@oneuptime/common 12.0.33 → 12.0.34

package/Tests/Server/Services/ApiKeyPermissionSecurity.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
+import ApiKeyPermission from "../../../Models/DatabaseModels/ApiKeyPermission";
+import Label from "../../../Models/DatabaseModels/Label";
+import ApiKeyPermissionService from "../../../Server/Services/ApiKeyPermissionService";
+import ApiKeyService from "../../../Server/Services/ApiKeyService";
+import DatabaseRequestType from "../../../Server/Types/BaseDatabase/DatabaseRequestType";
+import TablePermission from "../../../Server/Types/Database/Permissions/TablePermission";
+import { ColumnAccessControl } from "../../../Types/BaseDatabase/AccessControl";
+import DatabaseCommonInteractionProps from "../../../Types/BaseDatabase/DatabaseCommonInteractionProps";
+import PermissionScope from "../../../Types/Database/AccessControl/PermissionScope";
+import BadDataException from "../../../Types/Exception/BadDataException";
+import NotAuthorizedException from "../../../Types/Exception/NotAuthorizedException";
+import ObjectID from "../../../Types/ObjectID";
+import Permission, { UserPermission } from "../../../Types/Permission";
+import { getJestSpyOn } from "../../Spy";
+import {
+  afterEach,
+  beforeEach,
+  describe,
+  expect,
+  jest,
+  test,
+} from "@jest/globals";
+
+/*
+ * PasswordHash has a known, pre-existing TS5.9 compile failure under ts-jest
+ * (Buffer vs BinaryLike) that breaks every suite whose import graph reaches
+ * it. Nothing here touches password hashing; stub the module before the
+ * service import graph drags it into compilation.
+ */
+jest.mock("../../../Server/Utils/PasswordHash", () => {
+  return {
+    __esModule: true,
+    default: class PasswordHashStub {},
+  };
+});
+
+/*
+ * Security regression for delegated API-key management.
+ *
+ * Creating an API key and deciding what that key may do are separate powers.
+ * The old ApiKeyPermission ACL nevertheless admitted CreateProjectApiKey, so a
+ * user trusted only to mint a key could attach ProjectOwner and come back as a
+ * full owner. The service also trusted the request's projectId independently
+ * of the referenced key, and the authorization hot path loaded grants by key
+ * id alone. Together those gaps turned a narrow delegated capability into a
+ * tenant-crossing privilege-minting primitive.
+ *
+ * This suite pins both layers. Model ACL tests prove the public CRUD endpoint
+ * rejects create-only and metadata-edit callers. Hook tests prove that even an
+ * alternate/internal caller which reaches the service cannot grant above its
+ * own effective authority or point a permission row at another tenant's key.
+ */
+
+const projectId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+const otherProjectId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+const apiKeyId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+const otherApiKeyId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+const userId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+
+type HookCallable = {
+  onBeforeCreate: (createBy: unknown) => Promise<unknown>;
+  onBeforeUpdate: (updateBy: unknown) => Promise<unknown>;
+};
+
+function hooks(): HookCallable {
+  return ApiKeyPermissionService as unknown as HookCallable;
+}
+
+function userPermission(data: {
+  permission: Permission;
+  labels?: Array<ObjectID>;
+  isBlockPermission?: boolean;
+  scope?: PermissionScope;
+}): UserPermission {
+  return {
+    permission: data.permission,
+    labelIds: data.labels || [],
+    isBlockPermission: data.isBlockPermission || false,
+    scope: data.scope,
+    _type: "UserPermission",
+  };
+}
+
+function props(
+  permissions: Array<UserPermission>,
+  tenantId: ObjectID = projectId,
+): DatabaseCommonInteractionProps {
+  return {
+    userId,
+    tenantId,
+    userGlobalAccessPermission: {
+      projectIds: [tenantId],
+      globalPermissions: [Permission.Public, Permission.User],
+      _type: "UserGlobalAccessPermission",
+    },
+    userTenantAccessPermission: {
+      [tenantId.toString()]: {
+        projectId: tenantId,
+        permissions,
+        _type: "UserTenantAccessPermission",
+      },
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function label(labelId: ObjectID): Label {
+  const value: Label = new Label();
+  value.id = labelId;
+  return value;
+}
+
+function permissionRow(
+  data: {
+    permission?: Permission;
+    project?: ObjectID;
+    key?: ObjectID;
+    labels?: Array<ObjectID>;
+    isBlockPermission?: boolean;
+  } = {},
+): ApiKeyPermission {
+  const row: ApiKeyPermission = new ApiKeyPermission();
+  row.id = ObjectID.generate();
+  row.projectId = data.project || projectId;
+  row.apiKeyId = data.key || apiKeyId;
+  row.permission = data.permission || Permission.TelemetryAdmin;
+  row.labels = (data.labels || []).map(label);
+  row.isBlockPermission = data.isBlockPermission || false;
+  return row;
+}
+
+describe("ApiKeyPermission delegated-management ACL", () => {
+  const model: ApiKeyPermission = new ApiKeyPermission();
+
+  test("creation is limited to owners, admins, and the dedicated permission editor", () => {
+    expect(model.createRecordPermissions).toEqual([
+      Permission.ProjectOwner,
+      Permission.ProjectAdmin,
+      Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+    ]);
+    expect(model.createRecordPermissions).not.toContain(
+      Permission.CreateProjectApiKey,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("updates cannot be made with the API-key metadata editor", () => {
+    expect(model.updateRecordPermissions).toEqual([
+      Permission.ProjectOwner,
+      Permission.ProjectAdmin,
+      Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+    ]);
+    expect(model.updateRecordPermissions).not.toContain(
+      Permission.EditProjectApiKey,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test.each([
+    Permission.ProjectOwner,
+    Permission.ProjectAdmin,
+    Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+  ])("%s passes the table-level create gate", (permission: Permission) => {
+    expect(() => {
+      TablePermission.checkTableLevelPermissions(
+        ApiKeyPermission,
+        props([userPermission({ permission })]),
+        DatabaseRequestType.Create,
+      );
+    }).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  test("CreateProjectApiKey alone fails the table-level create gate", () => {
+    expect(() => {
+      TablePermission.checkTableLevelPermissions(
+        ApiKeyPermission,
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.CreateProjectApiKey })]),
+        DatabaseRequestType.Create,
+      );
+    }).toThrow(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("EditProjectApiKey alone fails the table-level update gate", () => {
+    expect(() => {
+      TablePermission.checkTableLevelPermissions(
+        ApiKeyPermission,
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKey })]),
+        DatabaseRequestType.Update,
+      );
+    }).toThrow(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("no grant-bearing column reintroduces the create-only or metadata-edit capabilities", () => {
+    for (const columnName of [
+      "apiKey",
+      "apiKeyId",
+      "project",
+      "projectId",
+      "permission",
+      "labels",
+      "isBlockPermission",
+    ]) {
+      const accessControl: ColumnAccessControl | null =
+        model.getColumnAccessControlFor(columnName);
+      expect(accessControl?.create || []).not.toContain(
+        Permission.CreateProjectApiKey,
+      );
+    }
+
+    for (const columnName of ["permission", "labels", "isBlockPermission"]) {
+      const accessControl: ColumnAccessControl | null =
+        model.getColumnAccessControlFor(columnName);
+      expect(accessControl?.update || []).not.toContain(
+        Permission.EditProjectApiKey,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("ApiKeyPermissionService create boundaries", () => {
+  let findApiKey: jest.SpyInstance;
+  let findPermission: jest.SpyInstance;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    ApiKeyPermissionService.clearCache();
+    findApiKey = getJestSpyOn(ApiKeyService, "findOneBy").mockResolvedValue({
+      _id: apiKeyId.toString(),
+    } as never);
+    findPermission = getJestSpyOn(
+      ApiKeyPermissionService,
+      "findOneBy",
+    ).mockResolvedValue(null);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  async function createAs(
+    callerProps: DatabaseCommonInteractionProps,
+    row: ApiKeyPermission = permissionRow(),
+  ): Promise<unknown> {
+    return await hooks().onBeforeCreate({
+      data: row,
+      props: callerProps,
+    });
+  }
+
+  test("an owner may grant ProjectOwner", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+        permissionRow({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner }),
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  test("a project admin may delegate the ProjectAdmin authority it holds", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectAdmin })]),
+        permissionRow({ permission: Permission.ProjectAdmin }),
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  test.each([
+    Permission.ProjectOwner,
+    Permission.DeleteProject,
+    Permission.ManageProjectBilling,
+  ])(
+    "a project admin cannot mint the separately-gated %s authority",
+    async (permission: Permission) => {
+      await expect(
+        createAs(
+          props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectAdmin })]),
+          permissionRow({ permission }),
+        ),
+      ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("a project admin may delegate DeleteProject only when it is separately held", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectAdmin }),
+          userPermission({ permission: Permission.DeleteProject }),
+        ]),
+        permissionRow({ permission: Permission.DeleteProject }),
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  test("a granular editor may delegate a permission it also holds", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({ permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin }),
+        ]),
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  test("the granular editor alone cannot delegate a permission it lacks", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+        ]),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("a blocked permission does not count as authority to delegate it", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({ permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin }),
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+            isBlockPermission: true,
+          }),
+        ]),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("a label-scoped permission can be delegated to a subset of its labels", async () => {
+    const allowedLabelId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+            labels: [allowedLabelId, ObjectID.generate()],
+            scope: PermissionScope.Labels,
+          }),
+        ]),
+        permissionRow({ labels: [allowedLabelId] }),
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  test("a label-scoped permission cannot be widened to an unscoped grant", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+            labels: [ObjectID.generate()],
+            scope: PermissionScope.Labels,
+          }),
+        ]),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("a label-scoped permission cannot be delegated to a label the caller lacks", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+            labels: [ObjectID.generate()],
+            scope: PermissionScope.Labels,
+          }),
+        ]),
+        permissionRow({ labels: [ObjectID.generate()] }),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("a label block prevents delegating that label while leaving other labels available", async () => {
+    const allowedLabelId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+    const blockedLabelId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+    const callerProps: DatabaseCommonInteractionProps = props([
+      userPermission({
+        permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+      }),
+      userPermission({
+        permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+        scope: PermissionScope.All,
+      }),
+      userPermission({
+        permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+        labels: [blockedLabelId],
+        isBlockPermission: true,
+        scope: PermissionScope.Labels,
+      }),
+    ]);
+
+    await expect(
+      createAs(callerProps, permissionRow({ labels: [allowedLabelId] })),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+    await expect(
+      createAs(callerProps, permissionRow({ labels: [blockedLabelId] })),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("Owned authority cannot be converted into an API-key-wide grant", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+            scope: PermissionScope.Owned,
+          }),
+        ]),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("root maintenance still bypasses the delegation ceiling", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        { isRoot: true },
+        permissionRow({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner }),
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  test("the referenced API key is resolved by id and project together", async () => {
+    await createAs(
+      props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+    );
+
+    const options: Record<string, any> = findApiKey.mock.calls[0]![0] as Record<
+      string,
+      any
+    >;
+    expect(options["query"]["_id"].toString()).toBe(apiKeyId.toString());
+    expect(options["query"]["projectId"].toString()).toBe(projectId.toString());
+    expect(options["props"]["isRoot"]).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("relation-only references are canonicalized to validated scalar IDs before persistence", async () => {
+    const row: ApiKeyPermission = permissionRow();
+    delete row.apiKeyId;
+    delete row.projectId;
+    row.apiKey = { id: apiKeyId } as never;
+    row.project = { id: projectId } as never;
+
+    await createAs(
+      props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+      row,
+    );
+
+    expect((row.apiKeyId as ObjectID | undefined)?.toString()).toBe(
+      apiKeyId.toString(),
+    );
+    expect((row.projectId as ObjectID | undefined)?.toString()).toBe(
+      projectId.toString(),
+    );
+    expect(row.apiKey).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(row.project).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(findApiKey).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        query: {
+          _id: apiKeyId,
+          projectId,
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("a conflicting API key relation cannot override the validated scalar ID", async () => {
+    const row: ApiKeyPermission = permissionRow();
+    row.apiKey = { id: otherApiKeyId } as never;
+
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+        row,
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow("Conflicting API Key references");
+    expect(findApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(findPermission).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("a conflicting project relation cannot override the request tenant during persistence", async () => {
+    const row: ApiKeyPermission = permissionRow();
+    row.project = { id: otherProjectId } as never;
+
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+        row,
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow("Conflicting Project references");
+    expect(findApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(findPermission).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("a key id from another project is rejected before duplicate checks", async () => {
+    findApiKey.mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadDataException);
+    expect(findPermission).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("a body project cannot differ from the authenticated request tenant", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props(
+          [userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })],
+          projectId,
+        ),
+        permissionRow({ project: otherProjectId }),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadDataException);
+    expect(findApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("an existing allow/block tuple remains a duplicate within this project", async () => {
+    findPermission.mockResolvedValue(permissionRow() as never);
+
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow("already assigned");
+
+    const options: Record<string, any> = findPermission.mock
+      .calls[0]![0] as Record<string, any>;
+    expect(options["query"]["apiKeyId"].toString()).toBe(apiKeyId.toString());
+    expect(options["query"]["projectId"].toString()).toBe(projectId.toString());
+    expect(options["query"]["permission"]).toBe(Permission.TelemetryAdmin);
+    expect(options["query"]["isBlockPermission"]).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("the opposite allow/block tuple is not treated as a duplicate", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAs(
+        props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+        permissionRow({ isBlockPermission: true }),
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+
+    const options: Record<string, any> = findPermission.mock
+      .calls[0]![0] as Record<string, any>;
+    expect(options["query"]["isBlockPermission"]).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("ApiKeyPermissionService update boundaries", () => {
+  let findApiKey: jest.SpyInstance;
+  let findPermissions: jest.SpyInstance;
+  let findPermission: jest.SpyInstance;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    findApiKey = getJestSpyOn(ApiKeyService, "findOneBy").mockResolvedValue({
+      _id: apiKeyId.toString(),
+    } as never);
+    findPermissions = getJestSpyOn(
+      ApiKeyPermissionService,
+      "findBy",
+    ).mockResolvedValue([permissionRow()] as never);
+    findPermission = getJestSpyOn(
+      ApiKeyPermissionService,
+      "findOneBy",
+    ).mockResolvedValue(null);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  test("changing a grant to ProjectOwner is denied to a project admin", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      hooks().onBeforeUpdate({
+        query: { _id: ObjectID.generate() },
+        data: { permission: Permission.ProjectOwner },
+        props: props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectAdmin })]),
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+    expect(findPermission).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("an editor may narrow a grant to a label it holds", async () => {
+    const allowedLabelId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+    findPermissions.mockResolvedValue([
+      permissionRow({ labels: [allowedLabelId] }),
+    ] as never);
+
+    await expect(
+      hooks().onBeforeUpdate({
+        query: { _id: ObjectID.generate() },
+        data: { labels: [label(allowedLabelId)] },
+        props: props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+            labels: [allowedLabelId],
+            scope: PermissionScope.Labels,
+          }),
+        ]),
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  test("an editor cannot clear labels and widen a scoped grant", async () => {
+    const allowedLabelId: ObjectID = ObjectID.generate();
+    findPermissions.mockResolvedValue([
+      permissionRow({ labels: [allowedLabelId] }),
+    ] as never);
+
+    await expect(
+      hooks().onBeforeUpdate({
+        query: { _id: ObjectID.generate() },
+        data: { labels: [] },
+        props: props([
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.EditProjectApiKeyPermissions,
+          }),
+          userPermission({
+            permission: Permission.TelemetryAdmin,
+            labels: [allowedLabelId],
+            scope: PermissionScope.Labels,
+          }),
+        ]),
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthorizedException);
+  });
+
+  test("an update cannot operate on a permission row from another request tenant", async () => {
+    findPermissions.mockResolvedValue([
+      permissionRow({ project: otherProjectId }),
+    ] as never);
+
+    await expect(
+      hooks().onBeforeUpdate({
+        query: { _id: ObjectID.generate() },
+        data: { labels: [] },
+        props: props(
+          [userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })],
+          projectId,
+        ),
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadDataException);
+    expect(findApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test("changing permission or block state rejects a duplicate tuple", async () => {
+    findPermission.mockResolvedValue(permissionRow() as never);
+
+    await expect(
+      hooks().onBeforeUpdate({
+        query: { _id: ObjectID.generate() },
+        data: { isBlockPermission: false },
+        props: props([userPermission({ permission: Permission.ProjectOwner })]),
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow("already assigned");
+  });
+});