@noy-db/hub 0.8.0-pre.0 → 0.9.0-pre.0

package/dist/chunk-QBBUZ3I3.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-formula/materialized-views/window-stage.ts","../src/with-formula/materialized-views/emit-memo.ts","../src/with-formula/materialized-views/executor.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * #1411 — the declared window stage of a materialized view.\n *\n * `unionSources` → `map` → `groupBy` → `aggregate` → **`window`** → `derive`.\n *\n * ## Why a window is safe here when `derive` is deliberately single-row\n *\n * `derive`'s contract is *pure, single-row, no cross-row access* — a window is\n * the opposite of all three. The difference is not caution, it is that\n * materialization is a FULL RECOMPUTE: the executor holds every row the view\n * will store, in one array, before it writes any of them. So an\n * order-dependent, cross-row pass runs exactly once over exactly the rows that\n * get stored, and its output is then an ordinary column. A per-row recompute\n * could not do this — inserting a row early in a partition moves every later\n * row's running total.\n *\n * ## Why this does not simply call `applyWindow`\n *\n * ⚠️ `applyWindow` does no Via rewriting. On the ad-hoc builder,\n * `Query.window().select()` rewrites reducer slots through the COLLECTION's\n * Via pipeline first, which is what makes `runningMoneySum` exact. A UNION-mode\n * MV has no collection — its rows are MAPPED — so it has the same answer\n * `aggregate` already uses: the MV's own `moneyFields` descriptors, bound\n * through the kernel's Via port. This mirrors `groupAndReduce`'s money block\n * line for line, deliberately: two places that must agree about what a money\n * reducer is, doing it the same way.\n *\n * Without that rewrite the failure is silent and specific — a running total\n * over decimal strings accumulates in float and returns\n * `0.6000000000000001` where the aggregate on the same rows returns `'0.60'`.\n */\nimport { applyWindow } from '../../with-lookup/reduce/window.js'\nimport type { WindowSelectSpec, WindowSpec } from '../../with-lookup/reduce/window.js'\nimport { bindDistinctReducers } from '../../with-lookup/reduce/reducers.js'\nimport type { Reducer } from '../../with-lookup/reduce/reducers.js'\nimport type { ReduceSpec } from '../../with-lookup/reduce/reduction.js'\nimport { viaBinder } from '../../kernel/via/index.js'\nimport type { MaterializedViewWindow, MoneyDescriptorMap } from './types.js'\n\n/** Is this slot a window function rather than a reducer? */\nfunction isWindowFn(v: unknown): boolean {\n  return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && (v as { __window?: unknown }).__window === true\n}\n\n/**\n * Apply a declared window to the finished row set.\n *\n * `moneyFields` is the MV's own descriptor map; when present, every REDUCER\n * slot is rewritten exactly as `aggregate`'s are. Window functions\n * (`rowNumber`, `rank`, `lag`, `lead`) are passed through untouched — they\n * navigate rows rather than accumulate values, so there is nothing to make\n * exact.\n */\nexport function applyDeclaredWindow(\n  rows: readonly Record<string, unknown>[],\n  window: MaterializedViewWindow,\n  moneyFields?: MoneyDescriptorMap,\n): ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  if (rows.length === 0) return rows\n\n  let select: WindowSelectSpec = window.select\n  if (moneyFields) {\n    const reducersOnly: Record<string, Reducer<unknown, unknown>> = {}\n    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(select)) {\n      if (!isWindowFn(v)) reducersOnly[k] = v as Reducer<unknown, unknown>\n    }\n    if (Object.keys(reducersOnly).length > 0) {\n      const binding = viaBinder('money')({ moneyFields })\n      let wrapped = binding.wrapReducers!(reducersOnly as ReduceSpec) as Record<\n        string,\n        Reducer<unknown, unknown>\n      >\n      wrapped = bindDistinctReducers(wrapped as ReduceSpec, {\n        canonicalizeIndexKey: (f, v) => binding.canonicalizeIndexKey?.(f, v),\n      }) as Record<string, Reducer<unknown, unknown>>\n      select = { ...select, ...wrapped }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // `applyWindow` takes the partition/order spec and the select list\n  // separately, so strip `select` off rather than pass it twice. Built by\n  // spreading absent keys away rather than assigning `undefined` — the package\n  // compiles under `exactOptionalPropertyTypes`, where the two differ.\n  const spec: WindowSpec = {\n    ...(window.partitionBy !== undefined && { partitionBy: window.partitionBy }),\n    ...(window.orderBy !== undefined && { orderBy: window.orderBy }),\n  }\n  return applyWindow<Record<string, unknown>>(rows, spec, select)\n}\n","/**\n * Skip re-writing materialized-view output rows whose content has not changed\n * (#1418).\n *\n * `MaterializedViewExecutor.refresh()` recomputes the whole view and then\n * writes EVERY output row, on every source write. Measured on one MV with a\n * single union arm, writing rows the MV's own `map` drops:\n *\n *     250 receipts / 250 bills   →  23.0 ms per source write\n *     450 receipts / 450 bills   →  41.6 ms per source write\n *\n * 1.8x the sources, 1.8x the cost — because the thing that grew was the OUTPUT\n * ROW COUNT, and each row is an encrypt-and-store round trip. The query and the\n * aggregation are not where the time goes.\n *\n * ## Why this, and not \"skip the refresh when the row maps to nothing\"\n *\n * The issue proposed short-circuiting the refresh when the written row's `map`\n * returns null. That cannot be built as stated, and the reason is worth\n * recording so nobody re-attempts it:\n *\n *  1. `materializeUnionResult` feeds `map` rows from `coll.query().toArray()`,\n *     which applies `decodeVia` — money arrives as a canonical decimal string,\n *     not the stored scaled integer. Probing `arm.map(writtenRecord)` at\n *     dispatch time hands `map` a DIFFERENTLY SHAPED row, so any `map` that\n *     filters on a money field can answer `null` where the real pipeline would\n *     not. The view then silently stops updating, which is far worse than the\n *     latency it was meant to fix.\n *  2. Skipping also requires that the row contributed nothing BEFORE, or an\n *     update that removes a row from the view is dropped. The prior record is\n *     not passed to the dispatcher, and is a stored record, so it hits (1)\n *     twice over.\n *  3. An arm with `join` legs has the right side attached before `map` runs, so\n *     a probe would have to resolve the legs too.\n *\n * Comparing the row we are ABOUT to write against the row we LAST wrote sides\n * steps all three. It needs no prior record, it is form-agnostic (query, union\n * and projection all benefit), and it degrades to the right thing: a write that\n * changes one group rewrites one row instead of all of them.\n *\n * ## Why the entries are canonical strings and not short hashes\n *\n * A hash collision here means a row that is never rewritten — a silently stale\n * view with no symptom. At the 20k-row cap below, an 8-byte hash carries a\n * couple of percent chance of one collision somewhere, which is not a trade\n * worth making for memory. So entries hold the full canonical string, and\n * memory is bounded by refusing to memoize a view larger than the cap.\n *\n * ## Why a mutation stamp, and what it does NOT cover\n *\n * The memo is only sound while nothing else writes the output collection —\n * tombstoning, `invalidateMVAtRest`, forget/erase and sync cut-over all can. So\n * a refresh records the output collection's mutation stamp AFTER its writes,\n * and the next refresh discards the whole set unless the stamp is still where\n * it left it. That is a \"nobody else touched this\" test rather than an\n * enumeration of writers — the same reasoning that made #1417's keyset memo and\n * #1426's slot guard safe, and it does not rot when a new writer is added.\n *\n * ⚠️ It covers writers that go THROUGH the output `Collection`. A writer that\n * bypasses it and edits the store directly moves neither the stamp nor the\n * collection's own cache — but such a writer already makes `list()` on that\n * collection wrong, so it is a broader defect than this memo.\n *\n * ## ⛔ The memo stands down when a REDUNDANT write is still observable\n *\n * `Collection._cacheStamp` returns `null` — no memo — whenever writing the same\n * bytes again would have an effect beyond the stored bytes. This is the half\n * that is easy to get wrong, and it was found by a failing test rather than by\n * reasoning, so the cases are recorded:\n *\n *  - **A `beforePut` gate handler.** Measured: with `withPeriods()` and a\n *    closed period, an unchanged MV row previously produced a\n *    `PeriodClosedError` from `put`, which `putDerivedOutput` converts into a\n *    `derivation:skipped-frozen` event and an audit record. Skipping the write\n *    silences that — `written=0 skipped=2 events=0` where the suite expects one\n *    event. A performance change must not quietly narrow a compliance signal.\n *  - **Explicit history.** A put records a version, so skipping changes what\n *    `history()` returns. (Arguably an improvement — 450 identical versions per\n *    source write is not useful — but that is a product call, not this one.)\n *  - **Sync (`onDirty`) and the search index.** Both mark state from the fact\n *    that a write happened, independently of what was written.\n *  - **Lazy mode**, which has no eager cache to stamp.\n *\n * The asymmetry is what makes this the right default: opting out costs the old\n * write path, opting in wrongly changes behaviour with no symptom at all.\n *\n * ⭐ So an MV whose OUTPUT collection carries periods, history, sync or search\n * gets no speedup. That is deliberate, and it is the first thing to check when\n * this fix appears not to help a real workload — the answer is per output\n * collection, not per vault.\n *\n * ⛔ A row is recorded ONLY when the write actually landed. A `putDerivedOutput`\n * that declines (the frozen-period skip) or throws leaves no entry, so the next\n * refresh writes it again rather than believing a row exists that does not.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { canonicalizeQueryPlan } from './query-hash.js'\n\n/**\n * Views larger than this are not memoized at all. The memo would otherwise\n * hold a canonical string per row for the process's life, and a view this size\n * is dominated by its write cost in ways one skip cannot rescue.\n */\nconst MAX_MEMOIZED_ROWS = 20_000\n\ninterface EmitMemo {\n  /** The output collection's mutation stamp when this set was written. */\n  readonly stamp: number\n  /** `outputId -> canonical content string` for rows this MV actually wrote. */\n  readonly rows: Map<string, string>\n}\n\nconst memos = new Map<string, EmitMemo>()\n\n/**\n * Identity of one MV's output, per vault — MV names are not globally unique.\n *\n * ⚠️ `\\0` written as the ESCAPE, not as a raw byte. A raw NUL in the source\n * makes git classify the whole file as binary, so it stops diffing and stops\n * being reviewable — caught here by a `Bin 0 -> 8811 bytes` line in a diffstat.\n * The separator itself is right: no vault or collection name can contain one.\n */\nexport function emitMemoKey(vault: string, mvName: string, outputCollection: string): string {\n  return `${vault}\\0${mvName}\\0${outputCollection}`\n}\n\n/**\n * The rows this MV last wrote, or `null` when the memo cannot be trusted —\n * nothing recorded yet, or the output collection moved under us.\n *\n * `stamp` of `null` means the collection cannot supply one (lazy mode), which\n * is treated as \"no memo\" rather than \"unchanged\".\n */\nexport function readEmitMemo(key: string, stamp: number | null): ReadonlyMap<string, string> | null {\n  if (stamp === null) return null\n  const hit = memos.get(key)\n  if (!hit || hit.stamp !== stamp) {\n    // Someone else wrote the output collection. Everything we believed about\n    // its contents is now a guess, so drop all of it rather than reconcile.\n    if (hit) memos.delete(key)\n    return null\n  }\n  return hit.rows\n}\n\n/** Record what this refresh actually left on disk. A `null` stamp records nothing. */\nexport function writeEmitMemo(key: string, stamp: number | null, rows: Map<string, string>): void {\n  if (stamp === null || rows.size > MAX_MEMOIZED_ROWS) {\n    memos.delete(key)\n    return\n  }\n  memos.set(key, { stamp, rows })\n}\n\n/** Forget one MV's output entirely. Used when a refresh could not complete cleanly. */\nexport function dropEmitMemo(key: string): void {\n  memos.delete(key)\n}\n\n/**\n * A canonical string for the row a refresh is about to write, or `null` when no\n * safe one exists.\n *\n * The MV's `queryHash` is folded in so a strategy change rewrites every row\n * even where the projected content happens to match — a row carrying a stale\n * `_materializedFrom.queryHash` is stale by definition (`stale.ts`).\n *\n * `_materializedFrom` itself is excluded: its `materializedAt` moves on every\n * refresh, so including it would make every comparison differ and the memo a\n * pure cost.\n *\n * ⛔ Returns `null` rather than throwing on anything `JSON.stringify` refuses\n * (a `BigInt`, a cycle). Declining to memoize costs the old write; guessing\n * costs a stale view.\n */\nexport function rowContentKey(row: Record<string, unknown>, queryHash: string): string | null {\n  try {\n    // `_materializedFrom` is excluded by rebuilding without it rather than by\n    // destructuring into an unused binding — same result, no dead name.\n    const content: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n    for (const k of Object.keys(row)) {\n      if (k !== '_materializedFrom') content[k] = row[k]\n    }\n    return `${queryHash}\\0${canonicalizeQueryPlan(content)}`\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/** Test seam — the process-wide memo must not leak between test cases. */\nexport function _clearEmitMemos(): void {\n  memos.clear()\n}\n","import { groupKeyName, isDateTruncKey, projectDateTruncKeys, type GroupKey } from '../../kernel/query/reduce/date-trunc.js'\nimport type { Collection } from '../../kernel/collection.js'\nimport type { TxContext } from '../../with-commit/tx/transaction.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { MaterializedViewTooLargeError, MaterializedViewConfigError, LocaleNotSpecifiedError, JoinTooLargeError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { DEFAULT_JOIN_MAX_ROWS } from '../../kernel/query/relate/join.js'\nimport type { MaterializedFromMeta, MVQueryContext, MaterializedViewSpec, ProjectionJoinLeg } from './types.js'\nimport type { RegisteredMV } from './registry.js'\nimport { wrapDbWithPredicates, ungatedMvContext } from './registry.js'\nimport { groupAndReduce } from '../../with-lookup/reduce/groupby.js'\nimport { applyDeclaredWindow } from './window-stage.js'\nimport { canonicalGroupKey } from '../../with-lookup/reduce/canonical-key.js'\nimport { applyI18nLocale, type I18nTextDescriptor } from '../../via/i18n/core.js'\nimport { canonicalizeMoneyFieldsAsDecimal, decodeMoneyFields } from '../../via/money/normalize.js'\nimport { exactMath } from '../../via/money/exact.js'\nimport { putDerivedOutput, type PutDerivedOutputCtx } from '../../kernel/via/dispatch.js'\nimport { isCollectLeg, resolveLegOwner, type RefLookup } from './projection-legs.js' // #1140\nimport { emitMemoKey, readEmitMemo, writeEmitMemo, rowContentKey } from './emit-memo.js' // #1418\n\n/**\n * Accessor shape passed in from the owning Vault. Mirrors v1's\n * `DerivationStaleAccessor` — provides the per-collection resolver\n * and the active TxContext so refresh writes/tombstones register on\n * `_executed` for rollback symmetry.\n */\nexport interface MVExecutorAccessor {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  getCollection(name: string): Collection<any>\n  getActiveTxContext(): TxContext | null\n  /**\n   * Vault-shaped accessor passed to the MV's `query()` callback at\n   * each refresh. Same instance the registry used at registration\n   * time; threading through the executor lets the refresh path\n   * re-evaluate the closure against the live vault state.\n   */\n  getQueryContext(): MVQueryContext\n  /**\n   * #638 Task 5 — ctx for `putDerivedOutput`'s frozen-period skip+audit. #641: the lazy\n   * resolve-on-read caller (`stale.ts#resolveStaleMVOnRead`) now supplies one too — built at\n   * the `Collection.get()`/`list()` entry point with a `'resolve-on-read'` sentinel id (no\n   * real \"reacting write\" for a read-triggered materialize, mirroring `refreshView()`'s\n   * `'refreshView'` sentinel). Still declared optional here since `MVExecutorAccessor` is a\n   * general shape and a future caller could reasonably omit it.\n   */\n  dispatchCtx?: PutDerivedOutputCtx\n}\n\nexport interface RefreshResult {\n  /** Rows newly written / overwritten. */\n  written: number\n  /**\n   * #1418 — rows whose content was byte-identical to what this MV last wrote,\n   * so the encrypt-and-store round trip was skipped. Counted separately from\n   * `written` on purpose: `written` means \"a row was persisted\", and reporting\n   * a skip as a write would make the two indistinguishable to anyone\n   * diagnosing whether a refresh actually did anything.\n   */\n  skipped: number\n  /** Rows tombstoned via `_internalDelete` (only when `onEmpty: 'delete'`). */\n  deleted: number\n  /** Failed row writes (non-strict mode). */\n  failed: number\n  /** #782/#785 — `outputCollection:id` entries from the tombstone pass whose ownership stamp\n   *  couldn't be decoded under the collection's default DEK (undecodable, mirroring\n   *  `invalidateMVAtRest`'s #776 posture) — ownership UNCONFIRMED. Only populated when\n   *  `onEmpty: 'delete'`. */\n  residueUndecodable: string[]\n  /** #782/#785 — `outputCollection:id` entries that decoded, stamp-matched this MV, but\n   *  `_internalDelete` declined (the #718 tier-elevation gate) — ownership CONFIRMED, a real\n   *  silent survival, surfaced rather than dropped. Only populated when `onEmpty: 'delete'`. */\n  residueDeclined: string[]\n}\n\n/** Default cost ceiling — overridable per-MV via `spec.maxRows`. */\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_ROWS = 100_000\n\n/**\n * Materialize a query terminal that may be a `Query<T>` (call\n * `.toArray()`), an `Reduction<R>` (call `.run()` returning a\n * single object — wrap as a one-row array), or a `GroupedReduction<R>`\n * (call `.run()` returning an array of grouped rows). Branches on\n * available terminal at runtime — no type-discrimination at registration.\n */\nasync function materializeQueryResult(\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  q: any,\n  mvName: string,\n  i18nLocale?: string,\n  i18nFields?: Record<string, I18nTextDescriptor>,\n): Promise<ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>> {\n  if (typeof q?.toArray === 'function') {\n    // Query<T> — non-aggregate path. `.toArray()` returns Promise<T[]>.\n    return await q.toArray()\n  }\n  if (typeof q?.run === 'function') {\n    // Reduction<R> or GroupedReduction<R>. `.run()` is synchronous\n    // and returns either a single object (Reduction) or an array of\n    // rows (GroupedReduction). Promise.resolve() normalizes both\n    // sync and async (future) variants.\n    // Query-form MV grouping: when the MV declares i18nLocale, pass it +\n    // i18nFields so a GroupedReduction resolves i18n group keys before\n    // bucketing (the Reduction path ignores the extra arg).\n    const runOpts = i18nLocale !== undefined ? { locale: i18nLocale, i18nFields } : undefined\n    const result: unknown = await Promise.resolve(q.run(runOpts))\n    if (Array.isArray(result)) {\n      return result as ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>\n    }\n    // Single-aggregate result — wrap as one-row array. The consumer's\n    // `rowKey()` should return a stable identity (often a literal\n    // constant like `'total'`) since there's only one row.\n    return [result as Record<string, unknown>]\n  }\n  throw new Error(\n    `MV \"${mvName}\": query() must return a Query<T>, Reduction, or GroupedReduction. ` +\n      `Got something without a .toArray() or .run() terminal.`,\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Materialize a UNION-form MV: read every arm's source\n * collection, apply each arm's `map` to project rows into the unified\n * MV row shape, concatenate the mapped streams, then optionally run\n * `groupBy` + `aggregate` over the result.\n *\n * Modes (driven by `spec.groupBy` / `spec.aggregate`):\n *\n *   - No `groupBy` → return the concatenated mapped rows unchanged.\n *   - `groupBy` without `aggregate` → dedupe by composite group key,\n *     keep the first row seen per key (later arms don't overwrite\n *     earlier arms — Map insertion order rules).\n *   - `groupBy` + `aggregate` → delegate to the shared `groupAndReduce`\n *     pipeline used by `Query.groupBy().aggregate()`.\n *\n * Per-arm `map` is the schema-unification boundary; the strategy's\n * `TRow` type parameter enforces that every arm projects into the\n * same shape at compile time.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nasync function materializeUnionResult<TRow extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<TRow>,\n  db: MVQueryContext,\n): Promise<ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>> {\n  const unified: TRow[] = []\n  for (const arm of spec.unionSources!) {\n    const coll = db.collection<Record<string, unknown>>(arm.collection)\n    // Optional per-arm FK joins: chain `.join(field, { as, ... })` for\n    // each declared leg before terminating. The aliased right-side\n    // record lands at `sourceRow[leg.as]`, where the arm's `map` reads\n    // it. Cast to `any` because the chained join widens the row type but\n    // the executor treats every row as `Record<string, unknown>` — same\n    // pattern the query-form join path uses.\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    let q: any = coll.query()\n    if (arm.join?.length) {\n      for (const leg of arm.join) {\n        // #1411 — a declared leg is `Query.joinOn()`; a ref leg is `Query.join()`.\n        q = 'on' in leg\n          ? q.joinOn(leg.target, { as: leg.as, on: leg.on, mode: leg.mode, maxRows: leg.maxRows })\n          : q.join(leg.field, { as: leg.as, maxRows: leg.maxRows, strategy: leg.strategy })\n      }\n    }\n    const sourceRows = q.toArray() as ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>\n    for (const r of sourceRows) {\n      const mapped = arm.map(r)\n      // null / undefined means \"omit this source row\" — skip without\n      // pushing so groupBy/aggregate never see a null entry.\n      if (mapped == null) continue\n      unified.push(mapped)\n    }\n  }\n\n  return finalizeMappedRows(spec, unified)\n}\n\n\n/**\n * #1411 — the window stage, applied at every exit from the grouping tail.\n *\n * A no-op without `spec.window`, so the ungrouped and grouped paths can both\n * call it unconditionally rather than each remembering to.\n */\nfunction applyWindowStage<TRow extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<TRow>,\n  rows: ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>,\n): ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  if (!spec.window) return rows\n  return applyDeclaredWindow(rows, spec.window, spec.moneyFields)\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared post-map tail for the UNION and projection (#810) forms:\n * optional `groupBy` (+ `aggregate`) over the mapped-row stream.\n * Extracted verbatim from `materializeUnionResult` so both forms feed\n * the identical grouping pipeline — i18n group-key resolution, the\n * object-group-key guard, dedup-without-aggregate, and the shared\n * `groupAndReduce` delegate.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction finalizeMappedRows<TRow extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<TRow>,\n  unified: TRow[],\n): ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  // #1411 — a window with no grouping is a legitimate shape: the pilot's\n  // running total is per-row, not per-bucket. Both exits go through the same\n  // stage so the two cannot drift on whether a window ran.\n  if (!spec.groupBy) return applyWindowStage(spec, unified)\n\n  const groupKeys: readonly GroupKey[] = Array.isArray(spec.groupBy)\n    ? (spec.groupBy as readonly GroupKey[])\n    : [spec.groupBy as GroupKey]\n  const groupFields: readonly string[] = groupKeys.map(groupKeyName)\n\n  // Derived calendar keys (#1350) are bucketed onto the mapped row first, so\n  // every rule below — the i18n resolution, the object-key refusal, the dedup\n  // path and `groupAndReduce` — sees an ordinary stored field.\n  const derivedKeys = groupKeys.filter(isDateTruncKey)\n  if (derivedKeys.length > 0) {\n    unified = projectDateTruncKeys(unified, derivedKeys)\n  }\n\n  // i18n-aware group keys. An `i18nText` group field carries a raw\n  // `{ locale: string }` map, an unstable object key. When `i18nLocale` is\n  // declared (with `i18nFields` describing those fields), resolve the declared\n  // group-key i18n fields to it at the `mv` layer FIRST — the same unified-rows\n  // boundary where money is threaded — so buckets are stable strings and the\n  // `mv`-layer `onMissing` policy fires here.\n  if (spec.i18nLocale !== undefined && spec.i18nFields !== undefined) {\n    const groupI18n: Record<string, I18nTextDescriptor> = {}\n    for (const f of groupFields) {\n      const d = spec.i18nFields[f]\n      if (d !== undefined) groupI18n[f] = d\n    }\n    if (Object.keys(groupI18n).length > 0) {\n      for (let i = 0; i < unified.length; i++) {\n        unified[i] = applyI18nLocale(unified[i] as Record<string, unknown>, groupI18n, spec.i18nLocale, undefined, 'mv') as TRow\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  // Guard (always): a remaining object-valued group key — an undeclared i18n\n  // field or a locale-less MV — would bucket on a map. Refuse, don't bucket wrong.\n  for (const f of groupFields) {\n    for (const row of unified) {\n      const v = (row as Record<string, unknown>)[f]\n      if (v !== null && typeof v === 'object') {\n        throw new LocaleNotSpecifiedError(\n          f,\n          `Materialized view \"${spec.name}\" groups by \"${f}\", whose value is a raw i18n locale map — ` +\n            `an unstable object group key. Declare { i18nLocale, i18nFields } on the MV to resolve it at ` +\n            `the 'mv' layer, or group by a dictKey/staticDict code (the stable key) and resolve the label at read time.`,\n        )\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // groupBy without aggregate — dedupe by composite key, keep first\n  // seen row per key. Useful for cross-arm uniqueness (e.g. unify two\n  // sibling collections, keeping one row per natural key).\n  if (!spec.aggregate) {\n    const seen = new Map<string, TRow>()\n    for (const row of unified) {\n      const k = canonicalGroupKey(groupFields, row as Record<string, unknown>)\n      if (!seen.has(k)) seen.set(k, row)\n    }\n    return [...seen.values()]\n  }\n\n  // groupBy + aggregate — delegate to the shared pipeline used by\n  // `Query.groupBy().aggregate()`. Result rows carry each grouped\n  // field in declaration order followed by the spec's reducer outputs.\n  return applyWindowStage(\n    spec,\n    groupAndReduce<Record<string, unknown>>(unified, groupFields, spec.aggregate, spec.moneyFields),\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Apply the spec's `derive` to each finished row (#1007).\n *\n * Three rules, all of them about keeping the hook narrow enough that the\n * engine never has to reason about the function:\n *\n *  - a `null` / `undefined` return leaves the row untouched;\n *  - a returned key that collides with a `groupBy` field is refused — group\n *    keys are the row's identity and feed `rowKey`, so letting `derive`\n *    rewrite one would silently re-home the row into a different bucket than\n *    the one it was aggregated for;\n *  - a derived field declared in `moneyFields` is quantised through its\n *    descriptor, so the stored value is exact at the declared scale instead of\n *    whatever the user's arithmetic produced.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction applyDerive<TRow extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<TRow>,\n  rows: ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>,\n): ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  const groupFields = new Set<string>(\n    spec.groupBy === undefined\n      ? []\n      : (Array.isArray(spec.groupBy) ? spec.groupBy : [spec.groupBy]).map(groupKeyName),\n  )\n  return rows.map((row) => {\n    // `derive` sees the row the way a READER would: money decoded to its\n    // canonical decimal form, not the scaled integer the reducer left behind.\n    // Handing over `1005` where the schema says `10.05` would make every\n    // derived money expression quietly wrong by a factor of the scale.\n    // `'raw'` keeps it at the exact decimal rather than a locale-formatted\n    // string, which is what `exact.*` consumes.\n    const view = spec.moneyFields ? decodeMoneyFields(row, spec.moneyFields, 'raw') : row\n    const patch = spec.derive!(view as TRow, exactMath)\n    if (patch === null || patch === undefined) return row\n    for (const key of Object.keys(patch)) {\n      if (groupFields.has(key)) {\n        throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(\n          `Materialized view \"${spec.name}\": derive() returned the group key \"${key}\". ` +\n            'A group key is the row\\'s identity and feeds rowKey — rewriting it would re-home the ' +\n            'row into a bucket it was not aggregated for. Emit a differently-named field instead.',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    // Canonicalize the PATCH only, into the DECIMAL form the money-aware\n    // reducers emit — not the scaled-integer storage form a collection uses.\n    // An MV row's money fields are decimal strings, so a derived field\n    // quantised into storage form reads back as the scaled integer beside\n    // correctly-decoded siblings: `\"1000000\"` next to `\"10000.00\"` (#1018).\n    // Precision is still enforced; only the output shape differs.\n    const canonical = spec.moneyFields\n      ? canonicalizeMoneyFieldsAsDecimal(patch, spec.moneyFields)\n      : patch\n    return { ...row, ...canonical }\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * Materialize a projection-form MV (#810): hydrate the primary source\n * rows, resolve forward FK legs through the same `.join()` machinery\n * the UNION arms use, attach reverse \"collect\" legs via one\n * hash-grouped snapshot pass per leg, then run the projection `map`\n * (null / undefined omits the primary row) and the shared post-map\n * grouping tail.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nasync function materializeProjectionResult<TRow extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<TRow>,\n  db: MVQueryContext,\n): Promise<ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>> {\n  const projection = spec.projection!\n  const coll = db.collection<Record<string, unknown>>(projection.source)\n  // ROOT forward legs chain through the query builder exactly like UNION arm\n  // joins — ref() resolution, dangling-mode semantics, presentation dressing,\n  // and ceilings all ride the existing `.join()` path. Cast to `any` for the\n  // same reason `materializeUnionResult` does.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  let q: any = coll.query()\n  for (const leg of projection.joins) {\n    if (isCollectLeg(leg) || leg.from !== undefined) continue\n    q = q.join(leg.field, { as: leg.as, maxRows: leg.maxRows, strategy: leg.strategy })\n  }\n  let rows = q.toArray() as Array<Record<string, unknown>>\n  // Remaining legs in DECLARATION order — which is what makes `from` work: a leg\n  // may only name an alias declared earlier, so by the time it runs, the rows it\n  // attaches to are already on the row. Root collect legs are in this loop too;\n  // they were never part of the query chain.\n  for (const leg of projection.joins) {\n    if (isCollectLeg(leg)) {\n      rows = applyCollectLeg(rows, leg, spec.name, projection.source, projection.joins, db)\n    } else if (leg.from !== undefined) {\n      rows = applyLegRelativeForwardLeg(rows, leg, spec.name, projection.source, projection.joins, db)\n    }\n  }\n  const mapped: TRow[] = []\n  for (const r of rows) {\n    const m = projection.map(r)\n    // null / undefined means \"omit this primary row\" — same contract\n    // as the UNION arm `map`.\n    if (m == null) continue\n    mapped.push(m)\n  }\n  return finalizeMappedRows(spec, mapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * A `RefLookup` backed by the live join contexts — the executor's answer to the\n * same question the registry answers from the ref registry. Reads through, so a\n * ref declared after `openVault()` (the only place refs CAN be declared) is\n * visible here.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction legOwnerLookup(db: MVQueryContext): RefLookup {\n  return (collection, field) => {\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    const q = db.collection<Record<string, unknown>>(collection).query() as any\n    return (q._joinContext?.()?.resolveRef(field) as { target: string } | null | undefined) ?? null\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Attach one FORWARD leg that hangs off another leg's alias (#1140).\n *\n * Root forward legs ride `Query.join()` and are resolved before this runs; a\n * leg-relative one cannot, because the FK it follows lives on an already-attached\n * record rather than on a column of the primary query. It is therefore resolved\n * the same way a collect leg is — one snapshot of the target collection, indexed\n * by id — which keeps it O(N+M) rather than one `get()` per row.\n *\n * Attaches `null` when the `from` alias is null (a dangling ref upstream), when\n * the FK is nullish, or when the target row is missing. That is deliberately\n * outer-by-nature and matches the collect leg's empty array: a projection MV\n * must not drop a primary row because something two hops away is absent.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction applyLegRelativeForwardLeg(\n  primaryRows: ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>,\n  leg: Extract<ProjectionJoinLeg, { field: string }>,\n  mvName: string,\n  source: string,\n  joins: ReadonlyArray<ProjectionJoinLeg>,\n  db: MVQueryContext,\n): Array<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  const lookup = legOwnerLookup(db)\n  const owner = resolveLegOwner(leg, joins, source, lookup)\n  const refDesc = owner === null ? null : lookup(owner, leg.field)\n  if (owner === null || refDesc === null) {\n    throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(\n      `\"${mvName}\": projection leg \"${leg.as}\" requires a ref() on field \"${leg.field}\" of `\n      + `collection \"${owner ?? `(behind from: \"${leg.from}\")`}\" — declare it on that collection, `\n      + `then retry`,\n    )\n  }\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  const targetQ = db.collection<Record<string, unknown>>(refDesc.target).query() as any\n  const byId = new Map<string, Record<string, unknown>>()\n  for (const row of targetQ.toArray() as Array<Record<string, unknown>>) {\n    const id = coerceCollectKey(row.id)\n    if (id !== null) byId.set(id, row)\n  }\n  return primaryRows.map((row) => {\n    const anchor = leg.from === undefined\n      ? row\n      : (row[leg.from] as Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined)\n    const key = anchor == null ? null : coerceCollectKey(anchor[leg.field])\n    return { ...row, [leg.as]: key === null ? null : byId.get(key) ?? null }\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * Attach one reverse \"collect\" leg (#810): every row of `leg.collect`\n * whose `leg.on` field references the ATTACH POINT's id lands in a\n * possibly-empty ARRAY under `leg.as` on that primary row. One\n * snapshot pass over the collect collection, hash-grouped by the `on`\n * FK — O(N+M), mirroring the forward hash-join fallback.\n *\n * The attach point is the primary record, or — with `from` (#1140) — the record\n * already attached under that alias. Matching then keys off `row[from].id`\n * instead of `row.id`, and `leg.on` must ref THAT leg's collection. A row whose\n * `from` alias is null (a dangling forward ref) gets `[]`, which is the same\n * outer-by-nature semantics a root collect leg already has for a primary record\n * with no children.\n *\n * Semantic check (first materialization, not factory time — parity\n * with join-time ref errors): `leg.on` must carry a `ref()` declared\n * on the collect collection targeting the attach point's collection.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction applyCollectLeg(\n  primaryRows: ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>,\n  leg: { readonly collect: string; readonly on: string; readonly as: string; readonly from?: string; readonly maxRows?: number },\n  mvName: string,\n  source: string,\n  joins: ReadonlyArray<ProjectionJoinLeg>,\n  db: MVQueryContext,\n): Array<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  const childColl = db.collection<Record<string, unknown>>(leg.collect)\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  const childQ = childColl.query() as any\n  const refDesc = childQ._joinContext?.()?.resolveRef(leg.on) as { target: string } | null | undefined\n  // The collection this leg matches AGAINST: the projection source for a root\n  // leg, the `from` leg's own target otherwise (#1140).\n  const expected = resolveLegOwner(leg, joins, source, legOwnerLookup(db))\n  const expectedName = expected ?? source\n  if (refDesc == null) {\n    throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(\n      `\"${mvName}\": projection collect leg \"${leg.as}\" requires a ref() on field \"${leg.on}\" of `\n      + `collection \"${leg.collect}\" targeting \"${expectedName}\" — declare `\n      + `refs: { ${leg.on}: ref('${expectedName}') } on collection \"${leg.collect}\", then retry`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (refDesc.target !== expectedName) {\n    throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(\n      `\"${mvName}\": projection collect leg \"${leg.as}\" expects field \"${leg.on}\" of collection `\n      + `\"${leg.collect}\" to reference ${leg.from === undefined\n        ? `the projection source \"${expectedName}\"`\n        : `\"${expectedName}\" (the collection behind from: \"${leg.from}\")`}`\n      + `, but its ref() targets \"${refDesc.target}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n  const maxRows = leg.maxRows ?? DEFAULT_JOIN_MAX_ROWS\n  const groups = new Map<string, Array<Record<string, unknown>>>()\n  for (const child of childQ.toArray() as Array<Record<string, unknown>>) {\n    const key = coerceCollectKey(child[leg.on])\n    // Nullish / non-scalar FK values mean \"no reference\" — same\n    // narrowing as the forward join path's key coercion.\n    if (key === null) continue\n    const bucket = groups.get(key)\n    if (bucket) bucket.push(child)\n    else groups.set(key, [child])\n  }\n  const out: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = []\n  for (const row of primaryRows) {\n    // `from` matches against the attached record's id, not the primary row's.\n    const anchor = leg.from === undefined\n      ? row\n      : (row[leg.from] as Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined)\n    const key = anchor == null ? null : coerceCollectKey(anchor.id)\n    const children = key === null ? [] : groups.get(key) ?? []\n    if (children.length > maxRows) {\n      throw new JoinTooLargeError({\n        leftRows: primaryRows.length,\n        rightRows: children.length,\n        maxRows,\n        side: 'right',\n        message:\n          `projection MV \"${mvName}\": collect leg \"${leg.as}\" gathered ${children.length} ` +\n          `\"${leg.collect}\" rows for one \"${source}\" record, exceeding the ${maxRows}-row ` +\n          `per-primary-row ceiling. Raise the ceiling via { maxRows } on the leg if the ` +\n          `fan-out genuinely fits in memory, or restructure the child collection.`,\n      })\n    }\n    out.push({ ...row, [leg.as]: children })\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Coerce an unknown FK value into a collect-grouping key. Same\n * narrowing as the join path's `coerceRefKey` (not exported from\n * there): strings and numbers are legitimate ref values; anything\n * else is \"no reference\" and returns `null`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction coerceCollectKey(value: unknown): string | null {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) return null\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value\n  if (typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'bigint') return String(value)\n  return null\n}\n\n/**\n * Run an MV's `query()` and write the result rows to the output\n * collection. Same-DEK encryption: routes through the standard\n * `Collection.put` pipeline, so the output collection's DEK is what\n * gets used (matches the v2 spec's \"same DEK as the left-most source\"\n * invariant — `Collection.put` looks up the DEK by collection name,\n * and the output collection IS the MV's owned collection).\n *\n * Stamps `_materializedFrom` onto every emitted row.\n *\n * **Tombstoning:** when `spec.onEmpty: 'delete'` (default), rows\n * that existed in a prior refresh but no longer appear in the new\n * materialized result are deleted via `Collection._internalDelete` —\n * the housekeeping bypass primitive prevents user\n * `onDelete` guards on the output collection from firing on these\n * system-internal deletes. `onEmpty: 'keep'` opts out (rows from\n * prior refreshes linger even when the new result lacks them).\n *\n * **Cost ceiling:** if the materialized row count exceeds\n * `spec.maxRows` (default 100k), throws `MaterializedViewTooLargeError`\n * before any writes hit the store — so strict-mode rollback is\n * clean.\n *\n * **Strict mode:** `spec.strict === true` re-throws on any\n * row-write failure; the active TxContext registration means the\n * source-write rolls back atomically via `revertExecuted`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const MaterializedViewExecutor = {\n  async refresh(\n    reg: RegisteredMV,\n    accessor: MVExecutorAccessor,\n  ): Promise<RefreshResult> {\n    const spec = reg.spec\n    const outputColl = accessor.getCollection(reg.outputCollection)\n    const maxRows = spec.maxRows ?? DEFAULT_MAX_ROWS\n    const onEmpty = spec.onEmpty ?? 'delete'\n    const strict = spec.strict ?? false\n\n    // 1. Materialize the query (branches on terminal shape). If the\n    //    MV declared predicates, wrap the query context the same way\n    //    the registry did at registration time so `.wherePredicate()`\n    //    calls resolve to the registered functions.\n    // #1414 — `ungatedMvContext` keeps the engine's synchronous source reads\n    // exactly as they were before the cold-collection gate existed.\n    const baseCtx = ungatedMvContext(accessor.getQueryContext())\n    const ctxForQuery: MVQueryContext = spec.predicates\n      ? wrapDbWithPredicates(baseCtx, spec.predicates)\n      : baseCtx\n    // UNION-form strategies: read every arm, map to the unified\n    // row shape, concatenate, then optionally groupBy + aggregate.\n    // Projection-form strategies (#810): hydrate the primary source,\n    // attach forward + collect legs, map, then the same optional\n    // grouping tail. The single-source `query()` path is untouched.\n    let rows: ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>\n    if (spec.unionSources) {\n      rows = await materializeUnionResult(spec, ctxForQuery)\n    } else if (spec.projection) {\n      rows = await materializeProjectionResult(spec, ctxForQuery)\n    } else {\n      const q = spec.query!(ctxForQuery)\n      rows = await materializeQueryResult(q, spec.name, spec.i18nLocale, spec.i18nFields)\n    }\n\n    // #1007 — the post-aggregate projection. Applied here, after every form has\n    // produced its finished rows, so union / projection / query all get the\n    // same single definition of \"last step before materialisation\".\n    if (spec.derive) rows = applyDerive(spec, rows)\n\n    // #777 — exclude this MV's OWN previously-stamped output rows from the\n    // input scan. A same-collection Query-form MV copies the whole source row\n    // verbatim into its output, so a stale output row can itself satisfy the\n    // MV's own input filter (when the filter is on a field disjoint from the\n    // partition field) and get re-selected as if it were live source — the\n    // row self-perpetuates after its true source is gone. Prior output is\n    // never this MV's own source.\n    rows = rows.filter((row) => {\n      const stamp = row._materializedFrom as { mvName?: string } | undefined\n      return stamp?.mvName !== spec.name\n    })\n\n    // 2. Cost ceiling check BEFORE any writes — keeps the rollback\n    //    clean if the source-write is wrapped in a transaction.\n    if (rows.length > maxRows) {\n      throw new MaterializedViewTooLargeError(spec.name, rows.length, maxRows)\n    }\n\n    const txCtx = accessor.getActiveTxContext()\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    const adapter = (outputColl as any).adapter as {\n      get(v: string, c: string, i: string): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>\n    }\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    const vaultName = (outputColl as any).vault as string\n\n    // 3. Compute the post-refresh id set so we can diff against the\n    //    prior-emitted id set for tombstoning (when onEmpty === 'delete').\n    const newIds = new Set<string>()\n    const enrichedRows: Array<{ id: string; record: Record<string, unknown> }> = []\n    for (const row of rows) {\n      const id = spec.rowKey(row)\n      newIds.add(id)\n      const meta: MaterializedFromMeta = {\n        mvName: spec.name,\n        queryHash: reg.queryHash,\n        sourceVersions: {},\n        materializedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n      }\n      enrichedRows.push({ id, record: { ...row, _materializedFrom: meta } })\n    }\n\n    // 4. Write the new rows — skipping any whose content is unchanged (#1418).\n    //\n    // ⛔ THE OUTPUT ROW COUNT, NOT THE SOURCE SCAN, IS WHAT MADE THIS EXPENSIVE.\n    // This loop used to encrypt-and-store EVERY row of the view on EVERY source\n    // write, so per-write cost tracked the size of the view: measured 23 ms at\n    // 250 output rows and 41.6 ms at 450, for source writes the MV's own `map`\n    // dropped entirely. Comparing against what this MV last wrote turns \"one\n    // source write rewrites the whole view\" into \"one source write rewrites the\n    // groups that moved\". See `emit-memo.ts` for why this, and not a\n    // predict-whether-the-refresh-is-needed short circuit.\n    const memoKey = emitMemoKey(vaultName, spec.name, reg.outputCollection)\n    // Read the stamp BEFORE writing: it has to describe the collection as this\n    // refresh found it, so a write by anyone else since last time invalidates.\n    const priorEmitted = readEmitMemo(memoKey, outputColl._cacheStamp)\n    const emitted = new Map<string, string>()\n\n    let written = 0\n    let skipped = 0\n    let failed = 0\n    for (const { id, record } of enrichedRows) {\n      const contentKey = rowContentKey(record, reg.queryHash)\n      // ⚠️ A txCtx changes what a \"skip\" means: the rollback journal below\n      // needs an entry for every row the transaction could revert, and a row we\n      // never wrote has nothing to revert TO. Rather than reason about partial\n      // journals, the memo stands down inside a transaction entirely.\n      // #1439 — and only when no `beforePut` gate can fire FOR THIS ROW. Asking\n      // the bus \"is anything registered\" instead disabled the skip for every\n      // collection in any vault carrying a guard or a periods strategy —\n      // measured by the reporter at 54 redundant writes per source write with\n      // guards alone, which is close to every real consumer.\n      if (\n        contentKey !== null && txCtx === null\n        && !outputColl._derivedWriteGated(record)\n        && priorEmitted?.get(id) === contentKey\n      ) {\n        skipped++\n        emitted.set(id, contentKey)\n        continue\n      }\n      try {\n        if (txCtx !== null) {\n          const prior = await adapter.get(vaultName, reg.outputCollection, id)\n          txCtx._executed.push({\n            op: { type: 'put', vaultName, collectionName: reg.outputCollection, id },\n            priorEnvelope: prior,\n          })\n        }\n        let landed = false\n        if (accessor.dispatchCtx) {\n          if (await putDerivedOutput(outputColl, id, record, accessor.dispatchCtx) === 'written') {\n            written++\n            landed = true\n          }\n        } else {\n          await outputColl.put(id, record)\n          written++\n          landed = true\n        }\n        // ⛔ ONLY a write that actually landed is remembered. `putDerivedOutput`\n        // declines inside a frozen period, and recording that row would make\n        // every later refresh skip a row that is not there.\n        if (landed && contentKey !== null) emitted.set(id, contentKey)\n      } catch (err) {\n        failed++\n        if (strict) throw err\n         \n        console.warn(`[mv] \"${spec.name}\" row write failed:`, err)\n      }\n    }\n\n    // 5. Tombstone rows that existed before but don't appear now.\n    //    `onEmpty: 'keep'` skips this pass entirely. Uses\n    //    `_internalDelete` so a user-registered `onDelete` on the\n    //    output collection does NOT fire on housekeeping (composition fix).\n    let deleted = 0\n    const residueUndecodable: string[] = []\n    const residueDeclined: string[] = []\n    if (onEmpty === 'delete') {\n      const priorIds = await listOutputIds(outputColl)\n      for (const priorId of priorIds) {\n        if (newIds.has(priorId)) continue\n        // #762 — a same-collection partition MV (`output: { collection: <source>, partition }`,\n        // the DERIV-PP30-001 shape) writes INTO its own source collection, so `listOutputIds`\n        // also returns untouched USER source rows here. Decode each candidate and only\n        // tombstone rows THIS MV stamped via `_materializedFrom.mvName` — the exact discipline\n        // `invalidateMVAtRest` uses (stale.ts:151-162). An unstamped row, or one stamped by a\n        // different MV, is never this MV's to delete.\n        const priorEnvelope = await adapter.get(vaultName, reg.outputCollection, priorId)\n        if (priorEnvelope === null) continue\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n        const priorDecoded = await (outputColl as any)._decodeEnvelope(priorEnvelope, priorId)\n        if (priorDecoded === null) {\n          // #782 part a — ownership unknown (undecodable, e.g. elevated above tier 0 on a\n          // tiered output collection): can't rule out this being THIS MV's own stamped row.\n          // Surface it rather than silently skip (mirrors invalidateMVAtRest's #776 posture —\n          // previously this leg had NO residue channel at all).\n          residueUndecodable.push(`${reg.outputCollection}:${priorId}`)\n          continue\n        }\n        const priorStampedBy =\n          typeof priorDecoded === 'object'\n            ? (priorDecoded as Record<string, unknown>)._materializedFrom as { mvName?: string } | undefined\n            : undefined\n        if (priorStampedBy?.mvName !== spec.name) continue\n        try {\n          // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n          const outAny = outputColl as any\n          if (typeof outAny._internalDelete === 'function') {\n            // #776 part b — gate on the boolean, matching invalidateMVAtRest's discipline\n            // (stale.ts): `_internalDelete` returns `false` for a #718 elevated-skip (no\n            // erasure happened), and that must not inflate the tombstone count.\n            if (await outAny._internalDelete(priorId, txCtx)) {\n              deleted++\n            } else {\n              // #782 part b — decoded AND stamp-owned, but erasure was declined (#718\n              // tier-elevation gate). Ownership IS confirmed here — a real silent survival,\n              // not a legit stamp-mismatch skip. Surface it too.\n              residueDeclined.push(`${reg.outputCollection}:${priorId}`)\n            }\n          } else {\n            // Defensive fallback — should never hit in real flow since\n            // every Collection has `_internalDelete`.\n            await outputColl.delete(priorId)\n            deleted++\n          }\n        } catch (err) {\n          failed++\n          if (strict) throw err\n\n          console.warn(`[mv] \"${spec.name}\" tombstone failed for id=\"${priorId}\":`, err)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Record the stamp AFTER every write and tombstone, so the next refresh's\n    // check means \"nothing has happened to this collection since I finished\".\n    // A row that failed, was declined, or was tombstoned is simply absent from\n    // `emitted` and will be written again.\n    writeEmitMemo(memoKey, outputColl._cacheStamp, emitted)\n\n    return { written, skipped, deleted, failed, residueUndecodable, residueDeclined }\n  },\n}\n\n/**\n * List ids currently present in the MV's output collection via the\n * adapter directly (avoids triggering the lazy resolve-on-read path\n * we're INSIDE). Returns an empty array if the collection doesn't\n * exist or the adapter doesn't surface a list method.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nasync function listOutputIds(\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  outputColl: Collection<any>,\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  const cAny = outputColl as any\n  const adapter = cAny.adapter as { list?: (v: string, c: string) => Promise<readonly string[]> }\n  const vault = cAny.vault as string\n  const name = cAny.name as string\n  if (typeof adapter?.list !== 'function') return []\n  try {\n    const ids = await adapter.list(vault, name)\n    return [...ids]\n  } catch {\n    return []\n  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-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/via/classified/descriptor.ts","../src/via/classified/errors.ts","../src/via/classified/resolve.ts","../src/via/classified/write.ts","../src/via/classified/guards.ts","../src/via/classified/binding.ts","../src/port/with/classified-strategy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Classified fields — behavioral sensitive-field descriptors (stage 1).\n * Design: design-history/2026-07-04-classified-fields-design.md\n * Law: open on write, declarative on read — read-side behavior is this\n * closed vocabulary; there are no read-side callbacks.\n * @module\n */\n\nexport type ClassifiedStorage = 'recoverable' | 'never' | 'digest-only'\n\nexport type ClassifiedList =\n  | { readonly kind: 'omit' }\n  | { readonly kind: 'mask'; readonly pattern: string }\n  | { readonly kind: 'rider'; readonly rider: string }\n\nexport type ClassifiedRider = (value: unknown) => unknown\n\nexport interface ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  readonly _noydbClassified: true\n  /**\n   * Via port brand marker — lets a `ClassifiedFieldSpec` satisfy the\n   * kernel's opaque `ViaDescriptor` (#629 Task 5). Optional (unlike\n   * `MoneyDescriptor._viaBrand`/`I18nTextDescriptor._viaBrand`, which are\n   * required): every `classified.*()` preset factory stamps it, but the\n   * pre-existing test suite's hand-rolled `ClassifiedFieldSpec` fixtures\n   * (built without going through a preset) predate this field and would\n   * fail to compile if it were mandatory.\n   */\n  readonly _viaBrand?: 'classified'\n  readonly preset: string\n  readonly storage: ClassifiedStorage\n  readonly list: ClassifiedList\n  readonly sensitivity: 'pii' | 'secret'\n  /** Write-time safe projections; companion field name is `<field>_<rider>`. */\n  readonly riders?: Record<string, ClassifiedRider>\n  /** Write-time validator: error message, or null when valid. */\n  readonly validate?: (value: unknown) => string | null\n  /** Digest-only verify policy (stage 2). Mode both sides normalize under. */\n  readonly verifyNormalize?: 'password' | 'secret-answer'\n  /** Decorate ok:true verdicts with mustRotate after this many days (I1). */\n  readonly rotateDays?: number\n  /** Refuse reuse of the last N values on rotate (cap 8, spec Q4). */\n  readonly notLastN?: number\n  /** Member of the collection's matchGroup (secretAnswer preset). */\n  readonly verifyGroupMember?: true\n  /**\n   * Opt into a store-visible blind-index (`_bidx`) tag so equal values become\n   * queryable/joinable while staying digest-only. Digest-only knob (R7); gated\n   * behind the collection's `acknowledgeEquatableRisk` door (R8). Equal values\n   * produce equal tags — a partition leak a DEK holder can offline-dictionary\n   * at the PBKDF2 floor. Absent/false ⇒ refused-by-default.\n   */\n  readonly equatable?: true\n}\n\nexport interface ClassifiedGroup {\n  readonly _noydbClassifiedGroup: true\n  /** Via port brand marker — see {@link ClassifiedFieldSpec._viaBrand}. */\n  readonly _viaBrand?: 'classified'\n  readonly preset: string\n  /** member record-field name -> spec (differential per-member policy). */\n  readonly members: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec>\n}\n\nexport type ClassifiedEntry = ClassifiedFieldSpec | ClassifiedGroup\n\nexport function isClassifiedFieldSpec(x: unknown): x is ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  return typeof x === 'object' && x !== null\n    && (x as { _noydbClassified?: unknown })._noydbClassified === true\n}\n\nexport function isClassifiedGroup(x: unknown): x is ClassifiedGroup {\n  return typeof x === 'object' && x !== null\n    && (x as { _noydbClassifiedGroup?: unknown })._noydbClassifiedGroup === true\n}\n","/**\n * Configuration/write errors for classified fields. @module\n *\n * `ClassifiedConfigError` / `ClassifiedRevealError` moved to `kernel/errors.ts`\n * (stage 2) so `kernel/enclave/classify/*` can throw them without importing\n * with-*. Re-exported here under the same names so existing import paths\n * keep working.\n */\nexport { ClassifiedConfigError, ClassifiedRevealError, ClassifiedVerifyError, ClassifiedRotationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport class ClassifiedNeverStoredError extends Error {\n  constructor(public readonly collection: string, public readonly field: string) {\n    super(`Field \"${field}\" in collection \"${collection}\" is classified storage:'never' `\n      + `(e.g. a CVC) and must not be persisted. Validate it at capture and drop it before put().`)\n    this.name = 'ClassifiedNeverStoredError'\n  }\n}\n\nexport class ClassifiedValidationError extends Error {\n  constructor(public readonly collection: string, public readonly field: string, detail: string) {\n    super(`Classified field \"${field}\" in collection \"${collection}\" failed validation: ${detail}`)\n    this.name = 'ClassifiedValidationError'\n  }\n}\n","/** Flatten a classifiedFields config into a per-field map + rider computed entries. @module */\n\nimport { isClassifiedGroup, type ClassifiedEntry, type ClassifiedFieldSpec } from './descriptor.js'\nimport { ClassifiedConfigError } from './errors.js'\n\nexport type { ClassifiedEntry, ClassifiedFieldSpec, ClassifiedGroup, ClassifiedList } from './descriptor.js'\nexport { ClassifiedConfigError } from './errors.js'\n\nexport interface ResolvedClassified {\n  readonly byField: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec>\n  readonly riderComputed: Record<string, (record: Record<string, unknown>) => unknown>\n}\n\nexport function resolveClassifiedFields(\n  collection: string,\n  config: Record<string, ClassifiedEntry>,\n): ResolvedClassified {\n  const byField: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec> = {}\n  const claim = (field: string, spec: ClassifiedFieldSpec): void => {\n    if (byField[field] !== undefined) {\n      throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n        `field \"${field}\" is claimed twice — storage forms are mutually exclusive per field (R5): ` +\n        `a field is digest-only OR recoverable OR never, exactly one`)\n    }\n    byField[field] = spec\n  }\n  for (const [key, entry] of Object.entries(config)) {\n    if (isClassifiedGroup(entry)) {\n      for (const [field, spec] of Object.entries(entry.members)) claim(field, spec)\n    } else {\n      claim(key, entry)\n    }\n  }\n  const riderComputed: Record<string, (record: Record<string, unknown>) => unknown> = {}\n  for (const [field, spec] of Object.entries(byField)) {\n    for (const [name, rider] of Object.entries(spec.riders ?? {})) {\n      const companion = `${field}_${name}`\n      if (byField[companion] !== undefined || riderComputed[companion] !== undefined) {\n        throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection, `rider companion \"${companion}\" collides with a declared field`)\n      }\n      riderComputed[companion] = (record) =>\n        record[field] === undefined ? undefined : rider(record[field])\n    }\n  }\n  return { byField, riderComputed }\n}\n","/** Write-path enforcement: storage:'never' rejection + preset validators.\n *  Runs BEFORE riders/computed and BEFORE schema validation. Pure. @module */\n\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec } from './descriptor.js'\nimport { ClassifiedNeverStoredError, ClassifiedValidationError } from './errors.js'\n\nexport function enforceClassifiedWrite(\n  record: Record<string, unknown>,\n  byField: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec>,\n  collection: string,\n): void {\n  for (const [field, spec] of Object.entries(byField)) {\n    const value = record[field]\n    if (value === undefined) continue\n    if (value === null && spec.storage === 'digest-only') continue // explicit clear (C6 branch 3)\n    if (spec.storage === 'never') throw new ClassifiedNeverStoredError(collection, field)\n    const problem = spec.validate?.(value) ?? null\n    if (problem !== null) throw new ClassifiedValidationError(collection, field, problem)\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Refusal matrix R1-R5 (spec) — ONE guard, run at BOTH doors:\n * `collection()` config resolution AND `_applyClassifiedFields` (the reconcile\n * seam), because crdt/conflictPolicy/perRecordKeys are construction-only\n * while classifiedFields can attach later (C5's lesson). @module\n */\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec } from './descriptor.js'\nimport { ClassifiedConfigError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport interface ClassifiedGuardCtx {\n  readonly perRecordKeys: boolean\n  readonly crdt: boolean\n  readonly hasConflictPolicy: boolean\n  /** False on plaintext (`encrypt: false`) collections — no vdig/seal path exists. */\n  readonly storeCiphertext: boolean\n  readonly deterministicFields: ReadonlySet<string> | null\n  readonly indexedFields: ReadonlySet<string>\n  readonly textIndexFields: ReadonlySet<string>\n  readonly vectorSourceFields: ReadonlySet<string>\n  readonly subjectKeyField: string | undefined\n  readonly bareSensitiveFields: ReadonlySet<string>\n  /** Collection-level gate for the `equatable` knob (R8 double door). */\n  readonly acknowledgeEquatableRisk: boolean\n}\n\nexport function guardClassifiedCompat(\n  collection: string,\n  byField: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec>,\n  ctx: ClassifiedGuardCtx,\n): void {\n  const digestOnly = Object.entries(byField)\n    .filter(([, s]) => s.storage === 'digest-only')\n  const protectedForms = Object.values(byField)\n    .filter((s) => s.storage === 'digest-only' || s.storage === 'recoverable')\n\n  // R2 — merge resolvers bypass the write pipeline entirely (C5): a merge\n  // could carry stale/foreign _vdig or resurrect plaintext (the CRDT put\n  // branch persists via encryptJsonString with no vdig backstop). Fail-loud.\n  if (protectedForms.length > 0 && (ctx.crdt || ctx.hasConflictPolicy)) {\n    throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n      'digest-only/recoverable classified fields cannot combine with a crdt mode or a ' +\n      'conflictPolicy resolver — merge paths bypass write enforcement (R2)')\n  }\n  // R7 — `equatable` is a digest-only knob: it drives the `_bidx` blind-index\n  // slot, which only exists on the digest-only write path. A recoverable/never\n  // field carrying it would silently no-op (recoverable equality is `_det`'s\n  // job). Refuse rather than accept-and-ignore. Checked over ALL specs, before\n  // the digest-only early-return below, precisely to catch the non-digest case.\n  for (const [f, spec] of Object.entries(byField)) {\n    if (spec.equatable === true && spec.storage !== 'digest-only') {\n      throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n        `field \"${f}\" declares equatable but storage is '${spec.storage}' — equatable is a ` +\n        `digest-only knob; recoverable equality is _det's job (R7)`)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // R8 — the equatable double door (mirrors deterministicFields ×\n  // acknowledgeDeterministicRisk): any field opting into `equatable` requires\n  // the collection to acknowledge the partition-leak risk. One-directional —\n  // `acknowledgeEquatableRisk: true` with ZERO equatable members is a silent\n  // no-op (never throws here), so the ack can sit on a collection config\n  // ahead of the field landing.\n  const hasEquatable = Object.values(byField).some((s) => s.equatable === true)\n  if (hasEquatable && ctx.acknowledgeEquatableRisk !== true) {\n    throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n      `classified equatable fields require \\`acknowledgeEquatableRisk: true\\` — equal values ` +\n      `produce equal store-visible index tags (a partition leak a DEK holder can offline-` +\n      `dictionary at the PBKDF2 floor); the door is the real control for low-entropy fields (R8)`)\n  }\n\n  if (digestOnly.length === 0) return\n\n  // Digest-only on a plaintext collection: the codec's vdig block is gated on\n  // storeCiphertext, so the secret would persist as raw plaintext. Refuse.\n  if (!ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n    throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n      `storage:'digest-only' requires an encrypted collection — with encrypt: false the ` +\n      `write path skips the digest slot entirely and the secret would persist as raw plaintext`)\n  }\n  // R1 — vdig slot keys are CEK-only (I3); without perRecordKeys a digest\n  // would survive forget() in backups as offline-crackable material.\n  if (!ctx.perRecordKeys) {\n    throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n      `storage:'digest-only' requires perRecordKeys: true — vdig keys derive from the ` +\n      `per-record CEK so forget() shreds them (R1)`)\n  }\n  for (const [f, spec] of digestOnly) {\n    // notLastN cap: presets clamp this at construction, but a raw spec object\n    // bypasses the preset — enforce the same 0..8 cap in the policy projection.\n    const n = spec.notLastN ?? 0\n    if (!Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > 8) {\n      throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n        `digest-only field \"${f}\" declares notLastN ${n} — must be an integer 0..8 ` +\n        `(write cost is n × 600K PBKDF2; ring blast radius is documented)`)\n    }\n    if (ctx.bareSensitiveFields.has(f)) {\n      // R5 — the sealed block runs before the vdig block in the codec, so the\n      // overlap would seal the value recoverably (silent downgrade + I4\n      // double-slot). Storage forms are mutually exclusive per field.\n      throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n        `field \"${f}\" is digest-only AND listed in sensitive[] — storage forms are mutually exclusive per field (R5)`)\n    }\n    if (ctx.deterministicFields?.has(f)) {\n      throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n        `digest-only field \"${f}\" cannot be deterministic — equality-correlatable ciphertext defeats per-write salts (R3)`)\n    }\n    if (ctx.indexedFields.has(f) || ctx.textIndexFields.has(f)\n      || ctx.vectorSourceFields.has(f) || ctx.subjectKeyField === f) {\n      throw new ClassifiedConfigError(collection,\n        `digest-only field \"${f}\" cannot be indexed, text-indexed, embedded, or a forget-subject key (R4)`)\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * The classified `NoydbVia` (#629 Task 5, LIVE since Task 6) — wires\n * classified-fields declaration/write-enforcement/at-rest sealing/erasure\n * into the kernel's generic Via port. Mirrors `via/money/binding.ts`'s\n * inline declaration-time validation and `via/i18n/binding.ts`'s\n * `linkXVia` static-link pattern — except the link itself is EAGER\n * (`port/with/classified-strategy.ts` calls `linkClassifiedVia()` at module\n * load, not lazily from a `classified.*()` preset call): several fixtures\n * build a raw `ClassifiedFieldSpec` literal without ever calling a preset,\n * and the binder must be installed before `compileVias` needs it\n * regardless.\n *\n * `compileVias` (`kernel/collection-config.ts`) compiles this binding\n * in whenever a collection declares `classifiedFields` — money then i18n\n * then classified, order pinned. `kernel/collection.ts`'s `_putInternal`\n * runs `enforceClassifiedWrite`'s effect via the pipeline's `enforceWrite`\n * phase; the codec's `encodeAtRest`/`decodeAtRest` hooks (Task 3's boundary)\n * replace the inline `sensitiveFields` seal path for any collection this\n * binding is compiled into.\n *\n * `declare` — `classifiedVia(cfg)` runs `resolveClassifiedFields` +\n * `guardClassifiedCompat` at CONSTRUCTION time (the same #553 pattern\n * `moneyVia`'s `validateMoneyFieldPaths(moneyFields)` call uses) —\n * mirrors today's \"door 1\" (`collection-config.ts`'s\n * `resolveCollectionConfig`). Both may throw `ClassifiedConfigError`.\n */\nimport type { NoydbVia, ViaWriteCtx, ViaCryptoCtx, SealedSlotRef, ViaEraseCtx, ViaEraseReport } from '../../kernel/via/index.js'\nimport { installViaBinder } from '../../kernel/via/index.js'\nimport { SealedHandle } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { resolveClassifiedFields, type ClassifiedEntry } from './resolve.js'\nimport { guardClassifiedCompat, type ClassifiedGuardCtx } from './guards.js'\nimport { enforceClassifiedWrite } from './write.js'\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec } from './descriptor.js'\n\n/**\n * One classified per-slot shred/residue verdict — mirrors\n * `RecordCodec.SealedShredSlot` (`kernel/enclave/record-keys/record-codec.ts`)\n * byte-for-byte. Duplicated here (not imported) so this binding never\n * reaches into `kernel/enclave/` (`via-enclave-isolation`, #629) — the\n * closure that PRODUCES real values of this shape is codec-owned and\n * injected via {@link ClassifiedViaConfig.classifySealedShred}.\n */\nexport interface ClassifiedShredSlot {\n  readonly field: string\n  readonly class: 'shreddable' | 'dekResidue' | 'live-shreddable+dekResidue-in-backups'\n}\n\n/**\n * Config a classified collection's declarations resolve to — the binding's\n * construction input. `entries`/`guardCtx` are the raw \"door 1\" inputs\n * (`resolveClassifiedFields`/`guardClassifiedCompat`'s own parameters);\n * `classifySealedShred`/`purgeSealedCekEnvelopes` are OPTIONAL codec/vault-\n * provided closures for the `erase` hook — undefined in this dormant task\n * (no caller wires them yet), wired for real in #629 Task 10 (\"posture\n * enforcement — forget + erase hooks live\").\n */\nexport interface ClassifiedViaConfig {\n  readonly entries: Record<string, ClassifiedEntry>\n  readonly collectionName: string\n  readonly guardCtx: ClassifiedGuardCtx\n  /**\n   * Codec-provided closure mirroring `RecordCodec.classifySealedShred` —\n   * classifies a live envelope's `_sealed` slots for crypto-shred\n   * completeness (see that method's doc comment for the shreddable/\n   * dekResidue/both-class semantics). `live` is `ViaEraseCtx.live`'s opaque\n   * envelope, passed straight through. NOT `readonly` (#629 Task 10):\n   * `compileVias` builds this cfg before the owning `Collection`'s\n   * `RecordCodec` exists, so `Collection`'s constructor mutates this field\n   * in place once `this.codec` is available — the closure `eraseClassified`\n   * reads is looked up at CALL time, not at binding-construction time, so\n   * the late assignment is picked up correctly.\n   */\n  classifySealedShred?: (live: unknown) => Promise<{ readonly slots: readonly ClassifiedShredSlot[] }>\n  /**\n   * Vault-provided closure that purges every `_sealed_cek/<collection>/<id>/*`\n   * host-delivery envelope for one record (mirrors `rotateRecordCek`'s own\n   * prefix-delete) and returns the count purged. Deliberately left UNWIRED\n   * by `compileVias` (#629 Task 10) — `forget-sealed-erasure.test.ts`\n   * proves this purge is UNCONDITIONAL on `sealRecordToHost` usage alone,\n   * independent of whether `classifiedFields` is declared (a bare\n   * `sensitive: [...]` collection exercises it with no classified binding\n   * at all) — vault.ts keeps owning it directly so that case stays correct.\n   */\n  readonly purgeSealedCekEnvelopes?: (id: string) => Promise<number>\n}\n\n/** Fields declared `storage: 'recoverable'` (digest-only stays codec-inline; `'never'` is rejected by `enforceWrite` before either hook runs). */\nfunction recoverableFields(byField: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec>): string[] {\n  return Object.entries(byField).filter(([, spec]) => spec.storage === 'recoverable').map(([field]) => field)\n}\n\n/**\n * The full set this binding's `encodeAtRest`/`decodeAtRest` seal: declared\n * recoverable classified fields UNION bare `sensitive[]` fields — mirrors\n * `collection-config.ts`'s pre-cutover \"recoverable classified fields are\n * unioned into sensitiveFields... zero new crypto code\" semantics. Once this\n * binding is compiled into a collection's pipeline, `hasAtRestHooks` is true\n * and the codec's inline `sensitiveFields` seal path (record-codec.ts) is\n * DEAD for that collection — mutually exclusive with the hook path (#629\n * Task 3) — so bare `sensitive[]` fields MUST seal through here too, or\n * they'd silently stop being sealed at all (#629 Task 6 reconciliation).\n * `guardCtx.bareSensitiveFields` is the exact same `Set` the collection's\n * refusal-matrix guard already carries (`ClassifiedGuardCtx`).\n */\nfunction sealFieldNames(byField: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec>, guardCtx: ClassifiedGuardCtx): string[] {\n  return [...recoverableFields(byField), ...guardCtx.bareSensitiveFields]\n}\n\n/**\n * Seal every named field present with a defined value into its own sealed\n * slot via `crypto.sealedSlots`, peeling it out of the record.\n */\nasync function encodeClassifiedAtRest(\n  record: Record<string, unknown>,\n  crypto: ViaCryptoCtx,\n  fields: readonly string[],\n): Promise<{ record: Record<string, unknown>; sealed?: Record<string, SealedSlotRef> }> {\n  let open = record\n  let sealed: Record<string, SealedSlotRef> | undefined\n  for (const field of fields) {\n    if (!(field in record)) continue\n    const value = record[field]\n    if (value === undefined) continue\n    const ref = await crypto.sealedSlots.seal(field, value)\n    if (open === record) open = { ...record }\n    delete open[field]\n    sealed ??= {}\n    sealed[field] = ref\n  }\n  return sealed ? { record: open, sealed } : { record }\n}\n\n/**\n * Restore every named field's sealed slot back onto the record: an opaque\n * `SealedHandle` under `asHandles` (never materialises plaintext into the\n * cache — `SealedHandle.toJSON()` returns `'[sealed]'`, the export-redaction\n * guarantee `reveal()` alone can lift), the plaintext value otherwise.\n */\nasync function decodeClassifiedAtRest(\n  record: Record<string, unknown>,\n  sealed: Record<string, SealedSlotRef>,\n  crypto: ViaCryptoCtx,\n  opts: { asHandles: boolean },\n  fields: readonly string[],\n): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  let out = record\n  for (const field of fields) {\n    const ref = sealed[field]\n    if (ref === undefined) continue\n    if (out === record) out = { ...record }\n    out[field] = opts.asHandles\n      ? new SealedHandle(() => crypto.sealedSlots.unseal(field, ref))\n      : await crypto.sealedSlots.unseal(field, ref)\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * `forget()`'s per-ref erasure participation: classify the live envelope's\n * sealed slots (via the codec-provided closure) and mark each shreddable\n * one deleted on this call's sealed-slots capability, then purge the\n * record's sealed-CEK host-delivery envelopes (via the vault-provided\n * closure). Both closures are optional — undefined (this dormant task's\n * only caller, its own unit tests) reports a zero-shredded, zero-residue\n * no-op rather than throwing.\n */\nasync function eraseClassified(\n  ctx: ViaEraseCtx,\n  cfg: ClassifiedViaConfig,\n): Promise<ViaEraseReport> {\n  let shredded = 0\n  const residue: unknown[] = []\n\n  if (cfg.classifySealedShred) {\n    const { slots } = await cfg.classifySealedShred(ctx.live)\n    for (const slot of slots) {\n      if (slot.class === 'shreddable' || slot.class === 'live-shreddable+dekResidue-in-backups') {\n        shredded += 1\n        await ctx.crypto.sealedSlots.delete(slot.field)\n      }\n      if (slot.class === 'dekResidue' || slot.class === 'live-shreddable+dekResidue-in-backups') {\n        residue.push({ kind: 'classified-sealed-dek-residue', field: slot.field })\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (cfg.purgeSealedCekEnvelopes) {\n    shredded += await cfg.purgeSealedCekEnvelopes(ctx.id)\n  }\n\n  return { shredded, residue }\n}\n\nfunction buildClassifiedDescribeFragment(byField: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec>): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return {\n    classifiedFields: Object.fromEntries(\n      Object.entries(byField).map(([field, spec]) => [field, { storage: spec.storage, sensitivity: spec.sensitivity }]),\n    ),\n  }\n}\n\nexport function classifiedVia(cfg: ClassifiedViaConfig): NoydbVia {\n  // declare — door 1: resolve + guard, exactly like collection-config.ts's\n  // resolveCollectionConfig does today. Throws ClassifiedConfigError on any\n  // R1-R8 refusal-matrix violation or field-collision.\n  const resolved = resolveClassifiedFields(cfg.collectionName, cfg.entries)\n  guardClassifiedCompat(cfg.collectionName, resolved.byField, cfg.guardCtx)\n  const byField = resolved.byField\n  const sealFields = sealFieldNames(byField, cfg.guardCtx)\n\n  return {\n    brand: 'classified',\n    posture: { encryptedAtRest: 'sealed', queryable: 'det-exact', exportable: false, forgettable: true },\n    covers: (field) => field in byField,\n    coveredFields: Object.keys(byField), // #1447 — the FIELD only; the sensitivity label is deliberately NOT reported\n    // async (rather than a bare passthrough) so a refusal is always a\n    // rejected Promise for direct callers, matching every other async-stack\n    // hook's calling convention — `enforceClassifiedWrite` itself stays sync.\n    enforceWrite: async (record: Record<string, unknown>, _ctx: ViaWriteCtx) =>\n      enforceClassifiedWrite(record, byField, cfg.collectionName),\n    encodeAtRest: (record, crypto) => encodeClassifiedAtRest(record, crypto, sealFields),\n    decodeAtRest: (record, sealed, crypto, opts) => decodeClassifiedAtRest(record, sealed, crypto, opts, sealFields),\n    erase: (ctx) => eraseClassified(ctx, cfg),\n    describeFragment: () => buildClassifiedDescribeFragment(byField),\n  }\n}\n\nexport function linkClassifiedVia(): void {\n  installViaBinder('classified', (c) => classifiedVia(c as ClassifiedViaConfig))\n}\n","/**\n * Classified strategy seam (#629 Task 5 — moved out of\n * `via/classified/strategy.ts`, precedent: `port/with/i18n-strategy.ts`).\n * Lives on the `/with` port (the one seam the kernel spine may import\n * statically) so `Collection`/`Vault` can hold the `NO_CLASSIFIED` default\n * without a spine→service static import.\n *\n * This file (unlike `via/classified/**`) is NOT subject to the\n * `via-enclave-isolation` architecture guard — it may import `EnclaveKey`\n * from the enclave barrel freely, the same way `port/with/i18n-strategy.ts`\n * did before #629 Task 4's DictionaryHandle cutover.\n *\n * The ② capability seam for classified read-egress ops (stage 1: reveal;\n * stage 2: verify).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec } from '../../via/classified/descriptor.js'\nimport { ClassifiedNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { linkClassifiedVia } from '../../via/classified/binding.js'\n\n// #629 Task 10 — re-export the classified binding's erase-cfg TYPE (not\n// `via/classified/binding.js` directly) so the kernel spine can name\n// it for the post-construction `classifySealedShred` wiring, same rationale\n// as `resolveClassifiedFields`/`guardClassifiedCompat` above.\nexport type { ClassifiedViaConfig } from '../../via/classified/binding.js'\n\nexport type { ClassifiedVerdict } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { ClassifiedVerdict } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n// #629 Task 6 — the classified binding's construction-time resolve/guard,\n// re-exported here (not `via/classified/{resolve,guards}.js` directly)\n// so the kernel spine keeps importing only this one `/with` port seam, same\n// rationale as `NO_CLASSIFIED` below.\nexport { resolveClassifiedFields, type ClassifiedEntry, type ResolvedClassified } from '../../via/classified/resolve.js'\nexport { guardClassifiedCompat, type ClassifiedGuardCtx } from '../../via/classified/guards.js'\nexport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec }\n\n// Install the classified Via binder EAGERLY — unlike money()/i18nText(),\n// several classified fixtures (both hub tests and consumer code) build a raw\n// `ClassifiedFieldSpec` object literal without ever calling a\n// `classified.*()` preset (bypassing `via/classified/presets.ts`\n// entirely — an intentionally supported pattern, see that module's Task 5\n// doc comment). Linking lazily at preset-call time (the money/i18n pattern)\n// would leave `viaBinder('classified')` unlinked for those declarations.\n// This port module is already unconditionally imported by the kernel spine\n// (for the `NO_CLASSIFIED` strategy default below), so linking here\n// guarantees the binder is always installed before `compileVias`\n// ever needs it, regardless of how a collection's classifiedFields were\n// constructed.\nlinkClassifiedVia()\n\nexport interface ClassifiedRevealCtx {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly spec: ClassifiedFieldSpec\n  /** True on an encrypted collection — false selects the plaintext-body read. */\n  readonly encrypted: boolean\n  readonly getEnvelope: (id: string) => Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>\n  readonly resolveCek: (env: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined>\n  readonly getDEK: () => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  readonly onAccess?: ((op: 'reveal', id: string) => Promise<void>) | undefined\n}\n\nexport interface ClassifiedVerifyCtx {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly spec: ClassifiedFieldSpec\n  readonly getEnvelope: (id: string) => Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>       // raw envelope, NOT a decrypted view\n  readonly resolveCek: (env: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined>\n  readonly getDEK: () => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  readonly now: () => number                                        // injected (Q7)\n  /** Group members resolved by the collection (matchGroup only). */\n  readonly groupMembers?: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly field: string; readonly spec: ClassifiedFieldSpec }>\n  readonly onAccess?: ((op: 'verify' | 'find', id: string) => Promise<void>) | undefined\n}\n\nexport interface ClassifiedStrategy {\n  reveal(ctx: ClassifiedRevealCtx, id: string, field: string): Promise<unknown>\n  verify(ctx: ClassifiedVerifyCtx, id: string, field: string, candidate: string): Promise<ClassifiedVerdict>\n  verifyText(ctx: ClassifiedVerifyCtx, id: string, field: string, candidate: string): Promise<ClassifiedVerdict>\n  matchGroup(ctx: ClassifiedVerifyCtx, id: string, answers: Record<string, string>,\n             opts: { readonly min: number }): Promise<{ readonly passed: boolean }>\n  computeTarget(ctx: ClassifiedVerifyCtx, field: string, candidate: string, costByte?: number): Promise<string | null>\n}\n\nexport const NO_CLASSIFIED: ClassifiedStrategy = {\n  async reveal() { throw new ClassifiedNotEnabledError() },\n  async verify() { throw new ClassifiedNotEnabledError() },\n  async verifyText() { throw new ClassifiedNotEnabledError() },\n  async matchGroup() { throw new ClassifiedNotEnabledError() },\n  async computeTarget() { throw new ClassifiedNotEnabledError() 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package/dist/chunk-QWFHIOD2.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/attestation/signer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope, encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ConflictError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { generateDocSigningKeyPair } from '@noy-db/attestation'\n\nexport const ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION = '_attestations'\nexport const SIGNER_RECORD_ID = '_signer'\nexport const REVOKED_RECORD_ID = '_revoked'\n\nexport interface DocSigner {\n  readonly keyId: string\n  readonly publicKeyB64: string\n  readonly privateKeyPkcs8B64: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure read: return the firm's persisted document-signing keypair, or `null`\n * if none has been minted yet. Never writes — callers that must NOT mint\n * (e.g. an ungated public-key getter) use this instead of `loadOrCreateSigner`.\n *\n * Stored as an encrypted record `_attestations/_signer` under the\n * `_attestations` collection DEK (resolved via `getDEK`, which is\n * AES-KW-wrapped under the owner KEK + persisted by the keyring). The KEK\n * itself is AES-KW-only and cannot AES-GCM-encrypt these bytes — hence\n * storage under a normal collection DEK.\n */\nexport async function loadSigner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<DocSigner | null> {\n  const existing = await store.get(vault, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, SIGNER_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!existing) return null\n  const dek = await getDEK(ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION)\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, id: SIGNER_RECORD_ID }, existing, dek)\n  return JSON.parse(json) as DocSigner\n}\n\n/**\n * Lazily mint (or load) the firm's Ed25519 document-signing keypair.\n *\n * On a concurrent first-mint, two callers can both read `null` and both mint\n * distinct keypairs. The `put(…, expectedVersion: 0)` (\"must not already\n * exist\") lets exactly one win; the loser catches `ConflictError`, re-reads,\n * and returns the winner's signer — converging on a single keypair rather than\n * clobbering it or surfacing a raw conflict. (All real stores treat a missing\n * record + `ev: 0` as a no-conflict write, so the catch fires on lost-race only.)\n */\nexport async function loadOrCreateSigner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<DocSigner> {\n  const existing = await loadSigner(store, vault, getDEK)\n  if (existing) return existing\n\n  const dek = await getDEK(ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION)\n  const signer = await generateDocSigningKeyPair()\n  const identity = { collection: ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, id: SIGNER_RECORD_ID, version: 1 }\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(JSON.stringify(signer), dek, buildRecordAad(identity))\n  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    identity,\n    { iv, data },\n  )\n  try {\n    await store.put(vault, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, SIGNER_RECORD_ID, env, 0)\n    return signer\n  } catch (e) {\n    if (!(e instanceof ConflictError)) throw e\n    // Lost the race — another writer minted first. Adopt the winner.\n    const winner = await loadSigner(store, vault, getDEK)\n    if (!winner) {\n      throw new ConflictError(0, 'loadOrCreateSigner: signer mint lost a concurrent race but the winning record could not be re-read.')\n    }\n    return winner\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAGA,SAAS,iCAAiC;AAEnC,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAChC,IAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,IAAM,oBAAoB;AAmBjC,eAAsB,WACpB,OACA,OACA,QAC2B;AAC3B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,yBAAyB,gBAAgB;AACjF,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAuB;AAChD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,yBAAyB,IAAI,iBAAiB,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG;AAChH,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AACxB;AAYA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,OACA,QACoB;AACpB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AACtD,MAAI,SAAU,QAAO;AAErB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAuB;AAChD,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,0BAA0B;AAC/C,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,yBAAyB,IAAI,kBAAkB,SAAS,EAAE;AACzF,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACxF,QAAM,MAAM;AAAA,IACV;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,EACb;AACA,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,yBAAyB,kBAAkB,KAAK,CAAC;AACxE,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,QAAI,EAAE,aAAa,eAAgB,OAAM;AAEzC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD,QAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;AACX,YAAM,IAAI,cAAc,GAAG,qGAAqG;AAAA,IAClI;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-QWGU66MP.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-commit/history/history.ts","../src/with-commit/history/strategy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { RecordIdentity } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, HistoryOptions, PruneOptions } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { isTombstone, isTombstoneShape, rewrapEnvelope, isRewrappedUnder, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/**\n * History storage convention:\n * Collection: `_history`\n * ID format: `{collection}:{recordId}:{paddedVersion}`\n * Version is zero-padded to 10 digits for lexicographic sorting.\n */\n\nconst HISTORY_COLLECTION = '_history'\nconst VERSION_PAD = 10\n\nfunction historyId(collection: string, recordId: string, version: number): string {\n  return `${collection}:${recordId}:${String(version).padStart(VERSION_PAD, '0')}`\n}\n\n/**\n * The identity a history snapshot is **sealed against** — its STORAGE location,\n * not the live record it is a copy of (#1041).\n *\n * ## Why storage, and why this is a decision rather than a detail\n *\n * A snapshot is a copy, so two identities are available: the live record\n * (`collection`/`recordId`) or where the bytes actually land\n * (`_history`/`historyId(...)`). They are not equivalent under attack.\n *\n * Binding the LIVE identity makes a snapshot's AAD **indistinguishable from the\n * live record's at the same version** — so an untrusted store could serve a\n * history entry *as the current record* and the client would accept it. It also\n * leaves entries relocatable within `_history`.\n *\n * Binding STORAGE identity closes both. The cost is that the id must be known\n * *before* the envelope is sealed, where `saveHistory` previously derived it\n * *after* (from `envelope._v`) — which is precisely the restructure this\n * function exists to make possible.\n *\n * `saveHistory` uses this too, so the sealed identity and the put location have\n * **one definition** and cannot drift apart. Changing the layout here changes\n * both at once, by construction.\n */\nexport function historyIdentity(collection: string, recordId: string, version: number): RecordIdentity {\n  // The snapshot's own `_v` IS the version it preserves — the same number that\n  // appears in its id. One argument feeds both, so they cannot disagree (#1093).\n  return { collection: HISTORY_COLLECTION, id: historyId(collection, recordId, version), version }\n}\n\n// Unused today, kept for future history-id parsing utilities.\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars\nfunction parseHistoryId(id: string): { collection: string; recordId: string; version: number } | null {\n  const lastColon = id.lastIndexOf(':')\n  if (lastColon < 0) return null\n  const versionStr = id.slice(lastColon + 1)\n  const rest = id.slice(0, lastColon)\n  const firstColon = rest.indexOf(':')\n  if (firstColon < 0) return null\n  return {\n    collection: rest.slice(0, firstColon),\n    recordId: rest.slice(firstColon + 1),\n    version: parseInt(versionStr, 10),\n  }\n}\n\nfunction matchesPrefix(id: string, collection: string, recordId?: string): boolean {\n  if (recordId) {\n    return id.startsWith(`${collection}:${recordId}:`)\n  }\n  return id.startsWith(`${collection}:`)\n}\n\n/** Save a history entry (a complete encrypted envelope snapshot). */\nexport async function saveHistory(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // Same derivation the caller sealed against — one definition, so the sealed\n  // identity and the put location cannot drift (#1041).\n  const { id } = historyIdentity(collection, recordId, envelope._v)\n  await adapter.put(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id, envelope)\n}\n\n/** Get history entries for a record, sorted newest-first. */\nexport async function getHistory(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  options?: HistoryOptions,\n): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope[]> {\n  const allIds = await adapter.list(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION)\n  const matchingIds = allIds\n    .filter(id => matchesPrefix(id, collection, recordId))\n    .sort()\n    .reverse() // newest first\n\n  const entries: EncryptedEnvelope[] = []\n\n  for (const id of matchingIds) {\n    const envelope = await adapter.get(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (!envelope) continue\n\n    // Apply time filters\n    if (options?.from && envelope._ts < options.from) continue\n    if (options?.to && envelope._ts > options.to) continue\n\n    entries.push(envelope)\n\n    if (options?.limit && entries.length >= options.limit) break\n  }\n\n  return entries\n}\n\n/** Get a specific version's envelope from history. */\nexport async function getVersionEnvelope(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  version: number,\n): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null> {\n  const id = historyId(collection, recordId, version)\n  return adapter.get(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id)\n}\n\n/** Prune history entries. Returns the number of entries deleted. */\nexport async function pruneHistory(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string | undefined,\n  options: PruneOptions,\n): Promise<number> {\n  const allIds = await adapter.list(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION)\n  const matchingIds = allIds\n    .filter(id => recordId ? matchesPrefix(id, collection, recordId) : matchesPrefix(id, collection))\n    .sort()\n\n  let toDelete: string[] = []\n\n  if (options.keepVersions !== undefined) {\n    // Keep only the N most recent, delete the rest\n    const keep = options.keepVersions\n    if (matchingIds.length > keep) {\n      toDelete = matchingIds.slice(0, matchingIds.length - keep)\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (options.beforeDate) {\n    // Delete entries older than the specified date\n    for (const id of matchingIds) {\n      if (toDelete.includes(id)) continue\n      const envelope = await adapter.get(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id)\n      if (envelope && envelope._ts < options.beforeDate) {\n        toDelete.push(id)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deduplicate\n  const uniqueDeletes = [...new Set(toDelete)]\n\n  for (const id of uniqueDeletes) {\n    await adapter.delete(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id)\n  }\n\n  return uniqueDeletes.length\n}\n\n/** Clear all history for a vault, optionally scoped to a collection or record. */\nexport async function clearHistory(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection?: string,\n  recordId?: string,\n): Promise<number> {\n  const allIds = await adapter.list(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION)\n  let toDelete: string[]\n\n  if (collection && recordId) {\n    toDelete = allIds.filter(id => matchesPrefix(id, collection, recordId))\n  } else if (collection) {\n    toDelete = allIds.filter(id => matchesPrefix(id, collection))\n  } else {\n    toDelete = allIds\n  }\n\n  for (const id of toDelete) {\n    await adapter.delete(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id)\n  }\n\n  return toDelete.length\n}\n\n/**\n * Crypto-shred every `_history` version of a record. Each non-tombstone\n * history envelope is OVERWRITTEN in place with a tombstone\n * `{ _noydb, _v, _ts: now, _by: actor, _iv: '', _data: '' }` — dropping\n * `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`/`_det`, so the prior ciphertext (and the wrapped CEK\n * that could decrypt it) is gone everywhere this store reaches. The version\n * counter (`_v`) is preserved so the audit trail still shows \"N versions\n * existed and were erased.\"\n *\n * Overwrite — NOT delete — so the history key itself survives as proof the\n * version existed. Already-tombstoned versions (re-run / idempotent forget)\n * are left untouched and not counted.\n *\n * Returns the number of history versions newly tombstoned.\n */\nexport async function tombstoneHistory(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  actor: string,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n): Promise<number> {\n  const allIds = await adapter.list(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION)\n  const matchingIds = allIds.filter(id => matchesPrefix(id, collection, recordId))\n\n  const now = new Date().toISOString()\n  let count = 0\n  for (const id of matchingIds) {\n    const env = await adapter.get(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (!env) continue\n    // Already a tombstone (no body and no wrapped CEK)? Skip — idempotent.\n    if (isTombstone(env, encrypted)) continue\n    // `by` rides on the IDENTITY — passing it in the body went through a\n    // conditional spread, which TypeScript does not excess-property-check, so\n    // it was silently dropped once `_by` moved to the identity (#1041).\n    const tombstone: EncryptedEnvelope = buildRecordEnvelope(\n      { collection: HISTORY_COLLECTION, id, ...(actor ? { by: actor } : {}), version: env._v },\n      { ts: now, iv: '', data: '' },\n    )\n    await adapter.put(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id, tombstone)\n    count++\n  }\n  return count\n}\n\n/**\n * Re-key every `_history` snapshot of a record from `fromDek` to `toDek`.\n * Mirrors what `rewrapBodyToDek` already does for a record's LIVE body on a\n * tier move (elevate/demote/putAtTier) — each `_history` envelope also\n * carries its own `_cek`, wrapped under the collection's tier-0 DEK at write\n * time (`record-codec.ts`), so a tier move that rewraps only the live\n * envelope leaves prior versions decryptable at rest under the tier the\n * record left. This is defense-in-depth *beneath* the read-gate\n * (`history()`/`getVersion()` already return empty for an elevated record;\n * this protects the ciphertext even if that gate is bypassed).\n *\n * Rewraps content in place — unlike `tombstoneHistory`, it does NOT blank\n * `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek` — so a subsequent `demote()` restores tier-0\n * readability. Tombstone-shaped entries (a forgotten/shredded version —\n * blanked `_data`, no `_cek`) are skipped: there is no key material left to\n * rewrap.\n *\n * **Legacy fallback.** A snapshot written before this fix stays wrapped\n * under the tier-0 DEK even after its live record has since moved tiers, so\n * a rewrap attempted with a tier-N `fromDek` fails to unwrap/decrypt. When\n * the caller supplies `tier0Dek`, a failed rewrap is retried once with\n * `tier0Dek` as `fromDek` (the only other key a pre-fix snapshot can be\n * wrapped under — history is written only by tier-0 `put()`). The output is\n * always wrapped under `toDek` regardless of which `fromDek` succeeded. A\n * rewrap that fails under BOTH keys re-throws — that is real corruption, not\n * a tier mismatch, and must not be swallowed.\n *\n * **Crash-atomicity / idempotency (#712 whole-branch-fix-3).** This loop has\n * no transaction around it: a crash after some entries have been rewritten\n * under `toDek` but before the loop finishes leaves the record's history\n * split across two keys. A retry of the SAME call must not re-fail on the\n * entries that already made it — so each entry is probed with\n * `isRewrappedUnder(env, toDek)` FIRST; a match means it's already at the\n * target key and is skipped (put nothing). This makes same-target retries\n * and demote-after-crash fully self-healing. It does NOT close every crash\n * window: a crash that lands SOME entries under `toDek` while the record's\n * NEXT move target differs from this call's `toDek` (an intermediate-tier\n * crash — e.g. elevate 0→1 crashes mid-loop, then the record is moved 1→2)\n * still finds those entries unreadable under either `fromDek` or the\n * tier-0 fallback, since `toDek` is a third key the next call never probes\n * for. That residual window is an accepted, fail-closed limitation (see\n * `.changeset/history-at-rest.md` and the design doc) — availability is\n * lost, never confidentiality.\n */\nexport async function rewrapHistory(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  fromDek: EnclaveKey,\n  toDek: EnclaveKey,\n  tier0Dek?: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const allIds = await adapter.list(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION)\n  const matchingIds = allIds.filter(id => matchesPrefix(id, collection, recordId))\n\n  for (const id of matchingIds) {\n    const env = await adapter.get(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (!env) continue\n    // Already a tombstone (forgotten/shredded version)? Nothing to rewrap.\n    if (isTombstoneShape(env)) continue\n    // #712/whole-branch-fix-3: toDek-first idempotency skip — already at the\n    // target key (a same-target retry, or demote-after-crash landing back on\n    // a key it already reached)? Nothing to do; put nothing.\n    // In-place re-key of a `_history` entry: the address does not move, so the\n    // same identity opens and re-seals it (#1041). Built from the entry itself,\n    // exactly as a reader would via `recordAadFor`.\n    const identity = {\n      collection: HISTORY_COLLECTION, id, version: env._v,\n      ...(env._tier !== undefined ? { tier: env._tier } : {}),\n      ...(env._by !== undefined ? { by: env._by } : {}),\n    }\n    if (await isRewrappedUnder(identity, env, toDek)) continue\n\n    let next: EncryptedEnvelope\n    try {\n      next = await rewrapEnvelope(identity, env, fromDek, toDek)\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (!tier0Dek) throw err\n      // Legacy fallback: retry once under the tier-0 DEK. A failure here is\n      // real corruption, not a tier mismatch — let it propagate.\n      next = await rewrapEnvelope(identity, env, tier0Dek, toDek)\n    }\n\n    await adapter.put(vault, HISTORY_COLLECTION, id, next)\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Strategy seam for the optional history + ledger + time-machine\n * service. Core imports `HistoryStrategy` type-only + `NO_HISTORY`\n * stub; real implementations of `saveHistory`, `LedgerStore`,\n * `VaultInstant`, `computePatch`, `diff` etc. are only reachable via\n * `withHistory()` in `./active.ts`.\n *\n * Applications that don't track per-record versioning, don't need the\n * hash-chained audit ledger, and don't restore to past instants ship\n * none of the ~1,880 LOC behind this seam.\n *\n * Strategy contract:\n *\n * - **saveHistory / pruneHistory / clearHistory** — no-ops under\n *   NO_HISTORY. Writes still succeed; no snapshot is captured.\n * - **getHistoryEntries / getVersionEnvelope / diff** — throw under\n *   NO_HISTORY. These are read APIs the consumer would only call\n *   after explicitly asking for history; the throw guides them to\n *   `@noy-db/hub/history`.\n * - **envelopePayloadHash / computePatch** — return empty / `[]`\n *   under NO_HISTORY. These are only used inside the\n *   `if (this.ledger)` branch, which is itself gated by\n *   `buildLedger()` returning null.\n * - **buildLedger** — returns `null` under NO_HISTORY. The Vault's\n *   public `vault.ledger()` accessor throws when null.\n * - **buildVaultInstant** — throws under NO_HISTORY. `vault.at()`\n *   propagates the throw.\n *\n * @internal\n */\n\nimport type {\n  EncryptedEnvelope,\n  NoydbStore,\n  HistoryOptions,\n  PruneOptions,\n} from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from './ledger/store.js'\nimport type { JsonPatch } from './ledger/patch.js'\nimport type { DiffEntry } from './diff.js'\nimport type { VaultInstant, VaultEngine } from './time-machine.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey, RecordIdentity } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { historyIdentity } from './history.js'\n\n/**\n * Options accepted by `HistoryStrategy.buildLedger`. Mirrors the\n * `LedgerStore` constructor verbatim — kept in this file so `core`\n * code never imports the LedgerStore module at runtime.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport interface BuildLedgerOptions {\n  adapter: NoydbStore\n  vault: string\n  encrypted: boolean\n  getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  actor: string\n}\n\n/**\n * @internal\n */\nexport interface HistoryStrategy {\n  /**\n   * Persist a full encrypted envelope snapshot of the prior version\n   * under `_history/{collection}:{id}:{paddedVersion}`. No-op under\n   * `NO_HISTORY`.\n   */\n  saveHistory(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    collection: string,\n    recordId: string,\n    envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  ): Promise<void>\n\n  /**\n   * The identity a snapshot of `collection/recordId@version` must be **sealed\n   * against** — its `_history` storage location (#1041).\n   *\n   * On the port because the kernel writes history snapshots but must not import\n   * `with-commit` to learn its layout. Exposing it here keeps the derivation in\n   * the module that owns the layout, and `saveHistory` uses the same function,\n   * so the sealed identity and the put location cannot drift.\n   */\n  historyIdentity(collection: string, recordId: string, version: number): RecordIdentity\n\n  /**\n   * List history envelopes for a record, newest first. Throws under\n   * `NO_HISTORY` — callers reach this via `collection.history()` /\n   * `collection.getVersion()` / `collection.diff()`, which only work\n   * with the strategy enabled.\n   */\n  getHistoryEntries(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    collection: string,\n    recordId: string,\n    options?: HistoryOptions,\n  ): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope[]>\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch a specific version's envelope. Throws under `NO_HISTORY`.\n   */\n  getVersionEnvelope(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    collection: string,\n    recordId: string,\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>\n\n  /**\n   * Prune history entries by retention rule. Returns `0` under\n   * `NO_HISTORY`.\n   */\n  pruneHistory(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    collection: string,\n    recordId: string | undefined,\n    options: PruneOptions,\n  ): Promise<number>\n\n  /**\n   * Clear all history for vault/collection/record. Returns `0` under\n   * `NO_HISTORY`.\n   */\n  clearHistory(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    collection?: string,\n    recordId?: string,\n  ): Promise<number>\n\n  /**\n   * Crypto-shred (overwrite-to-tombstone) every `_history` version of a\n   * record for GDPR erasure. Returns the number of versions newly\n   * tombstoned, or `0` under `NO_HISTORY` (no history = nothing to shred).\n   */\n  tombstoneHistory(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    collection: string,\n    recordId: string,\n    actor: string,\n    encrypted: boolean,\n  ): Promise<number>\n\n  /**\n   * Re-key every `_history` snapshot of a record from `fromDek` to `toDek`\n   * on a tier move (elevate/demote/putAtTier), mirroring the live-body\n   * rewrap so prior versions are not left decryptable at rest under a tier\n   * the record has moved away from. Optional `tier0Dek` enables the legacy\n   * fallback for snapshots written before this rewrap existed (see\n   * `history.ts` for the full contract). No-op under `NO_HISTORY` (no\n   * history = nothing to rewrap).\n   */\n  rewrapHistory(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    collection: string,\n    recordId: string,\n    fromDek: EnclaveKey,\n    toDek: EnclaveKey,\n    tier0Dek?: EnclaveKey,\n  ): Promise<void>\n\n  /**\n   * Compute the SHA-256 hash of an envelope's encrypted payload, used\n   * by `LedgerStore.append` to track tamper-evidence. Returns the\n   * empty string under `NO_HISTORY` (the call site is gated by\n   * `if (this.ledger)`, so the value is never observed).\n   */\n  envelopePayloadHash(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope | null): Promise<string>\n\n  /**\n   * Compute the JSON patch from `from` → `to`. 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The message names the offending\n * operation and points to the subpath import.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction notEnabled(op: string): Error {\n  return new Error(\n    `${op} requires the history strategy. Import ` +\n    '`{ withHistory }` from \"@noy-db/hub/history\" and pass it to ' +\n    '`createNoydb({ historyStrategy: withHistory() })`.',\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * No-history stub. Snapshots and prune/clear are no-ops; reads and\n * time-machine throw with an actionable message; ledger construction\n * returns null so the write-path's `if (this.ledger)` branch is dead\n * code in the bundle.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const NO_HISTORY: HistoryStrategy = {\n  async saveHistory() {},\n  // Unreachable in practice — `saveHistory` above is a no-op, so nothing is\n  // ever sealed. 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package/dist/chunk-RHVMZSUU.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/port/with/coverage-strategy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Read-coverage sensor contract (#1363, from the #1251 design).\n *\n * ⛔⛔ **THIS IS TELEMETRY. IT IS NOT A CONTROL.** Against an insider holding\n * the device and local keys, it prevents nothing — they hold the DEK, so the\n * plaintext is derivable whatever hub decides. What it does is make bulk\n * extraction **visible early, attributable and loud**. The real remediation is\n * key custody — tiers and per-collection DEKs — and any deployment that reads\n * this as a control has been made *less* safe by it, because it stops building\n * the key boundary that would actually bind.\n *\n * Lives on the `/with` port (the one seam the kernel spine may import\n * statically) so `Collection`/`RecordCodec` can hold the {@link NO_COVERAGE}\n * floor default without a spine→service static import.\n *\n * ⛔ There is deliberately NO refusal path here, and none may be added. The\n * design ruled (#1251 §3) that set-completion ALERTING beats threshold\n * blocking: a refusal at a boundary is a threshold the reader can\n * binary-search, and a signal is not. Adding \"just an option\" to refuse\n * reintroduces exactly the objection the shape was chosen to dissolve.\n *\n * @internal\n */\n\n/**\n * The one event every sensor in the #1251 design emits, whatever its\n * enforcement point — so a controller subscribes once. Emitted on the Noydb\n * event bus as `'coverage:threshold'`.\n */\nexport interface CoverageEvent {\n  /** Authenticated identity the reads are attributed to (`keyring.userId`). */\n  readonly principal: string\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly collection: string\n  /** Records novel to this window (Bloom-estimated; under-reports, never over). */\n  readonly novel: number\n  /** Decrypts served to this principal for this collection, all time. */\n  readonly served: number\n  /** Distinct-ever-decrypted as a fraction of the declared corpus, 0..1 (HLL-estimated). */\n  readonly coverage: number\n  /** ISO-8601 start of the window the crossing was observed in. */\n  readonly window: string\n  /** Which sensor produced it. `'hub/coverage'` for this one. */\n  readonly source: string\n}\n\n/**\n * The decrypt observer: called once per record decrypt, with the record id.\n *\n * ⛔ The id is passed so the sketch can be UPDATED with it, and must never be\n * retained. See `with-audit/coverage/sketch.ts`.\n */\nexport type CoverageObserver = (id: string) => void\n\n/** The minimal emitter slice the sensor needs. Structural, to avoid an import. */\nexport interface CoverageEmitter {\n  emit(event: 'coverage:threshold', data: CoverageEvent): void\n}\n\n/** Field descriptors, read only for the `bulk` axis. Structural by design. */\nexport type CoverageFieldMeta = Readonly<Record<string, { readonly bulk?: 'sensitive' }>>\n\nexport interface CoverageStrategy {\n  /**\n   * Resolve the decrypt observer for one collection, or `undefined` when\n   * nothing should be accounted — which is the un-opted-in case, and also the\n   * opted-in case for a collection declaring no `bulk: 'sensitive'` field.\n   *\n   * `fieldMeta` is a THUNK because `fieldMeta` can be attached to a Collection\n   * after construction (`_applyFieldMeta`, first-wins), and this is called\n   * from the constructor.\n   *\n   * ⛔ `eager` is load-bearing, not informational — see the eager-hydration\n   * note in `with-audit/coverage/accounting.ts`. An eager collection decrypts\n   * its WHOLE corpus at hydration, so a decrypt-point sensor reads 100%\n   * coverage for anyone who opens the vault.\n   */\n  observer(\n    vault: string,\n    collection: string,\n    principal: string,\n    fieldMeta: () => CoverageFieldMeta | undefined,\n    emitter: CoverageEmitter,\n    eager: boolean,\n  ): CoverageObserver | undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * The un-opted-in floor: no observer, therefore no accounting, no allocation\n * per read, and no coverage code in the bundle. `Collection` calls\n * `observer()` once at construction and stores `undefined`; `RecordCodec`'s\n * hot path is a single `!== undefined` test.\n */\nexport const NO_COVERAGE: CoverageStrategy = { observer: () => undefined }\n"],"mappings":";AA6FO,IAAM,cAAgC,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,OAAU;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-S57HTZ6X.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `unilateralWithdrawal`: a non-owner extracts their accessible scope\n * AND disposes of the source copy. Destructive; gated by the default-off\n * fail-closed built-in `client-unilateral-withdraw` policy (checked in the\n * UserApi wrapper).\n *\n * Two source dispositions:\n *  - 'delete'  — delete-closure: the records leave the source vault entirely.\n *  - 'freeze'  — the firm retains a cryptographically-frozen, read-only, write-once\n *                snapshot (hash-pinned in the tamper-evident ledger) while the live\n *                records are removed.\n *\n * Ordering guarantees no data loss: the client's re-keyed export bundle (and the\n * freeze snapshot) are produced BEFORE anything is deleted.\n *\n * The `freezeAndDeleteClosure` core is shared with the two-party approval path\n * (`request-withdrawal.ts`).\n */\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope, sha256Hex } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ReadOnlyError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { resolveAccessibleCollections, buildAccessibleBundle } from './export-accessible.js'\n\nexport const FROZEN_SNAPSHOTS_COLLECTION = '_frozen_snapshots'\nconst ENC = new TextEncoder()\n\n/** 24-hex-char random id (used for withdrawal ids + request ids). */\nexport function randomId(): string {\n  const b = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  return Array.from(b, (x) => x.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')\n}\n\nexport interface FrozenSnapshotRef {\n  readonly withdrawalId: string\n  readonly sha256: string\n  readonly recordCount: number\n  readonly frozenAt: string\n}\n\nexport interface WithdrawAccessibleOptions {\n  /** Legal/contractual basis recorded in the audit (e.g. 'gdpr-art-17'). */\n  readonly legalBasis: string\n  /** Re-key the exported bundle to a new owner secret. */\n  readonly reKey?: { readonly secret: string }\n  /** Source disposition. Default 'delete'. */\n  readonly disposition?: 'delete' | 'freeze'\n  readonly scope?: { readonly collections?: readonly string[] }\n  /** Stable id for idempotent resume (default random). */\n  readonly withdrawalId?: string\n}\n\nexport interface WithdrawResult {\n  readonly bundle: Uint8Array\n  readonly snapshot?: FrozenSnapshotRef\n}\n\n/**\n * Freeze a write-once, hash-pinned snapshot of the current ciphertext for\n * `collections` WITHOUT touching the live records. Returns the snapshot ref.\n *\n * This is the non-destructive core shared by two callers:\n *  - `freezeAndDeleteClosure` (withdrawal, disposition `'freeze'`) — which\n *    pins the snapshot and THEN delete-closures the live records.\n *  - FR-6 `liberateVault` (custody) — which pins a PRE-liberation evidence\n *    snapshot but PRESERVES the live data for the new owner (operational\n *    continuity; liberation transfers, it does not erase).\n *\n * The snapshot put is write-once (CAS expectedVersion 0) and the ledger pin is\n * appended on success, so a crashed run re-run with the same `withdrawalId` is\n * safe. The snapshot is taken under the vault's own firm-owned DEKs — no re-key.\n */\nexport async function freezeSnapshotOnly(\n  vault: Vault,\n  collections: readonly string[],\n  opts: { actorUserId: string; withdrawalId?: string },\n): Promise<FrozenSnapshotRef> {\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n\n  // Enumerate the closure (record ids per collection).\n  const closure: Array<{ collection: string; id: string }> = []\n  for (const c of collections) {\n    for (const id of await adapter.list(vaultName, c)) closure.push({ collection: c, id })\n  }\n\n  const withdrawalId = opts.withdrawalId ?? `wd-${randomId()}`\n  const snap: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>> = {}\n  for (const { collection, id } of closure) {\n    const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, collection, id)\n    if (env) (snap[collection] ??= {})[id] = env\n  }\n  const frozenAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ withdrawalId, frozenAt, by: opts.actorUserId, collections: snap })\n  const sha = await sha256Hex(ENC.encode(body))\n  // Write-once: expectedVersion 0 rejects an overwrite (idempotent resume).\n  await adapter.put(\n    vaultName,\n    FROZEN_SNAPSHOTS_COLLECTION,\n    withdrawalId,\n    buildRecordEnvelope(\n      { collection: FROZEN_SNAPSHOTS_COLLECTION, id: withdrawalId, by: opts.actorUserId, version: 1 },\n      { ts: frozenAt, iv: '', data: body},\n    ),\n    0,\n  )\n  // Hash-pin into the tamper-evident ledger — makes the snapshot provably unaltered.\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: opts.actorUserId, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `withdrawal-frozen-snapshot:${withdrawalId}:${sha}`,\n  })\n  return { withdrawalId, sha256: sha, recordCount: closure.length, frozenAt }\n}\n\n/**\n * Dispose of the source records for `collections`: optionally freeze a\n * write-once hash-pinned snapshot of the original ciphertext, then\n * delete-closure the live records. Returns the snapshot ref on freeze.\n *\n * Caller MUST have produced the portable bundle FIRST — this is destructive.\n * The delete is best-effort + idempotent (re-deleting an absent record is a\n * no-op) and the snapshot put is write-once (CAS expectedVersion 0), so a\n * crashed run re-run with the same `withdrawalId` is safe.\n */\nexport async function freezeAndDeleteClosure(\n  vault: Vault,\n  collections: readonly string[],\n  opts: { disposition: 'delete' | 'freeze'; actorUserId: string; withdrawalId?: string },\n): Promise<FrozenSnapshotRef | undefined> {\n  // freeze: pin a write-once, hash-pinned snapshot BEFORE any delete. The\n  // snapshot-only core is shared with FR-6 liberation (which never deletes).\n  const snapshot = opts.disposition === 'freeze'\n    ? await freezeSnapshotOnly(vault, collections, {\n        actorUserId: opts.actorUserId,\n        ...(opts.withdrawalId ? { withdrawalId: opts.withdrawalId } : {}),\n      })\n    : undefined\n\n  // delete-closure — only after the snapshot is durable.\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n  for (const c of collections) {\n    for (const id of await adapter.list(vaultName, c)) {\n      await vault.collection(c).delete(id)\n    }\n  }\n\n  return snapshot\n}\n\nexport async function withdrawAccessibleData(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: WithdrawAccessibleOptions,\n): Promise<WithdrawResult> {\n  const { keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  const disposition = opts.disposition ?? 'delete'\n\n  // Owner-class roles hold blanket authority — they use extractPartition.\n  if (keyring.role === 'owner' || keyring.role === 'admin') {\n    throw new ReadOnlyError(\n      'unilateralWithdrawal is the scoped self-service path; an owner/admin should use extractPartition',\n    )\n  }\n  // FR-6: a custodian must NOT destructively SEVER the vault. It holds the DEKs\n  // and operates fully, but ownership is claimed only through the audited\n  // Liberate ceremony — never by a one-sided delete/freeze withdrawal. Fires\n  // BEFORE the operator rw-scope path below (where a custodian would otherwise\n  // be rejected with the wrong \"requires rw access\" message).\n  if (keyring.role === 'custodian') {\n    throw new ReadOnlyError(\n      'a custodian cannot destructively withdraw/sever; use vault.custody.liberate for an audited ownership claim',\n    )\n  }\n  // client/viewer are read-only by construction (see hasWritePermission): a\n  // destructive withdrawal they cannot self-serve — they use the two-party\n  // requestWithdrawal flow where firm authority executes the delete-closure.\n  if (keyring.role === 'client' || keyring.role === 'viewer') {\n    throw new ReadOnlyError(\n      'read-only role cannot self-serve a destructive withdrawal — use requestWithdrawal (two-party)',\n    )\n  }\n  // Operator path: destructive ops need rw on the whole scope.\n  const collections = resolveAccessibleCollections(keyring, opts.scope, true)\n  if (!collections || collections.length === 0) {\n    throw new ReadOnlyError(\n      'unilateralWithdrawal requires rw access on the withdrawn collections — use requestWithdrawal for read-only scope',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 1. 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package/dist/chunk-SEE332EV.js

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-ODVPTDPK.js";
-
-// src/kernel/enclave/record-envelope.ts
-function buildRecordEnvelope(identity, body) {
-  return {
-    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
-    _v: identity.version,
-    _ts: body.ts ?? (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
-    _iv: body.iv,
-    _data: body.data,
-    ...identity.by !== void 0 ? { _by: identity.by } : {},
-    ...identity.tier !== void 0 && identity.tier > 0 ? { _tier: identity.tier } : {},
-    ...body.cek !== void 0 ? { _cek: body.cek } : {},
-    ...body.provenance !== void 0 ? { _source: body.provenance.source, _sourceTs: body.provenance.sourceTs } : {},
-    ...body.extra ?? {}
-  };
-}
-async function buildSealedRecordEnvelope(identity, seal, body) {
-  const sealed = await seal(identity);
-  return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, {
-    ...body,
-    iv: sealed._iv,
-    data: sealed._data,
-    cek: sealed._cek
-  });
-}
-
-// src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/tombstone.ts
-function isTombstoneShape(envelope) {
-  return envelope._data === "" && envelope._cek === void 0 && envelope._del !== true;
-}
-function isTombstone(envelope, encrypted) {
-  if (!encrypted) return false;
-  return isTombstoneShape(envelope);
-}
-function buildTombstone(ref, version, actor) {
-  return buildRecordEnvelope(
-    { ...ref, version, ...actor ? { by: actor } : {} },
-    { iv: "", data: "" }
-  );
-}
-function isDeleteMarker(envelope) {
-  return envelope._del === true;
-}
-function buildDeleteMarker(ref, version, actor) {
-  return {
-    ...buildRecordEnvelope(
-      { ...ref, version, ...actor ? { by: actor } : {} },
-      { iv: "", data: "" }
-    ),
-    _del: true
-  };
-}
-
-export {
-  buildRecordEnvelope,
-  buildSealedRecordEnvelope,
-  isTombstoneShape,
-  isTombstone,
-  buildTombstone,
-  isDeleteMarker,
-  buildDeleteMarker
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-SEE332EV.js.map

package/dist/chunk-SEE332EV.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/record-envelope.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/tombstone.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The one place an `EncryptedEnvelope` is constructed (#1051).\n *\n * ## Why this exists\n *\n * 49 files built envelopes with an object literal, bypassing\n * `RecordCodec.buildEnvelope` (which had 4 callers). That is **writer\n * fan-out**: N independent places each had to know the envelope contract, and\n * nothing checked that they agreed.\n *\n * It only became load-bearing with #1041. Binding a record's identity into the\n * AEAD requires every writer to supply that identity — and a writer that\n * doesn't produces data the reader rejects. Reader fan-out you fix by threading\n * an argument through call sites; **writer fan-out cannot be migrated\n * incrementally**, because the first migrated writer emits envelopes the\n * unmigrated readers refuse.\n *\n * ## Why adopting it is safe\n *\n * `identity` is **required but not yet used**. Output is byte-identical to the\n * literals it replaces, so every producer can migrate independently and the\n * existing suite verifies each step. The behaviour change happens **once**,\n * when AAD is switched on here — by which point every writer already supplies\n * identity, and the compiler proved it.\n *\n * That ordering is deliberate: a required-but-unused parameter converts \"did\n * we find every writer?\" from a question into a compile error, the same trick\n * that made the `NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION` single-sourcing safe in #1048.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../types.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../types.js'\nimport type { RecordIdentity } from './record-aad.js'\n\n/** The body an envelope carries, independent of who is writing it. */\nexport interface RecordEnvelopeBody {\n  /** AES-GCM IV, base64. Empty string for a plaintext or tombstone envelope. */\n  readonly iv: string\n  /** Ciphertext (or plaintext JSON when the collection stores plaintext). */\n  readonly data: string\n  /** ISO timestamp. Defaults to now — pass it when the caller has a real one. */\n  readonly ts?: string | undefined\n  /** Wrapped per-record CEK, when the record has one. */\n  readonly cek?: string | undefined\n  readonly provenance?: { readonly source: string; readonly sourceTs: string } | undefined\n  /**\n   * Slots the envelope may additionally carry.\n   *\n   * `_tier`, `_by` and `_v` are deliberately NOT here — they come from\n   * `identity`, which is the single source for all three. See\n   * {@link buildRecordEnvelope}.\n   */\n  readonly extra?: Partial<Pick<EncryptedEnvelope, '_det' | '_sealed' | '_vdig' | '_bidx'>> | undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an envelope for `identity`.\n *\n * ## `identity` is the SINGLE SOURCE for `_by`, `_tier` and `_v`\n *\n * All three are stamped from it, and `RecordEnvelopeBody` deliberately cannot\n * carry them. That is not tidiness — it is what makes the AAD binding safe.\n *\n * The caller encrypts the body under AAD derived from `{collection, id, tier,\n * by, version}`. A reader recomputes that AAD from the address it fetched from\n * plus `_tier`/`_by`/`_v` read back **off the envelope** (`recordAadFor`). So if the\n * identity a writer *declares* could differ from the fields it *stamps*, the\n * AAD would not reproduce and the record would be undecryptable — silently, at\n * write time, discoverable only on the next read, and invisible to every gate\n * because the envelope is perfectly well-formed.\n *\n * An earlier draft took both and asserted they agreed. The assertion fired 230\n * times on the existing tree, which is the argument against it: a rule that can\n * be violated is a rule someone must remember. Taking one source removes the\n * violation instead of reporting it.\n */\nexport function buildRecordEnvelope(\n  identity: RecordIdentity,\n  body: RecordEnvelopeBody,\n): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  return {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: identity.version,\n    _ts: body.ts ?? new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: body.iv,\n    _data: body.data,\n    ...(identity.by !== undefined ? { _by: identity.by } : {}),\n    ...(identity.tier !== undefined && identity.tier > 0 ? { _tier: identity.tier } : {}),\n    ...(body.cek !== undefined ? { _cek: body.cek } : {}),\n    ...(body.provenance !== undefined\n      ? { _source: body.provenance.source, _sourceTs: body.provenance.sourceTs }\n      : {}),\n    ...(body.extra ?? {}),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an envelope from an already-sealed body — the output of\n * `writeEnvelopeBody` — **without the caller ever naming `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`**.\n *\n * This exists because of a guard, and the guard was right. Migrating\n * `writeEnvelopeBody` callers to {@link buildRecordEnvelope} meant rewriting\n * `...body` (a spread, which names nothing) into `iv: body._iv, data:\n * body._data, cek: body._cek` — and `enclave-body-only` failed it: three new\n * protected-body accesses in files that previously had zero.\n *\n * That is the correct outcome rather than an obstacle. #1051 exists to move\n * knowledge of the envelope's shape *inward*; a migration that spreads the\n * protected field names outward to every caller would have defeated its own\n * purpose while looking like progress. The pairing belongs here.\n *\n * ## It takes a SEALER, not a sealed body — and that is load-bearing (#1041)\n *\n * The obvious shape is `(identity, alreadySealedBody, rest)`. That requires the\n * caller to name the identity TWICE — once for `writeEnvelopeBody` and once\n * here — and the two must agree byte for byte or the record is sealed under\n * AAD no reader can reproduce.\n *\n * They did not agree. `with-party/broker/seed.ts` sealed against\n * `{collection, id}` and stamped `{collection, id, by}`, so every broker seed\n * became unreadable the moment AAD switched on. 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With the wrapped\n * per-record CEK gone, the body — and every history version under the same\n * CEK — is permanently undecryptable, while the record KEY survives so the\n * version counter and \"record existed and was erased\" persist for the audit\n * ledger.\n *\n * These two helpers are the pure, collection-independent core of that\n * contract: {@link buildTombstone} mints the shape, {@link isTombstone}\n * recognises it on the read path. The orchestration that *writes* a tombstone\n * (`_writeTombstone`) and drives `vault.forget()` lives with the collection /\n * vault; it calls into these.\n */\nimport { type EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../record-envelope.js'\nimport type { RecordRef } from '../record-aad.js'\n\n/**\n * Shape-only tombstone recognition for layers that have no per-collection\n * context (the sync engine, #590): a tombstone carries an empty `_data` and\n * no wrapped CEK. No live envelope can match — record bodies never serialize\n * to the empty string (the `_sync` meta envelope carries non-empty `_data`,\n * and legacy migration envelopes carry non-empty `_iv`/`_data`).\n */\nexport function isTombstoneShape(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): boolean {\n  return envelope._data === '' && envelope._cek === undefined && envelope._del !== true\n}\n\n/**\n * Is this envelope a crypto-shred tombstone?\n *\n * A tombstone carries no body (`_data` empty) and no wrapped CEK (`_cek`\n * absent) — decrypting it would call `decrypt('', '', dek)` → an AES-GCM\n * throw, so every read choke point must short-circuit to `null` instead.\n *\n * `encrypted` is the collection's encryption flag: on an unencrypted\n * collection there are no envelopes to shred, so nothing is ever a tombstone.\n * (Legacy migration envelopes carry non-empty `_iv`/`_data`, so they are not\n * tombstones and stay readable.)\n */\nexport function isTombstone(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, encrypted: boolean): boolean {\n  if (!encrypted) return false\n  return isTombstoneShape(envelope)\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a tombstone envelope from a record's live version + actor.\n *\n * Keeps `_v` (the displaced version) so the counter is monotonic across the\n * shred, stamps a fresh `_ts`, and records `_by` when an actor is supplied.\n * Deliberately omits `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`/`_det` — that omission *is* the\n * erasure.\n */\nexport function buildTombstone(\n  ref: RecordRef,\n  version: number,\n  actor: string,\n): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  // `actor` rides on the IDENTITY, not the body — it is stamped as `_by` and\n  // bound into the AAD from that one source (#1041).\n  return buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { ...ref, version, ...(actor ? { by: actor } : {}) },\n    { iv: '', data: '' },\n  )\n}\n\n/** #589: is this envelope an ordinary-delete marker (version-ordered, reads as absent)? */\nexport function isDeleteMarker(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): boolean {\n  return envelope._del === true\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a delete marker from the deleted record's next version + actor (#589).\n * Minted at the NEXT version (`existing._v + 1`) — unlike `buildTombstone`, which\n * keeps the displaced `_v` — so it wins convergence over the pre-delete copy and a\n * re-create can still win over it at a higher version.\n */\nexport function buildDeleteMarker(\n  ref: RecordRef,\n  version: number,\n  actor: string,\n): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  // `_del` is not one of buildRecordEnvelope's declared slots — a delete marker\n  // is a distinct envelope class, not a record body — so it is stamped here.\n  return {\n    ...buildRecordEnvelope(\n      { ...ref, version, ...(actor ? { by: actor } : {}) },\n      { iv: '', data: '' },\n    ),\n    _del: true,\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AA6EO,SAAS,oBACd,UACA,MACmB;AACnB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IACb,KAAK,KAAK,OAAM,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACvC,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACV,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,GAAI,SAAS,OAAO,SAAY,EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,GAAI,SAAS,SAAS,UAAa,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnF,GAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAY,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnD,GAAI,KAAK,eAAe,SACpB,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,WAAW,SAAS,IACvE,CAAC;AAAA,IACL,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AA8BA,eAAsB,0BACpB,UACA,MACA,MAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;AAClC,SAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU;AAAA,IACnC,GAAG;AAAA,IACH,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,IACX,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACb,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd,CAAC;AACH;;;AC7GO,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAsC;AACrE,SAAO,SAAS,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,UAAa,SAAS,SAAS;AACnF;AAcO,SAAS,YAAY,UAA6B,WAA6B;AACpF,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO;AACvB,SAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ;AAClC;AAUO,SAAS,eACd,KACA,SACA,OACmB;AAGnB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,GAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,EAAG;AAAA,IACnD,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,UAAsC;AACnE,SAAO,SAAS,SAAS;AAC3B;AAQO,SAAS,kBACd,KACA,SACA,OACmB;AAGnB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,GAAG;AAAA,MACD,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,GAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,EAAG;AAAA,MACnD,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACrB;AAAA,IACA,MAAM;AAAA,EACR;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-SOIQ4MM4.js

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  dekKey
-} from "./chunk-JCN44NCY.js";
-import {
-  TierNotGrantedError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
-
-// src/with-party/team/tiers.ts
-function assertTierAccess(keyring, collection, tier) {
-  if (tier <= 0) return;
-  if (keyring.role === "owner" || keyring.role === "admin" || keyring.role === "custodian") return;
-  if (!keyring.deks.has(dekKey(collection, tier))) {
-    throw new TierNotGrantedError(collection, tier);
-  }
-}
-
-export {
-  assertTierAccess
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-SOIQ4MM4.js.map

package/dist/chunk-SOIQ4MM4.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/tiers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Hierarchical access — tier-aware keyring helpers.\n *\n * The keyring's existing `deks: Map<string, CryptoKey>` is keyed by\n * collection name. extends the key space:\n *\n *   `'invoices'`      — tier-0 DEK (unchanged from v0.x)\n *   `'invoices#1'`    — tier-1 DEK\n *   `'invoices#2'`    — tier-2 DEK\n *\n * Tier 0 keeps the bare collection name so any keyring written\n * before tiers existed loads without migration. Tiers ≥ 1 use `#N`\n * suffixes that\n * would be invalid as user-supplied collection names (see\n * `ReservedCollectionNameError` — `#` is reserved).\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { TierNotGrantedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/** Canonical DEK key for a given collection + tier. Tier 0 → bare name. */\n// Moved to `kernel/tier-visibility.ts` (#1042): the kernel needs it to resolve\n// a pulled envelope's DEK, and `port-layering` forbids the spine importing a\n// `with-*` service. Re-exported so every existing importer is unchanged.\nimport { dekKey } from '../../kernel/tier-visibility.js'\nexport { dekKey }\n\n/**\n * Returns the user's effective clearance for a given collection: the\n * maximum tier for which their keyring holds a DEK. Falls back to 0\n * when the user has only the tier-0 DEK (or none — the getDEK caller\n * will raise separately).\n */\nexport function effectiveClearance(keyring: UnlockedKeyring, collection: string): number {\n  let max = 0\n  const prefix = `${collection}#`\n  for (const key of keyring.deks.keys()) {\n    if (!key.startsWith(prefix)) continue\n    const suffix = key.slice(prefix.length)\n    const n = Number.parseInt(suffix, 10)\n    if (Number.isFinite(n) && n > max) max = n\n  }\n  return max\n}\n\n/**\n * Assert the caller is cleared for the requested tier. Owners and\n * admins always pass (they can mint any new tier DEK on demand);\n * other roles must already hold the tier DEK — via a prior grant or\n * an active delegation — otherwise this throws `TierNotGrantedError`.\n *\n * This gate runs BEFORE `getDEK()` on the mutation path so a\n * non-cleared operator never has the opportunity to silently\n * auto-create a tier DEK they shouldn't have.\n */\nexport function assertTierAccess(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  collection: string,\n  tier: number,\n): void {\n  if (tier <= 0) return\n  // FR-6: custodian operates every collection at every tier (admin-level\n  // operational authority), so it may mint a tier DEK on demand like admin.\n  if (keyring.role === 'owner' || keyring.role === 'admin' || keyring.role === 'custodian') return\n  if (!keyring.deks.has(dekKey(collection, tier))) {\n    throw new TierNotGrantedError(collection, tier)\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAyDO,SAAS,iBACd,SACA,YACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,QAAQ,EAAG;AAGf,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAa;AAC1F,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG;AAC/C,UAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,EAChD;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-SYVZW77S.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-shape/manifest/types.ts","../src/with-shape/manifest/storage.ts","../src/with-shape/manifest/derive.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The pod-wide **schema manifest** record type (#941).\n *\n * This is an INDEX, not a full-inline manifest: `SchemaManifest.collections`\n * carries per-collection *metadata* (generation / content hash / field ids),\n * never the JSON Schema body itself. The JSON Schema stays the source of\n * truth at `_schemas/<collection>`, encrypted under that collection's own\n * DEK (see `with-shape/persisted-schemas`). Inlining full schemas into one\n * pod-wide manifest record would either leak every collection's schema to a\n * principal scoped to a single collection, or force the manifest itself\n * onto a collection-DEK it has no business holding — the index preserves\n * per-collection DEK isolation while still giving a single place to answer\n * \"what schema generation is this pod at, and does collection X's stored\n * schema match its declared content hash.\"\n *\n * `aggregateHash` binds the whole per-collection index's content: it is\n * `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))`, so any change to any collection's\n * entry (a new generation, a changed hash, added/renamed field ids) changes\n * `aggregateHash` too. Canonical JSON (sorted object keys, no whitespace)\n * makes the hash independent of the map's key insertion order.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\n/** Per-collection entry inside a {@link SchemaManifest}'s `collections` index. */\nexport interface SchemaManifestEntry {\n  /** The vault-wide schema-fence generation this collection's schema was last written at. */\n  readonly generation: number\n  /** SHA-256 (hex) of the collection's canonicalised JSON Schema (see `persisted-schemas/derive.ts`). */\n  readonly contentHash: string\n  /** Stable per-field ids (#946), keyed by the field's current name. Absent when the collection has none. */\n  readonly fieldIds?: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * The pod-wide schema manifest — one record per pod, stored at\n * `_manifest/schema` (see `storage.ts`). An INDEX over the per-collection\n * `_schemas/<collection>` entries, not the schemas themselves.\n */\nexport interface SchemaManifest {\n  readonly v: 1\n  readonly kind: 'schema'\n  /** Pod-wide schema-fence generation (`FenceDoc.currentSchemaVersion`) as of this manifest's derivation. */\n  readonly generation: number\n  /** Per-collection index: collection name → its manifest entry. */\n  readonly collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry>\n  /** `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))` — the pod-wide content binding over the index. */\n  readonly aggregateHash: string\n}\n\n/** The record id the schema manifest is stored under inside `_manifest`. */\nexport const MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID = 'schema' as const\n","/**\n * Read / write the pod-wide `_manifest/schema` envelope.\n *\n * Mirrors `with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.ts`'s shape: the same\n * standard noy-db record envelope, AES-GCM encrypted with a collection DEK\n * (here, the `_manifest` collection's own DEK — the manifest INDEX\n * discloses collection names + hashes + generations + field ids, metadata\n * rather than schema bodies, so it gets the same encryption grain as\n * `_schemas` itself).\n *\n * Storage layout:\n *\n *   <vault>/_manifest/schema   →   EncryptedEnvelope\n *\n * Unlike `persisted-schemas/storage.ts` (which takes an already-resolved\n * `EnclaveKey`), these functions take a `getDEK` resolver and call\n * `getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)` themselves — there is exactly one manifest\n * record per pod, so there is no per-collection DEK the caller needs to\n * pick; resolving it here keeps every manifest call-site symmetric.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { buildSealedRecordEnvelope, openEnvelopeJson, writeEnvelopeBody, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { canonicalJson, sha256Hex } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_COLLECTION } from './reserved-collections.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, type SchemaManifest, type SchemaManifestEntry } from './types.js'\n\n/** A resolver for a collection's DEK — the same shape as `Vault`'s internal `getDEK`. */\nexport type GetManifestDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/**\n * A decrypted schema-manifest read paired with the wrapping envelope's `_v`\n * — the optimistic-concurrency token. Pass `version` back to\n * {@link saveSchemaManifest} (via `writeSchemaManifest`'s `expectedVersion`)\n * to make the write a strict CAS.\n */\nexport interface LoadedSchemaManifest {\n  /** Wrapping envelope `_v`. */\n  readonly version: number\n  /** Decrypted schema manifest. */\n  readonly manifest: SchemaManifest\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the `_manifest/schema` envelope together with its wrapping `_v`.\n * Returns `undefined` when no manifest has ever been written, when the\n * envelope fails to decrypt (wrong DEK), or when it doesn't parse as a\n * `v: 1, kind: 'schema'` manifest.\n */\nexport async function loadSchemaManifestEntry(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetManifestDEK,\n): Promise<LoadedSchemaManifest | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, MANIFEST_COLLECTION, MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  const dek = await getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: MANIFEST_COLLECTION, id: MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID }, envelope, dek)\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(plaintext) as SchemaManifest\n    if (parsed.v !== 1 || parsed.kind !== 'schema') return undefined\n    return { version: envelope._v, manifest: parsed }\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt and persist the schema manifest as a strict CAS write:\n * `expectedVersion` must match the stored envelope's `_v` (0 when no\n * envelope exists yet) or `store.put` throws `ConflictError` — surfaced by\n * `writer.ts`'s `writeSchemaManifest` as `ManifestConflictError` rather than\n * retried.\n */\nexport async function saveSchemaManifest(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  manifest: SchemaManifest,\n  expectedVersion: number,\n  getDEK: GetManifestDEK,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const dek = await getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)\n  const json = JSON.stringify(manifest)\n  const env = await buildSealedRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: MANIFEST_COLLECTION, id: MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, version: expectedVersion + 1 },\n    (identity) => writeEnvelopeBody(identity, json, dek),\n    {},\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, MANIFEST_COLLECTION, MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, env, expectedVersion)\n}\n\n/**\n * `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))` — the pod-wide content binding\n * over a schema manifest's per-collection index. Canonical JSON sorts\n * object keys at every depth, so the result is independent of the map's\n * key insertion order. Shared by the writer's tests and (#941 Task 3) the\n * derivation path, so the hash is computed identically everywhere.\n */\nexport async function computeAggregateHash(\n  collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry>,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))\n}\n","/**\n * Derive the pod-wide {@link SchemaManifest} from the per-collection\n * `_schemas/<collection>` records — the source of truth (#941 Task 3).\n *\n * The manifest is an INDEX, never a cache with independent state: every\n * field in a {@link SchemaManifestEntry} is a direct projection of the\n * matching `PersistedSchemaEnvelope` (`hash` → `contentHash`, `fieldIds` →\n * `fieldIds`, `generation` → `generation`, falling back to the live fence's\n * `currentSchemaVersion` for a legacy pre-#946 envelope that never got a\n * generation stamp). Re-running this function against the same stored state\n * always produces the same manifest — that's what makes round-trip identity\n * (AC #2: dump → restore → re-derive matches the original) hold for free,\n * with no special-cased restore logic.\n *\n * A collection whose `_schemas/<collection>` envelope decrypts successfully\n * but has no derivable content (`hash === null` — a stub envelope for a\n * non-Zod validator) is legitimately omitted from the index: there is no\n * content hash to bind.\n *\n * ## Scoped principals: \"cannot decrypt\" is NOT \"doesn't exist\"\n *\n * A `_schemas/<collection>` envelope is encrypted under **that data\n * collection's own DEK** — the same key its records use — NOT a shared\n * `_schemas`-wide key. In a team vault, a collection-scoped grantee (e.g.\n * `grant(..., { role: 'operator', permissions: { invoices: 'rw' } })`) holds\n * only the DEKs their `permissions` name, plus every system-prefixed (`_*`)\n * collection's DEK — `_manifest` included, by `grant()`'s \"propagate system\n * collections to every role\" rule (`keyring.ts`). So a member scoped to\n * `invoices` CAN decrypt `_manifest/schema` (the pod-wide index) but CANNOT\n * decrypt a sibling's `_schemas/customers` envelope — even though that\n * envelope is right there in `store.list(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION)`.\n *\n * `lookupDEK` (the {@link LookupDEK} passed in) reflects this: it returns\n * `undefined` for a collection name whose DEK the caller does not hold —\n * deliberately NEVER minting a fresh one (see the module doc on\n * `LookupDEK` for why). This function distinguishes that case\n * (`undecodableCollections`) from \"the schema envelope legitimately has no\n * derivable content\" (`hash === null`) — the caller (`sync.ts`) MUST treat\n * an incomplete view differently: writing a manifest derived from a\n * partial view would silently drop every collection this principal can't\n * see. See `sync.ts`'s module doc for how the sync path handles this.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { loadFence } from '../schema-update/fence.js'\nimport { loadPersistedSchema, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION } from '../persisted-schemas/storage.js'\nimport { computeAggregateHash } from './storage.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { SchemaManifest, SchemaManifestEntry } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * A NON-MINTING DEK lookup: returns the collection's DEK if the caller\n * already holds it, `undefined` otherwise. Deliberately distinct from\n * `storage.ts`'s `GetManifestDEK` (which mints+persists a fresh DEK for an\n * absent collection — correct for a caller about to WRITE that collection,\n * e.g. `_manifest` itself). `deriveSchemaManifest` only ever READS sibling\n * collections it never created and has no business minting keys for — an\n * absent DEK here means \"not my collection to see,\" never \"new collection\n * that needs a key.\" Minting here would be worse than a no-op: it would\n * silently persist a garbage DEK into the caller's OWN `_keyring/<user>`\n * file (via `ensureCollectionDEK`'s `persistKeyring` side effect) that\n * still can't decrypt anything — see `sync.ts` / `with-pod/open.ts`'s\n * fix notes (#941 review).\n */\nexport type LookupDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined>\n\nexport interface DeriveSchemaManifestResult {\n  /** The derived manifest — an index over every collection this principal could decrypt. */\n  readonly manifest: SchemaManifest\n  /**\n   * Names present in `_schemas` (per `store.list`) whose envelope this\n   * principal could NOT decrypt — either no DEK held for that collection,\n   * or the DEK held failed to decrypt/parse it (treated the same: the\n   * caller cannot verify what's there, so it cannot safely be omitted or\n   * asserted). Empty for a principal with full visibility (typically the\n   * owner/admin/custodian). Non-empty means `manifest.collections` is\n   * DEFINITELY INCOMPLETE relative to the pod's true collection set —\n   * see `sync.ts` for why that must gate whether the manifest gets written.\n   */\n  readonly undecodableCollections: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the fence generation + every `_schemas/<collection>` envelope this\n * principal can decrypt, and project them into a fresh {@link SchemaManifest}.\n * `lookupDEK` is called once per collection found under `_schemas` (never\n * mints — see {@link LookupDEK}). Names whose DEK isn't held, or whose\n * envelope fails to decrypt/parse despite holding a DEK, are reported via\n * `undecodableCollections` rather than silently dropped from the result.\n */\nexport async function deriveSchemaManifest(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  lookupDEK: LookupDEK,\n): Promise<DeriveSchemaManifestResult> {\n  const fence = await loadFence(store, vault)\n  const collectionNames = await store.list(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION)\n\n  const collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry> = {}\n  const undecodableCollections: string[] = []\n  for (const name of collectionNames) {\n    const dek = await lookupDEK(name)\n    if (dek === undefined) {\n      undecodableCollections.push(name) // present in _schemas, but not decodable by this principal\n      continue\n    }\n\n    const payload = await loadPersistedSchema(store, vault, name, dek)\n    if (!payload) {\n      // Held a DEK but still couldn't decrypt/parse — cannot distinguish\n      // \"wrong key after all\" from real corruption from here; treat as\n      // undecodable (never silently drop) rather than \"no content.\"\n      undecodableCollections.push(name)\n      continue\n    }\n    if (payload.hash === null) continue // legitimately no derivable content (stub envelope)\n\n    const entry: SchemaManifestEntry = {\n      generation: payload.generation ?? fence.currentSchemaVersion,\n      contentHash: payload.hash,\n    }\n    collections[name] = payload.fieldIds !== undefined ? { ...entry, fieldIds: payload.fieldIds } : entry\n  }\n\n  const aggregateHash = await computeAggregateHash(collections)\n  const manifest: SchemaManifest = { v: 1, kind: 'schema', generation: fence.currentSchemaVersion, collections, aggregateHash }\n  return { manifest, undecodableCollections }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDO,IAAM,4BAA4B;;;ACAzC,eAAsB,wBACpB,OACA,OACA,QAC2C;AAC3C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,qBAAqB,yBAAyB;AACtF,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,qBAAqB,IAAI,0BAA0B,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG;AAC1H,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AACnC,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,SAAU,QAAO;AACvD,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,EAClD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AASA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,OACA,UACA,iBACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5C,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ;AACpC,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,IAChB,EAAE,YAAY,qBAAqB,IAAI,2BAA2B,SAAS,kBAAkB,EAAE;AAAA,IAC/F,CAAC,aAAa,kBAAkB,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACnD,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,qBAAqB,2BAA2B,KAAK,eAAe;AAC7F;AASA,eAAsB,qBACpB,aACiB;AACjB,SAAO,UAAU,cAAc,WAAW,CAAC;AAC7C;;;ACZA,eAAsB,qBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACqC;AACrC,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK;AAC1C,QAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAElE,QAAM,cAAmD,CAAC;AAC1D,QAAM,yBAAmC,CAAC;AAC1C,aAAW,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAClC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI;AAChC,QAAI,QAAQ,QAAW;AACrB,6BAAuB,KAAK,IAAI;AAChC;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,oBAAoB,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG;AACjE,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AAIZ,6BAAuB,KAAK,IAAI;AAChC;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAM;AAE3B,UAAM,QAA6B;AAAA,MACjC,YAAY,QAAQ,cAAc,MAAM;AAAA,MACxC,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,gBAAY,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,EAClG;AAEA,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,qBAAqB,WAAW;AAC5D,QAAM,WAA2B,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,sBAAsB,aAAa,cAAc;AAC5H,SAAO,EAAE,UAAU,uBAAuB;AAC5C;","names":[]}