@o3co/create-auth-provider 0.15.0 → 0.17.0-rc.1

package/templates/standalone/src/__tests__/documented-env-overrides.test.mts

@@ -14,52 +14,59 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
-import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import {
 	type AppConfig,
-	AppConfigSchema,
+	createApp,
+	type Module,
+	moduleReferences,
 	resolveAccessTokenLifetime,
 } from "@o3co/auth-provider-core";
-import { parseFile } from "@o3co/ts.hocon";
-import { validate } from "@o3co/ts.hocon/zod";
+import { oauthModule } from "@o3co/auth-provider-oauth";
+import { sessionModule, sessionStoreModule } from "@o3co/auth-provider-session";
 import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 import { buildModules } from "../buildModules.mjs";
-import { resolveConfigPaths, resolveLibraryReferenceConfPath } from "../configPath.mjs";
+import {
+	expectedSessionRequirements,
+	readOwnLayers,
+	readSwitches,
+	resolveConfigPaths,
+	resolveForBoot,
+	type Switches,
+} from "../configPath.mjs";
+import { httpModule, keyStoreModule, templateReference } from "../modules.mjs";
 
 /**
- * #288 — boot the shipped config with EVERY documented override supplied the
- * way an operator actually supplies one: as a string.
+ * Boots the shipped config with EVERY documented override supplied the way an
+ * operator supplies one: as a string.
  *
- * HOCON substitutes `${?VAR}` as a string, always. Whether that string is
- * usable depends entirely on the schema leaf it lands on, and the schema had
- * two answers to that question — an explicit `coerceBooleanFromEnv` on two
- * fields, and a bare `z.boolean()` everywhere else that only worked because
- * `@o3co/ts.hocon`'s zod bridge coerces a bare boolean leaf it can *reach*.
- * The bridge stops at anything that is not a `ZodObject` shape (or an
- * optional/nullable/default/catch/readonly wrapper around one), so wrapping a
- * section in `z.preprocess(...)` silently took the override away — which is
- * precisely what had happened to `OAUTH_JWT_LEGACY_TYP_ACCEPT`.
+ * HOCON substitutes `${?VAR}` as a string, always. `app.mts` reads its switches
+ * with core's transitional reader and hands `createApp` what it resolved,
+ * which boot parses once with plain Zod, so every schema leaf must read the
+ * string itself. This suite reads through that path: `readSwitches` for what
+ * is read before boot, `resolveForBoot` and `createApp` for the configuration
+ * boot parsed.
  *
- * This suite is the thing that stops the two paths diverging again. It is not
- * a sample of interesting variables: `covers every documented override` below
- * fails when a `${?VAR}` is added to either config layer, or documented in the
- * README, without being exercised here.
+ * It is not a sample of interesting variables: `covers every documented
+ * override` below fails when a `${?VAR}` is added to either config layer, or
+ * documented in the README, without being exercised here.
  */
 
 // config/ is two levels above this test file: src/__tests__/ → src/ → standalone/
 const standaloneDir = fileURLToPath(new URL("../..", import.meta.url));
 const configDir = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../config", import.meta.url));
 const readmePath = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../README.md", import.meta.url));
+const readmeJaPath = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../README.ja.md", import.meta.url));
 
 /**
- * Every environment variable the shipped artifact documents, with a value in
- * the shape an operator would supply. Strings throughout — that is the whole
- * point of the exercise.
+ * Every environment variable the shipped artifact documents, as the string an
+ * operator would supply.
  *
- * `OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHM` is `EdDSA` here so the asymmetric key variables can be
- * in the same map: the HS256 branch of `signingKey.local` is a `.strict()`
+ * `KEY_STORE_LOCAL_ALGORITHM` is `EdDSA` so the asymmetric key variables fit in the
+ * same map: the HS256 branch of `signingKey.local` is a `.strict()`
  * discriminated-union member and refuses `privateKeyPath` and friends by
  * design. The HS256 shape gets its own test below.
  */
@@ -70,20 +77,18 @@ const DOCUMENTED_ENV: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
 	HTTP_READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS: "1500",
 
 	// --- logging ------------------------------------------------------
-	LOG_LEVEL: "debug",
+	LOGGING_LEVEL: "debug",
 
 	// --- oauth.jwt ----------------------------------------------------
 	OAUTH_JWT_ISSUER: "https://auth.test",
-	OAUTH_JWT_SIGNING_KEY_PROVIDER: "local",
-	OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHM: "EdDSA",
-	OAUTH_JWT_KID: "v1",
-	OAUTH_JWT_SECRET: "documented-env-secret.at-least-32-bytes.ok",
-	OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMC4=\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
-	OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: "./config/jwt-private.pem",
-	OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY: "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMCo=\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
-	OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH: "./config/jwt-public.pem",
-	// The override this issue was filed over: a bare `z.boolean()` behind a
-	// `z.preprocess` wrapper the hocon bridge cannot see through.
+	KEY_STORE_PROVIDER: "local",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_ALGORITHM: "EdDSA",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_KID: "v1",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_SECRET: "documented-env-secret.at-least-32-bytes.ok",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMC4=\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: "./config/jwt-private.pem",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY: "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMCo=\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH: "./config/jwt-public.pem",
 	OAUTH_JWT_LEGACY_TYP_ACCEPT: "true",
 
 	// --- oauth tokens / policy ----------------------------------------
@@ -95,140 +100,201 @@ const DOCUMENTED_ENV: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
 	OAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN: "86400",
 	OAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_UNKNOWN_FAMILY_POLICY: "reject",
 	OAUTH_OIDC_MODE: "dual",
-	OAUTH_CODE_ADAPTER: "redis",
 	OAUTH_REVOCATION_ACCESS_TOKEN: "denylist",
 	OAUTH_REVOCATION_SUBJECT: "unsupported",
 	OAUTH_REQUIRE_EMAIL_VERIFIED: "true",
 	OAUTH_REQUIRE_GRANT_TYPE_ALLOWLIST: "true",
-	OAUTH_GRANTS_JWT_BEARER_ENABLED: "false",
 	OAUTH_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH: "256",
-	OAUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_MAX_ACTOR_CHAIN_DEPTH: "3",
 	OAUTH_RESOURCE_INDICATOR_ENABLED: "true",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_ENABLED: "true",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_ALLOWED_SCOPES: "read, write",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES: "https://mcp.example",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "client.example, .trusted.example",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_DENIED_HOSTS: "evil.example",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_MAX_BYTES: "8192",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_TIMEOUT_MS: "3000",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_CACHE_MAX_AGE_MS: "60000",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES: "128",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_STALE_IF_ERROR_MS: "120000",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MS: "30000",
-	OAUTH_CIMD_MAX_CONCURRENT_FETCHES: "4",
-	OAUTH_TOKEN_BINDING_DISPATCH_POLICY: "intent-explicit",
-	OAUTH_TOKEN_BINDING_BIND_CONFIDENTIAL_CLIENT_REFRESH_TOKENS: "true",
-
-	// --- oauth.grants -------------------------------------------------
-	OAUTH_GRANTS_SESSION_ENABLED: "false",
-	OAUTH_GRANTS_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_ENABLED: "true",
-	OAUTH_GRANTS_REFRESH_TOKEN_ENABLED: "true",
-	OAUTH_GRANTS_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_ENABLED: "true",
-	// #273 tombstone: inert, but a still-exported value must reach the boot
-	// warning rather than failing parse.
-	OAUTH_GRANTS_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_PKCE_REQUIRE_S256: "true",
-
-	// --- session ------------------------------------------------------
-	SESSION_SECRET: "documented-env-session-secret.at-least-32-bytes.ok",
-	SESSION_NAME: "auth.session",
-	SESSION_MAX_AGE: "3600000",
-	SESSION_SECURE: "false",
-	SESSION_SAME_SITE: "lax",
-	SESSION_DOMAIN: "auth.example.com",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ENABLED: "true",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ALLOWED_SCOPES: "read, write",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES: "https://mcp.example",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "client.example, .trusted.example",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_DENIED_HOSTS: "evil.example",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_MAX_BYTES: "8192",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_TIMEOUT_MS: "3000",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_CACHE_MAX_AGE_MS: "60000",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES: "128",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_STALE_IF_ERROR_MS: "120000",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MS: "30000",
+	OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_MAX_CONCURRENT_FETCHES: "4",
+	CORE_TOKEN_BINDING_DISPATCH_POLICY: "intent-explicit",
+	CORE_TOKEN_BINDING_BIND_CONFIDENTIAL_CLIENT_REFRESH_TOKENS: "true",
+	CORE_OUTBOUND_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "rp.example, .partner.example",
+	CORE_OUTBOUND_DENIED_HOSTS: "blocked.example",
+	CORE_OUTBOUND_INTERNAL_HOSTS: ".corp.internal",
+	CORE_OUTBOUND_TIMEOUT_MS: "3000",
+	CORE_OUTBOUND_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES: "32768",
+	CORE_OUTBOUND_EGRESS: "direct",
+
+	// --- the grant switches ------------------------------------------
+	OAUTH_SESSION_ENABLED: "false",
+	OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_ENABLED: "true",
+	OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_REFRESH_TOKEN_ENABLED: "true",
+	OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_ENABLED: "true",
+	OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_JWT_BEARER_ENABLED: "false",
+
+	// --- session: the login routes -------------------------------------
 	SESSION_CSRF_TTL_SECONDS: "7200",
-	SESSION_STORAGE_TYPE: "redis",
-	SESSION_STORAGE_REDIS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
-	SESSION_STORAGE_REDIS_PASSWORD: "session-store-password",
 
-	// --- rate limiting ------------------------------------------------
-	RATE_LIMIT_FAIL_MODE: "open",
-	RATE_LIMITER_ADAPTER: "redis",
-	MEMORY_RATE_LIMITER_MAX_BUCKETS: "10000",
+	// --- session-store: the session cookie and its store ---------------
+	SESSION_STORE_SECRET: "documented-env-session-secret.at-least-32-bytes.ok",
+	SESSION_STORE_NAME: "auth.session",
+	SESSION_STORE_MAX_AGE: "3600000",
+	SESSION_STORE_SECURE: "false",
+	SESSION_STORE_SAME_SITE: "lax",
+	SESSION_STORE_DOMAIN: "auth.example.com",
+	SESSION_STORE_STORAGE_TYPE: "redis",
+	SESSION_STORE_STORAGE_REDIS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
+	SESSION_STORE_STORAGE_REDIS_PASSWORD: "session-store-password",
 
-	// --- audit --------------------------------------------------------
-	// #287: selects the sink builder; "console" is the registered builtin.
-	// There is deliberately no "none" — an unknown type fails boot in
-	// buildModules (pinned by audit-sink.test.mts), not at config parse,
-	// because the schema keeps `audit.sink.type` an open string so
-	// out-of-tree sinks need no schema change here.
-	AUDIT_SINK_TYPE: "console",
+	// --- rate limiting ------------------------------------------------
+	REDIS_RATE_LIMITER_FAIL_MODE: "open",
+	CORE_RATE_LIMITER_MEMORY_MAX_BUCKETS: "10000",
+
+	// --- adapters -----------------------------------------------------
+	// Which adapter fills each slot: the composition root's own section,
+	// read before the modules are chosen.
+	ADAPTERS_RATE_LIMITER: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_USER_SESSION_STORES: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_ACCESS_TOKEN_DENYLIST: "redis",
+	// The replay seen-set behind private_key_jwt client authentication.
+	ADAPTERS_REPLAY_SEEN_SET: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_CONSENT_STORE: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_FEDERATION_GRANT_STORE: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_FEDERATION_GRANT_INTENT_STORE: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_MFA_FACTOR_STORE: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_MFA_TRANSACTION_STORE: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_CODE_REPOSITORY: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_CLIENT_REPOSITORY: "yaml",
+	ADAPTERS_USER_REPOSITORY: "yaml",
+	// Selects the sink builder; "console" is the registered builtin. There
+	// is deliberately no "none" — an unknown sink fails boot in buildModules
+	// (pinned by audit-sink.test.mts), not in phase one, because the schema
+	// keeps `adapters.auditSink` an open string so out-of-tree sinks need no
+	// schema change here.
+	ADAPTERS_AUDIT_SINK: "console",
+
+	// --- JWKS ---------------------------------------------------------
+	JWKS_PATH: "/keys/jwks.json",
+	JWKS_CACHE_MAX_AGE: "600",
 
 	// --- shared stores ------------------------------------------------
-	DEPLOYMENT_MODE: "multi",
-	USER_SESSION_STORES_ADAPTER: "redis",
-	ACCESS_TOKEN_DENYLIST_ADAPTER: "redis",
-	// #484: the replay seen-set behind private_key_jwt client authentication.
-	REPLAY_SEEN_SET_ADAPTER: "redis",
-	// #561: the consent stores' shared backend and its namespace.
-	CONSENT_STORE_ADAPTER: "redis",
+	CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE: "multi",
+	// The consent stores' namespace.
 	REDIS_CONSENT_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "tenant-a:consent:",
 	REDIS_ACCESS_TOKEN_DENYLIST_KEY_PREFIX: "atdeny:",
 	REDIS_SESSION_STORES_KEY_PREFIX: "ss:",
-	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "rtfam:",
-	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_CAS_RETRY_LIMIT: "3",
-	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_REDIS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
-	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_REDIS_PASSWORD: "rt-family-password",
-	// #456: the federation token store's Redis branch, which the README
-	// documented and which could not boot.
-	FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE_TYPE: "redis",
+	REDIS_REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "rtfam:",
+	REDIS_REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_CAS_RETRY_LIMIT: "3",
+	REDIS_CLIENTS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
+	REDIS_CLIENTS_PASSWORD: "rt-family-password",
+	// The federation token store's Redis branch.
 	REDIS_FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "ft:",
 	REDIS_FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE_ENCRYPTION_MODE: "required",
 	REDIS_FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: "BwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwc=",
-	// #593: federation grants — a user's standing consent that a client may
-	// obtain upstream tokens without them. The overrides `reference.conf`
-	// declares, and (slice 7) the two adapter switches the template composes
-	// the feature from.
+	// Federation grants: a user's standing consent that a client may obtain
+	// upstream tokens without them. The overrides `reference.conf` declares.
 	FEDERATION_GRANTS_ENABLED: "true",
-	FEDERATION_GRANT_STORE_ADAPTER: "redis",
-	FEDERATION_GRANT_INTENT_STORE_ADAPTER: "redis",
-	FEDERATION_GRANTS_ENCRYPTION_MODE: "required",
+	REDIS_FEDERATION_GRANT_STORE_ENCRYPTION_MODE: "required",
 	FEDERATION_GRANTS_ALLOW_KEEP_ON_SUBJECT_REVOCATION: "false",
-	// Slice 6: acquisition's two deployment decisions — whether the callback
+	// Acquisition's two deployment decisions — whether the callback
 	// refuses an upstream account linked to another user, and the consent page.
 	FEDERATION_GRANTS_IDENTITY_LOOKUP: "required",
 	FEDERATION_GRANTS_CONSENT_URL: "/consent/grants",
 	REDIS_FEDERATION_GRANT_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "fg:",
+	// The intent store's own namespace, which a deployment moves with the grant store's.
+	REDIS_FEDERATION_GRANT_INTENT_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "fg:",
+
+	// --- multi-factor authentication ----------------------------------
+	// The template's switch, `mfaMode`: off here, so the parse below
+	// layers nothing of MFA. The rest is what the switch installs — the MFA
+	// package's settings, foundation's Store-backed factor store's — and is
+	// covered by the substitutions it brings (`liveSubstitutions`).
+	MFA_MODE: "off",
+	MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY: "CQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQk=",
+	MFA_PAGE_URL: "/mfa",
+	MFA_STORE_TIMEOUT_MS: "5000",
+	MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRE_EMAIL_PROOF: "when-mail",
+	MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_ENABLED: "true",
+	MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_ALGORITHM: "SHA1",
+	MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_DIGITS: "6",
+	MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_PERIOD: "30",
+	MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_WINDOW: "1",
+	MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_ISSUER: "auth.test",
+	MFA_RECOVERY_CODE_FACTOR_ENABLED: "true",
+	MFA_RECOVERY_CODE_FACTOR_COUNT: "10",
+	MFA_EMAIL_FACTOR_ENABLED: "false",
+	MFA_EMAIL_FACTOR_ADDS_MFA: "false",
+	MFA_EMAIL_FACTOR_CODE_TTL_SECONDS: "600",
+	FOUNDATION_MFA_FACTOR_STORE_LIST_URL: "https://users.example.com/mfa/factors/list",
+	FOUNDATION_MFA_FACTOR_STORE_CREATE_URL: "https://users.example.com/mfa/factors/create",
+	FOUNDATION_MFA_FACTOR_STORE_UPDATE_URL: "https://users.example.com/mfa/factors/update",
+	FOUNDATION_MFA_FACTOR_STORE_DELETE_URL: "https://users.example.com/mfa/factors/delete",
+
+	// --- mail ---------------------------------------------------------
+	// The SMTP sender's section, which the template installs outside
+	// development and builds only where something sends.
+	STANDARD_SMTP_MAIL_SENDER_HOST: "smtp.example.com",
+	STANDARD_SMTP_MAIL_SENDER_PORT: "587",
+	STANDARD_SMTP_MAIL_SENDER_SECURE: "starttls",
+	STANDARD_SMTP_MAIL_SENDER_USER: "mailer",
+	STANDARD_SMTP_MAIL_SENDER_PASSWORD: "mailer-password",
+	STANDARD_SMTP_MAIL_SENDER_FROM: "auth@example.com",
+	// …and the Redis stores' key namespaces, which the Redis package's two MFA
+	// modules read.
+	REDIS_MFA_FACTOR_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "tenant-a:mfaf:",
+	REDIS_MFA_TRANSACTION_STORE_KEY_PREFIX: "tenant-a:mfat:",
 
 	// --- federation ---------------------------------------------------
-	FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_ENABLED: "true",
-	FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID: "google-client-id",
-	FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET: "google-client-secret",
-	FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_CALLBACK_URL: "https://auth.test/session/oauth/federation/google/callback",
-	// #524: the generic OIDC federation the template ships disabled.
-	FEDERATIONS_OIDC_ENABLED: "true",
-	FEDERATIONS_OIDC_ISSUER: "https://idp.test",
-	FEDERATIONS_OIDC_CLIENT_ID: "oidc-client-id",
-	FEDERATIONS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: "oidc-client-secret",
-	FEDERATIONS_OIDC_CALLBACK_URL: "https://auth.test/session/oauth/federation/oidc/callback",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_ENABLED: "true",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID: "google-client-id",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET: "google-client-secret",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_CALLBACK_URL:
+		"https://auth.test/session/oauth/federation/google/callback",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_GOOGLE_ACCESS_TYPE: "online",
+	// The generic OIDC federation the template ships disabled.
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_OIDC_ENABLED: "true",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_OIDC_ISSUER: "https://idp.test",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_OIDC_CLIENT_ID: "oidc-client-id",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: "oidc-client-secret",
+	CORE_FEDERATIONS_OIDC_CALLBACK_URL: "https://auth.test/session/oauth/federation/oidc/callback",
 
 	// --- repositories -------------------------------------------------
-	CLIENT_TYPE: "yaml",
-	CLIENT_PATH: "./config/clients.yaml",
-	CLIENT_USER_TYPE: "yaml",
-	CLIENT_USER_PATH: "./config/users.yaml",
-	CLIENT_USER_AUTHENTICATE_URL: "https://users.example.com/authenticate",
-	CLIENT_USER_AUTHENTICATE_BY_TOKEN_URL: "https://users.example.com/authenticate-by-token",
-	CLIENT_USER_LINK_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL: "https://users.example.com/link-federated-identity",
-	// #613: the Store's identity lookup for federation grants (D7 check 5).
-	CLIENT_USER_FIND_SUBJECT_BY_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL:
+	REPOSITORIES_CLIENT_YAML_PATH: "./config/clients.yaml",
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_YAML_PATH: "./config/users.yaml",
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_AUTHENTICATE_URL: "https://users.example.com/authenticate",
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_AUTHENTICATE_BY_TOKEN_URL:
+		"https://users.example.com/authenticate-by-token",
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_LINK_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL:
+		"https://users.example.com/link-federated-identity",
+	// The Store's identity lookup for federation grants (see ADR
+	// 2026-09-17-federation-grants-offline-delegation).
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_FIND_SUBJECT_BY_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL:
 		"https://users.example.com/find-subject-by-federated-identity",
-	CLIENT_USER_TIMEOUT: "5000",
-	CLIENT_USER_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES: "1048576",
-	CLIENT_CODE_TYPE: "redis",
-	CLIENT_CODE_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN: "600",
-	CLIENT_CODE_ENDPOINT_URI: "redis://redis:6379",
-	CLIENT_CODE_PASSWORD: "code-store-password",
-	CLIENT_CODE_KEY_PREFIX: "oauth:code:",
-
-	// --- endpoints ----------------------------------------------------
-	ENDPOINTS_LOGIN_URL: "/login",
-	ENDPOINTS_CONSENT_URL: "/consent",
+	// The Store's MFA enrollment witness endpoint (the MFA ADR's D12).
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_MARK_MFA_ENROLLED_URL: "https://users.example.com/mfa/enrolled",
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_TIMEOUT: "5000",
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES: "1048576",
+	// The credential the http user adapter presents to the Store; >= 32 bytes.
+	REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN:
+		"0328d706529061d93abd6d826e09ef0f0a1e71a12af813b29e5cd2977b7dc63a",
+	// The authorization-code repositories: the Redis one (selected above) and
+	// the in-process one.
+	REDIS_CODE_REPOSITORY_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN: "600",
+	REDIS_CODE_REPOSITORY_KEY_PREFIX: "oauth:code:",
+	STANDALONE_IN_MEMORY_CODE_REPOSITORY_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN: "600",
+
+	// --- the login and consent pages ----------------------------------
+	SESSION_LOGIN_PAGE_URL: "/login",
+	OAUTH_CONSENT_PAGE_URL: "/consent",
 
 	// --- cors ---------------------------------------------------------
-	// #500: a list, in the only shape an environment variable can carry one.
+	// A list, in the only shape an environment variable can carry one.
 	// The schema splits and validates it; the `turns every non-boolean
 	// override into its declared type` case below pins the result.
-	CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: "https://app.example.com,http://localhost:5173",
+	HTTP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: "https://app.example.com,http://localhost:5173",
 };
 
 /**
@@ -239,53 +305,286 @@ const DOCUMENTED_ENV: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
 const DELIBERATELY_UNSET: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
 	OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_ALLOW_UNMARKED_CLIENTS:
 		"#330 tombstone — any value must fail boot with migration instructions",
+	DEPLOYMENT_MODE:
+		"renamed CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	MEMORY_RATE_LIMITER_MAX_BUCKETS:
+		"renamed CORE_RATE_LIMITER_MEMORY_MAX_BUCKETS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	RATE_LIMIT_FAIL_MODE:
+		"renamed REDIS_RATE_LIMITER_FAIL_MODE, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_KEY_PREFIX:
+		"renamed REDIS_REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_KEY_PREFIX, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_CAS_RETRY_LIMIT:
+		"renamed REDIS_REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_CAS_RETRY_LIMIT, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	FEDERATION_GRANTS_ENCRYPTION_MODE:
+		"renamed REDIS_FEDERATION_GRANT_STORE_ENCRYPTION_MODE, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_TOKEN_BINDING_DISPATCH_POLICY:
+		"renamed CORE_TOKEN_BINDING_DISPATCH_POLICY, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_TOKEN_BINDING_BIND_CONFIDENTIAL_CLIENT_REFRESH_TOKENS:
+		"renamed CORE_TOKEN_BINDING_BIND_CONFIDENTIAL_CLIENT_REFRESH_TOKENS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_GRANTS_SESSION_ENABLED:
+		"renamed OAUTH_SESSION_ENABLED, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_GRANTS_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_ENABLED:
+		"renamed OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_ENABLED, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_GRANTS_REFRESH_TOKEN_ENABLED:
+		"renamed OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_REFRESH_TOKEN_ENABLED, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_GRANTS_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_ENABLED:
+		"renamed OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_ENABLED, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_GRANTS_JWT_BEARER_ENABLED:
+		"renamed OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_JWT_BEARER_ENABLED, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	ENDPOINTS_CONSENT_URL:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CONSENT_PAGE_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_ENABLED:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ENABLED, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_ALLOWED_SCOPES:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ALLOWED_SCOPES, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_ALLOWED_HOSTS:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_ALLOWED_HOSTS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_DENIED_HOSTS:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_DENIED_HOSTS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_MAX_BYTES:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_MAX_BYTES, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_TIMEOUT_MS:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_TIMEOUT_MS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_CACHE_MAX_AGE_MS:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_CACHE_MAX_AGE_MS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_STALE_IF_ERROR_MS:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_STALE_IF_ERROR_MS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MS:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_NEGATIVE_CACHE_MS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_CIMD_MAX_CONCURRENT_FETCHES:
+		"renamed OAUTH_CLIENT_ID_METADATA_DOCUMENTS_MAX_CONCURRENT_FETCHES, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_GRANTS_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_PKCE_REQUIRE_S256:
+		"the authorization-code grant's pkce block was removed, and this is only captured — set at all, it fails boot",
+	ENDPOINTS_LOGIN_URL:
+		"renamed SESSION_LOGIN_PAGE_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_SECRET:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_SECRET, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_NAME:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_NAME, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_MAX_AGE:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_MAX_AGE, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_SECURE:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_SECURE, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_SAME_SITE:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_SAME_SITE, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_DOMAIN:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_DOMAIN, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_STORAGE_TYPE:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_STORAGE_TYPE, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_STORAGE_REDIS_URL:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_STORAGE_REDIS_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	SESSION_STORAGE_REDIS_PASSWORD:
+		"renamed SESSION_STORE_STORAGE_REDIS_PASSWORD, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	LOG_LEVEL:
+		"renamed LOGGING_LEVEL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:
+		"renamed HTTP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_SIGNING_KEY_PROVIDER:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_PROVIDER, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHM:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_LOCAL_ALGORITHM, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_KID:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_LOCAL_KID, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_SECRET:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_LOCAL_SECRET, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+		"renamed KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_REDIS_URL:
+		"renamed REDIS_CLIENTS_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_REDIS_PASSWORD:
+		"renamed REDIS_CLIENTS_PASSWORD, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_PATH:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_CLIENT_YAML_PATH, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_PATH:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_YAML_PATH, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_AUTHENTICATE_URL:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_AUTHENTICATE_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_AUTHENTICATE_BY_TOKEN_URL:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_AUTHENTICATE_BY_TOKEN_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_LINK_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_LINK_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_FIND_SUBJECT_BY_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_FIND_SUBJECT_BY_FEDERATED_IDENTITY_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_BEARER_TOKEN:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_TIMEOUT:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_TIMEOUT, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_USER_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+		"renamed REPOSITORIES_USER_HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_CODE_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN:
+		"renamed REDIS_CODE_REPOSITORY_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN (the Redis code repository) and STANDALONE_IN_MEMORY_CODE_REPOSITORY_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN (the in-process one), and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_CODE_KEY_PREFIX:
+		"renamed REDIS_CODE_REPOSITORY_KEY_PREFIX, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_CODE_ENDPOINT_URI:
+		"removed: the Redis code repository uses the shared redis-clients connection; only captured — set at all, it fails boot",
+	CLIENT_CODE_PASSWORD:
+		"removed: the Redis code repository uses the shared redis-clients connection; only captured — set at all, it fails boot",
+	ENDPOINTS_MFA_URL:
+		"renamed MFA_PAGE_URL, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot where MFA is installed",
+	MFA_TOTP_ENABLED:
+		"renamed MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_ENABLED, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot where MFA is installed",
+	MFA_TOTP_ISSUER:
+		"renamed MFA_TOTP_FACTOR_ISSUER, and only captured — set alone, or to another value, it fails boot where MFA is installed",
 };
 
 /**
  * The provider environment `o3co/auth`'s `tests/docker-compose.yml` sets,
- * transcribed. The umbrella E2E boots the shipped template with exactly this,
+ * transcribed: each renamed variable under its old and its new name, the two
+ * at one value. The umbrella E2E boots the shipped template with exactly this,
  * so a parse failure here is a red umbrella build that this repository can see
- * first. `SESSION_SECURE=false` is the one it cannot run without: the suite
- * speaks plain HTTP.
+ * first. `SESSION_STORE_SECURE=false` is the one it cannot run without: the
+ * suite speaks plain HTTP.
  *
- * The two `FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE` lines are what #455 / #456 **require the
- * umbrella compose to add**: the federation token store defaults to memory,
- * and the standalone's memory module now declares itself replica-unsafe, so
- * the umbrella's `DEPLOYMENT_MODE=multi` refuses it by name until the compose
- * selects the Redis store and supplies its encryption key. Until that lands
- * in `o3co/auth`, this transcription is ahead of the file it transcribes on
- * exactly those two lines.
+ * The two `FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE` lines are required: the federation token
+ * store defaults to memory, the standalone's memory module declares itself
+ * replica-unsafe, and `CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=multi` refuses it by name unless the
+ * Redis store is selected with its encryption key.
  */
 const UMBRELLA_E2E_ENV: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
 	OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHM: "HS256",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_ALGORITHM: "HS256",
 	OAUTH_JWT_SECRET: "e2e-shared-hs256-secret.at-least-32-bytes.ok",
+	KEY_STORE_LOCAL_SECRET: "e2e-shared-hs256-secret.at-least-32-bytes.ok",
 	OAUTH_JWT_ISSUER: "https://auth.e2e.test",
 	SESSION_SECRET: "lO0QH09fuKSGuViZ9myJbH3jsgai99A2GpC3RYRuy6Y=",
+	SESSION_STORE_SECRET: "lO0QH09fuKSGuViZ9myJbH3jsgai99A2GpC3RYRuy6Y=",
 	SESSION_SECURE: "false",
+	SESSION_STORE_SECURE: "false",
 	SESSION_NAME: "auth.session",
+	SESSION_STORE_NAME: "auth.session",
 	DEPLOYMENT_MODE: "multi",
+	CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE: "multi",
 	REFRESH_TOKEN_FAMILY_STORE_REDIS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
+	REDIS_CLIENTS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
 	SESSION_STORAGE_REDIS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
+	SESSION_STORE_STORAGE_REDIS_URL: "redis://redis:6379",
 	USER_SESSION_STORES_ADAPTER: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_USER_SESSION_STORES: "redis",
 	RATE_LIMITER_ADAPTER: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_RATE_LIMITER: "redis",
 	OAUTH_CODE_ADAPTER: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_CODE_REPOSITORY: "redis",
 	FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE_TYPE: "redis",
+	ADAPTERS_FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE: "redis",
 	REDIS_FEDERATION_TOKEN_STORE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: "BwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwc=",
 	CLIENT_USER_TYPE: "yaml",
+	ADAPTERS_USER_REPOSITORY: "yaml",
 	OAUTH_RESOURCE_INDICATOR_ENABLED: "true",
 	OAUTH_REQUIRE_EMAIL_VERIFIED: "true",
-	OAUTH_GRANTS_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_PKCE_REQUIRE_S256: "true",
+	OAUTH_GRANTS_SESSION_ENABLED: "true",
+	OAUTH_SESSION_ENABLED: "true",
+	MFA_MODE: "off",
 };
 
-function buildResolvedConfig(env: Record<string, string>, configEnv = "production"): AppConfig {
+/** The template's own files for `configEnv`, under `operatorLayer` — HOCON an operator adds above them — when given. */
+function ownFiles(configEnv: string, operatorLayer?: string): string[] {
 	const { applicationConfPath, envConfPath } = resolveConfigPaths(configDir, configEnv);
-	const libraryReferencePath = resolveLibraryReferenceConfPath();
-	return validate(
-		parseFile(envConfPath, { env })
-			.withFallback(parseFile(applicationConfPath, { env }))
-			.withFallback(parseFile(libraryReferencePath, { env })),
-		AppConfigSchema,
-	);
+	if (operatorLayer === undefined) return [envConfPath, applicationConfPath];
+	const file = join(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "documented-env-overrides-")), "operator.conf");
+	writeFileSync(file, operatorLayer);
+	return [file, envConfPath, applicationConfPath];
+}
+
+/** Phase one, as `app.mts` reads it: the switches. */
+function readShippedSwitches(env: Record<string, string>, configEnv = "production"): Switches {
+	return readSwitches(readOwnLayers(ownFiles(configEnv), { env }));
+}
+
+/**
+ * The stores an enabled federation needs beside it, which boot refuses a
+ * composition without. What they hold is not this suite's question.
+ */
+const FEDERATION_STORES = Object.fromEntries(
+	[
+		"userSessionStore",
+		"sessionRPRegistry",
+		"sessionFamilyIndex",
+		"sessionFederationIndex",
+		"federationTokenStore",
+		"refreshTokenFamilyRevocation",
+	].map((key) => [key, {}]),
+);
+
+/**
+ * The shipped layers under `env`, as `app.mts` hands them to boot, and the
+ * configuration boot parsed: phase one for what the composition expects of
+ * session admission, phase two resolved over the reference of every package
+ * the template's modules come from (the template's own and core's) and
+ * parsed once by `createApp` — no bridge on the way.
+ * No module is loaded unless `modules` names one: the parse is what this
+ * suite asks about, and each key it reads is one core's schema declares, or
+ * the section of a module it loads.
+ */
+async function bootParsed(
+	env: Record<string, string>,
+	configEnv = "production",
+	operatorLayer?: string,
+	modules: readonly Module[] = [],
+): Promise<AppConfig> {
+	const own = readOwnLayers(ownFiles(configEnv, operatorLayer), { env });
+	const switches = readSwitches(own);
+	const handle = await createApp({
+		modules: [...modules],
+		bootstrapComponents: {
+			config: resolveForBoot(own, buildModules(switches, { environment: configEnv }), switches),
+			pathResolver: (s: string) => s,
+			...FEDERATION_STORES,
+		} as never,
+	});
+	const parsed = handle.components.config;
+	await handle.dispose();
+	if (parsed === undefined) throw new Error("createApp booted without the parsed configuration");
+	return parsed;
+}
+
+/** `session-store {}` as the session store's module parses it. */
+function sessionStoreSection(config: AppConfig): {
+	readonly secure: boolean;
+	readonly sameSite: string;
+	readonly maxAge: number;
+} {
+	const schema = sessionStoreModule.section?.schema;
+	if (schema === undefined) throw new Error("the session store's module declares no section");
+	return schema.parse((config as Record<string, unknown>)["session-store"]) as ReturnType<
+		typeof sessionStoreSection
+	>;
+}
+
+/** `session {}` as the session module parses it. */
+function sessionSection(config: AppConfig): { readonly csrf?: { readonly ttlSeconds: number } } {
+	const schema = sessionModule.section?.schema;
+	if (schema === undefined) throw new Error("the session module declares no section");
+	return schema.parse(config.session) as ReturnType<typeof sessionSection>;
+}
+
+/** `http {}` as the `http` module parsed it, in a configuration boot parsed with the module loaded. */
+function httpSectionOf(config: AppConfig): {
+	readonly port: number;
+	readonly readinessTimeoutMs: number;
+	readonly trustProxy: unknown;
+	readonly cors: { readonly allowedOrigins: readonly string[] };
+} {
+	return (config as unknown as { http: ReturnType<typeof httpSectionOf> }).http;
+}
+
+/** `oauth {}` as the oauth module's own schema parses it. */
+function oauthSection(config: AppConfig): {
+	readonly consentPage?: { readonly url: string };
+	readonly clientIdMetadataDocuments?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+} {
+	const schema = oauthModule({ config }).section?.schema;
+	if (schema === undefined) throw new Error("the oauth module declares no section");
+	return schema.parse(config.oauth) as ReturnType<typeof oauthSection>;
 }
 
 /** Every `${?VAR}` in a HOCON layer, ignoring commented-out lines. */
@@ -306,51 +605,66 @@ function substitutionsIn(path: string): Set<string> {
  * The underscore is what separates an environment variable from the HTTP
  * methods in the endpoint table, which share the shouting-case shape.
  */
-function documentedInReadme(): Set<string> {
+function documentedInReadme(path: string = readmePath): Set<string> {
 	const found = new Set<string>();
-	for (const match of readFileSync(readmePath, "utf8").matchAll(
-		/^\|\s*`([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)`\s*\|/gm,
-	)) {
+	for (const match of readFileSync(path, "utf8").matchAll(/^\|\s*`([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)`\s*\|/gm)) {
 		const name = match[1] as string;
 		if (name.includes("_")) found.add(name);
 	}
 	return found;
 }
 
+/**
+ * The substitutions of the template's own layers, and of the `reference.conf`
+ * of every package the template loads a module from under the documented
+ * environment in production (core's among them) — and under it with MFA
+ * installed, its factors in the Store, which brings the MFA package's and
+ * foundation's.
+ */
 function liveSubstitutions(): Set<string> {
 	const { applicationConfPath } = resolveConfigPaths(configDir, "production");
+	const references = [
+		DOCUMENTED_ENV,
+		{ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, MFA_MODE: "required", ADAPTERS_MFA_FACTOR_STORE: "store" },
+	].flatMap((env) =>
+		moduleReferences(buildModules(readShippedSwitches(env), { environment: "production" })),
+	);
 	return new Set([
-		...substitutionsIn(resolveLibraryReferenceConfPath()),
+		...references.flatMap((reference) => [...substitutionsIn(fileURLToPath(reference))]),
+		...substitutionsIn(fileURLToPath(templateReference())),
 		...substitutionsIn(applicationConfPath),
 	]);
 }
 
-describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied as a string", () => {
-	it("parses with every documented environment variable set", () => {
-		expect(() => buildResolvedConfig(DOCUMENTED_ENV)).not.toThrow();
+describe("the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied as a string", () => {
+	it("parses with every documented environment variable set", async () => {
+		await expect(bootParsed(DOCUMENTED_ENV)).resolves.toBeDefined();
 	});
 
-	it("turns every boolean override into an actual boolean", () => {
-		const config = buildResolvedConfig(DOCUMENTED_ENV);
+	it("turns every boolean override into an actual boolean", async () => {
+		const config = await bootParsed(DOCUMENTED_ENV);
 		// Each of these arrives from HOCON as a string. A leftover string is
 		// not a cosmetic defect: `=== true` is how the runtime reads them.
-		expect(config.session.secure).toBe(false);
+		expect(sessionStoreSection(config).secure).toBe(false);
 		expect(config.oauth.jwt.legacyTypAccept).toBe(true);
 		expect(config.oauth.requireEmailVerified).toBe(true);
 		expect(config.oauth.resourceIndicator?.enabled).toBe(true);
-		expect(config.federations.google?.enabled).toBe(true);
-		expect(config.federations.oidc?.enabled).toBe(true);
-		// #593: the newest one, and the one where a leftover string would be
-		// read as "on" by a truthiness check and as "off" by `=== true` — a
-		// feature whose whole default is off.
-		expect(config.federationGrants?.enabled).toBe(true);
+		expect(config.core?.federations?.google?.enabled).toBe(true);
+		expect(config.core?.federations?.oidc?.enabled).toBe(true);
+		// A leftover string here would be read as "on" by a truthiness check
+		// and as "off" by `=== true`, for a feature whose whole default is off.
+		expect(config["federation-grants"]?.enabled).toBe(true);
 	});
 
-	it("turns every non-boolean override into its declared type", () => {
-		const config = buildResolvedConfig(DOCUMENTED_ENV);
-		expect(config.http.port).toBe(3000);
-		expect(config.http.readinessTimeoutMs).toBe(1500);
-		expect(config.http.trustProxy).toEqual(["10.0.0.0/8", "loopback"]);
+	it("turns every non-boolean override into its declared type", async () => {
+		const config = await bootParsed(DOCUMENTED_ENV);
+		const http = httpSectionOf(
+			await bootParsed(DOCUMENTED_ENV, "production", undefined, [httpModule]),
+		);
+		expect(http.port).toBe(3000);
+		expect(http.readinessTimeoutMs).toBe(1500);
+		expect(http.trustProxy).toEqual(["10.0.0.0/8", "loopback"]);
+		expect(config.core?.federations?.google?.accessType).toBe("online");
 		// The new default wins over the deprecated variable, and the parsed
 		// config mirrors it onto the old key for readers that predate the split.
 		expect(resolveAccessTokenLifetime(config)).toEqual({
@@ -359,13 +673,16 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 		});
 		expect(config.oauth.accessToken.expiresIn).toBe(900);
 		expect(config.oauth.refreshToken.expiresIn).toBe(86400);
-		expect(config.session.maxAge).toBe(3600000);
-		expect(config.session.csrf?.ttlSeconds).toBe(7200);
+		expect(sessionStoreSection(config).maxAge).toBe(3600000);
+		expect(sessionSection(config).csrf?.ttlSeconds).toBe(7200);
 		expect(config.oauth.nonce?.maxLength).toBe(256);
-		expect(config.consentStore?.adapter).toBe("redis");
-		expect(config.redisConsentStore?.keyPrefix).toBe("tenant-a:consent:");
-		// #529: the comma-separated lists become lists, trimmed; the numbers, numbers.
-		expect(config.oauth.clientIdMetadataDocuments).toEqual({
+		expect(readShippedSwitches(DOCUMENTED_ENV).adapters.consentStore).toBe("redis");
+		// A Redis store's section, which its module (not loaded here) parses.
+		const sections = config as unknown as Record<string, { keyPrefix?: unknown } | undefined>;
+		expect(sections["redis-consent-store"]?.keyPrefix).toBe("tenant-a:consent:");
+		// The comma-separated lists become lists, trimmed; the numbers, numbers:
+		// the oauth module's schema reads them (the module is not loaded here).
+		expect(oauthSection(config).clientIdMetadataDocuments).toEqual({
 			enabled: true,
 			allowedScopes: ["read", "write"],
 			allowedAudiences: ["https://mcp.example"],
@@ -379,22 +696,35 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 			maxConcurrentFetches: 4,
 			cacheMaxAgeMs: 60000,
 		});
-		// #500: a comma-separated string becomes a list of origins, trimmed.
-		expect(config.cors?.allowedOrigins).toEqual([
-			"https://app.example.com",
-			"http://localhost:5173",
-		]);
+		// The MFA switch is read before boot, by the template; off, it hands
+		// boot no `mfa` section.
+		expect(readShippedSwitches(DOCUMENTED_ENV).mfaMode).toBe("off");
+		expect(config).not.toHaveProperty("mfa");
+		expect(config).not.toHaveProperty("endpoints.mfa");
+		expect(readShippedSwitches(DOCUMENTED_ENV).adapters).toMatchObject({
+			mfaFactorStore: "redis",
+			mfaTransactionStore: "redis",
+		});
+		expect(sections["redis-mfa-factor-store"]?.keyPrefix).toBe("tenant-a:mfaf:");
+		expect(sections["redis-mfa-transaction-store"]?.keyPrefix).toBe("tenant-a:mfat:");
+		// A comma-separated string becomes a list of origins, trimmed.
+		expect(http.cors.allowedOrigins).toEqual(["https://app.example.com", "http://localhost:5173"]);
 	});
 
-	describe("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS (#500)", () => {
-		it("reads an exported-but-empty variable as no origins, not as an error", () => {
+	describe("HTTP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", () => {
+		it("reads an exported-but-empty variable as no origins, not as an error", async () => {
 			// The .env / compose / ConfigMap shape. "CORS off" is what both the
 			// unset key and the empty string mean, so they must agree.
-			const config = buildResolvedConfig({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: "" });
-			expect(config.cors?.allowedOrigins).toEqual([]);
+			const config = await bootParsed(
+				{ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, HTTP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: "" },
+				"production",
+				undefined,
+				[httpModule],
+			);
+			expect(httpSectionOf(config).cors.allowedOrigins).toEqual([]);
 		});
 
-		it("fails boot on an origin that could never match, naming the key", () => {
+		it("fails boot on an origin that could never match, naming the key", async () => {
 			// Every one of these parses as a URL and is a real typo: matching is
 			// exact string equality against the Origin header, so each would be
 			// an allowlist that admits nobody with nothing to say so.
@@ -405,56 +735,96 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 				"http://app.example.com", // plaintext off loopback
 				"https://app.example.com/callback", // a URL, not an origin
 			]) {
-				expect(() => buildResolvedConfig({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: bad })).toThrow(
-					/cors\.allowedOrigins/,
-				);
+				await expect(
+					bootParsed(
+						{ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, HTTP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: bad },
+						"production",
+						undefined,
+						[httpModule],
+					),
+				).rejects.toThrow(/http\.cors\.allowedOrigins/);
 			}
 		});
 
-		it("accepts the loopback http carve-out a dev front-end needs", () => {
-			const config = buildResolvedConfig({
-				...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
-				CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: "http://localhost:5173,http://127.0.0.1:5173,https://app.example.com",
-			});
-			expect(config.cors?.allowedOrigins).toHaveLength(3);
+		it("fails boot on a value that is neither a list nor a string, naming the key", async () => {
+			// The variable can only ever carry a string, so this shape comes
+			// from a configuration file. Read as no origins, it would turn CORS
+			// silently off for a key someone wrote.
+			for (const value of ["42", "true", '{ origin = "https://app.example.com" }']) {
+				await expect(
+					bootParsed(DOCUMENTED_ENV, "production", `http.cors.allowedOrigins = ${value}`, [
+						httpModule,
+					]),
+					value,
+				).rejects.toThrow(/http\.cors\.allowedOrigins/);
+			}
+		});
+
+		it("accepts the loopback http carve-out a dev front-end needs", async () => {
+			const config = await bootParsed(
+				{
+					...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
+					HTTP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:
+						"http://localhost:5173,http://127.0.0.1:5173,https://app.example.com",
+				},
+				"production",
+				undefined,
+				[httpModule],
+			);
+			expect(httpSectionOf(config).cors.allowedOrigins).toHaveLength(3);
 		});
 	});
 
-	it("parses the HS256 shape, whose strict union refuses asymmetric key fields", () => {
-		// `OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHM=HS256` is not a variation on the map above: the
-		// HS256 member of the signingKey union is `.strict()`, so a deployment
-		// that switches algorithm must also stop exporting the key-file
-		// variables. Worth pinning — it is the umbrella E2E's shape.
-		const { OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY, OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, ...rest } = DOCUMENTED_ENV;
-		void OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY;
-		void OAUTH_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH;
-		const { OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY, OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH, ...hs256 } = rest;
-		void OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY;
-		void OAUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH;
-		const config = buildResolvedConfig({ ...hs256, OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHM: "HS256" });
-		expect(config.oauth.jwt.signingKey.local?.algorithm).toBe("HS256");
+	it("parses the HS256 shape, whose strict union refuses asymmetric key fields", async () => {
+		// `KEY_STORE_LOCAL_ALGORITHM=HS256` is not a variation on the map above:
+		// the HS256 member of the key store's `local` union is strict, so a
+		// deployment that switches algorithm must also stop exporting the
+		// key-file variables. Worth pinning — it is the umbrella E2E's shape.
+		const { KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY, KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, ...rest } =
+			DOCUMENTED_ENV;
+		void KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY;
+		void KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH;
+		const { KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY, KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH, ...hs256 } = rest;
+		void KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY;
+		void KEY_STORE_LOCAL_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH;
+		const config = await bootParsed(
+			{ ...hs256, KEY_STORE_LOCAL_ALGORITHM: "HS256" },
+			"production",
+			undefined,
+			[keyStoreModule],
+		);
+		expect(
+			(config as unknown as { "key-store": { local: { algorithm: string } } })["key-store"].local
+				.algorithm,
+		).toBe("HS256");
 	});
 
-	it("parses the environment the umbrella E2E boots, with SESSION_SECURE=false as a string", () => {
-		const config = buildResolvedConfig(UMBRELLA_E2E_ENV);
-		expect(config.session.secure).toBe(false);
+	it("parses the environment the umbrella E2E boots, with SESSION_STORE_SECURE=false as a string", async () => {
+		const config = await bootParsed(UMBRELLA_E2E_ENV);
+		expect(sessionStoreSection(config).secure).toBe(false);
 		expect(config.oauth.requireEmailVerified).toBe(true);
 		expect(config.oauth.resourceIndicator?.enabled).toBe(true);
-		expect(config.deployment?.mode).toBe("multi");
+		expect(config.core?.deployment?.mode).toBe("multi");
 	});
 
 	it("wires nothing replica-unsafe for the umbrella E2E environment", async () => {
-		// `DEPLOYMENT_MODE=multi` makes the provider audit its own store wiring
+		// `CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=multi` makes the provider audit its own store wiring
 		// at boot, so a config that parses but wires a memory store still fails
-		// there. Ask each manifest, the way the guard does (#455): the exported
-		// name list covers core's modules only, and the template's own memory
-		// modules are precisely the ones it could not see.
+		// there. Ask each manifest, the way the guard does: the exported name
+		// list covers core's modules only, and cannot see the template's own
+		// memory modules.
 		const { replicaUnsafeReason } = await import("@o3co/auth-provider-core");
-		for (const module of buildModules(buildResolvedConfig(UMBRELLA_E2E_ENV))) {
+		for (const module of buildModules(readShippedSwitches(UMBRELLA_E2E_ENV))) {
 			expect(replicaUnsafeReason(module), module.name).toBeUndefined();
 		}
 	});
 
+	it("reads MFA_MODE=off before boot, where the shipped configuration expects no session requirement", async () => {
+		expect(readShippedSwitches({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, MFA_MODE: "off" }).mfaMode).toBe("off");
+		const parsed = await bootParsed({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, MFA_MODE: "off" });
+		expect(parsed.core?.sessionRequirements).toEqual({ expected: [] });
+	});
+
 	describe("boolean overrides accept the spellings an operator writes", () => {
 		const cases: ReadonlyArray<[string, boolean]> = [
 			["true", true],
@@ -463,22 +833,22 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 			["false", false],
 			["0", false],
 			// An exported-but-empty variable — the `.env` / compose / ConfigMap
-			// shape. Reads as false, matching what #292 decided for trustProxy.
+			// shape. Reads as false, as it does for trustProxy.
 			["", false],
 		];
 
 		for (const [supplied, expected] of cases) {
-			it(`SESSION_SECURE=${JSON.stringify(supplied)} resolves to ${expected}`, () => {
-				const config = buildResolvedConfig({
+			it(`SESSION_STORE_SECURE=${JSON.stringify(supplied)} resolves to ${expected}`, async () => {
+				const config = await bootParsed({
 					...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
-					SESSION_SECURE: supplied,
-					SESSION_SAME_SITE: "lax",
+					SESSION_STORE_SECURE: supplied,
+					SESSION_STORE_SAME_SITE: "lax",
 				});
-				expect(config.session.secure).toBe(expected);
+				expect(sessionStoreSection(config).secure).toBe(expected);
 			});
 
-			it(`OAUTH_JWT_LEGACY_TYP_ACCEPT=${JSON.stringify(supplied)} resolves to ${expected}`, () => {
-				const config = buildResolvedConfig({
+			it(`OAUTH_JWT_LEGACY_TYP_ACCEPT=${JSON.stringify(supplied)} resolves to ${expected}`, async () => {
+				const config = await bootParsed({
 					...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
 					OAUTH_JWT_LEGACY_TYP_ACCEPT: supplied,
 				});
@@ -486,30 +856,27 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 			});
 		}
 
-		it("fails boot on a spelling it does not recognise rather than guessing", () => {
-			expect(() => buildResolvedConfig({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, SESSION_SECURE: "ture" })).toThrow(
-				/true.*false/s,
-			);
+		it("refuses a spelling it does not recognise rather than guessing", async () => {
+			const config = await bootParsed({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, SESSION_STORE_SECURE: "ture" });
+			expect(() => sessionStoreSection(config)).toThrow(/true.*false/s);
 		});
 
-		it("refuses SESSION_SAME_SITE=none unless SESSION_SECURE is on", () => {
-			// The #282 guard reads the coerced value, so it has to keep firing
+		it("refuses SESSION_STORE_SAME_SITE=none unless SESSION_STORE_SECURE is on", async () => {
+			// The SameSite=None guard reads the coerced value, so it has to keep firing
 			// for the string form an environment variable actually delivers.
-			expect(() =>
-				buildResolvedConfig({
-					...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
-					SESSION_SAME_SITE: "none",
-					SESSION_SECURE: "false",
-				}),
-			).toThrow(/SESSION_SECURE=true/);
-			expect(() =>
-				buildResolvedConfig({
-					...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
-					SESSION_SAME_SITE: "none",
-					SESSION_SECURE: "true",
-					SESSION_NAME: "auth.session",
-				}),
-			).not.toThrow();
+			const insecure = await bootParsed({
+				...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
+				SESSION_STORE_SAME_SITE: "none",
+				SESSION_STORE_SECURE: "false",
+			});
+			expect(() => sessionStoreSection(insecure)).toThrow(/SESSION_STORE_SECURE=true/);
+			const secure = await bootParsed({
+				...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
+				SESSION_STORE_SAME_SITE: "none",
+				SESSION_STORE_SECURE: "true",
+				SESSION_STORE_NAME: "auth.session",
+			});
+			expect(sessionStoreSection(secure).sameSite).toBe("none");
 		});
 	});
 
@@ -522,12 +889,23 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 		});
 
 		it("covers every environment variable the README documents", () => {
-			const uncovered = [...documentedInReadme()].filter(
+			const uncovered = [...documentedInReadme(), ...documentedInReadme(readmeJaPath)].filter(
 				(name) => !(name in DOCUMENTED_ENV) && !(name in DELIBERATELY_UNSET),
 			);
 			expect(uncovered).toEqual([]);
 		});
 
+		it("documents the same variables in README.md and README.ja.md", () => {
+			// The Japanese README carries the same facts (AGENTS.md): a row added
+			// to one and not the other is a variable one audience never hears of.
+			const en = documentedInReadme();
+			const ja = documentedInReadme(readmeJaPath);
+			expect({
+				onlyInEnglish: [...en].filter((name) => !ja.has(name)).sort(),
+				onlyInJapanese: [...ja].filter((name) => !en.has(name)).sort(),
+			}).toEqual({ onlyInEnglish: [], onlyInJapanese: [] });
+		});
+
 		it("exercises no variable the config layers no longer substitute", () => {
 			// Catches the reverse drift: a README row (and a test entry) left
 			// behind by a key that was removed from the HOCON.
@@ -538,23 +916,23 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 	});
 
 	describe("variables whose documented behaviour is to fail boot", () => {
-		it("still refuses OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_ALLOW_UNMARKED_CLIENTS (#330 tombstone)", () => {
-			expect(() =>
-				buildResolvedConfig({
+		it("refuses OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_ALLOW_UNMARKED_CLIENTS, naming allowUnmarkedClients", async () => {
+			await expect(
+				bootParsed({
 					...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
 					OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_ALLOW_UNMARKED_CLIENTS: "true",
 				}),
-			).toThrow(/allowUnmarkedClients/);
+			).rejects.toThrow(/allowUnmarkedClients/);
 		});
 
-		it("refuses an access-token default above the max, naming both keys", () => {
-			expect(() =>
-				buildResolvedConfig({
+		it("refuses an access-token default above the max, naming both keys", async () => {
+			await expect(
+				bootParsed({
 					...DOCUMENTED_ENV,
 					OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN: "7200",
 					OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_MAX_EXPIRES_IN: "3600",
 				}),
-			).toThrow(/defaultExpiresIn.*maxExpiresIn/s);
+			).rejects.toThrow(/defaultExpiresIn.*maxExpiresIn/s);
 		});
 
 		for (const name of [
@@ -562,17 +940,40 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 			"OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_MAX_EXPIRES_IN",
 			"OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN",
 		]) {
-			it(`refuses an empty ${name} rather than minting already-expired tokens`, () => {
-				expect(() => buildResolvedConfig({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, [name]: "" })).toThrow();
+			it(`refuses an empty ${name} rather than minting already-expired tokens`, async () => {
+				await expect(bootParsed({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, [name]: "" })).rejects.toThrow();
 			});
 		}
 
-		it("still refuses an empty SESSION_CSRF_TTL_SECONDS (#272)", () => {
+		it("refuses MFA_MODE that is none of the three before boot, naming mfaMode", async () => {
+			const env = { ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, MFA_MODE: "on" };
+			expect(() => readShippedSwitches(env)).toThrow(RangeError);
+			await expect(bootParsed(env)).rejects.toThrow(/mfaMode/);
+		});
+
+		for (const mode of ["optional", "required"] as const) {
+			it(`reads MFA_MODE=${mode} as the switch that installs MFA, expecting mfa`, () => {
+				const switches = readShippedSwitches({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, MFA_MODE: mode });
+				expect(switches.mfaMode).toBe(mode);
+				expect(expectedSessionRequirements(switches)).toEqual({
+					expected: ["mfa"],
+					secondFactorAuthority: "mfa",
+				});
+			});
+		}
+
+		it("refuses DEPLOYMENT_MODE set alone, naming CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE", async () => {
+			const { CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE: _new, ...env } = DOCUMENTED_ENV;
+			await expect(bootParsed({ ...env, DEPLOYMENT_MODE: "multi" })).rejects.toThrow(
+				/DEPLOYMENT_MODE was renamed CORE_DEPLOYMENT_MODE/,
+			);
+		});
+
+		it("still refuses an empty SESSION_CSRF_TTL_SECONDS", async () => {
 			// Pinned alongside the boolean cases because it is the same trap
 			// read from the other side: for a *number*, empty means fail loudly.
-			expect(() =>
-				buildResolvedConfig({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, SESSION_CSRF_TTL_SECONDS: "" }),
-			).toThrow();
+			const config = await bootParsed({ ...DOCUMENTED_ENV, SESSION_CSRF_TTL_SECONDS: "" });
+			expect(() => sessionSection(config)).toThrow(/ttlSeconds/);
 		});
 	});
 
@@ -581,7 +982,7 @@ describe("#288: the shipped config boots with every documented override supplied
 		// artifact these tests would pass while testing nothing. Checked by
 		// what the directory holds, not by what it is called: this file ships
 		// in every scaffolded project, and none of those lives at
-		// `templates/standalone` (#512).
+		// `templates/standalone`.
 		for (const file of ["config/application.conf", "config/production.conf", "src/app.mts"]) {
 			expect(existsSync(join(standaloneDir, file)), file).toBe(true);
 		}