@openclaw/nostr 2026.5.20-beta.2 → 2026.5.22

package/node_modules/@noble/curves/abstract/montgomery.js

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+/**
+ * Montgomery curve methods. It's not really whole montgomery curve,
+ * just bunch of very specific methods for X25519 / X448 from
+ * [RFC 7748](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748)
+ * @module
+ */
+/*! noble-curves - MIT License (c) 2022 Paul Miller (paulmillr.com) */
+import { abytes, aInRange, bytesToNumberLE, copyBytes, numberToBytesLE, randomBytes, validateObject, } from "../utils.js";
+import { createKeygen } from "./curve.js";
+import { mod } from "./modular.js";
+const _0n = BigInt(0);
+const _1n = BigInt(1);
+const _2n = BigInt(2);
+function validateOpts(curve) {
+    validateObject(curve, {
+        adjustScalarBytes: 'function',
+        powPminus2: 'function',
+    });
+    return Object.freeze({ ...curve });
+}
+export function montgomery(curveDef) {
+    const CURVE = validateOpts(curveDef);
+    const { P, type, adjustScalarBytes, powPminus2, randomBytes: rand } = CURVE;
+    const is25519 = type === 'x25519';
+    if (!is25519 && type !== 'x448')
+        throw new Error('invalid type');
+    const randomBytes_ = rand || randomBytes;
+    const montgomeryBits = is25519 ? 255 : 448;
+    const fieldLen = is25519 ? 32 : 56;
+    const Gu = is25519 ? BigInt(9) : BigInt(5);
+    // RFC 7748 #5:
+    // The constant a24 is (486662 - 2) / 4 = 121665 for curve25519/X25519 and
+    // (156326 - 2) / 4 = 39081 for curve448/X448
+    // const a = is25519 ? 156326n : 486662n;
+    const a24 = is25519 ? BigInt(121665) : BigInt(39081);
+    // RFC: x25519 "the resulting integer is of the form 2^254 plus
+    // eight times a value between 0 and 2^251 - 1 (inclusive)"
+    // x448: "2^447 plus four times a value between 0 and 2^445 - 1 (inclusive)"
+    const minScalar = is25519 ? _2n ** BigInt(254) : _2n ** BigInt(447);
+    const maxAdded = is25519
+        ? BigInt(8) * _2n ** BigInt(251) - _1n
+        : BigInt(4) * _2n ** BigInt(445) - _1n;
+    const maxScalar = minScalar + maxAdded + _1n; // (inclusive)
+    const modP = (n) => mod(n, P);
+    const GuBytes = encodeU(Gu);
+    function encodeU(u) {
+        return numberToBytesLE(modP(u), fieldLen);
+    }
+    function decodeU(u) {
+        const _u = copyBytes(abytes(u, fieldLen, 'uCoordinate'));
+        // RFC: When receiving such an array, implementations of X25519
+        // (but not X448) MUST mask the most significant bit in the final byte.
+        if (is25519)
+            _u[31] &= 127; // 0b0111_1111
+        // RFC: Implementations MUST accept non-canonical values and process them as
+        // if they had been reduced modulo the field prime.  The non-canonical
+        // values are 2^255 - 19 through 2^255 - 1 for X25519 and 2^448 - 2^224
+        // - 1 through 2^448 - 1 for X448.
+        return modP(bytesToNumberLE(_u));
+    }
+    function decodeScalar(scalar) {
+        return bytesToNumberLE(adjustScalarBytes(copyBytes(abytes(scalar, fieldLen, 'scalar'))));
+    }
+    function scalarMult(scalar, u) {
+        const pu = montgomeryLadder(decodeU(u), decodeScalar(scalar));
+        // Some public keys are useless, of low-order. Curve author doesn't think
+        // it needs to be validated, but we do it nonetheless.
+        // https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate
+        if (pu === _0n)
+            throw new Error('invalid private or public key received');
+        return encodeU(pu);
+    }
+    // Computes public key from private. By doing scalar multiplication of base point.
+    function scalarMultBase(scalar) {
+        return scalarMult(scalar, GuBytes);
+    }
+    const getPublicKey = scalarMultBase;
+    const getSharedSecret = scalarMult;
+    // cswap from RFC7748 "example code"
+    function cswap(swap, x_2, x_3) {
+        // dummy = mask(swap) AND (x_2 XOR x_3)
+        // Where mask(swap) is the all-1 or all-0 word of the same length as x_2
+        // and x_3, computed, e.g., as mask(swap) = 0 - swap.
+        const dummy = modP(swap * (x_2 - x_3));
+        x_2 = modP(x_2 - dummy); // x_2 = x_2 XOR dummy
+        x_3 = modP(x_3 + dummy); // x_3 = x_3 XOR dummy
+        return { x_2, x_3 };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Montgomery x-only multiplication ladder.
+     * @param pointU u coordinate (x) on Montgomery Curve 25519
+     * @param scalar by which the point would be multiplied
+     * @returns new Point on Montgomery curve
+     */
+    function montgomeryLadder(u, scalar) {
+        aInRange('u', u, _0n, P);
+        aInRange('scalar', scalar, minScalar, maxScalar);
+        const k = scalar;
+        const x_1 = u;
+        let x_2 = _1n;
+        let z_2 = _0n;
+        let x_3 = u;
+        let z_3 = _1n;
+        let swap = _0n;
+        for (let t = BigInt(montgomeryBits - 1); t >= _0n; t--) {
+            const k_t = (k >> t) & _1n;
+            swap ^= k_t;
+            ({ x_2, x_3 } = cswap(swap, x_2, x_3));
+            ({ x_2: z_2, x_3: z_3 } = cswap(swap, z_2, z_3));
+            swap = k_t;
+            const A = x_2 + z_2;
+            const AA = modP(A * A);
+            const B = x_2 - z_2;
+            const BB = modP(B * B);
+            const E = AA - BB;
+            const C = x_3 + z_3;
+            const D = x_3 - z_3;
+            const DA = modP(D * A);
+            const CB = modP(C * B);
+            const dacb = DA + CB;
+            const da_cb = DA - CB;
+            x_3 = modP(dacb * dacb);
+            z_3 = modP(x_1 * modP(da_cb * da_cb));
+            x_2 = modP(AA * BB);
+            z_2 = modP(E * (AA + modP(a24 * E)));
+        }
+        ({ x_2, x_3 } = cswap(swap, x_2, x_3));
+        ({ x_2: z_2, x_3: z_3 } = cswap(swap, z_2, z_3));
+        const z2 = powPminus2(z_2); // `Fp.pow(x, P - _2n)` is much slower equivalent
+        return modP(x_2 * z2); // Return x_2 * (z_2^(p - 2))
+    }
+    const lengths = {
+        secretKey: fieldLen,
+        publicKey: fieldLen,
+        seed: fieldLen,
+    };
+    const randomSecretKey = (seed = randomBytes_(fieldLen)) => {
+        abytes(seed, lengths.seed, 'seed');
+        return seed;
+    };
+    const utils = { randomSecretKey };
+    return Object.freeze({
+        keygen: createKeygen(randomSecretKey, getPublicKey),
+        getSharedSecret,
+        getPublicKey,
+        scalarMult,
+        scalarMultBase,
+        utils,
+        GuBytes: GuBytes.slice(),
+        lengths,
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=montgomery.js.map

package/node_modules/@noble/curves/abstract/montgomery.js.map

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package/node_modules/@noble/curves/abstract/oprf.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/**
+ * RFC 9497: Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) Using Prime-Order Groups.
+ * https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9497
+ *
+
+OPRF allows to interactively create an `Output = PRF(Input, serverSecretKey)`:
+
+- Server cannot calculate Output by itself: it doesn't know Input
+- Client cannot calculate Output by itself: it doesn't know server secretKey
+- An attacker interception the communication can't restore Input/Output/serverSecretKey and can't
+  link Input to some value.
+
+## Issues
+
+- Low-entropy inputs (e.g. password '123') enable brute-forced dictionary attacks by the server
+  (solveable by domain separation in POPRF)
+- High-level protocol needs to be constructed on top, because OPRF is low-level
+
+## Use cases
+
+1. **Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE):** Enables secure password login (e.g., OPAQUE)
+   without revealing the password to the server.
+2. **Private Set Intersection (PSI):** Allows two parties to compute the intersection of their
+   private sets without revealing non-intersecting elements.
+3. **Anonymous Credential Systems:** Supports issuance of anonymous, unlinkable credentials
+   (e.g., Privacy Pass) using blind OPRF evaluation.
+4. **Private Information Retrieval (PIR):** Helps users query databases without revealing which
+   item they accessed.
+5. **Encrypted Search / Secure Indexing:** Enables keyword search over encrypted data while keeping
+   queries private.
+6. **Spam Prevention and Rate-Limiting:** Issues anonymous tokens to prevent abuse
+   (e.g., CAPTCHA bypass) without compromising user privacy.
+
+## Modes
+
+- OPRF: simple mode, client doesn't need to know server public key
+- VOPRF: verifable mode, allows client to verify that server used secret key corresponding to known public key
+- POPRF: partially oblivious mode, VOPRF + domain separation
+
+There is also non-interactive mode (Evaluate) that supports creating Output in non-interactive mode with knowledge of secret key.
+
+Flow:
+- (once) Server generates secret and public keys, distributes public keys to clients
+  - deterministically: `deriveKeyPair` or just random: `generateKeyPair`
+- Client blinds input: `blind(secretInput)`
+- Server evaluates blinded input: `blindEvaluate` generated by client, sends result to client
+- Client creates output using result of evaluation via 'finalize'
+
+ * @module
+ */
+/*! noble-curves - MIT License (c) 2022 Paul Miller (paulmillr.com) */
+import { randomBytes } from '../utils.ts';
+import { type CurvePoint, type CurvePointCons } from './curve.ts';
+import { type H2CDSTOpts } from './hash-to-curve.ts';
+export type PointBytes = Uint8Array;
+export type ScalarBytes = Uint8Array;
+export type Bytes = Uint8Array;
+export type RNG = typeof randomBytes;
+export type OPRFOpts<P extends CurvePoint<any, P>> = {
+    name: string;
+    Point: CurvePointCons<P>;
+    hash(msg: Bytes): Bytes;
+    hashToScalar(msg: Uint8Array, options: H2CDSTOpts): bigint;
+    hashToGroup(msg: Uint8Array, options: H2CDSTOpts): P;
+};
+export type OPRFKeys = {
+    secretKey: ScalarBytes;
+    publicKey: PointBytes;
+};
+export type OPRFBlind = {
+    blind: Uint8Array;
+    blinded: Uint8Array;
+};
+export type OPRFBlindEval = {
+    evaluated: PointBytes;
+    proof: Bytes;
+};
+export type OPRFBlindEvalBatch = {
+    evaluated: PointBytes[];
+    proof: Bytes;
+};
+export type OPRFFinalizeItem = {
+    input: Bytes;
+    blind: ScalarBytes;
+    evaluated: PointBytes;
+    blinded: PointBytes;
+};
+/**
+ * Represents a full OPRF ciphersuite implementation according to RFC 9497.
+ * This object bundles the three protocol variants (OPRF, VOPRF, POPRF) for a specific
+ * prime-order group and hash function combination.
+ *
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9497.html
+ */
+export type OPRF = {
+    /**
+     * The unique identifier for the ciphersuite, e.g., "ristretto255-SHA512".
+     * This name is used for domain separation to prevent cross-protocol attacks.
+     */
+    readonly name: string;
+    /**
+     * The base Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) mode (mode 0x00).
+     * This is a two-party protocol between a client and a server to compute F(k, x)
+     * where 'k' is the server's key and 'x' is the client's input.
+     *
+     * The client learns the output F(k, x) but nothing about 'k'.
+     * The server learns nothing about 'x' or F(k, x).
+     * This mode is NOT verifiable; the client cannot prove the server used a specific key.
+     */
+    readonly oprf: {
+        /**
+         * (Server-side) Generates a new random private/public key pair for the server.
+         * @returns A new key pair.
+         */
+        generateKeyPair(): OPRFKeys;
+        /**
+         * (Server-side) Deterministically derives a private/public key pair from a seed.
+         * @param seed A 32-byte cryptographically secure random seed.
+         * @param keyInfo An optional byte string for domain separation.
+         * @returns The derived key pair.
+         */
+        deriveKeyPair(seed: Bytes, keyInfo: Bytes): OPRFKeys;
+        /**
+         * (Client-side) The first step of the protocol. The client blinds its private input.
+         * @param input The client's private input bytes.
+         * @param rng An optional cryptographically secure random number generator.
+         * @returns An object containing the `blind` scalar (which the client MUST keep secret)
+         * and the `blinded` element (which the client sends to the server).
+         */
+        blind(input: Bytes, rng?: RNG): OPRFBlind;
+        /**
+         * (Server-side) The second step. The server evaluates the client's blinded element
+         * using its secret key.
+         * @param secretKey The server's private key.
+         * @param blinded The blinded group element received from the client.
+         * @returns The evaluated group element, to be sent back to the client.
+         */
+        blindEvaluate(secretKey: ScalarBytes, blinded: PointBytes): PointBytes;
+        /**
+         * (Client-side) The final step. The client unblinds the server's response to
+         * compute the final OPRF output.
+         * @param input The original private input from the `blind` step.
+         * @param blind The secret scalar from the `blind` step.
+         * @param evaluated The evaluated group element received from the server.
+         * @returns The final OPRF output, `Hash(len(input)||input||len(unblinded)||unblinded||"Finalize")`.
+         */
+        finalize(input: Bytes, blind: ScalarBytes, evaluated: PointBytes): Bytes;
+    };
+    /**
+     * The Verifiable Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (VOPRF) mode (mode 0x01).
+     * This mode extends the base OPRF by providing a proof that the server used the
+     * secret key corresponding to its known public key.
+     */
+    readonly voprf: {
+        /** (Server-side) Generates a key pair for the VOPRF mode. */
+        generateKeyPair(): OPRFKeys;
+        /** (Server-side) Deterministically derives a key pair for the VOPRF mode. */
+        deriveKeyPair(seed: Bytes, keyInfo: Bytes): OPRFKeys;
+        /** (Client-side) Blinds the client's private input for the VOPRF protocol. */
+        blind(input: Bytes, rng?: RNG): OPRFBlind;
+        /**
+         * (Server-side) Evaluates the client's blinded element and generates a DLEQ proof
+         * of correctness.
+         * @param secretKey The server's private key.
+         * @param publicKey The server's public key, used in proof generation.
+         * @param blinded The blinded group element received from the client.
+         * @param rng An optional cryptographically secure random number generator for the proof.
+         * @returns The evaluated element and a proof of correct computation.
+         */
+        blindEvaluate(secretKey: ScalarBytes, publicKey: PointBytes, blinded: PointBytes, rng?: RNG): OPRFBlindEval;
+        /**
+         * (Server-side) An optimized batch version of `blindEvaluate`. It evaluates multiple
+         * blinded elements and produces a single, constant-size proof for the entire batch,
+         * amortizing the cost of proof generation.
+         * @param secretKey The server's private key.
+         * @param publicKey The server's public key.
+         * @param blinded An array of blinded group elements from one or more clients.
+         * @param rng An optional cryptographically secure random number generator for the proof.
+         * @returns An array of evaluated elements and a single proof for the batch.
+         */
+        blindEvaluateBatch(secretKey: ScalarBytes, publicKey: PointBytes, blinded: PointBytes[], rng?: RNG): OPRFBlindEvalBatch;
+        /**
+         * (Client-side) The final step. The client verifies the server's proof, and if valid,
+         * unblinds the result to compute the final VOPRF output.
+         * @param input The original private input.
+         * @param blind The secret scalar from the `blind` step.
+         * @param evaluated The evaluated element from the server.
+         * @param blinded The blinded element sent to the server (needed for proof verification).
+         * @param publicKey The server's public key against which the proof is verified.
+         * @param proof The DLEQ proof from the server.
+         * @returns The final VOPRF output.
+         * @throws If the proof verification fails.
+         */
+        finalize(input: Bytes, blind: ScalarBytes, evaluated: PointBytes, blinded: PointBytes, publicKey: PointBytes, proof: Bytes): Bytes;
+        /**
+         * (Client-side) The batch-aware version of `finalize`. It verifies a single batch proof
+         * against a list of corresponding inputs and outputs.
+         * @param items An array of objects, each containing the parameters for a single finalization.
+         * @param publicKey The server's public key.
+         * @param proof The single DLEQ proof for the entire batch.
+         * @returns An array of final VOPRF outputs, one for each item in the input.
+         * @throws If the proof verification fails.
+         */
+        finalizeBatch(items: OPRFFinalizeItem[], publicKey: PointBytes, proof: Bytes): Bytes[];
+    };
+    /**
+     * A factory for the Partially Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (POPRF) mode (mode 0x02).
+     * This mode extends VOPRF to include a public `info` parameter, known to both client and
+     * server, which is cryptographically bound to the final output.
+     * This is useful for domain separation at the application level.
+     * @param info A public byte string to be mixed into the computation.
+     * @returns An object with the POPRF protocol functions.
+     */
+    readonly poprf: (info: Bytes) => {
+        /** (Server-side) Generates a key pair for the POPRF mode. */
+        generateKeyPair(): OPRFKeys;
+        /** (Server-side) Deterministically derives a key pair for the POPRF mode. */
+        deriveKeyPair(seed: Bytes, keyInfo: Bytes): OPRFKeys;
+        /**
+         * (Client-side) Blinds the client's private input and computes the "tweaked key".
+         * The tweaked key is a public value derived from the server's public key and the public `info`.
+         * @param input The client's private input.
+         * @param publicKey The server's public key.
+         * @param rng An optional cryptographically secure random number generator.
+         * @returns The `blind`, `blinded` element, and the `tweakedKey` which the client uses for verification.
+         */
+        blind(input: Bytes, publicKey: PointBytes, rng?: RNG): OPRFBlind & {
+            tweakedKey: PointBytes;
+        };
+        /**
+         * (Server-side) Evaluates the blinded element using a key derived from its secret key and the public `info`.
+         * It generates a DLEQ proof against the tweaked key.
+         * @param secretKey The server's private key.
+         * @param blinded The blinded element from the client.
+         * @param rng An optional RNG for the proof.
+         * @returns The evaluated element and a proof of correct computation.
+         */
+        blindEvaluate(secretKey: ScalarBytes, blinded: PointBytes, rng?: RNG): OPRFBlindEval;
+        /**
+         * (Server-side) A batch-aware version of `blindEvaluate` for the POPRF mode.
+         * @param secretKey The server's private key.
+         * @param blinded An array of blinded elements.
+         * @param rng An optional RNG for the proof.
+         * @returns An array of evaluated elements and a single proof for the batch.
+         */
+        blindEvaluateBatch(secretKey: ScalarBytes, blinded: PointBytes[], rng: RNG): OPRFBlindEvalBatch;
+        /**
+         * (Client-side) A batch-aware version of `finalize` for the POPRF mode.
+         * It verifies the proof against the tweaked key.
+         * @param items An array containing the parameters for each finalization.
+         * @param proof The single DLEQ proof for the batch.
+         * @param tweakedKey The tweaked key corresponding to the proof (all items must share the same `info` and `publicKey`).
+         * @returns An array of final POPRF outputs.
+         * @throws If proof verification fails.
+         */
+        finalizeBatch(items: OPRFFinalizeItem[], proof: Bytes, tweakedKey: PointBytes): Bytes[];
+        /**
+         * (Client-side) Finalizes the POPRF protocol. It verifies the server's proof against the
+         * `tweakedKey` computed in the `blind` step. The final output is bound to the public `info`.
+         * @param input The original private input.
+         * @param blind The secret scalar.
+         * @param evaluated The evaluated element from the server.
+         * @param blinded The blinded element sent to the server.
+         * @param proof The DLEQ proof from the server.
+         * @param tweakedKey The public tweaked key computed by the client during the `blind` step.
+         * @returns The final POPRF output.
+         * @throws If proof verification fails.
+         */
+        finalize(input: Bytes, blind: ScalarBytes, evaluated: PointBytes, blinded: PointBytes, proof: Bytes, tweakedKey: PointBytes): Bytes;
+        /**
+         * A non-interactive evaluation function for an entity that knows all inputs.
+         * Computes the final POPRF output directly. Useful for testing or specific applications
+         * where the server needs to compute the output for a known input.
+         * @param secretKey The server's private key.
+         * @param input The client's private input.
+         * @returns The final POPRF output.
+         */
+        evaluate(secretKey: ScalarBytes, input: Bytes): Bytes;
+    };
+};
+export declare function createORPF<P extends CurvePoint<any, P>>(opts: OPRFOpts<P>): OPRF;
+//# sourceMappingURL=oprf.d.ts.map

package/node_modules/@noble/curves/abstract/oprf.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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