@oneuptime/common 14.0.9 → 14.0.10

package/Tests/Server/Utils/AI/RemediationCommandToolsResource.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1530 @@
+import RemediationCommandToolkit, {
+  INLINE_COMMAND_STEP_ID_PREFIX,
+  RemediationCommandNeedingApproval,
+  RemediationCommandToolkitOptions,
+} from "../../../../Server/Utils/AI/Remediation/RemediationCommandTools";
+import { ObservabilityAssistantExtraTool } from "../../../../Server/Utils/AI/Chat/ObservabilityAssistant";
+import { ToolCallOutcome } from "../../../../Server/Utils/AI/Toolbox/Index";
+import AIRunService from "../../../../Server/Services/AIRunService";
+import AutoRemediationSuggestionService from "../../../../Server/Services/AutoRemediationSuggestionService";
+import ResourceAiAccessService from "../../../../Server/Services/ResourceAiAccessService";
+import RunnerJobService, {
+  MAX_AI_RESOURCE_COMMAND_JOBS_PER_PROJECT_PER_HOUR,
+  ResourceCommandEnqueueRefusedException,
+} from "../../../../Server/Services/RunnerJobService";
+import RunnerService from "../../../../Server/Services/RunnerService";
+import { MAX_AUTO_EXECUTIONS_PER_RULE_PER_HOUR } from "../../../../Server/Services/AutoRemediationRuleEngineService";
+import Semaphore, {
+  SemaphoreMutex,
+} from "../../../../Server/Infrastructure/Semaphore";
+import logger from "../../../../Server/Utils/Logger";
+import AutoRemediationSuggestion from "../../../../Models/DatabaseModels/AutoRemediationSuggestion";
+import RunnerJob from "../../../../Models/DatabaseModels/RunnerJob";
+import AutoRemediationSuggestionStatus from "../../../../Types/AutoRemediation/AutoRemediationSuggestionStatus";
+import AutoRemediationVerificationStatus from "../../../../Types/AutoRemediation/AutoRemediationVerificationStatus";
+import {
+  AiRemediationCommand,
+  AiRemediationCommandExecutionStatus,
+  AiRemediationCommandPlan,
+  AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict,
+  MAX_PLAN_COMMANDS,
+  RESOURCE_ALWAYS_ASKS_SUMMARY,
+  RESOURCE_NEVER_RUNS_SUMMARY,
+} from "../../../../Types/AutoRemediation/AiRemediationCommandPlan";
+import AiResourceType from "../../../../Types/ResourceAiAgent/AiResourceType";
+import {
+  MAX_RESOURCE_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  ResourceAiAccessStatus,
+  ResourceAiAgentPosture,
+  ResourceAiRemediationMode,
+  ResourceCommandTier,
+} from "../../../../Types/ResourceAiAgent/ResourceAiAccess";
+import RunbookStepType from "../../../../Types/Runbook/RunbookStepType";
+import RunnerJobOrigin from "../../../../Types/Runbook/RunnerJobOrigin";
+import RunnerJobStatus from "../../../../Types/Runbook/RunnerJobStatus";
+import ResourceCommandPolicy from "../../../../Utils/AiRemediation/Resource/ResourceCommandPolicy";
+import { RUN_INFRASTRUCTURE_COMMAND_TOOL_NAME } from "../../../../Server/Utils/AI/ResourceAccess/ResourceAccessToolNames";
+import { JSONObject } from "../../../../Types/JSON";
+import ObjectID from "../../../../Types/ObjectID";
+import PositiveNumber from "../../../../Types/PositiveNumber";
+import OneUptimeDate from "../../../../Types/Date";
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "@jest/globals";
+
+/*
+ * Contract under test — the remediation toolkit on a RESOURCE round (a
+ * Docker or Podman host, a Docker Swarm, Proxmox, VMware or Ceph cluster, a
+ * database server, a host), mirroring what the kubectl branch guarantees on
+ * a cluster round:
+ *
+ * - the round offers ResourceCommand steps on its resource and nothing else:
+ *   no Runner, no cluster, no credential; the schema, the targets list and
+ *   the tool descriptions say so, and carry the resource's own write guide;
+ * - a read sent through the execute tool is refused and pointed at
+ *   run_infrastructure_command (it would count as an executed fix);
+ * - Denied never runs; the ladder (evaluateForAutoExecution with the
+ *   resource's allowlist, bypass = BypassApproval) decides what runs
+ *   unattended, and what a human's click would let run is KEPT for the
+ *   round's proposal — riskier changes, what always needs a human, a mode
+ *   changed to "ask", a tripped breaker, another round holding the resource;
+ * - the resource is re-read LIVE before every change: fixes turned off, not
+ *   ready, deleted or reached through another agent revoke it (and drop what
+ *   was kept); a failed read refuses without revoking; the live mode and
+ *   allowlist decide;
+ * - the agent's reported write scope (read-only, protected targets,
+ *   ONEUPTIME_AI_WRITE_TARGETS) refuses a change, or its rollback, before it
+ *   is composed — never kept;
+ * - the run's first change takes a per-resource breaker slot under the
+ *   resource's own lock; later changes reuse it;
+ * - the command is enqueued through enqueueAiResourceCommand with the
+ *   inline step id and the resource's agent, recorded BEFORE and named on
+ *   the record before the wait, and read like every resource job: NotRun is
+ *   off the record, Unknown stays as "may have run".
+ */
+
+const PROJECT_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID(
+  "22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222",
+);
+const RUN_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID("88888888-8888-4888-8888-888888888888");
+const SUGGESTION_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID(
+  "77777777-7777-4777-8777-777777777777",
+);
+const OTHER_SUGGESTION_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID(
+  "79797979-7979-4979-8979-797979797979",
+);
+const RESOURCE_ID: string = "33333333-3333-4333-8333-333333333333";
+const AGENT_ID: string = "44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444";
+const OTHER_AGENT_ID: string = "45454545-4545-4545-8545-454545454545";
+const JOB_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID("66666666-6666-4666-8666-666666666666");
+
+const SAFE_WRITE: string = "docker restart web";
+const SAFE_UNDO: string = "docker start web";
+const RISKY_WRITE: string = "docker stop web";
+const READ: string = "docker ps -a";
+
+function posture(
+  overrides: Partial<ResourceAiAgentPosture> = {},
+): ResourceAiAgentPosture {
+  return {
+    resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+    resourceIdentifier: "web-1",
+    allowWrites: true,
+    writeTargets: [],
+    protectedTargets: ["oneuptime-ai-agent"],
+    reachable: true,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function resource(
+  overrides: Partial<ResourceAiAccessStatus> = {},
+  postureOverrides: Partial<ResourceAiAgentPosture> = {},
+): ResourceAiAccessStatus {
+  const resourceType: AiResourceType =
+    overrides.resourceType || AiResourceType.DockerHost;
+
+  return {
+    resourceType,
+    resourceId: RESOURCE_ID,
+    resourceName: "web-1",
+    isAiInvestigationEnabled: true,
+    aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.Automatic,
+    aiCommandAllowlist: [],
+    agent: {
+      agentId: AGENT_ID,
+      connectionStatus: "connected",
+      isOnline: true,
+      posture: posture({ resourceType, ...postureOverrides }),
+    },
+    gaps: [],
+    isInvestigationReady: true,
+    isRemediationReady: true,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function buildToolkit(
+  overrides: Partial<RemediationCommandToolkitOptions> = {},
+): RemediationCommandToolkit {
+  return new RemediationCommandToolkit({
+    projectId: PROJECT_ID,
+    aiRunId: RUN_ID,
+    suggestionId: SUGGESTION_ID,
+    mode: "FullAuto",
+    allowlistPatterns: [],
+    allowedRunnerIds: [],
+    clusterTargets: [],
+    resourceTargets: [resource()],
+    proposesRefusedCommands: true,
+    resourceHold: { anyOrder: false },
+    ...overrides,
+  });
+}
+
+function tool(
+  toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit,
+  name: string,
+): ObservabilityAssistantExtraTool {
+  const found: ObservabilityAssistantExtraTool | undefined = toolkit
+    .buildTools()
+    .find((candidate: ObservabilityAssistantExtraTool) => {
+      return candidate.definition.name === name;
+    });
+  if (!found) {
+    throw new Error(`${name} is not offered.`);
+  }
+  return found;
+}
+
+function execute(
+  toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit,
+  args: JSONObject,
+): Promise<ToolCallOutcome> {
+  return tool(toolkit, "execute_remediation_command").execute(args);
+}
+
+function resourceArgs(
+  overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {},
+): JSONObject {
+  return {
+    stepType: "ResourceCommand",
+    resourceId: RESOURCE_ID,
+    command: SAFE_WRITE,
+    rationale: "the web container is wedged after an OOM",
+    expectedEffect: "web serves requests again",
+    ...overrides,
+  } as JSONObject;
+}
+
+function fakeJob(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}): RunnerJob {
+  return {
+    id: JOB_ID,
+    _id: JOB_ID.toString(),
+    status: RunnerJobStatus.Succeeded,
+    exitCode: 0,
+    output: "web",
+    payload: { displayCommand: SAFE_WRITE, program: "docker" },
+    ...overrides,
+  } as unknown as RunnerJob;
+}
+
+let enqueue: jest.SpyInstance;
+let persist: jest.SpyInstance;
+let liveStatus: jest.SpyInstance;
+let lock: jest.SpyInstance;
+let release: jest.SpyInstance;
+let poll: jest.SpyInstance;
+let jobCount: jest.SpyInstance;
+let suggestionCount: jest.SpyInstance;
+let suggestionFindBy: jest.SpyInstance;
+let recordOutcome: jest.SpyInstance;
+let claimRead: jest.SpyInstance;
+
+function mockHappyPath(): void {
+  jest.spyOn(logger, "error").mockImplementation((): void => {
+    return undefined;
+  });
+  jest.spyOn(logger, "warn").mockImplementation((): void => {
+    return undefined;
+  });
+  jest
+    .spyOn(AutoRemediationSuggestionService, "findOneById")
+    .mockResolvedValue({
+      id: SUGGESTION_ID,
+      _id: SUGGESTION_ID.toString(),
+      status: AutoRemediationSuggestionStatus.Planning,
+    } as unknown as AutoRemediationSuggestion);
+  persist = jest
+    .spyOn(AutoRemediationSuggestionService, "updateOneById")
+    .mockResolvedValue(undefined as never);
+  jobCount = jest
+    .spyOn(RunnerJobService, "countBy")
+    .mockResolvedValue(new PositiveNumber(0));
+  enqueue = jest
+    .spyOn(RunnerJobService, "enqueueAiResourceCommand")
+    .mockResolvedValue(fakeJob({ status: RunnerJobStatus.Pending }));
+  poll = jest
+    .spyOn(RunnerJobService, "pollUntilTerminal")
+    .mockResolvedValue(fakeJob());
+  claimRead = jest.spyOn(RunnerJobService, "findOneById").mockResolvedValue({
+    id: JOB_ID,
+    claimedAt: new Date(),
+    startedAt: new Date(),
+  } as unknown as RunnerJob);
+  jest.spyOn(AIRunService, "updateOneBy").mockResolvedValue(undefined as never);
+  recordOutcome = jest
+    .spyOn(ResourceAiAccessService, "recordCommandOutcome")
+    .mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  jest
+    .spyOn(RunnerService, "getOnlineAiCommandRunnersForProject")
+    .mockResolvedValue([]);
+  liveStatus = jest
+    .spyOn(ResourceAiAccessService, "getStatusForResource")
+    .mockResolvedValue(resource());
+  lock = jest
+    .spyOn(Semaphore, "lock")
+    .mockResolvedValue({ id: "resource-lock" } as unknown as SemaphoreMutex);
+  release = jest.spyOn(Semaphore, "release").mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  suggestionCount = jest
+    .spyOn(AutoRemediationSuggestionService, "countBy")
+    .mockResolvedValue(new PositiveNumber(0));
+  suggestionFindBy = jest
+    .spyOn(AutoRemediationSuggestionService, "findBy")
+    .mockResolvedValue([]);
+  jest.spyOn(RunnerJobService, "findBy").mockResolvedValue([]);
+}
+
+function expectNothingRanOrRecorded(
+  toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit,
+  outcome: ToolCallOutcome,
+): void {
+  expect(outcome.success).toBe(false);
+  expect(enqueue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  expect(persist).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()).toHaveLength(0);
+}
+
+function kept(
+  toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit,
+): Array<RemediationCommandNeedingApproval> {
+  return toolkit.getCommandsNeedingApproval();
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  mockHappyPath();
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+describe("the tools a resource round offers", () => {
+  it("offers the targets list and the execute tool in FullAuto — ResourceCommand on the resource only", () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    expect(toolkit.isResourceRound()).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      toolkit.buildTools().map((candidate: ObservabilityAssistantExtraTool) => {
+        return candidate.definition.name;
+      }),
+    ).toEqual(["list_command_targets", "execute_remediation_command"]);
+
+    const executeTool: ObservabilityAssistantExtraTool = tool(
+      toolkit,
+      "execute_remediation_command",
+    );
+    const schema: JSONObject = executeTool.definition.inputSchema as JSONObject;
+    const properties: JSONObject = schema["properties"] as JSONObject;
+
+    expect((properties["stepType"] as JSONObject)["enum"]).toEqual([
+      "ResourceCommand",
+    ]);
+    expect(Object.keys(properties).sort()).toEqual(
+      [
+        "command",
+        "expectedEffect",
+        "rationale",
+        "resourceId",
+        "rollbackCommand",
+        "stepType",
+        "timeoutInMs",
+      ].sort(),
+    );
+    expect(schema["required"]).toContain("resourceId");
+
+    const description: string = executeTool.definition.description;
+    expect(description).toContain("stepType ResourceCommand");
+    expect(description).toContain(RUN_INFRASTRUCTURE_COMMAND_TOOL_NAME);
+    expect(description).toContain(RESOURCE_ALWAYS_ASKS_SUMMARY);
+    expect(description).toContain(RESOURCE_NEVER_RUNS_SUMMARY);
+    expect(description).toContain(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getWriteCommandGuide(AiResourceType.DockerHost),
+    );
+    expect(description).toContain(`resourceId: ${RESOURCE_ID}`);
+    expect(description).not.toContain("kubectl");
+
+    expect(
+      tool(toolkit, "list_command_targets").definition.description,
+    ).toContain("the infrastructure resource this round is about");
+  });
+
+  it("offers the propose tool in Suggest, with the same ResourceCommand schema and the write guide", () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      mode: "Suggest",
+    });
+
+    const proposeTool: ObservabilityAssistantExtraTool = tool(
+      toolkit,
+      "propose_remediation_commands",
+    );
+    const items: JSONObject = (
+      (proposeTool.definition.inputSchema as JSONObject)[
+        "properties"
+      ] as JSONObject
+    )["commands"] as JSONObject;
+    const itemSchema: JSONObject = items["items"] as JSONObject;
+
+    expect(
+      ((itemSchema["properties"] as JSONObject)["stepType"] as JSONObject)[
+        "enum"
+      ],
+    ).toEqual(["ResourceCommand"]);
+    expect(itemSchema["required"]).toContain("resourceId");
+    expect(proposeTool.definition.description).toContain(
+      ResourceCommandPolicy.getWriteCommandGuide(AiResourceType.DockerHost),
+    );
+    expect(proposeTool.definition.description).toContain(
+      RESOURCE_NEVER_RUNS_SUMMARY,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("a round without resource targets is not a resource round, and its schema is unchanged", () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: undefined,
+    });
+
+    expect(toolkit.isResourceRound()).toBe(false);
+    const properties: JSONObject = (
+      tool(toolkit, "execute_remediation_command").definition
+        .inputSchema as JSONObject
+    )["properties"] as JSONObject;
+    expect((properties["stepType"] as JSONObject)["enum"]).toEqual([
+      "Bash",
+      "SSH",
+      "Kubectl",
+    ]);
+    expect(properties["resourceId"]).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * A Kubernetes or rule round never offered ResourceCommand: to it the
+   * step type is as unknown as before the resource lane existed, and its
+   * refusal lists exactly the step types it offers — the words it always
+   * had ("stepType must be one of: Bash, SSH, Kubectl.").
+   */
+  it("a non-resource round refuses a ResourceCommand step with the original words", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toBe(
+      "stepType must be one of: Bash, SSH, Kubectl.",
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+
+  it("a non-resource round refuses an unknown step type naming only Bash, SSH and Kubectl — never ResourceCommand", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ stepType: "kubectl" }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toBe(
+      "stepType must be one of: Bash, SSH, Kubectl.",
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+
+  it("a resource round refuses an unknown step type naming only ResourceCommand", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ stepType: "Docker" }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toBe(
+      "stepType must be one of: ResourceCommand.",
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("list_command_targets on a resource round", () => {
+  it("lists the resource, its programs, mode, write scope and allowlist — and no Runner", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [resource({ aiCommandAllowlist: ["docker stop web"] })],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await tool(
+      toolkit,
+      "list_command_targets",
+    ).execute({});
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(outcome.result?.rowCount).toBe(1);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Resource");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(RESOURCE_ID);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("ResourceCommand");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("its Docker AI agent");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Automatic:");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("docker stop web");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("oneuptime-ai-agent");
+    expect(
+      RunnerService.getOnlineAiCommandRunnersForProject,
+    ).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("says so when the resource no longer allows remediation", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [resource({ isRemediationReady: false })],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await tool(
+      toolkit,
+      "list_command_targets",
+    ).execute({});
+
+    expect(outcome.result?.rowCount).toBe(0);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("no longer allows AI remediation");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("execute_remediation_command on a resource round", () => {
+  it("runs a safe change through the resource chokepoint, recorded before it runs", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ rollbackCommand: SAFE_UNDO, timeoutInMs: 45000 }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(enqueue.mock.calls[0]![0]).toEqual({
+      projectId: PROJECT_ID,
+      aiRunId: RUN_ID,
+      origin: RunnerJobOrigin.AiRemediation,
+      autoRemediationSuggestionId: SUGGESTION_ID,
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      resourceId: new ObjectID(RESOURCE_ID),
+      stepId: `${INLINE_COMMAND_STEP_ID_PREFIX}1`,
+      targetResourceAiAgentId: new ObjectID(AGENT_ID),
+      command: SAFE_WRITE,
+      timeoutInMs: 45000,
+      claimTimeoutInMs: 60000,
+    });
+
+    // The durable record lands before the job exists.
+    expect(persist.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]!).toBeLessThan(
+      enqueue.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]!,
+    );
+
+    const executed: AiRemediationCommand = toolkit.getExecutedCommands()[0]!;
+    expect(executed).toMatchObject({
+      sequence: 1,
+      stepType: RunbookStepType.ResourceCommand,
+      runnerId: AGENT_ID,
+      runnerNameSnapshot: "Docker AI agent",
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      resourceId: RESOURCE_ID,
+      resourceNameSnapshot: "web-1",
+      resourceCommandTier: ResourceCommandTier.SafeWrite,
+      command: SAFE_WRITE,
+      rollbackCommand: SAFE_UNDO,
+      policyVerdict: AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.AutoApproved,
+      wasAutoExecuted: true,
+    });
+    expect(executed.credentialId).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(executed.kubernetesClusterId).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(executed.execution).toMatchObject({
+      status: AiRemediationCommandExecutionStatus.Succeeded,
+      runnerJobId: JOB_ID.toString(),
+      exitCode: 0,
+    });
+
+    expect(outcome.result?.citationLabel).toBe(
+      'Executed on Docker host "web-1": docker restart web',
+    );
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      '<tool_result source="untrusted_resource_output">',
+    );
+    expect(recordOutcome).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      resourceId: new ObjectID(RESOURCE_ID),
+      succeeded: true,
+      errorMessage: undefined,
+    });
+
+    // The job id was on the record before the wait began.
+    const recorded: Array<JSONObject> = persist.mock.calls.map(
+      (call: Array<unknown>): JSONObject => {
+        return (call[0] as { data: { commandPlan: JSONObject } }).data
+          .commandPlan;
+      },
+    );
+    expect(
+      recorded.some((plan: JSONObject): boolean => {
+        const commands: Array<JSONObject> = plan[
+          "commands"
+        ] as Array<JSONObject>;
+        return (
+          (commands[0]!["execution"] as JSONObject)["runnerJobId"] ===
+            JOB_ID.toString() &&
+          (commands[0]!["execution"] as JSONObject)["status"] ===
+            AiRemediationCommandExecutionStatus.Pending
+        );
+      }),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("takes the resource's own breaker lock for its first change, releases it once the job exists, and not again for the next change", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(lock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(lock.mock.calls[0]![0]).toMatchObject({
+      namespace: "AutoRemediationResourceBreaker",
+      key: `DockerHost:${RESOURCE_ID}`,
+    });
+    expect(release).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(release.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]!).toBeGreaterThan(
+      enqueue.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]!,
+    );
+    expect(release.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]!).toBeLessThan(
+      poll.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]!,
+    );
+
+    await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs({ command: "docker restart api" }));
+
+    expect(lock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(enqueue.mock.calls[1]![0]).toMatchObject({
+      stepId: `${INLINE_COMMAND_STEP_ID_PREFIX}2`,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a read and points at run_infrastructure_command", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ command: READ }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("is read-only");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(RUN_INFRASTRUCTURE_COMMAND_TOOL_NAME);
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["docker exec web sh"],
+    ["docker rm -f web"],
+    ["docker restart web; rm -rf /"],
+    ["sudo docker restart web"],
+    ["systemctl restart nginx"],
+  ])("refuses a denied command outright: %s", async (command: string) => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ command }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      "Denied by the Docker host command policy",
+    );
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("can never run");
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a step that names a credential: the agent never gets one", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ credentialId: "55555555-5555-4555-8555-555555555555" }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("never carries a credential");
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["an unknown resourceId", { resourceId: OTHER_AGENT_ID }],
+    ["no resourceId", { resourceId: undefined }],
+  ])(
+    "refuses %s",
+    async (_label: string, overrides: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+      const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+      const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+        toolkit,
+        resourceArgs(overrides),
+      );
+
+      expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("resourceId is required");
+      expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    },
+  );
+
+  it("matches the resourceId case-insensitively", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ resourceId: RESOURCE_ID.toUpperCase() }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it.each([["Bash"], ["SSH"], ["Kubectl"]])(
+    "refuses a %s step: a resource round runs resource commands only",
+    async (stepType: string) => {
+      const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+      const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+        toolkit,
+        resourceArgs({ stepType, runnerId: AGENT_ID }),
+      );
+
+      expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("use stepType ResourceCommand");
+      expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    },
+  );
+
+  it("refuses a riskier change on an Automatic resource and KEEPS it for the proposal", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ command: RISKY_WRITE, rollbackCommand: SAFE_UNDO }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("The command was NOT executed");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      "OneUptime AI proposes it for one-click approval",
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+
+    const keptCommands: Array<RemediationCommandNeedingApproval> =
+      kept(toolkit);
+    expect(keptCommands).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(keptCommands[0]!.reason).toContain("riskier change");
+    expect(keptCommands[0]!.command).toMatchObject({
+      stepType: RunbookStepType.ResourceCommand,
+      command: RISKY_WRITE,
+      resourceCommandTier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+      policyVerdict: AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.RequiresApproval,
+      wasAutoExecuted: false,
+    });
+
+    // The same change twice is kept once.
+    await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ command: RISKY_WRITE, rollbackCommand: SAFE_UNDO }),
+    );
+    expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("runs a riskier change the resource's allowlist names", async () => {
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(
+      resource({ aiCommandAllowlist: ["docker stop *"] }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [resource({ aiCommandAllowlist: ["docker stop *"] })],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ command: RISKY_WRITE }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()[0]!.policyVerdict).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.AutoApproved,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("uses the LIVE allowlist, not the run's snapshot", async () => {
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(
+      resource({ aiCommandAllowlist: ["docker stop web"] }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ command: RISKY_WRITE }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("runs a riskier change on a BypassApproval resource, rollback included", async () => {
+    const bypass: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource({
+      aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.BypassApproval,
+    });
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(bypass);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [bypass],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({
+        command: "docker start web",
+        rollbackCommand: RISKY_WRITE,
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()[0]!.rollbackCommand).toBe(RISKY_WRITE);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a change that always needs a human even on a bypassed, allowlisted resource", async () => {
+    const host: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource({
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.Host,
+      aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.BypassApproval,
+      aiCommandAllowlist: ["kill -TERM 1234"],
+    });
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(host);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [host],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ command: "kill -TERM 1234" }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("always needs a human, in every mode");
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)[0]!.reason).toContain("always needs a human");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps every change on a resource that asks for approval", async () => {
+    const askFirst: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource({
+      aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.RequireApproval,
+    });
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(askFirst);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [askFirst],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      'Docker host "web-1" requires human approval for every change',
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)[0]!.reason).toBe(
+      'Docker host "web-1" asks for approval of every change',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a change when the operator moved the resource to ask for approval mid-run", async () => {
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(
+      resource({
+        aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.RequireApproval,
+      }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      "was changed to ask for approval during this run",
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)[0]!.reason).toContain(
+      "was changed to ask for approval during the round",
+    );
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * Automatic runs only a signal's FIRST round unattended. A follow-up that
+   * started under Bypass approval must stop running changes once the
+   * operator moves the resource to Automatic mid-run — Automatic is still
+   * an "unattended" mode, but not for round 2.
+   */
+  it("keeps a change on a follow-up round when the operator moved the resource from Bypass approval to Automatic mid-run", async () => {
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(
+      resource({ aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.Automatic }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [
+        resource({
+          aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.BypassApproval,
+        }),
+      ],
+      resourceRoundNumber: 2,
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      "was changed to Automatic during this run, and Automatic asks for approval of every change after a signal's first round (this is round 2)",
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)[0]!.reason).toContain(
+      "was changed to Automatic during the round",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("negative control: the same move on round 1 keeps running safe changes (Automatic runs round 1 unattended)", async () => {
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(
+      resource({ aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.Automatic }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [
+        resource({
+          aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.BypassApproval,
+        }),
+      ],
+      resourceRoundNumber: 1,
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("negative control: a follow-up round on a resource still on Bypass approval keeps running", async () => {
+    const bypass: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource({
+      aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.BypassApproval,
+    });
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(bypass);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [bypass],
+      resourceRoundNumber: 2,
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    [
+      "fixes turned off",
+      resource({
+        isRemediationReady: false,
+        aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.Disabled,
+        gaps: [
+          {
+            code: "remediation_disabled",
+            title: "AI fixes are turned off for this Docker host",
+            nextStep: "Turn them on.",
+            blocksInvestigation: false,
+            blocksRemediation: true,
+          },
+        ],
+      }),
+      "no longer allows AI remediation (AI fixes are turned off for this Docker host)",
+    ],
+    [
+      "the agent was replaced",
+      resource({
+        agent: {
+          agentId: OTHER_AGENT_ID,
+          connectionStatus: "connected",
+          isOnline: true,
+          posture: posture(),
+        },
+      }),
+      "is no longer reached through the AI agent this run started with",
+    ],
+    ["the resource was deleted", null, "no longer exists in this project"],
+  ])(
+    "revokes the resource when %s — and drops what was kept for it",
+    async (
+      _label: string,
+      live: ResourceAiAccessStatus | null,
+      expected: string,
+    ) => {
+      const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+      // Kept while the resource still allowed remediation.
+      await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs({ command: RISKY_WRITE }));
+      expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(1);
+
+      liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(live);
+
+      const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+      expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(expected);
+      expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+        "Do NOT run any further command on this Docker host",
+      );
+      expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+      expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(0);
+      expect(toolkit.getResourceTargets()).toHaveLength(0);
+    },
+  );
+
+  it("refuses without revoking when the live status cannot be read", async () => {
+    liveStatus.mockRejectedValue(new Error("db down"));
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      'Could not confirm that Docker host "web-1" still allows AI remediation',
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(toolkit.getResourceTargets()).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    [
+      "a protected target",
+      { protectedTargets: ["web"] },
+      "which the Docker AI agent protects",
+    ],
+    [
+      "a target outside ONEUPTIME_AI_WRITE_TARGETS",
+      { writeTargets: ["api*"] },
+      "outside the targets the Docker AI agent may change (ONEUPTIME_AI_WRITE_TARGETS=api*)",
+    ],
+  ])(
+    "refuses — never keeps — a change to %s",
+    async (
+      _label: string,
+      postureOverrides: Partial<ResourceAiAgentPosture>,
+      expected: string,
+    ) => {
+      const scoped: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource({}, postureOverrides);
+      liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(scoped);
+      const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+        resourceTargets: [scoped],
+      });
+
+      const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+      expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(expected);
+      expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+        "The command was neither run nor recorded.",
+      );
+      expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+      expect(kept(toolkit)).toHaveLength(0);
+    },
+  );
+
+  it("refuses when the agent's LIVE posture narrowed the write scope mid-run", async () => {
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(resource({}, { protectedTargets: ["web"] }));
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("which the Docker AI agent protects");
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a change whose rollback the agent would refuse", async () => {
+    const scoped: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource(
+      {},
+      { writeTargets: ["web"] },
+    );
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(scoped);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [scoped],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ rollbackCommand: "docker start api" }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      "The rollbackCommand would be refused when it has to run",
+    );
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    [
+      "a riskier rollback on an Automatic resource",
+      { command: SAFE_UNDO, rollbackCommand: RISKY_WRITE },
+      "is a risky change",
+    ],
+    [
+      "a denied rollback",
+      { rollbackCommand: "docker rm -f web" },
+      "The rollbackCommand is denied",
+    ],
+  ])(
+    "refuses %s",
+    async (
+      _label: string,
+      overrides: Record<string, unknown>,
+      expected: string,
+    ) => {
+      const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+      const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+        toolkit,
+        resourceArgs(overrides),
+      );
+
+      expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(expected);
+      expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+    },
+  );
+
+  it("refuses a rollback that always needs a human, even on a bypassed resource", async () => {
+    const host: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource({
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.Host,
+      aiRemediationMode: ResourceAiRemediationMode.BypassApproval,
+    });
+    liveStatus.mockResolvedValue(host);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      resourceTargets: [host],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({
+        command: "systemctl restart nginx",
+        rollbackCommand: "kill -TERM 1234",
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("always needs a human");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("rollbacks run unattended");
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the change when the resource's hourly breaker has tripped", async () => {
+    suggestionCount.mockResolvedValue(
+      new PositiveNumber(MAX_AUTO_EXECUTIONS_PER_RULE_PER_HOUR),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      'The hourly circuit breaker for Docker host "web-1" tripped',
+    );
+    expect(enqueue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(release).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)[0]!.reason).toContain("hourly circuit breaker");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the change when the breaker lock cannot be had", async () => {
+    lock.mockRejectedValue(new Error("redis down"));
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      'Could not check the hourly limit on unattended AI fixes for Docker host "web-1"',
+    );
+    expect(enqueue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(kept(toolkit)[0]!.reason).toContain("could not be checked");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the change when another round holds the resource", async () => {
+    suggestionFindBy.mockImplementation(
+      async (args: unknown): Promise<Array<AutoRemediationSuggestion>> => {
+        const query: Record<string, unknown> = (
+          args as { query: Record<string, unknown> }
+        ).query;
+        // The hold read (the breaker's in-flight read filters on Planning).
+        if (typeof query["status"] === "string") {
+          return [];
+        }
+        return [
+          {
+            id: OTHER_SUGGESTION_ID,
+            status: AutoRemediationSuggestionStatus.AutoExecuted,
+            verificationStatus: AutoRemediationVerificationStatus.Pending,
+            verificationDeadlineAt: OneUptimeDate.addRemoveMinutes(
+              OneUptimeDate.getCurrentDate(),
+              5,
+            ),
+          } as unknown as AutoRemediationSuggestion,
+        ];
+      },
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      'Another OneUptime AI run on Docker host "web-1" applied a fix that is still being verified',
+    );
+    expect(enqueue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(release).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(kept(toolkit)[0]!.reason).toContain("another OneUptime AI run");
+  });
+
+  it("refuses at the project's hourly limit on infrastructure commands, counted on ResourceCommand rows", async () => {
+    jobCount.mockResolvedValue(
+      new PositiveNumber(MAX_AI_RESOURCE_COMMAND_JOBS_PER_PROJECT_PER_HOUR),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      "hourly limit on AI commands on its infrastructure",
+    );
+    expect(enqueue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(
+      (jobCount.mock.calls[0]![0] as { query: Record<string, unknown> }).query,
+    ).toMatchObject({
+      projectId: PROJECT_ID,
+      origin: RunnerJobOrigin.AiRemediation,
+      stepType: RunbookStepType.ResourceCommand,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("stops the moment a human dismissed the suggestion", async () => {
+    jest
+      .spyOn(AutoRemediationSuggestionService, "findOneById")
+      .mockResolvedValue({
+        id: SUGGESTION_ID,
+        status: AutoRemediationSuggestionStatus.Dismissed,
+      } as unknown as AutoRemediationSuggestion);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("dismissed or already settled");
+    expectNothingRanOrRecorded(toolkit, outcome);
+  });
+
+  it("clamps the timeout to the resource agent's maximum", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs({ timeoutInMs: 290_000 }));
+
+    expect(enqueue.mock.calls[0]![0]).toMatchObject({
+      timeoutInMs: MAX_RESOURCE_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("takes a command that certainly never ran off the record, and says so", async () => {
+    poll.mockResolvedValue(
+      fakeJob({
+        status: RunnerJobStatus.Failed,
+        exitCode: undefined,
+        output: "",
+        errorMessage: "Refused: the agent is read-only.",
+      }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      '"docker restart web" did NOT run on Docker host "web-1": Refused: the agent is read-only.',
+    );
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Nothing changed on the Docker host");
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()).toHaveLength(0);
+    // The job exists: its sequence is never reused.
+    await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+    expect(enqueue.mock.calls[1]![0]).toMatchObject({
+      stepId: `${INLINE_COMMAND_STEP_ID_PREFIX}2`,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("tells the model the agent is not picking commands up when none claimed the job", async () => {
+    poll.mockResolvedValue(
+      fakeJob({
+        status: RunnerJobStatus.TimedOut,
+        exitCode: undefined,
+        output: "",
+        errorMessage: undefined,
+      }),
+    );
+    claimRead.mockResolvedValue({ id: JOB_ID } as unknown as RunnerJob);
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("its AI agent is not picking them up");
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("a command the chokepoint refused never ran", async () => {
+    enqueue.mockRejectedValue(
+      new ResourceCommandEnqueueRefusedException(
+        "switch_off",
+        'AI fixes are turned off for Docker host "web-1", so this command was not enqueued.',
+      ),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("did NOT run");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("AI fixes are turned off");
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("a command the agent took with no result back stays on the record as 'may have run'", async () => {
+    poll.mockResolvedValue(
+      fakeJob({
+        status: RunnerJobStatus.TimedOut,
+        exitCode: undefined,
+        output: "",
+        errorMessage: undefined,
+      }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(
+      toolkit,
+      resourceArgs({ rollbackCommand: SAFE_UNDO }),
+    );
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      'RESULT UNKNOWN on Docker host "web-1"',
+    );
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(RUN_INFRASTRUCTURE_COMMAND_TOOL_NAME);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain(
+      "its rollbackCommand is not run blind",
+    );
+    expect(outcome.result?.citationLabel).toBe(
+      'Sent to Docker host "web-1", result unknown: docker restart web',
+    );
+    const executed: AiRemediationCommand = toolkit.getExecutedCommands()[0]!;
+    expect(executed.execution?.status).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandExecutionStatus.Failed,
+    );
+    expect(executed.execution?.runnerJobId).toBe(JOB_ID.toString());
+  });
+
+  it("a broken wait after the enqueue is 'may have run' too", async () => {
+    poll.mockRejectedValue(new Error("lost the database connection"));
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("RESULT UNKNOWN");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Waiting for its result failed");
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()[0]!.execution?.runnerJobId).toBe(
+      JOB_ID.toString(),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("a program the agent killed at its timeout may have changed the resource", async () => {
+    poll.mockResolvedValue(
+      fakeJob({
+        status: RunnerJobStatus.Failed,
+        exitCode: undefined,
+        output: "",
+        errorMessage: "Killed (timeout 30s)",
+      }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("MAY have changed the resource");
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("a change that ran and failed is on the record, and only an access failure becomes the resource's last error", async () => {
+    poll.mockResolvedValue(
+      fakeJob({
+        status: RunnerJobStatus.Failed,
+        exitCode: 1,
+        output: "[stderr]\nError response from daemon: No such container: web",
+        errorMessage: "Exit code 1",
+      }),
+    );
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("FAILED");
+    expect(toolkit.getExecutedCommands()[0]!.execution?.status).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandExecutionStatus.Failed,
+    );
+    expect(recordOutcome).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it(`sends at most the run's command budget`, async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit();
+
+    for (let i: number = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+      await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+    }
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await execute(toolkit, resourceArgs());
+
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("command budget");
+    expect(enqueue).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(5);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("propose_remediation_commands on a resource round", () => {
+  function propose(
+    toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit,
+    commands: Array<JSONObject>,
+  ): Promise<ToolCallOutcome> {
+    return tool(toolkit, "propose_remediation_commands").execute({
+      commands,
+    } as JSONObject);
+  }
+
+  it("records a plan of resource commands, every one RequiresApproval, with the resource and the tier", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      mode: "Suggest",
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await propose(toolkit, [
+      resourceArgs({ command: RISKY_WRITE, rollbackCommand: SAFE_UNDO }),
+      resourceArgs({ command: SAFE_WRITE }),
+    ]);
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(true);
+    const plan: AiRemediationCommandPlan = toolkit.getProposedPlan()!;
+    expect(plan.commands).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(plan.commands[0]).toMatchObject({
+      sequence: 1,
+      stepType: RunbookStepType.ResourceCommand,
+      runnerId: AGENT_ID,
+      runnerNameSnapshot: "Docker AI agent",
+      resourceType: AiResourceType.DockerHost,
+      resourceId: RESOURCE_ID,
+      resourceNameSnapshot: "web-1",
+      resourceCommandTier: ResourceCommandTier.RiskyWrite,
+      policyVerdict: AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.RequiresApproval,
+      rollbackCommand: SAFE_UNDO,
+    });
+    expect(plan.commands[1]!.policyVerdict).toBe(
+      AiRemediationCommandPolicyVerdict.RequiresApproval,
+    );
+    // Nothing is enqueued while planning.
+    expect(enqueue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(liveStatus).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses the whole plan when a step is a read, denied, credentialed or out of scope", async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      mode: "Suggest",
+      resourceTargets: [resource({}, { protectedTargets: ["api"] })],
+    });
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await propose(toolkit, [
+      resourceArgs({ command: READ }),
+      resourceArgs({ command: "docker exec web sh" }),
+      resourceArgs({ credentialId: "55555555-5555-4555-8555-555555555555" }),
+      resourceArgs({ command: "docker restart api" }),
+      resourceArgs(),
+    ]);
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("The plan was NOT recorded");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Command 1:");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("is read-only — it is not a fix");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Command 2: Denied");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Command 3: A ResourceCommand never");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("Command 4:");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).toContain("protects");
+    expect(outcome.textForLlm).not.toContain("Command 5:");
+    expect(toolkit.getProposedPlan()).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it(`caps a plan at ${MAX_PLAN_COMMANDS} commands`, async () => {
+    const toolkit: RemediationCommandToolkit = buildToolkit({
+      mode: "Suggest",
+    });
+    const commands: Array<JSONObject> = [];
+    for (let i: number = 0; i <= MAX_PLAN_COMMANDS; i++) {
+      commands.push(resourceArgs());
+    }
+
+    const outcome: ToolCallOutcome = await propose(toolkit, commands);
+
+    expect(outcome.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(toolkit.getProposedPlan()).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the resource write scope, as the toolkit reads the agent's posture", () => {
+  it("never refuses a read or a denied command (the policy handles the latter)", () => {
+    const readOnly: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource(
+      {},
+      { allowWrites: false },
+    );
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.getResourceWriteScopeRefusal({
+        resource: readOnly,
+        command: READ,
+      }),
+    ).toBeNull();
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.getResourceWriteScopeRefusal({
+        resource: readOnly,
+        command: "docker exec web sh",
+      }),
+    ).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses every write of a read-only agent, naming the switch", () => {
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.getResourceWriteScopeRefusal({
+        resource: resource({}, { allowWrites: false }),
+        command: SAFE_WRITE,
+      }),
+    ).toContain("ONEUPTIME_AI_ALLOW_WRITES=true");
+  });
+
+  it("refuses every write when the agent reported no posture", () => {
+    const status: ResourceAiAccessStatus = resource();
+    status.agent!.posture = null;
+
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.getResourceWriteScopeRefusal({
+        resource: status,
+        command: SAFE_WRITE,
+      }),
+    ).toContain("read-only");
+    expect(RemediationCommandToolkit.describeResourceWriteScope(status)).toBe(
+      "not reported by the agent yet, so it runs no change",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("describes the scope in the words of the agent's settings", () => {
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.describeResourceWriteScope(
+        resource({}, { allowWrites: false }),
+      ),
+    ).toContain(
+      "read-only (ONEUPTIME_AI_ALLOW_WRITES is not true on the agent)",
+    );
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.describeResourceWriteScope(
+        resource({}, { writeTargets: ["web*", "api"] }),
+      ),
+    ).toContain(
+      "changes only targets matching ONEUPTIME_AI_WRITE_TARGETS=web*,api",
+    );
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.describeResourceWriteScope(resource()),
+    ).toContain("never its protected targets (oneuptime-ai-agent)");
+  });
+
+  it("names where the agent's write access is set, for an approval refusal", () => {
+    expect(
+      RemediationCommandToolkit.getResourceScopeRefusalNextStep(
+        AiResourceType.Host,
+      ),
+    ).toContain("Host AI agent's write access");
+  });
+});