@openclaw/matrix 2026.9.5 → 2026.9.7

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,672 @@
+# 🛡️ @openclaw/fs-safe
+
+![fs-safe banner](docs/assets/readme-banner.jpg)
+
+[![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@openclaw/fs-safe.svg?color=10b981&label=npm)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openclaw/fs-safe)
+[![ci](https://github.com/openclaw/fs-safe/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openclaw/fs-safe/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+[![node](https://img.shields.io/node/v/@openclaw/fs-safe.svg?color=10b981)](https://nodejs.org)
+[![license](https://img.shields.io/npm/l/@openclaw/fs-safe.svg?color=10b981)](LICENSE)
+[![docs](https://img.shields.io/badge/docs-fs--safe.io-10b981)](https://fs-safe.io)
+
+Capability-style filesystem roots for Node.js apps that handle untrusted relative paths.
+
+Think Go's `os.Root` / `OpenInRoot` or Rust's [`cap-std`](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std), but for Node. Hand `root()` a trusted directory and you get back a handle whose every method resolves relative paths against it and defends against `..`, symlink swaps, hardlink aliases, and TOCTOU rename races. The exact containment strength is reported per mechanism: Linux `openat2` opens are kernel-atomic; guarded Linux fallback, macOS, Windows, and JavaScript paths are best-effort.
+
+```ts
+import { root } from "@openclaw/fs-safe";
+
+const fs = await root("/safe/workspace");
+await fs.write("notes/today.txt", "hello\n");   // ok
+await fs.write("../escape.txt", "x");            // throws FsSafeError("outside-workspace")
+```
+
+That's the whole pitch. `root()` is the product; the rest of the package — JSON stores, atomic writes, secret files, archive extraction, temp workspaces — is supporting cast for the same boundary.
+
+Full docs and reference at **[fs-safe.io](https://fs-safe.io)**.
+
+## Contents
+
+[Why this exists](#why-this-exists) · [Not a sandbox](#not-a-sandbox) · [Install](#install) · [0.6 migration](docs/migrating-to-0.6.md) · [Python migration](#migrating-from-the-python-helper) · [Quick start](#quick-start) · [Reading](#reading) · [Subpaths](#subpaths) · [Failure semantics](#failure-semantics-in-the-name) · [Directory durability](#directory-durability) · [Atomic writes](#atomic-writes) · [External outputs](#external-outputs) · [Stores](#stores) · [Secure absolute reads](#secure-absolute-file-reads) · [Walking](#directory-walking) · [Archive extraction](#archive-extraction) · [Path scopes](#advanced-path-scopes) · [Errors](#errors) · [Safety model](#safety-model) · [Limitations](#limitations)
+
+## Why this exists
+
+Most Node code that has to touch caller-controlled paths reaches for:
+
+```ts
+path.resolve(root, input).startsWith(root)
+```
+
+That validates a *string*. It does not pin the file you opened, defend against a symlink retarget between check and use, reject hardlinked aliases of out-of-tree inodes, or verify that a write landed where you intended after a rename. The pieces to do those things exist scattered across the ecosystem — [`write-file-atomic`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/write-file-atomic) for atomic writes, `tar` / `jszip` for archive extraction, various `safefs`-style convenience wrappers — but none of them give you one root handle with traversal-resistant semantics across every operation.
+
+The same idea has landed in other languages. Go [added `os.Root` and `OpenInRoot`](https://go.dev/blog/osroot); Rust has had [`cap-std`](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std) for years. Node's `fs` is path-string-oriented and exposes flags like `O_NOFOLLOW` but not an ergonomic "operate inside this root" API. `fs-safe` fills that gap.
+
+| | Root boundary | Atomic writes | Symlink/hardlink defense | TOCTOU resistance | Archive extraction |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `path.resolve().startsWith()` | string check only | – | – | – | – |
+| [`write-file-atomic`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/write-file-atomic) | – | ✓ | – | – | – |
+| Go [`os.Root`](https://go.dev/blog/osroot) / Rust [`cap-std`](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std) | ✓ | platform | ✓ | ✓ | – |
+| **`@openclaw/fs-safe`** | **✓** | **✓** | **✓** | **Linux openat2 atomic; others best-effort** | **✓ (ZIP/TAR/gzip/zstd/bzip2)** |
+
+## Not a sandbox
+
+This is a **library-level guardrail**, not OS-level isolation. It does not replace containers, seccomp, AppArmor, or filesystem permissions. It is for code that already runs with the privileges of its workspace and wants to stop trivial path tricks from escaping it. If your threat model is a hostile process, you need OS isolation; if your threat model is "an agent, plugin, upload handler, or CLI will eventually be tricked into writing somewhere it shouldn't," `fs-safe` catches that. The [security model](docs/security-model.md) describes the exact Linux, macOS, Windows, and JavaScript fallback guarantees and race boundaries.
+
+## Install
+
+```sh
+pnpm add @openclaw/fs-safe
+```
+
+Node 22 or newer. Core root/path/json/temp helpers avoid framework dependencies. With all optional dependencies omitted, public subpaths remain safe to import and fallback-capable operations work in `auto` or `off`. Native-only features, including no-clobber `Root.move()` and [`private: true` creation on macOS](docs/creation.md#permission-options), remain unavailable and fail with `helper-unavailable`. TAR, gzip, zstd, and bzip2 extraction and bounded entry reads use the same Rust TAR parser through bundled WASM when native support is disabled or absent. Zstd/bzip2 codecs are bundled too; gzip uses Node's built-in decoder. ZIP fallback still needs optional `jszip`. See the [0.6 migration guide](docs/migrating-to-0.6.md).
+
+Bun 1.4.2 is also supported with the [Bun runtime requirements](docs/install.md#bun-runtime), including the matching Rust addon on macOS and Linux. JIT-disabled Bun works too.
+
+The package installs one prebuilt native binding for the current supported target. It
+supplies fd-relative and atomic no-replace primitives that Node does not expose
+directly. Configure the lazy loader before first use when you need a strict
+environment policy:
+
+```ts
+import { configureFsSafeNative } from "@openclaw/fs-safe";
+
+configureFsSafeNative({ mode: "auto" });    // default: native when available
+configureFsSafeNative({ mode: "off" });     // disable the addon; use supported fallbacks
+configureFsSafeNative({ mode: "require" }); // fail closed if the binding is unavailable
+```
+
+Native mode performs `write()`, `create()`, and `copyIn()` parent creation and
+publication relative to pinned directory descriptors, including atomic
+replacement. The JavaScript path selected by `off`, or by `auto` when no
+binding can load, is explicitly best-effort: a same-privilege peer that can
+replace a writable parent between its identity check and Node's pathname
+mutation can redirect that mutation outside the root before the post-check
+reports the escape. Use `require` when hostile concurrent mutation is in scope.
+
+Equivalent env var: `FS_SAFE_NATIVE_MODE=auto|off|require`. The seven bindings
+ship as exact-version optional packages filtered by OS, CPU, and Linux libc, so
+a normal install receives only its matching binary. Linux GNU x64/arm64 bindings
+support [glibc 2.28 or newer](docs/install.md#supported-native-platforms), including
+RHEL 8-family systems. There are no postinstall
+steps, runtime downloads, or consumer Rust builds. On a platform without a
+published binding, or when optional dependencies are omitted, `auto` silently retains lexical and canonical root
+checks, no-follow opens, guarded temp+rename writes, and post-write identity
+verification. See the [native
+helper policy](docs/native-helper.md) for the exact boundary and deployment
+tradeoff, and [native architecture](docs/native.md) for the platform mechanisms
+and policy ownership model.
+
+Open results report the mechanism's containment class as `"kernel-atomic"` or
+`"best-effort"`. Linux native `openBeneath()` is kernel-atomic when `openat2`
+is available. Older kernels and syscall-filtered containers use a guarded
+descriptor-relative walk reporting best-effort; nested no-clobber moves keep
+atomic `renameat2(RENAME_NOREPLACE)`. macOS, Windows, and guarded JavaScript
+results are best-effort. See [Linux compatibility](docs/native.md#linux-without-openat2). See the [security model](docs/security-model.md#containment-guarantees-by-platform) before using that fact in higher-level policy.
+
+## Migrating from the Python helper
+
+Version 0.5 replaces the persistent Python worker with prebuilt native
+bindings. The modes map directly: `configureFsSafePython({ mode: "auto" })`
+becomes `configureFsSafeNative({ mode: "auto" })`, and likewise for `off` and
+`require`. Replace `FS_SAFE_PYTHON_MODE` with `FS_SAFE_NATIVE_MODE`; remove
+`pythonPath`, `FS_SAFE_PYTHON`, and interpreter provisioning because the native
+loader does not spawn Python.
+
+Version 0.5 retains the old function and documented `FS_SAFE_PYTHON*`
+and OpenClaw Python environment names emit one `FS_SAFE_PYTHON_DEPRECATED`
+warning and map the old mode to its native equivalent. They are migration
+bridges for shipped 0.4 consumers, not an alternate helper contract. Update
+startup configuration as part of the 0.5 upgrade rather than relying on the
+warning path. Follow the [0.5 migration checklist](docs/migrating-to-0.5.md).
+
+## Quick start
+
+```ts
+import { root } from "@openclaw/fs-safe";
+
+const fs = await root("/safe/workspace", {
+  hardlinks: "reject",
+  symlinks: "reject",
+  mkdir: true,
+  mode: 0o600,
+});
+
+await fs.write("notes/today.txt", "hello\n");
+const text = await fs.readText("notes/today.txt");
+const config = await fs.readJson("config.json");
+await fs.copyIn("uploads/upload.png", "/tmp/upload.png");
+await fs.move("notes/today.txt", "notes/archive/today.txt", { overwrite: true });
+await fs.remove("notes/archive/today.txt");
+```
+
+Use `remove(path, { recursive: true, maxEntries: 20_000, maxDepth: 32 })` for
+bounded tree cleanup. It streams directory entries, checks mutation authority
+before every removal, and supports cancellation. See [removal options and partial
+failure semantics](docs/writing.md).
+
+`root()` takes the trusted directory; relative paths in subsequent calls are resolved against it. Defaults you pass to `root()` apply to every call below; per-call options override them.
+
+`copyIn()` also accepts `{ root: sourceRoot, relativePath }`, `overwrite: false`,
+and `clone: "auto"` for guarded, exclusive file copies with optional native
+copy-on-write acceleration. Byte limits, cancellation, and publication receipts
+are described in the [Root copy contract](docs/root.md#writes).
+
+When you need metadata or a `FileHandle`:
+
+```ts
+const { buffer, realPath, stat } = await fs.read("notes/today.txt");
+const opened = await fs.open("notes/today.txt");
+```
+
+`create()` is the don't-clobber variant of `write()` and throws `already-exists` when the target already exists:
+
+```ts
+await fs.create("notes/README.md", "seed\n"); // throws if it already exists
+```
+
+Use `private: true` on `mkdir()`, `ensureRoot()`, `create()`, or `createJson()`
+for private creation. On macOS, this requires native ACL inspection before
+creating parents or stages and verifies owner-only permissions with no ACL
+before writing payload bytes. Native `off` or a missing ACL capability rejects
+with `helper-unavailable`; nonprivate creation is unchanged. See the
+[creation contract](docs/creation.md#permission-options) for parent ACL handling
+and platform support.
+
+Pass `{ atomic: true }` to buffered `create()` or `createJson()` to keep the
+destination absent until complete content is ready, including with native support
+disabled. The JavaScript fallback requires hardlinks and never downgrades to a
+partial visible file. Omitted or `false` retains the existing buffered behavior.
+Atomic visibility is separate from the existing `durable` synchronization policy.
+Use `durable: "file"` on `create()` or `createJson()` when file-flush errors,
+including `EPERM`, must propagate. It combines with `atomic: true` without
+requiring strict parent-directory synchronization.
+
+`create()` also accepts an `AsyncIterable<Uint8Array>` for large or incrementally
+produced files. Streamed creates keep the destination absent until all chunks
+are written, support `maxBytes` and `signal`, and recheck mutation authority
+before writes and publication. See [streamed creation](docs/writing.md#streamed-creation)
+for producer ownership and cancellation semantics.
+
+`write()` replaces file contents by default; pass `{ overwrite: false }` or use `create()` when an existing file should be an error. `move()` defaults to no clobber because it can otherwise delete an unrelated target while also consuming the source. No-clobber moves require the native helper so the collision decision and rename are one descriptor-relative operation; they fail with `helper-unavailable` rather than falling back to a replacing rename. Pass `{ overwrite: true }` when replacing the target is intended.
+
+Mutating methods accept `assertBeforeMutation: () => void` for live lease or
+cancellation checks immediately before filesystem dispatch. Root defaults and
+per-call checks compose; cleanup and already-dispatched work still settle.
+See [live mutation authority](docs/root.md#live-mutation-authority) for the exact
+scope, including raw writable handles and lock bookkeeping.
+For workspaces with directory aliases, use `symlinks: "follow-parents-within-root"`
+on reads and `mutationSymlinks: "follow-parents-within-root"` on mutations or root
+defaults. Contained parent symlinks are resolved by the library, while a final
+symlink is rejected. Read policy and mutation policy are separate; omitting
+`mutationSymlinks` preserves the existing mutation behavior. See [root policies](docs/root.md#defaults-vs-per-call-options).
+
+Use `ensureRoot()` when a computed relative directory target resolves to the root itself (`""` or `"."`) and you want the operation to be accepted. `root()` still requires the trusted root directory to already exist.
+
+## Reading
+
+Pick the narrowest read shape that gives you what you need:
+
+```ts
+await fs.readJson("config.json"); // parsed value; validate it at your boundary
+await fs.readText("notes/today.txt");
+await fs.readBytes("image.png");
+await fs.read("notes/today.txt"); // { buffer, realPath, stat }
+const opened = await fs.open("large.log"); // FileHandle for streaming
+```
+
+For streams, use `open()` and the returned `FileHandle`:
+
+```ts
+await using opened = await fs.open("large.log");
+{
+  const stream = opened.handle.createReadStream();
+  // consume stream
+}
+```
+
+Root reads default to `DEFAULT_ROOT_MAX_BYTES` (16 MiB). Pass a larger `maxBytes`
+for expected large reads, or `Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY` when the caller has a
+separate size budget.
+
+`reader()` returns a callback that reads absolute or relative paths through the same root boundary. It is useful for APIs that accept a `(path) => Promise<Buffer>` loader. For roots configured through a directory symlink or Windows junction, absolute inputs may use either the configured spelling or the canonical real path. Absolute paths outside the root are rejected with `outside-workspace`. `readAbsolute()` has the same absolute-path behavior directly.
+
+When you need a writable `FileHandle`, use `openWritable()` and prefer `await using` for cleanup:
+
+```ts
+await using opened = await fs.openWritable("logs/current.log", { writeMode: "append" });
+{
+  await opened.handle.appendFile("line\n");
+}
+```
+
+`nonBlockingRead` remains as a compatibility hint in `RootDefaults`. Safe read/open operations already use nonblocking descriptor opens where the platform supports them so a raced FIFO cannot pin a worker; filesystem safety policy remains explicit through `hardlinks`, `symlinks`, and `denyMutations`.
+
+On POSIX, `openWritable()` also uses nonblocking admission for existing targets
+so a no-reader FIFO cannot stall validation. Ordinary regular-file write
+semantics are unchanged; see [writing](docs/writing.md#openwritable-for-streaming).
+
+```ts
+const locked = await root("/srv/workspace", {
+  denyMutations: {
+    paths: ["/srv/workspace/.env"],
+    prefixes: ["/srv/workspace/.ssh"],
+  },
+});
+
+await locked.write(".env", "token"); // FsSafeError code "denied-path"
+```
+
+`stat()`, `exists()`, `list()`, and `entries()` check the exact selected objects while collecting their advisory results, but they cannot pin a later operation to the same filesystem object. Use `read()`, `open()`, `write()`, `create()`, `copyIn()`, `move()`, or `remove()` for operation-local identity checks, and inspect `containment` when the platform distinction matters.
+
+## Subpaths
+
+The main entry point collects the common root, config, output, lock, native-mode,
+and error exports. Prefer focused subpaths when a consumer needs a narrower
+contract. Low-level helpers that OpenClaw needs to compose higher-level APIs are grouped under
+`@openclaw/fs-safe/advanced` instead of being separate public leaf contracts.
+
+| Subpath | Contents |
+|---|---|
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/root` | `root()`, `Root`, `RootDefaults`, and root-bounded walking with pruning/error markers |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/config` | process-global native helper and lock defaults |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/path` | canonical path checks: `isPathInside`, `safeRealpathSync`, `isNotFoundPathError`, `isSymlinkOpenError` |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/json` | `tryReadJson`, `readJson`, `readJsonIfExists`, `writeJson`, sync variants |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/output` | `writeExternalFileWithinRoot` for external libraries that need a temp output path |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/store` | `fileStore`, `fileStoreSync`, and `jsonStore` |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/secret` | sync/async strict and try-style secret reads, atomic replace, and create-only secret writes |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/atomic` | `replaceFileAtomic`, `replaceFileAtomicSync`, `replaceDirectoryAtomic`, `movePathWithCopyFallback` |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/durability` | pinned directory identities, strict directory sync, durable nested-directory creation, exclusive publication, streaming and synchronous SHA-256, provenance receipts, and sync-failure policy |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/temp` | `tempWorkspace`, `tempWorkspaceSync`, `withTempWorkspace`, `resolveSecureTempRoot` |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/secure-file` | fd-pinned absolute file reads with owner, mode, ACL, trusted-dir, size, and timeout checks |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/file-lock` | async/sync sidecar locks, root-bounded sidecars, ownership verification, and stale policy |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/permissions` | POSIX mode and Windows ACL inspection, raw owner/ACE facts, private-directory creation, and remediation helpers |
+| [`@openclaw/fs-safe/watch`](docs/watch.md) | Guarded observation with native event hints, bounded scans, and joined close |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/walk` | budget-bounded directory walking with symlink policy, filters, and truncation accounting; not root-bounded |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/copy` | directory copying with `clone: "auto"`, `"always"`, or `"never"`; native APFS, Btrfs, ReFS, XFS, and ZFS cloning, portable byte copying, and clone metadata; see [directory copying](docs/copy.md) |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/archive` | policy-driven ZIP/TAR extraction, clamp/filter policy, metadata/path-depth limits, gzip/zstd/bzip2 support, and bounded entry reads |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/advanced` | lower-level composition helpers such as path scopes, root-file open, bounded descriptor reads, [borrowed-handle and descriptor copying](docs/copy.md#borrowed-filehandle-transfers), [complete byte-window writes](docs/advanced.md#borrowed-handle-writes), [exact directory identity](docs/directory-identity.md), [case probing](docs/path-case.md), [suffix-alias probing](docs/path-suffix-aliases.md), [in-place writes](docs/in-place-write.md), [versioned install-ID encoding](docs/install-path.md#safepathsegmenthashedv2), filename sanitizing, temp-file targets, sibling-temp writes, local-root readers, regular-file helpers, `pathExists`, and `withTimeout`; less stable than focused public subpaths |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/errors` | `FsSafeError`, closed codes/categories, causes, and operation-specific details receipts |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/types` | shared types: `DirEntry`, `PathStat`, … |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/test-hooks` | hooks the test suite uses to inject races; registration requires `NODE_ENV=test` or `VITEST=true` |
+| `@openclaw/fs-safe/guest` | Python source and exit constants for caller-launched filesystem operations in Linux/macOS guests without Node; see the [guest protocol and trust boundary](docs/guest.md) |
+
+## Failure semantics in the name
+
+When two helpers behave differently on the same input, the difference is in the name, not the docs.
+
+```ts
+import { readJson, tryReadJson } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/json";
+
+await tryReadJson("./config.json"); // returns null on missing or invalid
+await readJson("./manifest.json");  // throws on missing or invalid
+```
+
+For one-off structured reads under a trusted root, `readRootJsonObjectSync()`
+performs the root-bounded open and JSON object validation in one step. Use
+`readRootStructuredFileSync()` when the parser lives outside fs-safe, such as
+JSON5-backed plugin manifests.
+
+## Directory durability
+
+```ts
+import { ensureDurableDirectory, pinDirectory } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/durability";
+
+const receipt = await ensureDurableDirectory({
+  directoryPath: "/srv/backups/sqlite",
+  mode: 0o700,
+});
+const pinned = await pinDirectory(receipt);
+try {
+  await publishSnapshot();
+  const outcome = await pinned.sync();
+  // `unsupported` is explicit on platforms without directory flushing.
+  console.log(outcome.status);
+} finally {
+  await pinned.close();
+}
+```
+
+The durability subpath pins a directory descriptor to its pathname identity,
+detects symlink/FIFO/replacement races, and synchronizes every new parent edge
+when creating a nested directory. Strict sync propagates real I/O failures and
+reports known Windows directory-flush limitations explicitly. Separate
+best-effort helpers preserve operations that do not promise crash durability.
+
+`publishFileExclusive()` adds no-clobber hardlink/copy/rename strategies and a
+typed post-creation receipt. Its `onSyncFailure` policy defaults to
+`"rollback"`; backup writers can choose `"preserve"` to keep a complete target
+when parent-directory sync fails, then inspect `details.directorySync` and
+retry or record the weaker durability state.
+
+See [Directory durability](docs/durability.md) for the receipt, pin lifecycle,
+publication policy, creation callback, and platform contract.
+
+## Atomic writes
+
+For preparation that must survive a parent rename until abort cleanup, use
+[`stageFileInDirectory()`](docs/staged-file.md) from `advanced`. It retains the
+original directory on Linux/macOS and requires native support for this operation.
+It offers atomic replace/no-replace publication, not expected-inode replacement
+or a crash-durability promise; application checks and coordination remain yours.
+
+For an already staged POSIX symlink, [`retainSymlinkInDirectory()`](docs/staged-symlink.md)
+admits caller-captured identity and retains that exact inode through no-replace
+publication or explicit recovery. Same-target foreign replacements are not adopted.
+Staging, cooperative locking and crash recovery remain application responsibilities.
+
+`replaceFileAtomic()` writes a sibling temp file, applies its exact mode through the still-open descriptor, optionally fsyncs it, and renames it over the destination. It never follows the published destination path to set file permissions. Mode preservation inherits only rwx bits from an existing non-symlink regular file; special bits, ownership, ACLs, and extended attributes are not copied. Pinned-destination hardlink rejection, rename retry / copy fallback on `EPERM`, bounded original-content restoration after a torn fallback, parent-directory fsync, and a `beforeRename` hook for backup or observer flows are all opt-in. `movePathWithCopyFallback()` stages cross-device moves before commit and removes only the copied source entries, so concurrent source additions or replacements are preserved. Its optional synchronous `assertBeforeMutation` hook rechecks caller authority before renames and each source removal; `onDestinationPublished` reports an exact bigint destination identity before later checks or cleanup can fail. See [mutation authority and publication receipts](docs/atomic.md#mutation-authority-and-publication-receipts).
+
+```ts
+import { replaceFileAtomic } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/atomic";
+
+await replaceFileAtomic({
+  filePath: "/safe/workspace/state.json",
+  content: JSON.stringify(state, null, 2),
+  mode: 0o600,
+  syncTempFile: true,
+  syncParentDir: true,
+});
+```
+
+`replaceFileAtomicSync()` covers the synchronous case with the same options shape. Both accept an injectable `fileSystem` for tests. Async adapters use `chmod()` on the `FileHandle` returned by their required `open()` operation; custom sync adapters using `mode` or `preserveExistingMode` provide the optional descriptor-bound `fchmodSync` operation.
+
+Both variants accept `assertBeforeMutation` for revocable caller authority and
+`onDestinationState` for observed removal, partial-write, and publication facts.
+The observer receives exact bigint identities from retained descriptors, including
+when later completion fails. These facts do not authorize rollback; the caller
+still owns current authority and content checks. See [atomic write authority](docs/atomic.md#atomic-write-authority-and-destination-state).
+
+## External outputs
+
+Use `writeExternalFileWithinRoot()` when a browser download, renderer, media
+tool, or native library needs an absolute path to write to:
+
+```ts
+import { writeExternalFileWithinRoot } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/output";
+
+await writeExternalFileWithinRoot({
+  rootDir: "/safe/workspace/downloads",
+  path: "reports/today.pdf",
+  staging: "sibling",
+  write: async (filePath) => {
+    await download.saveAs(filePath);
+  },
+});
+```
+
+The callback receives a staged path, not the final destination. The default
+`"workspace"` mode uses private temp storage plus `Root.copyIn()` for
+cross-device-tolerant finalization. `"sibling"` stages in the target directory,
+fsyncs the completed file, and atomically renames it over the target. Choose it
+when the destination directory is itself the writable boundary and atomic
+replacement matters.
+
+For sibling producers that can leave partial output before throwing, opt in to
+`producerIsolation: "private-directory"`. The callback writes inside an owned
+private workspace on the target filesystem, allowing cleanup after producer
+failure while preserving sibling publication behavior. See [external outputs](docs/output.md)
+for the identity checks and cleanup limits.
+
+Use it when the final filename is known before the external writer runs. If the
+filename depends on sniffing the produced bytes, write to a private temp
+workspace first, then finalize through the normal root APIs after validation.
+
+## Stores
+
+Use `fileStore().json()` for small state files that need explicit fallback
+reads, atomic writes, and optional sidecar locking around read-modify-write
+updates:
+
+```ts
+import { fileStore } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/store";
+
+const files = fileStore({ rootDir: "/safe/workspace/state", private: true });
+const store = files.json("settings.json", { lock: true });
+
+await store.updateOr({ enabled: false }, (current) => ({ ...current, enabled: true }));
+```
+
+`jsonStore({ filePath })` is the single-path convenience wrapper for the same
+primitive and exposes its resolved absolute path.
+
+Use `update()` when missing state is part of your model; use `updateOr()` for
+the common merge-into-defaults case. Standalone helpers use options bags
+because they do not carry a bound root and often need multiple authority, path,
+and policy knobs.
+
+Sidecar locks fail closed on stale holders by default. Opt-in `remove-if-unchanged`
+recovery requires caller approval and serializes snapshot verification and unlink
+with an exclusive reclaim guard so a replacement lock cannot be deleted; see the
+[file lock docs](docs/sidecar-lock.md).
+
+Use `fileStore()` for cache/blob/media-style directories where callers
+need safe relative paths, size limits, atomic replacement, stream writes, and
+TTL cleanup behind one root. Pass `private: true` for credentials, auth
+profiles, tokens, and per-agent private state; private mode keeps the same
+store shape while routing writes through the secret-file atomic path.
+
+```ts
+import { fileStore } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/store";
+
+const media = fileStore({
+  rootDir: "/safe/workspace/media",
+  maxBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,
+  mode: 0o600,
+});
+
+await media.write("inbound/photo.jpg", bytes);
+await media.writeJson("state/photo.json", { id: "photo" });
+const cached = await media.readJsonIfExists("state/photo.json");
+const opened = await media.open("inbound/photo.jpg");
+await media.pruneExpired({ ttlMs: 10 * 60 * 1000, recursive: true });
+```
+
+The `store` subpath also includes durable JSON queue helpers for the common
+"one JSON file per work item" pattern: atomic entry writes, pending-entry loads,
+acknowledgement via `.delivered` markers, failed-entry moves, and stale temp
+cleanup. On Windows, every independently supplied queue path rejects NTFS
+alternate-stream and directory-index namespace spellings before reads, locks,
+or mutations. Retry, dedupe, and transport semantics stay with the caller.
+
+`tempWorkspace()` exposes `write()`, `writeText()`, `writeJson()`, `copyIn()`, and `read()` for
+single-file scratch workflows without hand-rolled path joins, plus a `store: FileStore` view of
+the workspace dir for the richer cases (`writeStream`, `readJsonIfExists`, `store.json<T>(rel)`).
+Compatible creation and cleanup remain available without native support.
+Set `cleanupSafety: "require-bounded"` to require collision-safe quarantine and
+descriptor-bounded recursive cleanup before creating a child. See the
+[temp workspace contract](docs/temp.md).
+On POSIX, bounded cleanup requires owner read and search in the final `dirMode`
+(`0o500`); restrictive modes select compatible fallback or reject `require-bounded`
+before child creation.
+Linux bounded cleanup requires the exact `openat2`/`RESOLVE_NO_XDEV` capability
+at runtime; compatible mode falls back when unavailable, while `require-bounded`
+rejects before child creation.
+
+`tempFile()` is the smaller one-file temp helper. It is intentionally an
+advanced primitive: use `tempWorkspace()` for the stable temp surface and reach
+for `tempFile()` only when you need a raw file target.
+
+```ts
+import { tempFile } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/advanced";
+
+await using target = await tempFile({ prefix: "download", fileName: "payload.bin" });
+await fs.promises.writeFile(target.path, bytes);
+const checksumPath = target.file("payload.sha256");
+```
+
+## Exact file comparison
+
+For exact comparison of already-open files, use
+[`sameFileContentsSync()`](docs/file-contents.md) from `advanced`. It compares
+bytes through both EOFs with bounded memory and preserves the borrowed
+descriptors' positions and ownership.
+
+## Secure absolute file reads
+
+Use `readSecureFile()` when the caller gives you an absolute credential path
+instead of a root-relative workspace path. It opens the file first, validates the
+same handle it will read from, checks trusted directories, owner, POSIX mode or
+Windows ACLs, hardlink count, size, and optional timeout, then reads through the
+pinned handle. On Windows, both the bytes and the owner/DACL facts come from that
+handle. In native `auto` or `off` mode, a packaged, readable PowerShell script can
+inspect that borrowed handle when the native capability is unavailable, subject
+to the [Windows security fallback prerequisites](docs/install.md#windows-security-fallback).
+It emits one fallback warning per process for secure reads and adds PowerShell
+startup and compilation overhead per call. Native `require` remains strict, and
+native operation failures are terminal. Neither route reopens the pathname to
+inspect its ACL.
+
+```ts
+import { readSecureFile } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/secure-file";
+
+const { buffer } = await readSecureFile({
+  filePath: "/var/lib/app/token",
+  label: "auth token",
+  trust: { trustedDirs: ["/var/lib/app"] },
+  io: { maxBytes: 16 * 1024, timeoutMs: 5_000 },
+});
+```
+
+Use `permissions: { allowInsecure: true }` only for migration or explicit local-development
+flows where a warning is preferable to refusing the file.
+
+## Directory walking
+
+[`Root.entries()`](docs/entries.md) observes one directory without descending or
+following child symlinks. It streams in filesystem order by default and supports
+cancellation, entry limits that throw on overflow, and bounded sorted-name
+collection. Use it when the caller owns traversal or symlink validation:
+
+```ts
+for await (const entry of fs.entries("plugins", { maxEntries: 1_000 })) {
+  console.log(entry.name, entry.isSymbolicLink);
+}
+```
+
+`walkDirectory()` and `walkDirectorySync()` replace ad-hoc recursive
+`readdir()` loops with entry and depth budgets, a symlink policy, and stable
+relative paths.
+
+```ts
+import { walkDirectory } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/walk";
+
+const scan = await walkDirectory("/safe/workspace", {
+  maxDepth: 4,
+  maxEntries: 10_000,
+  symlinks: "skip",
+  include: (entry) => entry.kind === "file",
+});
+
+for (const file of scan.entries) {
+  console.log(file.relativePath);
+}
+```
+
+Check `scan.truncated` before treating the result as complete, and `scan.failedDirs` to tell an incomplete scan (a directory that could not be read) from an empty one before pruning state from the listing.
+
+`walkDirectory()` accepts asynchronous `include` and `descend` callbacks through `AsyncWalkDirectoryOptions`, so a marker lookup can prune a directory before its children are read. Decisions remain serial and retain the options object as their `this` receiver; `walkDirectorySync()` and its options remain synchronous. See [Directory walking](docs/walk.md) for callback timing, JavaScript result compatibility, and error handling.
+
+For caller-controlled paths, `Root.walk()` is the root-bounded async iterator.
+It supports entry/depth budgets, including links without following their targets,
+in-root symlink following, cancellation, and a
+truncation marker (or typed error) when a budget is reached. Its `entryFilter`
+accepts `"include"`, `"skip"`, or `"skip-subtree"`, directly or through a Promise.
+After an awaited decision resolves, the walk rechecks cancellation and the
+current listing directory and Root identities before using it. Pending callbacks
+settle before cancellation or iterator disposal completes. Callback failures
+reject the walk. `onDirectoryError: "skip-and-report"` yields typed `"directory-error"` markers
+for directory read or identity-check failures while preserving entries from
+readable subtrees.
+
+## Archive extraction
+
+`extractArchive()` handles ZIP and TAR behind one API, with traversal checks, blocked-link-type rejection, and entry-count and byte budgets.
+
+```ts
+import { extractArchive, resolveArchiveKind } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/archive";
+
+const kind = resolveArchiveKind(uploadPath);
+if (!kind) throw new Error(`unsupported archive: ${uploadPath}`);
+
+await extractArchive({
+  archivePath: uploadPath,
+  destDir: "/safe/workspace/plugin",
+  kind,
+  timeoutMs: 15_000,
+  limits: {
+    maxArchiveBytes: 256 * 1024 * 1024,
+    maxEntries: 50_000,
+    maxExtractedBytes: 512 * 1024 * 1024,
+    maxEntryBytes: 256 * 1024 * 1024,
+    maxEntryPathComponents: 64,
+  },
+});
+```
+
+Extraction stages into a private directory and merges through the same safe-open boundary used by direct writes, so a symlinked entry can't trick the merge into following an out-of-tree path.
+
+## Advanced path scopes
+
+For code that already has a trusted absolute path and wants lower-level boundary
+validation without going through `root()`:
+
+```ts
+import { pathScope } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/advanced";
+
+const uploads = pathScope("/safe/uploads", { label: "uploads directory" });
+const files = await uploads.files(["photo.jpg"]);
+const target = await uploads.writable("report.pdf");
+```
+
+## Errors
+
+Every failure surfaces as an `FsSafeError` with a closed `code` union you can branch on:
+
+```ts
+import { FsSafeError } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/errors";
+
+try {
+  await fs.write("../escape.txt", "x");
+} catch (err) {
+  if (err instanceof FsSafeError && err.code === "outside-workspace") {
+    // handle
+  }
+  throw err;
+}
+```
+
+Codes are grouped by category:
+
+```ts
+if (err instanceof FsSafeError) {
+  if (err.category === "policy") {
+    // Unsafe caller input or filesystem state rejected by a safety policy.
+  } else {
+    // Routine filesystem outcome or runtime/environment problem.
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Routine filesystem outcomes such as `not-found`, `not-empty`, and
+`not-removable`, plus runtime failures such as `read-failed`, are operational;
+they do not indicate that a filesystem
+boundary policy was violated.
+
+Current `FsSafeErrorCode` values are `already-exists`, `denied-path`, `device-path`, `hardlink`, `helper-failed`, `helper-unavailable`, `invalid-path`, `insecure-permissions`, `not-empty`, `not-file`, `not-found`, `not-owned`, `not-removable`, `outside-workspace`, `path-alias`, `path-mismatch`, `permission-unverified`, `read-failed`, `secret-exists`, `store-reentrant-update`, `symlink`, `timeout`, `too-large`, and `unsupported-platform`.
+
+## Safety model
+
+- root-bounded APIs resolve paths against a configured root and reject canonical escapes
+- reads reject known unsafe device paths, open with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, then verify fd identity matches the path identity before returning the buffer or handle
+- create-only writes, sidecar acquisition, and exclusive publication prefer fd-relative native primitives, with verified guarded JavaScript fallbacks
+- `remove`, `mkdir`, `move`, `stat`, and `list` retain guarded JavaScript implementations with pre/post identity checks
+- archive extraction stages into a private directory and merges through the same boundary checks used by direct writes
+
+## Limitations
+
+- Windows native opens are handle-relative and reject reparse points; operations without native wiring use the guarded Node implementation.
+- Hardlink rejection depends on platform metadata. Treat it as defense-in-depth, not authorization.
+- `fs-safe` does not validate file contents or archive payload semantics beyond filesystem safety constraints. Schemas, signatures, and authorization belong in the layer above.
+
+## License
+
+MIT.