@oneuptime/common 13.0.0 → 13.0.3

package/Tests/Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHubCommandAuthorizer.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,883 @@
+import CodeRepositoryService from "../../../../Server/Services/CodeRepositoryService";
+import ProjectService from "../../../../Server/Services/ProjectService";
+import GitHubCommandAuthorizer, {
+  GitHubAuthorizationOutcome,
+  GitHubAuthorizationResult,
+} from "../../../../Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHubCommandAuthorizer";
+import GitHubConversation, {
+  GitHubRepositoryPermission,
+} from "../../../../Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHubConversation";
+import GitHubInstallationBinding from "../../../../Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHubInstallationBinding";
+import CodeRepository from "../../../../Models/DatabaseModels/CodeRepository";
+import Project from "../../../../Models/DatabaseModels/Project";
+import SortOrder from "../../../../Types/BaseDatabase/SortOrder";
+import CodeRepositoryType from "../../../../Types/CodeRepository/CodeRepositoryType";
+import ObjectID from "../../../../Types/ObjectID";
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "@jest/globals";
+
+/*
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * GitHubCommandAuthorizer is the ONLY thing standing between "@oneuptime
+ * implement this" typed by a stranger and an agent run that pushes commits,
+ * opens pull requests and spends a project's AI budget.
+ *
+ * Every command arrives from an untrusted party: a connected repository's
+ * issue tracker is open to anyone with a GitHub account, and a mention costs
+ * nothing to write. So there are four invariants here, and each one is a
+ * different incident when it regresses.
+ *
+ *   1. BOTS ARE NEVER OBEYED, AND NEVER ANSWERED. The app's own comments come
+ *      back as webhooks. If a bot sender ever reached the resolver, two apps
+ *      mentioning each other would burn a budget overnight. The guard has to
+ *      fire before ANY service call — a bot must not even cause a database
+ *      read.
+ *
+ *   2. THE ROW'S INSTALLATION ID IS NOT AUTHORITY (GHSA-xx95-gmcf-7q86). A
+ *      CodeRepository row carries an installation ID, and the single GitHub
+ *      App JWT this instance holds will mint a write-scoped token for whatever
+ *      installation it is handed. Whether an installation may act for a
+ *      project is answered by GitHubInstallationBinding and nowhere else, so
+ *      an unbound candidate row must be SKIPPED rather than used.
+ *
+ *   3. ONE COMMENT PRODUCES AT MOST ONE RUN. A repository can be imported by
+ *      several projects. Acting for all of them turns one mention into several
+ *      projects' pull requests, so the query is ordered oldest-first and the
+ *      first bound candidate wins — deterministically, and identically across
+ *      webhook redeliveries.
+ *
+ *   4. SILENCE VS. REPLY IS PART OF THE BOUNDARY. A collaborator who hits a
+ *      switched-off repository gets a reason to show them. Someone WITHOUT
+ *      write access gets no reason at all, because a guaranteed reply per
+ *      mention is exactly the amplifier an open issue tracker would hand to
+ *      anyone with an account. These tests assert the presence and the ABSENCE
+ *      of `reason` as carefully as they assert the outcome.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+const ORGANIZATION: string = "acme";
+const REPOSITORY: string = "checkout";
+const INSTALLATION_ID: string = "12345678";
+
+// The shape of the single argument CodeRepositoryService.findBy is handed.
+interface FindByCallArguments {
+  query: {
+    organizationName?: string | undefined;
+    repositoryName?: string | undefined;
+    repositoryHostedAt?: CodeRepositoryType | undefined;
+    gitHubAppInstallationId?: string | undefined;
+  };
+  sort: {
+    createdAt?: SortOrder | undefined;
+  };
+  props: {
+    isRoot?: boolean | undefined;
+  };
+  limit?: number | undefined;
+  skip?: number | undefined;
+}
+
+interface BindingCallArguments {
+  projectId: ObjectID;
+  installationId: string;
+}
+
+interface PermissionCallArguments {
+  installationId: string;
+  organizationName: string;
+  repositoryName: string;
+  username: string;
+}
+
+describe("GitHubCommandAuthorizer", () => {
+  let projectId: ObjectID;
+  let findBySpy: jest.SpyInstance;
+  let isBoundSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
+  let permissionSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
+  let findOneByIdSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    projectId = ObjectID.generate();
+
+    // Default world: nothing connected, everything else permissive.
+    findBySpy = jest.spyOn(CodeRepositoryService, "findBy");
+    findBySpy.mockResolvedValue([]);
+
+    isBoundSpy = jest.spyOn(
+      GitHubInstallationBinding,
+      "isInstallationBoundToProject",
+    );
+    isBoundSpy.mockResolvedValue(true);
+
+    permissionSpy = jest.spyOn(
+      GitHubConversation,
+      "getUserRepositoryPermission",
+    );
+    permissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(GitHubRepositoryPermission.Admin);
+
+    findOneByIdSpy = jest.spyOn(ProjectService, "findOneById");
+    findOneByIdSpy.mockResolvedValue(namedProject("Acme Production"));
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * Required, not cosmetic: these spies mutate shared module singletons that
+   * outlive the test and would leak into every other test in this worker.
+   */
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  function namedProject(name: string): Project {
+    const project: Project = new Project();
+    project.id = projectId;
+    project.name = name;
+    return project;
+  }
+
+  // A row with the identity fields set but neither project nor installation.
+  function bareRepository(): CodeRepository {
+    const repository: CodeRepository = new CodeRepository();
+    repository.id = ObjectID.generate();
+    repository.organizationName = ORGANIZATION;
+    repository.repositoryName = REPOSITORY;
+    repository.mainBranchName = "main";
+    repository.repositoryHostedAt = CodeRepositoryType.GitHub;
+    return repository;
+  }
+
+  function connectedRepository(data?: {
+    projectId?: ObjectID | undefined;
+    installationId?: string | undefined;
+  }): CodeRepository {
+    const repository: CodeRepository = bareRepository();
+    repository.projectId = data?.projectId || projectId;
+    repository.gitHubAppInstallationId =
+      data?.installationId || INSTALLATION_ID;
+    return repository;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * The commands switch is a nullable boolean column, and "null" is a state
+   * TypeScript will not let us assign through the model's own typing. Tests
+   * that pin the null-means-enabled semantics need to produce it anyway.
+   */
+  function setCommandsColumn(
+    repository: CodeRepository,
+    value: boolean | null | undefined,
+  ): void {
+    (repository as unknown as Record<string, boolean | null | undefined>)[
+      "isGitHubCommandsEnabled"
+    ] = value;
+  }
+
+  function mockCandidates(candidates: Array<CodeRepository>): void {
+    findBySpy.mockResolvedValue(candidates);
+  }
+
+  function authorize(overrides?: {
+    senderLogin?: string | undefined;
+    senderType?: string | undefined;
+    installationId?: string | undefined;
+  }): Promise<GitHubAuthorizationResult> {
+    return GitHubCommandAuthorizer.authorize({
+      organizationName: ORGANIZATION,
+      repositoryName: REPOSITORY,
+      installationId: overrides?.installationId ?? INSTALLATION_ID,
+      senderLogin: overrides?.senderLogin ?? "octo-dev",
+      senderType: overrides?.senderType ?? "User",
+    });
+  }
+
+  function resolve(): Promise<CodeRepository | null> {
+    return GitHubCommandAuthorizer.resolveConnectedRepository({
+      organizationName: ORGANIZATION,
+      repositoryName: REPOSITORY,
+      installationId: INSTALLATION_ID,
+    });
+  }
+
+  function findByCall(): FindByCallArguments {
+    return findBySpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as FindByCallArguments;
+  }
+
+  function bindingCall(callNumber: number): BindingCallArguments {
+    return isBoundSpy.mock.calls[callNumber - 1]![0] as BindingCallArguments;
+  }
+
+  function permissionCall(): PermissionCallArguments {
+    return permissionSpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as PermissionCallArguments;
+  }
+
+  function expectNoServiceCallsAtAll(): void {
+    expect(findBySpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(isBoundSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(permissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(findOneByIdSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Invariant 1. The app's own comment arrives here as a webhook, as does
+   * every other app's. A single reply to a bot is the first half of a loop
+   * that has no second half.
+   */
+  describe("the bot loop guard", () => {
+    test("ignores a sender GitHub itself labels as a Bot", async () => {
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize({
+        senderLogin: "dependabot",
+        senderType: "Bot",
+      });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+    });
+
+    test("ignores a login ending in [bot] even when the sender type says User", async () => {
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize({
+        senderLogin: "oneuptime[bot]",
+        senderType: "User",
+      });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+    });
+
+    test("ignores its own bot login whatever case GitHub sends it in", async () => {
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize({
+        senderLogin: "OneUptime[BOT]",
+        senderType: "User",
+      });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+    });
+
+    test("ignores an empty sender login", async () => {
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize({
+        senderLogin: "",
+        senderType: "User",
+      });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+    });
+
+    test("ignores an empty login even when the webhook omits the sender type", async () => {
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult =
+        await GitHubCommandAuthorizer.authorize({
+          organizationName: ORGANIZATION,
+          repositoryName: REPOSITORY,
+          installationId: INSTALLATION_ID,
+          senderLogin: "",
+          senderType: undefined,
+        });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The mirror image, and the more dangerous direction. A webhook that
+     * carries no sender.type is not evidence of a bot, and treating it as one
+     * would silently drop a collaborator's command.
+     */
+    test("still serves a human whose webhook carries no sender type", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult =
+        await GitHubCommandAuthorizer.authorize({
+          organizationName: ORGANIZATION,
+          repositoryName: REPOSITORY,
+          installationId: INSTALLATION_ID,
+          senderLogin: "octo-dev",
+          senderType: undefined,
+        });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The guard is worth nothing if it fires AFTER the work. A bot comment
+     * must not cost a database read, a binding check or a GitHub API call —
+     * otherwise two chatty apps still generate load in a tight loop even
+     * though neither is obeyed.
+     */
+    test("makes no service call at all for a bot, even on a connected repository", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+      await authorize({ senderLogin: "renovate[bot]", senderType: "Bot" });
+
+      expectNoServiceCallsAtAll();
+    });
+
+    test("makes no service call at all for an empty sender login", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+      await authorize({ senderLogin: "", senderType: "User" });
+
+      expectNoServiceCallsAtAll();
+    });
+
+    test("returns no repository to act on when it ignores a bot", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize({
+        senderLogin: "oneuptime[bot]",
+        senderType: "Bot",
+      });
+
+      expect(result.codeRepository).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(result.projectName).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(result.reason).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The other half of the guard: it must not be so broad that it silently
+     * swallows real people. A dropped command from a human reads to them as
+     * "the integration is broken", and there is no log line in their thread.
+     */
+    test("does not mistake a human whose login merely contains 'bot' for a bot", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize({
+        senderLogin: "robotnik",
+        senderType: "User",
+      });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+      expect(findBySpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    test("does not ignore a login with [bot] in the middle rather than at the end", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+      const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize({
+        senderLogin: "not-a[bot]-account",
+        senderType: "User",
+      });
+
+      expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("resolveConnectedRepository", () => {
+    /*
+     * All four filters matter. Dropping the installation would let any
+     * installation act on a repository name it does not own; dropping
+     * repositoryHostedAt would match a GitLab row of the same name.
+     */
+    test("filters on organization, repository, GitHub and installation together", async () => {
+      await resolve();
+
+      expect(findBySpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(findByCall().query.organizationName).toBe(ORGANIZATION);
+      expect(findByCall().query.repositoryName).toBe(REPOSITORY);
+      expect(findByCall().query.repositoryHostedAt).toBe(
+        CodeRepositoryType.GitHub,
+      );
+      expect(findByCall().query.gitHubAppInstallationId).toBe(INSTALLATION_ID);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * Invariant 3. Ascending createdAt is what makes "the oldest connection
+     * wins" a fact rather than a coin flip. Flip this to Descending and a
+     * webhook redelivery can land in a different project than the first
+     * delivery did.
+     */
+    test("asks for the candidates oldest first, so the winner is deterministic", async () => {
+      await resolve();
+
+      expect(findByCall().sort.createdAt).toBe(SortOrder.Ascending);
+    });
+
+    test("reads as root, so nobody's permissions can hide a connection", async () => {
+      await resolve();
+
+      expect(findByCall().props.isRoot).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("returns null when the repository is connected to no project", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([]);
+
+      await expect(resolve()).resolves.toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("returns the candidate when its installation is bound to its project", async () => {
+      const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+      mockCandidates([repository]);
+
+      await expect(resolve()).resolves.toBe(repository);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * Invariant 2, the core of it. The row says which installation it belongs
+     * to; the row is not allowed to be believed. A row whose installation ID
+     * was planted must be stepped over, and a legitimate row behind it must
+     * still be found.
+     */
+    test("skips an unbound candidate and uses the bound one behind it", async () => {
+      const plantedProjectId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+      const planted: CodeRepository = connectedRepository({
+        projectId: plantedProjectId,
+      });
+      const legitimate: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+
+      mockCandidates([planted, legitimate]);
+      isBoundSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(false).mockResolvedValueOnce(true);
+
+      await expect(resolve()).resolves.toBe(legitimate);
+    });
+
+    test("returns null when no candidate's installation is bound to its project", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([
+        connectedRepository({ projectId: ObjectID.generate() }),
+        connectedRepository({ projectId: ObjectID.generate() }),
+      ]);
+      isBoundSpy.mockResolvedValue(false);
+
+      await expect(resolve()).resolves.toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("asks the binding about the candidate's OWN project and installation", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([
+        connectedRepository({
+          projectId: projectId,
+          installationId: INSTALLATION_ID,
+        }),
+      ]);
+
+      await resolve();
+
+      expect(isBoundSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(bindingCall(1).projectId.toString()).toBe(projectId.toString());
+      expect(bindingCall(1).installationId).toBe(INSTALLATION_ID);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * Invariant 3 again, at the point it actually bites. Three projects have
+     * imported this repository and all three bindings are genuine. Only the
+     * oldest may act, and the loop must stop the moment it finds it — one
+     * mention, one run, one pull request.
+     */
+    test("stops at the FIRST bound candidate when several are bound", async () => {
+      const oldest: CodeRepository = connectedRepository({
+        projectId: projectId,
+      });
+      const middle: CodeRepository = connectedRepository({
+        projectId: ObjectID.generate(),
+      });
+      const newest: CodeRepository = connectedRepository({
+        projectId: ObjectID.generate(),
+      });
+
+      mockCandidates([oldest, middle, newest]);
+
+      const resolved: CodeRepository | null = await resolve();
+
+      expect(resolved).toBe(oldest);
+      expect(resolved).not.toBe(middle);
+      expect(resolved).not.toBe(newest);
+      expect(isBoundSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    // A half-populated row cannot be permitted by accident.
+    test("skips a row carrying no project id, without asking the binding about it", async () => {
+      const orphan: CodeRepository = bareRepository();
+      orphan.gitHubAppInstallationId = INSTALLATION_ID;
+      const legitimate: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+
+      mockCandidates([orphan, legitimate]);
+
+      await expect(resolve()).resolves.toBe(legitimate);
+      expect(isBoundSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(bindingCall(1).projectId.toString()).toBe(projectId.toString());
+    });
+
+    test("skips a row carrying no installation id, without asking the binding about it", async () => {
+      const halfPopulated: CodeRepository = bareRepository();
+      halfPopulated.projectId = ObjectID.generate();
+      const legitimate: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+
+      mockCandidates([halfPopulated, legitimate]);
+
+      await expect(resolve()).resolves.toBe(legitimate);
+      expect(isBoundSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    test("returns null when the only candidate is half-populated", async () => {
+      mockCandidates([bareRepository()]);
+
+      await expect(resolve()).resolves.toBeNull();
+      expect(isBoundSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * The switch was added after the repositories were. Defaulting existing
+   * rows to "off" would mean the feature does nothing anywhere until every
+   * repository is visited by hand, so a null/absent column reads as enabled.
+   * Only an explicit `false` turns it off.
+   */
+  describe("areCommandsEnabled", () => {
+    test("treats an untouched column as ENABLED", () => {
+      const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+
+      expect(repository.isGitHubCommandsEnabled).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(GitHubCommandAuthorizer.areCommandsEnabled(repository)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("treats a NULL column as enabled, not as disabled", () => {
+      const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+      setCommandsColumn(repository, null);
+
+      expect(GitHubCommandAuthorizer.areCommandsEnabled(repository)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("treats an explicitly undefined column as enabled", () => {
+      const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+      setCommandsColumn(repository, undefined);
+
+      expect(GitHubCommandAuthorizer.areCommandsEnabled(repository)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("returns true when the column is explicitly true", () => {
+      const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+      setCommandsColumn(repository, true);
+
+      expect(GitHubCommandAuthorizer.areCommandsEnabled(repository)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // The one and only value that switches the feature off.
+    test("returns false only for an explicit false", () => {
+      const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+      setCommandsColumn(repository, false);
+
+      expect(GitHubCommandAuthorizer.areCommandsEnabled(repository)).toBe(
+        false,
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("authorize", () => {
+    describe("a repository this instance has no standing in", () => {
+      test("ignores a command on a repository connected to no project", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+        expect(result.codeRepository).toBeUndefined();
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * Silence, not a reply. The app is installed somewhere it was never
+       * connected — commenting there would be an uninvited bot posting in
+       * someone else's repository.
+       */
+      test("says nothing back when the repository is not connected", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.reason).toBeUndefined();
+      });
+
+      test("never asks GitHub about the sender when nothing is connected", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([]);
+
+        await authorize();
+
+        expect(permissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * Invariant 2 end to end: an unbound row must produce exactly the same
+       * silence as no row at all, and must never reach the permission check
+       * with somebody else's installation.
+       */
+      test("ignores a command whose only candidate row is unbound", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+        isBoundSpy.mockResolvedValue(false);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+        expect(result.codeRepository).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(permissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+    });
+
+    describe("a repository with commands switched off", () => {
+      function disabledRepository(): CodeRepository {
+        const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+        setCommandsColumn(repository, false);
+        return repository;
+      }
+
+      test("returns CommandsDisabled", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([disabledRepository()]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(
+          GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.CommandsDisabled,
+        );
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * This outcome IS answered in the thread — a collaborator who gets
+       * silence assumes the integration is broken and files a bug — so the
+       * reason has to exist and has to say where the switch lives.
+       */
+      test("carries a reason that points the collaborator at the switch", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([disabledRepository()]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.reason).toBeDefined();
+        expect(result.reason!.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        expect(result.reason).toContain("OneUptime");
+      });
+
+      test("carries the repository, so the reply can name what it refused", async () => {
+        const repository: CodeRepository = disabledRepository();
+        mockCandidates([repository]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.codeRepository).toBe(repository);
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * The switch is checked BEFORE GitHub is asked anything. A disabled
+       * repository must not turn every drive-by mention into an API call
+       * against someone's rate limit.
+       */
+      test("never asks GitHub for the sender's permission", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([disabledRepository()]);
+
+        await authorize();
+
+        expect(permissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      test("still runs when the column is null, because null means enabled", async () => {
+        const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+        setCommandsColumn(repository, null);
+        mockCandidates([repository]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+      });
+    });
+
+    describe("the repository permission matrix", () => {
+      /*
+       * Write is the floor: it is the permission that lets a person push to
+       * the branch the agent would push to, so anyone who could do the work by
+       * hand may ask the app to do it.
+       */
+      test.each([
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.Admin,
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.Maintain,
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.Write,
+      ])(
+        "allows a command from a collaborator with %s access",
+        async (permission: GitHubRepositoryPermission) => {
+          mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+          permissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(permission);
+
+          const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+          expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+        },
+      );
+
+      /*
+       * Read and triage can both comment on the thread, which is exactly why
+       * neither may command the app: commenting is not a permission to push.
+       */
+      test.each([
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.Read,
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.Triage,
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.None,
+      ])(
+        "refuses a command from someone with only %s access",
+        async (permission: GitHubRepositoryPermission) => {
+          mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+          permissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(permission);
+
+          const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+          expect(result.outcome).toBe(
+            GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.InsufficientPermission,
+          );
+        },
+      );
+
+      /*
+       * Invariant 4. No reason means the caller has nothing to post, which is
+       * the whole point: a guaranteed reply per mention would make the app a
+       * comment-poster any GitHub account could drive.
+       */
+      test.each([
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.Read,
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.Triage,
+        GitHubRepositoryPermission.None,
+      ])(
+        "gives the caller nothing to say back to someone with %s access",
+        async (permission: GitHubRepositoryPermission) => {
+          mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+          permissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(permission);
+
+          const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+          expect(result.reason).toBeUndefined();
+        },
+      );
+
+      // The caller still needs the row — to react on the comment, not to reply.
+      test("still returns the repository when the permission is insufficient", async () => {
+        const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+        mockCandidates([repository]);
+        permissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(GitHubRepositoryPermission.Read);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.codeRepository).toBe(repository);
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * A refused sender must not learn which OneUptime project the
+       * repository belongs to — that is internal naming, and the refusal is
+       * not answered in the thread anyway.
+       */
+      test("does not attribute a project to a refused sender", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+        permissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(GitHubRepositoryPermission.Triage);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.projectName).toBeUndefined();
+      });
+
+      test("asks GitHub about the exact sender, repository and installation", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+        await authorize({ senderLogin: "octo-dev" });
+
+        expect(permissionSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(permissionCall().username).toBe("octo-dev");
+        expect(permissionCall().organizationName).toBe(ORGANIZATION);
+        expect(permissionCall().repositoryName).toBe(REPOSITORY);
+        expect(permissionCall().installationId).toBe(INSTALLATION_ID);
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * GitHub logins are matched exactly by the collaborator API. Any
+       * normalisation applied here — casing, trimming, stripping non-ASCII —
+       * would ask about a DIFFERENT account than the one that commented, and
+       * that account may have write access when the commenter does not.
+       */
+      test("passes an unusual sender login through to GitHub untouched", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+        await authorize({ senderLogin: "Ünïcodé-Dev" });
+
+        expect(permissionCall().username).toBe("Ünïcodé-Dev");
+      });
+
+      test("does not lowercase a mixed-case sender login before checking it", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+        await authorize({ senderLogin: "OctoDev" });
+
+        expect(permissionCall().username).toBe("OctoDev");
+      });
+    });
+
+    describe("project attribution on an allowed command", () => {
+      test("names the project the app is about to act for", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+        expect(result.projectName).toBe("Acme Production");
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * Attribution follows the WINNING candidate. Naming the first row's
+       * project while acting for the second one's would tell a team the wrong
+       * budget was about to be spent.
+       */
+      test("names the project of the bound candidate, not of a skipped one", async () => {
+        const skippedProjectId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+        mockCandidates([
+          connectedRepository({ projectId: skippedProjectId }),
+          connectedRepository({ projectId: projectId }),
+        ]);
+        isBoundSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(false).mockResolvedValueOnce(true);
+
+        await authorize();
+
+        const lookup: { id: ObjectID } = findOneByIdSpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as {
+          id: ObjectID;
+        };
+
+        expect(lookup.id.toString()).toBe(projectId.toString());
+        expect(lookup.id.toString()).not.toBe(skippedProjectId.toString());
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * A name is a nicety. Refusing to run a command a collaborator is
+       * entitled to, because a display-name lookup failed, would be a far
+       * worse bug than an unattributed acknowledgement.
+       */
+      test("still allows the command when the project lookup throws", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+        findOneByIdSpy.mockRejectedValue(new Error("database unreachable"));
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+        expect(result.projectName).toBeUndefined();
+      });
+
+      test("still allows the command when the project row is missing", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+        findOneByIdSpy.mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Allowed);
+        expect(result.projectName).toBeUndefined();
+      });
+
+      // An empty name is not a name — it would render as an empty attribution.
+      test("reports no project name rather than an empty one", async () => {
+        mockCandidates([connectedRepository()]);
+        findOneByIdSpy.mockResolvedValue(namedProject(""));
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.projectName).toBeUndefined();
+      });
+
+      // A row with no project has no budget to bill and no project to name.
+      test("skips the lookup entirely for a row with no project id", async () => {
+        const orphan: CodeRepository = bareRepository();
+        orphan.gitHubAppInstallationId = INSTALLATION_ID;
+        mockCandidates([orphan]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.outcome).toBe(GitHubAuthorizationOutcome.Ignore);
+        expect(findOneByIdSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      test("returns the repository the command should run against", async () => {
+        const repository: CodeRepository = connectedRepository();
+        mockCandidates([repository]);
+
+        const result: GitHubAuthorizationResult = await authorize();
+
+        expect(result.codeRepository).toBe(repository);
+      });
+    });
+  });
+});