 127');
+    }
+    if (len === 0)
+        return cmac(key, ONE_BLOCK);
+    // D = AES-CMAC(K, <zero>)
+    let d = cmac(key, EMPTY_BLOCK);
+    // for i = 1 to n-1 do
+    //   D = dbl(D) xor AES-CMAC(K, Si)
+    for (let i = 0; i < len - 1; i++) {
+        dbl(d);
+        const cmacResult = cmac(key, strings[i]);
+        xorBlock(d, cmacResult);
+        clean(cmacResult);
+    }
+    const s_n = strings[len - 1];
+    let t;
+    // if len(Sn) >= 128 then
+    if (s_n.byteLength >= BLOCK_SIZE) {
+        // T = Sn xorend D
+        t = xorend(Uint8Array.from(s_n), d);
+    }
+    else {
+        // pad(Sn):
+        const paddedSn = new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE);
+        paddedSn.set(s_n);
+        paddedSn[s_n.length] = 0x80; // padding: 0x80 followed by zeros
+        // T = dbl(D) xor pad(Sn)
+        t = xorBlock(dbl(d), paddedSn);
+        clean(paddedSn);
+    }
+    // V = AES-CMAC(K, T)
+    const result = cmac(key, t);
+    clean(d, t);
+    return result;
+}
+/** Use `gcmsiv` or `aessiv`. */
+export const siv = () => {
+    throw new Error('"siv" from v1 is now "gcmsiv"');
+};
+/**
+ * **SIV**: Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) Authenticated Encryption
+ * Nonce is derived from the plaintext and AAD using the S2V function.
+ * See [RFC 5297](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html).
+ */
+export const aessiv = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 16, tagLength: 16 }, function aessiv(key, ...AAD) {
+    // From RFC 5297: Section 6.1, 6.2, 6.3:
+    const PLAIN_LIMIT = limit('plaintext', 0, 2 ** 132);
+    const CIPHER_LIMIT = limit('ciphertext', 16, 2 ** 132 + 16);
+    if (AAD.length > 126) {
+        // see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html#section-7
+        throw new Error('"AAD" number of elements must be less than or equal to 126');
+    }
+    AAD.forEach((aad) => abytes(aad));
+    abytes(key);
+    if (![32, 48, 64].includes(key.length))
+        throw new Error('"aes key" expected Uint8Array of length 32/48/64, got length=' + key.length);
+    // The key is split into equal halves, K1 = leftmost(K, len(K)/2) and
+    // K2 = rightmost(K, len(K)/2).  K1 is used for S2V and K2 is used for CTR.
+    const k1 = key.subarray(0, key.length / 2);
+    const k2 = key.subarray(key.length / 2);
+    return {
+        // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html#section-2.6
+        encrypt(plaintext) {
+            PLAIN_LIMIT(plaintext.length);
+            const v = s2v(k1, [...AAD, plaintext]);
+            // clear out the 31st and 63rd (rightmost) bit:
+            const q = Uint8Array.from(v);
+            q[8] &= 0x7f;
+            q[12] &= 0x7f;
+            // encrypt:
+            const c = ctr(k2, q).encrypt(plaintext);
+            return concatBytes(v, c);
+        },
+        // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297.html#section-2.7
+        decrypt(ciphertext) {
+            CIPHER_LIMIT(ciphertext.length);
+            const v = ciphertext.subarray(0, BLOCK_SIZE);
+            const c = ciphertext.subarray(BLOCK_SIZE);
+            // clear out the 31st and 63rd (rightmost) bit:
+            const q = Uint8Array.from(v);
+            q[8] &= 0x7f;
+            q[12] &= 0x7f;
+            // decrypt:
+            const p = ctr(k2, q).decrypt(c);
+            // verify tag:
+            const t = s2v(k1, [...AAD, p]);
+            if (equalBytes(t, v)) {
+                return p;
+            }
+            else {
+                throw new Error('invalid siv tag');
+            }
+        },
+    };
+});
+//#endregion
+/** Unsafe low-level internal methods. May change at any time. */
+export const unsafe = {
+    expandKeyLE,
+    expandKeyDecLE,
+    encrypt,
+    decrypt,
+    encryptBlock,
+    decryptBlock,
+    ctrCounter,
+    ctr32,
+    dbl,
+    xorBlock,
+    xorend,
+    s2v,
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=aes.js.map