@noy-db/hub 0.8.0-pre.0 → 0.9.0-pre.0

package/dist/{chunk-CF5UU4S7.js → chunk-WHOKGHJ3.js}

@@ -4,25 +4,25 @@ import {
 import {
   bindDistinctReducers,
   reducerBuilder
-} from "./chunk-F2TDU7MQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-BJH77UY2.js";
 import {
   LiveMaintainer
 } from "./chunk-VHM7HCKB.js";
 import {
   gateTerminal
-} from "./chunk-5O7D6ZTW.js";
+} from "./chunk-DHU2AQ6T.js";
 import {
   readPath
-} from "./chunk-HLEK5VAN.js";
+} from "./chunk-BUE7R3B5.js";
 import {
   applyI18nLocale
-} from "./chunk-GHLTDZRS.js";
+} from "./chunk-V55JASXO.js";
 import {
   viaBinder
-} from "./chunk-Z5HTYMMQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-PTJY5R3O.js";
 import {
   GroupCardinalityError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/with-lookup/reduce/reduction.ts
 function reduceRecords(records, spec) {
@@ -754,4 +754,4 @@ export {
   compareReduced,
   GroupedReduction
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CF5UU4S7.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WHOKGHJ3.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-LGRLME4M.js → chunk-X2RP4TO5.js}

@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 import {
   createNoydb
-} from "./chunk-T2LBQ5DV.js";
+} from "./chunk-FSQNGPHH.js";
 import {
   deriveSchemaManifest
-} from "./chunk-SYVZW77S.js";
+} from "./chunk-5LMCVBMY.js";
 import {
   loadFence
-} from "./chunk-L7DOS3TE.js";
+} from "./chunk-BMHQHH7Q.js";
 import {
   readPod,
   readPodRedirect,
   signRecord,
   verifyPodHeader,
   verifyRecord
-} from "./chunk-HBPPGWUM.js";
+} from "./chunk-RDOEOPOI.js";
 import {
   loadKeyring
-} from "./chunk-M7NI3IWE.js";
+} from "./chunk-45VHWE4C.js";
 import {
   ConflictError,
   MigrationRequiredError,
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import {
   RedirectDepthExceededError,
   RedirectLoopError,
   RedirectUnreachableError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/with-pod/pod-store.ts
 var BUNDLE_STORE_VERSION = 1;
@@ -64,16 +64,16 @@ function wrapPodStore(bundle, options) {
     }
   }
   async function flush(vault) {
-    const snapshot = snapshots.get(vault) ?? {};
-    const format = {
-      _noydb_bundle_store: BUNDLE_STORE_VERSION,
-      vault,
-      ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
-      data: snapshot
-    };
-    const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(format));
-    const expectedVersion = versions.get(vault) ?? null;
     for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_CONFLICT_RETRIES; attempt++) {
+      const snapshot = snapshots.get(vault) ?? {};
+      const format = {
+        _noydb_bundle_store: BUNDLE_STORE_VERSION,
+        vault,
+        ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+        data: snapshot
+      };
+      const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(format));
+      const expectedVersion = versions.get(vault) ?? null;
       try {
         const { version: newVersion } = await bundle.writeBundle(vault, bytes, expectedVersion);
         versions.set(vault, newVersion);
@@ -286,4 +286,4 @@ export {
   followRedirects,
   open
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LGRLME4M.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-X2RP4TO5.js.map

package/dist/chunk-X2RP4TO5.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-pod/pod-store.ts","../src/with-pod/redirect.ts","../src/with-pod/open.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { NoydbStore, NoydbPodStore, VaultSnapshot, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { ConflictError, PodVersionConflictError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// ─── Bundle format ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst BUNDLE_STORE_VERSION = 1 as const\n\n/**\n * Wire format written by `wrapPodStore`. A JSON-serialised object that\n * contains the entire `VaultSnapshot` (all encrypted envelopes) plus a small\n * header for integrity checking. The envelopes inside are already AES-GCM\n * encrypted by core — the bundle bytes themselves are not additionally\n * encrypted, but they are safe to store on untrusted blob hosts because\n * every record inside is already ciphertext.\n *\n * @internal\n */\ninterface BundleStoreData {\n  readonly _noydb_bundle_store: typeof BUNDLE_STORE_VERSION\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly ts: string\n  readonly data: VaultSnapshot\n}\n\n// ─── Options ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface WrapPodStoreOptions {\n  /**\n   * When `true` (default), every `put()` and `delete()` flushes the full\n   * vault snapshot to the bundle backend. Set to `false` for bulk operations\n   * and call `store.flush(vaultId)` manually.\n   */\n  autoFlush?: boolean\n}\n\n// ─── Extended NoydbStore with flush/batch ───────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface WrappedPodNoydbStore extends NoydbStore {\n  /** Manually flush the in-memory snapshot to the bundle backend. */\n  flush(vaultId: string): Promise<void>\n  /**\n   * Run a batch of mutations without flushing until the callback completes.\n   * A single flush is performed at the end.\n   */\n  batch(vaultId: string, fn: () => Promise<void>): Promise<void>\n}\n\n// ─── wrapPodStore ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst MAX_CONFLICT_RETRIES = 3\n\n/**\n * Convert a `NoydbPodStore` (blob-oriented read/write with OCC) into the\n * standard six-method `NoydbStore` interface expected by `createNoydb({ store })`.\n *\n * Bundle stores operate on the entire vault as a single serialised unit —\n * ideal for backends like Google Drive, WebDAV, or iCloud Drive that work\n * best with whole-file I/O rather than per-record KV operations.\n *\n * ## Optimistic concurrency\n *\n * The wrapper tracks the `version` token from the last `readBundle` and\n * passes it as `expectedVersion` on every flush. On\n * `PodVersionConflictError`, it re-reads, merges the remote snapshot\n * (last-write-wins per record key), and retries (max 3 attempts).\n *\n * ## Flush modes\n *\n * By default, flushes on every mutation (O(vault size) per write). Options:\n * - `autoFlush: false` + explicit `store.flush(vaultId)` calls\n * - `store.batch(vaultId, async () => { ... })` — defers flush until end\n * - Pair with `syncPolicy: { push: { mode: 'debounce' } }` from \n */\nexport function wrapPodStore(\n  bundle: NoydbPodStore,\n  options?: WrapPodStoreOptions,\n): WrappedPodNoydbStore {\n  const autoFlush = options?.autoFlush !== false\n\n  // Per-vault state\n  const snapshots = new Map<string, VaultSnapshot>()\n  const versions = new Map<string, string | null>()\n  const loaded = new Set<string>()\n\n  // Batch mode: when > 0, suppress auto-flush\n  let batchDepth = 0\n\n  // #908 — in-flight loads, keyed by vault. Without this, every concurrent\n  // caller issued its own `readBundle` and then REPLACED `snapshots` with a\n  // freshly parsed object — orphaning the mutations earlier callers had\n  // already made to the object they were handed. 100 racing puts kept 1.\n  const loading = new Map<string, Promise<VaultSnapshot>>()\n\n  async function load(vault: string): Promise<VaultSnapshot> {\n    if (loaded.has(vault)) return snapshots.get(vault)!\n\n    const inFlight = loading.get(vault)\n    if (inFlight) return inFlight\n\n    const pending = (async () => {\n      const result = await bundle.readBundle(vault)\n      if (result) {\n        const text = new TextDecoder().decode(result.bytes)\n        const format = JSON.parse(text) as BundleStoreData\n        snapshots.set(vault, format.data)\n        versions.set(vault, result.version)\n      } else {\n        snapshots.set(vault, {})\n        versions.set(vault, null)\n      }\n\n      loaded.add(vault)\n      return snapshots.get(vault)!\n    })()\n\n    loading.set(vault, pending)\n    try {\n      return await pending\n    } finally {\n      // Clear on failure too, so a transient read error does not poison\n      // every later load of this vault with a rejected promise.\n      loading.delete(vault)\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function flush(vault: string): Promise<void> {\n    // ⛔ BOTH of these MUST be read inside the loop, from the maps. #10: they\n    // used to be captured once above it, so a retry re-sent the stale\n    // `expectedVersion` and the PRE-merge bytes — against any OCC backend that\n    // is a guaranteed repeat conflict, so the loop burned its retries and threw\n    // while the merge it had just computed was discarded. The conflict branch\n    // below writes the merged snapshot and the observed remote version into the\n    // maps; reading them here is what makes that work mean anything.\n    // Pinned by `__tests__/pod-flush-conflict-retry.test.ts`.\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_CONFLICT_RETRIES; attempt++) {\n      const snapshot = snapshots.get(vault) ?? {}\n      const format: BundleStoreData = {\n        _noydb_bundle_store: BUNDLE_STORE_VERSION,\n        vault,\n        ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n        data: snapshot,\n      }\n      const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(format))\n      const expectedVersion = versions.get(vault) ?? null\n\n      try {\n        const { version: newVersion } = await bundle.writeBundle(vault, bytes, expectedVersion)\n        versions.set(vault, newVersion)\n        return\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (err instanceof PodVersionConflictError && attempt < MAX_CONFLICT_RETRIES - 1) {\n          // Pull remote, merge (last-write-wins by record key), retry\n          const remote = await bundle.readBundle(vault)\n          if (remote) {\n            const remoteText = new TextDecoder().decode(remote.bytes)\n            const remoteFormat = JSON.parse(remoteText) as BundleStoreData\n            const localSnap = snapshots.get(vault) ?? {}\n            const mergedSnap = mergeSnapshots(remoteFormat.data, localSnap)\n            snapshots.set(vault, mergedSnap)\n            versions.set(vault, remote.version)\n          }\n          // The next iteration re-reads both maps above, so it re-encodes the\n          // merged snapshot and sends the version we just observed.\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // #908 — one flush at a time per vault. `flush` reads and writes the vault's\n  // version token, so concurrent flushes race: each sends the same\n  // `expectedVersion`, the losers take the conflict/merge path, and with enough\n  // of them the retry budget is exhausted and the error surfaces to a caller\n  // whose write was perfectly valid. Serialising makes every flush see the\n  // token its predecessor produced.\n  const flushChain = new Map<string, Promise<void>>()\n\n  function serialFlush(vault: string): Promise<void> {\n    const prev = flushChain.get(vault) ?? Promise.resolve()\n    // Chain past a rejection as well — one failed flush must not wedge every\n    // subsequent write to this vault.\n    const next = prev.then(() => flush(vault), () => flush(vault))\n    flushChain.set(vault, next)\n    return next\n  }\n\n  async function maybeFlush(vault: string): Promise<void> {\n    if (autoFlush && batchDepth === 0) {\n      await serialFlush(vault)\n    }\n  }\n\n  const store: WrappedPodNoydbStore = {\n    name: bundle.name ?? 'bundle',\n\n    async flush(vaultId: string): Promise<void> {\n      await serialFlush(vaultId)\n    },\n\n    async batch(vaultId: string, fn: () => Promise<void>): Promise<void> {\n      await load(vaultId) // ensure loaded before batch\n      batchDepth++\n      try {\n        await fn()\n      } finally {\n        batchDepth--\n      }\n      await serialFlush(vaultId)\n    },\n\n    async get(vault: string, collection: string, id: string): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null> {\n      const snap = await load(vault)\n      return snap[collection]?.[id] ?? null\n    },\n\n    async put(\n      vault: string,\n      collection: string,\n      id: string,\n      envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n      expectedVersion?: number,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n      const snap = await load(vault)\n\n      if (expectedVersion !== undefined) {\n        const current = snap[collection]?.[id]\n        const currentVersion = current?._v ?? 0\n        if (currentVersion !== expectedVersion) {\n          throw new ConflictError(\n            currentVersion,\n            `Expected version ${expectedVersion} but found ${currentVersion} on ${collection}/${id}`,\n          )\n        }\n      }\n\n      snap[collection] ??= {}\n      snap[collection][id] = envelope\n      await maybeFlush(vault)\n    },\n\n    async delete(vault: string, collection: string, id: string): Promise<void> {\n      const snap = await load(vault)\n      if (snap[collection]) {\n        delete snap[collection][id]\n        await maybeFlush(vault)\n      }\n    },\n\n    async list(vault: string, collection: string): Promise<string[]> {\n      const snap = await load(vault)\n      return Object.keys(snap[collection] ?? {})\n    },\n\n    async loadAll(vault: string): Promise<VaultSnapshot> {\n      const snap = await load(vault)\n      // #908 — two contract fixes in one place:\n      //  1. internal collections (`_keyring`, `_sync`) are the vault's own\n      //     bookkeeping and must not appear in a snapshot — `@noy-db/to-file`\n      //     sets the reference behaviour with this same `_`-prefix rule;\n      //  2. copy rather than hand out the live cache, which let a caller\n      //     mutating the result silently rewrite the wrapper's own state.\n      // `get()`/`list()` still serve internal collections; this is about what\n      // a *snapshot* claims, not about hiding data.\n      const out: VaultSnapshot = {}\n      for (const [collection, records] of Object.entries(snap)) {\n        if (collection.startsWith('_')) continue\n        out[collection] = { ...records }\n      }\n      return out\n    },\n\n    async saveAll(vault: string, data: VaultSnapshot): Promise<void> {\n      snapshots.set(vault, data)\n      loaded.add(vault)\n      await serialFlush(vault)\n    },\n  }\n\n  return store\n}\n\n// ─── Snapshot merge (last-write-wins per record) ────────────────────────\n\nfunction mergeSnapshots(remote: VaultSnapshot, local: VaultSnapshot): VaultSnapshot {\n  const merged: VaultSnapshot = {}\n\n  // Start with all remote collections\n  for (const [coll, records] of Object.entries(remote)) {\n    merged[coll] = { ...records }\n  }\n\n  // Overlay local collections — LWW by _ts per record\n  for (const [coll, records] of Object.entries(local)) {\n    if (!merged[coll]) {\n      merged[coll] = { ...records }\n      continue\n    }\n    for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n      const existing = merged[coll][id]\n      if (!existing || envelope._ts >= existing._ts) {\n        merged[coll][id] = envelope\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return merged\n}\n\n// ─── Factory helper ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Type-safe factory helper for `NoydbPodStore` implementations,\n * analogous to `createStore` for KV stores.\n */\nexport function createPodStore<TOptions>(\n  factory: (options: TOptions) => NoydbPodStore,\n): (options: TOptions) => NoydbPodStore {\n  return factory\n}\n\n// ─── Deprecated aliases (pre-rename compatibility) ──────────────────────\n\n","/**\n * Redirect record (#944) — a signed \"this moved, go there\" pointer carried\n * in the pod's PLAINTEXT header (`NoydbPodHeader.redirect`, see\n * `format.ts`) so a dispatcher can follow it pre-auth: no secret, no\n * decompression.\n *\n * The record carries its OWN inner `sig` (via `signRecord`/`verifyRecord`\n * from `signature.ts`) — independent from, and in addition to, the #943\n * pod-header signature. A Redirect is REQUIRED to be signed: there is no\n * legacy unsigned install base for this new record type, so an absent or\n * invalid signature is invalid for following, not merely \"unverified\".\n *\n * Minimum-disclosure: the record is kept to exactly\n * `{ v, target, reason, issuedBy, sig }` — no timestamps, no identities\n * beyond the signer's `keyId` fingerprint.\n */\n\nimport type { DocSigner } from '../with-audit/attestation/signer.js'\nimport { signRecord, verifyRecord } from './signature.js'\nimport { readPodRedirect } from './pod.js'\nimport {\n  RedirectBadSignatureError,\n  RedirectDepthExceededError,\n  RedirectLoopError,\n  RedirectUnreachableError,\n} from '../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/**\n * A signed pointer to another pod. `target` is a locator string or URL —\n * the forthcoming #945 `Locator` type isn't built yet, so `target` stays a\n * plain string for now (forward-seam noted, not blurred: a Redirect says\n * \"go elsewhere once\"; a Locator will say \"where cargo lives\").\n */\nexport interface Redirect {\n  readonly v: 1\n  readonly target: string\n  readonly reason: 'moved' | 'release' | 'tombstone' | 'repoint'\n  readonly issuedBy: string\n  readonly sig: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a new Redirect record with `signer`. Builds the record minus `sig`,\n * signs it via the #943 `signRecord` convention, and returns the complete\n * signed record.\n */\nexport async function signRedirect(\n  signer: DocSigner,\n  fields: { readonly target: string; readonly reason: Redirect['reason'] },\n): Promise<Redirect> {\n  const record = {\n    v: 1 as const,\n    target: fields.target,\n    reason: fields.reason,\n    issuedBy: signer.keyId,\n  }\n  const sig = await signRecord(signer.privateKeyPkcs8B64, record)\n  return { ...record, sig }\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a Redirect record's signature against `trustedKeys`\n * (`keyId → publicKeyB64`). Fails closed: an `issuedBy` not present in\n * `trustedKeys` is untrusted/unverifiable and returns `false`, same as a\n * tampered or forged signature.\n */\nexport async function verifyRedirect(\n  record: Redirect,\n  trustedKeys: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const publicKeyB64 = trustedKeys[record.issuedBy]\n  if (publicKeyB64 === undefined) return false\n  const payload = { v: record.v, target: record.target, reason: record.reason, issuedBy: record.issuedBy }\n  return verifyRecord(publicKeyB64, record.sig, payload)\n}\n\n/** One followed hop's provenance — surfaced so a UI can show \"moved from X via Y\". */\nexport interface RedirectHop {\n  readonly target: string\n  readonly reason: Redirect['reason']\n  readonly issuedBy: string\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link followRedirects}: the terminal (non-redirect) pod's bytes, plus the ordered hop list that led there. */\nexport interface FollowRedirectsResult {\n  readonly terminal: Uint8Array\n  readonly hops: readonly RedirectHop[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Follow a chain of Redirect records starting from `start`'s pod bytes,\n * fetching each hop's target via `fetcher`, until a pod with no `redirect`\n * header field (the terminal) is reached.\n *\n * HTTP-redirect discipline: each hop's Redirect is verified against\n * `opts.trustedKeys` BEFORE it is followed (fail closed — an untrusted or\n * forged hop never advances the walk), loops are detected on the target\n * about to be followed, and the hop count is capped at `opts.maxDepth`\n * (default 8). `fetcher` throwing or returning `null` for a target means\n * that hop is unreachable.\n *\n * @throws {RedirectBadSignatureError} a hop's Redirect fails verification.\n * @throws {RedirectLoopError} a hop's target was already followed in this chain.\n * @throws {RedirectDepthExceededError} more than `maxDepth` hops were followed.\n * @throws {RedirectUnreachableError} `fetcher` threw or returned `null` for a target.\n */\nexport async function followRedirects(\n  start: Uint8Array,\n  fetcher: (target: string) => Promise<Uint8Array | null>,\n  opts: { readonly trustedKeys: Readonly<Record<string, string>>; readonly maxDepth?: number },\n): Promise<FollowRedirectsResult> {\n  const maxDepth = opts.maxDepth ?? 8\n  let current = start\n  const hops: RedirectHop[] = []\n  const visited = new Set<string>()\n\n  for (;;) {\n    const rec = readPodRedirect(current)\n    if (rec === undefined) return { terminal: current, hops }\n\n    if (!(await verifyRedirect(rec, opts.trustedKeys))) {\n      throw new RedirectBadSignatureError(rec.target)\n    }\n    if (visited.has(rec.target)) {\n      throw new RedirectLoopError(rec.target)\n    }\n    visited.add(rec.target)\n\n    hops.push({ target: rec.target, reason: rec.reason, issuedBy: rec.issuedBy })\n    if (hops.length > maxDepth) {\n      throw new RedirectDepthExceededError(maxDepth)\n    }\n\n    let next: Uint8Array | null\n    try {\n      next = await fetcher(rec.target)\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw new RedirectUnreachableError(rec.target, cause)\n    }\n    if (next === null) {\n      throw new RedirectUnreachableError(rec.target)\n    }\n    current = next\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `open(podBytesOrFile)` — the pod READ-path orchestrator (#941 Task 4).\n *\n * A free function (never a `Vault` method — `kernel/vault.ts` is at its\n * line ceiling and open() needs no vault-internal state that isn't already\n * reachable through published seams). Composes, in order:\n *\n *   1. `readPod` — parse + integrity-check the container (throws\n *      `PodIntegrityError` on a corrupted/truncated pod).\n *   2. `verifyPodHeader` — only when `opts.trustedKeys` is supplied.\n *      `'unsigned'` is benign (legacy pod, or `writePod({ sign: false })`)\n *      and open() proceeds; `'untrusted'` / `'tampered'` are fail-closed —\n *      `PodHeaderVerificationError` — mirroring `followRedirects`'s\n *      `RedirectBadSignatureError` posture: once a caller opts into\n *      verification, an unverifiable header is a hard stop.\n *   3. `createNoydb` + `openVault` + `vault.load(dumpJson)` — the exact\n *      unlock+restore sequence `bundle-roundtrip.test.ts` drives by hand.\n *      The pod header carries no vault name (minimum-disclosure —\n *      `format.ts`'s forbidden-fields list), so the caller names the\n *      target vault via `opts.vault`.\n *   4. Re-derive the `SchemaManifest` from the just-restored `_schemas/*`\n *      (the source of truth — Task 3's `deriveSchemaManifest`), via a\n *      NON-MINTING `LookupDEK` built from `loadKeyring`'s already-unwrapped\n *      `UnlockedKeyring.deks` map directly (`with-party/team/keyring.js`).\n *      **Not** `ensureCollectionDEK` (#941 review fix — Important 2): that\n *      helper mints+persists a fresh DEK into `_keyring/<user>` for any\n *      collection absent from the keyring, which is correct for a WRITE\n *      path but wrong here — `deriveSchemaManifest` only ever reads\n *      collections that already have a `_schemas` envelope, so an absent\n *      DEK means \"this principal can't decrypt this sibling\" (e.g. a\n *      collection-scoped grantee), never \"new collection.\" The old\n *      minting call polluted a scoped principal's freshly-restored keyring\n *      with garbage sibling DEKs on every `open()`. The returned\n *      `manifest` is that principal's own visible slice — see\n *      `derive.ts`'s `LookupDEK` doc and `sync.ts`'s module doc for the\n *      full rationale (the same distinction governs why the sync path\n *      must SKIP rather than write a partial manifest).\n *   5. Generation check (AC #4 coexistence): compare the HIGHEST\n *      per-collection generation stamp carried by the restored manifest\n *      against THIS store's schema-fence generation as it stood\n *      immediately before the restore (0 for a brand-new vault; whatever a\n *      coexisting local vault already had). If the pod is ahead and\n *      `!opts.allowGenerationAhead`, throw `MigrationRequiredError` (the\n *      same class `SchemaFenceController`'s write-path gate throws) — the\n *      reader hasn't reconciled schema changes that happened elsewhere.\n *      `allowGenerationAhead: true` is the documented dev override: open\n *      proceeds, with a console warning. Divergence in the OTHER direction\n *      (reader ahead of the pod) is non-fatal but also warned (#941\n *      review, Important 3 — AC #4 coexistence divergence must be\n *      observable in either direction, not just the bypass case).\n *\n *      NOTE: this deliberately reads per-collection entries, not\n *      `manifest.generation` itself. `_meta/schema-fence` is local\n *      session-coordination state and does NOT travel in a pod dump\n *      (`with-pod/backup.ts`'s reserved-collection list carries `_schemas`\n *      and `_manifest` but not `_meta`) — a fresh re-derive's top-level\n *      `generation` is always driven by the (untouched-by-restore) target\n *      store's own fence, not the pod's. Each `_schemas/<collection>`\n *      envelope's own `generation` field DOES travel (it's stamped at\n *      declare-time from the writer's real fence), so per-collection\n *      entries are the only signal that survives a restore intact.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { readPod, verifyPodHeader } from './pod.js'\nimport type { NoydbPodHeader } from './format.js'\nimport type { PodVerifyResult } from './pod.js'\nimport { createNoydb } from '../kernel/noydb.js'\nimport type { Noydb } from '../kernel/noydb.js'\nimport type { Vault } from '../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { NoydbOptions, NoydbStore, EchoSecretParts } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { MigrationRequiredError, PodHeaderVerificationError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { loadKeyring } from '../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { loadFence } from '../with-shape/schema-update/fence.js'\nimport { deriveSchemaManifest, type LookupDEK } from '../with-shape/manifest/derive.js'\nimport type { SchemaManifest } from '../with-shape/manifest/types.js'\n\nexport interface OpenPodOptions {\n  /** The ciphertext store to restore into (and where the opened `Vault` lives). */\n  readonly store: NoydbStore\n  /**\n   * The target vault name. The pod header deliberately carries no vault\n   * name (minimum-disclosure — `NoydbPodHeader`'s forbidden-fields list),\n   * so the caller names the vault to restore into/open.\n   */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** User identifier — passed through to `createNoydb`. */\n  readonly user: string\n  /** That user's secret — passed through to `createNoydb` / `loadKeyring`. */\n  readonly secret: string | EchoSecretParts\n  /**\n   * Trusted signing keys (`keyId → publicKeyB64`). When supplied,\n   * `verifyPodHeader` runs and its result is returned as `verification`.\n   * Omitted → no verification attempted, `verification` is absent.\n   */\n  readonly trustedKeys?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>\n  /**\n   * Passthrough to `createNoydb` for every option beyond `store`/`user`/\n   * `secret` (history/indexing/blobs/… strategies, `secretMode`, etc.).\n   */\n  readonly noydbOptions?: Omit<NoydbOptions, 'store' | 'user' | 'secret'>\n  /**\n   * Dev override for the generation-ahead fence (AC #4). Default `false`:\n   * a pod whose schema manifest generation is ahead of this store's\n   * pre-restore fence generation throws `MigrationRequiredError`. `true`\n   * opens anyway, logging a console warning.\n   */\n  readonly allowGenerationAhead?: boolean\n}\n\nexport interface OpenPodResult {\n  readonly db: Noydb\n  readonly vault: Vault\n  readonly header: NoydbPodHeader\n  /** Present iff `opts.trustedKeys` was supplied. */\n  readonly verification?: PodVerifyResult\n  /** The pod's schema manifest, re-derived from the just-restored `_schemas/*`. */\n  readonly manifest?: SchemaManifest\n}\n\n/**\n * Open a `.noydb` pod: verify its integrity (and, opt-in, its signature),\n * unlock + restore it into `opts.vault`, and re-derive its schema manifest.\n * See the module doc for the full flow and the errors each step can throw.\n */\nexport async function open(podFileOrBytes: Uint8Array, opts: OpenPodOptions): Promise<OpenPodResult> {\n  const { header, dumpJson } = await readPod(podFileOrBytes)\n\n  let verification: PodVerifyResult | undefined\n  if (opts.trustedKeys !== undefined) {\n    verification = await verifyPodHeader(podFileOrBytes, opts.trustedKeys)\n    if (verification.status === 'untrusted' || verification.status === 'tampered') {\n      throw new PodHeaderVerificationError(verification.status, verification.keyId)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Reader's pre-restore generation snapshot (see module doc, step 5) —\n  // must be read from the raw store BEFORE vault.load() overwrites it.\n  const readerGeneration = (await loadFence(opts.store, opts.vault)).currentSchemaVersion\n\n  const db = await createNoydb({ ...opts.noydbOptions, store: opts.store, user: opts.user, secret: opts.secret })\n  const vault = await db.openVault(opts.vault)\n  await vault.load(dumpJson)\n\n  // #941 review fix: a NON-MINTING lookup, not `ensureCollectionDEK` (which\n  // mints+persists a fresh DEK for any collection absent from the keyring).\n  // open() is a READ path — deriveSchemaManifest only ever iterates\n  // collections that already have a `_schemas` envelope, so an absent DEK\n  // here means \"this principal cannot decrypt this sibling,\" never \"new\n  // collection.\" The old minting call polluted a scoped principal's just-\n  // restored `_keyring/<user>` file with garbage sibling DEKs on every\n  // open(). See `derive.ts`'s `LookupDEK` doc for the full rationale.\n  const keyring = await loadKeyring(opts.store, opts.vault, { userId: opts.user, secret: opts.secret })\n  const lookupDEK: LookupDEK = async (name) => keyring.deks.get(name)\n  const { manifest, undecodableCollections } = await deriveSchemaManifest(opts.store, opts.vault, lookupDEK)\n\n  // A scoped principal's `manifest` is legitimately their own visible\n  // slice (see `sync.ts`'s module doc) — `open()` is a per-principal read,\n  // not an assertion of pod-wide completeness. `undecodableCollections` is\n  // intentionally not surfaced on `OpenPodResult` (out of this fix's\n  // scope); callers that need it can call `deriveSchemaManifest` directly.\n  void undecodableCollections\n\n  // See module doc, step 5 — the pod's generation signal is the highest\n  // per-collection stamp, not the (locally re-derived, fence-driven)\n  // top-level `manifest.generation`.\n  const podGeneration = Object.values(manifest.collections)\n    .reduce((max, entry) => Math.max(max, entry.generation), 0)\n\n  if (podGeneration > readerGeneration) {\n    if (!opts.allowGenerationAhead) {\n      throw new MigrationRequiredError(\n        `open(): pod's schema generation (${podGeneration}) is ahead of vault ` +\n          `\"${opts.vault}\"'s local generation (${readerGeneration}). Pass ` +\n          `\\`allowGenerationAhead: true\\` to open anyway, or reconcile the schema first.`,\n      )\n    }\n    console.warn(\n      `[noy-db] open(): vault \"${opts.vault}\" opened with allowGenerationAhead — pod schema ` +\n        `generation ${podGeneration} is ahead of the local generation ${readerGeneration}.`,\n    )\n  } else if (podGeneration < readerGeneration) {\n    // #941 review (Important 3, AC #4): divergence in EITHER direction\n    // should be observable, not just the ahead-bypass case above. The\n    // reader being ahead of the pod is non-fatal (the pod is simply older\n    // content) but silent coexistence divergence is exactly what AC #4\n    // asks to surface — same `[noy-db]`-prefixed console.warn facility as\n    // `sync.ts`'s cap-exhaustion warning.\n    console.warn(\n      `[noy-db] open(): vault \"${opts.vault}\"'s local schema generation (${readerGeneration}) is ` +\n        `ahead of the pod's (${podGeneration}) — the pod reflects an earlier schema than this reader.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  return { db, vault, header, manifest, ...(verification !== undefined ? { verification } : {}) 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package/dist/{chunk-VNPEWFPD.js → chunk-XA34THLF.js}

@@ -1,20 +1,22 @@
 import {
   hopCollections,
   normalizeTriggerBy
-} from "./chunk-FFWI7UH7.js";
+} from "./chunk-GAGT3YZN.js";
 import {
   ViaGraph,
-  matchTargetFieldNames,
+  matchTargetFieldNames
+} from "./chunk-ZMVSKYTJ.js";
+import {
   schemaFieldKeys
-} from "./chunk-UD5EVGZ7.js";
+} from "./chunk-QJNAHPVT.js";
 import {
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-UYB234ZR.js";
+} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
 import {
   DerivationCycleError,
   DuplicateBehaviorNameError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/derivations/strategy-hash.ts
 async function computeStrategyHash(source, outputKeys, derive, sources) {
@@ -244,4 +246,4 @@ var DerivationRegistry = class {
 export {
   DerivationRegistry
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VNPEWFPD.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XA34THLF.js.map

package/dist/chunk-XA34THLF.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-formula/derivations/strategy-hash.ts","../src/with-formula/derivations/registry.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Deterministic hash of a derivation strategy's \"shape\": source\n * collection, declared sibling sources, output keys, derive function\n * source. Used to detect\n * strategy drift: a record whose `_derivedFrom.strategyHash` doesn't\n * match the current strategy is considered stale.\n *\n * Web Crypto SHA-256 — no extra deps.\n */\nimport { sha256Hex } from '../../capsule/index.js'\n\nexport async function computeStrategyHash(\n  source: string,\n  outputKeys: readonly string[],\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  derive: (...args: any[]) => any,\n  sources?: ReadonlyArray<string>,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const canonical = JSON.stringify({\n    source,\n    outputs: [...outputKeys].sort(),\n    derive: derive.toString(),\n    // Declared sibling sources — adding/removing a trigger\n    // collection invalidates cached derived records. Omitted when empty\n    // so strategies without siblings keep their existing hash.\n    ...(sources?.length ? { sources: [...sources].sort() } : {}),\n  })\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(canonical)\n  return sha256Hex(bytes)\n}\n","import { matchTargetFieldNames } from '../../kernel/collection-config.js'\nimport { DerivationCycleError, DuplicateBehaviorNameError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { ViaGraph, type FieldRef, type EdgeKind, type Grain } from '../../kernel/via/graph.js'\nimport { schemaFieldKeys } from '../../with-shape/introspection/describe.js'\nimport { computeStrategyHash } from './strategy-hash.js'\nimport { hopCollections, normalizeTriggerBy, type NormalizedTrigger } from './trigger-match.js'\nimport type { DerivationSpec } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Whole-record artifact-grain field marker (#638 Task 2). A derivation's\n * `derive()`/a rollup's `compute()` reads the WHOLE source record — there is\n * no single declared field to point at — so a trigger/output collection is\n * modelled as one artifact node per collection (`kernel/via/graph.ts`'s\n * \"Artifact-grain targets... modelled as a field node whose field is the\n * artifact key\" convention). MUST match `materialized-views/registry.ts`'s\n * and `vault.ts`'s overlay-edge marker so cross-registry edges (a derivation\n * feeding into / out of an MV or overlay collection) resolve to the SAME\n * graph node.\n */\nconst WHOLE_RECORD = '*'\n\n/** Strip this registry's `.${WHOLE_RECORD}` artifact suffix off a graph cycle\n *  path entry, recovering the bare collection name — preserves the exact\n *  pre-#638 `DerivationCycleError` message shape (behavior lock) for a pure\n *  record-shape derivation cycle. A rollup's real-field target (not suffixed\n *  `.${WHOLE_RECORD}`) is left untouched. */\nfunction stripArtifactSuffix(displayId: string): string {\n  const suffix = `.${WHOLE_RECORD}`\n  return displayId.endsWith(suffix) ? displayId.slice(0, -suffix.length) : displayId\n}\n\ninterface RegisteredStrategy {\n  // Type-erased to allow the registry to hold heterogeneous strategies.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  spec: DerivationSpec<any, any>\n  strategyHash: string\n  readonly triggers: ReadonlyArray<NormalizedTrigger>\n}\n\n/**\n * Vault-internal registry of derivation strategies. Owned by `Vault`;\n * not exported.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport class DerivationRegistry {\n  private readonly _bySource = new Map<string, RegisteredStrategy[]>()\n  private readonly _byOutput = new Map<string, RegisteredStrategy[]>()\n  private readonly _byName = new Map<string, RegisteredStrategy>()\n\n  /**\n   * Register a derivation strategy. If `spec.name` is given and already\n   * registered by another derivation in this vault, throws\n   * {@link DuplicateBehaviorNameError} before indexing.\n   */\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  async register(spec: DerivationSpec<any, any>): Promise<void> {\n    if (spec.name !== undefined && this._byName.has(spec.name)) {\n      throw new DuplicateBehaviorNameError(spec.name, 'derivation')\n    }\n\n    const outputKeys = Object.keys(spec.outputs)\n    const strategyHash = await computeStrategyHash(spec.source, outputKeys, spec.derive, spec.sources)\n    const triggers = normalizeTriggerBy(spec.triggerBy)\n    const reg: RegisteredStrategy = { spec, strategyHash, triggers }\n\n    if (spec.name !== undefined) this._byName.set(spec.name, reg)\n\n    const fromSource = this._bySource.get(spec.source)\n    if (fromSource) fromSource.push(reg)\n    else this._bySource.set(spec.source, [reg])\n\n    // Declared sibling sources index the SAME `reg` under each\n    // extra collection so `strategiesForSource(extra)` returns it and a\n    // sibling write re-fires the derivation. Sibling keys also enter\n    // `_bySource`, so `validate()`'s cycle DFS walks them automatically.\n    for (const extra of spec.sources ?? []) {\n      const fromExtra = this._bySource.get(extra)\n      if (fromExtra) fromExtra.push(reg)\n      else this._bySource.set(extra, [reg])\n    }\n\n    // FK triggers index the SAME `reg` under each parent collection so\n    // a parent write re-fires the derivation (fanned out to matching source\n    // records in `dispatchDerivations`). Like sources[], these keys enter\n    // `_bySource` so the cycle DFS walks the trigger→output edge.\n    // #1277 — the INTERMEDIATE of a declared hop is indexed too, so a write\n    // that re-points it re-fires the derivation. Without this the hop's whole\n    // correctness argument fails: nothing is written to the trigger or source\n    // collection when an intermediate moves, so no other path can notice, and\n    // every source it used to address is stranded silently. Entering `_bySource`\n    // also puts the hop edge into `validate()`'s cycle DFS, which would\n    // otherwise be blind to it.\n    for (const t of triggers) {\n      for (const hop of hopCollections(t.match)) {\n        const fromHop = this._bySource.get(hop)\n        if (fromHop) { if (!fromHop.includes(reg)) fromHop.push(reg) }\n        else this._bySource.set(hop, [reg])\n      }\n    }\n    for (const t of triggers) {\n      const fromTrigger = this._bySource.get(t.collection)\n      if (fromTrigger) fromTrigger.push(reg)\n      else this._bySource.set(t.collection, [reg])\n    }\n\n    // Rollup: a write to the child `from` collection recomputes\n    // the parent (= spec.source = into) at id child[key]. Index under `from`\n    // so a child write fires it; spec.source (into) is already indexed above,\n    // so a parent write also recomputes its own aggregate (covers the\n    // parent-created-after-children case). The from→into edge enters the cycle\n    // DFS automatically.\n    if (spec.rollup) {\n      const fromRollup = this._bySource.get(spec.rollup.from)\n      if (fromRollup) fromRollup.push(reg)\n      else this._bySource.set(spec.rollup.from, [reg])\n    }\n\n    for (const key of outputKeys) {\n      const output = spec.outputs[key]\n      if (!output) continue\n      const outputCollection = output.collection\n      const arr = this._byOutput.get(outputCollection)\n      if (arr) arr.push(reg)\n      else this._byOutput.set(outputCollection, [reg])\n    }\n  }\n\n  strategiesForSource(source: string): ReadonlyArray<RegisteredStrategy> {\n    return this._bySource.get(source) ?? []\n  }\n\n  strategiesProducingOutput(collection: string): ReadonlyArray<RegisteredStrategy> {\n    return this._byOutput.get(collection) ?? []\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The #1253-pattern typo guard for match fields (#1249): a misspelt\n   * `to`/`from` silently matches nothing forever, so validate against the\n   * collection's enumerable field set at the earliest point it exists.\n   * `schemaFieldKeys(schema) === undefined` (TS-generic collection,\n   * unreadable validator) is DELIBERATELY silent — those fields are real\n   * and unenumerable. `configKeys` folds in the collection's other\n   * non-schema field declarations (fieldMeta/moneyFields/dictKeyFields/\n   * refs/computed); `denormExempt` is derived here from this registry's\n   * own strategies rather than taken as a parameter — a field this\n   * collection's own derivations write via `denorm` is never a typo.\n   */\n  validateFieldsFor(\n    collectionName: string,\n    schema: unknown,\n    configKeys: ReadonlyArray<string>,\n    viaSources: {\n      readonly computed?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined\n      readonly viaFields?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined\n    } | undefined = undefined,\n  ): void {\n    const targets = matchTargetFieldNames(viaSources ?? {})\n    const virtual = new Set(targets.virtual)\n    const shapeKeys = schemaFieldKeys(schema)\n    // The two checks have DIFFERENT preconditions, which is why one loop runs\n    // both rather than an early return covering both. The typo check needs a\n    // readable field list and must stay silent without one — a false \"unknown\n    // field\" on a TS-generic collection would be worse than no check. The\n    // virtual check needs nothing but the declaration in hand: \"declared, and\n    // never stored\" is provable from the declaration alone (#1266).\n    if (shapeKeys === undefined && virtual.size === 0) return\n    const keys = shapeKeys === undefined ? undefined\n      : new Set([...shapeKeys, ...configKeys, ...targets.declared])\n    const denormExempt = new Set<string>()\n    const regs = new Set([...this._bySource.values()].flat())\n    for (const reg of regs) {\n      if (reg.spec.source !== collectionName) continue\n      for (const out of Object.values(reg.spec.outputs) as Array<{ collection?: string; denorm?: readonly string[] }>) {\n        if (out.collection === collectionName) for (const d of out.denorm ?? []) denormExempt.add(d)\n      }\n    }\n    const unknown = (f: string): boolean =>\n      keys !== undefined && !keys.has(f) && !denormExempt.has(f)\n    for (const reg of regs) {\n      const name = reg.spec.name ?? reg.spec.source\n      for (const t of reg.triggers) {\n        for (const p of t.match) {\n          // `to` reads the SOURCE record; `from` reads the WRITTEN record.\n          // Both are the stored shape, so both refuse a virtual target.\n          if (reg.spec.source === collectionName) {\n            if (virtual.has(p.to)) throw new ValidationError(this._virtualMatchMessage(name, collectionName, p.to, 'to'))\n            if (unknown(p.to)) {\n              throw new ValidationError(\n                `derivation \"${name}\": triggerBy match names source field \"${p.to}\", which \"${collectionName}\" does not declare — a typo here silently matches nothing forever`)\n            }\n          }\n          if (t.collection === collectionName && p.from !== 'id') {\n            if (virtual.has(p.from)) throw new ValidationError(this._virtualMatchMessage(name, collectionName, p.from, 'from'))\n            if (unknown(p.from)) {\n              throw new ValidationError(\n                `derivation \"${name}\": triggerBy match reads \"${p.from}\" from written \"${collectionName}\" records, which that collection does not declare — a typo here silently matches nothing forever`)\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** #1266 — one message shape for both match sides; see {@link matchTargetFieldNames}. */\n  private _virtualMatchMessage(name: string, collectionName: string, field: string, side: 'to' | 'from'): string {\n    const where = side === 'to'\n      ? `names source field \"${field}\", which \"${collectionName}\"`\n      : `reads \"${field}\" from written \"${collectionName}\" records, which that collection`\n    return `derivation \"${name}\": triggerBy match ${where} declares as a VIRTUAL computed field — virtual fields are evaluated on read and never stored, so the matcher would read every candidate record and match nothing, forever. Declare it as \\`mode: 'materialized'\\` (stored, indexable) or match on a stored field.`\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * All registered strategies as a flat, deduplicated array.\n   * Each strategy is indexed once per source (not once per output key),\n   * so iterating `_bySource.values()` naturally yields each strategy\n   * exactly once per source — deduplication is handled by flattening\n   * the per-source arrays and collecting into a Set by identity.\n   *\n   * Used by `dumpSchema()` / `describeDerivations()` in the introspection\n   * walker to populate the derivations map.\n   */\n  all(): ReadonlyArray<RegisteredStrategy> {\n    const seen = new Set<RegisteredStrategy>()\n    for (const strategies of this._bySource.values()) {\n      for (const s of strategies) seen.add(s)\n    }\n    return [...seen]\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Graph edges for #638 Task 2: one `'derivation'`/`'record'` edge per\n   * (non-self-write) output key — target = the output collection (a\n   * `WHOLE_RECORD` artifact node), sources = every collection that can\n   * trigger this strategy (`source`, `sources[]`, `triggerBy[].collection`,\n   * and — for a rollup — `rollup.from`), mirroring EXACTLY the trigger keys\n   * `register()` indexes under `_bySource`. The self-write reverse-denorm\n   * output (`output.collection === source` with `denorm` declared) is\n   * skipped — the SAME condition the old local DFS used; it is not a cycle\n   * (see the comment `validate()` used to carry, now on this skip).\n   * Rollups ADDITIONALLY get a dedicated `'rollup'`/`'aggregate'` edge\n   * targeting the real `rollup.field` on the parent (`source`) — the\n   * self-write output above only covers the cycle-DFS skip, not\n   * dispatch/taint (Tasks 3/4/6), which need the real field.\n   */\n  edges(): ReadonlyArray<{ readonly target: FieldRef; readonly sources: readonly FieldRef[]; readonly kind: EdgeKind; readonly grain: Grain }> {\n    const out: Array<{ target: FieldRef; sources: FieldRef[]; kind: EdgeKind; grain: Grain }> = []\n    for (const reg of this.all()) {\n      const spec = reg.spec\n      const triggerCollections = [\n        spec.source,\n        ...(spec.sources ?? []),\n        ...(spec.triggerBy ?? []).map((t) => t.collection),\n        ...(spec.rollup ? [spec.rollup.from] : []),\n      ]\n      const sources: FieldRef[] = triggerCollections.map((c) => ({ collection: c, field: WHOLE_RECORD }))\n      for (const key of Object.keys(spec.outputs)) {\n        const output = spec.outputs[key]\n        if (!output) continue\n        if (output.shape === 'record' && output.collection === spec.source && output.denorm !== undefined) continue\n        out.push({ target: { collection: output.collection, field: WHOLE_RECORD }, sources, kind: 'derivation', grain: 'record' })\n      }\n      if (spec.rollup) {\n        out.push({\n          target: { collection: spec.source, field: spec.rollup.field },\n          sources: [{ collection: spec.rollup.from, field: WHOLE_RECORD }],\n          kind: 'rollup',\n          grain: 'aggregate',\n        })\n      }\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Cycle detection, delegated to `ViaGraph.assertAcyclic()` (#638 Task 2 —\n   * retires the local DFS). Call after all `register()` calls complete (i.e.\n   * at vault open). Throws `DerivationCycleError` on the first cycle found —\n   * SAME class/timing as before; the message/path is byte-identical to the\n   * pre-#638 shape for a pure record-shape derivation cycle (the\n   * `WHOLE_RECORD` artifact suffix is stripped back to a bare collection\n   * name before re-throwing).\n   *\n   * `graph` is the caller's shared per-vault graph, ALREADY carrying this\n   * registry's `edges()` (the caller registers them — see `Vault._initDerivations`)\n   * — omit it (e.g. this registry's own unit tests) to validate this\n   * registry's edges in isolation against a throwaway graph.\n   */\n  validate(graph?: ViaGraph): void {\n    const g = graph ?? new ViaGraph()\n    if (!graph) {\n      for (const edge of this.edges()) g.registerDerived(edge.target, edge.sources, edge.kind, edge.grain)\n    }\n    try {\n      g.assertAcyclic()\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof DerivationCycleError) throw new DerivationCycleError(e.path.map(stripArtifactSuffix))\n      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package/dist/{chunk-HVSCEIYL.js → chunk-XITHENBI.js}

@@ -1,25 +1,23 @@
 import {
   freezeSnapshotOnly
-} from "./chunk-S57HTZ6X.js";
+} from "./chunk-SNM7LSYG.js";
 import {
   resolveManagedSecret
-} from "./chunk-ENAG3IY7.js";
+} from "./chunk-XKBTJGFP.js";
 import {
   assertRosterTagValid,
   createOwnerKeyring,
   mintRosterTag,
-  nextRosterEpoch,
-  requireRosterKey
-} from "./chunk-M7NI3IWE.js";
-import {
-  buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-SEE332EV.js";
+  requireRosterKey,
+  stampAuthority
+} from "./chunk-45VHWE4C.js";
 import {
+  buildRecordEnvelope,
   wrapKey
-} from "./chunk-UYB234ZR.js";
+} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
 import {
   PermissionDeniedError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/deed.ts
 var DEED_RECORD_ID = "deed";
@@ -39,7 +37,7 @@ async function loadDeedMarker(store, vault) {
   if (!envelope) return null;
   let payload;
   try {
-    payload = JSON.parse(envelope._data);
+    payload = JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? "");
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ async function liberateVault(vault, opts) {
   if (!env) {
     throw new PermissionDeniedError(`new owner keyring for "${opts.newOwnerId}" did not persist`);
   }
-  const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data);
+  const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data ?? "");
   const mintedRosterKey = requireRosterKey(newOwner, "liberateVault");
   await assertRosterTagValid(keyringFile, mintedRosterKey, opts.newOwnerId);
   const mergedDeks = { ...keyringFile.deks };
@@ -108,7 +106,7 @@ async function liberateVault(vault, opts) {
   }
   const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(keyring, "liberateVault");
   const merged = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks };
-  const withEpoch = { ...merged, roster_epoch: nextRosterEpoch(keyringFile.roster_epoch) };
+  const withEpoch = stampAuthority(merged, keyringFile.roster_epoch);
   const mergedFile = { ...withEpoch, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, rosterKey) };
   await adapter.put(vaultName, "_keyring", opts.newOwnerId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) });
   await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({
@@ -137,4 +135,4 @@ export {
   isDeedVault,
   liberateVault
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HVSCEIYL.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XITHENBI.js.map

package/dist/chunk-XITHENBI.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/deed.ts","../src/with-party/custody/liberate.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * FR-6 — Deed: sealed / hidden-owner provisioning.\n *\n * A **Deed** is a vault owned by a *latent* principal who never\n * authenticates. The owner credential (the random secret that\n * derives `KEK_owner`) is minted machine-side and sealed under a\n * **non-firm** {@link NoydbSealer} — that sealing boundary is\n * the cryptographic *inalienability anchor*: whoever holds the\n * provider (the client / their KMS) is the only party that can ever\n * re-derive `KEK_owner`. A firm-side custodian operates the vault\n * fully but can never reach the owner key — there is deliberately NO\n * firm-controlled fallback.\n *\n * Provisioning reuses the managed-mode seam:\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} mints + seals + persists the random\n *     secret at `_meta/sealed-secret` (and unseals it on every\n *     subsequent open through the same provider).\n *   - {@link createOwnerKeyring} derives `KEK_owner` from that\n *     secret and writes the `_keyring/<ownerUserId>` file.\n *\n * On top of that, a Deed writes a `_meta/deed` **marker**. The marker\n * is PLAINTEXT metadata — it records WHO the latent owner is and WHICH\n * sealing boundary protects them, so it must be readable without\n * unlocking the vault (a custodian or auditor inspecting the vault must\n * be able to see \"this is a Deed vault, owner = X, sealed under Y\"\n * without any key). The marker itself is therefore never sealed; only\n * the owner *credential* is.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport type { NoydbSealer } from './managed-secret.js'\nimport { resolveManagedSecret } from './managed-secret.js'\n\n/** Reserved id for the Deed marker under `_meta`. */\nexport const DEED_RECORD_ID = 'deed' as const\n\n/**\n * Plaintext metadata recording a vault's latent-owner Deed. Persisted\n * at `_meta/deed`. Readable without unlocking the vault by design — it\n * carries no secret material, only the identity of the latent owner\n * and the sealing boundary that anchors inalienability.\n */\nexport interface DeedMarker {\n  /** The latent owner principal — the user id of the `_keyring/<id>` owner file. */\n  readonly ownerUserId: string\n  /**\n   * The `NoydbSealer.id` the owner credential is sealed under.\n   * The inalienability anchor: only the holder of this (non-firm)\n   * provider can re-derive `KEK_owner`. Audit metadata — never secret.\n   */\n  readonly sealedUnder: string\n  /** Always `true` for a Deed — the owner never authenticates interactively. */\n  readonly latent: true\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp the Deed was issued. */\n  readonly issuedAt: string\n  /**\n   * ISO-8601 timestamp the vault was liberated (a new owner claimed it\n   * via the audited Liberate ceremony), if any. Absent until liberation.\n   */\n  readonly liberatedAt?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format payload stored inside the `_meta/deed` envelope. Carries\n * a magic marker for forensics + the {@link DeedMarker} fields. JSON,\n * AES-GCM bypassed (the marker is plaintext metadata by design).\n */\ninterface DeedEnvelopePayload extends DeedMarker {\n  readonly _noydb_deed: 1\n}\n\n/**\n * Provision a Deed: a latent owner whose credential is sealed under\n * `sealing` (a NON-firm provider). Mints + seals the owner secret\n * via {@link resolveManagedSecret}, derives the owner keyring via\n * {@link createOwnerKeyring}, then writes the plaintext `_meta/deed`\n * marker. Returns the unlocked owner keyring.\n *\n * The returned keyring is the only in-memory window onto `KEK_owner`\n * for this call; the persistent re-entry point is the sealing provider\n * (re-run {@link resolveManagedSecret} with the same provider to\n * re-resolve the secret, then {@link createOwnerKeyring}/load to\n * unlock — no interactive secret is ever required).\n *\n * There is deliberately no firm-controlled fallback: the marker's\n * `sealedUnder` is the single cryptographic anchor of ownership.\n */\nexport async function createDeedOwner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  ownerUserId: string,\n  sealing: NoydbSealer,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  // 1. Mint + seal + persist the random owner secret under the\n  //    non-firm provider (writes _meta/sealed-secret).\n  const secret = await resolveManagedSecret(store, vault, sealing)\n\n  // 2. Derive KEK_owner from the (never-human-seen) secret and\n  //    write the owner keyring file.\n  const keyring = await createOwnerKeyring(store, vault, { userId: ownerUserId, secret: secret })\n\n  // 3. Write the plaintext Deed marker. NOT sealed — it is audit\n  //    metadata that must be readable without unlocking.\n  await saveDeedMarker(store, vault, {\n    ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: sealing.id,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  })\n\n  return keyring\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the {@link DeedMarker} from `_meta/deed`, or `null` if the vault\n * has no Deed marker (i.e. it is not a Deed vault). Plaintext read — no\n * unlocking required.\n */\nexport async function loadDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<DeedMarker | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  let payload: unknown\n  try {\n    payload = JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? '')\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'object' || payload === null) return null\n  const r = payload as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_deed !== 1) return null\n  if (\n    typeof r.ownerUserId !== 'string'\n    || typeof r.sealedUnder !== 'string'\n    || r.latent !== true\n    || typeof r.issuedAt !== 'string'\n  ) {\n    return null\n  }\n  const marker: DeedMarker = {\n    ownerUserId: r.ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: r.sealedUnder,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: r.issuedAt,\n    ...(typeof r.liberatedAt === 'string' ? { liberatedAt: r.liberatedAt } : {}),\n  }\n  return marker\n}\n\n/** Whether `vault` carries a Deed marker (a sealed/latent owner). */\nexport async function isDeedVault(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  return (await loadDeedMarker(store, vault)) !== null\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist a {@link DeedMarker} at `_meta/deed`. Mirrors\n * `saveSealedSecret`'s envelope shape: a standard\n * {@link EncryptedEnvelope} with AES-GCM bypassed (`_iv: ''`), the\n * payload stored as plaintext JSON in `_data`. The marker is metadata,\n * not a secret — sealing it would defeat its purpose (auditors /\n * custodians must read it without a key).\n *\n * @internal — used by `createDeedOwner` and (later) the Liberate\n * ceremony to stamp `liberatedAt`.\n */\nexport async function saveDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  marker: DeedMarker,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: DeedEnvelopePayload = { _noydb_deed: 1, ...marker }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: DEED_RECORD_ID, version: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1 },\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the marker is plaintext audit metadata.\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(persisted) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n","/**\n * `liberateVault` — the audited claim of ownership over a\n * sealed-owner (Deed) vault. The inverse of withdrawal.\n *\n * A **Deed** vault's owner credential is sealed under a non-firm provider, so\n * the firm-side **custodian** (which holds every collection DEK and operates\n * the vault fully) can never reach `KEK_owner`. Liberation is the ONLY route\n * by which a custodian assumes ownership, and it is deliberately a manual,\n * audited ceremony:\n *\n *   1. gate `'liberate-vault'` (fail-closed)\n *   2. caller MUST be the `custodian` (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)\n *   3. freeze a PRE-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot (hash-pinned in the ledger) —\n *      but PRESERVE the live data for the new owner (see the freeze decision\n *      below)\n *   4. mint a NEW owner keyring re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n *      owner's KEK\n *   5. lifecycle ledger `liberation-claimed:<newOwnerId>:<legalBasis>`\n *   6. stamp the `_meta/deed` marker with `liberatedAt`\n *\n * ## Security: the inalienability floor\n *\n * Liberation **mints a new owner from the custodian's DEKs** — it does NOT\n * unseal the original sealed owner. The old sealed-owner credential is left\n * untouched and ORPHANED (its `_keyring/<id>` file remains, its KEK is still\n * sealed under the non-firm provider), never impersonated. The new owner is a\n * DISTINCT principal under a fresh KEK derived from `newOwnerSecret`. This\n * preserves the inalienability floor: the act of claiming ownership is itself\n * auditable and produces a different principal, rather than silently assuming\n * the latent owner's identity.\n *\n * ## Freeze decision: snapshot-only, not freeze-and-delete\n *\n * `freezeAndDeleteClosure` (withdraw-accessible.ts) writes a hash-pinned\n * snapshot and THEN delete-closures the live records — correct for a\n * destructive withdrawal, WRONG for liberation. Liberation transfers\n * operational continuity; it must leave the live data intact for the new\n * owner. We therefore call the snapshot-only core `freezeSnapshotOnly`\n * (factored out of that module; the freeze-AND-delete withdrawal path is\n * unchanged) to pin the evidence snapshot while preserving the records.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { FactorProofBundle, KeyringFile } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { PermissionDeniedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { wrapKey } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring, requireRosterKey } from '../team/keyring.js'\nimport { mintRosterTag, assertRosterTagValid } from '../team/roster-tag.js'\nimport { stampAuthority } from '../team/roster-tag.js'\nimport type { FrozenSnapshotRef } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { freezeSnapshotOnly } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { loadDeedMarker, saveDeedMarker } from '../team/deed.js'\n\nexport interface LiberateOptions {\n  /** The id of the new owner principal the custodian mints by claiming ownership. */\n  readonly newOwnerId: string\n  /** The secret that derives the new owner's KEK (the DEKs are re-wrapped under it). */\n  readonly newOwnerSecret: string\n  /** Legal/contractual basis recorded in the audit (e.g. 'contractual-handover'). */\n  readonly legalBasis: string\n  readonly factors?: FactorProofBundle\n}\n\nexport interface LiberateResult {\n  /** The hash-pinned pre-liberation evidence snapshot. */\n  readonly snapshot: FrozenSnapshotRef\n}\n\n/**\n * Audited claim of ownership over a sealed-owner vault by its custodian. See\n * the module doc for the full ceremony + security rationale.\n */\nexport async function liberateVault(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: LiberateOptions,\n): Promise<LiberateResult> {\n  // 1. gate — fail-closed `liberate-vault`.\n  await vault.noydb.checkGate(vault.name, 'liberate-vault', opts.factors)\n\n  // 2. caller must be the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs).\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter, keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  if (keyring.role !== 'custodian') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      'liberation is claimed only by the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Refuse to clobber an existing principal: the new owner must be a FRESH id.\n  // (Checked before any side effect so a colliding id never leaves a half-run\n  //  ceremony — no orphan snapshot, no partial keyring overwrite.)\n  const existing = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (existing) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `liberateVault: newOwnerId \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" already exists as a principal; choose a fresh id (liberation mints a distinct owner, it never overwrites an existing keyring)`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 3. Pre-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot of every operational collection —\n  //    snapshot-only (live data preserved for the new owner; liberation\n  //    transfers operational continuity, it does not erase).\n  const collections = await listOperationalCollections(vault)\n  const snapshot = await freezeSnapshotOnly(vault, collections, { actorUserId: keyring.userId })\n\n  // 4. Mint a NEW owner keyring, re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n  //    owner's fresh KEK. The old sealed owner is NOT unsealed — a DISTINCT\n  //    principal is minted and the original owner credential is left orphaned\n  //    (inalienability floor). Mirrors adopt-partition.ts's DEK re-wrap.\n  const newOwner = await createOwnerKeyring(adapter, vaultName, { userId: opts.newOwnerId, secret: opts.newOwnerSecret })\n  if (!newOwner.kek) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" has no KEK to re-wrap the incumbent DEKs under`,\n    )\n  }\n  const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (!env) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(`new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" did not persist`)\n  }\n  const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data ?? '') as KeyringFile\n  // #1096 — this is a read-BACK of the file `createOwnerKeyring` just wrote, and\n  // it is about to be edited and restamped, so the store gets a window to alter\n  // it in between. Verified against the NEW owner's own roster key, not the\n  // incumbent's: at this instant the file is still stamped under the fresh key\n  // minted above (the swap to the incumbent key happens below).\n  const mintedRosterKey = requireRosterKey(newOwner, 'liberateVault')\n  await assertRosterTagValid(keyringFile, mintedRosterKey, opts.newOwnerId)\n  const mergedDeks: Record<string, string> = { ...keyringFile.deks }\n  for (const [collection, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, newOwner.kek)\n  }\n  // #1096 — liberation joins a new owner to an EXISTING vault, so the vault's\n  // roster key must stay the incumbent one. `createOwnerKeyring` above minted a\n  // fresh roster key (correct for a new vault, wrong here), and the merge loop\n  // has just overwritten `_roster` with the incumbent's — so the tag it stamped\n  // no longer matches the key in the file. Restamp under the key that actually\n  // ends up persisted, or the new owner cannot open the vault they just claimed.\n  //\n  // Keeping the incumbent key is the substantive half: a fresh one would leave\n  // the new owner unable to verify any co-member's roster, and every co-member\n  // unable to verify theirs.\n  const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(keyring, 'liberateVault')\n  const merged: KeyringFile = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks }\n  // #1097 — stamped BEFORE the tag is minted, so it lands inside the\n  // authenticated canonical and a store can neither edit nor strip it.\n  const withEpoch = stampAuthority(merged, keyringFile.roster_epoch)\n  const mergedFile: KeyringFile = { ...withEpoch, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, rosterKey) }\n  await adapter.put(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) })\n\n  // 5. Lifecycle ledger audit (no-op if the history strategy is absent).\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: opts.newOwnerId, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `liberation-claimed:${opts.newOwnerId}:${opts.legalBasis}`,\n  })\n\n  // 6. Stamp the Deed marker with `liberatedAt` (if a marker exists).\n  const marker = await loadDeedMarker(adapter, vaultName)\n  if (marker) {\n    await saveDeedMarker(adapter, vaultName, { ...marker, liberatedAt: new Date().toISOString() })\n  }\n\n  return { snapshot }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enumerate the vault's operational (user-facing) collections — those carried\n * by the caller's keyring DEK map, minus the reserved internal collections\n * (`_*`). These are the collections frozen into the evidence snapshot.\n */\nasync function listOperationalCollections(vault: Vault): Promise<readonly string[]> {\n  const { keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  return [...keyring.deks.keys()].filter((c) => !c.startsWith('_'))\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuCO,IAAM,iBAAiB;AAqD9B,eAAsB,gBACpB,OACA,OACA,aACA,SAC0B;AAG1B,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AAI/D,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAe,CAAC;AAI9F,QAAM,eAAe,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,WAAU,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACnC,CAAC;AAED,SAAO;AACT;AAOA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAC/D,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,cAAU,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EAC3C,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,YAAY,YAAY,KAAM,QAAO;AAC5D,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,MAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,MACE,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,YACtB,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,YACzB,EAAE,WAAW,QACb,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,UACzB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,SAAqB;AAAA,IACzB,aAAa,EAAE;AAAA,IACf,aAAa,EAAE;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,IACZ,GAAI,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5E;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,eAAsB,YACpB,OACA,OACkB;AAClB,SAAQ,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,MAAO;AAClD;AAaA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,YAAiC,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO;AACnE,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAC5D,QAAM,MAAM;AAAA,IACV,EAAE,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,gBAAgB,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA;AAAA,IAEzE,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EAC5C;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACrD;;;AClHA,eAAsB,cACpB,OACA,MACyB;AAEzB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,OAAO;AAGtE,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AACrE,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,aAAa;AAChC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AACzE,MAAI,UAAU;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,8BAA8B,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC/C;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,2BAA2B,KAAK;AAC1D,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC;AAM7F,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC;AACtH,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK;AACjB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,0BAA0B,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC3C;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AACpE,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,0BAA0B,KAAK,UAAU,mBAAmB;AAAA,EAC9F;AACA,QAAM,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE;AAM9C,QAAM,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,UAAU,eAAe;AAClE,QAAM,qBAAqB,aAAa,iBAAiB,KAAK,UAAU;AACxE,QAAM,aAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK;AACjE,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC5C,eAAW,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1D;AAWA,QAAM,YAAY,iBAAiB,SAAS,eAAe;AAC3D,QAAM,SAAsB,EAAE,GAAG,aAAa,MAAM,WAAW;AAG/D,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,YAAY,YAAY;AACjE,QAAM,aAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,MAAM,cAAc,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE;AACtG,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;AAGvG,QAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC,IAAI;AAAA,IAAa,YAAY;AAAA,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IAAG,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAAY,aAAa;AAAA,IAC1F,QAAQ,sBAAsB,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,EAClE,CAAC;AAGD,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe,SAAS,SAAS;AACtD,MAAI,QAAQ;AACV,UAAM,eAAe,SAAS,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,cAAa,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/F;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS;AACpB;AAOA,eAAe,2BAA2B,OAA0C;AAClF,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC3C,SAAO,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG,CAAC;AAClE;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-ENAG3IY7.js → chunk-XKBTJGFP.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
 import {
-  buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-SEE332EV.js";
+  base64ToBuffer,
+  bufferToBase64,
+  buildRecordEnvelope,
+  decryptBytes,
+  encryptBytes,
+  exportRecipientPublicKeySpki,
+  generateRecipientKeyPair,
+  importRecipientPublicKeySpki,
+  importTransferKey,
+  recipientUnwrap,
+  recipientWrap
+} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts
 var MemorySealer = class {
@@ -81,19 +91,13 @@ var MemorySealer = class {
 };
 async function sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext, publicKeyPem) {
   const b64 = publicKeyPem.replace(/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----/, "").replace(/-----END PUBLIC KEY-----/, "").replace(/\s+/g, "");
-  const spki = base64ToBytes(b64);
-  const recipientPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
-    "spki",
-    spki,
-    { name: "RSA-OAEP", hash: "SHA-256" },
-    false,
-    ["encrypt"]
-  );
+  const recipientPub = await importRecipientPublicKeySpki(base64ToBytes(b64));
   const cekBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
-  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", cekBytes, "AES-GCM", false, ["encrypt"]);
-  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
-  const ct = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, cek, plaintext));
-  const wrapped = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: "RSA-OAEP" }, recipientPub, cekBytes));
+  const cek = await importTransferKey(cekBytes);
+  const { iv: ivB64, data } = await encryptBytes(plaintext, cek);
+  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivB64);
+  const ct = base64ToBuffer(data);
+  const wrapped = await recipientWrap(recipientPub, cekBytes);
   cekBytes.fill(0);
   if (wrapped.length !== 256) {
     throw new Error(`sealRsaOaepTlv: expected 256-byte RSA-OAEP wrap, got ${wrapped.length}`);
@@ -119,24 +123,19 @@ function parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes) {
   };
 }
 async function aesGcmOpen(cekBytes, iv, ct) {
-  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", cekBytes, "AES-GCM", false, ["decrypt"]);
-  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, cek, ct));
+  const cek = await importTransferKey(cekBytes);
+  return decryptBytes(bufferToBase64(iv), bufferToBase64(ct), cek);
 }
 var MemoryRecipientSealer = class {
   id;
   keypair;
   constructor(opts) {
     this.id = opts.id;
-    this.keypair = crypto.subtle.generateKey(
-      { name: "RSA-OAEP", modulusLength: 2048, publicExponent: new Uint8Array([1, 0, 1]), hash: "SHA-256" },
-      true,
-      ["encrypt", "decrypt"]
-    );
+    this.keypair = generateRecipientKeyPair();
   }
   async publishRecipientHint() {
-    const { publicKey } = await this.keypair;
-    const spki = await crypto.subtle.exportKey("spki", publicKey);
-    const pem = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(spki)).match(/.{1,64}/g).join("\n") + "\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
+    const spki = await exportRecipientPublicKeySpki(await this.keypair);
+    const pem = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + bytesToBase64(spki).match(/.{1,64}/g).join("\n") + "\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
     return { v: 1, pid: this.id, alg: "rsa-oaep-sha256", material: { publicKeyPem: pem } };
   }
   async sealForRecipient(plaintext, hint) {
@@ -158,8 +157,7 @@ var MemoryRecipientSealer = class {
   }
   async unseal(bytes) {
     const { wrapped, iv, ct } = parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes);
-    const { privateKey } = await this.keypair;
-    const cekBytes = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: "RSA-OAEP" }, privateKey, wrapped));
+    const cekBytes = await recipientUnwrap(await this.keypair, wrapped);
     const pt = await aesGcmOpen(cekBytes, iv, ct);
     cekBytes.fill(0);
     return pt;
@@ -216,7 +214,7 @@ async function loadSealedSecret(store, vault) {
   const envelope = await store.get(vault, "_meta", SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID);
   if (!envelope) return void 0;
   try {
-    return parseSealedEnvelope(JSON.parse(envelope._data));
+    return parseSealedEnvelope(JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? ""));
   } catch {
     return void 0;
   }
@@ -251,4 +249,4 @@ export {
   loadSealedSecret,
   resolveManagedSecret
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ENAG3IY7.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XKBTJGFP.js.map

package/dist/chunk-XKBTJGFP.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Managed-secret mode — rubber-hose-resistant vaults.\n *\n * A vault mode where the secret is machine-generated and never\n * exposed to the user, sealed under a developer-provided\n * {@link NoydbSealer} (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential\n * Manager, libsecret, AWS KMS, …). The user has no secret to give\n * up to coercion — they can't reveal what they don't know.\n *\n * ## Components in this file\n *\n *   - {@link NoydbSealer} — the interface concrete providers\n *     implement. Provider implementations live OUTSIDE hub (per-\n *     platform packages).\n *   - {@link MemorySealer} — in-memory test provider; uses\n *     a deterministic per-instance \"key\" so two providers with\n *     different ids cannot unseal each other's outputs.\n *   - {@link RecipientHint} — public material a sender uses to seal\n *     plaintext for a specific recipient; published by\n *     {@link RecipientSealer.publishRecipientHint} and transported\n *     out-of-band to the sender before bundle writes.\n *   - {@link RecipientSealer} — interface for asymmetric/granted\n *     providers that support recipient-target sealing (RSA-OAEP,\n *     cloud-KMS asymmetric, etc.); distinct from self-only\n *     {@link NoydbSealer} (macOS Keychain, WebAuthn-PRF).\n *   - {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} — in-process reference\n *     implementation of both `RecipientSealer` and\n *     `NoydbSealer` using real WebCrypto RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM;\n *     safe for tests and same-process sender/recipient scenarios.\n *   - {@link loadSealedSecret} / {@link saveSealedSecret} —\n *     plaintext envelope storage at `_meta/sealed-secret`.\n *     Mirrors the `_meta/handle` and `_meta/public-envelope` AES-\n *     GCM-bypassed patterns. The sealing layer (provider's job)\n *     is the security boundary; hub doesn't have a key to encrypt\n *     with at this layer — that's the whole point of the design.\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} — orchestrates the \"generate +\n *     seal + persist on first open; unseal on reopen\" flow.\n *     Returns the plaintext secret string that the rest of the\n *     `createNoydb` keyring path consumes.\n *\n * Deferred to follow-ups:\n *   - Block `rotate-secret` policy gate under managed mode.\n *   - Mandatory strong-recovery enforcement.\n *   - Recovery flow under managed mode (generates fresh sealed phrase).\n *\n * @see https://github.com/noy-db/docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Managed-secret mode\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport {\n  buildRecordEnvelope,\n  importTransferKey,\n  encryptBytes,\n  decryptBytes,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  generateRecipientKeyPair,\n  exportRecipientPublicKeySpki,\n  importRecipientPublicKeySpki,\n  recipientWrap,\n  recipientUnwrap,\n  type EnclaveKeyPair,\n} from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * The contract concrete providers (per-platform key stores) implement\n * to seal and unseal a hub-generated random secret. The plaintext\n * secret NEVER leaves hub-controlled memory in unsealed form —\n * the provider receives the bytes, returns opaque sealed bytes, and\n * later reverses the operation. Hub treats the sealed bytes as\n * fully opaque.\n *\n * Implementations live OUTSIDE `@noy-db/hub` (separate packages\n * per the issue's \"Concrete providers (live outside hub)\" note):\n *\n * | Platform | Package (TBD) | Backing |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | macOS | `@noy-db/seal-macos-keychain` | Security.framework |\n * | Windows | `@noy-db/seal-wincred` | Credential Manager |\n * | Linux | `@noy-db/seal-libsecret` | libsecret / secret-service |\n * | Cloud / server | `@noy-db/seal-aws-kms` | AWS KMS Decrypt |\n */\nexport interface NoydbSealer {\n  /**\n   * Non-sensitive identifier disclosed in the persisted envelope.\n   * Surfaced to consumers via `loadSealedSecret().providerId` so\n   * a vault opened with the wrong provider class can detect the\n   * mismatch and surface a clear error. NOT secret — fine to log.\n   *\n   * Suggested format: `<family>:<scope>` — e.g. `macos-keychain:com.acme.app`,\n   * `aws-kms:arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123:key/abc`. The hub never\n   * parses this; it's purely audit metadata.\n   */\n  readonly id: string\n\n  /** Seal raw secret bytes. Output bytes are opaque to hub. */\n  seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n\n  /**\n   * Reverse {@link seal}. MUST throw on tamper, wrong-provider, or\n   * any other failure — hub treats a thrown error as \"this provider\n   * cannot unlock this vault\" and surfaces it to the caller.\n   */\n  unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory test provider. NOT secure — uses a deterministic\n * per-instance \"key\" (16-byte SHA-256 of `id`) XOR'd over the\n * secret plus a 4-byte provider-id fingerprint prefix. The XOR is\n * sufficient to make different `id` values produce mutually-unsealable\n * outputs (the contract tests for that), but offers ZERO real\n * confidentiality — never use outside tests.\n *\n * Replace with a real platform provider in production.\n */\nexport class MemorySealer implements NoydbSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly fingerprint: Uint8Array\n  private readonly keyBytes: Uint8Array\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    // Deterministic 4-byte fingerprint of the provider id, prepended\n    // to every sealed output so we can detect \"wrong provider\" at\n    // unseal time without leaking anything sensitive about either\n    // provider's actual key material.\n    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(opts.id)\n    let h = 0\n    for (let i = 0; i < encoded.length; i++) {\n      h = (h * 31 + encoded[i]!) >>> 0\n    }\n    this.fingerprint = new Uint8Array([\n      (h >>> 24) & 0xff, (h >>> 16) & 0xff, (h >>> 8) & 0xff, h & 0xff,\n    ])\n    // Deterministic 16-byte \"key\" derived from the id by repeating\n    // the fingerprint with offsets. Good enough for the XOR-stream\n    // test cipher; never confuse this with real key derivation.\n    this.keyBytes = new Uint8Array(16)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) {\n      this.keyBytes[i] = this.fingerprint[i % 4]! ^ (i * 17)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Deterministic 4-byte integrity tag over the ciphertext, keyed by the\n   * same derived bytes. NOT a MAC and not forgery-resistant — a real\n   * provider authenticates with its backend. It exists because the contract\n   * says `unseal` MUST throw on tamper, and a double that silently returns\n   * corrupted bytes is not modelling the contract it stands in for. Without\n   * it, every managed-mode test ran against a provider that could not fail\n   * the way a real one must (found by @noy-db/test-sealer-conformance).\n   */\n  private tag(cipher: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n    let a = 0x9e3779b9\n    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {\n      a = ((a ^ (cipher[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!)) * 0x01000193) >>> 0\n    }\n    return new Uint8Array([(a >>> 24) & 0xff, (a >>> 16) & 0xff, (a >>> 8) & 0xff, a & 0xff])\n  }\n\n  async seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const cipher = new Uint8Array(secret.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < secret.length; i++) {\n      cipher[i] = secret[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    const out = new Uint8Array(8 + secret.length)\n    out.set(this.fingerprint, 0)\n    out.set(this.tag(cipher), 4)\n    out.set(cipher, 8)\n    return out\n  }\n\n  async unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (sealed.length < 8) {\n      throw new Error('MemorySealer: sealed input too short')\n    }\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[i] !== this.fingerprint[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealer(\"${this.id}\"): provider-id mismatch on unseal `\n          + '(sealed bytes were produced by a different provider)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const cipher = sealed.subarray(8)\n    const expected = this.tag(cipher)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[4 + i] !== expected[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealer(\"${this.id}\"): integrity check failed on unseal `\n          + '(the sealed bytes were modified after sealing)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const out = new Uint8Array(cipher.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {\n      out[i] = cipher[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Public material a sender uses to seal-for-this-recipient. Published by\n * a recipient's RecipientSealer; transported to the sender out-of-band\n * (email, S3, in-app message). The sender obtains the hint, supplies it\n * to writePod's sealedCredentials.perUser[userId].hint, and the\n * hub seals each user's credential against it. Per foundation §11.4.\n */\nexport type RecipientHint = {\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Recipient's provider id; matches the SealedAutoUnlockEntry.pid they'll unseal under. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Algorithm the sender uses to produce the seal. Slice 1 ships RSA-OAEP-SHA256 only. */\n  readonly alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256'\n  /** Public material — alg-specific. For 'rsa-oaep-sha256': { publicKeyPem: string }. */\n  readonly material: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>\n}\n\n// Hoisted to kernel/types.ts (C3 — enclave self-containment: sealing.ts\n// consumes this as a spine-owned contract type). Re-exported here so existing\n// importers of this module are unaffected.\nexport type { RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * Shared RSA-OAEP-SHA256 + AES-GCM seal in the canonical recipient-target\n * TLV wire format. Mints a fresh 32-byte CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts `plaintext`\n * under it, RSA-OAEP-SHA256-wraps the CEK to `publicKeyPem`, and packs:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * This is the single source of truth for the wire format — both\n * {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} and external sealers (e.g. `@noy-db/at-aws-kms`'s\n * asymmetric-KMS recipient sealer) call it so a blob sealed by one unseals\n * by the other. WebCrypto RSA-OAEP/SHA-256 here is wire-compatible with\n * AWS KMS `RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256` (both RSAES-OAEP, SHA-256 hash, MGF1-SHA256,\n * empty label).\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext: Uint8Array, publicKeyPem: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  // Parse PEM → SPKI bytes.\n  const b64 = publicKeyPem.replace(/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/-----END PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  const recipientPub = await importRecipientPublicKeySpki(base64ToBytes(b64))\n  // Mint fresh CEK, AES-GCM encrypt plaintext.\n  const cekBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const cek = await importTransferKey(cekBytes)\n  const { iv: ivB64, data } = await encryptBytes(plaintext, cek)\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivB64)\n  const ct = base64ToBuffer(data)\n  // RSA-OAEP-wrap the CEK bytes.\n  const wrapped = await recipientWrap(recipientPub, cekBytes)\n  cekBytes.fill(0)\n  if (wrapped.length !== 256) {\n    throw new Error(`sealRsaOaepTlv: expected 256-byte RSA-OAEP wrap, got ${wrapped.length}`)\n  }\n  // TLV layout.\n  const out = new Uint8Array(1 + 256 + 12 + ct.length)\n  out[0] = 0x01\n  out.set(wrapped, 1)\n  out.set(iv, 1 + 256)\n  out.set(ct, 1 + 256 + 12)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a {@link sealRsaOaepTlv} blob into its three segments without\n * decrypting. The `wrapped` CEK is RSA-OAEP-SHA256 ciphertext over a\n * 32-byte CEK — the unwrap step is pluggable: {@link MemoryRecipientSealer}\n * decrypts it with a local RSA private key; `@noy-db/at-aws-kms` hands it to\n * KMS `Decrypt`. After unwrapping, pass the CEK + `iv` + `ct` to\n * {@link aesGcmOpen}.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport function parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes: Uint8Array): { wrapped: Uint8Array; iv: Uint8Array; ct: Uint8Array } {\n  if (bytes.length < 1 + 256 + 12 + 16) {\n    throw new Error('parseRsaOaepTlv: sealed input too short')\n  }\n  if (bytes[0] !== 0x01) {\n    throw new Error(`parseRsaOaepTlv: unknown TLV version ${bytes[0]}`)\n  }\n  return {\n    wrapped: bytes.subarray(1, 1 + 256),\n    iv: bytes.subarray(1 + 256, 1 + 256 + 12),\n    ct: bytes.subarray(1 + 256 + 12),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-GCM-decrypt the `ct` segment of a {@link parseRsaOaepTlv} result under\n * the unwrapped 32-byte CEK and its `iv`. Throws on a bad tag (tamper) — the\n * same authenticated-decryption guarantee the TLV relies on.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function aesGcmOpen(cekBytes: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array, ct: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const cek = await importTransferKey(cekBytes)\n  return decryptBytes(bufferToBase64(iv), bufferToBase64(ct), cek)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reference implementation of `RecipientSealer` + `NoydbSealer`.\n * Uses WebCrypto RSA-OAEP-SHA256 (2048-bit) to wrap a fresh 32-byte\n * AES-GCM CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts plaintext under it, and packs the\n * result into a self-describing TLV:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * Implements BOTH interfaces. `seal(plaintext)` (self-target) is just\n * `sealForRecipient(plaintext, this own hint)` — same TLV. Convenient\n * for tests where one provider plays both ends. Real cloud providers\n * (`at-aws-kms`, etc.) will pick their own internal layouts; the only\n * contract is round-trip identity.\n *\n * SAFE for production within its scope — the cryptography is real\n * (RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM via WebCrypto), but the keypair lives in-process\n * and is regenerated on every construction. Not suitable as a managed\n * keychain; use it for tests and for shipping bundles where the\n * recipient instance lives in the same process as the sender (rare).\n */\nexport class MemoryRecipientSealer implements NoydbSealer, RecipientSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly keypair: Promise<EnclaveKeyPair>\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    this.keypair = generateRecipientKeyPair()\n  }\n\n  async publishRecipientHint(): Promise<RecipientHint> {\n    const spki = await exportRecipientPublicKeySpki(await this.keypair)\n    const pem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n      + bytesToBase64(spki).match(/.{1,64}/g)!.join('\\n')\n      + '\\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n    return { v: 1, pid: this.id, alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256', material: { publicKeyPem: pem } }\n  }\n\n  async sealForRecipient(plaintext: Uint8Array, hint: RecipientHint): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (hint.v !== 1) {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.v ${String(hint.v)} (expected 1)`)\n    }\n    if (hint.alg !== 'rsa-oaep-sha256') {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.alg '${String(hint.alg)}' (expected 'rsa-oaep-sha256')`)\n    }\n    const pem = hint.material['publicKeyPem']\n    if (typeof pem !== 'string') {\n      throw new Error('MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: hint.material.publicKeyPem missing or not a string')\n    }\n    return sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext, pem)\n  }\n\n  async seal(plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const hint = await this.publishRecipientHint()\n    return this.sealForRecipient(plaintext, hint)\n  }\n\n  async unseal(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const { wrapped, iv, ct } = parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes)\n    // Local RSA-OAEP-SHA256 unwrap of the CEK — the pluggable step external\n    // sealers replace with KMS Decrypt.\n    const cekBytes = await recipientUnwrap(await this.keypair, wrapped)\n    const pt = await aesGcmOpen(cekBytes, iv, ct)\n    cekBytes.fill(0)\n    return pt\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Persisted envelope ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Reserved id for the managed-secret envelope under `_meta`. */\nexport const SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID = 'sealed-secret' as const\n\n/** Plaintext payload stored inside the `_meta/sealed-secret` envelope. */\nexport interface SealedSecret {\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  readonly providerId: string\n  /** Sealed bytes. Base64-encoded on the wire; decoded on load. */\n  readonly sealed: Uint8Array\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format envelope persisted at `_meta/sealed-secret` for\n * managed-mode vaults. The provider produces raw sealed bytes via\n * {@link NoydbSealer.seal}; this wrapper carries the dispatch\n * metadata hub needs to pick the right provider on the unseal path.\n *\n * Stability boundary: once shipped, the wire format only grows by\n * adding optional fields. See the at-* sealing dimension foundation\n * doc, §11.9.1.\n *\n * v1 shape (this release): `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }`.\n *\n * Legacy shape (earlier releases): `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }`\n * — accepted on read for backwards compatibility; never produced on\n * write going forward.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  /** Envelope schema version. v1 is the current shape. */\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Magic marker for forensics + legacy-shape detection. */\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  /** Matches the producing provider's `.id`. Dispatch key on unseal. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Sealed bytes from the provider, base64-encoded on the wire. */\n  readonly payload: string\n}\n\nfunction bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nfunction base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(b64)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) out[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a `_meta/sealed-secret` `_data` JSON string into the\n * in-memory {@link SealedSecret} representation. Accepts both:\n *\n *   1. v1 wire format `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }` —\n *      the current shape.\n *   2. Legacy wire format `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }` —\n *      read-only; never written\n *      going forward.\n *\n * Returns `undefined` for any input that doesn't match either shape,\n * so callers can fall back to \"no managed-mode envelope present.\"\n *\n * @internal — exported only for the migration safety-net test suite.\n */\nexport function parseSealedEnvelope(raw: unknown): SealedSecret | undefined {\n  if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) return undefined\n  const r = raw as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_sealed !== 1) return undefined\n\n  // v1 shape — preferred.\n  if (\n    r.v === 1\n    && typeof r.pid === 'string'\n    && typeof r.payload === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.pid,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.payload),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Legacy shape — earlier releases. Accept on read for compat.\n  if (\n    typeof r.providerId === 'string'\n    && typeof r.sealed === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.providerId,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.sealed),\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined\n}\n\nexport async function saveSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  payload: { readonly providerId: string; readonly sealed: Uint8Array },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: SealedEnvelope = {\n    v: 1,\n    _noydb_sealed: 1,\n    pid: payload.providerId,\n    payload: bytesToBase64(payload.sealed),\n  }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, version: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1 },\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the sealing layer is the security boundary.\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(persisted) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n\nexport async function loadSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<SealedSecret | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    return parseSealedEnvelope(JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? ''))\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── createNoydb orchestration ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective plaintext secret string for a managed-mode\n * vault. Two paths:\n *\n *   1. **First open (no envelope persisted):** generate a 256-bit random\n *      via `crypto.getRandomValues`, base64-encode for use as a\n *      secret string, seal the underlying bytes under the\n *      provider, persist `_meta/sealed-secret`, return the\n *      base64 string.\n *\n *   2. **Reopen (envelope exists):** read + unseal + decode → return.\n *      A different provider whose `seal` output disagrees on the\n *      stored bytes throws here, surfaced as a clear error.\n *\n * The returned string is the same shape that `secret:` would take in\n * standard mode — the rest of the keyring path consumes it\n * unchanged.\n *\n * @internal — called from `createNoydb` / `getKeyringInternal`.\n */\nexport async function resolveManagedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  provider: NoydbSealer,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const existing = await loadSealedSecret(store, vault)\n  if (existing) {\n    if (existing.providerId !== provider.id) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Managed-mode vault \"${vault}\" was sealed under provider id `\n        + `\"${existing.providerId}\" but the current NoydbSealer is `\n        + `\"${provider.id}\". Pass the same provider that originally enrolled `\n        + 'the vault, or treat this as a fresh enrollment and clear '\n        + '`_meta/sealed-secret` first.',\n      )\n    }\n    const plaintext = await provider.unseal(existing.sealed)\n    return bytesToBase64(plaintext)\n  }\n\n  // First open: mint a 256-bit random, seal, persist.\n  const random = new Uint8Array(32)\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(random)\n  const sealed = await provider.seal(random)\n  await saveSealedSecret(store, vault, { providerId: provider.id, sealed })\n  return 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package/dist/{chunk-32YV3TJT.js → chunk-XXNWU5QZ.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/derivations/with-derivation.ts
 function withDerivation(spec) {
@@ -149,4 +149,4 @@ export {
   withDerivation,
   withRollup
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-32YV3TJT.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XXNWU5QZ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-B57AFBY2.js → chunk-XXQ5XIYY.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/overlay-views/with-overlayed-view.ts
 function withOverlayedView(spec) {
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ function withOverlayedView(spec) {
 export {
   withOverlayedView
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-B57AFBY2.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XXQ5XIYY.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ORDURZBU.js → chunk-YFFMPZPY.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   FieldNotQueryableError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/kernel/via/pipeline.ts
 var ViaPipeline = class _ViaPipeline {
@@ -458,4 +458,4 @@ export {
   EXPORT_REDACTION_MARKER,
   exportRedact
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ORDURZBU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YFFMPZPY.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-MDWKM2XC.js → chunk-YKGJ44Z7.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import {
   getAtPath
-} from "./chunk-GHLTDZRS.js";
+} from "./chunk-V55JASXO.js";
 import {
   EmbeddingModelMismatchError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
 
 // src/with-lookup/embeddings/descriptor.ts
 function embeddingSourceText(record, source) {
@@ -290,4 +290,4 @@ export {
   isVecIdFor,
   deriveChunkVectors
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MDWKM2XC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YKGJ44Z7.js.map