@open-mercato/core 0.7.0 → 0.7.1-develop.7103.1.41ff100d93

package/dist/modules/auth/commands/acl.js

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+import { registerCommand } from "@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands";
+import { snapshotsEqual } from "@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands/helpers";
+import { withAtomicFlush } from "@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands/flush";
+import { resolveTranslations } from "@open-mercato/shared/lib/i18n/server";
+import { createLogger } from "@open-mercato/shared/lib/logger";
+import { findOneWithDecryption } from "@open-mercato/shared/lib/encryption/find";
+import { Role, RoleAcl, User, UserAcl } from "@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/data/entities";
+const logger = createLogger("auth").child({ component: "acl-commands" });
+const EMPTY_ACL_SNAPSHOT = {
+  isSuperAdmin: false,
+  features: [],
+  organizations: null
+};
+function compareIdentifiers(left, right) {
+  if (left === right) return 0;
+  return left < right ? -1 : 1;
+}
+function toSortedList(values) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return [];
+  return [...values].filter((value) => typeof value === "string").sort(compareIdentifiers);
+}
+function captureAclSnapshot(acl) {
+  if (!acl) return { ...EMPTY_ACL_SNAPSHOT };
+  return {
+    isSuperAdmin: Boolean(acl.isSuperAdmin),
+    features: toSortedList(acl.featuresJson),
+    organizations: Array.isArray(acl.organizationsJson) ? toSortedList(acl.organizationsJson) : null
+  };
+}
+function holdsGrants(snapshot) {
+  return snapshot.isSuperAdmin || snapshot.features.length > 0;
+}
+function resolveEffect(before, after) {
+  if (!holdsGrants(before) && holdsGrants(after)) return "granted";
+  if (holdsGrants(before) && !holdsGrants(after)) return "revoked";
+  return "changed";
+}
+function resolveEm(ctx) {
+  return ctx.container.resolve("em");
+}
+function resolveOrganizationId(ctx, tenantId) {
+  if ((ctx.auth?.tenantId ?? null) !== tenantId) return null;
+  return ctx.selectedOrganizationId ?? ctx.auth?.orgId ?? null;
+}
+async function deleteCacheTags(ctx, tags) {
+  let cache;
+  try {
+    cache = ctx.container.resolve("cache");
+  } catch (err) {
+    logger.debug("No cache registered for ACL tag invalidation", { err, tags });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!cache?.deleteByTags) return;
+  await cache.deleteByTags(tags);
+}
+const AUTH_ROLE_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID = "auth.role-acl.update";
+const AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID = "auth.user-acl.update";
+async function loadTargetSafely(config, input, ctx) {
+  try {
+    return await config.loadTarget(resolveEm(ctx).fork(), input, ctx);
+  } catch (err) {
+    logger.warn("Could not resolve the ACL target for the audit entry", {
+      err,
+      commandId: config.id,
+      resourceId: config.resourceId(input),
+      tenantId: input.tenantId
+    });
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+function buildAuditContext(params) {
+  const context = {};
+  if (params.target) context.target = params.target;
+  if (params.effect) context.effect = params.effect;
+  if (params.sanitizedRequest) context.sanitizedRequest = params.sanitizedRequest;
+  return Object.keys(context).length ? context : null;
+}
+function createAclUpdateCommand(config) {
+  return {
+    id: config.id,
+    // See "Auth ACL Commands — Undo Policy" at top of file.
+    isUndoable: false,
+    async prepare(input, ctx) {
+      const existing = await config.loadAcl(resolveEm(ctx).fork(), input);
+      return { before: captureAclSnapshot(existing) };
+    },
+    async execute(input, ctx) {
+      const em = resolveEm(ctx);
+      const existing = await config.loadAcl(em, input);
+      await config.persist({ em, input, existing });
+      try {
+        await config.invalidate({ ctx, input });
+      } catch (err) {
+        logger.error("ACL cache invalidation failed after a committed permission change", {
+          err,
+          commandId: config.id,
+          resourceId: config.resourceId(input),
+          tenantId: input.tenantId
+        });
+      }
+      return {
+        resourceId: config.resourceId(input),
+        tenantId: input.tenantId,
+        organizationId: resolveOrganizationId(ctx, input.tenantId)
+      };
+    },
+    captureAfter: async (input, _result, ctx) => {
+      const persisted = await config.loadAcl(resolveEm(ctx).fork(), input);
+      if (persisted) return captureAclSnapshot(persisted);
+      return config.snapshotWhenAbsent(input);
+    },
+    buildLog: async ({ input, result, ctx, snapshots }) => {
+      const before = snapshots.before ?? null;
+      const after = snapshots.after ?? null;
+      const changed = !before || !after || !snapshotsEqual(before, after);
+      const sanitizedRequest = config.sanitizedRequest?.(input) ?? null;
+      if (!changed && !sanitizedRequest) return { skipLog: true };
+      const { translate } = await resolveTranslations();
+      const target = await loadTargetSafely(config, input, ctx);
+      return {
+        actionLabel: translate(config.labelKey, config.labelFallback),
+        resourceKind: config.resourceKind,
+        resourceId: result.resourceId,
+        tenantId: result.tenantId,
+        organizationId: result.organizationId,
+        snapshotBefore: before,
+        snapshotAfter: after,
+        context: buildAuditContext({
+          target,
+          // A sanitized-only entry is written *because* nothing changed, so
+          // labelling it would have the trail assert a permission change that
+          // never happened.
+          effect: changed && before && after ? resolveEffect(before, after) : null,
+          sanitizedRequest
+        })
+      };
+    }
+  };
+}
+const updateRoleAclCommand = createAclUpdateCommand({
+  id: AUTH_ROLE_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID,
+  resourceKind: "auth.role_acl",
+  labelKey: "auth.audit.roleAcl.update",
+  labelFallback: "Change role permissions",
+  resourceId: (input) => input.roleId,
+  loadAcl: (em, input) => em.findOne(RoleAcl, { role: input.roleId, tenantId: input.tenantId }),
+  persist: async ({ em, input, existing }) => {
+    const acl = existing ?? em.create(RoleAcl, {
+      role: em.getReference(Role, input.roleId),
+      tenantId: input.tenantId,
+      createdAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
+      isSuperAdmin: false
+    });
+    await withAtomicFlush(
+      em,
+      [
+        () => {
+          acl.organizationsJson = input.organizations;
+          acl.isSuperAdmin = input.isSuperAdmin;
+          acl.featuresJson = input.features;
+          em.persist(acl);
+        }
+      ],
+      { transaction: true, label: AUTH_ROLE_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID }
+    );
+  },
+  invalidate: async ({ ctx, input }) => {
+    const rbacService = ctx.container.resolve("rbacService");
+    await rbacService.invalidateTenantCache(input.tenantId);
+    await deleteCacheTags(ctx, [`rbac:tenant:${input.tenantId}`]);
+  },
+  snapshotWhenAbsent: () => null,
+  // Looked up by id alone: the entry already names this role through
+  // `resource_id`, and a tenant predicate would only blank the label when a
+  // super admin edits a role from outside the tenant scope they are writing in.
+  loadTarget: async (em, input) => {
+    const role = await em.findOne(Role, { id: input.roleId });
+    if (!role) return null;
+    return { kind: "role", id: input.roleId, name: role.name ?? null };
+  }
+});
+const updateUserAclCommand = createAclUpdateCommand({
+  id: AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID,
+  resourceKind: "auth.user_acl",
+  labelKey: "auth.audit.userAcl.update",
+  labelFallback: "Change user permissions",
+  resourceId: (input) => input.userId,
+  loadAcl: (em, input) => em.findOne(UserAcl, { user: input.userId, tenantId: input.tenantId }),
+  persist: async ({ em, input, existing }) => {
+    if (input.clear) {
+      if (!existing) return;
+      const aclToRemove = existing;
+      await withAtomicFlush(
+        em,
+        [
+          () => {
+            em.remove(aclToRemove);
+          }
+        ],
+        { transaction: true, label: AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID }
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+    const acl = existing ?? em.create(UserAcl, {
+      user: em.getReference(User, input.userId),
+      tenantId: input.tenantId,
+      createdAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
+      isSuperAdmin: false
+    });
+    await withAtomicFlush(
+      em,
+      [
+        () => {
+          acl.isSuperAdmin = input.isSuperAdmin;
+          acl.featuresJson = input.features;
+          acl.organizationsJson = input.organizations;
+          em.persist(acl);
+        }
+      ],
+      { transaction: true, label: AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID }
+    );
+  },
+  invalidate: async ({ ctx, input }) => {
+    const rbacService = ctx.container.resolve("rbacService");
+    await rbacService.invalidateUserCache(input.userId);
+    await deleteCacheTags(ctx, [`rbac:user:${input.userId}`]);
+  },
+  // Clearing removes the row, so an absent row is the real post-state here.
+  snapshotWhenAbsent: (input) => input.clear ? { ...EMPTY_ACL_SNAPSHOT } : null,
+  // `userId` arrives in the request body and `auth:user` carries encrypted
+  // personal data, so the lookup is tenant-scoped: an id belonging to another
+  // tenant must not be decrypted under this scope and stamped into this
+  // tenant's trail. A global account (`users.tenant_id` is nullable) still
+  // resolves, mirroring how the role route widens its own lookup.
+  loadTarget: async (em, input, ctx) => {
+    const user = await findOneWithDecryption(
+      em,
+      User,
+      { id: input.userId, $or: [{ tenantId: input.tenantId }, { tenantId: null }] },
+      {},
+      { tenantId: input.tenantId, organizationId: ctx.auth?.orgId ?? null }
+    );
+    if (!user) return null;
+    return { kind: "user", id: input.userId, email: user.email ?? null, name: user.name ?? null };
+  },
+  sanitizedRequest: (input) => input.requested ?? null
+});
+registerCommand(updateRoleAclCommand);
+registerCommand(updateUserAclCommand);
+export {
+  AUTH_ROLE_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID,
+  AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=acl.js.map

package/dist/modules/auth/commands/acl.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "version": 3,
+  "sources": ["../../../../src/modules/auth/commands/acl.ts"],
+  "sourcesContent": ["// =============================================================================\n// Auth ACL Commands \u2014 Undo Policy\n// =============================================================================\n//\n// Neither command in this file defines `undo` or `redo`, so the command bus\n// never mints an undo token for them: `CommandBus.isUndoable()` requires a\n// handler-provided `undo`. The explicit `isUndoable: false` below is executable\n// documentation of that intent, not the mechanism \u2014 the guarantee comes from\n// the absence of the handlers, and the unit tests pin both.\n//\n// The policy is deliberate even though an ACL grant is trivially reversible.\n// The undo and redo endpoints are gated on `audit_logs.undo_self` /\n// `audit_logs.undo_tenant` (and their redo counterparts), not on\n// `auth.acl.manage`. `audit_logs.undo_self` is a default `employee` grant and\n// `audit_logs.undo_tenant` reaches every `admin` through `audit_logs.*`, so an\n// undoable ACL command would let a caller revert or replay someone else's\n// permission change without ever holding the feature that authorizes editing\n// permissions.\n//\n// Reversal stays available to the callers who are actually authorized for it:\n// re-submitting the ACL form, gated on `auth.acl.manage` and guarded by\n// `assertActorCanGrantAcl`. The audit log still captures the full before/after\n// via `buildLog`, so any such correction is itself fully traceable.\n// =============================================================================\nimport type { CommandHandler, CommandRuntimeContext } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands'\nimport { registerCommand } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands'\nimport { snapshotsEqual } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands/helpers'\nimport { withAtomicFlush } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands/flush'\nimport { resolveTranslations } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/i18n/server'\nimport { createLogger } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/logger'\nimport { findOneWithDecryption } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/encryption/find'\nimport type { EntityManager, FilterQuery } from '@mikro-orm/postgresql'\nimport { Role, RoleAcl, User, UserAcl } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/data/entities'\nimport type { RbacService } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/services/rbacService'\n\nconst logger = createLogger('auth').child({ component: 'acl-commands' })\n\ntype TaggableCache = { deleteByTags?: (tags: string[]) => Promise<void> | void }\n\n/** Structural view of the fields both `RoleAcl` and `UserAcl` expose. */\ntype AclRecord = {\n  isSuperAdmin: boolean\n  featuresJson?: string[] | null\n  organizationsJson?: string[] | null\n}\n\n/**\n * Audit snapshot of a single ACL row.\n *\n * `features` and `organizations` are grant *sets*, but `features_json` /\n * `organizations_json` preserve the client's insertion order. The command bus\n * derives `changes` from these snapshots with a deep equality check that is\n * order-sensitive for arrays, so an unsorted snapshot would report a spurious\n * `features` change every time an admin re-saves an unmodified form. Sorting\n * here makes the derived diff reflect real grant changes only.\n *\n * `organizations: null` (visible in every organization) is deliberately\n * distinct from `[]` (visible in none).\n */\ntype AclSnapshot = {\n  isSuperAdmin: boolean\n  features: string[]\n  organizations: string[] | null\n}\n\nconst EMPTY_ACL_SNAPSHOT: AclSnapshot = {\n  isSuperAdmin: false,\n  features: [],\n  organizations: null,\n}\n\n/**\n * Identity of the role or user an entry is about.\n *\n * `action_logs` keeps only `resource_id`, so an entry degrades to a bare UUID\n * the moment the role or account is deleted \u2014 exactly when the trail matters\n * most. This rides in `context` rather than in the snapshots because the\n * command bus derives `changes` from the two snapshots with a deep comparison:\n * a target renamed between two ACL edits would otherwise be reported as a\n * permission change, and the no-op guard below would stop recognising an\n * unchanged ACL.\n */\ntype AclTarget =\n  | { kind: 'user'; id: string; email: string | null; name: string | null }\n  | { kind: 'role'; id: string; name: string | null }\n\n/**\n * What the caller asked for when the route trimmed the request instead of\n * refusing it.\n *\n * `sanitizeTenantFeatures` drops restricted grants silently, so such a request\n * leaves `before` and `after` identical and is indistinguishable from a no-op \u2014\n * which `buildLog` skips. Recording the original request both keeps the attempt\n * visible and exempts the entry from that guard.\n *\n * Features are the only axis carried, because they are the only one the route\n * can trim: a super-admin request is honoured or refused outright, and\n * organizations are never sanitized. Recording either would put a value next to\n * the snapshots that always matches them, inviting a reader to diff the two and\n * conclude a grant was refused.\n */\ntype SanitizedAclRequest = {\n  features: string[]\n}\n\n/** How the change reads at a glance, without diffing two grant lists. */\ntype AclChangeEffect = 'granted' | 'changed' | 'revoked'\n\n/**\n * Codepoint ordering rather than `localeCompare`: these snapshots are persisted\n * audit records, so the ordering must not shift with the runtime's default\n * locale. Feature and organization ids are opaque ASCII identifiers that are\n * never shown in this order to a user.\n *\n * The default comparator would coerce and compare the same way today, but\n * omitting one is banned repo-wide (`explicit-sort-comparators.test.ts`,\n * #3620): the ordering must be stated rather than inherited, so it cannot\n * silently change meaning if a call site ever drifts to non-strings. This is\n * the canonical-key form that audit prescribes.\n */\nfunction compareIdentifiers(left: string, right: string): number {\n  if (left === right) return 0\n  return left < right ? -1 : 1\n}\n\nfunction toSortedList(values: unknown): string[] {\n  if (!Array.isArray(values)) return []\n  return [...values].filter((value): value is string => typeof value === 'string').sort(compareIdentifiers)\n}\n\nfunction captureAclSnapshot(acl: AclRecord | null | undefined): AclSnapshot {\n  if (!acl) return { ...EMPTY_ACL_SNAPSHOT }\n  return {\n    isSuperAdmin: Boolean(acl.isSuperAdmin),\n    features: toSortedList(acl.featuresJson),\n    organizations: Array.isArray(acl.organizationsJson) ? toSortedList(acl.organizationsJson) : null,\n  }\n}\n\nfunction holdsGrants(snapshot: AclSnapshot): boolean {\n  return snapshot.isSuperAdmin || snapshot.features.length > 0\n}\n\nfunction resolveEffect(before: AclSnapshot, after: AclSnapshot): AclChangeEffect {\n  if (!holdsGrants(before) && holdsGrants(after)) return 'granted'\n  if (holdsGrants(before) && !holdsGrants(after)) return 'revoked'\n  return 'changed'\n}\n\nfunction resolveEm(ctx: CommandRuntimeContext): EntityManager {\n  return ctx.container.resolve('em') as EntityManager\n}\n\n/**\n * The log row's organization must belong to the same tenant as the row itself.\n *\n * A super admin may edit a role in a tenant other than their own, and\n * `ActionLogService.buildListQuery` filters with strict equality\n * (`organization_id = ?`, applied only when the reader supplies one). Stamping\n * the actor's organization onto a row scoped to a different tenant produces a\n * (tenant B, organization from tenant A) pair that no reader can ever match, so\n * the cross-tenant permission change \u2014 exactly the record worth keeping \u2014\n * becomes invisible. `null` is the honest value there: it still reaches\n * tenant-scoped readers whose organization filter is unset.\n */\nfunction resolveOrganizationId(ctx: CommandRuntimeContext, tenantId: string): string | null {\n  if ((ctx.auth?.tenantId ?? null) !== tenantId) return null\n  return ctx.selectedOrganizationId ?? ctx.auth?.orgId ?? null\n}\n\n/**\n * A runtime with no cache registered (CLI, workers, tests) is a configuration,\n * not a failure, so resolution is guarded here. An adapter that *is* wired and\n * then throws is a failure, and it propagates to the single error-level guard\n * in `execute` \u2014 the same one that covers the `rbacService` half of this\n * invalidation. Reporting one half at `debug` and the other at `error` would\n * hide a nav cache still serving revoked grants.\n */\nasync function deleteCacheTags(ctx: CommandRuntimeContext, tags: string[]): Promise<void> {\n  let cache: TaggableCache | undefined\n  try {\n    cache = ctx.container.resolve('cache') as TaggableCache | undefined\n  } catch (err) {\n    logger.debug('No cache registered for ACL tag invalidation', { err, tags })\n    return\n  }\n  if (!cache?.deleteByTags) return\n  await cache.deleteByTags(tags)\n}\n\ntype AclCommandValues = {\n  isSuperAdmin: boolean\n  features: string[]\n  organizations: string[] | null\n}\n\ntype AclCommandInput = AclCommandValues & { tenantId: string }\n\nexport type RoleAclUpdateInput = AclCommandInput & {\n  roleId: string\n}\n\nexport type UserAclUpdateInput = AclCommandInput & {\n  userId: string\n  /** Mirrors the route's `!hasCustomAcl`: drop the override row instead of upserting it. */\n  clear: boolean\n  /** Set by the route only when it wrote less than the caller asked for. */\n  requested?: SanitizedAclRequest | null\n}\n\nexport type AclUpdateResult = {\n  resourceId: string\n  tenantId: string\n  organizationId: string | null\n}\n\nexport const AUTH_ROLE_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID = 'auth.role-acl.update'\nexport const AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID = 'auth.user-acl.update'\n\ntype AclCommandConfig<TInput extends AclCommandInput> = {\n  id: string\n  resourceKind: string\n  labelKey: string\n  labelFallback: string\n  resourceId: (input: TInput) => string\n  loadAcl: (em: EntityManager, input: TInput) => Promise<AclRecord | null>\n  persist: (params: { em: EntityManager; input: TInput; existing: AclRecord | null }) => Promise<void>\n  invalidate: (params: { ctx: CommandRuntimeContext; input: TInput }) => Promise<void>\n  /**\n   * Post-state when the row is absent after the write. Only the user command's\n   * clear path legitimately removes the row; anywhere else a missing row means\n   * the re-read failed, which must be logged as \"unknown\" rather than guessed.\n   */\n  snapshotWhenAbsent: (input: TInput) => AclSnapshot | null\n  /** Human-readable identity of the target; `null` when it cannot be resolved. */\n  loadTarget: (em: EntityManager, input: TInput, ctx: CommandRuntimeContext) => Promise<AclTarget | null>\n  /** Only the user route sanitizes, so only it can report a trimmed request. */\n  sanitizedRequest?: (input: TInput) => SanitizedAclRequest | null\n}\n\n/**\n * Enrichment must never cost the entry.\n *\n * The bus persists the log after `execute` has already committed the permission\n * change, so a throw from the target lookup would leave the write recorded\n * nowhere \u2014 the same \"committed but unaudited\" hole the cache-invalidation\n * guard in `execute` closes. A missing label is a far smaller loss.\n */\nasync function loadTargetSafely<TInput extends AclCommandInput>(\n  config: AclCommandConfig<TInput>,\n  input: TInput,\n  ctx: CommandRuntimeContext,\n): Promise<AclTarget | null> {\n  try {\n    return await config.loadTarget(resolveEm(ctx).fork(), input, ctx)\n  } catch (err) {\n    logger.warn('Could not resolve the ACL target for the audit entry', {\n      err,\n      commandId: config.id,\n      resourceId: config.resourceId(input),\n      tenantId: input.tenantId,\n    })\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\nfunction buildAuditContext(params: {\n  target: AclTarget | null\n  effect: AclChangeEffect | null\n  sanitizedRequest: SanitizedAclRequest | null\n}): Record<string, unknown> | null {\n  const context: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n  if (params.target) context.target = params.target\n  if (params.effect) context.effect = params.effect\n  if (params.sanitizedRequest) context.sanitizedRequest = params.sanitizedRequest\n  return Object.keys(context).length ? context : null\n}\n\n/**\n * Both ACL commands differ only in entity, lookup key, cache invalidation and\n * labels \u2014 `prepare`, `captureAfter` and `buildLog` are otherwise identical.\n * Sharing them here keeps the two audit-entry shapes from drifting apart.\n */\nfunction createAclUpdateCommand<TInput extends AclCommandInput>(\n  config: AclCommandConfig<TInput>,\n): CommandHandler<TInput, AclUpdateResult> {\n  return {\n    id: config.id,\n    // See \"Auth ACL Commands \u2014 Undo Policy\" at top of file.\n    isUndoable: false,\n    async prepare(input, ctx) {\n      const existing = await config.loadAcl(resolveEm(ctx).fork(), input)\n      return { before: captureAclSnapshot(existing) }\n    },\n    async execute(input, ctx) {\n      const em = resolveEm(ctx)\n      const existing = await config.loadAcl(em, input)\n      await config.persist({ em, input, existing })\n      // Cache invalidation runs only after the write commits, never inside the\n      // atomic flush \u2014 and must never propagate. The command bus persists the\n      // action log *after* `execute` returns, so a throw here would commit the\n      // permission change and then suppress its audit entry: precisely the\n      // \"committed but unaudited\" hole these commands exist to close, and it\n      // would open exactly when infrastructure is already degraded.\n      // `RbacService.deleteCacheByTags` awaits the cache adapter without a\n      // guard of its own, so an outage does reach us here.\n      //\n      // The resulting staleness (a revoked grant served from cache until its\n      // TTL) is not introduced by swallowing \u2014 it happens either way once the\n      // adapter is down. Logging at error level keeps it alarmable instead of\n      // trading a recorded change for an HTTP 500 that misreports a write which\n      // did commit.\n      try {\n        await config.invalidate({ ctx, input })\n      } catch (err) {\n        logger.error('ACL cache invalidation failed after a committed permission change', {\n          err,\n          commandId: config.id,\n          resourceId: config.resourceId(input),\n          tenantId: input.tenantId,\n        })\n      }\n      return {\n        resourceId: config.resourceId(input),\n        tenantId: input.tenantId,\n        organizationId: resolveOrganizationId(ctx, input.tenantId),\n      }\n    },\n    captureAfter: async (input, _result, ctx) => {\n      // Read the committed row back rather than echoing the request, so a grant\n      // the route sanitized away can never be logged as if it had been applied.\n      const persisted = await config.loadAcl(resolveEm(ctx).fork(), input)\n      if (persisted) return captureAclSnapshot(persisted)\n      return config.snapshotWhenAbsent(input)\n    },\n    buildLog: async ({ input, result, ctx, snapshots }) => {\n      const before = (snapshots.before as AclSnapshot | undefined) ?? null\n      const after = (snapshots.after as AclSnapshot | undefined) ?? null\n      // An unknown post-state (`after: null`, the failed re-read) counts as a\n      // change: it is the one case where the entry is the only evidence left.\n      // Both snapshots leave `captureAclSnapshot` with their grant lists sorted,\n      // so the shared order-sensitive comparison is a set comparison here.\n      const changed = !before || !after || !snapshotsEqual(before, after)\n      const sanitizedRequest = config.sanitizedRequest?.(input) ?? null\n      // The admin user-edit page PUTs the ACL on every save, even when only the\n      // name or the roles changed, and most accounts carry no per-user override\n      // at all \u2014 so recording an unchanged ACL faithfully buries the real\n      // permission changes under identical empty entries. A request the route\n      // trimmed rather than refused also arrives with `before == after`; that\n      // one is an escalation attempt and must survive this guard.\n      if (!changed && !sanitizedRequest) return { skipLog: true }\n      const { translate } = await resolveTranslations()\n      const target = await loadTargetSafely(config, input, ctx)\n      return {\n        actionLabel: translate(config.labelKey, config.labelFallback),\n        resourceKind: config.resourceKind,\n        resourceId: result.resourceId,\n        tenantId: result.tenantId,\n        organizationId: result.organizationId,\n        snapshotBefore: before,\n        snapshotAfter: after,\n        context: buildAuditContext({\n          target,\n          // A sanitized-only entry is written *because* nothing changed, so\n          // labelling it would have the trail assert a permission change that\n          // never happened.\n          effect: changed && before && after ? resolveEffect(before, after) : null,\n          sanitizedRequest,\n        }),\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n\nconst updateRoleAclCommand = createAclUpdateCommand<RoleAclUpdateInput>({\n  id: AUTH_ROLE_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID,\n  resourceKind: 'auth.role_acl',\n  labelKey: 'auth.audit.roleAcl.update',\n  labelFallback: 'Change role permissions',\n  resourceId: (input) => input.roleId,\n  loadAcl: (em, input) =>\n    em.findOne(RoleAcl, { role: input.roleId as unknown as Role, tenantId: input.tenantId }),\n  persist: async ({ em, input, existing }) => {\n    const acl =\n      (existing as RoleAcl | null) ??\n      em.create(RoleAcl, {\n        role: em.getReference(Role, input.roleId),\n        tenantId: input.tenantId,\n        createdAt: new Date(),\n        isSuperAdmin: false,\n      })\n    await withAtomicFlush(\n      em,\n      [\n        () => {\n          acl.organizationsJson = input.organizations\n          acl.isSuperAdmin = input.isSuperAdmin\n          acl.featuresJson = input.features\n          em.persist(acl)\n        },\n      ],\n      { transaction: true, label: AUTH_ROLE_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID },\n    )\n  },\n  invalidate: async ({ ctx, input }) => {\n    // Every user in the tenant inherits this role's grants, so the whole tenant\n    // scope is invalidated.\n    const rbacService = ctx.container.resolve('rbacService') as RbacService\n    await rbacService.invalidateTenantCache(input.tenantId)\n    // Sidebar nav caches depend on RBAC; invalidate tenant scope nav caches\n    await deleteCacheTags(ctx, [`rbac:tenant:${input.tenantId}`])\n  },\n  snapshotWhenAbsent: () => null,\n  // Looked up by id alone: the entry already names this role through\n  // `resource_id`, and a tenant predicate would only blank the label when a\n  // super admin edits a role from outside the tenant scope they are writing in.\n  loadTarget: async (em, input) => {\n    const role = await em.findOne(Role, { id: input.roleId } as FilterQuery<Role>)\n    if (!role) return null\n    return { kind: 'role', id: input.roleId, name: role.name ?? null }\n  },\n})\n\nconst updateUserAclCommand = createAclUpdateCommand<UserAclUpdateInput>({\n  id: AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID,\n  resourceKind: 'auth.user_acl',\n  labelKey: 'auth.audit.userAcl.update',\n  labelFallback: 'Change user permissions',\n  resourceId: (input) => input.userId,\n  loadAcl: (em, input) =>\n    em.findOne(UserAcl, { user: input.userId as unknown as User, tenantId: input.tenantId }),\n  persist: async ({ em, input, existing }) => {\n    if (input.clear) {\n      if (!existing) return\n      const aclToRemove = existing as UserAcl\n      await withAtomicFlush(\n        em,\n        [\n          () => {\n            em.remove(aclToRemove)\n          },\n        ],\n        { transaction: true, label: AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID },\n      )\n      return\n    }\n    const acl =\n      (existing as UserAcl | null) ??\n      em.create(UserAcl, {\n        user: em.getReference(User, input.userId),\n        tenantId: input.tenantId,\n        createdAt: new Date(),\n        isSuperAdmin: false,\n      })\n    await withAtomicFlush(\n      em,\n      [\n        () => {\n          acl.isSuperAdmin = input.isSuperAdmin\n          acl.featuresJson = input.features\n          acl.organizationsJson = input.organizations\n          em.persist(acl)\n        },\n      ],\n      { transaction: true, label: AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID },\n    )\n  },\n  invalidate: async ({ ctx, input }) => {\n    const rbacService = ctx.container.resolve('rbacService') as RbacService\n    await rbacService.invalidateUserCache(input.userId)\n    await deleteCacheTags(ctx, [`rbac:user:${input.userId}`])\n  },\n  // Clearing removes the row, so an absent row is the real post-state here.\n  snapshotWhenAbsent: (input) => (input.clear ? { ...EMPTY_ACL_SNAPSHOT } : null),\n  // `userId` arrives in the request body and `auth:user` carries encrypted\n  // personal data, so the lookup is tenant-scoped: an id belonging to another\n  // tenant must not be decrypted under this scope and stamped into this\n  // tenant's trail. A global account (`users.tenant_id` is nullable) still\n  // resolves, mirroring how the role route widens its own lookup.\n  loadTarget: async (em, input, ctx) => {\n    const user = await findOneWithDecryption(\n      em,\n      User,\n      { id: input.userId, $or: [{ tenantId: input.tenantId }, { tenantId: null }] } as FilterQuery<User>,\n      {},\n      { tenantId: input.tenantId, organizationId: ctx.auth?.orgId ?? null },\n    )\n    if (!user) return null\n    return { kind: 'user', id: input.userId, email: user.email ?? null, name: user.name ?? null }\n  },\n  sanitizedRequest: (input) => input.requested ?? null,\n})\n\nregisterCommand(updateRoleAclCommand)\nregisterCommand(updateUserAclCommand)\n"],
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+  "names": []
+}

package/dist/modules/auth/components/AclEditor.js

@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ import Link from "next/link";
 import { hasFeature, matchFeature } from "@open-mercato/shared/security/features";
 import { useT } from "@open-mercato/shared/lib/i18n/context";
 import { AclDependencyDiagnosticsPanel } from "./AclDependencyDiagnosticsPanel.js";
-function toTitleCase(value) {
-  return value.replace(/[-_.]/g, " ").replace(/\b\w/g, (char) => char.toUpperCase());
-}
 function normalizeFeatureArray(input) {
   if (!Array.isArray(input)) return [];
   const dedup = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
@@ -26,12 +23,13 @@ function isTenantRestrictedFeature(feature) {
   if (feature.startsWith("directory.tenants")) return true;
   return false;
 }
-function formatWildcardLabel(moduleId, wildcard) {
+function formatWildcardLabel(t, moduleId, wildcard) {
   if (!wildcard.endsWith(".*")) return wildcard;
   const prefix = `${moduleId}.`;
   const suffix = wildcard.startsWith(prefix) ? wildcard.slice(prefix.length, -2) : wildcard.slice(0, -2);
-  if (!suffix) return "All features";
-  return `All ${suffix.split(".").map(toTitleCase).join(" / ")}`;
+  if (!suffix) return t("auth.acl.wildcards.allFeatures", "All features");
+  const group = suffix.split(".").map((segment) => segment.replace(/[-_]/g, " ").replace(/\b\w/g, (char) => char.toUpperCase())).join(" / ");
+  return t("auth.acl.wildcards.allGroup", "All permissions in {group}", { group });
 }
 function buildRoleSummaries(items, allowedNames) {
   const summaries = [];
@@ -209,19 +207,27 @@ function AclEditor({
   const grouped = React.useMemo(() => {
     const moduleMap = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
     for (const m of modules) {
-      moduleMap.set(m.id, m.title);
+      moduleMap.set(m.id, t(`auth.acl.modules.${m.id}`, m.title));
     }
     const map = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
     for (const f of features) {
       const moduleId = f.module;
       const moduleTitle = moduleMap.get(moduleId) || moduleId;
+      const localizedFeature = {
+        ...f,
+        title: t(`auth.acl.features.${f.id}`, f.title)
+      };
       if (!map.has(moduleId)) {
         map.set(moduleId, { moduleId, moduleTitle, features: [] });
       }
-      map.get(moduleId).features.push(f);
+      map.get(moduleId).features.push(localizedFeature);
     }
     return Array.from(map.values()).sort((a, b) => a.moduleTitle.localeCompare(b.moduleTitle));
-  }, [features, modules]);
+  }, [features, modules, t]);
+  const localizedFeatures = React.useMemo(
+    () => grouped.flatMap((group) => group.features),
+    [grouped]
+  );
   const hasGlobalWildcard = granted.includes("*");
   const hasOrganizationRestriction = Array.isArray(organizations) && organizations.length > 0;
   const showOrganizationWarning = (kind === "role" || overrideEnabled) && canEditOrganizations && !isSuperAdmin && hasOrganizationRestriction && granted.length === 0;
@@ -243,16 +249,18 @@ function AclEditor({
   };
   const isFeatureCoveredByWildcard = (featureId) => granted.some((feature) => (feature === "*" || feature.endsWith(".*")) && matchFeature(featureId, feature));
   const isFeatureChecked = (featureId) => hasFeature(granted, featureId);
-  if (loading) return /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-sm text-muted-foreground", children: "Loading ACL\u2026" });
+  if (loading) {
+    return /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-sm text-muted-foreground", children: t("auth.acl.loading", "Loading access control\u2026") });
+  }
   const showRoleBanner = kind === "user" && !hasCustomAcl && !overrideEnabled;
   return /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "space-y-4", children: [
-    showRoleBanner && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "rounded-lg border border-blue-200 bg-blue-50 p-4", children: [
-      /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-sm font-medium text-blue-900 mb-2", children: "Permissions inherited from roles" }),
-      /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "text-sm text-blue-700 mb-3", children: [
-        "This user currently inherits permissions from their assigned roles.",
+    showRoleBanner && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "rounded-lg border border-status-info-border bg-status-info-bg p-4", children: [
+      /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-sm font-medium text-status-info-text mb-2", children: t("auth.acl.inherited.title", "Permissions inherited from roles") }),
+      /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "text-sm text-status-info-text mb-3", children: [
+        t("auth.acl.inherited.description", "This user currently inherits permissions from their assigned roles."),
         roleDetails.length > 0 && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("span", { children: [
           " ",
-          "Assigned roles:",
+          t("auth.acl.inherited.assignedRoles", "Assigned roles:"),
           " ",
           roleDetails.map((role, idx) => {
             const roleId = typeof role?.id === "string" && role.id.length > 0 ? role.id : `role-${idx}`;
@@ -263,7 +271,7 @@ function AclEditor({
                 Link,
                 {
                   href: `/backend/roles/${roleId}/edit`,
-                  className: "font-semibold text-blue-900 underline hover:text-blue-950 transition-colors",
+                  className: "font-semibold text-status-info-text underline",
                   children: roleName
                 }
               )
@@ -282,7 +290,7 @@ function AclEditor({
             onChange: (e) => setOverrideEnabled(e.target.checked)
           }
         ),
-        /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("label", { htmlFor: "overrideAcl", className: "text-sm text-blue-900 font-medium", children: "Override permissions for this user only" })
+        /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("label", { htmlFor: "overrideAcl", className: "text-sm text-status-info-text font-medium", children: t("auth.acl.inherited.override", "Override permissions for this user only") })
       ] })
     ] }),
     (kind === "role" || overrideEnabled) && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs(Fragment, { children: [
@@ -298,13 +306,13 @@ function AclEditor({
             onChange: (e) => setIsSuperAdmin(!!e.target.checked)
           }
         ),
-        /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("label", { htmlFor: "isSuperAdmin", className: "text-sm", children: "Super Admin (all features)" })
+        /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("label", { htmlFor: "isSuperAdmin", className: "text-sm", children: t("auth.acl.superAdmin.label", "Super Admin (all features)") })
       ] }),
-      !actorIsSuperAdmin && /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("p", { className: "text-xs text-muted-foreground", children: "Only super administrators can change this option." }),
+      !actorIsSuperAdmin && /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("p", { className: "text-xs text-muted-foreground", children: t("auth.acl.superAdmin.hint", "Only super administrators can change this option.") }),
       !isSuperAdmin && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs(Fragment, { children: [
-        hasGlobalWildcard && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "rounded border border-blue-200 bg-blue-50 p-3", children: [
-          /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-sm font-medium text-blue-900", children: "Global wildcard (*) enabled" }),
-          /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-xs text-blue-700 mt-1", children: "This grants access to all features in the system." }),
+        hasGlobalWildcard && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "rounded border border-status-info-border bg-status-info-bg p-3", children: [
+          /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-sm font-medium text-status-info-text", children: t("auth.acl.globalWildcard.title", "Global wildcard (*) enabled") }),
+          /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-xs text-status-info-text mt-1", children: t("auth.acl.globalWildcard.description", "This grants access to all features in the system.") }),
           /* @__PURE__ */ jsx(
             Button,
             {
@@ -312,7 +320,7 @@ function AclEditor({
               size: "sm",
               className: "mt-2",
               onClick: () => updateGranted((prev) => prev.filter((x) => x !== "*")),
-              children: "Remove global wildcard"
+              children: t("auth.acl.globalWildcard.remove", "Remove global wildcard")
             }
           )
         ] }),
@@ -320,7 +328,7 @@ function AclEditor({
           AclDependencyDiagnosticsPanel,
           {
             granted,
-            catalog: features,
+            catalog: localizedFeatures,
             onGrantedChange: updateGranted,
             hideUnknownReferences: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production"
           }
@@ -360,13 +368,14 @@ function AclEditor({
                   }
                 ),
                 /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("label", { htmlFor: `module-${group.moduleId}`, className: "text-sm text-muted-foreground", children: [
-                  "All ",
-                  moduleWildcard && !hasGlobalWildcard ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("span", { className: "font-medium text-blue-600", children: [
+                  t("auth.acl.allModuleFeatures", "All"),
+                  " ",
+                  moduleWildcard && !hasGlobalWildcard ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("span", { className: "font-medium text-status-info-text", children: [
                     "(",
                     group.moduleId,
                     ".*)"
                   ] }) : "",
-                  moduleRestricted ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("span", { className: "ml-2 text-xs font-medium text-muted-foreground", children: "(manage via super admin)" }) : null
+                  moduleRestricted ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("span", { className: "ml-2 text-xs font-medium text-muted-foreground", children: t("auth.acl.manageViaSuperAdmin", "(manage via super admin)") }) : null
                 ] })
               ] })
             ] }),
@@ -393,7 +402,7 @@ function AclEditor({
                       htmlFor: `wildcard-${wildcard}`,
                       className: `text-sm ${disabled ? "text-muted-foreground" : ""}`,
                       children: [
-                        formatWildcardLabel(group.moduleId, wildcard),
+                        formatWildcardLabel(t, group.moduleId, wildcard),
                         " ",
                         /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("span", { className: "text-muted-foreground text-xs font-mono", children: [
                           "(",
@@ -467,7 +476,7 @@ function AclEditor({
       ] }),
       canEditOrganizations && /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "rounded border p-3", children: [
         /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-sm font-medium mb-2", children: t("auth.acl.organizationsScope", "Organizations scope") }),
-        /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-xs text-muted-foreground mb-2", children: "Empty = all organizations. Select one or more to restrict." }),
+        /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "text-xs text-muted-foreground mb-2", children: t("auth.acl.organizationsScopeHint", "Empty means all organizations. Select one or more to restrict access.") }),
         /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "grid grid-cols-1 md:grid-cols-2 gap-2", children: orgOptions.map((o) => {
           const checked = organizations == null ? false : (organizations || []).includes(o.id);
           return /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs("div", { className: "flex items-center gap-2", children: [
@@ -482,7 +491,7 @@ function AclEditor({
           ] }, o.id);
         }) }),
         /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "mt-2", children: /* @__PURE__ */ jsx(Button, { variant: "outline", onClick: () => setOrganizations(null), children: t("auth.acl.allowAllOrganizations", "Allow all organizations") }) }),
-        showOrganizationWarning && /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "mt-3 rounded border border-amber-200 bg-amber-50 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-amber-900", children: t("auth.acl.organizationWarning", "Organization restrictions are saved only when at least one feature override is selected. Add a feature or enable a module wildcard before saving.") })
+        showOrganizationWarning && /* @__PURE__ */ jsx("div", { className: "mt-3 rounded border border-status-warning-border bg-status-warning-bg px-3 py-2 text-sm text-status-warning-text", children: t("auth.acl.organizationWarning", "Organization restrictions are saved only when at least one feature override is selected. Add a feature or enable a module wildcard before saving.") })
       ] })
     ] })
   ] });