@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 0.4.0 → 2.0.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +126 -5
- package/COMMERCIAL.md +1 -1
- package/README.md +10 -7
- package/SECURITY.md +2 -2
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +1 -1
- package/device/README.md +7 -5
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/client.js +58 -25
- package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts +46 -7
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.js +2 -2
- package/dist/client/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/constants.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/client/constants.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/constants.js +4 -2
- package/dist/client/constants.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js +224 -0
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.js +74 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.js +255 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.js +115 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts +158 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js +926 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.d.ts +223 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.js +541 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts +5 -3
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/client/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/messages.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/messages.js +4 -5
- package/dist/client/messages.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js +37 -7
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/{sealed-sender-ops.d.ts → sealed-sender.d.ts} +39 -22
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.js +296 -0
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +23 -26
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +468 -706
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts +18 -3
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.js +6 -0
- package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/device/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/transfer.d.ts +7 -43
- package/dist/device/transfer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/transfer.js +31 -150
- package/dist/device/transfer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/types.d.ts +6 -47
- package/dist/device/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/device/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +6 -5
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +2 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js +5 -4
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.d.ts +10 -4
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.js +64 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts +34 -47
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js +95 -182
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts +49 -64
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js +120 -123
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.d.ts +5 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.js +4 -12
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-helpers.d.ts → multi-recipient-crypto.d.ts} +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-crypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-helpers.js → multi-recipient-crypto.js} +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-crypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-binary.d.ts → multi-recipient-message.d.ts} +3 -2
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-message.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/{v2-binary.js → multi-recipient-message.js} +16 -8
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/multi-recipient-message.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js +25 -2
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts +11 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js +13 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts +20 -135
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js +15 -6
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts +22 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js +39 -4
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/braid-serialize.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/braid-serialize.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/state-machine.js +4 -4
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/state-machine.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.d.ts +37 -12
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.js +104 -31
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/profile-key-credential.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js +3 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.js +4 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/key-storage.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js +4 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js +3 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.js +5 -0
- package/dist/local/store/node/database.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js +4 -0
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/reference-backend.js +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/reference-backend.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.d.ts +63 -0
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js +219 -0
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js +5 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/media/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/media/index.js +7 -4
- package/dist/media/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.js +8 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/server.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.d.ts +5 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.js +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/convex-r2/storage.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/types.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/object-store/validation.js +3 -0
- package/dist/remote/object-store/validation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts +7 -18
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js +15 -24
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts +10 -18
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js +14 -5
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts +3 -17
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js +28 -56
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts +6 -6
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js +2 -2
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts +7 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js +29 -14
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts +3 -6
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js +23 -50
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.d.ts +5 -11
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.js +41 -34
- package/dist/remote/relay/memory/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts +19 -29
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts +8 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.js +9 -2
- package/dist/types/errors.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/username/link.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/username/link.js +1 -1
- package/dist/username/link.js.map +1 -1
- package/docs/ASSURANCE.md +5 -5
- package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md +32 -61
- package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md +7 -0
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +6 -0
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/remote/relay/convex/component/README.md +28 -24
- package/scripts/oe-groups.mjs +5 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js +0 -203
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts +0 -46
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js +0 -198
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts +0 -56
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js +0 -163
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-binary.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-binary.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-helpers.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/v2-helpers.js.map +0 -1
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*/
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import { REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_IDS } from './types.js';
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import { verify, sign, bytesToBase64, base64ToBytes } from '../../crypto/index.js';
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import { verify, sign, bytesToBase64, base64ToBytes, constantTimeEqual } from '../../crypto/index.js';
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import { encodeServerCertificateData, decodeServerCertificateData, encodeServerCertificate, decodeServerCertificate, encodeSenderCertificateData, decodeSenderCertificateData, encodeSenderCertificate, decodeSenderCertificate, } from './proto/index.js';
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const GENERIC_ERROR = 'Sealed sender verification failed';
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// ============================================================================
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export async function createServerCertificate(id, publicKey, trustRootPrivateKey) {
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});
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return {
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export async function createSenderCertificate(fields, signer, signerPrivateKey) {
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});
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const signatureBase64 = await sign(signerPrivateKey, certificateBytesRaw);
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expires: fields.expires,
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senderE164: fields.senderE164,
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// Step 2: Decode inner Certificate protobuf → parsed fields + signer bytes
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const inner = decodeSenderCertificateData(outer.certificate);
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// Validate inner Certificate has required fields
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throw new Error('missing required fields');
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}
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// Step 3: Decode signer bytes as outer ServerCertificate protobuf
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// Step 4: Decode server cert inner protobuf → {id, key}
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const signerInner = decodeServerCertificateData(signerOuter.certificate);
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// Validate server cert inner data
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-
if (!signerInner.key.length
|
|
156
|
+
if (!signerInner.key.length ||
|
|
157
|
+
!Number.isSafeInteger(signerInner.notBefore) ||
|
|
158
|
+
!Number.isSafeInteger(signerInner.notAfter) ||
|
|
159
|
+
signerInner.notBefore <= 0 ||
|
|
160
|
+
signerInner.notAfter < signerInner.notBefore) {
|
|
136
161
|
throw new Error('missing required fields');
|
|
137
162
|
}
|
|
138
163
|
// Build the full ServerCertificate
|
|
139
164
|
const signer = {
|
|
140
165
|
id: signerInner.id,
|
|
141
166
|
publicKey: bytesToBase64(signerInner.key),
|
|
167
|
+
notBefore: signerInner.notBefore,
|
|
168
|
+
notAfter: signerInner.notAfter,
|
|
142
169
|
certificateBytes: bytesToBase64(signerOuter.certificate),
|
|
143
170
|
signature: bytesToBase64(signerOuter.signature),
|
|
144
171
|
};
|
|
@@ -148,6 +175,7 @@ export function deserializeSenderCertificate(bytes) {
|
|
|
148
175
|
senderIdentityKey: bytesToBase64(inner.identityKey),
|
|
149
176
|
expires: inner.expires,
|
|
150
177
|
senderE164: inner.senderE164,
|
|
178
|
+
relayScopeId: bytesToBase64(inner.relayScopeId),
|
|
151
179
|
signer,
|
|
152
180
|
certificateBytes: bytesToBase64(outer.certificate),
|
|
153
181
|
signature: bytesToBase64(outer.signature),
|
|
@@ -172,16 +200,36 @@ export function deserializeSenderCertificate(bytes) {
|
|
|
172
200
|
* @param cert Certificate to validate
|
|
173
201
|
* @param trustRoots Ed25519 trust root public keys
|
|
174
202
|
* @param currentTime Optional timestamp for expiration check (defaults to Date.now())
|
|
203
|
+
* @param policy Required deployment scope and issuer revocation policy
|
|
175
204
|
* @throws Error (generic) if validation fails
|
|
176
205
|
*/
|
|
177
|
-
export async function validateSenderCertificate(cert, trustRoots, currentTime) {
|
|
206
|
+
export async function validateSenderCertificate(cert, trustRoots, currentTime, policy) {
|
|
178
207
|
const now = currentTime ?? Date.now();
|
|
179
208
|
// Must have at least one trust root
|
|
180
209
|
if (trustRoots.length === 0) {
|
|
181
210
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
182
211
|
}
|
|
212
|
+
if (base64ToBytes(policy.expectedRelayScopeId).length !== 16) {
|
|
213
|
+
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
214
|
+
}
|
|
183
215
|
// Step 1: Check revocation by server certificate ID (cheapest check)
|
|
184
|
-
if (REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_IDS.includes(cert.signer.id)
|
|
216
|
+
if (REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_IDS.includes(cert.signer.id) ||
|
|
217
|
+
policy.revokedIssuerKeyIds?.includes(cert.signer.id)) {
|
|
218
|
+
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
219
|
+
}
|
|
220
|
+
if (base64ToBytes(cert.relayScopeId).length !== 16 ||
|
|
221
|
+
!constantTimeEqual(base64ToBytes(cert.relayScopeId), base64ToBytes(policy.expectedRelayScopeId))) {
|
|
222
|
+
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
223
|
+
}
|
|
224
|
+
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(cert.expires) ||
|
|
225
|
+
cert.expires <= 0 ||
|
|
226
|
+
cert.signer.notBefore > cert.signer.notAfter ||
|
|
227
|
+
!Number.isSafeInteger(cert.signer.notBefore) ||
|
|
228
|
+
!Number.isSafeInteger(cert.signer.notAfter) ||
|
|
229
|
+
cert.signer.notBefore <= 0 ||
|
|
230
|
+
now < cert.signer.notBefore ||
|
|
231
|
+
now > cert.signer.notAfter ||
|
|
232
|
+
cert.expires > cert.signer.notAfter) {
|
|
185
233
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
186
234
|
}
|
|
187
235
|
// Check every trust root so the control flow does not reveal which root
|
|
@@ -224,13 +272,22 @@ export async function validateSenderCertificate(cert, trustRoots, currentTime) {
|
|
|
224
272
|
*
|
|
225
273
|
* @param cert Server certificate to validate
|
|
226
274
|
* @param trustRoots Ed25519 trust root public keys
|
|
275
|
+
* @param currentTime Optional timestamp for issuer validity (defaults to Date.now())
|
|
227
276
|
* @throws Error (generic) if validation fails
|
|
228
277
|
*/
|
|
229
|
-
export async function validateServerCertificate(cert, trustRoots) {
|
|
278
|
+
export async function validateServerCertificate(cert, trustRoots, currentTime = Date.now()) {
|
|
230
279
|
// Check revocation
|
|
231
280
|
if (REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_IDS.includes(cert.id)) {
|
|
232
281
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
233
282
|
}
|
|
283
|
+
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(cert.notBefore) ||
|
|
284
|
+
!Number.isSafeInteger(cert.notAfter) ||
|
|
285
|
+
cert.notBefore <= 0 ||
|
|
286
|
+
cert.notAfter < cert.notBefore ||
|
|
287
|
+
currentTime < cert.notBefore ||
|
|
288
|
+
currentTime > cert.notAfter) {
|
|
289
|
+
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
290
|
+
}
|
|
234
291
|
// Validate public key length
|
|
235
292
|
const publicKeyBytes = base64ToBytes(cert.publicKey);
|
|
236
293
|
if (publicKeyBytes.length !== 32) {
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"certificate.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"certificate.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/certificate.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AAOH,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAGlD,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAC7F,OAAO,EACL,2BAA2B,EAC3B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,uBAAuB,EACvB,uBAAuB,EACvB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,uBAAuB,EACvB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAIjB,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAE1D,+EAA+E;AAC/E,uBAAuB;AACvB,+EAA+E;AAE/E;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,uBAAuB,CAC3C,EAAU,EACV,SAAiB,EACjB,mBAA+B,EAC/B,QAAiD;IAEjD,IACE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QACzC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;QACxC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;QACvB,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EACtC,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,CAAC;IAED,oCAAoC;IACpC,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC;QACtD,EAAE;QACF,GAAG,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS;QAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ;KAC5B,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,uBAAuB;IACvB,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC;IAE7E,OAAO;QACL,EAAE;QACF,SAAS;QACT,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS;QAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ;QAC3B,gBAAgB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC;QACpD,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe;KAC3B,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,uBAAuB,CAC3C,MAOC,EACD,MAAyB,EACzB,gBAA4B;IAE5B,IACE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE;QAChD,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;QACrC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;QACnB,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,EAChC,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,CAAC;IAED,2DAA2D;IAC3D,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAAC;QAC1C,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC;QACnD,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;KAC3C,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,+DAA+D;IAC/D,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC;QACtD,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU;QAC7B,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc;QACnC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU;QAC7B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO;QACvB,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC;QACpD,iBAAiB,EAAE,WAAW;QAC9B,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;KACjD,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,iCAAiC;IACjC,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC;IAE1E,OAAO;QACL,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU;QAC7B,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc;QACrC,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB;QAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO;QACvB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU;QAC7B,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY;QACjC,MAAM;QACN,gBAAgB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC;QACpD,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe;KAC3B,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED,+EAA+E;AAC/E,gBAAgB;AAChB,+EAA+E;AAE/E;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAuB;IAChE,OAAO,uBAAuB,CAAC;QAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC;QACjD,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;KACzC,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,4BAA4B,CAAC,KAAiB;IAC5D,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,2DAA2D;QAC3D,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAE7C,4EAA4E;QAC5E,sCAAsC;QACtC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACzD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,CAAC;QAED,2EAA2E;QAC3E,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;QAE7D,iDAAiD;QACjD,IACE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU;YACjB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM;YACzB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAM;YAC/B,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,EAChC,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,CAAC;QAED,kEAAkE;QAClE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;QAErE,sCAAsC;QACtC,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACrE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,CAAC;QAED,wDAAwD;QACxD,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;QAEzE,kCAAkC;QAClC,IACE,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM;YACvB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;YAC5C,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;YAC3C,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;YAC1B,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,EAC5C,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,CAAC;QAED,mCAAmC;QACnC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAsB;YAChC,EAAE,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE;YAClB,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;YACzC,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS;YAChC,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ;YAC9B,gBAAgB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;YACxD,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;SAChD,CAAC;QAEF,OAAO;YACL,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU;YAC5B,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY;YAClC,iBAAiB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;YACnD,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO;YACtB,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU;YAC5B,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;YAC/C,MAAM;YACN,gBAAgB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;YAClD,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;SAC1C,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED,+EAA+E;AAC/E,aAAa;AACb,+EAA+E;AAE/E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,yBAAyB,CAC7C,IAAuB,EACvB,UAAoB,EACpB,WAA+B,EAC/B,MAAyC;IAEzC,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;IAEtC,oCAAoC;IACpC,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC5B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7D,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,CAAC;IAED,qEAAqE;IACrE,IACE,uBAAuB,CAAC,QAA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|
|
@@ -1,59 +1,46 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
*
|
|
2
|
+
* Sealed Sender V2 Multi-Recipient Decryption
|
|
3
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+
*
|
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4
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+
* Implements V2 multi-recipient sealed-sender decryption.
|
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5
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+
*
|
|
6
|
+
* Algorithm:
|
|
7
|
+
* 1. Parse version, find my recipient entry by serviceId
|
|
8
|
+
* 2. M = apply_agreement_xor(recipient_identity, ephemeral_pub, encrypted_key)
|
|
9
|
+
* 3. Verify E_pub matches X25519(derive_private_from_M(M)) - authenticates XOR decryption
|
|
10
|
+
* 4. K = HKDF(M, LABEL_K)
|
|
11
|
+
* 5. usmc = AES-GCM-SIV.Decrypt(K, nonce=zeros, ciphertext) - authenticated decryption
|
|
12
|
+
* 6. Parse certificate from usmc to get sender identity
|
|
13
|
+
* 7. Verify auth_tag using identity-to-identity ECDH (binds sender to message)
|
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14
|
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* 8. Validate sender certificate, return content
|
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15
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*
|
|
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|
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* IMPORTANT: Auth tag is verified AFTER decryption because it requires sender identity
|
|
17
|
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* from the certificate. This is safe because:
|
|
18
|
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* - AES-GCM-SIV provides authenticated encryption
|
|
19
|
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* - Ephemeral key consistency check authenticates the XOR decryption
|
|
20
|
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* - Auth tag binds the sender's identity to the message
|
|
3
21
|
*
|
|
4
|
-
* Implements two decryption stages:
|
|
5
|
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* - Stage 1 (Ephemeral): Decrypts sender's identity public key
|
|
6
|
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* - Stage 2 (Sender): Decrypts certificate + message
|
|
7
|
-
*
|
|
8
|
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* Security:
|
|
9
|
-
* - MAC is verified BEFORE decryption at each stage (critical for security)
|
|
10
|
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* - All errors use generic messages to prevent fingerprinting
|
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11
|
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* - Constant-time MAC comparison prevents timing attacks
|
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|
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* - Sender identity is verified against certificate
|
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*
|
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|
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* @see https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
|
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|
*/
|
|
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|
-
import type { UnsealOptions,
|
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|
+
import type { UnsealOptions, SealedSenderMessageContent } from './types.js';
|
|
17
24
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/** Generic error message for all unseal failures */
|
|
18
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|
export {};
|
|
19
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|
/**
|
|
20
|
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* Unseal a Sealed Sender message
|
|
21
|
-
*
|
|
22
|
-
* Reveals the sender identity only after authenticating the encrypted
|
|
23
|
-
* certificate.
|
|
24
|
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*
|
|
25
|
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* Two-Stage Algorithm:
|
|
26
|
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*
|
|
27
|
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* Stage 1 - Ephemeral Layer (verify and decrypt sender identity):
|
|
28
|
-
* 1. Extract ephemeralPublic, encryptedStatic, encryptedMessage
|
|
29
|
-
* 2. Parse encryptedStatic: e_ciphertext (32 bytes) || e_mac (10 bytes)
|
|
30
|
-
* 3. Compute shared secret: e_ss = X25519(recipientIdentityPrivate, ephemeralPublic)
|
|
31
|
-
* 4. Build salt: e_salt = "UnidentifiedDelivery" || recipientIdentityPublic || ephemeralPublic
|
|
32
|
-
* 5. Derive keys: e_material = HKDF(salt=e_salt, ikm=e_ss, length=96)
|
|
33
|
-
* 6. **VERIFY MAC FIRST**: Compare e_mac with HMAC(e_macKey, e_ciphertext)
|
|
34
|
-
* 7. Decrypt: senderIdentityPublic = AES-CTR(e_cipherKey, iv=0, e_ciphertext)
|
|
35
|
-
*
|
|
36
|
-
* Stage 2 - Sender Layer (verify and decrypt message):
|
|
37
|
-
* 1. Parse encryptedMessage: s_ciphertext || s_mac (10 bytes)
|
|
38
|
-
* 2. Compute shared secret: s_ss = X25519(recipientIdentityPrivate, senderIdentityPublic)
|
|
39
|
-
* 3. Build salt: s_salt = e_chain || e_ciphertext || e_mac
|
|
40
|
-
* 4. Derive keys: s_material = HKDF(salt=s_salt, ikm=s_ss, length=96)
|
|
41
|
-
* 5. **VERIFY MAC FIRST**: Compare s_mac with HMAC(s_macKey, s_ciphertext)
|
|
42
|
-
* 6. Decrypt: envelope = AES-CTR(s_cipherKey, iv=0, s_ciphertext)
|
|
43
|
-
* 7. Parse envelope to extract certificate and message
|
|
44
|
-
* 8. Validate certificate matches decrypted sender identity
|
|
45
|
-
* 9. Validate certificate (expiration, signature, revocation)
|
|
46
|
-
* 10. Self-send detection
|
|
47
|
-
*
|
|
48
|
-
* Security:
|
|
49
|
-
* - MAC is verified BEFORE decryption at each stage
|
|
50
|
-
* - Sender identity from Stage 1 is verified against certificate
|
|
27
|
+
* Unseal a V2 multi-recipient Sealed Sender message.
|
|
51
28
|
*
|
|
52
|
-
* @param options
|
|
29
|
+
* @param options V2 unsealing options
|
|
53
30
|
* @returns Decrypted content with validated sender certificate
|
|
54
31
|
* @throws Error (generic) if any validation fails
|
|
55
32
|
*
|
|
56
|
-
* @
|
|
33
|
+
* @example
|
|
34
|
+
* ```typescript
|
|
35
|
+
* const content = await unseal({
|
|
36
|
+
* sealedMessage: receivedMessage,
|
|
37
|
+
* recipientIdentityPrivate: myPrivateKey,
|
|
38
|
+
* recipientIdentityPublic: myPublicKey,
|
|
39
|
+
* recipientServiceId: 'my-user-id',
|
|
40
|
+
* recipientDeviceId: 1,
|
|
41
|
+
* trustRoots: [trustRootPublicKey],
|
|
42
|
+
* });
|
|
43
|
+
* ```
|
|
57
44
|
*/
|
|
58
|
-
export declare function unseal(options: UnsealOptions): Promise<
|
|
45
|
+
export declare function unseal(options: UnsealOptions): Promise<SealedSenderMessageContent>;
|
|
59
46
|
//# sourceMappingURL=decryption.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"decryption.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"decryption.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAqB,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AA2B5F,oDAAoD;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AA6EV;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAsB,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAwIxF"}
|
|
@@ -1,53 +1,36 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
*
|
|
2
|
+
* Sealed Sender V2 Multi-Recipient Decryption
|
|
3
3
|
*
|
|
4
|
-
* Implements
|
|
5
|
-
* - Stage 1 (Ephemeral): Decrypts sender's identity public key
|
|
6
|
-
* - Stage 2 (Sender): Decrypts certificate + message
|
|
4
|
+
* Implements V2 multi-recipient sealed-sender decryption.
|
|
7
5
|
*
|
|
8
|
-
*
|
|
9
|
-
*
|
|
10
|
-
*
|
|
11
|
-
*
|
|
12
|
-
*
|
|
6
|
+
* Algorithm:
|
|
7
|
+
* 1. Parse version, find my recipient entry by serviceId
|
|
8
|
+
* 2. M = apply_agreement_xor(recipient_identity, ephemeral_pub, encrypted_key)
|
|
9
|
+
* 3. Verify E_pub matches X25519(derive_private_from_M(M)) - authenticates XOR decryption
|
|
10
|
+
* 4. K = HKDF(M, LABEL_K)
|
|
11
|
+
* 5. usmc = AES-GCM-SIV.Decrypt(K, nonce=zeros, ciphertext) - authenticated decryption
|
|
12
|
+
* 6. Parse certificate from usmc to get sender identity
|
|
13
|
+
* 7. Verify auth_tag using identity-to-identity ECDH (binds sender to message)
|
|
14
|
+
* 8. Validate sender certificate, return content
|
|
15
|
+
*
|
|
16
|
+
* IMPORTANT: Auth tag is verified AFTER decryption because it requires sender identity
|
|
17
|
+
* from the certificate. This is safe because:
|
|
18
|
+
* - AES-GCM-SIV provides authenticated encryption
|
|
19
|
+
* - Ephemeral key consistency check authenticates the XOR decryption
|
|
20
|
+
* - Auth tag binds the sender's identity to the message
|
|
13
21
|
*
|
|
14
|
-
* @see https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
|
|
15
22
|
*/
|
|
16
|
-
import {
|
|
23
|
+
import { SEALED_SENDER_V2_UUID_VERSION, SEALED_SENDER_V2_SERVICE_ID_VERSION, isSealedSenderContentType, } from './types.js';
|
|
17
24
|
import { deserializeSenderCertificate, validateSenderCertificate } from './certificate.js';
|
|
18
|
-
import {
|
|
19
|
-
import {
|
|
25
|
+
import { deriveEphemeralPrivateFromM, deriveCipherKeyFromM, applyAgreementXor, computeAuthenticationTag, verifyAuthenticationTag, } from './multi-recipient-crypto.js';
|
|
26
|
+
import { bytesToBase64, base64ToBytes, constantTimeEqual, secureZeroBytes, aesGcmSivDecryptZeroNonce, } from '../../crypto/index.js';
|
|
27
|
+
import { decodeVarint } from '../../encoding/proto/primitives.js';
|
|
20
28
|
import { x25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519.js';
|
|
21
29
|
const GENERIC_ERROR = 'Sealed sender verification failed';
|
|
22
30
|
/** contentType(1) + certLen varint(1) + msgLen varint(1) + contentHint(1). */
|
|
23
31
|
const MIN_ENVELOPE_BYTES = 4;
|
|
24
32
|
/**
|
|
25
|
-
*
|
|
26
|
-
*
|
|
27
|
-
* Wraps the shared decodeVarint primitive with:
|
|
28
|
-
* - Tuple return format [value, bytesRead] (matching sealed sender convention)
|
|
29
|
-
* - Generic error message (no information leakage)
|
|
30
|
-
*
|
|
31
|
-
* @param bytes Bytes to decode from
|
|
32
|
-
* @param offset Starting offset
|
|
33
|
-
* @returns [value, bytesRead]
|
|
34
|
-
*/
|
|
35
|
-
function decodeVarint(bytes, offset) {
|
|
36
|
-
try {
|
|
37
|
-
const { value, bytesRead } = decodeVarintObj(bytes, offset);
|
|
38
|
-
return [value, bytesRead];
|
|
39
|
-
}
|
|
40
|
-
catch {
|
|
41
|
-
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
42
|
-
}
|
|
43
|
-
}
|
|
44
|
-
/**
|
|
45
|
-
* Parse the decrypted envelope to extract certificate and message.
|
|
46
|
-
*
|
|
47
|
-
* Format: contentType(1) || varint(certLen) || certBytes || varint(msgLen) || msgBytes || contentHint
|
|
48
|
-
*
|
|
49
|
-
* @param envelope Decrypted envelope bytes
|
|
50
|
-
* @returns Parsed envelope components
|
|
33
|
+
* Parse decrypted envelope to extract certificate and message.
|
|
51
34
|
*/
|
|
52
35
|
function parseEnvelope(envelope) {
|
|
53
36
|
// Smallest well-formed envelope: type, two zero-length varints, hint.
|
|
@@ -61,12 +44,11 @@ function parseEnvelope(envelope) {
|
|
|
61
44
|
}
|
|
62
45
|
let offset = 1;
|
|
63
46
|
// Read certificate length
|
|
64
|
-
const
|
|
47
|
+
const { value: certLen, bytesRead: certLenBytes } = decodeVarint(envelope, offset);
|
|
65
48
|
if (certLenBytes === 0) {
|
|
66
49
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
67
50
|
}
|
|
68
51
|
offset += certLenBytes;
|
|
69
|
-
// Validate we have enough bytes for certificate
|
|
70
52
|
if (offset + certLen > envelope.length) {
|
|
71
53
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
72
54
|
}
|
|
@@ -74,12 +56,11 @@ function parseEnvelope(envelope) {
|
|
|
74
56
|
const certBytes = envelope.slice(offset, offset + certLen);
|
|
75
57
|
offset += certLen;
|
|
76
58
|
// Read message length
|
|
77
|
-
const
|
|
59
|
+
const { value: msgLen, bytesRead: msgLenBytes } = decodeVarint(envelope, offset);
|
|
78
60
|
if (msgLenBytes === 0) {
|
|
79
61
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
80
62
|
}
|
|
81
63
|
offset += msgLenBytes;
|
|
82
|
-
// Validate we have enough bytes for message
|
|
83
64
|
if (offset + msgLen > envelope.length) {
|
|
84
65
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
85
66
|
}
|
|
@@ -103,171 +84,103 @@ function parseEnvelope(envelope) {
|
|
|
103
84
|
return { certificate, message, contentType, contentHint };
|
|
104
85
|
}
|
|
105
86
|
/**
|
|
106
|
-
* Unseal a Sealed Sender message
|
|
107
|
-
*
|
|
108
|
-
* Reveals the sender identity only after authenticating the encrypted
|
|
109
|
-
* certificate.
|
|
110
|
-
*
|
|
111
|
-
* Two-Stage Algorithm:
|
|
87
|
+
* Unseal a V2 multi-recipient Sealed Sender message.
|
|
112
88
|
*
|
|
113
|
-
*
|
|
114
|
-
* 1. Extract ephemeralPublic, encryptedStatic, encryptedMessage
|
|
115
|
-
* 2. Parse encryptedStatic: e_ciphertext (32 bytes) || e_mac (10 bytes)
|
|
116
|
-
* 3. Compute shared secret: e_ss = X25519(recipientIdentityPrivate, ephemeralPublic)
|
|
117
|
-
* 4. Build salt: e_salt = "UnidentifiedDelivery" || recipientIdentityPublic || ephemeralPublic
|
|
118
|
-
* 5. Derive keys: e_material = HKDF(salt=e_salt, ikm=e_ss, length=96)
|
|
119
|
-
* 6. **VERIFY MAC FIRST**: Compare e_mac with HMAC(e_macKey, e_ciphertext)
|
|
120
|
-
* 7. Decrypt: senderIdentityPublic = AES-CTR(e_cipherKey, iv=0, e_ciphertext)
|
|
121
|
-
*
|
|
122
|
-
* Stage 2 - Sender Layer (verify and decrypt message):
|
|
123
|
-
* 1. Parse encryptedMessage: s_ciphertext || s_mac (10 bytes)
|
|
124
|
-
* 2. Compute shared secret: s_ss = X25519(recipientIdentityPrivate, senderIdentityPublic)
|
|
125
|
-
* 3. Build salt: s_salt = e_chain || e_ciphertext || e_mac
|
|
126
|
-
* 4. Derive keys: s_material = HKDF(salt=s_salt, ikm=s_ss, length=96)
|
|
127
|
-
* 5. **VERIFY MAC FIRST**: Compare s_mac with HMAC(s_macKey, s_ciphertext)
|
|
128
|
-
* 6. Decrypt: envelope = AES-CTR(s_cipherKey, iv=0, s_ciphertext)
|
|
129
|
-
* 7. Parse envelope to extract certificate and message
|
|
130
|
-
* 8. Validate certificate matches decrypted sender identity
|
|
131
|
-
* 9. Validate certificate (expiration, signature, revocation)
|
|
132
|
-
* 10. Self-send detection
|
|
133
|
-
*
|
|
134
|
-
* Security:
|
|
135
|
-
* - MAC is verified BEFORE decryption at each stage
|
|
136
|
-
* - Sender identity from Stage 1 is verified against certificate
|
|
137
|
-
*
|
|
138
|
-
* @param options Unsealing options
|
|
89
|
+
* @param options V2 unsealing options
|
|
139
90
|
* @returns Decrypted content with validated sender certificate
|
|
140
91
|
* @throws Error (generic) if any validation fails
|
|
141
92
|
*
|
|
142
|
-
* @
|
|
93
|
+
* @example
|
|
94
|
+
* ```typescript
|
|
95
|
+
* const content = await unseal({
|
|
96
|
+
* sealedMessage: receivedMessage,
|
|
97
|
+
* recipientIdentityPrivate: myPrivateKey,
|
|
98
|
+
* recipientIdentityPublic: myPublicKey,
|
|
99
|
+
* recipientServiceId: 'my-user-id',
|
|
100
|
+
* recipientDeviceId: 1,
|
|
101
|
+
* trustRoots: [trustRootPublicKey],
|
|
102
|
+
* });
|
|
103
|
+
* ```
|
|
143
104
|
*/
|
|
144
105
|
export async function unseal(options) {
|
|
145
|
-
const { sealedMessage, recipientIdentityPrivate, trustRoots, currentTime } = options;
|
|
146
|
-
//
|
|
106
|
+
const { sealedMessage, recipientIdentityPrivate, recipientIdentityPublic, recipientServiceId, recipientDeviceId, trustRoots, currentTime, certificatePolicy, } = options;
|
|
107
|
+
// Track sensitive material for secure zeroing
|
|
147
108
|
const toZero = [];
|
|
148
|
-
//
|
|
149
|
-
//
|
|
150
|
-
|
|
151
|
-
const
|
|
152
|
-
|
|
153
|
-
|
|
109
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
110
|
+
// Step 1: Validate version and find my recipient entry
|
|
111
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
112
|
+
const version = sealedMessage.version;
|
|
113
|
+
if (version !== SEALED_SENDER_V2_UUID_VERSION &&
|
|
114
|
+
version !== SEALED_SENDER_V2_SERVICE_ID_VERSION) {
|
|
154
115
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
155
116
|
}
|
|
156
|
-
//
|
|
157
|
-
|
|
117
|
+
// Find my recipient entry
|
|
118
|
+
const myRecipient = sealedMessage.recipients.find((r) => r.serviceId === recipientServiceId && r.deviceId === recipientDeviceId);
|
|
119
|
+
if (!myRecipient) {
|
|
158
120
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
159
121
|
}
|
|
160
122
|
try {
|
|
161
|
-
|
|
162
|
-
|
|
163
|
-
|
|
164
|
-
|
|
165
|
-
|
|
166
|
-
const ephemeralPublicBytes = base64ToBytes(sealedMessage.ephemeralPublic);
|
|
167
|
-
const encryptedStatic = base64ToBytes(sealedMessage.encryptedStatic);
|
|
168
|
-
const encryptedMessage = base64ToBytes(sealedMessage.encryptedMessage);
|
|
169
|
-
// Validate ephemeral key size
|
|
170
|
-
if (ephemeralPublicBytes.length !== 32) {
|
|
171
|
-
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
172
|
-
}
|
|
173
|
-
// Step 1.2: Parse encryptedStatic: e_ciphertext || e_mac
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174
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// e_ciphertext = 32 bytes (encrypted sender identity public key)
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175
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// e_mac = MAC_BYTES
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176
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const expectedStaticLen = 32 + MAC_BYTES;
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177
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if (encryptedStatic.length !== expectedStaticLen) {
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178
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throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
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179
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-
}
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180
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-
const e_ciphertext = encryptedStatic.slice(0, 32);
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181
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const e_mac = encryptedStatic.slice(32, 32 + MAC_BYTES);
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182
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// Step 1.3: Compute shared secret: e_ss = ECDH(recipientIdentityPrivate, ephemeralPublic)
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183
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-
const recipientPrivateBase64 = bytesToBase64(recipientIdentityPrivate);
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184
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-
const ephemeralPublicBase64 = bytesToBase64(ephemeralPublicBytes);
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185
|
-
const e_sharedSecret = await computeSharedSecret(recipientPrivateBase64, ephemeralPublicBase64);
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|
186
|
-
toZero.push(e_sharedSecret);
|
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187
|
-
// Step 1.4: build the Stage 1 salt.
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188
|
-
// We need the recipient's public key, so derive it from the private key.
|
|
189
|
-
// Note: for X25519, we cannot easily derive public from private without the
|
|
190
|
-
// curve library.
|
|
191
|
-
// The recipient should provide their public key. For now, we will need to
|
|
192
|
-
// add it to options.
|
|
193
|
-
// WORKAROUND: use the certificate's expected sender identity to validate
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|
194
|
-
// later.
|
|
195
|
-
const saltPrefix = stringToBytes(SEALED_SENDER_SALT);
|
|
196
|
-
// Derive recipient's public key from private key for salt computation.
|
|
197
|
-
// The reference implementation uses the recipient's stored public key. We derive it from the private key.
|
|
198
|
-
const recipientIdentityPublic = x25519.getPublicKey(recipientIdentityPrivate);
|
|
199
|
-
const e_salt = concatBytes(saltPrefix, recipientIdentityPublic, ephemeralPublicBytes);
|
|
200
|
-
// Step 1.5: Derive ephemeral keys (96 bytes: cipher + mac + chain)
|
|
201
|
-
const e_material = await hkdf(e_sharedSecret, e_salt, new Uint8Array(0), 96);
|
|
202
|
-
toZero.push(e_material);
|
|
203
|
-
const e_cipherKey = e_material.slice(0, 32);
|
|
204
|
-
const e_macKey = e_material.slice(32, 64);
|
|
205
|
-
const e_chain = e_material.slice(64, 96);
|
|
206
|
-
toZero.push(e_cipherKey, e_macKey, e_chain);
|
|
207
|
-
// Step 1.6: **VERIFY MAC FIRST** (critical for security)
|
|
208
|
-
const expectedE_mac_full = await hmac(e_macKey, e_ciphertext);
|
|
209
|
-
const expectedE_mac = expectedE_mac_full.slice(0, MAC_BYTES);
|
|
210
|
-
if (!constantTimeEqual(e_mac, expectedE_mac)) {
|
|
123
|
+
const ephemeralPublic = base64ToBytes(sealedMessage.ephemeralPublic);
|
|
124
|
+
const encryptedMessageKey = base64ToBytes(myRecipient.encryptedMessageKey);
|
|
125
|
+
const receivedAuthTag = base64ToBytes(myRecipient.authenticationTag);
|
|
126
|
+
const messageCiphertext = base64ToBytes(sealedMessage.messageCiphertext);
|
|
127
|
+
if (ephemeralPublic.length !== 32) {
|
|
211
128
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
212
129
|
}
|
|
213
|
-
//
|
|
214
|
-
|
|
215
|
-
|
|
216
|
-
//
|
|
217
|
-
|
|
130
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
131
|
+
// Step 2: Decrypt M using XOR (ephemeral-to-identity ECDH)
|
|
132
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
133
|
+
const M = await applyAgreementXor(recipientIdentityPrivate, ephemeralPublic, ephemeralPublic, // For receiving: both ECDH target and IKM are the ephemeral key
|
|
134
|
+
'receiving', encryptedMessageKey);
|
|
135
|
+
toZero.push(M);
|
|
136
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
137
|
+
// Step 3: Verify ephemeral public key consistency
|
|
138
|
+
// This authenticates the XOR decryption - if M was wrong, derived key will not match
|
|
139
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
140
|
+
const derivedEphemeralPrivate = await deriveEphemeralPrivateFromM(M);
|
|
141
|
+
toZero.push(derivedEphemeralPrivate);
|
|
142
|
+
const derivedEphemeralPublic = x25519.getPublicKey(derivedEphemeralPrivate);
|
|
143
|
+
if (!constantTimeEqual(ephemeralPublic, derivedEphemeralPublic)) {
|
|
218
144
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
219
145
|
}
|
|
220
146
|
// ========================================================================
|
|
221
|
-
//
|
|
222
|
-
// Decrypt certificate + message
|
|
147
|
+
// Step 4: Derive cipher key K from M
|
|
223
148
|
// ========================================================================
|
|
224
|
-
|
|
225
|
-
|
|
226
|
-
|
|
149
|
+
const cipherKey = await deriveCipherKeyFromM(M);
|
|
150
|
+
toZero.push(cipherKey);
|
|
151
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
152
|
+
// Step 5: Decrypt message with AES-GCM-SIV (provides authenticated decryption)
|
|
153
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
154
|
+
let envelope;
|
|
155
|
+
try {
|
|
156
|
+
envelope = aesGcmSivDecryptZeroNonce(cipherKey, messageCiphertext);
|
|
227
157
|
}
|
|
228
|
-
|
|
229
|
-
const s_mac = encryptedMessage.slice(-MAC_BYTES);
|
|
230
|
-
// Step 2.2: Compute shared secret: s_ss = ECDH(recipientIdentityPrivate, senderIdentityPublic)
|
|
231
|
-
const senderIdentityPublicBase64 = bytesToBase64(senderIdentityPublic);
|
|
232
|
-
const s_sharedSecret = await computeSharedSecret(recipientPrivateBase64, senderIdentityPublicBase64);
|
|
233
|
-
toZero.push(s_sharedSecret);
|
|
234
|
-
// Step 2.3: Build salt for Stage 2 (chained from Stage 1)
|
|
235
|
-
// s_salt = e_chain || e_ciphertext || e_mac
|
|
236
|
-
const s_salt = concatBytes(e_chain, e_ciphertext, e_mac);
|
|
237
|
-
// Step 2.4: Derive sender keys (96 bytes: discard + cipher + mac)
|
|
238
|
-
// The first 32 bytes of the 96-byte derivation are domain-separated discard
|
|
239
|
-
// material. Cipher and MAC keys occupy the remaining bytes.
|
|
240
|
-
const s_material = await hkdf(s_sharedSecret, s_salt, new Uint8Array(0), 96);
|
|
241
|
-
toZero.push(s_material);
|
|
242
|
-
// s_material[0:32] discarded (mirrors EphemeralKeys structure)
|
|
243
|
-
const s_cipherKey = s_material.slice(32, 64);
|
|
244
|
-
const s_macKey = s_material.slice(64, 96);
|
|
245
|
-
toZero.push(s_cipherKey, s_macKey);
|
|
246
|
-
// Step 2.5: **VERIFY MAC FIRST** (critical for security)
|
|
247
|
-
const expectedS_mac_full = await hmac(s_macKey, s_ciphertext);
|
|
248
|
-
const expectedS_mac = expectedS_mac_full.slice(0, MAC_BYTES);
|
|
249
|
-
if (!constantTimeEqual(s_mac, expectedS_mac)) {
|
|
158
|
+
catch {
|
|
250
159
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
251
160
|
}
|
|
252
|
-
//
|
|
253
|
-
|
|
254
|
-
|
|
255
|
-
// Step 2.7: Parse envelope
|
|
161
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
162
|
+
// Step 6: Parse envelope to get sender certificate
|
|
163
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
256
164
|
const { certificate, message, contentType, contentHint } = parseEnvelope(envelope);
|
|
257
|
-
//
|
|
258
|
-
|
|
259
|
-
|
|
165
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
166
|
+
// Step 7: Verify authentication tag (identity-to-identity ECDH).
|
|
167
|
+
// Now that we have the sender's identity from the certificate, verify the
|
|
168
|
+
// auth tag. This binds the sender's identity to the message.
|
|
169
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
170
|
+
const senderIdentityPublic = base64ToBytes(certificate.senderIdentityKey);
|
|
171
|
+
const expectedAuthTag = await computeAuthenticationTag(recipientIdentityPrivate, recipientIdentityPublic, senderIdentityPublic, ephemeralPublic, encryptedMessageKey, 'receiving');
|
|
172
|
+
if (!verifyAuthenticationTag(expectedAuthTag, receivedAuthTag)) {
|
|
260
173
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
261
174
|
}
|
|
262
|
-
//
|
|
263
|
-
|
|
264
|
-
//
|
|
265
|
-
|
|
266
|
-
|
|
267
|
-
|
|
175
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
176
|
+
// Step 8: Validate sender certificate
|
|
177
|
+
// ========================================================================
|
|
178
|
+
await validateSenderCertificate(certificate, trustRoots, currentTime, certificatePolicy);
|
|
179
|
+
// Self-send detection
|
|
180
|
+
if (certificate.senderUuid === recipientServiceId &&
|
|
181
|
+
certificate.senderDeviceId === recipientDeviceId) {
|
|
268
182
|
throw new Error(GENERIC_ERROR);
|
|
269
183
|
}
|
|
270
|
-
// Step 2.11: Return validated content
|
|
271
184
|
return {
|
|
272
185
|
senderCertificate: certificate,
|
|
273
186
|
signalProtocolMessage: bytesToBase64(message),
|