@noy-db/hub 0.9.0-pre.0 → 0.9.0-pre.1

package/dist/with-party/team/keyring.d.ts

@@ -99,8 +99,18 @@ export interface LoadKeyringOptions {
      * That user's secret — a single string for a standard keyring, or the
      * structured 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts} for an echo keyring (spec
      * #940, AG-1: a single string can never unlock an echo keyring).
+     * One of `secret` / `kek` is required.
      */
-    readonly secret: string | EchoSecretParts;
+    readonly secret?: string | EchoSecretParts;
+    /**
+     * core#96 — a KEK this session already HOLDS, instead of re-deriving one
+     * from a secret. The in-session roster reload (core#82) uses it: the secret
+     * the vault was opened with is stale after an in-session `rotateSecret`,
+     * and 600K PBKDF2 iterations are not needed to adopt a file this KEK
+     * already opens. A file re-keyed under this member by somebody else fails
+     * the canary and reports `InvalidKeyError` — a defined event, not a hang.
+     */
+    readonly kek?: EnclaveKey;
 }
 /**
  * KDF dispatch for tier-1 unlock (spec #940). An echo keyring accepts
@@ -186,8 +196,18 @@ export interface CreateOwnerKeyringOptions extends SecretPolicy {
 export declare function createOwnerKeyring(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, opts: CreateOwnerKeyringOptions): Promise<UnlockedKeyring>;
 /** Grant access to a new user. Caller must have grant privilege. */
 export declare function grant(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: GrantOptions): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Reserved DEK-map slots that are KEYS, not collections, and can never be
+ * rotated — `rotateKeys` refuses each by name. Every caller that derives a
+ * rotation scope from a DEK map (`revoke`, `quarantineKeyring`) strips these
+ * first. ⛔ Kept as ONE set rather than a filter per caller: `quarantineKeyring`
+ * stripped only `_roster` and broke the moment the owner keyring gained an
+ * inbox key (core#65), which is the second time this list grew and a caller
+ * was missed.
+ */
+export declare const NON_ROTATABLE_SLOTS: ReadonlySet<string>;
 /** Revoke a user's access. Optionally rotate keys for affected collections. */
-export declare function revoke(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: RevokeOptions): Promise<void>;
+export declare function revoke(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: RevokeOptions): Promise<RevokeResult>;
 /** What {@link verifyRoster} found. */
 export interface RosterVerifyResult {
     /**
@@ -306,7 +326,19 @@ export declare function quarantineKeyring(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, call
  * @throws `ValidationError` when the diff is empty (nothing to update).
  *
  */
-export declare function updateKeyringIdentity(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: UpdateUserOptions): Promise<void>;
+/** What `updateKeyringIdentity` hands back to the kernel (core#96). */
+export interface UpdateKeyringResult {
+    /** The role moved. The kernel re-registers the member with a broker host, if one is configured. */
+    readonly roleChanged: boolean;
+    /**
+     * A fresh `_broker_member` DEK, delivered through the inbox, when the member
+     * is (still) a sub-admin after a role change — the kernel seals the new seed
+     * under it and re-enrols. Absent otherwise (a promotion to owner/admin drops
+     * the slot: those roles use the shared `_broker` seed).
+     */
+    readonly brokerMemberDek?: EnclaveKey;
+}
+export declare function updateKeyringIdentity(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: UpdateUserOptions): Promise<UpdateKeyringResult>;
 /**
  * Rotate DEKs for specified collections:
  * 1. Generate new DEKs
@@ -351,11 +383,38 @@ export interface RotateResult {
         readonly userId: string;
         readonly reason: KeyringTamperedReason;
     }>;
+    /**
+     * core#100 — every record this rotation re-encrypted, with its version.
+     * Rotation writes through the raw store, invisible to the sync dirty log,
+     * so a replica kept the OLD ciphertext until each record was edited again —
+     * a revoked member with store access went on reading it, and a survivor
+     * handed the new DEK read `TamperedError` (measured by pilot-1). The kernel
+     * dirty-tracks these on every sync engine so the next push carries them.
+     */
+    readonly rewritten: ReadonlyArray<{
+        readonly collection: string;
+        readonly id: string;
+        readonly version: number;
+    }>;
+}
+/** core#100 — what `revoke` hands the kernel: the rotation's rewrites, for the dirty log. */
+export interface RevokeResult {
+    readonly rewritten: RotateResult['rewritten'];
 }
 /** Options for {@link rotateKeys} (#846b — was a bare `string[]`). */
 export interface RotateKeysOptions {
     /** Collections whose DEKs are re-minted. */
     readonly collections: readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * core#100 — members who must NOT be delivered the new keys: the member
+     * being revoked or quarantined (a store that suppresses the `_keyring`
+     * delete leaves their file in place — #1043 — and delivering to it would
+     * hand the revoked member the very key the rotation exists to take away),
+     * and a member being narrowed (the collection just left their file, but a
+     * pending inbox slot for it cannot be pulled out of its box). They get the
+     * drop, and appear in `needsRegrant` as before.
+     */
+    readonly exclude?: readonly string[];
 }
 export declare function rotateKeys(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, opts: RotateKeysOptions): Promise<RotateResult>;
 /** Options for {@link changeSecret} (#846b). */
@@ -507,7 +566,38 @@ export declare function ensureCollectionDEK(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, ke
 export declare function hasWritePermission(keyring: UnlockedKeyring, collectionName: string): boolean;
 /** Check if a user has any access to a collection. */
 export declare function hasAccess(keyring: UnlockedKeyring, collectionName: string): boolean;
+export declare function mintInboxKey(kek: EnclaveKey): Promise<{
+    wrappedInboxKey: string;
+    inboxKeyAes: EnclaveKey;
+    inboxKey: NonNullable<KeyringFile['inbox_key']>;
+}>;
+/** core#96 — the collections a member has pending in their inbox, over every box. */
+export declare function inboxSlots(file: Pick<KeyringFile, 'inbox'>): string[];
+/**
+ * core#65 — this member's INBOX KEY PAIR, rebuilt from their keyring file: the
+ * private half is sealed under `deks[INBOX_KEY_ID]`, which only their own KEK
+ * unwraps. The inbox drain below opens boxes with it; `with-party/team/
+ * delegation.ts` opens a delegation's content key with the same pair, so a
+ * grantor can hand a member a key without knowing their secret.
+ */
+export declare function openInboxKeyPair(inboxKey: NonNullable<KeyringFile['inbox_key']>, inboxKeyAes: EnclaveKey): Promise<CryptoKeyPair>;
 /** Persist a keyring file to the store. */
+/**
+ * ⛔⛔ core#132 — DO NOT ADD A RETRY HERE. An earlier cut of this change did,
+ * and it was wrong in a way that looked like a fix.
+ *
+ * This function writes the caller's in-memory `keyring.deks` WHOLESALE. If a
+ * CAS fails, the write that lost was based on a stale version — retrying it
+ * re-persists that same map over the winner's, which is exactly the clobber
+ * the CAS just caught, laundered into a success. The suite went green and the
+ * data loss stayed.
+ *
+ * ⭐ The resolution belongs where the intent is, not where the write is. The
+ * only caller that races in practice is the lazy DEK mint in
+ * `ensureCollectionDEK`, and it can resolve correctly because it has not
+ * encrypted anything yet: on conflict it adopts the winner's key and returns
+ * that. See the comment there.
+ */
 export declare function persistKeyring(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, keyring: UnlockedKeyring): Promise<void>;
 /**
  * Check whether a keyring is authorised for a given `@noy-db/as-*`
@@ -559,3 +649,42 @@ export declare function hasImportCapability(keyring: UnlockedKeyring, tier: 'bun
  */
 export declare function evaluateImportCapability(capability: ImportCapability | undefined, role: Role, tier: 'plaintext', format: ExportFormat): boolean;
 export declare function evaluateImportCapability(capability: ImportCapability | undefined, role: Role, tier: 'bundle'): boolean;
+/**
+ * core#132 — what this write is based on.
+ *
+ * `{ on }` is the envelope the edit was computed from; the write then CASes
+ * against its `_v` and lands at `_v + 1`. `'create'` is a keyring that did not
+ * exist.
+ *
+ * ⭐ REQUIRED, not optional, and that is the point: keyring writes were a bare
+ * `store.put` with no `expectedVersion`, so two concurrent edits to one member
+ * were last-writer-wins, silently. Making the basis a required parameter means
+ * the COMPILER enumerates every call site — `NON_ROTATABLE_SLOTS`' own comment
+ * records two defects caused by enumerating callers with grep instead.
+ *
+ * ⛔ `'create'` is NOT protected, and the limit is in the store contract, not
+ * in this function: two concurrent creates of the same userId still clobber,
+ * because this path passes no `expectedVersion` at all. Do not read a
+ * `'create'` basis as protected.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ It is not that absence is inexpressible — core#134 measured that claim and
+ * it was wrong. Every version hub writes starts at 1, so on a store that
+ * compares only when the record is present, `expectedVersion: 0` lets the
+ * first create through and conflicts every later one: an exact "write only if
+ * absent", for free. Censused 2026-09-24, every record store in the family
+ * already behaves that way, `to-aws-s3` deliberately and by name.
+ *
+ * ⛔ What stops this call site adopting it is that NOTHING HOLDS that
+ * convergence: `@noy-db/ports/to` asserts none of it, so a third-party adapter
+ * owes it nothing and this would become a silent correctness dependency on
+ * behaviour no gate checks. Adopt it after the conformance case lands, not
+ * before. core#134 carries the decision.
+ */
+export type KeyringWriteBasis = {
+    readonly on: EncryptedEnvelope;
+} | 'create';
+/** The basis for a write computed from a `readKeyringFile` result. */
+export declare const basisOf: (found: {
+    readonly envelope: EncryptedEnvelope;
+} | undefined) => KeyringWriteBasis;
+export declare function writeKeyringFile(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, userId: string, keyringFile: KeyringFile, basis: KeyringWriteBasis): Promise<void>;

package/dist/with-party/team/noydb-facade.d.ts

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import { type RotateSecretInput, type RecoverSecretInput, type RecoverSecretResu
 import { type RecoverUserOptions } from './peer-recover.js';
 import { type PaperRecoveryEntry, type ShamirRecoveryEntry } from './recovery.js';
 import type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js';
-import type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js';
+import type { UnlockedKeyring, RevokeResult } from './keyring.js';
 import { type EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, type UpdateAuthenticatorOptions } from './authenticators.js';
 import type { QuickUnlockStore, QuickUnlockState } from '../session/unlock-state.js';
 import type { SecretPolicy } from '../../kernel/validation.js';
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ export interface TeamFacadeDeps {
         readonly userId: string;
         readonly secret: string;
     }): Promise<void>;
+    /** core#96 — pull a member's keyring file from every sync target before an authority edit. */
+    refreshRoster(vault: string, userId: string): Promise<void>;
     /** Managed-recovery enrolment check (kernel-resident). */
     assertRecoveryEnrolled(vault: string, policy: VaultPolicy, opts?: {
         skipManagedCheck?: boolean;
@@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ export declare class TeamFacade {
     /** Gate + run a `grant` engine. See `Noydb.grant` for the public contract. */
     runGrant(engine: (adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: GrantOptions) => Promise<void>, vault: string, options: GrantOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
     /** Gate + run a `revoke` engine. See `Noydb.revoke` for the public contract. */
-    runRevoke(engine: (adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: RevokeOptions) => Promise<void>, vault: string, options: RevokeOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    runRevoke(engine: (adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: RevokeOptions) => Promise<RevokeResult>, vault: string, options: RevokeOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<RevokeResult>;
     /** Gate + run a `rotateKeys` engine. See `Noydb.rotate` for the public contract. */
     runRotate(engine: (store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, opts: RotateKeysOptions) => Promise<RotateResult>, vault: string, collections: string[]): Promise<RotateResult>;
     /** Gate + run the `verifyRoster` engine (#1121). See `Noydb.verifyRoster`. */
@@ -171,6 +173,7 @@ export declare class TeamFacade {
      *     meta: {
      *       credentialId: e.credentialId,
      *       wrapIv: e.wrapIv,
+     *       rpId: e.rpId,
      *       prfUsed: e.prfUsed,
      *       beFlag: e.beFlag,
      *       requireSingleDevice: e.requireSingleDevice,
@@ -179,6 +182,15 @@ export declare class TeamFacade {
      * })
      * ```
      *
+     * `meta` is a free-form blob — hub validates `credentialId` and nothing
+     * else, so this example IS the contract for what a slot carries. Record
+     * `rpId` (core#140): the slot rewrap / rotation ceremony falls back to
+     * `meta.rpId` when the caller passes no `options.rpId` and the enrollment
+     * record predates `WebAuthnEnrollment.rpId`. Omitting it does not break
+     * single-hostname deployments — absence correctly reads as "send no RP ID"
+     * — but on a shared registrable domain rotation then works only if every
+     * caller remembers to pass the RP ID by hand.
+     *
      * Returns the WebAuthn `credentialId` (extracted from `meta.credentialId`)
      * for the caller's lookup index (a bootstrap vault, a Cover,
      * a server-side allowlist).

package/dist/with-party/team/roster-tag.d.ts

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ export interface RosterTag {
     readonly iv: string;
     readonly data: string;
 }
-export type RosterAuthorityFields = Pick<KeyringFile, 'user_id' | 'role' | 'permissions' | 'granted_by' | 'expires_at' | 'export_capability' | 'import_capability' | 'deks' | 'pending_deks' | 'roster_epoch' | 'clearance'>;
+export type RosterAuthorityFields = Pick<KeyringFile, 'user_id' | 'role' | 'permissions' | 'granted_by' | 'expires_at' | 'export_capability' | 'import_capability' | 'deks' | 'pending_deks' | 'roster_epoch' | 'clearance' | 'inbox_key' | 'inbox'>;
 export declare function rosterCanonical(file: RosterAuthorityFields): string;
 export declare function mintRosterTag(file: RosterAuthorityFields, rosterKey: EnclaveKey): Promise<RosterTag>;
 /**

package/dist/with-pod/backup.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, ExportStreamOptions, ExportChunk } from '../kernel/types.js';
+import type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, LoadPodOptions, LoadPodResult, ExportStreamOptions, ExportChunk } from '../kernel/types.js';
 import type { LedgerStore } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js';
 /** Everything the moving backup methods touched on the vault's `this.*`. */
 export interface BackupContext {
@@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ export interface BackupContext {
      * callback (plaintext vaults / test constructions).
      */
     reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK(): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * core#71 — reset every sync engine attached to the vault after a restore:
+     * the dirty log, the watermarks, the adopted epoch. A restore is a new base;
+     * the pre-restore dirty entries refer to records the load just replaced.
+     * Absent on test constructions without sync.
+     */
+    resetSync?(): Promise<void>;
     /** Clear the vault's collection cache (post-load). */
     clearCollectionCache(): void;
     /** Reset the ledger store so the next `ledger()` rebuilds its head cache. */
@@ -42,23 +49,8 @@ export type VerifyBackupResult = {
     readonly id: string;
     readonly message: string;
 };
-/**
- * Dump vault as a verifiable encrypted JSON backup string.
- *
- * backups embed the current ledger head and the full `_ledger` +
- * `_ledger_deltas` internal collections so the receiver can run
- * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` after `load()` and detect any tampering between
- * dump and restore. Backups produced without a ledger skip the integrity check
- * with a warning — both modes round-trip cleanly.
- */
 export declare function dumpVault(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<string>;
-/**
- * Restore a vault from a verifiable backup. After loading, runs
- * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` to confirm the hash chain, the embedded head, and
- * every data envelope's payload hash. Legacy backups (no `ledgerHead`) load
- * with a console warning and skip the integrity check.
- */
-export declare function loadVault(ctx: BackupContext, backupJson: string): Promise<void>;
+export declare function loadVault(ctx: BackupContext, backupJson: string, options?: LoadPodOptions): Promise<LoadPodResult>;
 /**
  * End-to-end backup integrity check: `ledger.verify()` (hash chain) plus a data
  * envelope cross-check (every current record's `_data` hash must match the

package/dist/with-sync/active.d.ts

@@ -30,4 +30,31 @@
  * @public
  */
 import type { SyncStrategy } from './strategy.js';
-export declare function withSync(): SyncStrategy;
+/**
+ * core#107 — `arbiter: true` makes this device the vault's ARBITER: its
+ * admission refusals are replicated so the writer finds out, instead of
+ * staying local to the device that judged them.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ One arbiter, named by configuration on the device that is to be it
+ * (the admin host, or the daemon) — ruled over a quorum because the failure
+ * mode is legible: no arbiter configured means no replication, which is
+ * exactly the pre-core#107 behaviour. It is NOT an authority proof: nothing
+ * stops a member hand-writing `_sync_rejections`, and the reason that is
+ * tolerable is the report-only ruling — a replicated refusal never deletes,
+ * tombstones or retracts anything, so the worst a forged one does is show
+ * somebody a notice about their own record.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ THE CONDITION THAT WOULD MAKE THAT NON-BOUNDARY A REAL ONE, named by
+ * pilot-1 when they accepted it: every member is currently staff of the same
+ * firm, and a forged refusal is sealed under the refused record's own
+ * collection DEK — so a forger can only show a notice about a record they
+ * could already read. ⛔ If EXTERNAL `client`-role users ever hold
+ * collections of their own, "who may write `_sync_rejections`" stops being
+ * cosmetic and this needs an authority design, not a flag. Do not read the
+ * paragraph above as a general safety argument; it is an argument about one
+ * topology, and this is the trigger to re-open it.
+ */
+export interface WithSyncOptions {
+    readonly arbiter?: boolean;
+}
+export declare function withSync(options?: WithSyncOptions): SyncStrategy;

package/dist/with-sync/engine.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-import type { NoydbStore, DirtyEntry, ConflictStrategy, CollectionConflictResolver, PushOptions, PullOptions, PushResult, PullResult, SyncStatus, SyncTargetRole, RealignResult } from '../kernel/types.js';
+import type { NoydbStore, DirtyEntry, ConflictStrategy, CollectionConflictResolver, PushOptions, PullOptions, PushResult, PullResult, SyncStatus, SyncTargetRole, RealignResult, SyncRejectedApi, ReplaceRemoteResult } from '../kernel/types.js';
+/** core#74 — where a device parks the records its admission gate refused. Local-only: never mirrored, never full-pushed. */
+export declare const REJECTED_COLLECTION = "_sync_rejected";
 import type { MergeAuthority } from '../port/with/merge-authority.js';
+import type { AdmissionAuthority } from '../port/with/admission-authority.js';
+import type { RejectionCourier } from '../port/with/rejection-courier.js';
 import { type PeriodPullSource } from './period-scope.js';
 import type { NoydbEventEmitter } from '../kernel/events.js';
 import type { SyncPolicy } from '../kernel/sync-policy.js';
@@ -13,7 +17,14 @@ export interface ReservedLookupSource {
 }
 /** Sync engine: dirty tracking, push, pull, conflict resolution, scheduling. */
 export declare class SyncEngine {
+    #private;
     private readonly mergeAuthority;
+    /** core#74 — the vault's admission gate for incoming records; wired at open like the other vault seams. */
+    private admission;
+    /** core#107 — the vault's sealing capability for replicated refusals; wired at open like `admission`. */
+    private courier;
+    /** core#107 — this device's refusals replicate. Configuration, not an authority proof — see `withSync`. */
+    private readonly arbiter;
     private readonly local;
     private readonly remote;
     private readonly strategy;
@@ -29,6 +40,8 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
     /** #1036 — last SUCCESSFUL push/pull. Never advanced by a failed attempt. */
     private lastPush;
     private lastPull;
+    /** core#72 — the target's restore epoch this device adopted; null before any. */
+    private epoch;
     /**
      * #1036 — the failure that ended the most recent attempt, cleared by the next
      * success. Live state only: deliberately NOT persisted in `_sync/meta`, since a
@@ -89,9 +102,37 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
     private periodPullSource?;
     /** Wire the period-window source (#807). Same injection pattern as `setReservedLookupSource`. */
     setPeriodPullSource(source: PeriodPullSource): void;
+    /** core#81 — the collections this keyring names; the walk set for a paged pull. Wired by the vault at open. */
+    private collectionNames?;
+    /** Wire the paged-pull walk set (core#81). Same injection pattern as `setCacheInvalidator`. */
+    setCollectionNames(fn: () => readonly string[]): void;
+    /**
+     * core#81 — one chunk per page of one collection, for `pull({ paged: true })`.
+     * `listPage` when the store offers it (200 per page), else `list` + `get` in
+     * batches of the same size. Never more than one page in memory.
+     */
+    private pagedChunks;
     /** core#82 — when a pull replaces the caller's OWN keyring file, the vault reloads it in place. */
     private rosterReload?;
     /** Wire the roster-reload seam (core#82). Same injection pattern as `setCacheInvalidator`. */
+    /** core#107 — wire the vault's rejection sealing capability. */
+    setRejectionCourier(c: RejectionCourier): void;
+    /** core#74 — wire the vault's admission gate. */
+    setAdmission(a: AdmissionAuthority): void;
+    /** core#71 — after `vault.load()`: a new base. Drops the dirty log, the watermarks and the adopted epoch. */
+    resetAfterRestore(): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * core#72 — make the LOCAL vault authoritative on this target. Every local
+     * record goes up unconditionally, re-sealed above the target's version where
+     * the target moved on (so every peer's copy is superseded); every id the
+     * target holds that the local vault lacks gets a delete marker at
+     * `remote._v + 1` (so every peer removes it); the reserved collections are
+     * mirrored; then a new epoch is written at `_sync/epoch`. The dirty log is
+     * cleared: the target IS the local state now.
+     */
+    replaceRemote(): Promise<ReplaceRemoteResult>;
+    /** core#74 — the parked refusals on this device, and their two fates. */
+    rejected(): SyncRejectedApi;
     setRosterReload(seam: {
         userId: string;
         reload: () => Promise<void>;
@@ -128,6 +169,8 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
          * bound to the keys rather than the engine reaching for them.
          */
         mergeAuthority?: MergeAuthority;
+        /** core#107 — this device is the vault's arbiter: its refusals replicate. */
+        arbiter?: boolean;
     });
     /** Start the sync scheduler. Called after vault is fully opened. */
     startScheduler(): void;
@@ -163,9 +206,16 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
      */
     remirrorPairResolvers(names: readonly string[]): void;
     /** Record a local change for later push. */
-    trackChange(collection: string, id: string, action: 'put' | 'delete', version: number): Promise<void>;
+    trackChange(collection: string, id: string, action: DirtyEntry['action'], version: number): Promise<void>;
     /** Remove a dirty entry (satellite fan-out revert cleanup — spec #591). */
     removeDirty(collection: string, id: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * core#92 — mark every user-collection record in the local store dirty at its
+     * current version, so the next push sends it (CAS against `_v - 1`, so a
+     * remote that already holds a newer copy resolves through the conflict path
+     * instead of being overwritten). Records already dirty keep their entry.
+     */
+    markAllDirty(): Promise<void>;
     /** Push dirty records to remote adapter. Accepts optional `PushOptions` for partial sync. */
     push(options?: PushOptions): Promise<PushResult>;
     /** Pull remote records to local adapter. Accepts optional `PullOptions` for partial sync. */
@@ -209,6 +259,13 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
      * what the caller can read. Requires a `MergeAuthority` (a vault-attached
      * engine on an encrypted vault).
      */
+    /**
+     * core#96 (pilot-1, finding B) — bring one member's keyring file down from
+     * this target if the target's copy supersedes ours. Called by the kernel
+     * before an authority edit; reloads the caller's own keyring in place when
+     * it is the one refreshed (core#82).
+     */
+    refreshKeyring(userId: string): Promise<boolean>;
     realign(): Promise<RealignResult>;
     status(): SyncStatus;
     /** Start auto-sync: listen for online/offline events, optional periodic sync. */

package/dist/with-sync/index.d.ts

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  * directly. This subpath is the clean LTS factory entry point.
  */
 export { withSync } from './active.js';
+export type { WithSyncOptions } from './active.js';
 export type { SyncStrategy } from './strategy.js';
 /** The un-opted-in stub for this service — exported so callers can compare against it (#844). */
 export { NO_SYNC } from './strategy.js';

package/dist/with-sync/reserved-mirror.d.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
  * | `_meta/invite-audit-*` | higher `_v` wins | single-use evidence for magic links (core#83) |
  * | `_users` | higher `_v` wins | the directory's user envelopes; a member app renders these |
  * | `_delegations` | higher `_v` wins | delegation tokens; revocation is a delete |
+ * | `_broker`, `_broker_member` | higher `_v` wins | broker seeds (core#91) — sealed under DEKs only their holder has; a fresh device mints from them |
  * | `_history`, `_ledger` | NOT replicated | per-device evidence: the ledger is a hash chain per writer, two devices appending would fork it; `vault.at(T)` runs where history lives |
+ * | `_sync_rejections` | higher `_v` wins | core#107 — the arbiter's refusals, sealed under the refused record's own collection DEK |
  * | `_sync` | NOT replicated | this device's dirty log and watermarks |
  * | `_meta/schema-fence`, `_meta/handle`, other `_meta` | NOT replicated | session and instance state; the rest of `_meta` is decided one id at a time |
  *
@@ -49,12 +51,13 @@
  * the acting device and is pushed through the dirty log as
  * `(collection, id, 'delete')`. On PULL, a record the remote lacks and the
  * local holds is deleted locally only when (a) the remote carries at least
- * one record of that collection — a target never pushed to is not evidence
- * of revocation — and (b) no dirty entry protects it (a grant made offline,
- * not yet pushed). Invite audit docs are never deleted; revocation is a
+ * one KEYRING file — a target never pushed to is not evidence of revocation,
+ * but a collection that emptied by revocation is exactly what must propagate
+ * (core#91) — and (b) no dirty entry protects it (a grant made offline, not
+ * yet pushed). Invite audit docs are never deleted; revocation is a
  * field update, which the `_v` rule carries.
  */
-import type { NoydbStore } from '../kernel/types.js';
+import type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../kernel/types.js';
 export interface ReservedMirrorResult {
     /** Records written to `to`. */
     readonly copied: number;
@@ -62,9 +65,29 @@ export interface ReservedMirrorResult {
     readonly deleted: number;
     /** Ids of `_keyring` files copied — the roster reload seam reads this for the caller's own file. */
     readonly keyringsCopied: readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * core#96 (pilot-1, finding B) — push only: local `_keyring` files the epoch
+     * rule did not write and whose content differs from the remote's (the remote
+     * is ahead, or the two diverged at one epoch). The local edit LOST; the
+     * engine reports each as a `Conflict` so an authority edit made on a stale
+     * copy is never silently dropped.
+     */
+    readonly staleKeyrings?: readonly {
+        readonly id: string;
+        readonly local: EncryptedEnvelope;
+        readonly remote: EncryptedEnvelope;
+    }[];
 }
 /** The push half: mirror every declared rule from `local` to `remote`. Never deletes. */
 export declare function pushReserved(local: NoydbStore, remote: NoydbStore, vault: string): Promise<ReservedMirrorResult>;
+/**
+ * core#96 (pilot-1, finding B) — bring ONE member's keyring file down from the
+ * target if the target's copy supersedes the local one. The kernel calls it
+ * before every authority edit (`grant` on an existing user, `updateUser`,
+ * `revoke`, `recoverUser`), so the edit is made on the current file and its
+ * push wins instead of being discarded by the epoch rule. One GET.
+ */
+export declare function pullKeyringFile(remote: NoydbStore, local: NoydbStore, vault: string, userId: string): Promise<boolean>;
 /**
  * The pull half: mirror every declared rule from `remote` into `local`, then
  * propagate revocations under the two guards in the module doc.

package/dist/with-sync/strategy.d.ts

@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ export interface BuildSyncEngineOptions {
     label?: string;
     /** #1042 — the merge's verify/re-stamp capability, bound to the keys by the caller. */
     mergeAuthority?: MergeAuthority;
+    /** core#107 — this device is the vault's arbiter: its admission refusals replicate. */
+    arbiter?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * @internal

package/dist/withdraw-accessible-MTFP7OIB.js

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import {
+  freezeAndDeleteClosure,
+  freezeSnapshotOnly,
+  randomId,
+  withdrawAccessibleData
+} from "./chunk-R2ZULFXU.js";
+import "./chunk-KN4LUMH6.js";
+import "./chunk-XPW7T2GN.js";
+import "./chunk-DMIEKD24.js";
+import "./chunk-GMKGGY7V.js";
+import "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
+import "./chunk-ZD7WFMV2.js";
+import "./chunk-RRTQAQ3N.js";
+import "./chunk-NH2UOV3B.js";
+import "./chunk-ZF6JECDT.js";
+import "./chunk-THQ3BHLM.js";
+import "./chunk-XX4R7TUB.js";
+import "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
+export {
+  freezeAndDeleteClosure,
+  freezeSnapshotOnly,
+  randomId,
+  withdrawAccessibleData
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=withdraw-accessible-MTFP7OIB.js.map

package/dist/withdraw-accessible-MTFP7OIB.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":[],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":"","names":[]}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@noy-db/hub",
-  "version": "0.9.0-pre.0",
+  "version": "0.9.0-pre.1",
   "description": "Zero-knowledge, offline-first, encrypted document store — core library with AES-256-GCM, PBKDF2, multi-user keyring, and sync engine",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "vLannaAi <vicio@lanna.ai>",
@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@
     "happy-dom": "^18.0.0",
     "zod": "^4.0.0",
     "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.25.2",
-    "@noy-db/attestation": "0.9.0-pre.0",
-    "@noy-db/shamir": "0.9.0-pre.0"
+    "@noy-db/attestation": "0.9.0-pre.1",
+    "@noy-db/shamir": "0.9.0-pre.1"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "zod": "^3.0.0 || ^4.0.0",

package/dist/api-MSJXVYQG.js

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  UserApi,
-  createUserApi
-} from "./chunk-GCUMOKTN.js";
-import "./chunk-FZXRLNJO.js";
-import "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
-import "./chunk-ZBUAX4EF.js";
-import "./chunk-SPPOUJLN.js";
-import "./chunk-NH2UOV3B.js";
-import "./chunk-OM3SEDI4.js";
-import "./chunk-PUBI455O.js";
-import "./chunk-2ELOCEXE.js";
-import "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
-export {
-  UserApi,
-  createUserApi
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=api-MSJXVYQG.js.map

package/dist/backup-7RKNZMQO.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-pod/backup.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Vault backup / restore / integrity.\n *\n * Holds `dump()` (verifiable encrypted JSON backup, including the blob\n * collections so blob \"covers\" travel in the bundle), `load()` (restore +\n * post-load integrity gate), `verifyBackupIntegrity()` (chain + data-envelope\n * cross-check), and `exportJSON()` (plaintext per-collection export, built on\n * the vault's `exportStream`). Behaviour is byte-identical to the inline\n * `Vault` methods these functions replaced — every dependency the moving code\n * touched on `this.*` arrives via {@link BackupContext}. `Vault` keeps the\n * public methods as thin delegators.\n *\n * Internal — reached through `vault.dump()` / `vault.load()` / etc.\n */\nimport { NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { BackupLedgerError, BackupCorruptedError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/constants.js'\nimport { SCHEMAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.js'\nimport { SEQUENCE_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/sequence/index.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/manifest/reserved-collections.js'\n// #1025 — imported from the dependency-light `window.ts`, not `periods.ts`: that\n// module exists precisely so a consumer can name the period collections without\n// dragging the ledger hash-chain machinery (`sha256Hex`/`canonicalJson`) into a\n// bundle that opted out of the periods service. Same reason the sync engine's\n// period-scoped pull imports it.\nimport {\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n} from '../with-audit/periods/window.js'\nimport type {\n  NoydbStore,\n  EncryptedEnvelope,\n  VaultBackup,\n  VaultSnapshot,\n  ExportStreamOptions,\n  ExportChunk,\n} from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../capsule/index.js'\n\n/** Everything the moving backup methods touched on the vault's `this.*`. */\nexport interface BackupContext {\n  /** The ciphertext store. */\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** Vault namespace name. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The invoking keyring's user id (read fresh per call). */\n  userId(): string\n  /** The vault's ledger store, or null when history is off. */\n  getLedgerOrNull(): LedgerStore | null\n  /** Recompute an envelope's `payloadHash` (bound `historyStrategy.envelopePayloadHash`). */\n  envelopePayloadHash(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string>\n  /**\n   * Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded keyring file and\n   * rebuild the DEK resolver. No-op when the vault has no `reloadKeyring`\n   * callback (plaintext vaults / test constructions).\n   */\n  reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK(): Promise<void>\n  /** Clear the vault's collection cache (post-load). */\n  clearCollectionCache(): void\n  /** Reset the ledger store so the next `ledger()` rebuilds its head cache. */\n  resetLedgerStore(): void\n  /** The vault's decrypt+ACL export stream (used by `exportJSON`). */\n  exportStream(opts: ExportStreamOptions): AsyncIterableIterator<ExportChunk>\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link verifyBackupIntegrity}. */\nexport type VerifyBackupResult =\n  | { readonly ok: true; readonly head: string; readonly length: number }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'chain'\n      readonly divergedAt: number\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'data'\n      readonly collection: string\n      readonly id: string\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n\n/**\n * Dump vault as a verifiable encrypted JSON backup string.\n *\n * backups embed the current ledger head and the full `_ledger` +\n * `_ledger_deltas` internal collections so the receiver can run\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` after `load()` and detect any tampering between\n * dump and restore. Backups produced without a ledger skip the integrity check\n * with a warning — both modes round-trip cleanly.\n */\nexport async function dumpVault(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<string> {\n  const snapshot = await ctx.adapter.loadAll(ctx.vault)\n\n  // Load keyrings (separate path because loadAll filters them out\n  // along with all other underscore-prefixed internal collections).\n  const keyringIds = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, '_keyring')\n  const keyrings: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n  for (const keyringId of keyringIds) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, '_keyring', keyringId)\n    if (envelope) {\n      keyrings[keyringId] = JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? '')\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Load the ledger entries + deltas so the receiver can replay\n  // the chain after restore. Without this, `load()` would have an\n  // empty ledger and `verifyBackupIntegrity()` would have nothing\n  // to compare against.\n  //\n  // Also enumerate the blob collections so blob content (\"covers\")\n  // travels in the bundle (the blob DEK already travels in `_keyring`).\n  // Literals are inlined (not imported from blobs/blob-set.ts) to keep\n  // the blob runtime out of this kernel hot path — they mirror\n  // BLOB_INDEX/CHUNKS/EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION and SLOTS/VERSIONS_PREFIX.\n  // The collect-loop skips empty ids, so this no-ops without blobs.\n  const internalSnapshot: VaultSnapshot = {}\n  const internalNames = [\n    LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION,\n    MANIFEST_COLLECTION, // #941: the pod's manifest-set record(s) travel in the bundle too\n    // #1025: the accounting-period close state + its companions. The bundle is\n    // the backup/restore path, so without these a restore discarded the\n    // hash-chained evidence that a month was ever closed — the artifact\n    // `closePeriod` exists to produce — and dropped the write gate with it, so\n    // the restored vault silently accepted back-dated writes into a sealed\n    // month. The companions matter as much as the close: a bounded reopen\n    // window (`reopenPeriod({ until })`) is state a restore must not lose.\n    PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n    '_history', // full-snapshot version history — so history()/getVersion()/diff() survive the bundle\n    '_blob_index', '_blob_chunks', '_blob_eviction_audit',\n    // #753 spec §7 Q3: `_blob_intent` markers travel too — restoring mid-op\n    // state (a blob row without its marker) would reproduce the ambiguity\n    // the journal exists to prevent. Note: `_mv_stale` does NOT travel\n    // today (a pre-existing, separate gap) — observed here, tracked on\n    // #761, not fixed in this pass.\n    '_blob_intent',\n    // #769: `_blob_slots_<c>` envelopes travel verbatim (raw ciphertext,\n    // same DEK, same vault) — including any `SlotRecord.pendingRelease`\n    // resume breadcrumb they carry. This is INTENTIONALLY the opposite of\n    // `extract-partition`'s `reKeyBlobs`, which STRIPS `pendingRelease`:\n    // a full-vault backup restores into the SAME vault it was taken from,\n    // so a breadcrumb taken mid-rehome (together with its `_blob_intent`\n    // marker, carried above) is resumable on restore — carry-and-resume is\n    // correct here. A partition extraction crosses vaults: the breadcrumb's\n    // old eTag may not exist in the destination, so it must be stripped\n    // there instead. Asymmetry: backup = same-vault-resumable = carry;\n    // partition = cross-vault = strip-breadcrumb-carry-marker.\n    ...Object.keys(snapshot).flatMap((c) => [`_blob_slots_${c}`, `_blob_versions_${c}`]),\n  ]\n  for (const internalName of internalNames) {\n    const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, internalName)\n    if (ids.length === 0) continue\n    const records: Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope> = {}\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, internalName, id)\n      if (envelope) records[id] = envelope\n    }\n    internalSnapshot[internalName] = records\n  }\n\n  // Embed the ledger head if there's a chain. An empty ledger\n  // (fresh vault) leaves `ledgerHead` undefined, which\n  // load() treats the same as a legacy backup (no integrity\n  // check, console warning). If history is not opted in,\n  // `getLedgerOrNull` returns null and we skip embedding entirely\n  // — the backup is still valid, just without the integrity head.\n  const ledgerForHead = ctx.getLedgerOrNull()\n  const head = ledgerForHead ? await ledgerForHead.head() : null\n  const backup: VaultBackup = {\n    _noydb_backup: NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION,\n    _compartment: ctx.vault,\n    _exported_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _exported_by: ctx.userId(),\n    keyrings: keyrings as VaultBackup['keyrings'],\n    collections: snapshot,\n    ...(Object.keys(internalSnapshot).length > 0\n      ? { _internal: internalSnapshot }\n      : {}),\n    ...(head\n      ? {\n          ledgerHead: {\n            hash: head.hash,\n            index: head.entry.index,\n            ts: head.entry.ts,\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n  }\n\n  return JSON.stringify(backup)\n}\n\n/**\n * Restore a vault from a verifiable backup. After loading, runs\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` to confirm the hash chain, the embedded head, and\n * every data envelope's payload hash. Legacy backups (no `ledgerHead`) load\n * with a console warning and skip the integrity check.\n */\nexport async function loadVault(ctx: BackupContext, backupJson: string): Promise<void> {\n  const backup = JSON.parse(backupJson) as VaultBackup\n\n  // 1. Restore data collections.\n  await ctx.adapter.saveAll(ctx.vault, backup.collections)\n\n  // 2. Restore keyrings.\n  for (const [userId, keyringFile] of Object.entries(backup.keyrings)) {\n    const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope({ collection: '_keyring', id: userId, version: 1 },\n      { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(keyringFile) })\n    await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, '_keyring', userId, envelope)\n  }\n\n  // 3. Restore internal collections (`_ledger`, `_ledger_deltas`).\n  //    Required so verifyBackupIntegrity has the chain to walk.\n  if (backup._internal) {\n    for (const [internalName, records] of Object.entries(backup._internal)) {\n      for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n        await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, internalName, id, envelope)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // 4. Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded\n  //    keyring file. Without this, the Vault's getDEK\n  //    closure still holds the OLD session's DEKs, and every\n  //    decrypt of a loaded ledger entry / data envelope fails\n  //    with TamperedError because the DEK doesn't match the\n  //    ciphertext that was encrypted with the SOURCE user's DEK.\n  //    Skipped for plaintext vaults and for tests that\n  //    construct Vault without a reloadKeyring callback.\n  await ctx.reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK()\n\n  // 5. Clear collection cache + reset the ledger store so the\n  //    next ledger() call rebuilds its head cache from the\n  //    freshly-loaded entries.\n  ctx.clearCollectionCache()\n  ctx.resetLedgerStore()\n\n  // 5. Run the verification gate. A backup with no ledgerHead cannot be\n  //    integrity-checked, and skipping silently would collapse\n  //    *unverifiable* into *clean* — so it always warns. But the REMEDY\n  //    depends on the reader, not the pod (#1303): the pod cannot say\n  //    whether its exporter predates the ledger or never enabled it, and\n  //    the reader knows its own configuration.\n  //\n  //    - Reader HAS the ledger: the pod is behind it. \"Re-export\" is\n  //      actionable; keep the migration wording.\n  //    - Reader has NO ledger: nothing is stale and nothing is migrating —\n  //      the consumer priced the ledger (#1248 measured ~2.4x) and declined.\n  //      Prescribing a re-export is advice they should not take, and\n  //      repeating it on every read trains people to filter the one line\n  //      that also fires on a genuinely stale pod. State the consequence,\n  //      name the discriminator, prescribe nothing.\n  if (!backup.ledgerHead) {\n    if (ctx.getLedgerOrNull()) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[noy-db] Loaded a legacy backup with no ledgerHead — ` +\n        `verifiable-backup integrity check skipped. ` +\n        `Re-export with a ledger-aware build to get tamper detection.`,\n      )\n    } else {\n      console.warn(\n        `[noy-db] Loaded a backup with no ledgerHead — this pod is not integrity-checked. ` +\n        `This reader has no ledger enabled (withHistory() is not configured), so nothing is stale: ` +\n        `enable the ledger on both the exporter and this reader if tamper detection is wanted.`,\n      )\n    }\n    return\n  }\n\n  const result = await verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx)\n  if (!result.ok) {\n    // Surface the most specific error class we can. The result\n    // shape carries enough info for callers to inspect.\n    if (result.kind === 'data') {\n      throw new BackupCorruptedError(\n        result.collection,\n        result.id,\n        result.message,\n      )\n    }\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(result.message, result.divergedAt)\n  }\n\n  // 6. Cross-check: the freshly-verified head must match the\n  //    value embedded at dump time. A mismatch means someone\n  //    truncated or extended the chain after dump.\n  if (result.head !== backup.ledgerHead.hash) {\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(\n      `Backup ledger head mismatch: embedded \"${backup.ledgerHead.hash}\" ` +\n      `but reconstructed \"${result.head}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * End-to-end backup integrity check: `ledger.verify()` (hash chain) plus a data\n * envelope cross-check (every current record's `_data` hash must match the\n * latest `put` entry's `payloadHash`). Returns a discriminated union so callers\n * can distinguish chain vs data failures.\n */\nexport async function verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<VerifyBackupResult> {\n  // Step 1: chain verification. Without the history strategy there\n  // is no ledger; an unaudited backup verifies trivially as `ok`\n  // because there's nothing to diverge from.\n  const ledgerForVerify = ctx.getLedgerOrNull()\n  if (!ledgerForVerify) {\n    return { ok: true, head: '', length: 0 }\n  }\n  const chainResult = await ledgerForVerify.verify()\n  if (!chainResult.ok) {\n    return {\n      ok: false,\n      kind: 'chain',\n      divergedAt: chainResult.divergedAt,\n      message:\n        `Ledger chain diverged at index ${chainResult.divergedAt}: ` +\n        `expected prevHash \"${chainResult.expected}\" but found \"${chainResult.actual}\".`,\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 2: data envelope cross-check. Walk every entry in the\n  // ledger and, for the LATEST `put` per (collection, id), recompute\n  // the data envelope's payloadHash and compare. Earlier puts of the\n  // same id are skipped because the data collection only holds the\n  // current version — historical envelopes live in the deltas\n  // collection (which is itself protected by the chain).\n  // Reuse the ledger we already resolved in step 1.\n  const allEntries = await ledgerForVerify.loadAllEntries()\n\n  // Find the latest non-delete entry per (collection, id). Walk\n  // the entries in reverse so we hit the latest first; mark each\n  // (collection, id) as seen and skip subsequent entries.\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const latest = new Map<\n    string,\n    { collection: string; id: string; expectedHash: string }\n  >()\n  for (let i = allEntries.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    const entry = allEntries[i]\n    if (!entry) continue\n    // Amendment entries are multi-record audit entries whose\n    // `collection` and `id` are empty strings — building a `\"/\"`\n    // key here would mark that synthetic slot as seen and falsely\n    // trip the data check on a record that never existed. Skip\n    // them BEFORE the key/seen bookkeeping so they neither\n    // tombstone real entries nor enter the latest map.\n    if (entry.op === 'amendment' || entry.op === 'lifecycle') continue\n    const key = `${entry.collection}/${entry.id}`\n    if (seen.has(key)) continue\n    seen.add(key)\n    // For deletes the data collection should NOT have the record,\n    // so we skip — there's nothing to cross-check. Marking the key\n    // as seen above ensures any earlier `put` of the same id is\n    // also skipped (the record was subsequently deleted).\n    if (entry.op === 'delete') continue\n    latest.set(key, {\n      collection: entry.collection,\n      id: entry.id,\n      expectedHash: entry.payloadHash,\n    })\n  }\n\n  for (const { collection, id, expectedHash } of latest.values()) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n    if (!envelope) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Ledger expects data record \"${collection}/${id}\" to exist, ` +\n          `but the adapter has no envelope for it.`,\n      }\n    }\n    const actualHash = await ctx.envelopePayloadHash(envelope)\n    if (actualHash !== expectedHash) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Data envelope \"${collection}/${id}\" has been tampered with: ` +\n          `expected payloadHash \"${expectedHash}\", got \"${actualHash}\".`,\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    head: chainResult.head,\n    length: chainResult.length,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Plaintext per-collection export, built on the vault's `exportStream`. Forces\n * collection granularity (record-by-record output makes no sense in a single\n * string) and merges dictionary snapshots across collections.\n */\nexport async function exportVaultJSON(ctx: BackupContext, opts: ExportStreamOptions = {}): Promise<string> {\n  // Force per-collection granularity regardless of caller setting:\n  // record-by-record output doesn't make sense in a single string.\n  const collections: Record<\n    string,\n    {\n      schema: null\n      refs: Record<string, { target: string; mode: 'strict' | 'warn' | 'cascade' }>\n      records: unknown[]\n    }\n  > = {}\n  let ledgerHead: ExportChunk['ledgerHead'] | undefined\n  // Merged dictionary snapshot across all collections.\n  // Only populated when `resolveLabels` is not set.\n  const allDictionaries: Record<\n    string, // collection name\n    Record<string, Record<string, Record<string, string>>>\n  > = {}\n\n  for await (const chunk of ctx.exportStream({\n    granularity: 'collection',\n    withLedgerHead: opts.withLedgerHead === true,\n    // Thread the export locale so records are read at the\n    // `export` layer (i18nText collapsed + dictKey/staticDict labels resolved).\n    ...(opts.resolveLabels !== undefined ? { resolveLabels: opts.resolveLabels } : {}),\n  })) {\n    collections[chunk.collection] = {\n      schema: null, // Standard Schema validators are not JSON-serializable\n      refs: chunk.refs,\n      records: chunk.records,\n    }\n    if (chunk.ledgerHead) ledgerHead = chunk.ledgerHead\n    // Collect dictionary snapshots unless resolveLabels is set\n    if (!opts.resolveLabels && chunk.dictionaries) {\n      allDictionaries[chunk.collection] = chunk.dictionaries\n    }\n  }\n\n  const hasDictionaries = Object.keys(allDictionaries).length > 0\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    _noydb_export: 1,\n    _compartment: ctx.vault,\n    _exported_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _exported_by: ctx.userId(),\n    collections,\n    ...(hasDictionaries ? { _dictionaries: allDictionaries } : {}),\n    ...(ledgerHead ? { ledgerHead } : {}),\n  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