@noy-db/hub 0.9.0-pre.0 → 0.9.0-pre.1

package/dist/{chunk-CB4467G3.js → chunk-YH4OUOSI.js}

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ import {
   VDIG_ITERATIONS,
   mintBidxTag,
   pbkdf2VerifyDigest
-} from "./chunk-ABU6A4Z5.js";
+} from "./chunk-MBPZMZVB.js";
 import {
   ctEqualTags,
   makeCapsule
-} from "./chunk-OM3SEDI4.js";
+} from "./chunk-ZF6JECDT.js";
 import {
   IV_BYTES,
   KEY_BITS,
@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ import {
   generateIV,
   generateSalt,
   normalizeForVerify
-} from "./chunk-PUBI455O.js";
+} from "./chunk-THQ3BHLM.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedRotationError,
   DecryptionError,
   InvalidKeyError,
   TamperedError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/compare.ts
 var subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ async function importTransferKey(raw) {
   }
   return subtle2.importKey("raw", raw, { name: "AES-GCM", length: KEY_BITS }, false, ["encrypt", "decrypt"]);
 }
+async function importWrappingKey(raw) {
+  if (raw.byteLength !== 32) {
+    throw new ValidationError(`wrapping key must be 32 bytes, got ${raw.byteLength}.`);
+  }
+  return subtle2.importKey("raw", raw, { name: "AES-KW", length: KEY_BITS }, false, ["wrapKey", "unwrapKey"]);
+}
 async function encrypt(plaintext, dek, aad) {
   const iv = generateIV();
   const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);
@@ -214,8 +220,14 @@ async function encrypt(plaintext, dek, aad) {
   };
 }
 async function decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek, aad) {
-  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64);
-  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64);
+  let iv;
+  let ciphertext;
+  try {
+    iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64);
+    ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64);
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new DecryptionError(`envelope body is not valid base64: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
+  }
   try {
     const plaintext = await subtle2.decrypt(
       {
@@ -419,6 +431,17 @@ async function recipientWrap(pub, bytes) {
 async function recipientUnwrap(pair, wrapped) {
   return new Uint8Array(await subtle2.decrypt({ name: "RSA-OAEP" }, pair.privateKey, wrapped));
 }
+async function exportRecipientPrivateKeyPkcs8(pair) {
+  return new Uint8Array(await subtle2.exportKey("pkcs8", pair.privateKey));
+}
+async function importRecipientKeyPair(pkcs8, spki) {
+  const alg = { name: "RSA-OAEP", hash: "SHA-256" };
+  const [privateKey, publicKey] = await Promise.all([
+    subtle2.importKey("pkcs8", pkcs8, alg, false, ["decrypt"]),
+    subtle2.importKey("spki", spki, alg, false, ["encrypt"])
+  ]);
+  return { privateKey, publicKey };
+}
 
 // src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/vdig.ts
 var subtle3 = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
@@ -541,6 +564,7 @@ export {
   unwrapCek,
   importCek,
   importTransferKey,
+  importWrappingKey,
   encrypt,
   decrypt,
   encryptBytes,
@@ -557,9 +581,11 @@ export {
   importRecipientPublicKeySpki,
   recipientWrap,
   recipientUnwrap,
+  exportRecipientPrivateKeyPkcs8,
+  importRecipientKeyPair,
   deriveVdigSlotKey,
   openVdigPayload,
   aesCapsule,
   dualReadSealedSlot
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CB4467G3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YH4OUOSI.js.map

package/dist/chunk-YH4OUOSI.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/compare.ts","../src/capsule/enclave-aes/crypto.ts","../src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/vdig.ts","../src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/write.ts","../src/capsule/enclave-aes/primitives.ts","../src/capsule/enclave-aes/bound.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * C2 — fixed-length-tag constant-time comparison (hub-portable; no\n * Node timingSafeEqual). Two mandatory rules (spec §3):\n *  1. Only fixed 32-byte tags are ever compared — ctEqualTags throws on\n *     anything else (tag length is structural, never secret-dependent).\n *  2. Every comparand is reduced to a 32-byte tag under a FRESH ephemeral\n *     HMAC-SHA256 key before comparison — keyed blinding makes compare\n *     timing uncorrelated with underlying values; rule 1 (not blinding)\n *     is what removes input-length timing. Length inequality folds into\n *     unequal tags — never an early return.\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { ctEqualTags } from '../../plumbing/ct-equal.js'\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n\n/**\n * Blinded equality of arbitrary-length byte strings: fresh K_e per\n * comparison (never stored, never reused), HMAC both sides to 32-byte\n * tags, then ctEqualTags. On the digest path the inputs are already\n * 32-byte PBKDF2 outputs but still route through this reduction so\n * there is exactly ONE comparison construction (spec §3 rule 2).\n */\nexport async function blindedEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {\n  const ke = await subtle.generateKey({ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'])\n  const tagA = new Uint8Array(await subtle.sign('HMAC', ke, a as BufferSource))\n  const tagB = new Uint8Array(await subtle.sign('HMAC', ke, b as BufferSource))\n  return ctEqualTags(tagA, tagB)\n}\n","/**\n * Cryptographic primitives — thin wrappers around the Web Crypto API.\n *\n * ## Design principle\n *\n * **Zero npm crypto dependencies.** Every operation uses `globalThis.crypto.subtle`,\n * which is available natively in Node.js ≥ 18, all modern browsers, and\n * Deno/Bun. This avoids supply-chain risk from third-party crypto packages and\n * ensures the library stays auditable.\n *\n * ## Algorithms\n *\n * | Use case | Algorithm | Parameters |\n * |----------|-----------|------------|\n * | Key derivation | PBKDF2-SHA256 | 600,000 iterations, 32-byte salt |\n * | Record encryption | AES-256-GCM | 12-byte random IV per operation |\n * | DEK wrapping | AES-KW (RFC 3394) | 256-bit KEK |\n * | Binary encrypt | AES-256-GCM | same as record encryption |\n * | Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 | for presence channels |\n * | Content hash | SHA-256 | for ledger and bundle integrity |\n *\n * ## Key lifecycle\n *\n * ```\n * secret + salt\n *   └─► deriveKey()       → KEK (CryptoKey, extractable: false)\n *         └─► wrapKey()   → wrapped DEK bytes  [stored in keyring]\n *         └─► unwrapKey() → DEK (CryptoKey)    [memory only during session]\n *               └─► encrypt() / decrypt()       → ciphertext / plaintext\n * ```\n *\n * IVs are generated fresh by {@link generateIV} on every encrypt call.\n * Reusing an IV with the same key would break GCM's authentication guarantee —\n * this function should be the only place IVs are produced.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { DecryptionError, InvalidKeyError, TamperedError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport {\n  KEY_BITS,\n  IV_BYTES,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  generateIV,\n  encodeEchoParts,\n  type EchoSecretParts,\n} from '../plumbing/digest.js'\n\n/**\n * **EnclaveKey** — the opaque key type at the enclave seam.\n *\n * In noy-db's reference enclave this is `CryptoKey` (the Web Crypto API's\n * key handle). A fork's enclave redefines this alias to its own key\n * representation (e.g. `type EnclaveKey = null` for a keyless HSM-backed\n * fork) — outside `capsule/enclave-aes/**`, every consumer must treat it as\n * opaque: never construct, inspect, or serialize it directly, only pass it\n * between barrel functions (`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`/…).\n */\nexport type EnclaveKey = CryptoKey\n\n/** Opaque asymmetric pair at the enclave seam — `CryptoKeyPair` in the reference enclave. */\nexport type EnclaveKeyPair = CryptoKeyPair\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n// ─── Key Derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Derive a KEK from a secret and salt using PBKDF2-SHA256. */\nexport async function deriveKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(new TextEncoder().encode(secret), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared PBKDF2 → AES-KW derivation core. `material` is the raw\n * pre-KDF input bytes (a UTF-8 phrase for standard mode, an\n * AG-1-encoded 3-part structure for echo mode).\n */\nasync function deriveKekFromMaterial(\n  material: Uint8Array,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey('raw', material as BufferSource, 'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey'])\n  return subtle.deriveKey(\n    { name: 'PBKDF2', salt: salt as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n  )\n}\n\n/** One three-part echo secret: prompt (typed) → echo (revealed) → key (typed). */\n\n/**\n * Domain context for the AG-1 encoding. The leading `0xFF` is the load-bearing\n * byte: it is not a legal UTF-8 lead byte, so `TextEncoder` can never emit it —\n * no string's UTF-8 encoding can equal an AG-1 encoding, whatever the string.\n */\n\nexport async function deriveEchoKey(\n  parts: EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(encodeEchoParts(parts), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Which AES algorithm/usage a {@link deriveSecretKey} result is for:\n * `'aes-kw'` mints a key-wrapping key (`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`, e.g. for\n * KEK derivation); `'aes-gcm'` mints a direct encrypt/decrypt key (e.g.\n * for the wrap-DEKs primitive in `with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts`).\n */\nexport type SecretKeyUsage = 'aes-kw' | 'aes-gcm'\n\n/**\n * Derive a non-extractable AES key from a secret/credential and salt\n * via PBKDF2-SHA256, generalizing {@link deriveKey}'s AES-KW derivation to\n * also cover AES-GCM-usage keys. Callers pin their own `iterations` and\n * `keyUsage` so an existing call site's exact parameters (and thus its\n * derived-key bytes) are preserved verbatim when migrated onto this\n * shared primitive — this is call-site consolidation, not a KDF change.\n */\nexport async function deriveSecretKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  params: { iterations: number; keyUsage: SecretKeyUsage },\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return params.keyUsage === 'aes-gcm'\n    ? subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n      )\n    : subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n      )\n}\n\n// ─── DEK Generation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM data encryption key. */\nexport async function generateDEK(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true, // extractable — needed for AES-KW wrapping\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a NON-extractable AES-256-GCM key for in-memory-only use — a\n * session key, a device seal. Unlike {@link generateDEK} it can never be\n * wrapped or exported: WebCrypto enforces that, and it is the tab-scope\n * invariant `with-party/session` and `device-seal` rely on.\n */\nexport async function generateEphemeralKey(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey({ name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])\n}\n\n// ─── DEK-Set Codec ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// The portable form of a DEK set — `{ collection: base64(rawKey) }` — is the\n// plaintext body of every persisted WrappedDeksBlob (recovery-paper,\n// recovery-shamir, tier-2 password slots). It is an enclave door because it\n// is the one place a key's REPRESENTATION crosses into bytes: a fork with its\n// own EnclaveKey (hardware-backed, post-quantum, no encryption) decides here\n// what \"the bytes of a key\" means, and nothing outside capsule/enclave-aes has to\n// know. Byte-for-byte what wrapped-deks.ts did inline before #1317.\n\n/** Serialize a DEK set to `{ collection: base64(rawKey) }`. */\nexport async function exportDekSet(deks: Map<string, CryptoKey>): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [coll, dek] of deks) {\n    out[coll] = bufferToBase64(await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek))\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Reverse of {@link exportDekSet}. Keys come back extractable AES-GCM\n * (`encrypt`/`decrypt`), matching what `generateDEK` mints.\n */\nexport async function importDekSet(exported: Record<string, string>): Promise<Map<string, CryptoKey>> {\n  const deks = new Map<string, CryptoKey>()\n  for (const [coll, b64] of Object.entries(exported)) {\n    const key = await subtle.importKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(b64) as BufferSource,\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n    deks.set(coll, key)\n  }\n  return deks\n}\n\n// ─── Key Wrapping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Wrap (encrypt) a DEK with a KEK using AES-KW. Returns base64 string. */\nexport async function wrapKey(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', dek, kek, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/** Unwrap (decrypt) a DEK from base64 string using a KEK. */\nexport async function unwrapKey(\n  wrappedBase64: string,\n  kek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kek,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Canary ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// \"Is this KEK the right one?\" is answered by wrapping a CONSTANT key under\n// it and seeing whether the wrap opens later. AES-KW is deterministic\n// (RFC 3394 fixed IV), so the same constant under the same KEK always yields\n// the same bytes — every write site can re-mint on persist. The keyring\n// canary (32 zero bytes) and the echo prompt/echo verifiers (32 × 0x5a) are\n// both this primitive with a different constant.\n\n/** Wrap the constant AES-GCM key built from `plaintext` under `kek`. */\nexport async function mintCanary(kek: CryptoKey, plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const constant = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw', plaintext as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, true, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n  return wrapKey(constant, kek)\n}\n\n/** True iff `wrapped` unwraps under `kek` — the KEK is right AND the bytes are intact. */\nexport async function checkCanary(wrapped: string, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<boolean> {\n  try {\n    await unwrapKey(wrapped, kek)\n    return true\n  } catch {\n    return false\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Per-record CEK wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **dedicated** AES-KW wrapping key from a collection/tier DEK via\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to wrap/unwrap a per-record CEK.\n *\n * The collection/tier DEKs are AES-256-**GCM** keys (usages\n * `encrypt`/`decrypt`) and cannot themselves act as an AES-KW KEK. We do NOT\n * re-import the raw DEK bytes directly as an AES-KW key — that would reuse one\n * key across two primitives (AES-GCM for `_det`/presence, AES-KW for CEK\n * wrapping), violating key separation. Instead we HKDF-derive a domain-\n * separated KW key (salt `noydb-cek-wrap`), exactly as `derivePresenceKey`\n * derives a separate presence key. The derivation is deterministic, so\n * wrapping the same CEK under the same DEK always yields identical ciphertext\n * — which is what lets an update reuse a record's stable CEK and produce a\n * byte-identical `_cek`. The KW key is independent of the DEK's GCM key.\n *\n * The DEK must be extractable (it is — `generateDEK`/`unwrapKey` mint\n * extractable keys).\n */\nasync function asKwKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-cek-wrap')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode('v1')\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-KW', false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-KW-wrap a per-record CEK under a collection/tier DEK. Returns base64.\n * Deterministic over `(cek, dek)`.\n */\nexport async function wrapCek(cek: CryptoKey, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', cek, kw, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap a per-record CEK from base64 under a collection/tier DEK. Throws\n * `InvalidKeyError` if the wrapped bytes do not authenticate under the DEK.\n */\nexport async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64: string, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kw,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK (e.g. from a sealed-CEK\n * delivery binding). Non-extractable, decrypt-only — the imported key is\n * used solely to open the record's `_iv`/`_data` body under `decrypt()`.\n */\nexport async function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', rawKey as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['decrypt'])\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte pre-shared key as a NON-extractable AES-256-GCM key\n * (encrypt + decrypt). The transfer seal (`with-cargo`) and the RSA-OAEP\n * TLV's per-blob CEK (`managed-secret`) both hand raw bytes to the enclave\n * here; the bytes never become a key anywhere else.\n */\nexport async function importTransferKey(raw: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  if (raw.byteLength !== 32) {\n    throw new ValidationError(`transfer key must be 32 bytes, got ${raw.byteLength}.`)\n  }\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', raw as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])\n}\n\n/**\n * core#65 — import raw 32 bytes as a NON-extractable AES-KW key (wrap +\n * unwrap). The per-delegation CONTENT KEY: a delegation's tier DEKs are\n * AES-KW-wrapped under it exactly as they are under a KEK, and the key itself\n * travels RSA-OAEP-sealed to the target's inbox public half — so the token's\n * slot NAMES stay readable to any vault member for audit while its keys open\n * for the target alone. Distinct from {@link importTransferKey}, which imports\n * an AES-GCM key for body encryption and cannot wrap.\n */\nexport async function importWrappingKey(raw: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  if (raw.byteLength !== 32) {\n    throw new ValidationError(`wrapping key must be 32 bytes, got ${raw.byteLength}.`)\n  }\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', raw as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n// ─── Encrypt / Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface EncryptResult {\n  iv: string   // base64\n  data: string // base64\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt plaintext JSON string with AES-256-GCM. Fresh IV per call.\n *\n * `aad` binds the record's identity into the auth tag (#1041) — see\n * `record-aad.ts` for what is bound and why `_v` is not. A body sealed with\n * AAD can only be opened by a reader supplying the identical bytes, which is\n * what stops an untrusted store from relocating or re-tiering an envelope.\n *\n * Optional **only while the call-site sweep is in progress**. It becomes\n * mandatory once every `encrypt`/`decrypt` pair supplies it, at which point\n * the format version bumps and the reader rejects anything unbound. Until\n * then an omitted `aad` reproduces the previous, unauthenticated behaviour.\n */\nexport async function encrypt(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n    },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Throws on wrong key or tampered data.\n *\n * `aad` must be byte-identical to what {@link encrypt} was given, or the auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError` (#1041). Note the asymmetry that\n * makes this useful: a mismatched identity is indistinguishable from a\n * corrupted body, so relocation fails **closed** rather than returning a\n * plausible record in the wrong place.\n */\nexport async function decrypt(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<string> {\n  // A body that is not even base64 (`atob` throws a DOMException) is a corrupted\n  // envelope, and must read as one: the same named error a wrong key produces,\n  // never the raw WebCrypto/`atob` exception (measured by a consumer, core#67).\n  let iv: Uint8Array\n  let ciphertext: Uint8Array\n  try {\n    iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n    ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new DecryptionError(`envelope body is not valid base64: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`)\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError(...(await classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad)))\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Distinguish a FORMAT TRANSITION from an attack, when the enclave can (#1103).\n *\n * ## The problem\n *\n * Since #1041 switched identity AAD on, one `TamperedError` covers at least\n * four situations: legitimate pre-binding data, a store that reconstructs an\n * envelope and drops a bound field, a CEK/rotation mismatch, and actual\n * tampering. `SECURITY.md` and the subsystem docs teach the LAST reading — so a\n * user who upgrades, hits this on their own honest data, and consults the docs\n * is told their store has been compromised.\n *\n * That is a false positive on the product's central security claim, and the\n * cost is not merely a confusing message: **a tamper alarm that cries wolf is\n * one users learn to ignore.**\n *\n * ## Why the probe is sound, and why it is NOT a downgrade\n *\n * A body sealed before #1041 carries no AAD, so it opens under an empty one.\n * Retrying that way is **positive evidence** of the legacy format rather than a\n * guess: forging a body that decrypts under this DEK requires the DEK, and an\n * untrusted store does not hold one.\n *\n * ⚠️ **Classification ONLY — the plaintext is discarded and the caller still\n * throws.** That is the entire safety argument: the outcome is identical either\n * way, so this cannot become the lenient path #1041 exists to remove. A variant\n * that RETURNED the retry's plaintext would be exactly the accept-without-AAD\n * downgrade the binding was built to prevent. Do not \"optimise\" it into one.\n *\n * Note what the honest message concedes: pre-#1041 data had no authenticated\n * metadata, so a legacy record that was ALSO tampered with reads as legacy.\n * That is not a weakening — it is an accurate statement about data that\n * genuinely never carried a binding.\n */\nasync function classifyTagFailure(\n  iv: Uint8Array,\n  ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array | undefined,\n): Promise<[] | [string, 'unbound-legacy-format']> {\n  // Only meaningful when AAD was supplied: with none there is no second\n  // interpretation to test, and the failure is a plain tag mismatch.\n  if (aad === undefined) return []\n  try {\n    await subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, dek, ciphertext as BufferSource)\n  } catch {\n    return [] // no benign explanation — the security alert stands\n  }\n  return [\n    'This record was sealed BEFORE record-identity binding (#1041) and cannot be read by this ' +\n    'version. Its body decrypts correctly under the record key, so this is a data-format ' +\n    'transition, not tampering — but it also means the record predates authenticated metadata. ' +\n    'There is no migration path; see noy-db #1100.',\n    'unbound-legacy-format',\n  ]\n}\n\n// ─── Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ────────\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random IV.\n * Used by the attachment store so binary blobs avoid double base64 encoding\n * (the existing `encrypt()` function calls `TextEncoder` on a string — here\n * we pass the `Uint8Array` directly to `subtle.encrypt`).\n */\nexport async function encryptBytes(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to raw bytes.\n * Counterpart to `encryptBytes`. Throws `TamperedError` on auth-tag failure.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytes(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n\nexport async function encryptBytesWithAAD(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n    },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with AAD verification.\n *\n * If the AAD does not match the one used at encryption time (e.g. because\n * a chunk was reordered or substituted from another blob), the GCM auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError`.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytesWithAAD(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Presence Key Derivation ──────────────────────────────\n\n\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKey(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed')\n  // JSON-array encoding is injective: each element is separately quoted/\n  // escaped, so collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with\n  // collection `a` + field `b/sealed/c`.\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a per-record sealed-field key from the record's **per-record CEK**\n * rather than the collection DEK. Same HKDF construction as\n * {@link deriveSealedFieldKey} but with salt `'noydb-sealed-cek'` (distinct\n * from `'noydb-sealed'`), so a CEK-derived key can never collide with a\n * DEK-derived one for the same `{collection, field}`.\n *\n * The point: the sealed ciphertext's only key now flows from the record's CEK.\n * Dropping the record's wrapped `_cek` (crypto-shred / `forget`) makes the key\n * — and thus `_sealed[field]` — unrecoverable, giving sealed fields the same\n * erasure guarantee `_data` already has. The CEK must be extractable (it is —\n * `unwrapCek`/`generateDEK` mint extractable keys).\n *\n * @param cek            The record's AES-256-GCM CEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(\n  cek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawCek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed-cek')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed-cek', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Deterministic Encryption ────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection's **dedicated deterministic-index key** from its DEK\n * via HKDF-SHA256 (L-1, #554).\n *\n * `_det` slots previously encrypted under the raw collection DEK — the same\n * key `_data` uses with a *randomized*-IV regime while `_det` uses a\n * *deterministic*-IV regime. Two IV regimes on one key is avoidable hygiene\n * debt (~2^-96 theoretical collision), so the deterministic index now gets its\n * own HKDF-separated key: salt `'noydb-det'`, info\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-det'])` (the injective JSON-array domain tag, same\n * convention as {@link deriveSealedFieldKey}). Per-field separation still\n * comes from the `'<collection>/<field>'` context inside\n * {@link encryptDeterministic}, exactly as before.\n *\n * The derived key stays **DEK-derived (collection-level)** on purpose: `_det`\n * is carried verbatim through per-record CEK rotation (see\n * `record-keys/sealing.ts`), so its key must not depend on the CEK. It rotates\n * with the collection DEK, like the presence key.\n *\n * The key is minted **extractable** — {@link encryptDeterministic} derives its\n * per-value IV via HKDF over the raw key bytes (an `exportKey` under the\n * hood), which a non-extractable key would forbid. Same in-memory posture as\n * the DEK itself (`generateDEK` mints extractable keys).\n *\n * @param dek The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @returns A dedicated AES-256-GCM key for the `_det` deterministic index.\n */\nexport async function deriveDeterministicKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-det')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-det']))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a deterministic 12-byte IV from `{ DEK, context, plaintext }`\n * via HKDF-SHA256. Given the same three inputs, the IV is identical, so\n * `encryptDeterministic` produces the same ciphertext on every call —\n * which is precisely what enables blind equality search on encrypted\n * fields.\n *\n * **The side channel this opens.** Two records whose field value is the\n * same produce the same ciphertext. An observer with store access can\n * therefore tell which records share a value — not *what* the value is,\n * but the equivalence class. This is the well-known trade-off of\n * deterministic encryption and is why the feature is strictly opt-in\n * per field, guarded by `acknowledgeDeterministicRisk: true` at\n * collection creation.\n *\n * The context string MUST include the collection name and field name,\n * so:\n *   - The same plaintext in two different fields encrypts differently\n *     (no cross-field equality leak).\n *   - The same plaintext in two different collections (different DEKs)\n *     encrypts differently by virtue of the key, even before HKDF\n *     domain separation kicks in.\n */\nasync function deriveDeterministicIV(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n  plaintext: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-deterministic-v1')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${context}\\x00${plaintext}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    IV_BYTES * 8,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt a plaintext string with AES-256-GCM and a deterministic,\n * HKDF-derived IV.\n *\n * The same `{ dek, context, plaintext }` triple always produces the\n * same `{ iv, data }` — call this twice and you can string-compare the\n * ciphertexts to check equality of the inputs without decrypting them.\n *\n * @param context  Domain-separation string — by convention\n *                 `'<collection>/<field>'`. Different contexts encrypt\n *                 the same plaintext to different ciphertexts, so\n *                 `email` in collection `users` does not collide with\n *                 `email` in collection `customers`.\n */\nexport async function encryptDeterministic(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = await deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Counterpart to {@link encryptDeterministic}. The IV is stored\n * alongside the ciphertext (exactly like the randomized path), so\n * decrypt uses the stored IV and verifies the GCM auth tag — a tampered\n * ciphertext throws `TamperedError` just like randomized AES-GCM.\n */\nexport async function decryptDeterministic(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek)\n}\n\n// ─── Random Generation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n\nexport async function generateRecipientKeyPair(): Promise<CryptoKeyPair> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'RSA-OAEP', modulusLength: 2048, publicExponent: new Uint8Array([1, 0, 1]), hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\nexport async function exportRecipientPublicKeySpki(pair: CryptoKeyPair): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return new Uint8Array(await subtle.exportKey('spki', pair.publicKey))\n}\n\nexport async function importRecipientPublicKeySpki(spki: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('spki', spki as BufferSource, { name: 'RSA-OAEP', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['encrypt'])\n}\n\n/** RSA-OAEP-encrypt `bytes` (a 32-byte CEK) to the recipient's public key. */\nexport async function recipientWrap(pub: CryptoKey, bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return new Uint8Array(await subtle.encrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, pub, bytes as BufferSource))\n}\n\n/**\n * RSA-OAEP-decrypt with the pair's private key. Propagates WebCrypto's own\n * error on failure — callers that need a typed error map it themselves.\n */\nexport async function recipientUnwrap(pair: CryptoKeyPair, wrapped: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return new Uint8Array(await subtle.decrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, pair.privateKey, wrapped as BufferSource))\n}\n\n/**\n * core#96 — the private half of a recipient pair as PKCS#8 bytes, so a caller\n * can seal it under a key it holds and persist it (a member's keyring inbox\n * key pair lives in the keyring file). The caller zeroes the bytes after use.\n */\nexport async function exportRecipientPrivateKeyPkcs8(pair: CryptoKeyPair): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return new Uint8Array(await subtle.exportKey('pkcs8', pair.privateKey))\n}\n\n/** core#96 — rebuild a recipient pair from persisted PKCS#8 private + SPKI public bytes. */\nexport async function importRecipientKeyPair(pkcs8: Uint8Array, spki: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKeyPair> {\n  const alg = { name: 'RSA-OAEP', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const\n  const [privateKey, publicKey] = await Promise.all([\n    subtle.importKey('pkcs8', pkcs8 as BufferSource, alg, false, ['decrypt']),\n    subtle.importKey('spki', spki as BufferSource, alg, false, ['encrypt']),\n  ])\n  return { privateKey, publicKey }\n}\n\n// ─── Base64 Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n\n","/**\n * The `_vdig` slot payload + crypto (stage 2, spec §2).\n *\n * A `_vdig[field]` blob is AES-256-GCM `\"iv:data\"` sealed under an\n * HKDF(CEK) slot key with AAD = ['noydb-classify-vdig', collection,\n * recordId, field] (C1 rollback-splice hardening). The AAD is NOT stored —\n * readers reconstruct it. It is deliberately `_v`-independent: C6's\n * carry-forward copies blob bytes verbatim across version bumps; the\n * same-record same-field TEMPORAL rollback residual is detected by the\n * ledger's conditional `_vdig` binding (envelope-body.ts).\n *\n * CEK-ONLY (I3): there is no DEK derivation and no\n * 'noydb-classify-vdig-dek' salt domain — every vdig slot dies with the\n * record's `_cek` (forget() shreds it totally; no vdig-dekResidue class).\n * @module\n */\nimport { encryptBytesWithAAD, decryptBytesWithAAD, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { base64ToBuffer } from '../../plumbing/digest.js'\nimport { TamperedError } from '../../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\nexport const VDIG_SALT_DOMAIN = 'noydb-classify-vdig'\n\nexport interface VdigDigestEntry {\n  readonly salt: string   // base64 32-byte per-write random salt\n  readonly hash: string   // base64 32-byte pbkdf2VerifyDigest output\n}\n\nexport interface VdigPayload {\n  readonly v: 1\n  readonly alg: 'PBKDF2-SHA256'\n  readonly iter: number\n  readonly cur: VdigDigestEntry & { readonly at: string }  // ISO write-time\n  /** Previous digests, oldest-first, length ≤ notLastN (cap 8). */\n  readonly ring?: readonly VdigDigestEntry[]\n}\n\n/** Injective JSON-array AAD — same collision argument as deriveSealedFieldKey. */\nexport function buildVdigAad(collection: string, recordId: string, field: string): Uint8Array {\n  return new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([VDIG_SALT_DOMAIN, collection, recordId, field]))\n}\n\n/** HKDF(CEK) → non-extractable AES-256-GCM vdig slot key. CEK-only (I3). */\nexport async function deriveVdigSlotKey(\n  cek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  const raw = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdf = await subtle.importKey('raw', raw, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(VDIG_SALT_DOMAIN)\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([VDIG_SALT_DOMAIN, collection, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info }, hkdf, 256)\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 }, false, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])\n}\n\nexport async function sealVdigPayload(\n  payload: VdigPayload,\n  cek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const key = await deriveVdigSlotKey(cek, collection, field)\n  const { iv, data } = await encryptBytesWithAAD(\n    new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(payload)),\n    key,\n    buildVdigAad(collection, recordId, field),\n  )\n  return `${iv}:${data}`\n}\n\n/** Throws TamperedError on any AAD / auth-tag mismatch (C1). */\nexport async function openVdigPayload(\n  blob: string,\n  cek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<VdigPayload> {\n  const sep = blob.indexOf(':')\n  if (sep === -1) throw new TamperedError()\n  const ivPart = blob.slice(0, sep)\n  const dataPart = blob.slice(sep + 1)\n  try {\n    base64ToBuffer(ivPart)\n    base64ToBuffer(dataPart)\n  } catch {\n    throw new TamperedError()\n  }\n  const key = await deriveVdigSlotKey(cek, collection, field)\n  const bytes = await decryptBytesWithAAD(\n    ivPart,\n    dataPart,\n    key,\n    buildVdigAad(collection, recordId, field),\n  )\n  return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(bytes)) as VdigPayload\n}\n","/**\n * Digest-only write engine (C6 rotate branch + notLastN ring, spec §2/§4).\n * Called ONLY by RecordCodec.encryptRecord — both live inside the enclave.\n * @module\n */\nimport { type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { generateSalt, bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer } from '../../plumbing/digest.js'\nimport { pbkdf2VerifyDigest, VDIG_ITERATIONS } from './digest.js'\nimport { normalizeForVerify } from '../../plumbing/normalize.js'\nimport { blindedEqual } from './compare.js'\nimport { sealVdigPayload, openVdigPayload, type VdigPayload, type VdigDigestEntry } from './vdig.js'\nimport { ClassifiedRotationError, TamperedError } from '../../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { VdigFieldPolicy } from '../../../kernel/types.js'\n\nexport async function mintVdigSlot(\n  rawValue: string,\n  policy: VdigFieldPolicy,\n  prevBlob: string | undefined,\n  cek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const normalized = normalizeForVerify(policy.normalize, rawValue)\n\n  let prev: VdigPayload | null = null\n  if (prevBlob !== undefined) {\n    try {\n      prev = await openVdigPayload(prevBlob, cek, collection, recordId, field)\n    } catch {\n      // Any failure opening a prior _vdig slot (auth-tag mismatch, malformed\n      // JSON, wrong AAD) is a tamper/false condition — normalize to\n      // TamperedError so the write path never sees a distinct error shape.\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    if (!Number.isInteger(prev.iter) || prev.iter < 1) {\n      // A corrupted/tampered iter count would silently weaken (or break)\n      // the reuse-check PBKDF2 pass — floor/validate before trusting it.\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n  }\n\n  // notLastN reuse refusal: candidate vs cur + every ring entry, each a full\n  // PBKDF2 at the payload's own iteration count (n × 600K is the documented\n  // write-time cost ceiling, cap 8 — spec Q4).\n  if (prev !== null && policy.notLastN > 0) {\n    const history: readonly VdigDigestEntry[] = [prev.cur, ...(prev.ring ?? [])]\n    for (const entry of history) {\n      const digest = await pbkdf2VerifyDigest(normalized, base64ToBuffer(entry.salt), prev.iter)\n      if (await blindedEqual(digest, base64ToBuffer(entry.hash))) {\n        throw new ClassifiedRotationError(collection, field, 'password was used recently')\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const salt = generateSalt()\n  const hash = await pbkdf2VerifyDigest(normalized, salt, VDIG_ITERATIONS)\n  const ring = prev !== null && policy.notLastN > 0\n    ? [...(prev.ring ?? []), { salt: prev.cur.salt, hash: prev.cur.hash }].slice(-policy.notLastN)\n    : undefined\n\n  const payload: VdigPayload = {\n    v: 1,\n    alg: 'PBKDF2-SHA256',\n    iter: VDIG_ITERATIONS,\n    cur: { salt: bufferToBase64(salt), hash: bufferToBase64(hash), at: new Date().toISOString() },\n    ...(ring !== undefined && ring.length > 0 ? { ring } : {}),\n  }\n  return sealVdigPayload(payload, cek, collection, recordId, field)\n}\n","/**\n * `enclave-aes` as a {@link CapsulePrimitives} — the 13 functions the shared\n * plumbing binds to.\n *\n * ⭐ THE ASSIGNMENT BELOW IS A TEST, and it is the reason this file exists as\n * a file rather than an inline object at the `makeCapsule()` call. Declaring\n * the seam type and implementing it are two different acts; nothing checks a\n * hand-written interface against the module it claims to describe unless\n * something binds one to the other. This binding caught two errors in the\n * declaration within minutes of it being written:\n *\n *   - `deriveDeterministicKey` was declared `(dek, context)`. It takes ONE\n *     argument — the AES capsule derives the context into the IV, not the key.\n *   - `bufferToBase64` was declared `(bytes: Uint8Array)`. It also accepts an\n *     `ArrayBuffer`, which is what its callers actually pass.\n *\n * Both would have compiled here and failed at the far end of the refactor,\n * where the cause is no longer visible. (The same lesson as `#16`: a\n * structural declaration drifts silently from its implementation until an\n * assignment pins the two together.)\n *\n * ⚠️ Method shorthand in `CapsulePrimitives` is checked BIVARIANTLY, so this\n * assignment does NOT catch parameter-arity drift — that is exactly how the\n * `deriveDeterministicKey` mistake survived the type and was caught by a call\n * site instead. Keep the conformance kit's call-site coverage; this assignment\n * is necessary, not sufficient.\n */\nimport type { CapsulePrimitives } from '../contract.js'\nimport { encrypt, decrypt, encryptBytesWithAAD, decryptBytesWithAAD, encryptDeterministic, deriveDeterministicKey, deriveSealedFieldKey, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek, generateDEK, wrapCek, unwrapCek } from './crypto.js'\nimport { bufferToBase64 } from '../plumbing/digest.js'\nimport { mintVdigSlot } from './classify/write.js'\nimport { mintBidxTag } from './classify/bidx.js'\nimport { openVdigPayload, sealVdigPayload } from './classify/vdig.js'\n\nexport const aesPrimitives: CapsulePrimitives = {\n  encrypt,\n  decrypt,\n  encryptBytesWithAAD,\n  decryptBytesWithAAD,\n  encryptDeterministic,\n  deriveDeterministicKey,\n  deriveSealedFieldKey,\n  deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek,\n  generateDEK,\n  wrapCek,\n  unwrapCek,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  mintVdigSlot,\n  mintBidxTag,\n  openVdigPayload,\n  sealVdigPayload,\n}\n","/**\n * The AES capsule, assembled: hub's shared plumbing bound to `aesPrimitives`.\n *\n * `classify/**` stays capsule-private (it is an optional group an exclave\n * refuses) but still needs `dualReadSealedSlot`, which is plumbing. Binding it\n * once here keeps `reveal.ts`/`verify.ts` from each building their own copy —\n * two bindings of the same primitives would work, but they would be two\n * objects, and `instanceof` across them is the class of bug the Stage B door\n * test caught by asserting identity rather than names.\n */\nimport { makeCapsule } from '../plumbing/index.js'\nimport { aesPrimitives } from './primitives.js'\n\nexport const aesCapsule = makeCapsule(aesPrimitives)\nexport const { dualReadSealedSlot } = 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package/dist/{chunk-BNFNQNEP.js → chunk-YJGKOSQD.js}

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
   filterRecords,
   fnViewDecoder,
   orderKeyOf
-} from "./chunk-ZVSKSUGI.js";
+} from "./chunk-DWCFGF2K.js";
 
 // src/kernel/query/internal/maintenance.ts
 var MaintenanceMethods = class {
@@ -97,4 +97,4 @@ var MaintenanceMethods = class {
 export {
   MaintenanceMethods
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-BNFNQNEP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YJGKOSQD.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-3V6LZHUO.js → chunk-Z3STG43F.js}

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-4CFHL5RY.js";
 import {
   readPath
-} from "./chunk-BUE7R3B5.js";
+} from "./chunk-GIQJGXV7.js";
 
 // src/with-lookup/indexing/index-snapshot.ts
 var FIELD_INDEX_SNAPSHOT_VERSION = 1;
@@ -933,4 +933,4 @@ export {
   normalizeIndexDefs,
   CollectionIndexes
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3V6LZHUO.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Z3STG43F.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ZBUAX4EF.js → chunk-ZD7WFMV2.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   NoydbError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/capsule/contract.ts
 function assertCapsuleSupports(caps, group, requirer) {
@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ export {
   assertCapsuleSupports,
   CapsuleNotSupportedError
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZBUAX4EF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZD7WFMV2.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-OM3SEDI4.js → chunk-ZF6JECDT.js}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import {
   normalizeForVerify
-} from "./chunk-PUBI455O.js";
+} from "./chunk-THQ3BHLM.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
   SealedHandle
-} from "./chunk-2ELOCEXE.js";
+} from "./chunk-XX4R7TUB.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   DebugReservedFieldError,
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import {
   RecordCekNotFoundError,
   SchemaValidationError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/capsule/plumbing/record-aad.ts
 var SCHEME = "noydb-aad/2";
@@ -1372,4 +1372,4 @@ export {
   makeCapsule,
   ctEqualTags
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OM3SEDI4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZF6JECDT.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-3Y5JLSXS.js → chunk-ZF7KNSLU.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   NonAdditiveSchemaChangeError,
   SchemaLockedError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/schema-update/strategies.ts
 function blindUpdate() {
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ export {
   lockSchema,
   coordinatedCutover
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3Y5JLSXS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZF7KNSLU.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-B65CC6Z6.js → chunk-ZGKODRGB.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   ReadOnlyFrameError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/with-fork/shadow/vault-frame.ts
 var VaultFrame = class {
@@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ export {
   VaultFrame,
   CollectionFrame
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-B65CC6Z6.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZGKODRGB.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-D4V5JJAK.js → chunk-ZNEKQFGF.js}

@@ -3,15 +3,15 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-XBKH4FOC.js";
 import {
   normalizeJoinOn
-} from "./chunk-5UUJE4FP.js";
+} from "./chunk-ICF3TIGY.js";
 import {
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
+} from "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
 import {
   MaterializedViewConfigError,
   MaterializedViewSourceUnknownError,
   RefNotDeclaredError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/materialized-views/dependency-analyzer.ts
 function analyzeDependencies(query) {
@@ -574,4 +574,4 @@ export {
   ungatedMvContext,
   wrapDbWithPredicates
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-D4V5JJAK.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZNEKQFGF.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-D5A3GCZ4.js → chunk-ZUTUNVFD.js}

@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ import {
   generateSigningKeyPair,
   openEnvelopeJson,
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
+} from "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
 import {
   ConflictError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/attestation/signer.ts
 var ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION = "_attestations";
@@ -54,4 +54,4 @@ export {
   loadSigner,
   loadOrCreateSigner
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-D5A3GCZ4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZUTUNVFD.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-G5EDYVSE.js → chunk-ZWMOHANW.js}

@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@ import {
   BLOB_CHUNKS_COLLECTION,
   BLOB_COLLECTION,
   BLOB_INDEX_COLLECTION
-} from "./chunk-QXJXG7DN.js";
+} from "./chunk-QFW4MYGN.js";
 import {
   installViaBinder
-} from "./chunk-PTJY5R3O.js";
+} from "./chunk-NCTN2FW4.js";
 import {
   buildRecordAad,
   buildRecordEnvelope,
   encrypt,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
+} from "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
 import {
   TamperedError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/via/blob/binding.ts
 async function eraseBlobs(ctx, cfg) {
@@ -472,4 +472,4 @@ export {
   BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION,
   runCompaction
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-G5EDYVSE.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZWMOHANW.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-CAD7N6HQ.js → chunk-ZZZ4VCY2.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import {
   matchesReferencingValue
-} from "./chunk-GETUTTZU.js";
+} from "./chunk-C4XV3PSJ.js";
 import {
   PeriodClosedError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/kernel/via/dispatch.ts
 function touchFor(batch, collection) {
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ async function runGraphDispatchWave(vault, batch) {
       try {
         const stored = await coll._getStoredRecordForDispatch(id);
         if (!stored) continue;
-        await coll.dispatchDerivations(id, stored.record, stored.version, wave);
-        await coll.dispatchMaterializedViews(id, stored.record, wave);
+        await coll._dispatchDerivations(id, stored.record, stored.version, wave);
+        await coll._dispatchMaterializedViews(id, stored.record, wave);
       } catch (err) {
         console.warn(`[via-dispatch] wave recompute failed for ${collectionName}/${id}:`, err);
         vault._emit("derivation:wave-error", { collection: collectionName, id, error: err });
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ async function runGraphDispatchWave(vault, batch) {
     for (const [id, intents] of touch.deletes) {
       try {
         await coll._recomputeDeletedRollups(intents, wave);
-        await coll.dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete(id);
-        await coll.dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete(id);
+        await coll._dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete(id);
+        await coll._dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete(id);
       } catch (err) {
         console.warn(`[via-dispatch] wave delete-recompute failed for ${collectionName}/${id}:`, err);
         vault._emit("derivation:wave-error", { collection: collectionName, id, error: err });
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ function ledgerAuditHook(ledger, actor) {
 async function forgetDerivedFanout(vault, ref, envelope, stats, lookupCompareKeys) {
   const coll = vault._getCollection(ref.collection);
   if (coll) {
-    const mv = await coll.dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete(ref.id);
+    const mv = await coll._dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete(ref.id);
     stats.recordsErased += mv.deleted;
     stats.derivedResidueUndecodable.push(...mv.residueUndecodable);
     stats.derivedResidueDeclined.push(...mv.residueDeclined);
@@ -113,12 +113,12 @@ async function forgetDerivedFanout(vault, ref, envelope, stats, lookupCompareKey
     stats.lookupReferencesResidue.push(...residue);
   }
   if (edges.some((e) => e.kind === "derivation")) {
-    stats.recordsErased += await coll.dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete(ref.id, true);
+    stats.recordsErased += await coll._dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete(ref.id, true);
   }
   if (envelope && edges.some((e) => e.kind === "rollup")) {
     const priorRecord = await coll._decodeEnvelope(envelope, ref.id);
     if (priorRecord) {
-      for (const r of await coll.dispatchRollupsOnDelete(ref.id, priorRecord)) {
+      for (const r of await coll._dispatchRollupsOnDelete(ref.id, priorRecord)) {
         if (r.outcome === "written") stats.aggregatesRecomputed += 1;
         else if (r.outcome === "skipped-frozen") stats.residueFrozen.push(`${r.into}:${r.parentId}`);
       }
@@ -173,4 +173,4 @@ export {
   forgetDerivedFanout,
   selfWriteFieldEqual
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CAD7N6HQ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZZZ4VCY2.js.map

package/dist/chunk-ZZZ4VCY2.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/via/dispatch.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// kernel/via/dispatch.ts — the batched, origin-aware sync/cutover/restore dispatch wave\n// (Via port phase C, #638 Task 4, fixes #621).\n//\n// `Collection._onRecordMutated`'s `sync-apply`/`cutover`/`restore` cases feed touched\n// (collection, id) pairs into a per-session `GraphBatch` (owned by `Vault._collectGraphTouch`)\n// instead of dispatching inline — the `local-write` path keeps its own byte-identical inline\n// dispatch (`wave` stays `undefined` there, per the spec's behavior lock). At batch-flush time\n// `runGraphDispatchWave` decrypts each touched record (id threaded into the decrypt, matching\n// the phase-B at-rest contract) and re-runs the SAME `dispatchDerivations`/\n// `dispatchMaterializedViews` the local-write path uses, sharing one `WaveContext` so N touched\n// records feeding the SAME rollup/MV target recompute exactly once (per-target dedup).\n// See design-history/2026-07-11-via-phase-c-design.md §3.\n\nimport type { ViaGraph } from './graph.js'\nimport type { Collection } from '../collection.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../types.js'\nimport { PeriodClosedError } from '../errors.js'\nimport { matchesReferencingValue } from '../../port/with/lookup-strategy.js'\n\n/** One deleted child's resolved rollup PARENT intent (#640) — ids + a field name only. A\n *  resolved `parentId` is an id, same class as any touched record id — never a stored value. */\nexport interface RollupDeleteIntent {\n  readonly into: string\n  readonly parentId: string\n  readonly field: string\n}\n\n/** One collection's batched touches this session (#640 widens the #638 `Set<string>` shape):\n *  `puts` — the original semantics, unchanged; `deletes` — a deleted record's id mapped to its\n *  resolved rollup-parent intents, captured PRE-invalidation by `Collection._onRecordMutated`'s\n *  sync-apply delete case (the FK is only readable there — see `kernel/collection.ts\n *  #_rollupDeleteIntents`). */\nexport interface GraphTouch {\n  readonly puts: Set<string>\n  readonly deletes: Map<string, readonly RollupDeleteIntent[]>\n}\n\n/** Per-session touched set — collection → its `GraphTouch`. Metadata only — ids (collection\n *  names, record ids INCLUDING resolved rollup parent ids) and field names; NEVER record payload\n *  or key material. A resolved parentId is an id, same class as the touched ids — not a stored\n *  value. */\nexport type GraphBatch = Map<string, GraphTouch>\n\n/** Get-or-create `batch`'s `GraphTouch` entry for `collection` (#640) — shared by\n *  `Vault._collectGraphTouch`/`_collectGraphDelete` so each stays a one-line call. */\nexport function touchFor(batch: GraphBatch, collection: string): GraphTouch {\n  let t = batch.get(collection)\n  if (!t) {\n    t = { puts: new Set(), deletes: new Map() }\n    batch.set(collection, t)\n  }\n  return t\n}\n\n/** #640 — sync, I/O-free: `deleted`'s resolved rollup PARENT intents (the FK is only readable\n *  NOW, before the record is gone) — a pure function so `Collection._rollupDeleteIntents` stays\n *  a one-line delegator under the kernel-surface ceiling. `registry` is `this.derivationSource\n *  ?.registry()`; `collectionName` is `this.name` (the CHILD/`rollup.from` side). Generic over\n *  the registry's own spec shape so this file never imports a `with-formula` type (port-layering\n *  — via/dispatch.ts must not gain a with-* import). */\nexport function resolveRollupDeleteIntents<S extends { source: string; rollup?: { from: string; key: string; field: string } }>(\n  registry: { strategiesForSource(name: string): ReadonlyArray<{ spec: S }> } | undefined,\n  collectionName: string,\n  deleted: Record<string, unknown>,\n): RollupDeleteIntent[] {\n  if (!registry) return []\n  const intents: RollupDeleteIntent[] = []\n  for (const { spec } of registry.strategiesForSource(collectionName)) {\n    if (!spec.rollup || spec.rollup.from !== collectionName) continue\n    const kv = deleted[spec.rollup.key]\n    if (typeof kv === 'string' || typeof kv === 'number') intents.push({ into: spec.source, parentId: String(kv), field: spec.rollup.field })\n  }\n  return intents\n}\n\n/** #640 — resolve a `RollupDeleteIntent` back to its registry `spec`. The wave's per-intent\n *  driver needs `spec.rollup.compute`, which `GraphBatch`'s metadata-only pin forbids batching —\n *  so it's re-resolved here, post-boundary, instead of carried across it. `undefined` if the\n *  intent's originating strategy was unregistered between collect time and wave time (residual\n *  gap, freshness-only). */\nexport function findRollupSpecForIntent<S extends { source: string; rollup?: { from: string; field: string } }>(\n  registry: { strategiesForSource(name: string): ReadonlyArray<{ spec: S }> } | undefined,\n  collectionName: string,\n  intent: RollupDeleteIntent,\n): S | undefined {\n  return registry?.strategiesForSource(collectionName).find((s) => s.spec.source === intent.into && s.spec.rollup?.field === intent.field && s.spec.rollup?.from === collectionName)?.spec\n}\n\n/** One dedup ledger for a single wave — a target is recomputed at most once (mark-on-check). */\nexport class WaveContext {\n  private readonly _seen = new Set<string>()\n  seen(targetKey: string): boolean {\n    if (this._seen.has(targetKey)) return true\n    this._seen.add(targetKey)\n    return false\n  }\n}\n\n/** The slice of `Vault` the wave needs: the shared graph (the #553 zero-cost skip) and cached-\n *  collection lookup — never constructs, since a touched collection is, by construction,\n *  already open (it just fired `_onRecordMutated`). */\nexport interface VaultLike {\n  readonly graph: ViaGraph\n  _getCollection(name: string): Collection<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined\n  /** #640 (#644 item 3) — structured wave-error surfacing, additive to the existing console.warn. */\n  _emit(event: string, payload: unknown): void\n}\n\n/**\n * Run ONE dispatch wave for a completed batch: for each touched (collection, id), decrypt the\n * applied envelope (id threaded), then run the SAME `dispatchDerivations` +\n * `dispatchMaterializedViews` the local-write path uses — with a shared `WaveContext` so N\n * touched records feeding the SAME target recompute once. #553: a collection with no graph\n * out-edges (e.g. money-only) is skipped before any decrypt/dispatch async work.\n */\nexport async function runGraphDispatchWave(vault: VaultLike, batch: GraphBatch): Promise<void> {\n  const wave = new WaveContext()\n  for (const [collectionName, touch] of batch) {\n    if (vault.graph.dependentsOf(collectionName).length === 0) continue\n    const coll = vault._getCollection(collectionName)\n    if (!coll) continue\n    for (const id of touch.puts) {\n      try {\n        // Decrypt is INSIDE the per-id isolation boundary (whole-branch review Important\n        // finding, #638): an undecryptable synced envelope (`TamperedError`) must not\n        // escape `_getStoredRecordForDispatch` and abort the wave — that would propagate\n        // through `_flushGraphBatch` and reject the surrounding `SyncEngine.pull`/`push`\n        // AFTER records were already applied + meta persisted, starving every other\n        // touched target in the same batch.\n        const stored = await coll._getStoredRecordForDispatch(id)\n        if (!stored) continue\n        await coll._dispatchDerivations(id, stored.record, stored.version, wave)\n        await coll._dispatchMaterializedViews(id, stored.record, wave)\n      } catch (err) {\n        // #638 Task 5 review mandate: one touched record's recompute must not abort the\n        // whole wave (starving co-batched healthy targets) or the pull/push it's nested\n        // inside. `PeriodClosedError` never reaches here — `putDerivedOutput` already\n        // intercepts it at every output-write call site and turns it into a skip+event.\n        // Anything else (a genuine decrypt failure, a derive()/executor bug, a schema\n        // violation on the output, ...) is surfaced — not silently swallowed — via the\n        // SAME console.warn channel `dispatchDerivations`/the MV executor already use for\n        // their own non-strict-mode output failures, then isolated to just this one id.\n        // #644 item 3: ADDITIVELY (never in place of the warn) emit a structured event too,\n        // so a listener doesn't have to scrape console output to react to a wave failure.\n        console.warn(`[via-dispatch] wave recompute failed for ${collectionName}/${id}:`, err)\n        vault._emit('derivation:wave-error', { collection: collectionName, id, error: err })\n      }\n    }\n    // #640 — delete-kind touches: the deleted child's rollup-parent intents, resolved (sync,\n    // pre-invalidation) at collect time by `Collection._rollupDeleteIntents`. Same per-id\n    // isolation as the puts loop above. #658: the wave now ALSO heals MV rows and array-shape\n    // derivation output rows for the deleted child — parity with the local-delete boundary\n    // (`Collection._doDelete`'s `!internal` block, which already calls all three). Still never\n    // routed through `dispatchDerivations` (the mutation-choke-point.test.ts:85-99 pin — sync-\n    // applied deletes never RE-DERIVE); `dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete`/\n    // `dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete` only need `id` (MV refresh recomputes+diffs; array-\n    // derivation reads its per-source sidecar) and never call `derive()`, so the pin holds.\n    for (const [id, intents] of touch.deletes) {\n      try {\n        await coll._recomputeDeletedRollups(intents, wave)\n        // #658: record-shape same-id outputs are left untouched (eraseRecordShapeToo defaults\n        // false), matching local delete — the user deletes those directly if wanted.\n        // #658: TODO dedup MV refresh per wave — `dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete` doesn't\n        // accept a `WaveContext` (unlike the put-path `dispatchMaterializedViews`), so N deleted\n        // children of one eager MV in a batch each trigger a full refresh pass. Threading `wave`\n        // through would touch collection.ts's zero-slack kernel-surface ceiling for a perf-only\n        // win; correctness doesn't depend on it (idempotent per source-id) — left as a follow-up.\n        await coll._dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete(id)\n        await coll._dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete(id)\n      } catch (err) {\n        console.warn(`[via-dispatch] wave delete-recompute failed for ${collectionName}/${id}:`, err)\n        vault._emit('derivation:wave-error', { collection: collectionName, id, error: err })\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** A record's post-freeze source mutation, for the `'derivation:skipped-frozen'` event\n *  and the optional audit-trail entry. See {@link putDerivedOutput}. */\nexport interface DerivationSkippedFrozen {\n  readonly source: { readonly collection: string; readonly id: string }\n  readonly target: { readonly collection: string; readonly id: string }\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly endDate: string\n}\n\n/** The minimal put-capable shape `putDerivedOutput` needs. Any `Collection<T>` structurally\n *  satisfies this — its real `options` type is a superset of what's declared here. */\nexport interface CollectionLike {\n  put(id: string, value: unknown, options?: { readonly source?: string }): Promise<void>\n}\n\nexport interface PutDerivedOutputCtx {\n  readonly emit: (ev: string, p: unknown) => void\n  readonly source: { readonly collection: string; readonly id: string }\n  readonly audit?: ((e: DerivationSkippedFrozen) => Promise<void>) | undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Attempt a dispatch-driven output write. On `PeriodClosedError` (the closed-period\n * `beforePut` gate — `freezePeriod`/`archivePeriod` add no separate gate, per seam map\n * Part 7): SKIP (no `_ts` stamped — the gate throws before any write happens), emit\n * `'derivation:skipped-frozen'` on the event bus (ALWAYS), and append an audit-trail entry\n * when the with-history ledger is active. Returns `'written' | 'skipped-frozen'`. Any OTHER\n * error propagates unchanged — this helper narrows exactly one error class. The SOURCE\n * write is never wrapped through this helper — only derived-output writes are (§7).\n */\nexport async function putDerivedOutput(\n  outColl: CollectionLike, id: string, value: unknown,\n  ctx: PutDerivedOutputCtx,\n  options?: { readonly source?: string },\n): Promise<'written' | 'skipped-frozen'> {\n  try {\n    await outColl.put(id, value, options)\n    return 'written'\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (!(err instanceof PeriodClosedError)) throw err\n    // Reach-around for the target collection's private `name` — the SAME pattern\n    // `with-formula/materialized-views/executor.ts`'s `listOutputIds` already uses to\n    // read a `Collection`'s private `adapter`/`vault`/`name` fields from outside the class.\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    const targetCollection = (outColl as any).name as string\n    const event: DerivationSkippedFrozen = {\n      source: ctx.source,\n      target: { collection: targetCollection, id },\n      period: err.periodName,\n      endDate: err.endDate,\n    }\n    ctx.emit('derivation:skipped-frozen', event)\n    if (ctx.audit) await ctx.audit(event)\n    return 'skipped-frozen'\n  }\n}\n\n/** Structural (no static import — kernel spine may not statically reach a with-* service,\n *  the S4 gate recipe `check-architecture.mjs`'s port-layering check enforces) shape of the\n *  with-history `LedgerStore.append` seam this helper needs. */\ninterface AuditLedgerLike {\n  append(input: {\n    readonly op: 'lifecycle'\n    readonly collection: string\n    readonly id: string\n    readonly version: number\n    readonly actor: string\n    readonly payloadHash: string\n    readonly reason?: string\n  }): Promise<unknown>\n}\n\n/** @internal — the optional with-history ledger audit hook for `putDerivedOutput`, present\n *  only when the ledger is active (mirrors every other kernel event's `if (this.ledger)`\n *  gate). Encoded as a `'lifecycle'` entry — the existing \"non-data audit event\" op (the\n *  same convention `forget`'s JSON-summary-in-`reason` entry uses; `ledger/entry.ts:88-104`). */\nexport function ledgerAuditHook(\n  ledger: AuditLedgerLike | undefined, actor: string,\n): ((e: DerivationSkippedFrozen) => Promise<void>) | undefined {\n  if (!ledger) return undefined\n  return async (e) => {\n    await ledger.append({\n      op: 'lifecycle', collection: e.target.collection, id: e.target.id, version: 0, actor, payloadHash: '',\n      reason: JSON.stringify({ event: 'derivation-skipped-frozen', ...e }),\n    })\n  }\n}\n\n/** `recomputeRollup`/`dispatchRollupsOnDelete`'s per-target write outcome (#638 Task 6):\n *  `'written'`/`'skipped-frozen'` mirror {@link putDerivedOutput}'s result; `'noop'` covers\n *  no-parent/no-change/deduped-by-wave — nothing to report either way. */\nexport type RollupOutcome = 'written' | 'skipped-frozen' | 'noop'\n\n/** Mutable accumulator `forgetDerivedFanout` writes into, one per `Vault.forget()` call — keeps\n *  the per-ref loop's call site to a single line under vault.ts's tight kernel-surface ceiling.\n *  Maps 1:1 onto `ForgetResult`'s additive fields (`with-audit/forget/strategy.ts`). */\nexport interface ForgetFanoutStats {\n  recordsErased: number\n  aggregatesRecomputed: number\n  readonly residueFrozen: string[]\n  /** #650 Task 5 (#648) — referencing records tombstoned via a `'ref'` edge's `cascade` policy. */\n  lookupReferencesCascaded: number\n  /** #650 Task 5 (#648) — referencing fields cleared via a `'ref'` edge's `nullify` policy. */\n  lookupReferencesNullified: number\n  /** #650 Task 5 review (Important fix) — `'ref'` edges whose compare-key could NOT be resolved,\n   *  even from the LIVE pre-shred row (the backing row itself is unreadable) — propagation was\n   *  skipped for these, reported here so the skip is never silent. `backing:key:collection.field`\n   *  entries, one per un-propagated edge. */\n  readonly lookupReferencesResidue: string[]\n  /** #776/#782/#785 — `outputCollection:id` MV-output rows that survived erasure invalidation\n   *  (eager tombstone leg AND lazy/manual `invalidateMVAtRest`) despite belonging to the\n   *  forgotten subject, because the ownership stamp could not be decoded (undecodable under\n   *  the default DEK — e.g. elevated above tier 0 on a tiered output collection). Ownership\n   *  UNCONFIRMED. Never erased, but surfaced here rather than silently skipped. */\n  readonly derivedResidueUndecodable: string[]\n  /** #782/#785 — `outputCollection:id` MV-output rows that decoded and stamp-matched but whose\n   *  `_internalDelete` declined (the #718 tier-elevation gate). Ownership CONFIRMED, erasure\n   *  declined — a real silent survival, surfaced here rather than silently skipped. */\n  readonly derivedResidueDeclined: string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * #622 — after `_writeTombstone(ref.id, actor)` erases the forgotten subject's own record, fan\n * out to its derived residue via the graph (spec §5): record-grain artifacts (MV rows,\n * array-shape derivation rows, same-id record-shape derivation copies) are ERASED through the\n * SAME `!internal` housekeeping-bypass machinery the ordinary delete path uses (no user\n * `onDelete` re-fires — the shred-is-not-a-domain-delete property `_writeTombstone` protects);\n * aggregate-grain rollups are RECOMPUTED without the forgotten contribution in open periods, or\n * skip+audit (via `putDerivedOutput`, already wired into the rollup/MV output paths) in frozen\n * ones. Mutates `stats` in place. `envelope` is `ref`'s PRE-tombstone envelope, decoded only if\n * a rollup edge is actually present — the #553 zero-cost-skip discipline: no decrypt for the\n * common case of a forgotten record with no aggregate-grain consumer, and no work at all when\n * `ref.collection` has no graph out-edges. `lookupCompareKeys` is the `'ref'` edges' compare-key\n * map, resolved from the LIVE row BEFORE any shred (`VaultLinks.checkLookupRefsRestrict`'s return\n * value — `Vault.forget()`'s pre-shred restrict check doubles as the live-resolve pass) — see\n * {@link applyLookupRefsFanout}.\n */\nexport async function forgetDerivedFanout(\n  vault: VaultLike,\n  ref: { readonly collection: string; readonly id: string },\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope | null,\n  stats: ForgetFanoutStats,\n  lookupCompareKeys: ReadonlyMap<string, string | undefined>,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const coll = vault._getCollection(ref.collection)\n\n  // #761 item 4 — drive the MV arm off `dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete` UNCONDITIONALLY,\n  // ABOVE the `edges` check below: `registry.edges()` drops the same-collection\n  // partition-disjoint MV edge (registry.ts's `sources.length === 0 → continue`), so a\n  // same-collection MV's source collection never appears in `vault.graph`'s derived-artifact\n  // edges even though the MV IS registered — forget() would otherwise never reach it.\n  // `dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete` self-guards O(1) via `mvsForSource` (a no-op when\n  // this collection isn't an MV source), so this is safe to call unconditionally. Safe to\n  // route through the eager executor's tombstone leg ONLY because that leg is now\n  // stamp-scoped (#762) — before that fix this would have opened a NEW forget-time\n  // data-loss path into the unscoped tombstone diff.\n  if (coll) {\n    const mv = await coll._dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete(ref.id)\n    stats.recordsErased += mv.deleted\n    stats.derivedResidueUndecodable.push(...mv.residueUndecodable)\n    stats.derivedResidueDeclined.push(...mv.residueDeclined)\n  }\n\n  const edges = vault.graph.derivedArtifactsOf(ref.collection)\n  if (edges.length === 0 || !coll) return\n\n  // #650 Task 5 (#648) — 'ref' cascade/nullify propagate ADDITIVELY, here, AFTER the shred\n  // (restrict already refused BEFORE any shred — the caller's pre-tombstone check, spec §4).\n  // The I/O shell (loop shape, collection accessor) is duplicated, not imported, from\n  // `VaultLinks.applyLookupRefsPropagation`/`checkLookupRefsRestrict` (with-shape/links/\n  // vault-facade.ts) — the kernel spine may not statically import a with-* service\n  // (port-layering, the #638 Task 5 via/dispatch.ts precedent); `vault._getCollection` is\n  // cached-only while `VaultLinks`' accessor constructs. The pure match predicate itself is\n  // shared through the port seam (#651 Task 3 — `matchesReferencingValue`, `port/with/\n  // lookup-strategy.ts`), so only the shell, not the coercion logic, stays duplicated. A\n  // referencing edge whose dimension uses a non-default `key` (matrix tier only) needs the\n  // backing row's OWN value at that field, not its PUT-id — the row is ALREADY tombstoned by\n  // now, so it's read from `lookupCompareKeys`, resolved by the caller from the LIVE row\n  // BEFORE the shred (#650 Task 5 review, Important fix — eliminates the post-shred\n  // envelope-decode dependency this used to have, which silently skipped propagation whenever\n  // that decode failed).\n  if (edges.some((e) => e.kind === 'ref')) {\n    const { cascaded, nullified, residue } = await applyLookupRefsFanout(vault, ref.collection, ref.id, lookupCompareKeys)\n    stats.lookupReferencesCascaded += cascaded\n    stats.lookupReferencesNullified += nullified\n    stats.lookupReferencesResidue.push(...residue)\n  }\n\n  if (edges.some((e) => e.kind === 'derivation')) {\n    // #622 review Finding 1: count REAL erasures (dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete's own\n    // `_internalDelete`-backed tally), not the derivation EDGE count — an edge exists whenever\n    // this collection is ANY trigger (source/sources[]/triggerBy), but the same-id record-shape\n    // guard only erases for `spec.source === this.name`, and `derive()` may never have produced\n    // an output row (optional-skip) in the first place. Both cases must contribute 0, not +1.\n    stats.recordsErased += await coll._dispatchArrayDerivationsOnDelete(ref.id, true)\n  }\n\n  if (envelope && edges.some((e) => e.kind === 'rollup')) {\n    const priorRecord = await coll._decodeEnvelope(envelope, ref.id)\n    if (priorRecord) {\n      for (const r of await coll._dispatchRollupsOnDelete(ref.id, priorRecord)) {\n        if (r.outcome === 'written') stats.aggregatesRecomputed += 1\n        else if (r.outcome === 'skipped-frozen') stats.residueFrozen.push(`${r.into}:${r.parentId}`)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Apply `cascade`/`nullify` propagation for `backing`'s non-restrict `'ref'` edges — the\n * forget-path counterpart of `VaultLinks.applyLookupRefsPropagation` (I/O shell duplicated, not\n * imported, match predicate shared via the port — see {@link forgetDerivedFanout}'s call site\n * comment). `restrict` edges are skipped here: the\n * forget loop's `checkLookupRefsRestrict`-equivalent call already refused (or the reference no\n * longer existed) BEFORE `_writeTombstone` ran, so by the time this runs only cascade/nullify\n * remain to propagate. `compareKeys` is the non-`'id'`-`keyField` compare-value map, resolved by\n * the caller from the LIVE row BEFORE the shred (#650 Task 5 review, Important fix) — the live row\n * is already shredded by the time THIS function runs, so it can no longer resolve one itself. A\n * `keyField` absent from (or `undefined` in) the map means that live resolve failed too — the edge\n * is reported as residue instead of silently skipped (never a bare `continue` with no trace).\n */\nasync function applyLookupRefsFanout(\n  vault: VaultLike,\n  backing: string,\n  key: string,\n  compareKeys: ReadonlyMap<string, string | undefined>,\n): Promise<{ cascaded: number; nullified: number; residue: string[] }> {\n  let cascaded = 0\n  let nullified = 0\n  const residue: string[] = []\n  for (const { referencing, onDelete, keyField } of vault.graph.referencingEdgesOf(backing)) {\n    if (onDelete === 'restrict') continue\n    const compareKey = keyField === 'id' ? key : compareKeys.get(keyField)\n    if (compareKey === undefined) {\n      residue.push(`${backing}:${key}:${referencing.collection}.${referencing.field}`)\n      continue\n    }\n    const coll = vault._getCollection(referencing.collection)\n    if (!coll) continue\n    const matches = (await coll.list()).filter((rec) => matchesReferencingValue(rec, referencing.field, compareKey))\n    for (const rec of matches) {\n      const id = rec['id'] as string | undefined\n      if (id === undefined) continue\n      if (onDelete === 'cascade') {\n        await coll.delete(id)\n        cascaded++\n      } else if (onDelete === 'nullify') {\n        await coll.put(id, { ...rec, [referencing.field]: null })\n        nullified++\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  return { cascaded, nullified, residue }\n}\n\n/**\n * Value-equality for a single self-write reverse-denorm field. Scalars\n * compare by identity; objects by canonical JSON (denorm values should be\n * deterministically shaped). Used as the cycle guard — when every denorm\n * field already matches, no write is issued and the self-write recursion ends.\n */\nexport function selfWriteFieldEqual(a: unknown, b: unknown): boolean {\n  if (a === b) return true\n  if (a === null || b === null || typeof a !== 'object' || typeof b !== 'object') return false\n  try {\n    return JSON.stringify(a) === JSON.stringify(b)\n  } catch {\n    return false\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AA6CO,SAAS,SAAS,OAAmB,YAAgC;AAC1E,MAAI,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAC5B,MAAI,CAAC,GAAG;AACN,QAAI,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAI,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS,oBAAI,IAAI,EAAE;AAC1C,UAAM,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,EACzB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAQO,SAAS,2BACd,UACA,gBACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO,CAAC;AACvB,QAAM,UAAgC,CAAC;AACvC,aAAW,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,oBAAoB,cAAc,GAAG;AACnE,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,eAAgB;AACzD,UAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG;AAClC,QAAI,OAAO,OAAO,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,SAAU,SAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1I;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAOO,SAAS,wBACd,UACA,gBACA,QACe;AACf,SAAO,UAAU,oBAAoB,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG;AACtL;AAGO,IAAM,cAAN,MAAkB;AAAA,EACN,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAY;AAAA,EACzC,KAAK,WAA4B;AAC/B,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO;AACtC,SAAK,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS;AACxB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAmBA,eAAsB,qBAAqB,OAAkB,OAAkC;AAC7F,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY;AAC7B,aAAW,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AAC3C,QAAI,MAAM,MAAM,aAAa,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,EAAG;AAC3D,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,eAAe,cAAc;AAChD,QAAI,CAAC,KAAM;AACX,eAAW,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAC3B,UAAI;AAOF,cAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAAE;AACxD,YAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,cAAM,KAAK,qBAAqB,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,IAAI;AACvE,cAAM,KAAK,2BAA2B,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MAC/D,SAAS,KAAK;AAWZ,gBAAQ,KAAK,4CAA4C,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG;AACrF,cAAM,MAAM,yBAAyB,EAAE,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACrF;AAAA,IACF;AAUA,eAAW,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AACzC,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,KAAK,yBAAyB,SAAS,IAAI;AAQjD,cAAM,KAAK,mCAAmC,EAAE;AAChD,cAAM,KAAK,kCAAkC,EAAE;AAAA,MACjD,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,gBAAQ,KAAK,mDAAmD,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG;AAC5F,cAAM,MAAM,yBAAyB,EAAE,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACrF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgCA,eAAsB,iBACpB,SAAyB,IAAY,OACrC,KACA,SACuC;AACvC,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,OAAO;AACpC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,EAAE,eAAe,mBAAoB,OAAM;AAK/C,UAAM,mBAAoB,QAAgB;AAC1C,UAAM,QAAiC;AAAA,MACrC,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MACZ,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,kBAAkB,GAAG;AAAA,MAC3C,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MACZ,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,IACf;AACA,QAAI,KAAK,6BAA6B,KAAK;AAC3C,QAAI,IAAI,MAAO,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AACpC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAqBO,SAAS,gBACd,QAAqC,OACwB;AAC7D,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO;AACpB,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AAClB,UAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MAClB,IAAI;AAAA,MAAa,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,MAAY,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,MAAI,SAAS;AAAA,MAAG;AAAA,MAAO,aAAa;AAAA,MACnG,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,6BAA6B,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,IACrE,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;AAmDA,eAAsB,oBACpB,OACA,KACA,UACA,OACA,mBACe;AACf,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU;AAYhD,MAAI,MAAM;AACR,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,mCAAmC,IAAI,EAAE;AAC/D,UAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,0BAA0B,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,kBAAkB;AAC7D,UAAM,uBAAuB,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,eAAe;AAAA,EACzD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,IAAI,UAAU;AAC3D,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,CAAC,KAAM;AAiBjC,MAAI,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;AACvC,UAAM,EAAE,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,iBAAiB;AACrH,UAAM,4BAA4B;AAClC,UAAM,6BAA6B;AACnC,UAAM,wBAAwB,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,EAC/C;AAEA,MAAI,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,GAAG;AAM9C,UAAM,iBAAiB,MAAM,KAAK,kCAAkC,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EAClF;AAEA,MAAI,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG;AACtD,UAAM,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AAC/D,QAAI,aAAa;AACf,iBAAW,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,yBAAyB,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AACxE,YAAI,EAAE,YAAY,UAAW,OAAM,wBAAwB;AAAA,iBAClD,EAAE,YAAY,iBAAkB,OAAM,cAAc,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,MAC7F;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAeA,eAAe,sBACb,OACA,SACA,KACA,aACqE;AACrE,MAAI,WAAW;AACf,MAAI,YAAY;AAChB,QAAM,UAAoB,CAAC;AAC3B,aAAW,EAAE,aAAa,UAAU,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,GAAG;AACzF,QAAI,aAAa,WAAY;AAC7B,UAAM,aAAa,aAAa,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ;AACrE,QAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,cAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,YAAY,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,EAAE;AAC/E;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,eAAe,YAAY,UAAU;AACxD,QAAI,CAAC,KAAM;AACX,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,wBAAwB,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC;AAC/G,eAAW,OAAO,SAAS;AACzB,YAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI;AACnB,UAAI,OAAO,OAAW;AACtB,UAAI,aAAa,WAAW;AAC1B,cAAM,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE;AACpB;AAAA,MACF,WAAW,aAAa,WAAW;AACjC,cAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;AACxD;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,EAAE,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ;AACxC;AAQO,SAAS,oBAAoB,GAAY,GAAqB;AACnE,MAAI,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACpB,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AACvF,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/C,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/classified/index.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   classified,
   luhnCheck,
   withClassified
-} from "../chunk-226V6XXJ.js";
+} from "../chunk-IQAJ4OR6.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedNeverStoredError,
   ClassifiedValidationError,
@@ -11,15 +11,15 @@ import {
   isClassifiedFieldSpec,
   isClassifiedGroup,
   resolveClassifiedFields
-} from "../chunk-K673OO6B.js";
-import "../chunk-PTJY5R3O.js";
-import "../chunk-2ELOCEXE.js";
+} from "../chunk-JAQHWHUN.js";
+import "../chunk-NCTN2FW4.js";
+import "../chunk-XX4R7TUB.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedRevealError,
   ClassifiedRotationError,
   ClassifiedVerifyError
-} from "../chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "../chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 export {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedNeverStoredError,

package/dist/{classified-marker-KHDOYIJB.js → classified-marker-WKP33U2R.js}

@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ function markerForFields(vdigFields) {
 async function persistClassifiedMarkerForFields(store, vault, collectionName, vdigFields, dek) {
   const marker = markerForFields(vdigFields);
   if (marker === null) return;
-  const { persistClassifiedMarker } = await import("./register-SN72QALV.js");
+  const { persistClassifiedMarker } = await import("./register-YJ5YLQ36.js");
   await persistClassifiedMarker({ store, vault, collectionName, dek, marker });
 }
 async function readClassifiedMarkerDigestOnly(store, vault, collectionName, dek) {
-  const { loadPersistedSchema } = await import("./storage-NPBYP2SM.js");
+  const { loadPersistedSchema } = await import("./storage-VH6SPXHC.js");
   const persisted = await loadPersistedSchema(store, vault, collectionName, dek);
   return persisted?.classified?.digestOnly ?? [];
 }
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ export {
   persistClassifiedMarkerForFields,
   readClassifiedMarkerDigestOnly
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=classified-marker-KHDOYIJB.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=classified-marker-WKP33U2R.js.map