@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 0.4.0 → 2.0.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +126 -5
- package/COMMERCIAL.md +1 -1
- package/README.md +10 -7
- package/SECURITY.md +2 -2
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +1 -1
- package/device/README.md +7 -5
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/client.js +58 -25
- package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts +46 -7
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.js +2 -2
- package/dist/client/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/constants.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/client/constants.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/constants.js +4 -2
- package/dist/client/constants.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js +224 -0
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.js +74 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.js +255 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.js +115 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts +158 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js +926 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.d.ts +223 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.js +541 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts +5 -3
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/client/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/messages.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/messages.js +4 -5
- package/dist/client/messages.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js +37 -7
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/{sealed-sender-ops.d.ts → sealed-sender.d.ts} +39 -22
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.js +296 -0
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +23 -26
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +468 -706
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts +18 -3
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.js +6 -0
- package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/device/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/transfer.d.ts +7 -43
- package/dist/device/transfer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/transfer.js +31 -150
- package/dist/device/transfer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/types.d.ts +6 -47
- package/dist/device/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/device/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +6 -5
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +2 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js +5 -4
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.d.ts +10 -4
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.js +64 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts +34 -47
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js +95 -182
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts +49 -64
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js +120 -123
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.d.ts +5 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.js +4 -12
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-helpers.d.ts → multi-recipient-crypto.d.ts} +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-crypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-helpers.js → multi-recipient-crypto.js} +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-crypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-binary.d.ts → multi-recipient-message.d.ts} +3 -2
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-message.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-binary.js → multi-recipient-message.js} +16 -8
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-message.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js +25 -2
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts +11 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js +13 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts +20 -135
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js +15 -6
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts +22 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js +39 -4
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/braid-serialize.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/braid-serialize.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/state-machine.js +4 -4
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/state-machine.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.d.ts +37 -12
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.js +104 -31
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js +3 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.js +4 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js +4 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js +3 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.js +5 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js +4 -0
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/reference-backend.js +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/reference-backend.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.d.ts +63 -0
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js +219 -0
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js +5 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/media/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/media/index.js +7 -4
- package/dist/media/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.js +8 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.d.ts +5 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.js +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/types.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/validation.js +3 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/validation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts +7 -18
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js +15 -24
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts +10 -18
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js +14 -5
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts +3 -17
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js +28 -56
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts +6 -6
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js +2 -2
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts +7 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js +29 -14
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts +3 -6
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js +23 -50
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.d.ts +5 -11
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.js +41 -34
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts +19 -29
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts +8 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.js +9 -2
- package/dist/types/errors.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/username/link.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/username/link.js +1 -1
- package/dist/username/link.js.map +1 -1
- package/docs/ASSURANCE.md +5 -5
- package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md +32 -61
- package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md +7 -0
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +6 -0
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/remote/relay/convex/component/README.md +28 -24
- package/scripts/oe-groups.mjs +5 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js +0 -203
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts +0 -46
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js +0 -198
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts +0 -56
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js +0 -163
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-binary.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-binary.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-helpers.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-helpers.js.map +0 -1
package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md
CHANGED
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@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Deviations fall into three kinds:
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`libsignal` system.
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A fourth label, **faithful**, appears in the table for an area that follows the
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specification closely. Such a row is here only to delimit what the
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specification closely. Such a row is here only to delimit what the neighboring
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deviations do and do not touch.
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Companion documents: [Protocol Policy](./PROTOCOL_POLICY.md) states which
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| **SPQR / ML-KEM Braid** | ML-KEM Braid rev. 1 | **Deviation.** Same protocol, same KDF labels, same Reed–Solomon parameters, byte-identical message framing — except `hek = SHA3-256(ek_seed ‖ ek_vector)`, the operand order the specification states, which is the reverse of `libsignal`'s implementation | The normative text was followed over the executable reference | Wire-visible. Headers, ciphertexts, and shared secrets diverge; a braid session cannot complete a single epoch against `libsignal`'s implementation. Also means the KEM is not FIPS 203 in braid mode |
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| **Triple Ratchet** | `libsignal` `triple_ratchet.rs` | **Faithful.** The PQ secret enters as the HKDF salt at message-key expansion, same label, same order | — | The braiding construction follows the ML-KEM Braid specification |
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| **Sesame** | Sesame rev. 2 | **Deviation** on session expiry (§4.2 applies only to unacknowledged sessions) and on deleted devices (hard-removed rather than marked stale). **Extensions:** QR provisioning, device transfer, encrypted device names, identity-change gating, a 5-device cap | Product requirements the specification does not address | Hard deletion **drops the MAXLATENCY window, so in-flight messages from a just-removed device become permanently undecryptable**. Device transfer clones ratchet state, which weakens the forward-secrecy bound |
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| **Sealed sender v2** | `libsignal` `sealed_sender.rs` | **Faithful** on all four labels, the KEM, AES-256-GCM-SIV, the multi-recipient binary format, and the `0x3FFF` registration-ID mask | — | The v2 construction follows `libsignal` |
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| **Sealed sender** | `libsignal` `sealed_sender.rs` | **Faithful** on the multi-recipient transport labels, KEM, AES-256-GCM-SIV, binary format, and `0x3FFF` registration-ID mask. **Extension:** sender and server certificates require signed Relay scope and issuer validity under operator-owned Ed25519 roots | Binds anonymous delivery to one Relay deployment and supports explicit issuer rotation and revocation | The transport follows `libsignal`; certificates are not interchangeable with Signal Messenger or another deployment |
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| **Delivery token** | `libsignal` `profile_key.rs` | **Faithful.** `deriveAccessKey` follows `libsignal`'s `ProfileKey::derive_access_key`, and reproduces `libsignal`'s published known-answer values | — | Not an SDK invention, despite what the module name suggests |
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| **Sender keys** | `libsignal` `sender_keys.rs` | **Deviation.** Protobuf field numbers and `0x33` framing match, and the `0x01`/`0x02` seeds match, but message-key derivation **omits HKDF-Extract**, signatures are Ed25519 not XEdDSA, and `distributionUuid` carries a UTF-8 string rather than 16 UUID bytes | The Ed25519 choice follows the identity profile; the missing Extract appears unintentional | Group message keys differ from `libsignal`'s for the same chain key. Confirmed numerically, not merely by inspection |
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| **Groups** | Signal Private Group System | **Independent design.** Real zkgroup primitives underneath; the server validates every change against zero-knowledge presentations and signs the accepted result, and clients verify those signatures
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| **zkgroup / zkcredential** | `libsignal` `zkgroup`, `zkcredential`, `poksho` | **Faithful** port of the Ristretto255 KVAC and Sigma-protocol system, verified against `libsignal`'s known-answer vectors. **Deviation:** server parameter derivation is structured as four
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| **Groups** | Signal Private Group System | **Independent design.** Real zkgroup primitives underneath; profile-key credential issuance blinds the ACI-bound profile-key attribute, the server validates every change against zero-knowledge presentations and signs the accepted result, and clients verify those signatures | Ships a validating group server with an enforcement contract (S1–S14) specified in-tree | Not wire-compatible with the Signal Private Group System; credentials are not interchangeable. The issuer sees the authenticated ACI and redemption window, but not the raw profile key |
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| **zkgroup / zkcredential** | `libsignal` `zkgroup`, `zkcredential`, `poksho` | **Faithful** port of the Ristretto255 KVAC and Sigma-protocol system, verified against `libsignal`'s known-answer vectors. **Deviation:** server parameter derivation is structured as four labeled derivations rather than one seeded derivation | Server keys are the deploying operator's own trust root (each deployment generates its own seed), not Signal Messenger's | The zero-knowledge properties are real. Credentials are not interchangeable with Signal Messenger's |
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| **Registration IDs** | `libsignal` `sealed_sender.rs` | **Faithful.** Generated in `[1, 16383]`, strictly inside the 14 bits the wire format reserves | — | — |
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---
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`0x4000` and does not fit in 14 bits. The SDK's multi-recipient sealed-sender
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(`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-message.ts`), so an ID one above
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the range would reach the wire as `0`. The generated range is therefore strictly
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narrower than `libsignal`'s accepted range, and a test asserts that every
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generated ID survives the mask unchanged.
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Inheriting them would be wrong on both parameters:
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1. **`pqkem` would name a KEM the SDK does not run**, violating §2.2. That is
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worse than a
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worse than a labeling error. Two implementations feeding an identical label
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derive *different* shared secrets. The KEM underneath differs, and nothing at
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the KDF layer signals it. Domain separation is the one job the info string
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has.
|
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@@ -538,7 +537,7 @@ independently and pinned against commit `fd32048`, which upstream tags
|
|
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|
- **ML-KEM-768 with the same incremental split** (32-byte seed, 1152-byte vector,
|
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|
960/128-byte ciphertext parts).
|
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539
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|
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|
-
The delta review that moved the pin forward from `f2589fef` found one
|
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+
The delta review that moved the pin forward from `f2589fef` found one behavioral
|
|
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541
|
change upstream. Decoding a chain epoch direction now rejects a `next` chain key
|
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whose length is neither zero nor 32 bytes. The internal next-key assertion checks
|
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that same exact length rather than mere non-emptiness.
|
|
@@ -548,7 +547,7 @@ key, root key, and skipped-message key to be canonical base64 for exactly 32
|
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bytes (`internal/protocol/spqr/serialize.ts:44-72`). The SDK has no state in
|
|
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|
which the key is absent. Two upstream error strings now name the value they
|
|
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549
|
reject. The rest of the delta is proof-assistant annotation and loop rewriting,
|
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|
-
which leaves
|
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+
which leaves behavior unchanged.
|
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551
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|
### 4.1 The `hek` operand order diverges
|
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@@ -758,7 +757,7 @@ possession must add it at the application layer.
|
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## 6. Sealed sender
|
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### 6.1
|
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+
### 6.1 The multi-recipient transport is faithful
|
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These parts match `libsignal`:
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@@ -771,39 +770,9 @@ These parts match `libsignal`:
|
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ServiceIds
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- the packed device ID with its 14-bit registration ID and `0x3FFF` mask
|
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-
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775
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-
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-
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-
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-
### 6.2 Version 1 diverges in three places
|
|
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|
-
|
|
780
|
-
**The SDK splits the 96-byte HKDF output in a different order.** `libsignal`
|
|
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|
-
derives `(chain_key, cipher_key, mac_key)` ([`sealed_sender.rs:711-746`][ss]).
|
|
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|
-
The SDK derives `(cipher, mac, chain)`
|
|
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|
-
(`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.ts:164-166`). The construction is
|
|
784
|
-
self-consistent and secure, because the keys are independent HKDF output either
|
|
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|
-
way. Every v1 key still sits in a different slot than `libsignal`'s. This is an
|
|
786
|
-
implementation divergence rather than a design decision. The SDK's own pinned
|
|
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|
-
specification document records the same order, so the two agree with each other.
|
|
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|
-
|
|
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|
-
**Public keys in the v1 salt and in certificates omit the `0x05` type byte.**
|
|
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|
-
`libsignal` uses the 33-byte serialized form. The SDK uses raw 32 bytes and
|
|
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|
-
enforces that length
|
|
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|
-
(`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.ts:306-309`). The SDK's own v2 path
|
|
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|
-
*does* apply the `0x05` prefix, so the two sealed-sender versions disagree with
|
|
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|
-
each other.
|
|
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|
-
|
|
796
|
-
**The inner envelope is a hand-rolled varint format**
|
|
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|
-
(`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.ts:46-86`) rather than the
|
|
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|
-
`UnidentifiedSenderMessage.Message` protobuf. It still carries the message-type
|
|
799
|
-
field that `libsignal` dispatches on, which selects between prekey, regular,
|
|
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|
-
sender-key, and plaintext payloads ([`sealed_sender.rs:2055-2075`][ss]). The
|
|
801
|
-
field is a leading byte holding `libsignal`'s enum values. The framing therefore
|
|
802
|
-
differs while the dispatch does not.
|
|
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|
-
|
|
804
|
-
That field lets the unseal path restore the real message type. Without it the
|
|
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|
-
path would rebuild the envelope with a fixed type, and a sealed group message
|
|
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|
-
would not decrypt as a group message.
|
|
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|
+
The base trust-root loop also matches. It does not short-circuit and therefore
|
|
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|
+
does not reveal which root validated. Required signed scope and issuer-validity
|
|
775
|
+
checks extend the upstream certificate semantics.
|
|
807
776
|
|
|
808
777
|
**`PLAINTEXT_CONTENT` (8) is a known wire value that this SDK rejects.**
|
|
809
778
|
`libsignal` uses it to carry a `DecryptionErrorMessage` when no session exists
|
|
@@ -829,7 +798,7 @@ one pattern: sealed messages from one peer stack fail with that error while
|
|
|
829
798
|
messages from this SDK succeed. Check the leading content-type byte before you
|
|
830
799
|
treat that as a cryptographic failure.
|
|
831
800
|
|
|
832
|
-
### 6.
|
|
801
|
+
### 6.2 The delivery token follows `libsignal`, not an SDK invention
|
|
833
802
|
|
|
834
803
|
Despite the module name, `deriveAccessKey`
|
|
835
804
|
(`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/delivery-token.ts:52-91`) is `libsignal`'s
|
|
@@ -846,10 +815,11 @@ The SDK's own documentation once described a different, 12-byte HKDF
|
|
|
846
815
|
construction that no code implements. That description is wrong, and the PR that
|
|
847
816
|
accompanies this file corrects it.
|
|
848
817
|
|
|
849
|
-
Certificate signatures use Ed25519 rather than XEdDSA, per §1.2
|
|
850
|
-
|
|
851
|
-
|
|
852
|
-
|
|
818
|
+
Certificate signatures use Ed25519 rather than XEdDSA, per §1.2. The signed
|
|
819
|
+
Relay scope and issuer-validity interval are deployment extensions. Hosted and
|
|
820
|
+
self-hosted deployments use disjoint operator roots, issuers, scopes, and
|
|
821
|
+
revocation policy. Their certificates cannot validate against each other or a
|
|
822
|
+
Signal Messenger trust root.
|
|
853
823
|
|
|
854
824
|
---
|
|
855
825
|
|
|
@@ -940,17 +910,18 @@ implements that contract. On every applied change, clients verify the server's
|
|
|
940
910
|
signature, the group binding, the strict version sequence, and the pre-state
|
|
941
911
|
authorization.
|
|
942
912
|
|
|
943
|
-
**Profile-key credential issuance
|
|
944
|
-
|
|
945
|
-
|
|
946
|
-
|
|
947
|
-
the key
|
|
948
|
-
|
|
949
|
-
|
|
950
|
-
|
|
913
|
+
**Profile-key credential issuance uses a package-owned blinded wire format**.
|
|
914
|
+
The client sends a fixed-width serialized request that contains an ephemeral
|
|
915
|
+
blinding public key and an ACI-bound blinded profile-key attribute. The issuer
|
|
916
|
+
sees the authenticated ACI and the public redemption time, but it does not
|
|
917
|
+
receive the raw 32-byte profile key or the client's blinding secret. The client
|
|
918
|
+
verifies and unblinds the signed response with the matching request context.
|
|
919
|
+
Fresh request randomness makes two requests for the same ACI and profile key
|
|
920
|
+
unlinkable from the blinded request bytes.
|
|
951
921
|
|
|
952
|
-
|
|
953
|
-
|
|
922
|
+
This preserves the Signal Private Group System's issuer-privacy property, but
|
|
923
|
+
the request and response encodings remain this SDK's own and are not
|
|
924
|
+
interchangeable with Signal Messenger or `libsignal` credentials.
|
|
954
925
|
|
|
955
926
|
**Serialization is JSON**, not protobuf, both for group state
|
|
956
927
|
(`internal/groups/manager.ts:1229-1236`) and for the blob payloads inside the
|
|
@@ -982,7 +953,7 @@ system parameters against a hex string taken from `libsignal`'s own Rust test,
|
|
|
982
953
|
and it passes.
|
|
983
954
|
|
|
984
955
|
One deviation remains. The SDK derives server secret parameters through four
|
|
985
|
-
separately
|
|
956
|
+
separately labeled key derivations, where `libsignal` uses a single seeded
|
|
986
957
|
derivation (`internal/protocol/zk/groups/server-params.ts:43-54`). The same
|
|
987
958
|
randomness therefore yields different server keys.
|
|
988
959
|
|
|
@@ -1004,7 +975,7 @@ confirm any of them in source.
|
|
|
1004
975
|
|
|
1005
976
|
- **Does a sealed-sender-wrapped prekey message decrypt end to end?** The unseal
|
|
1006
977
|
path rebuilds the envelope with a fixed message type
|
|
1007
|
-
(`client/sealed-sender
|
|
978
|
+
(`client/sealed-sender.ts`). An adjacent comment suggests that the
|
|
1008
979
|
Sesame layer re-derives the initiation state from the ciphertext. This review
|
|
1009
980
|
traced neither that path nor the integration tests. First-contact sealed
|
|
1010
981
|
messages break if Sesame does not detect the state itself.
|
|
@@ -1031,7 +1002,7 @@ confirm any of them in source.
|
|
|
1031
1002
|
`libsignal` commits the new state only after the MAC and the decryption
|
|
1032
1003
|
succeed. The SDK's receive
|
|
1033
1004
|
path mutates state during decode, and this review did not trace the caller's
|
|
1034
|
-
rollback
|
|
1005
|
+
rollback behavior.
|
|
1035
1006
|
- **Does an equivalent of `libsignal`'s `promote_matching_session` exist?**
|
|
1036
1007
|
`libsignal` matches archived sessions on `(version, base key)`. The SDK keys
|
|
1037
1008
|
its map on the base key alone.
|
package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ flowchart LR
|
|
|
101
101
|
envelopes.
|
|
102
102
|
- The remote object store carries encrypted attachment/media bytes only.
|
|
103
103
|
|
|
104
|
+
You can operate these server-side interfaces through a shipped or custom
|
|
105
|
+
adapter. You can instead use [OpenE2EE Relay](https://open-e2ee.dev/relay) for
|
|
106
|
+
managed encrypted delivery, private encrypted attachment storage, push wakes,
|
|
107
|
+
and lifecycle controls. The SDK does not require the managed service. The
|
|
108
|
+
[Relay pricing page](https://open-e2ee.dev/relay/pricing) defines its exact
|
|
109
|
+
meters and limits.
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
104
111
|
## Target Message-First API Preview
|
|
105
112
|
|
|
106
113
|
This is the target DX the package moves toward. It appears here so app
|
package/docs/SECURITY.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ round-3 Kyber1024 tagged `0x08`.
|
|
|
64
64
|
using ML-KEM-768 and bounded Reed-Solomon decoding.
|
|
65
65
|
- HEK follows the ML-KEM Braid specification:
|
|
66
66
|
`SHA3-256(ek_seed || ek_vector)`.
|
|
67
|
+
- FIPS 203 serializes the encapsulation key vector-first, and the braid HEK
|
|
68
|
+
order is seed-first. Braid mode therefore runs ML-KEM-768 with a modified
|
|
69
|
+
encapsulation-key commitment, and the SDK makes no FIPS 203 conformance claim
|
|
70
|
+
for that path.
|
|
71
|
+
- The modification reaches only the braid path. Direct ML-KEM-768 SCKA uses
|
|
72
|
+
stock ML-KEM-768, and PQXDH uses standardized FIPS 203 ML-KEM-1024 behavior.
|
|
67
73
|
- The SDK applies `KDF_OK` once when raw ML-KEM output enters the epoch
|
|
68
74
|
boundary. Braid output is already an epoch secret and is not derived a second
|
|
69
75
|
time.
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.0.0",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Signal Protocol E2EE SDK for TypeScript — Expo, React Native, browser, and Node. Post-quantum PQXDH and Double Ratchet.",
|
|
5
5
|
"keywords": [
|
|
6
6
|
"open-e2ee",
|
|
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@
|
|
|
421
421
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
422
422
|
"@noble/ciphers": "^2.3.0",
|
|
423
423
|
"@noble/curves": "^2.2.0",
|
|
424
|
-
"@noble/hashes": "2.
|
|
424
|
+
"@noble/hashes": "2.4.0",
|
|
425
425
|
"@noble/post-quantum": "^0.7.0",
|
|
426
426
|
"async-lock": "^1.4.0",
|
|
427
427
|
"unique-names-generator": "^4.7.1"
|
|
@@ -152,7 +152,6 @@ export const {
|
|
|
152
152
|
getPendingMessages,
|
|
153
153
|
markDelivered,
|
|
154
154
|
getActiveDevices,
|
|
155
|
-
sendUnidentified,
|
|
156
155
|
sendMultiRecipientUnidentified,
|
|
157
156
|
sendRetryRequest,
|
|
158
157
|
getPendingRetryRequests,
|
|
@@ -232,8 +231,8 @@ issuance also resolves identity. Group wrappers pass client arguments through
|
|
|
232
231
|
untouched because group reads and writes authenticate membership solely through
|
|
233
232
|
the supplied zero-knowledge presentation.
|
|
234
233
|
|
|
235
|
-
`
|
|
236
|
-
|
|
234
|
+
`sendMultiRecipientUnidentified` is the deliberate exception: this
|
|
235
|
+
sealed-sender path does **not** call `identify`. It authorizes
|
|
237
236
|
the bearer request with the target's unidentified-access key or verified group
|
|
238
237
|
send material, which keeps delivery available without an authenticated
|
|
239
238
|
application session. Rejections carry structured `ConvexError` data. The relay
|
|
@@ -277,16 +276,16 @@ component. Each authenticated fetcher/target-account pair receives ten fetches
|
|
|
277
276
|
per fixed one-minute window. The eleventh request fails with structured
|
|
278
277
|
`RATE_LIMITED` data and HTTP-equivalent status 429.
|
|
279
278
|
|
|
280
|
-
## Upgrading: clear `messages` before
|
|
279
|
+
## Upgrading to 2.0: clear `messages` before deployment
|
|
281
280
|
|
|
282
|
-
|
|
283
|
-
`
|
|
281
|
+
Version 2.0 replaces the optional `urgent` and `ephemeral` booleans with one
|
|
282
|
+
required `deliveryClass`. Every 1.x `messages` row lacks that field.
|
|
284
283
|
|
|
285
284
|
Convex validates every existing document against the new schema **during the
|
|
286
|
-
push**, before any of your code runs.
|
|
287
|
-
|
|
288
|
-
|
|
289
|
-
|
|
285
|
+
push**, before any of your code runs. Any retained 1.x row therefore fails the
|
|
286
|
+
deploy. No migration mutation can run first, because the deploy that would ship
|
|
287
|
+
it is the deploy that fails. The order is: empty the table first, then deploy.
|
|
288
|
+
Version 2.0 does not keep a compatibility field or parser for the old shape.
|
|
290
289
|
|
|
291
290
|
Messages are transient by design. The table has a seven-day TTL and an hourly
|
|
292
291
|
cleanup cron. Clients re-request undelivered messages through the retry path,
|
|
@@ -301,9 +300,7 @@ npx convex data messages --component signalProtocol
|
|
|
301
300
|
```
|
|
302
301
|
|
|
303
302
|
Add `--prod` or `--deployment <name-or-reference>` to target a deployment other
|
|
304
|
-
than your
|
|
305
|
-
had a caller pass `plaintext_content`, has no affected rows and needs no
|
|
306
|
-
action. No send path in this SDK ever produced the latter.
|
|
303
|
+
than your development deployment. An empty table needs no action.
|
|
307
304
|
|
|
308
305
|
If there are rows, either wait or clear:
|
|
309
306
|
|
|
@@ -330,8 +327,8 @@ Add `--prod` for the default production deployment or
|
|
|
330
327
|
- generates a cryptographically random 32-byte seed only when the secret is
|
|
331
328
|
absent
|
|
332
329
|
- writes the seed to the selected Convex deployment through stdin
|
|
333
|
-
- prints
|
|
334
|
-
|
|
330
|
+
- prints the serialized group trust root, the Ed25519 sender-certificate root,
|
|
331
|
+
and the sender-certificate relay scope as labeled base64 values
|
|
335
332
|
|
|
336
333
|
Pin both in the client build. See
|
|
337
334
|
[Sender certificate trust root](#sender-certificate-trust-root) for where each
|
|
@@ -350,18 +347,21 @@ from the group signing key by distinct KDF labels
|
|
|
350
347
|
(`open-e2ee:sealed-sender:root:v1` / `:server:v1`). Clients verify inbound
|
|
351
348
|
sealed-sender certificates against the matching Ed25519 **root** public key.
|
|
352
349
|
|
|
353
|
-
`oe-groups trust-root` prints both roots,
|
|
350
|
+
`oe-groups trust-root` prints both roots, labeled:
|
|
354
351
|
|
|
355
352
|
```
|
|
356
353
|
group trust root: <base64>
|
|
357
354
|
sealed sender trust root: <base64>
|
|
355
|
+
sealed sender relay scope: <base64>
|
|
358
356
|
```
|
|
359
357
|
|
|
360
358
|
The two roots go in different places and are not interchangeable. The group
|
|
361
359
|
trust root goes into the group configuration, and the sealed-sender root into
|
|
362
|
-
`sealedSender.trustRoots` in the client build.
|
|
363
|
-
|
|
364
|
-
|
|
360
|
+
`sealedSender.trustRoots` in the client build. Put the matching relay scope into
|
|
361
|
+
`sealedSender.relayScopeId`, and configure the operator-owned issuer revocation
|
|
362
|
+
list in `sealedSender.revokedIssuerKeyIds`. Pin these values at build time.
|
|
363
|
+
Never fetch them from a relay at runtime, because a relay that chooses its own
|
|
364
|
+
validation policy can mint certificates for any sender.
|
|
365
365
|
|
|
366
366
|
The component derives both from the same deployment secret, so rotating
|
|
367
367
|
`OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET` rotates both and strands clients pinned to either
|
|
@@ -451,8 +451,12 @@ The component cannot do it while its identity has no device field.
|
|
|
451
451
|
|
|
452
452
|
## Profile-key issuance threat model
|
|
453
453
|
|
|
454
|
-
`issueProfileKeyCredentialMutation` receives
|
|
455
|
-
group server
|
|
456
|
-
|
|
457
|
-
|
|
458
|
-
|
|
454
|
+
`issueProfileKeyCredentialMutation` receives a 160-byte blinded request bound
|
|
455
|
+
to the authenticated ACI. The group server sees the ACI and redemption window,
|
|
456
|
+
but it does not receive the raw 32-byte profile key or the client's ephemeral
|
|
457
|
+
blinding secret. The client unblinds and verifies the response before it uses
|
|
458
|
+
the credential in a group presentation.
|
|
459
|
+
|
|
460
|
+
`setUnidentifiedAccessKeyMutation` is a separate delivery-authorization seam.
|
|
461
|
+
It receives only the 16-byte access key that the client derives from its
|
|
462
|
+
profile key. Credential issuance does not derive or register that access key.
|
package/scripts/oe-groups.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ async function printTrustRoot(args) {
|
|
|
94
94
|
const [
|
|
95
95
|
{ generateServerSecretParams, getServerPublicParams },
|
|
96
96
|
{ encodeGroupTrustRoot },
|
|
97
|
-
{ deriveSealedSenderRootPublicKey },
|
|
97
|
+
{ deriveSealedSenderRootPublicKey, deriveSealedSenderScopeId },
|
|
98
98
|
] = await Promise.all([
|
|
99
99
|
// pathToFileURL: dynamic import of a bare absolute path fails on
|
|
100
100
|
// Windows, where the ESM loader requires a file:// URL.
|
|
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ async function printTrustRoot(args) {
|
|
|
136
136
|
const sealedSenderRoot = await deriveSealedSenderRootPublicKey(
|
|
137
137
|
secretParams.signingKeyPair.signingKey
|
|
138
138
|
);
|
|
139
|
+
const sealedSenderScope = await deriveSealedSenderScopeId(sealedSenderRoot);
|
|
139
140
|
|
|
140
141
|
// Two independently pinned roots, printed with labels because they go to
|
|
141
142
|
// different places in the client build and are not interchangeable.
|
|
@@ -145,6 +146,9 @@ async function printTrustRoot(args) {
|
|
|
145
146
|
process.stdout.write(
|
|
146
147
|
`sealed sender trust root: ${Buffer.from(sealedSenderRoot).toString('base64')}\n`
|
|
147
148
|
);
|
|
149
|
+
process.stdout.write(
|
|
150
|
+
`sealed sender relay scope: ${Buffer.from(sealedSenderScope).toString('base64')}\n`
|
|
151
|
+
);
|
|
148
152
|
}
|
|
149
153
|
|
|
150
154
|
const [command, ...args] = process.argv.slice(2);
|
|
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"sealed-sender-ops.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../client/sealed-sender-ops.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACtD,OAAO,EAA+B,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAEtE,OAAO,EACL,uBAAuB,EAGxB,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAElD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AACV,wBAAsB,WAAW,CAC/B,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,EACxB,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC/B,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,EACjC,uBAAuB,EAAE,UAAU,EACnC,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAC3B,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EACzB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,uBAAuB,GACpC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAkCjB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,wBAAsB,aAAa,CACjC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,EAC9B,wBAAwB,EAAE,UAAU,EACpC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,EACrB,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,EACzB,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAC1B,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,GACvB,OAAO,CAAC;IACT,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B,WAAW,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAC;CACtC,CAAC,CAgED;AA8ED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CACjC,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAAQ,EAC1B,QAAQ,EAAE;IACR,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B,WAAW,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAC;CACtC,GACA,QAAQ,CAQV;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CACpC,WAAW,EAAE,uBAAuB,GACnC,QAAQ,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAUzB"}
|
|
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
/**
|
|
2
|
-
* Sealed Sender Operations
|
|
3
|
-
*
|
|
4
|
-
* Provides seal/unseal wrapping for the message send/receive pipeline.
|
|
5
|
-
* Called by SignalProtocolServiceCipher when sealed sender is enabled.
|
|
6
|
-
*
|
|
7
|
-
* @see https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
|
|
8
|
-
*/
|
|
9
|
-
import { resolveSignalProtocolLogger } from '../logger.js';
|
|
10
|
-
import { SealedSenderContentType, SEALED_SENDER_V2_SERVICE_ID_VERSION, SEALED_SENDER_V2_UUID_VERSION, } from '../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js';
|
|
11
|
-
export async function sealMessage(ciphertextBase64, senderCertificateBase64, senderIdentityPrivate, recipientIdentityPublic, _config, _providedLogger, contentType) {
|
|
12
|
-
const { seal, deserializeSenderCertificate, encodeUnidentifiedSenderMessage } = await import('../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.js');
|
|
13
|
-
const { base64ToBytes, bytesToBase64 } = await import('../internal/crypto/index.js');
|
|
14
|
-
// Deserialize the sender certificate
|
|
15
|
-
const certBytes = base64ToBytes(senderCertificateBase64);
|
|
16
|
-
const senderCertificate = deserializeSenderCertificate(certBytes);
|
|
17
|
-
// Convert ciphertext to bytes for seal()
|
|
18
|
-
const signalProtocolMessage = base64ToBytes(ciphertextBase64);
|
|
19
|
-
// Seal the message
|
|
20
|
-
const sealed = await seal({
|
|
21
|
-
senderCertificate,
|
|
22
|
-
senderIdentityPrivate,
|
|
23
|
-
recipientIdentityPublic,
|
|
24
|
-
signalProtocolMessage,
|
|
25
|
-
contentType,
|
|
26
|
-
});
|
|
27
|
-
// Serialize: version byte + protobuf-encoded message (Sealed Sender wire format)
|
|
28
|
-
const protoBytes = encodeUnidentifiedSenderMessage({
|
|
29
|
-
ephemeralPublic: base64ToBytes(sealed.ephemeralPublic),
|
|
30
|
-
encryptedStatic: base64ToBytes(sealed.encryptedStatic),
|
|
31
|
-
encryptedMessage: base64ToBytes(sealed.encryptedMessage),
|
|
32
|
-
});
|
|
33
|
-
// Prepend version byte
|
|
34
|
-
const sealedBytes = new Uint8Array(1 + protoBytes.length);
|
|
35
|
-
sealedBytes[0] = sealed.version;
|
|
36
|
-
sealedBytes.set(protoBytes, 1);
|
|
37
|
-
return bytesToBase64(sealedBytes);
|
|
38
|
-
}
|
|
39
|
-
/**
|
|
40
|
-
* Unseal a sealed sender message to reveal the sender and inner ciphertext.
|
|
41
|
-
*
|
|
42
|
-
* Called when an incoming envelope has messageType === 'unidentified_sender'.
|
|
43
|
-
* Validates the certificate chain, reveals sender identity, and returns
|
|
44
|
-
* the inner Signal Protocol ciphertext for normal decryption.
|
|
45
|
-
*
|
|
46
|
-
* @param sealedCiphertextBase64 - Base64-encoded sealed sender message
|
|
47
|
-
* @param recipientIdentityPrivate - Recipient's X25519 identity private key
|
|
48
|
-
* @param recipientUuid - Recipient's user ID (for self-send detection)
|
|
49
|
-
* @param recipientDeviceId - Recipient's device ID
|
|
50
|
-
* @param config - Sealed sender config with trust roots
|
|
51
|
-
* @returns Unsealed envelope info with sender identity and inner ciphertext
|
|
52
|
-
*/
|
|
53
|
-
export async function unsealMessage(sealedCiphertextBase64, recipientIdentityPrivate, recipientUuid, recipientDeviceId, config, providedLogger) {
|
|
54
|
-
const logger = resolveSignalProtocolLogger(providedLogger);
|
|
55
|
-
const { base64ToBytes, bytesToBase64 } = await import('../internal/crypto/index.js');
|
|
56
|
-
// Decode sealed bytes and check version byte for V1 vs V2 dispatch
|
|
57
|
-
const sealedBytes = base64ToBytes(sealedCiphertextBase64);
|
|
58
|
-
const versionByte = sealedBytes[0];
|
|
59
|
-
// V2 detection: 0x22 = UUID version (ReceivedMessage), 0x23 = ServiceId version
|
|
60
|
-
if (versionByte === SEALED_SENDER_V2_UUID_VERSION ||
|
|
61
|
-
versionByte === SEALED_SENDER_V2_SERVICE_ID_VERSION) {
|
|
62
|
-
return unsealV2Message(sealedBytes, recipientIdentityPrivate, recipientUuid, recipientDeviceId, config, logger);
|
|
63
|
-
}
|
|
64
|
-
// V1 path (0x11). Existing code
|
|
65
|
-
const { unseal, decodeUnidentifiedSenderMessage } = await import('../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.js');
|
|
66
|
-
const version = versionByte;
|
|
67
|
-
const sealedProto = decodeUnidentifiedSenderMessage(sealedBytes.subarray(1));
|
|
68
|
-
// Build the UnidentifiedSenderMessage structure
|
|
69
|
-
const sealedMessage = {
|
|
70
|
-
version,
|
|
71
|
-
ephemeralPublic: bytesToBase64(sealedProto.ephemeralPublic),
|
|
72
|
-
encryptedStatic: bytesToBase64(sealedProto.encryptedStatic),
|
|
73
|
-
encryptedMessage: bytesToBase64(sealedProto.encryptedMessage),
|
|
74
|
-
};
|
|
75
|
-
// Build trust roots as base64 strings
|
|
76
|
-
const trustRoots = config.trustRoots.map((root) => bytesToBase64(root));
|
|
77
|
-
// Unseal the message
|
|
78
|
-
const content = await unseal({
|
|
79
|
-
sealedMessage,
|
|
80
|
-
recipientIdentityPrivate,
|
|
81
|
-
trustRoots,
|
|
82
|
-
recipientUuid,
|
|
83
|
-
recipientDeviceId,
|
|
84
|
-
});
|
|
85
|
-
logger.debug('Sealed sender message unsealed', {
|
|
86
|
-
category: 'E2EE',
|
|
87
|
-
data: {
|
|
88
|
-
senderUuid: content.senderCertificate.senderUuid,
|
|
89
|
-
senderDeviceId: content.senderCertificate.senderDeviceId,
|
|
90
|
-
},
|
|
91
|
-
});
|
|
92
|
-
return {
|
|
93
|
-
senderUserId: content.senderCertificate.senderUuid,
|
|
94
|
-
senderDeviceId: content.senderCertificate.senderDeviceId,
|
|
95
|
-
innerCiphertextBase64: content.signalProtocolMessage,
|
|
96
|
-
contentType: content.contentType,
|
|
97
|
-
};
|
|
98
|
-
}
|
|
99
|
-
/**
|
|
100
|
-
* Unseal a V2 multi-recipient sealed sender message (per-device view).
|
|
101
|
-
*
|
|
102
|
-
* The server constructs a per-device view: [0x22][C_i(32)][AT_i(16)][e_pub(32)][ciphertext]
|
|
103
|
-
* We deserialize this, build a SealedSenderV2Message, and call unsealV2().
|
|
104
|
-
*/
|
|
105
|
-
async function unsealV2Message(sealedBytes, recipientIdentityPrivate, recipientUuid, recipientDeviceId, config, logger) {
|
|
106
|
-
const { deserializeReceivedMessage } = await import('../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-binary.js');
|
|
107
|
-
const { unsealV2 } = await import('../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js');
|
|
108
|
-
const { bytesToBase64 } = await import('../internal/crypto/index.js');
|
|
109
|
-
const { x25519 } = await import('@noble/curves/ed25519.js');
|
|
110
|
-
// 1. Deserialize per-device ReceivedMessage
|
|
111
|
-
const deserialized = deserializeReceivedMessage(sealedBytes);
|
|
112
|
-
// 2. Derive recipient public key from private
|
|
113
|
-
const recipientIdentityPublic = x25519.getPublicKey(recipientIdentityPrivate);
|
|
114
|
-
// 3. Build SealedSenderV2Message with single recipient entry
|
|
115
|
-
const message = {
|
|
116
|
-
version: SEALED_SENDER_V2_UUID_VERSION,
|
|
117
|
-
ephemeralPublic: bytesToBase64(deserialized.ephemeralPublic),
|
|
118
|
-
recipients: [
|
|
119
|
-
{
|
|
120
|
-
serviceId: recipientUuid,
|
|
121
|
-
deviceId: recipientDeviceId,
|
|
122
|
-
registrationId: 0, // Not needed for unseal. Only used in send path
|
|
123
|
-
encryptedMessageKey: bytesToBase64(deserialized.encryptedMessageKey),
|
|
124
|
-
authenticationTag: bytesToBase64(deserialized.authenticationTag),
|
|
125
|
-
},
|
|
126
|
-
],
|
|
127
|
-
messageCiphertext: bytesToBase64(deserialized.messageCiphertext),
|
|
128
|
-
};
|
|
129
|
-
// 4. Build trust roots as Base64 strings
|
|
130
|
-
const trustRoots = config.trustRoots.map((root) => bytesToBase64(root));
|
|
131
|
-
// 5. Call unsealV2
|
|
132
|
-
const content = await unsealV2({
|
|
133
|
-
sealedMessage: message,
|
|
134
|
-
recipientIdentityPrivate,
|
|
135
|
-
recipientIdentityPublic,
|
|
136
|
-
recipientServiceId: recipientUuid,
|
|
137
|
-
recipientDeviceId,
|
|
138
|
-
trustRoots,
|
|
139
|
-
});
|
|
140
|
-
logger.debug('V2 sealed sender message unsealed', {
|
|
141
|
-
category: 'E2EE',
|
|
142
|
-
data: {
|
|
143
|
-
senderUuid: content.senderCertificate.senderUuid,
|
|
144
|
-
senderDeviceId: content.senderCertificate.senderDeviceId,
|
|
145
|
-
},
|
|
146
|
-
});
|
|
147
|
-
return {
|
|
148
|
-
senderUserId: content.senderCertificate.senderUuid,
|
|
149
|
-
senderDeviceId: content.senderCertificate.senderDeviceId,
|
|
150
|
-
innerCiphertextBase64: content.signalProtocolMessage,
|
|
151
|
-
contentType: content.contentType,
|
|
152
|
-
};
|
|
153
|
-
}
|
|
154
|
-
/**
|
|
155
|
-
* Reconstruct an Envelope from an unsealed message.
|
|
156
|
-
*
|
|
157
|
-
* Takes the original sealed sender envelope (with empty sender fields)
|
|
158
|
-
* and fills in the sender identity revealed by unsealing.
|
|
159
|
-
*
|
|
160
|
-
* @param originalEnvelope - The incoming envelope with messageType 'unidentified_sender'
|
|
161
|
-
* @param unsealed - The unsealed sender info and inner ciphertext
|
|
162
|
-
* @returns A new envelope with real sender info and the inner ciphertext
|
|
163
|
-
*/
|
|
164
|
-
export function reconstructEnvelope(originalEnvelope, unsealed) {
|
|
165
|
-
return {
|
|
166
|
-
...originalEnvelope,
|
|
167
|
-
senderUserId: unsealed.senderUserId,
|
|
168
|
-
senderDeviceId: unsealed.senderDeviceId,
|
|
169
|
-
ciphertext: unsealed.innerCiphertextBase64,
|
|
170
|
-
messageType: envelopeTypeForContent(unsealed.contentType),
|
|
171
|
-
};
|
|
172
|
-
}
|
|
173
|
-
/**
|
|
174
|
-
* Map a sealed envelope's content type onto the envelope type the decrypt
|
|
175
|
-
* path routes on.
|
|
176
|
-
*
|
|
177
|
-
* Exported because both receive paths need it. `SignalProtocolServiceCipher`
|
|
178
|
-
* via `reconstructEnvelope`, and `SignalProtocolClient.processIncomingEnvelope`
|
|
179
|
-
* directly. Two copies of this mapping would drift.
|
|
180
|
-
*
|
|
181
|
-
* `SENDERKEY_MESSAGE` is the only case that matters here. It is what keeps
|
|
182
|
-
* group routing working now that no group identifier travels on an envelope,
|
|
183
|
-
* sealed or otherwise. Both `PREKEY_MESSAGE` and `MESSAGE` decrypt as pairwise
|
|
184
|
-
* ratchet messages, and the ratchet distinguishes them from the payload
|
|
185
|
-
* itself.
|
|
186
|
-
*
|
|
187
|
-
* The default is unreachable: `isSealedSenderContentType` rejects every other
|
|
188
|
-
* value at the parse, so nothing arrives here that this function cannot map.
|
|
189
|
-
* It exists so that adding an enum member without a route fails loudly rather
|
|
190
|
-
* than silently decrypting as something it is not.
|
|
191
|
-
*/
|
|
192
|
-
export function envelopeTypeForContent(contentType) {
|
|
193
|
-
switch (contentType) {
|
|
194
|
-
case SealedSenderContentType.SENDERKEY_MESSAGE:
|
|
195
|
-
return 'sender_key';
|
|
196
|
-
case SealedSenderContentType.PREKEY_MESSAGE:
|
|
197
|
-
case SealedSenderContentType.MESSAGE:
|
|
198
|
-
return 'ciphertext';
|
|
199
|
-
default:
|
|
200
|
-
throw new Error('Unsupported sealed sender content type');
|
|
201
|
-
}
|
|
202
|
-
}
|
|
203
|
-
//# sourceMappingURL=sealed-sender-ops.js.map
|
|
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
|
|
1
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