@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.8 → 0.6.0

package/dist/chunk-J7FM3RAU.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-sync/presence.ts","../src/with-sync/period-scope.ts","../src/with-sync/engine.ts","../src/with-sync/transaction.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Presence handle — real-time awareness of who is viewing/editing a collection.\n * encrypted ephemeral channel keyed by collection DEK via HKDF.\n *\n * The presence key is derived from the collection DEK so:\n *  - The adapter never learns user identities from presence payloads.\n *  - Presence rotates automatically when the DEK rotates (revoked users\n *    can no longer participate after a DEK rotation).\n *\n * Two transport strategies:\n *  1. **Pub/sub** (real-time): used when the adapter implements\n *     `presencePublish` and `presenceSubscribe`.\n *  2. **Storage-poll** (fallback): presence records are written to a\n *     reserved `_presence_<collection>` collection on the sync adapter\n *     (if available) or local adapter, and polled periodically.\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, PresencePeer } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, decrypt, derivePresenceKey, type EnclaveKey } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n/**\n * HKDF salt domain for the presence-tag key — the adapter-opaque record-id\n * tag used by the storage-poll fallback. Domain-separated from the presence\n * PAYLOAD key (`'noydb-presence'`, in `derivePresenceKey`) so the tag key\n * and the payload encryption key are cryptographically independent even\n * though both derive from the same collection DEK.\n */\nconst PRESENCE_TAG_KEY_DOMAIN = 'noydb.presence.tag.v1'\n\n/** Options for constructing a PresenceHandle. @internal */\nexport interface PresenceHandleOpts {\n  /** Local adapter for storage-poll fallback. */\n  adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** Remote (sync) adapter — preferred for broadcasting presence if available. */\n  syncAdapter?: NoydbStore\n  /** Vault name — used as part of the channel and storage key. */\n  vault: string\n  /** Collection name — used as HKDF `info` and channel suffix. */\n  collectionName: string\n  /**\n   * Calling user's ID. In encrypted mode it is encrypted inside the\n   * storage-poll record's `data` field — the record id is an\n   * adapter-opaque HMAC tag, not the userId, so the adapter never learns\n   * peer identities. Unencrypted vaults have no key to tag or encrypt\n   * with, so the userId is used as the record id in cleartext (dev posture\n   * only — identity privacy requires encryption).\n   */\n  userId: string\n  /** Whether encryption is active. When false, presence payloads are stored as JSON. */\n  encrypted: boolean\n  /** Callback that resolves the collection DEK (used to derive the presence key). */\n  getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  /** How long (ms) before a peer's presence is considered stale. Default: 30_000. */\n  staleMs?: number\n  /** Poll interval (ms) for the storage-poll fallback. Default: 5_000. */\n  pollIntervalMs?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Internal storage envelope for the storage-poll fallback.\n * Written to `_presence_<collection>` as `{ lastSeen, iv, data }`.\n *\n * In encrypted mode `data` is ciphertext of `{ userId, payload }` — the\n * userId rides inside the encrypted payload, never as a top-level field, and\n * the record's storage id is a separate HMAC tag (see `presenceTag`), not\n * the userId. In unencrypted mode `data` is `JSON.stringify(payload)` and\n * the record id IS the (cleartext) userId — there is no key to tag with.\n */\ninterface StoragePresenceRecord {\n  lastSeen: string\n  iv: string    // base64 AES-GCM IV (empty when not encrypted)\n  data: string  // base64 ciphertext or JSON string when not encrypted\n}\n\n/** Presence handle for a single collection. */\nexport class PresenceHandle<P> {\n  private readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  private readonly syncAdapter: NoydbStore | undefined\n  private readonly vault: string\n  private readonly collectionName: string\n  private readonly userId: string\n  private readonly encrypted: boolean\n  private readonly getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  private readonly staleMs: number\n  private readonly pollIntervalMs: number\n  private readonly channel: string\n  private readonly storageCollection: string\n\n  private presenceKey: EnclaveKey | null = null\n  private presenceTagKey: EnclaveKey | null = null\n  private subscribers: Array<(peers: PresencePeer<P>[]) => void> = []\n  private unsubscribePubSub: (() => void) | null = null\n  private pollTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null\n  private stopped = false\n\n  constructor(opts: PresenceHandleOpts) {\n    this.adapter = opts.adapter\n    this.syncAdapter = opts.syncAdapter\n    this.vault = opts.vault\n    this.collectionName = opts.collectionName\n    this.userId = opts.userId\n    this.encrypted = opts.encrypted\n    this.getDEK = opts.getDEK\n    this.staleMs = opts.staleMs ?? 30_000\n    this.pollIntervalMs = opts.pollIntervalMs ?? 5_000\n    // Channel used by pub/sub adapters — vault-scoped so two collections\n    // in the same vault don't bleed into each other's presence channels.\n    this.channel = `${opts.vault}:${opts.collectionName}:presence`\n    // Reserved collection name for the storage-poll fallback.\n    this.storageCollection = `_presence_${opts.collectionName}`\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Announce yourself (or update your cursor/status).\n   * Encrypts `payload` with the presence key and publishes it.\n   */\n  async update(payload: P): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.stopped) return\n\n    const key = await this.getPresenceKey()\n    const now = new Date().toISOString()\n    const plaintext = JSON.stringify({ userId: this.userId, lastSeen: now, payload })\n    let encryptedPayload: string\n\n    if (this.encrypted && key) {\n      const { iv, data } = await encrypt(plaintext, key)\n      encryptedPayload = JSON.stringify({ iv, data })\n    } else {\n      encryptedPayload = plaintext\n    }\n\n    // Pub/sub path — publish to any adapter that supports it\n    const pubAdapter = this.getPubSubAdapter()\n    if (pubAdapter?.presencePublish) {\n      await pubAdapter.presencePublish(this.channel, encryptedPayload)\n    }\n\n    // Storage-poll path — write a record to the storage adapter\n    await this.writeStorageRecord(payload, now)\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Subscribe to presence updates. The callback receives a filtered, decrypted\n   * list of all currently-active peers (excluding yourself, excluding stale).\n   *\n   * Returns an unsubscribe function. Also call `stop()` to release all resources.\n   */\n  subscribe(cb: (peers: PresencePeer<P>[]) => void): () => void {\n    if (this.stopped) return () => {}\n\n    this.subscribers.push(cb)\n\n    // Start pub/sub listener on first subscriber\n    if (this.subscribers.length === 1) {\n      this.startListening()\n    }\n\n    return () => {\n      this.subscribers = this.subscribers.filter(s => s !== cb)\n      if (this.subscribers.length === 0) this.stopListening()\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Stop all listening and clear resources. */\n  stop(): void {\n    this.stopped = true\n    this.stopListening()\n    this.subscribers = []\n  }\n\n  // ─── Private ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  private async getPresenceKey(): Promise<EnclaveKey | null> {\n    if (!this.encrypted) return null\n    if (!this.presenceKey) {\n      try {\n        const dek = await this.getDEK(this.collectionName)\n        this.presenceKey = await derivePresenceKey(dek, this.collectionName)\n      } catch {\n        // no-op — presence degrades gracefully if crypto fails\n      }\n    }\n    return this.presenceKey\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Derive (and cache) the presence-tag key — a non-extractable, sign-only\n   * HMAC-SHA256 key HKDF-derived from the collection DEK, domain-separated\n   * from the presence payload key by {@link PRESENCE_TAG_KEY_DOMAIN}.\n   * Mirrors `deriveClassifyIndexKey` (kernel/enclave/classify/bidx.ts). No\n   * PBKDF2 stretch — the adapter never holds this key, so a plain keyed HMAC\n   * tag is sufficient and deterministic. Returns `null` when unencrypted\n   * (no DEK to derive from).\n   */\n  private async getPresenceTagKey(): Promise<EnclaveKey | null> {\n    if (!this.encrypted) return null\n    if (!this.presenceTagKey) {\n      try {\n        const dek = await this.getDEK(this.collectionName)\n        const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n        const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n        const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(PRESENCE_TAG_KEY_DOMAIN)\n        const info = new TextEncoder().encode(this.collectionName)\n        const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info }, hkdfKey, 256)\n        this.presenceTagKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', bits, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'])\n      } catch {\n        // no-op — presence degrades gracefully if crypto fails\n      }\n    }\n    return this.presenceTagKey\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Deterministic, adapter-opaque tag for `userId` — used as the\n   * storage-poll record id in encrypted mode so the adapter never sees the\n   * userId. Falls back to the raw `userId` when unencrypted (no key exists\n   * to tag with — see {@link PresenceHandleOpts.userId}).\n   *\n   * Signs directly via `subtle.sign` (like `bidx.ts`'s `mintAt`) rather than\n   * the barrel's `hmacSha256Hex` helper: that helper re-exports its key\n   * argument's raw bytes internally, which only works for extractable keys\n   * (e.g. an AES-GCM DEK) — `presenceTagKey` is deliberately non-extractable.\n   */\n  private async presenceTag(userId: string): Promise<string> {\n    const tagKey = await this.getPresenceTagKey()\n    if (!tagKey) return userId\n    const mac = await subtle.sign('HMAC', tagKey, new TextEncoder().encode(userId) as BufferSource)\n    return Array.from(new Uint8Array(mac)).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')\n  }\n\n  private getPubSubAdapter(): NoydbStore | undefined {\n    // Prefer the sync adapter (it broadcasts to other devices)\n    if (this.syncAdapter?.presencePublish) return this.syncAdapter\n    if (this.adapter.presencePublish) return this.adapter\n    return undefined\n  }\n\n  private startListening(): void {\n    const pubAdapter = this.getPubSubAdapter()\n\n    if (pubAdapter?.presenceSubscribe) {\n      // Real-time pub/sub path\n      this.unsubscribePubSub = pubAdapter.presenceSubscribe(\n        this.channel,\n        (encryptedPayload) => { void this.handlePubSubMessage(encryptedPayload) },\n      )\n    } else {\n      // Storage-poll fallback\n      this.pollTimer = setInterval(\n        () => { void this.pollStoragePresence() },\n        this.pollIntervalMs,\n      )\n      // Kick off an immediate poll\n      void this.pollStoragePresence()\n    }\n  }\n\n  private stopListening(): void {\n    if (this.unsubscribePubSub) {\n      this.unsubscribePubSub()\n      this.unsubscribePubSub = null\n    }\n    if (this.pollTimer) {\n      clearInterval(this.pollTimer)\n      this.pollTimer = null\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async handlePubSubMessage(encryptedPayload: string): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      const peer = await this.decryptPresencePayload(encryptedPayload)\n      if (!peer || peer.userId === this.userId) return\n\n      const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - this.staleMs).toISOString()\n      if (peer.lastSeen < cutoff) return\n\n      // Deliver only this new peer to subscribers; a full snapshot poll follows\n      // on next interval. For pub/sub, we could maintain a map of active peers,\n      // but for simplicity: emit a snapshot read from storage.\n      await this.pollStoragePresence()\n    } catch {\n      // Decrypt failure — stale key or tampered payload, ignore\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async decryptPresencePayload(\n    encryptedPayload: string,\n  ): Promise<{ userId: string; lastSeen: string; payload: P } | null> {\n    const key = await this.getPresenceKey()\n\n    if (!this.encrypted || !key) {\n      return JSON.parse(encryptedPayload) as { userId: string; lastSeen: string; payload: P }\n    }\n\n    const { iv: ivB64, data } = JSON.parse(encryptedPayload) as { iv: string; data: string }\n    const plaintext = await decrypt(ivB64, data, key)\n    return JSON.parse(plaintext) as { userId: string; lastSeen: string; payload: P }\n  }\n\n  private async writeStorageRecord(payload: P, now: string): Promise<void> {\n    const key = await this.getPresenceKey()\n    let iv = ''\n    let data: string\n    let recordId: string\n\n    if (this.encrypted && key) {\n      // userId rides INSIDE the ciphertext, like the pub/sub path — the\n      // adapter never sees it. The record id is a separate deterministic\n      // tag, also opaque to the adapter.\n      const plaintext = JSON.stringify({ userId: this.userId, payload })\n      const result = await encrypt(plaintext, key)\n      iv = result.iv\n      data = result.data\n      recordId = await this.presenceTag(this.userId)\n    } else {\n      // Unencrypted vault — no key exists to tag or encrypt with.\n      data = JSON.stringify(payload)\n      recordId = this.userId\n    }\n\n    const record: StoragePresenceRecord = { lastSeen: now, iv, data }\n    const json = JSON.stringify(record)\n\n    // Use the sync adapter if available (so other devices can read it);\n    // fall back to local adapter.\n    const storeAdapter = this.syncAdapter ?? this.adapter\n    const envelope = {\n      _noydb: 1 as const,\n      _v: 1,\n      _ts: now,\n      _iv: '',\n      _data: json,\n    }\n    try {\n      await storeAdapter.put(\n        this.vault,\n        this.storageCollection,\n        recordId,\n        envelope,\n      )\n    } catch {\n      // Presence write failure is non-fatal — the user is still present locally\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async pollStoragePresence(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.stopped || this.subscribers.length === 0) return\n\n    try {\n      const key = await this.getPresenceKey()\n      const storeAdapter = this.syncAdapter ?? this.adapter\n      const ids = await storeAdapter.list(this.vault, this.storageCollection)\n      const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - this.staleMs).toISOString()\n      const peers: PresencePeer<P>[] = []\n      const myTag = await this.presenceTag(this.userId)\n\n      for (const id of ids) {\n        if (id === myTag) continue // skip ourselves\n        const envelope = await storeAdapter.get(this.vault, this.storageCollection, id)\n        if (!envelope) continue\n\n        try {\n          const record = JSON.parse(envelope._data) as StoragePresenceRecord\n          if (record.lastSeen < cutoff) continue\n\n          let peerUserId: string\n          let peerPayload: P\n          if (this.encrypted && key && record.iv) {\n            const plaintext = await decrypt(record.iv, record.data, key)\n            const decoded = JSON.parse(plaintext) as { userId: string; payload: P }\n            peerUserId = decoded.userId\n            peerPayload = decoded.payload\n          } else {\n            // Unencrypted mode: the record id IS the userId (see writeStorageRecord).\n            peerUserId = id\n            peerPayload = JSON.parse(record.data) as P\n          }\n\n          peers.push({ userId: peerUserId, payload: peerPayload, lastSeen: record.lastSeen })\n        } catch {\n          // One bad record (e.g. a pre-fix record that fails to decrypt\n          // under a new reader) shouldn't blank the whole snapshot — skip\n          // just this record.\n          continue\n        }\n      }\n\n      for (const cb of this.subscribers) {\n        cb(peers)\n      }\n    } catch {\n      // Poll failure is non-fatal\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * #807 — period-scoped pull support for the `SyncEngine` (thin-client\n * bootstrap: first sync pulls the current period + the period summaries;\n * historical periods backfill on demand via `pull({ periods: ['<name>'] })`).\n *\n * ## Membership law\n *\n * The engine only ever sees ciphertext envelopes, so period membership at\n * the sync tier is by write-time `_ts` against the closed periods' windows\n * (`periodExclusiveUpperBound`) — the SAME store-tier law freeze (#604) and\n * archive (#613) use, NOT the business-date (`dateField`) seal the write\n * guard applies inside the trust boundary. A late-booked record (in-period\n * business date, current write-time) therefore syncs with the current\n * period — mirroring how it archives at the NEXT period's archive.\n *\n * Closed periods partition the timeline by their exclusive upper bounds:\n * the earliest closed period's window is unbounded below (a close seals\n * everything at-or-before its `endDate`), each later one starts at its\n * predecessor's bound, and the CURRENT window is everything at-or-after\n * the latest closed bound (everything, when no period was ever closed).\n *\n * ## What a period filter can never drop\n *\n * - **Period summaries** (`_periods` + freeze/archive/target-purge\n *   companions) — the navigation index; always pulled in full, exempt from\n *   every filter (`collections`, `periods`, `modifiedSince`).\n * - **Delete markers and tombstones** — an erasure or delete must never be\n *   skipped by partial sync (the #589/#590 law, mirroring the\n *   `modifiedSince` exemption). This is what makes a device that never\n *   pulled period P converge instead of resurrecting P's deleted records\n *   when it later backfills.\n * - **Reserved lookups** (`_dict_*`/`_lookup_*`) — vocabulary/config rows\n *   are not period-partitioned data; their explicit pull loop is exempt.\n *\n * Push is NEVER period-filtered — `PushOptions` has no `periods` member at\n * all; a thin client's writes always flow up in full.\n */\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { ValidationError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { isTombstoneShape, isDeleteMarker } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport {\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n  periodExclusiveUpperBound,\n} from '../with-audit/periods/window.js'\n\nexport { PERIODS_COLLECTION }\n\n/**\n * The reserved period-metadata collections a period-scoped pull always\n * fetches first (phase 1, \"summaries\"): the hash-chained `_periods` index\n * plus its freeze/archive/target-purge companions.\n */\nexport const PERIOD_SUMMARY_COLLECTIONS: readonly string[] = [\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n]\n\n/** The subset of a decrypted `PeriodRecord` the window computation needs. */\nexport interface PeriodSyncRecord {\n  readonly name: string\n  readonly kind: 'closed' | 'opened'\n  readonly endDate: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Vault-injected source of decrypted period records, wired via\n * `SyncEngine.setPeriodPullSource` (same injection pattern as\n * `setReservedLookupSource`). MUST re-read from the local store on every\n * call — the engine invokes it right after the summaries phase applied\n * freshly pulled `_periods` envelopes.\n */\nexport interface PeriodPullSource {\n  periods(): Promise<readonly PeriodSyncRecord[]>\n}\n\nconst SHAPE_MSG =\n  'pull: `periods` must be an array of closed-period names, or `{ current: true }`.'\n\n/** Validate the raw `PullOptions.periods` value (runtime shape only). */\nexport function validatePeriodsOption(\n  periods: unknown,\n): asserts periods is readonly string[] | { readonly current: true } {\n  if (Array.isArray(periods)) {\n    for (const p of periods) {\n      if (typeof p !== 'string' || p.length === 0) throw new ValidationError(SHAPE_MSG)\n    }\n    return\n  }\n  if (\n    typeof periods === 'object' && periods !== null &&\n    (periods as { current?: unknown }).current === true &&\n    Object.keys(periods).length === 1\n  ) {\n    return\n  }\n  throw new ValidationError(SHAPE_MSG)\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the selected `_ts` windows and return the pull-scope predicate:\n * `true` = the envelope is in scope for this pull. Tombstones and delete\n * markers are unconditionally in scope (see module doc).\n *\n * Throws `ValidationError` for a name that is not a closed period in the\n * (freshly synced) `_periods` index — a typo'd backfill must fail loudly,\n * never silently pull nothing.\n */\nexport function buildPeriodScope(\n  option: readonly string[] | { readonly current: true },\n  records: readonly PeriodSyncRecord[],\n): (envelope: EncryptedEnvelope) => boolean {\n  const closed = records\n    .filter((r) => r.kind === 'closed')\n    .map((r) => ({ name: r.name, bound: periodExclusiveUpperBound(r.endDate) }))\n    .sort((a, b) => a.bound.localeCompare(b.bound))\n\n  let windows: ReadonlyArray<{ lower: string | null; upper: string | null }>\n  if (Array.isArray(option)) {\n    windows = (option as readonly string[]).map((name) => {\n      const idx = closed.findIndex((c) => c.name === name)\n      if (idx < 0) {\n        const other = records.find((r) => r.name === name)\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          other\n            ? `pull: period \"${name}\" is \"${other.kind}\" — only closed periods have a backfill window; use \\`{ current: true }\\` for the open period.`\n            : `pull: no closed period named \"${name}\" in this vault's _periods index.`,\n        )\n      }\n      return { lower: idx > 0 ? closed[idx - 1]!.bound : null, upper: closed[idx]!.bound }\n    })\n  } else {\n    // { current: true } — everything at-or-after the latest closed bound\n    // (everything, when no period was ever closed: with no closed periods\n    // there is nothing historical to exclude, so nothing is silently dropped).\n    windows = [{ lower: closed.length > 0 ? closed[closed.length - 1]!.bound : null, upper: null }]\n  }\n\n  return (envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): boolean => {\n    if (isTombstoneShape(envelope) || isDeleteMarker(envelope)) return true\n    return windows.some(\n      (w) =>\n        (w.lower === null || envelope._ts >= w.lower) &&\n        (w.upper === null || envelope._ts < w.upper),\n    )\n  }\n}\n","import type {\n  NoydbStore,\n  DirtyEntry,\n  Conflict,\n  ConflictStrategy,\n  CollectionConflictResolver,\n  PushOptions,\n  PullOptions,\n  PushResult,\n  PullResult,\n  SyncStatus,\n  EncryptedEnvelope,\n  SyncMetadata,\n  SyncTargetRole,\n  ErasureEnforcement,\n} from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_SYNC_VERSION } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { isConflictError, ValidationError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport {\n  PERIOD_SUMMARY_COLLECTIONS,\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  buildPeriodScope,\n  validatePeriodsOption,\n  type PeriodPullSource,\n} from './period-scope.js'\nimport type { NoydbEventEmitter } from '../kernel/events.js'\nimport type { SyncPolicy } from '../kernel/sync-policy.js'\nimport { SyncScheduler } from '../kernel/sync-policy.js'\nimport { isTombstoneShape, isDeleteMarker, envelopeBodySize } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/** #650 Task 4 (#647) — the declared reserved-lookup (`_dict_*`/`_lookup_*`) collection-name\n *  registry a `SyncEngine` enumerates on pull. Explicit, not a blanket underscore-glob — other\n *  `_`-prefixed namespaces keep their `loadAll`-skip semantics untouched. */\nexport interface ReservedLookupSource {\n  /** Declared reserved-lookup collection names to enumerate on pull. */\n  collections(): readonly string[]\n}\n\n/** Sync engine: dirty tracking, push, pull, conflict resolution, scheduling. */\nexport class SyncEngine {\n  private readonly local: NoydbStore\n  private readonly remote: NoydbStore\n  private readonly strategy: ConflictStrategy\n  private readonly emitter: NoydbEventEmitter\n  private readonly vault: string\n  readonly role: SyncTargetRole\n  readonly label: string | undefined\n  /** #948: the resolved policy this engine was constructed with, retained for\n   *  introspection (`Noydb.listSyncTargets()`) — otherwise lost once consumed\n   *  into the scheduler below. */\n  readonly policy: SyncPolicy | undefined\n\n  private dirty: DirtyEntry[] = []\n  private lastPush: string | null = null\n  private lastPull: string | null = null\n  private loaded = false\n  private autoSyncInterval: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null\n  private isOnline = true\n\n  /** Sync scheduler. Manages push/pull timing. */\n  readonly scheduler: SyncScheduler | null\n\n  /** Per-collection conflict resolvers registered by Collection instances. */\n  private readonly conflictResolvers = new Map<string, CollectionConflictResolver>()\n\n  /**\n   * Expands a collection-name filter to include its satellite pair partner(s)\n   * (spec #591 convergence rule 5b) — wired from vault satellite declaration\n   * via `setPairExpander`. `undefined` when no satellite has ever been\n   * declared for this vault: identity behavior, zero change for non-satellite\n   * users.\n   */\n  private pairExpander?: (names: readonly string[]) => readonly string[]\n\n  /** #598: refreshes Collection in-memory views after a sync-applied local write. Wired by the\n   *  vault at open. `action` (#640): `'delete'` for a pulled tombstone/delete-marker, `'put'`\n   *  otherwise — classified at `applyRemote`, the one choke point that holds the envelope. */\n  private cacheInvalidator?: (collection: string, id: string, action: 'put' | 'delete') => Promise<void>\n\n  /** Wire the Collection-cache invalidation hook (#598). Same injection pattern as `setPairExpander`. */\n  setCacheInvalidator(fn: (collection: string, id: string, action: 'put' | 'delete') => Promise<void>): void {\n    this.cacheInvalidator = fn\n  }\n\n  /** #638 Task 4: opens/flushes the vault's graph-dispatch touch batch around a whole `pull()`/\n   *  `push()` call, so N `applyRemote`d records feeding the same derivation/rollup/MV target\n   *  recompute once. Wired by the vault at open, mirroring `cacheInvalidator`. */\n  private graphBatchController?: { begin(): void; flush(): Promise<void> }\n\n  /** Wire the graph-dispatch batch controller (#638 Task 4). Same injection pattern as `setCacheInvalidator`. */\n  setGraphBatchController(controller: { begin(): void; flush(): Promise<void> }): void {\n    this.graphBatchController = controller\n  }\n\n  /** #650 Task 4 (#647): declared reserved-lookup collections `pull()` enumerates explicitly (the\n   *  store's `list()` does not skip `_`-prefixed names, unlike `loadAll()`). Wired by the vault at\n   *  open, same injection pattern as `setCacheInvalidator`/`setGraphBatchController`. */\n  private reservedLookup?: ReservedLookupSource\n\n  /** Wire the reserved-lookup source (#650 Task 4). */\n  setReservedLookupSource(source: ReservedLookupSource): void {\n    this.reservedLookup = source\n  }\n\n  /** #653: expands a (pair-expanded) collection-name filter to include the reserved `_dict_*`\n   *  collections those names depend on via their lookup fields — mirrors `pairExpander` so a\n   *  partial `push`/`pull({collections:[...]})` never drops the dictionary a named collection's\n   *  labels/membership rely on. Wired unconditionally from the vault's `dictKeyFieldRegistry` via\n   *  `setReservedDictExpander` (returns `[]` when the vault has no dict-backed collections); only\n   *  `undefined` on a standalone engine that was never vault-attached. */\n  private reservedDictExpander?: (names: readonly string[]) => readonly string[]\n\n  /** Wire the reserved-dict expansion function (#653). Same injection pattern as `setPairExpander`. */\n  setReservedDictExpander(expander: (names: readonly string[]) => readonly string[]): void {\n    this.reservedDictExpander = expander\n  }\n\n  /** #807: vault-injected source of decrypted period records — resolves the `_ts` windows a\n   *  `pull({ periods })` scopes to. Re-read AFTER the summaries phase, so a fresh device's\n   *  freshly pulled `_periods` index is what the windows are computed from. `undefined` on a\n   *  standalone engine that was never vault-attached (period-scoped pull then throws). */\n  private periodPullSource?: PeriodPullSource\n\n  /** Wire the period-window source (#807). Same injection pattern as `setReservedLookupSource`. */\n  setPeriodPullSource(source: PeriodPullSource): void {\n    this.periodPullSource = source\n  }\n\n  /** #807: KPI accumulator `applyRemote` feeds during a period-scoped `pull()` — pointed at the\n   *  active phase's counters (summaries → records) and cleared before pull returns. Approximate\n   *  by design: a push interleaved mid-pull on the same engine would attribute its converge\n   *  applies to the open phase; the counters are a download-budget KPI, not an audit source. */\n  private pullByteSink: { records: number; bytes: number } | null = null\n\n  constructor(opts: {\n    local: NoydbStore\n    remote: NoydbStore\n    vault: string\n    strategy: ConflictStrategy\n    emitter: NoydbEventEmitter\n    syncPolicy?: SyncPolicy\n    role?: SyncTargetRole\n    label?: string\n  }) {\n    this.local = opts.local\n    this.remote = opts.remote\n    this.vault = opts.vault\n    this.strategy = opts.strategy\n    this.emitter = opts.emitter\n    this.role = opts.role ?? 'sync-peer'\n    this.label = opts.label\n    this.policy = opts.syncPolicy\n\n    // Create a scheduler when the policy asks for ANY automatic behaviour.\n    // #897: this used to test `push.mode !== 'manual'` alone, so a policy of\n    // `{ push: manual, pull: interval }` silently got no scheduler and its pull\n    // mode was ignored.\n    const policy = opts.syncPolicy\n    if (policy && (policy.push.mode !== 'manual' || policy.pull.mode !== 'manual')) {\n      this.scheduler = new SyncScheduler(policy, {\n        push: () => this.push().then(() => {}),\n        // #618 — role-gate the SCHEDULER-INITIATED pull. The Noydb layer gates\n        // pull-from-sink for explicit calls, but the scheduler calls the engine\n        // directly and would bypass it: a backup/archive-only primary with an\n        // `interval`/`on-focus` pull policy would pull ungated, reintroducing\n        // #616. This guards the engine self-initiating on a timer; an explicit\n        // `engine.pull()` still pulls for every role.\n        // `collections` is set by a 'phased' sequence — one collection per phase.\n        // A role-gated skip reports 'incomplete': nothing was pulled, so the\n        // phase must not mark its collection ready.\n        pull: (collections) =>\n          this.role === 'sync-peer'\n            ? this.pull(collections ? { collections: [...collections] } : undefined)\n                // PullResult.errors accumulates WITHOUT throwing, so a partial\n                // failure is only visible here — not via a rejected promise.\n                .then(r => (r.errors.length === 0 ? 'complete' : 'incomplete'))\n            : Promise.resolve('incomplete'),\n        getDirtyCount: () => this.dirty.length,\n      })\n    } else {\n      this.scheduler = null\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Start the sync scheduler. Called after vault is fully opened. */\n  startScheduler(): void {\n    this.scheduler?.start()\n  }\n\n  /** Stop the sync scheduler. Called on close. */\n  stopScheduler(): void {\n    this.scheduler?.stop()\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Register a per-collection conflict resolver.\n   * Called by Collection when `conflictPolicy` is set.\n   *\n   * Pair-coupled (#591 rule 5b): registering for one satellite-pair member\n   * registers the same resolver for both — the pair converges under one\n   * resolution policy. Expands with whatever the pair-expander knows *at this\n   * call*; resolvers registered before their pair existed are covered by\n   * `remirrorPairResolvers` at pair-registration time.\n   */\n  registerConflictResolver(collection: string, resolver: CollectionConflictResolver): void {\n    for (const n of this.pairExpander?.([collection]) ?? [collection]) this.conflictResolvers.set(n, resolver)\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Wire a satellite pair-expansion function (vault registration, #591 Task 11).\n   * The closure re-reads the live `SatelliteRegistry` on every call, so pairs\n   * declared after this is set are still picked up by `push`/`pull` filters.\n   */\n  setPairExpander(expander: (names: readonly string[]) => readonly string[]): void {\n    this.pairExpander = expander\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Retroactively mirror per-collection conflict resolvers across a newly\n   * registered satellite pair (#591 rule 5b) — covers the NORMAL declaration\n   * order, where the base's `conflictPolicy` resolver was registered before\n   * the satellite was declared (so the call-time expansion in\n   * `registerConflictResolver` saw no pair yet). Tie-break: when BOTH members\n   * already carry (different) resolvers, the FIRST name in `names` wins —\n   * callers pass `[base, satellite]`, so the base's resolver is canonical.\n   * Idempotent; a later explicit registration on either member still\n   * overwrites both (last-wins, via the call-time expansion above).\n   */\n  remirrorPairResolvers(names: readonly string[]): void {\n    const canonical = names.map(n => this.conflictResolvers.get(n)).find(r => r !== undefined)\n    if (!canonical) return\n    for (const n of names) this.conflictResolvers.set(n, canonical)\n  }\n\n  /** Record a local change for later push. */\n  async trackChange(collection: string, id: string, action: 'put' | 'delete', version: number): Promise<void> {\n    await this.ensureLoaded()\n\n    // Deduplicate: if same collection+id already in dirty, update it\n    const idx = this.dirty.findIndex(d => d.collection === collection && d.id === id)\n    const entry: DirtyEntry = {\n      vault: this.vault,\n      collection,\n      id,\n      action,\n      version,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n    }\n\n    if (idx >= 0) {\n      this.dirty[idx] = entry\n    } else {\n      this.dirty.push(entry)\n    }\n\n    await this.persistMeta()\n\n    // Notify scheduler of the write (triggers on-change or debounce)\n    this.scheduler?.notifyChange()\n  }\n\n  /** Remove a dirty entry (satellite fan-out revert cleanup — spec #591). */\n  async removeDirty(collection: string, id: string): Promise<void> {\n    const before = this.dirty.length\n    this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collection && d.id === id))\n    if (this.dirty.length !== before) await this.persistMeta()\n  }\n\n  /** Push dirty records to remote adapter. Accepts optional `PushOptions` for partial sync. */\n  async push(options?: PushOptions): Promise<PushResult> {\n    await this.ensureLoaded()\n    this.graphBatchController?.begin() // #638 Task 4\n\n    let pushed = 0\n    const conflicts: Conflict[] = []\n    const erasures: ErasureEnforcement[] = []\n    const errors: Error[] = []\n    const completed: number[] = []\n\n    // Partial sync: expand the filter to cover satellite pair partners (#591 rule 5b), then the\n    // reserved `_dict_*` collections those (expanded) names depend on (#653) — a locally-dirty\n    // dict edit pushes alongside push({collections:['orders']}), symmetric with pull below.\n    const expanded = options?.collections ? (this.pairExpander?.(options.collections) ?? options.collections) : null\n    const filter = expanded ? new Set([...expanded, ...(this.reservedDictExpander?.(expanded) ?? [])]) : null\n\n    for (let i = 0; i < this.dirty.length; i++) {\n      const entry = this.dirty[i]!\n\n      // Partial sync: skip collections not in the filter\n      if (filter && !filter.has(entry.collection)) {\n        continue\n      }\n\n      try {\n        if (entry.action === 'delete') {\n          await this.remote.delete(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id)\n          completed.push(i)\n          pushed++\n        } else {\n          const envelope = await this.local.get(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id)\n          if (!envelope) {\n            // Record was deleted locally after being marked dirty\n            completed.push(i)\n            continue\n          }\n\n          if (isTombstoneShape(envelope)) {\n            // #590: a tombstone push is an erasure assertion — unconditional,\n            // no CAS, no conflict resolution. Erasure always wins.\n            await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, envelope)\n            completed.push(i)\n            pushed++\n            continue\n          }\n\n          try {\n            await this.remote.put(\n              this.vault,\n              entry.collection,\n              entry.id,\n              envelope,\n              entry.version - 1,\n            )\n            completed.push(i)\n            pushed++\n          } catch (err) {\n            if (isConflictError(err)) {\n              const remoteEnvelope = await this.remote.get(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id)\n              if (remoteEnvelope) {\n                if (isTombstoneShape(remoteEnvelope)) {\n                  // #590: remote already shredded this record — enforce locally,\n                  // never resolve. Resolvers must not overrule an erasure.\n                  await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, remoteEnvelope)\n                  erasures.push(this.reportErasure(entry.collection, entry.id, remoteEnvelope, envelope, 'push'))\n                  completed.push(i)\n                } else if (\n                  remoteEnvelope._v === envelope._v &&\n                  isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope) !== isDeleteMarker(envelope) &&\n                  !this.conflictResolvers.get(entry.collection)\n                ) {\n                  // #589: a same-_v delete-vs-edit tie on the push channel. handleConflict's db-level\n                  // 'version' default would resolve it to local-wins; the tie rule consults ONLY the\n                  // per-collection resolver, else delete-wins. (When a per-collection resolver IS set,\n                  // fall through to handleConflict, which already honors it — incl. the merged case.)\n                  if (isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope)) {\n                    // remote already deleted → converge locally, drop our (edit) push\n                    await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, remoteEnvelope)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                  } else {\n                    // our local is the marker → force the delete onto the remote (unconditional put)\n                    await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, envelope)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                    pushed++\n                  }\n                } else {\n                  const { handled, conflict } = await this.handleConflict(\n                    entry.collection,\n                    entry.id,\n                    envelope,\n                    remoteEnvelope,\n                    'push',\n                  )\n                  conflicts.push(conflict)\n                  if (handled === 'local') {\n                    // #936: supersede, don't overwrite in place — see advancePastRemote.\n                    const winner = this.advancePastRemote(conflict.local, remoteEnvelope)\n                    await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, winner)\n                    if (winner !== conflict.local) await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, winner)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                    pushed++\n                  } else if (handled === 'remote') {\n                    await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, conflict.remote)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                  } else if (handled === 'merged' && conflict.local !== envelope) {\n                    // Merged envelope is stored in conflict.local (the winner)\n                    const merged = conflict.local\n                    await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, merged)\n                    await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, merged)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                    pushed++\n                  }\n                  // handled === 'deferred': leave in dirty log\n                }\n              }\n            } else {\n              throw err\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        errors.push(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)))\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Remove completed entries from dirty log (reverse order to preserve indices)\n    for (const i of completed.sort((a, b) => b - a)) {\n      this.dirty.splice(i, 1)\n    }\n\n    this.lastPush = new Date().toISOString()\n    try {\n      await this.persistMeta()\n    } finally {\n      // #644 item 1: flush (which clears `_graphBatch` unconditionally, vault.ts:1316-1320) must\n      // run even if `persistMeta()` throws — else a throw here leaves the batch open, corrupting\n      // the NEXT pull()/push() call's wave with THIS call's stale touches.\n      await this.graphBatchController?.flush() // #638 Task 4\n    }\n\n    const result: PushResult = { pushed, conflicts, errors, erasures }\n    this.emitter.emit('sync:push', result)\n    return result\n  }\n\n  /** Pull remote records to local adapter. Accepts optional `PullOptions` for partial sync. */\n  async pull(options?: PullOptions): Promise<PullResult> {\n    await this.ensureLoaded()\n\n    let pulled = 0\n    const conflicts: Conflict[] = []\n    const erasures: ErasureEnforcement[] = []\n    const errors: Error[] = []\n\n    // ── #807 period-scoped pull: validate the option, sync the period summaries\n    // (`_periods` + companions — the navigation index, ALWAYS pulled in full,\n    // exempt from every filter), then resolve the selected `_ts` windows from the\n    // freshly synced index. All BEFORE the graph batch opens, so an invalid\n    // option throws without leaving a batch dangling; summary applies route\n    // through `applyRemote` like any pull (reserved names have no Collection\n    // instance, so the invalidator/graph seams are no-ops for them). ──\n    let periodScope: ((envelope: EncryptedEnvelope) => boolean) | null = null\n    let phases: { summaries: { records: number; bytes: number }; records: { records: number; bytes: number } } | null = null\n    if (options?.periods !== undefined) {\n      validatePeriodsOption(options.periods)\n      if (!this.periodPullSource) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          'period-scoped pull requires a vault-attached sync engine (open the vault via createNoydb + openVault).',\n        )\n      }\n      phases = { summaries: { records: 0, bytes: 0 }, records: { records: 0, bytes: 0 } }\n      let remotePeriodCount = 0\n      this.pullByteSink = phases.summaries\n      try {\n        for (const collName of PERIOD_SUMMARY_COLLECTIONS) {\n          for (const id of await this.remote.list(this.vault, collName)) {\n            if (collName === PERIODS_COLLECTION) remotePeriodCount++\n            try {\n              const remoteEnvelope = await this.remote.get(this.vault, collName, id)\n              if (!remoteEnvelope) continue\n              const localEnvelope = await this.local.get(this.vault, collName, id)\n              if (!localEnvelope || remoteEnvelope._v > localEnvelope._v) {\n                await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n                pulled++\n              }\n            } catch (err) {\n              errors.push(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)))\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      } finally {\n        this.pullByteSink = null\n      }\n      const periodRecords = await this.periodPullSource.periods()\n      if (remotePeriodCount > 0 && periodRecords.length === 0) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          'period-scoped pull: the vault holds _periods records but none are readable — enable the ' +\n            'periods service (`periodsStrategy: withPeriods()`) so pull can resolve the period windows.',\n        )\n      }\n      periodScope = buildPeriodScope(options.periods, periodRecords)\n    }\n\n    this.graphBatchController?.begin() // #638 Task 4\n    if (phases) this.pullByteSink = phases.records\n\n    // Partial sync: expand the filter to cover satellite pair partners (#591 rule 5b), then the\n    // reserved `_dict_*` collections those (expanded) names depend on (#653) — adopters never\n    // name `_dict_*` in a `collections` filter, so a named collection's lookup-field dependency\n    // must be pulled alongside it or its labels/membership go stale.\n    const expanded = options?.collections ? (this.pairExpander?.(options.collections) ?? options.collections) : null\n    const filter = expanded ? new Set([...expanded, ...(this.reservedDictExpander?.(expanded) ?? [])]) : null\n\n    try {\n      const remoteSnapshot = await this.remote.loadAll(this.vault)\n\n      for (const [collName, records] of Object.entries(remoteSnapshot)) {\n        // Partial sync: skip collections not in the filter\n        if (filter && !filter.has(collName)) {\n          continue\n        }\n\n        for (const [id, remoteEnvelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n          // Partial sync: modifiedSince filter — arriving tombstones are exempt (#590):\n          // an erasure must never be skipped by partial sync.\n          if (\n            options?.modifiedSince &&\n            remoteEnvelope._ts <= options.modifiedSince &&\n            !isTombstoneShape(remoteEnvelope) &&\n            !isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope)\n          ) {\n            continue\n          }\n\n          // #807: period scope — a record whose `_ts` falls outside every selected\n          // window is skipped. Tombstones and delete markers are ALWAYS in scope\n          // (built into the predicate): an erasure or delete must never be skipped\n          // by partial sync, mirroring the modifiedSince exemption above — that is\n          // what lets a device that never pulled a period backfill it later without\n          // resurrecting its deleted records.\n          if (periodScope !== null && !periodScope(remoteEnvelope)) {\n            continue\n          }\n\n          try {\n            const localEnvelope = await this.local.get(this.vault, collName, id)\n            const remoteIsTombstone = isTombstoneShape(remoteEnvelope)\n\n            if (!localEnvelope) {\n              // New record from remote (tombstones included — durable erasure evidence)\n              await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n              pulled++\n            } else if (isTombstoneShape(localEnvelope)) {\n              if (remoteIsTombstone) {\n                // Both shredded — keep the higher version counter\n                if (remoteEnvelope._v > localEnvelope._v) await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n              } else {\n                // Terminal rule (#590): a tombstone is never overwritten by a live\n                // envelope, regardless of _v. Re-assert the shred outward instead.\n                erasures.push(await this.reassertTombstone(collName, id, localEnvelope, remoteEnvelope))\n              }\n            } else if (remoteIsTombstone) {\n              // Terminal rule (#590): an arriving tombstone wins over any local live\n              // envelope — even a newer, dirty one. Resolvers are never consulted.\n              const wasDirty = this.dirty.some(d => d.collection === collName && d.id === id)\n              await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n              this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collName && d.id === id))\n              pulled++\n              if (wasDirty) erasures.push(this.reportErasure(collName, id, remoteEnvelope, localEnvelope, 'pull'))\n            } else if (\n              remoteEnvelope._v === localEnvelope._v &&\n              isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope) !== isDeleteMarker(localEnvelope)\n            ) {\n              // #589: true concurrent delete-vs-edit at the SAME version. Version order\n              // can't break the tie. A per-collection resolver decides if one is set;\n              // otherwise DELETE wins (the db-level 'version' default is deliberately NOT\n              // consulted — it would resolve a tie to local-wins).\n              const resolver = this.conflictResolvers.get(collName)\n              if (resolver) {\n                const winner = await resolver(id, localEnvelope, remoteEnvelope)\n                if (winner !== localEnvelope && winner !== null) {\n                  // #589 (review): a novel/merged winner (neither side verbatim) must also be\n                  // pushed to remote — mirrors handleConflict's 'merged' handling — so both\n                  // sides converge instead of local applying it while remote keeps its old copy.\n                  if (winner !== remoteEnvelope) {\n                    await this.remote.put(this.vault, collName, id, winner)\n                  }\n                  await this.applyRemote(collName, id, winner)\n                  this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collName && d.id === id))\n                  pulled++\n                }\n                // winner === localEnvelope or null → keep local (its dirty entry, if any, pushes out)\n              } else if (isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope)) {\n                // no resolver → delete wins; the incoming marker is the delete\n                await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n                this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collName && d.id === id))\n                pulled++\n              }\n              // no resolver and LOCAL is the marker → keep local marker; its dirty 'put' pushes it outward\n            } else if (remoteEnvelope._v > localEnvelope._v) {\n              // Remote is newer — check if we have a dirty entry for this\n              const isDirty = this.dirty.some(d => d.collection === collName && d.id === id)\n              if (isDirty) {\n                // Both changed — conflict\n                const { handled, conflict } = await this.handleConflict(\n                  collName,\n                  id,\n                  localEnvelope,\n                  remoteEnvelope,\n                  'pull',\n                )\n                conflicts.push(conflict)\n                if (handled === 'remote') {\n                  await this.applyRemote(collName, id, conflict.remote)\n                  this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collName && d.id === id))\n                  pulled++\n                } else if (handled === 'merged' && conflict.local !== localEnvelope) {\n                  const merged = conflict.local\n                  await this.applyRemote(collName, id, merged)\n                  this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collName && d.id === id))\n                  pulled++\n                }\n                // 'local' or 'deferred': push handles it\n              } else {\n                // Remote is newer, no local changes — update\n                await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n                pulled++\n              }\n            }\n            // Same version or local is newer — skip (push will handle)\n          } catch (err) {\n            errors.push(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)))\n          }\n        }\n      }\n\n      // #650 Task 4 (#647) — reserved lookup collections (`_dict_*`/`_lookup_*`) are invisible to\n      // `remote.loadAll()` above (the store contract skips `_`-prefixed names) but DO sync via\n      // this EXPLICIT, declared registry — not a blanket underscore-glob; other `_` namespaces\n      // keep their `loadAll`-skip semantics untouched. Applied through the SAME `applyRemote` path,\n      // still inside this try block, BEFORE `persistMeta`/`flush` below — so a pulled vocabulary\n      // row lands before the wave (flushed at the end of `pull()`) recomputes any dependent.\n      //\n      // #647 fix wave 1: `LookupHandle.delete()`/`rename()` now write a version-ordered\n      // delete-marker row (mirroring #589) instead of a raw adapter delete, so a removed key is\n      // a normal row here too — reachable via `remote.list()` like any other id, applied by\n      // version like any other write. The only reserved-tier-specific rule is the same-version\n      // tie-break below: reserved lookups have no per-collection conflict-resolver concept\n      // (dictionaries are admin-edited, not multi-actor-negotiated), so a converging delete\n      // unconditionally wins over a same-version live edit.\n      //\n      // #807: the period scope deliberately does NOT apply here — vocabularies/config rows are\n      // not period-partitioned data (a thin client's lookups must be complete regardless of\n      // which periods it pulled), the same always-pull rule as the `_periods` summaries phase.\n      for (const collName of this.reservedLookup?.collections() ?? []) {\n        if (filter && !filter.has(collName)) continue\n        for (const id of await this.remote.list(this.vault, collName)) {\n          try {\n            const remoteEnvelope = await this.remote.get(this.vault, collName, id)\n            if (!remoteEnvelope) continue\n\n            // Partial sync: modifiedSince filter — a delete marker is exempt, mirroring the\n            // main loop's tombstone/marker exemption above: a deletion must never be silently\n            // skipped by a time-window partial pull.\n            if (\n              options?.modifiedSince &&\n              remoteEnvelope._ts <= options.modifiedSince &&\n              !isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope)\n            ) {\n              continue\n            }\n\n            const localEnvelope = await this.local.get(this.vault, collName, id)\n            if (!localEnvelope) {\n              await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n              pulled++\n            } else if (\n              remoteEnvelope._v === localEnvelope._v &&\n              isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope) !== isDeleteMarker(localEnvelope)\n            ) {\n              // Same-version delete-vs-edit tie (#589's rule, reserved-tier default: no\n              // resolver concept here, so delete always wins).\n              if (isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope)) {\n                await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n                this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collName && d.id === id))\n                pulled++\n              }\n              // else: local already holds the marker (a local delete not yet observed\n              // remotely) — keep it; push re-asserts it.\n            } else if (remoteEnvelope._v > localEnvelope._v) {\n              await this.applyRemote(collName, id, remoteEnvelope)\n              // Drop any now-superseded local dirty entry so a subsequent push doesn't\n              // redundantly re-fight a CAS conflict over content pull just overwrote.\n              this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collName && d.id === id))\n              pulled++\n            }\n          } catch (err) {\n            errors.push(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)))\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      errors.push(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)))\n    }\n\n    this.lastPull = new Date().toISOString()\n    try {\n      await this.persistMeta()\n    } finally {\n      this.pullByteSink = null // #807: stop attributing applies to this pull's KPI counters\n      // #644 item 1: flush must run even if `persistMeta()` throws (see push()'s identical guard).\n      await this.graphBatchController?.flush() // #638 Task 4\n    }\n\n    const result: PullResult = { pulled, conflicts, errors, erasures, ...(phases !== null ? { phases } : {}) }\n    this.emitter.emit('sync:pull', result)\n    return result\n  }\n\n  /** Bidirectional sync: pull then push. */\n  async sync(options?: { push?: PushOptions; pull?: PullOptions }): Promise<{ pull: PullResult; push: PushResult }> {\n    const pullResult = await this.pull(options?.pull)\n    const pushResult = await this.push(options?.push)\n    return { pull: pullResult, push: pushResult }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Push a specific subset of dirty entries (for sync transactions, ).\n   * Entries are matched by collection+id from the dirty log; matched entries\n   * are removed from the dirty log on success.\n   */\n  async pushFiltered(predicate: (entry: DirtyEntry) => boolean): Promise<PushResult> {\n    await this.ensureLoaded()\n\n    let pushed = 0\n    const conflicts: Conflict[] = []\n    const erasures: ErasureEnforcement[] = []\n    const errors: Error[] = []\n    const completed: number[] = []\n\n    for (let i = 0; i < this.dirty.length; i++) {\n      const entry = this.dirty[i]!\n      if (!predicate(entry)) continue\n\n      try {\n        if (entry.action === 'delete') {\n          await this.remote.delete(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id)\n          completed.push(i)\n          pushed++\n        } else {\n          const envelope = await this.local.get(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id)\n          if (!envelope) {\n            completed.push(i)\n            continue\n          }\n\n          if (isTombstoneShape(envelope)) {\n            // #590: a tombstone push is an erasure assertion — unconditional,\n            // no CAS, no conflict resolution. Erasure always wins.\n            await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, envelope)\n            completed.push(i)\n            pushed++\n            continue\n          }\n\n          try {\n            await this.remote.put(\n              this.vault,\n              entry.collection,\n              entry.id,\n              envelope,\n              entry.version - 1,\n            )\n            completed.push(i)\n            pushed++\n          } catch (err) {\n            if (isConflictError(err)) {\n              const remoteEnvelope = await this.remote.get(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id)\n              if (remoteEnvelope) {\n                if (isTombstoneShape(remoteEnvelope)) {\n                  // #590: remote already shredded this record — enforce locally,\n                  // never resolve. Resolvers must not overrule an erasure.\n                  await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, remoteEnvelope)\n                  erasures.push(this.reportErasure(entry.collection, entry.id, remoteEnvelope, envelope, 'push'))\n                  completed.push(i)\n                } else if (\n                  remoteEnvelope._v === envelope._v &&\n                  isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope) !== isDeleteMarker(envelope) &&\n                  !this.conflictResolvers.get(entry.collection)\n                ) {\n                  // #589: a same-_v delete-vs-edit tie on the push channel. handleConflict's db-level\n                  // 'version' default would resolve it to local-wins; the tie rule consults ONLY the\n                  // per-collection resolver, else delete-wins. (When a per-collection resolver IS set,\n                  // fall through to handleConflict, which already honors it — incl. the merged case.)\n                  if (isDeleteMarker(remoteEnvelope)) {\n                    // remote already deleted → converge locally, drop our (edit) push\n                    await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, remoteEnvelope)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                  } else {\n                    // our local is the marker → force the delete onto the remote (unconditional put)\n                    await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, envelope)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                    pushed++\n                  }\n                } else {\n                  const { handled, conflict } = await this.handleConflict(\n                    entry.collection,\n                    entry.id,\n                    envelope,\n                    remoteEnvelope,\n                    'push',\n                  )\n                  conflicts.push(conflict)\n                  if (handled === 'local') {\n                    // #936: supersede, don't overwrite in place — see advancePastRemote.\n                    const winner = this.advancePastRemote(conflict.local, remoteEnvelope)\n                    await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, winner)\n                    if (winner !== conflict.local) await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, winner)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                    pushed++\n                  } else if (handled === 'remote') {\n                    await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, conflict.remote)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                  } else if (handled === 'merged' && conflict.local !== envelope) {\n                    const merged = conflict.local\n                    await this.remote.put(this.vault, entry.collection, entry.id, merged)\n                    await this.applyRemote(entry.collection, entry.id, merged)\n                    completed.push(i)\n                    pushed++\n                  }\n                }\n              }\n            } else {\n              throw err\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        errors.push(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)))\n      }\n    }\n\n    for (const i of completed.sort((a, b) => b - a)) {\n      this.dirty.splice(i, 1)\n    }\n\n    this.lastPush = new Date().toISOString()\n    await this.persistMeta()\n\n    const result: PushResult = { pushed, conflicts, errors, erasures }\n    this.emitter.emit('sync:push', result)\n    return result\n  }\n\n  /** Get current sync status. */\n  status(): SyncStatus {\n    // #809 — readiness rides the status surface that already exists rather than\n    // a second accessor, so an app asks one question to learn everything about\n    // this vault's sync. Absent entirely unless a phased policy is running.\n    const scheduled = this.scheduler?.status\n    return {\n      dirty: this.dirty.length,\n      lastPush: this.lastPush,\n      lastPull: this.lastPull,\n      online: this.isOnline,\n      ...(scheduled && scheduled.readiness.size > 0\n        ? { readiness: scheduled.readiness, phase: scheduled.phase }\n        : {}),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ─── Auto-Sync ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  /** Start auto-sync: listen for online/offline events, optional periodic sync. */\n  startAutoSync(intervalMs?: number): void {\n    // Online/offline detection\n    if (typeof globalThis.addEventListener === 'function') {\n      globalThis.addEventListener('online', this.handleOnline)\n      globalThis.addEventListener('offline', this.handleOffline)\n    }\n\n    // Periodic sync\n    if (intervalMs && intervalMs > 0) {\n      this.autoSyncInterval = setInterval(() => {\n        if (this.isOnline) {\n          void this.sync()\n        }\n      }, intervalMs)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Stop auto-sync and scheduler. */\n  stopAutoSync(): void {\n    this.stopScheduler()\n    if (typeof globalThis.removeEventListener === 'function') {\n      globalThis.removeEventListener('online', this.handleOnline)\n      globalThis.removeEventListener('offline', this.handleOffline)\n    }\n    if (this.autoSyncInterval) {\n      clearInterval(this.autoSyncInterval)\n      this.autoSyncInterval = null\n    }\n  }\n\n  private handleOnline = (): void => {\n    this.isOnline = true\n    this.emitter.emit('sync:online', undefined as never)\n    void this.sync()\n  }\n\n  private handleOffline = (): void => {\n    this.isOnline = false\n    this.emitter.emit('sync:offline', undefined as never)\n  }\n\n  /** Apply an envelope to the local store and refresh in-memory views (#598). `action` (#640):\n   *  classified HERE — the one choke point that still holds the envelope — so the\n   *  cacheInvalidator seam (and, downstream, the dispatch wave) can tell a pulled delete from an\n   *  ordinary put. `isTombstoneShape` covers a forgotten-elsewhere record arriving as a shred;\n   *  `isDeleteMarker` covers an ordinary (#589) delete — both route to the SAME 'delete' action\n   *  (sync delete ≠ forget: freshness only, no shred/residue channel on the receiving side). */\n  /**\n   * #936 — a local-wins resolution write must SUPERSEDE the remote, never\n   * overwrite it in place: when the winner's `_v` does not already exceed\n   * the remote's (the same-`_v` push tie), re-stamp it at `remote._v + 1`.\n   * Without this the loser's next pull sees no delta (`_v`-based\n   * detection) and the peers stay silently diverged at the same version.\n   * `_v` is envelope metadata — AEAD-unbound, and `_vdig` is deliberately\n   * `_v`-independent — so the engine may restamp ciphertext. Callers must\n   * mirror the advanced envelope locally (`applyRemote`) so both sides\n   * agree. The 'merged' branch needs none of this: resolver output is\n   * already stamped `max(local, remote) + 1`.\n   */\n  private advancePastRemote(winner: EncryptedEnvelope, remote: EncryptedEnvelope): EncryptedEnvelope {\n    return winner._v > remote._v ? winner : { ...winner, _v: remote._v + 1 }\n  }\n\n  private async applyRemote(collection: string, id: string, envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<void> {\n    await this.local.put(this.vault, collection, id, envelope)\n    if (this.pullByteSink !== null) {\n      // #807: KPI — one applied envelope; bytes ≈ ciphertext payload size.\n      this.pullByteSink.records++\n      this.pullByteSink.bytes += envelopeBodySize(envelope)\n    }\n    const action: 'put' | 'delete' = isTombstoneShape(envelope) || isDeleteMarker(envelope) ? 'delete' : 'put'\n    await this.cacheInvalidator?.(collection, id, action)\n  }\n\n  /** Record + emit a tombstone enforcement (#590). */\n  private reportErasure(\n    collection: string, id: string,\n    tombstone: EncryptedEnvelope, suppressed: EncryptedEnvelope,\n    direction: 'pull' | 'push',\n  ): ErasureEnforcement {\n    const enforcement: ErasureEnforcement = { vault: this.vault, collection, id, tombstone, suppressed, direction }\n    this.emitter.emit('sync:erasure', enforcement)\n    return enforcement\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Re-assert a local tombstone over a live remote envelope (#590): the shred\n   * wins in both directions, regardless of `_v`. Bumps the tombstone to the\n   * suppressed envelope's `_v` when higher so per-key version counters stay\n   * monotonic on every store; `_by` (the shredding actor) is preserved.\n   */\n  private async reassertTombstone(\n    collection: string, id: string,\n    tombstone: EncryptedEnvelope, suppressedRemote: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  ): Promise<ErasureEnforcement> {\n    let winner = tombstone\n    if (suppressedRemote._v > tombstone._v) {\n      winner = { ...tombstone, _v: suppressedRemote._v, _ts: new Date().toISOString() }\n      await this.applyRemote(collection, id, winner)\n    }\n    await this.remote.put(this.vault, collection, id, winner)\n    // The re-assert already delivered the tombstone remotely — drop any dirty\n    // entry so the following push doesn't redundantly re-put it.\n    this.dirty = this.dirty.filter(d => !(d.collection === collection && d.id === id))\n    return this.reportErasure(collection, id, winner, suppressedRemote, 'pull')\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve a conflict, checking per-collection resolvers first,\n   * then falling back to the db-level `ConflictStrategy`.\n   *\n   * Returns the resolved `Conflict` object (possibly with `resolve` set for\n   * manual mode) and a `handled` discriminant:\n   * - `'local'` — keep the local envelope; push it to remote.\n   * - `'remote'` — keep the remote envelope; update local.\n   * - `'merged'` — a custom merge fn produced a new envelope stored as `conflict.local`.\n   * - `'deferred'` — manual mode, resolve was not called synchronously.\n   */\n  private async handleConflict(\n    collection: string,\n    id: string,\n    local: EncryptedEnvelope,\n    remote: EncryptedEnvelope,\n    _phase: 'push' | 'pull',\n  ): Promise<{ handled: 'local' | 'remote' | 'merged' | 'deferred'; conflict: Conflict }> {\n    const resolver = this.conflictResolvers.get(collection)\n\n    if (resolver) {\n      // Per-collection resolver is responsible for emitting sync:conflict\n      // (manual policy emits with a resolve callback; LWW/FWW/custom are silent).\n      const winner = await resolver(id, local, remote)\n      const base: Conflict = {\n        vault: this.vault,\n        collection,\n        id,\n        local,\n        remote,\n        localVersion: local._v,\n        remoteVersion: remote._v,\n      }\n      if (winner === null) return { handled: 'deferred', conflict: base }\n      if (winner === local) return { handled: 'local', conflict: base }\n      if (winner === remote) return { handled: 'remote', conflict: base }\n      // Custom merge fn produced a new envelope — store as conflict.local for the caller\n      return {\n        handled: 'merged',\n        conflict: { ...base, local: winner, localVersion: winner._v },\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Fall back to db-level strategy — emit once\n    const baseConflict: Conflict = {\n      vault: this.vault,\n      collection,\n      id,\n      local,\n      remote,\n      localVersion: local._v,\n      remoteVersion: remote._v,\n    }\n    this.emitter.emit('sync:conflict', baseConflict)\n    const side = this.legacyResolve(baseConflict)\n    return { handled: side, conflict: baseConflict }\n  }\n\n  /** DB-level ConflictStrategy resolution (legacy, kept for backward compat). */\n  private legacyResolve(conflict: Conflict): 'local' | 'remote' {\n    if (typeof this.strategy === 'function') {\n      return this.strategy(conflict)\n    }\n    switch (this.strategy) {\n      case 'local-wins': return 'local'\n      case 'remote-wins': return 'remote'\n      case 'version':\n      default:\n        return conflict.localVersion >= conflict.remoteVersion ? 'local' : 'remote'\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ─── Persistence ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  private async ensureLoaded(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.loaded) return\n\n    const envelope = await this.local.get(this.vault, '_sync', 'meta')\n    if (envelope) {\n      const meta = JSON.parse(envelope._data) as SyncMetadata\n      this.dirty = [...meta.dirty]\n      this.lastPush = meta.last_push\n      this.lastPull = meta.last_pull\n    }\n\n    this.loaded = true\n  }\n\n  private async persistMeta(): Promise<void> {\n    const meta: SyncMetadata = {\n      _noydb_sync: NOYDB_SYNC_VERSION,\n      last_push: this.lastPush,\n      last_pull: this.lastPull,\n      dirty: this.dirty,\n    }\n\n    const envelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n      _noydb: 1,\n      _v: 1,\n      _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n      _iv: '',\n      _data: JSON.stringify(meta),\n    }\n\n    await this.local.put(this.vault, '_sync', 'meta', envelope)\n  }\n}\n","import type { SyncTransactionResult } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { SyncEngine } from './engine.js'\nimport type { Vault } from '../kernel/vault.js'\n\ninterface TxOp {\n  readonly type: 'put' | 'delete'\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly record?: unknown\n}\n\n/**\n * Sync transaction.\n *\n * Stages local writes and then pushes only those records to remote in a\n * single batch. If any record conflicts during the push, the result\n * carries `status: 'conflict'` — no automatic rollback is performed;\n * the caller handles conflict resolution.\n *\n * Obtain via `db.transaction(compartmentName)`.\n */\nexport class SyncTransaction {\n  private readonly comp: Vault\n  private readonly engine: SyncEngine\n  private readonly ops: TxOp[] = []\n\n  /** @internal — constructed by `Noydb.transaction()` */\n  constructor(comp: Vault, engine: SyncEngine) {\n    this.comp = comp\n    this.engine = engine\n  }\n\n  /** Stage a record write. Does not write to any adapter until `commit()`. */\n  put(collection: string, id: string, record: unknown): this {\n    this.ops.push({ type: 'put', collection, id, record })\n    return this\n  }\n\n  /** Stage a record delete. Does not write to any adapter until `commit()`. */\n  delete(collection: string, id: string): this {\n    this.ops.push({ type: 'delete', collection, id })\n    return this\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Commit the transaction.\n   *\n   * Phase 1 — writes all staged operations to the local adapter via the\n   * collection layer (encryption + dirty-log tracking).\n   *\n   * Phase 2 — pushes only the records that were written in this\n   * transaction to the remote adapter. Existing dirty entries from\n   * outside this transaction are not affected.\n   *\n   * If any record conflicts during the push, `status` is `'conflict'`\n   * and `conflicts` lists the affected records. No automatic rollback is\n   * performed.\n   */\n  async commit(): Promise<SyncTransactionResult> {\n    // Phase 1: write all staged ops to local via collection layer\n    for (const op of this.ops) {\n      if (op.type === 'put') {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n        await (this.comp.collection<any>(op.collection)).put(op.id, op.record as any)\n      } else {\n        await this.comp.collection(op.collection).delete(op.id)\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Phase 2: push only the records from this transaction\n    const opSet = new Set<string>()\n    for (const op of this.ops) {\n      opSet.add(`${op.collection}::${op.id}`)\n    }\n\n    const pushResult = await this.engine.pushFiltered(\n      (entry) => opSet.has(`${entry.collection}::${entry.id}`),\n    )\n\n    return {\n      status: pushResult.conflicts.length > 0 ? 'conflict' : 'committed',\n      pushed: pushResult.pushed,\n      conflicts: pushResult.conflicts,\n      ...(pushResult.erasures?.length ? { erasures: pushResult.erasures } : {}),\n    }\n  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package/dist/chunk-JJNOLSG5.js.map

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-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/attestation/signer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ConflictError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { generateDocSigningKeyPair } from '@noy-db/attestation'\n\nexport const ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION = '_attestations'\nexport const SIGNER_RECORD_ID = '_signer'\nexport const REVOKED_RECORD_ID = '_revoked'\n\nexport interface DocSigner {\n  readonly keyId: string\n  readonly publicKeyB64: string\n  readonly privateKeyPkcs8B64: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure read: return the firm's persisted document-signing keypair, or `null`\n * if none has been minted yet. Never writes — callers that must NOT mint\n * (e.g. an ungated public-key getter) use this instead of `loadOrCreateSigner`.\n *\n * Stored as an encrypted record `_attestations/_signer` under the\n * `_attestations` collection DEK (resolved via `getDEK`, which is\n * AES-KW-wrapped under the owner KEK + persisted by the keyring). The KEK\n * itself is AES-KW-only and cannot AES-GCM-encrypt these bytes — hence\n * storage under a normal collection DEK.\n */\nexport async function loadSigner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<DocSigner | null> {\n  const existing = await store.get(vault, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, SIGNER_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!existing) return null\n  const dek = await getDEK(ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION)\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson(existing, dek)\n  return JSON.parse(json) as DocSigner\n}\n\n/**\n * Lazily mint (or load) the firm's Ed25519 document-signing keypair.\n *\n * On a concurrent first-mint, two callers can both read `null` and both mint\n * distinct keypairs. The `put(…, expectedVersion: 0)` (\"must not already\n * exist\") lets exactly one win; the loser catches `ConflictError`, re-reads,\n * and returns the winner's signer — converging on a single keypair rather than\n * clobbering it or surfacing a raw conflict. (All real stores treat a missing\n * record + `ev: 0` as a no-conflict write, so the catch fires on lost-race only.)\n */\nexport async function loadOrCreateSigner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<DocSigner> {\n  const existing = await loadSigner(store, vault, getDEK)\n  if (existing) return existing\n\n  const dek = await getDEK(ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION)\n  const signer = await generateDocSigningKeyPair()\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(JSON.stringify(signer), dek)\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: iv, _data: data,\n  }\n  try {\n    await store.put(vault, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, SIGNER_RECORD_ID, env, 0)\n    return signer\n  } catch (e) {\n    if (!(e instanceof ConflictError)) throw e\n    // Lost the race — another writer minted first. Adopt the winner.\n    const winner = await loadSigner(store, vault, getDEK)\n    if (!winner) {\n      throw new ConflictError(0, 'loadOrCreateSigner: signer mint lost a concurrent race but the winning record could not be re-read.')\n    }\n    return winner\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAIA,SAAS,iCAAiC;AAEnC,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAChC,IAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,IAAM,oBAAoB;AAmBjC,eAAsB,WACpB,OACA,OACA,QAC2B;AAC3B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,yBAAyB,gBAAgB;AACjF,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAuB;AAChD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,UAAU,GAAG;AACjD,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AACxB;AAYA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,OACA,QACoB;AACpB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AACtD,MAAI,SAAU,QAAO;AAErB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAuB;AAChD,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,0BAA0B;AAC/C,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AAC9D,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAsB,IAAI;AAAA,IAAG,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAAG,KAAK;AAAA,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,EACtF;AACA,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,yBAAyB,kBAAkB,KAAK,CAAC;AACxE,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,QAAI,EAAE,aAAa,eAAgB,OAAM;AAEzC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD,QAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;AACX,YAAM,IAAI,cAAc,GAAG,qGAAqG;AAAA,IAClI;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-JRKZTEZZ.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/validation.ts","../src/with-party/team/echo-secret.ts","../src/with-party/team/reserved-secret-collections.ts","../src/with-party/team/keyring.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Secret validation — phrase format (per the three-tier session-tiers\n * design, locked 2026-05-04).\n *\n * Secrets are **phrases**: multiple simple words, easy to remember,\n * structurally constrained so a weak choice cannot silently collapse the\n * security floor. The format is intentionally narrow: lowercase letters\n * and single spaces only, no punctuation, no symbols, no digits.\n *\n * - Default minimum: 6 words (~77 bits with the 7,776-word EFF list).\n * - Strict minimum: 8 words (~103 bits).\n * - Per-word minimum: 3 characters (excludes \"a\", \"is\", \"of\").\n * - Adjacent repeats rejected (\"the the\").\n *\n * The hub runs validation default-on at every secret ingress\n * (`createOwnerKeyring`, `grant`, `rotateSecret`); test fixtures and\n * CLI scripts override via `{ allowWeakSecret: true }`.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { NoydbError, ValidationError } from './errors.js'\n\n/** All reasons a phrase can be rejected. */\nexport type WeakSecretReason =\n  | 'empty'\n  | 'invalid-chars'\n  | 'leading-or-trailing-space'\n  | 'double-space'\n  | 'too-few-words'\n  | 'word-too-short'\n  | 'repeated-adjacent'\n\n/** Per-vault knobs. Aligns with `VaultPolicy.secret`. */\nexport interface SecretPolicy {\n  /** Minimum number of words. Default 6. Strict policy uses 8. */\n  readonly minWords?: number\n  /** Minimum characters per word. Default 3. */\n  readonly minWordLength?: number\n  /** Reject adjacent identical words (\"the the\"). Default true. */\n  readonly rejectRepeatedAdjacent?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Override the default character-class rule (`/^[a-z]+( [a-z]+)*$/`).\n   *\n   * The hub's strict default is lowercase-letters-and-single-spaces\n   * because that's what the EFF wordlist generator emits and what\n   * most attacker password lists are keyed on. Use this knob to allow\n   * digits, uppercase, hyphens, or non-Latin scripts when the\n   * consumer's audience needs them — e.g.:\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * // Thai + English mix with digits permitted\n   * pattern: /^[\\p{L}0-9 ]+( [\\p{L}0-9 ]+)*$/u\n   *\n   * // Allow uppercase + hyphens (secret-with-hyphens style)\n   * pattern: /^[A-Za-z]+([- ][A-Za-z]+)*$/\n   * ```\n   *\n   * The OTHER structural rules still apply (min-words split by space,\n   * min-word-length, repeated-adjacent, leading/trailing whitespace,\n   * double-space). For non-space-delimited word semantics, use\n   * {@link customValidator} instead.\n   *\n   */\n  readonly pattern?: RegExp\n  /**\n   * Replace ALL validation entirely with a custom function. When set,\n   * none of the other SecretPolicy fields apply — the consumer\n   * owns every rule (word splitting, character classes, entropy\n   * thresholds, allowlist/denylist). Use sparingly; this is the\n   * escape hatch for domain-specific phrase formats:\n   *\n   *   - Localized wordlists with non-space word boundaries\n   *   - BIP-39 seed phrases (24 words, fixed wordlist, etc.)\n   *   - Organization-specific HR password policies\n   *\n   * The returned `SecretValidationResult` is what\n   * {@link assertStrongSecret} dispatches on — `ok: true` accepts;\n   * `ok: false` throws `WeakSecretError` with the supplied reason.\n   *\n   */\n  readonly customValidator?: (phrase: string) => SecretValidationResult\n}\n\n/** Result of a check. Discriminated union — compile-time exhaustive. */\nexport type SecretValidationResult =\n  | { readonly ok: true; readonly words: number }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly reason: WeakSecretReason\n      readonly minimum?: number\n      readonly got?: number\n    }\n\n/**\n * Thrown by `assertStrongSecret()` and by every hub ingress\n * point (`createOwnerKeyring`, `grant`, `rotateSecret`) when a\n * supplied phrase fails the structural rules above.\n */\nexport class WeakSecretError extends NoydbError {\n  readonly reason: WeakSecretReason\n  readonly suggestion: string\n  constructor(reason: WeakSecretReason, suggestion: string) {\n    super('WEAK_SECRET', `Weak secret (${reason}). ${suggestion}`)\n    this.name = 'WeakSecretError'\n    this.reason = reason\n    this.suggestion = suggestion\n  }\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_MIN_WORDS = 6\nconst DEFAULT_MIN_WORD_LENGTH = 3\n\nconst SUGGESTIONS: Record<WeakSecretReason, string> = {\n  empty: 'Provide a phrase of at least 6 lowercase words separated by single spaces.',\n  'invalid-chars':\n    'Use only lowercase letters [a-z] and single spaces. No punctuation, symbols, digits, or uppercase.',\n  'leading-or-trailing-space': 'Trim leading and trailing spaces.',\n  'double-space': 'Use exactly one space between words.',\n  'too-few-words':\n    'Use at least 6 words by default (8 under strict policy). Example: \"correct horse battery staple printer toaster\".',\n  'word-too-short': 'Each word must be at least 3 characters. Drop short fillers like \"a\", \"is\", \"of\".',\n  'repeated-adjacent': 'Avoid repeating the same word twice in a row.',\n}\n\n/**\n * Inspect a phrase against the format rules and return a structured\n * verdict. Never throws — callers either branch on `ok` or pass the\n * result to {@link assertStrongSecret} for the throwing flavour.\n */\nexport function validateSecret(\n  s: string,\n  opts?: SecretPolicy,\n): SecretValidationResult {\n  // Escape hatch: customValidator owns the entire decision. None of\n  // the structural rules below run when this is set — the consumer is\n  // responsible for the full validation contract.\n  if (opts?.customValidator) {\n    return opts.customValidator(s)\n  }\n\n  const minWords = opts?.minWords ?? DEFAULT_MIN_WORDS\n  const minWordLength = opts?.minWordLength ?? DEFAULT_MIN_WORD_LENGTH\n  const rejectRepeated = opts?.rejectRepeatedAdjacent ?? true\n\n  if (s.length === 0) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: 'empty' }\n  }\n\n  if (s !== s.trim()) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: 'leading-or-trailing-space' }\n  }\n\n  if (s.includes('  ')) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: 'double-space' }\n  }\n\n  // The default character class is lowercase-letters-and-spaces;\n  // consumers can override via SecretPolicy.pattern (e.g. to\n  // allow digits, uppercase, or non-Latin scripts). Word splitting\n  // below remains space-based — for non-space word semantics the\n  // consumer should use customValidator instead.\n  const charPattern = opts?.pattern ?? /^[a-z]+( [a-z]+)*$/\n  if (!charPattern.test(s)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: 'invalid-chars' }\n  }\n\n  const words = s.split(' ')\n\n  if (words.length < minWords) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: 'too-few-words', minimum: minWords, got: words.length }\n  }\n\n  for (const w of words) {\n    if (w.length < minWordLength) {\n      return { ok: false, reason: 'word-too-short', minimum: minWordLength, got: w.length }\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (rejectRepeated) {\n    for (let i = 1; i < words.length; i++) {\n      if (words[i] === words[i - 1]) {\n        return { ok: false, reason: 'repeated-adjacent' }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true, words: words.length }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throw {@link WeakSecretError} when the phrase fails. Used by\n * `createOwnerKeyring`, `grant`, and `rotateSecret` at ingress.\n *\n * Pass `{ allowWeakSecret: true }` to bypass — intended for test\n * fixtures, CLI scripts, and dev environments. The override never\n * loosens the cryptographic key derivation; it only relaxes the\n * structural-strength gate.\n */\nexport function assertStrongSecret(\n  s: string,\n  opts?: SecretPolicy & { allowWeakSecret?: boolean },\n): void {\n  if (opts?.allowWeakSecret) return\n  const result = validateSecret(s, opts)\n  if (result.ok) return\n  throw new WeakSecretError(result.reason, SUGGESTIONS[result.reason])\n}\n\n/**\n * Estimate the entropy of a phrase, given the EFF 7,776-word list as\n * the assumed wordlist. ~12.9 bits per word.\n *\n * Returns 0 for any input that fails the phrase format — character-class\n * estimates aren't comparable to phrase entropy, and surfacing 0 makes\n * weak inputs visible in any UI that displays an entropy meter.\n */\nexport function estimateEntropy(secret: string): number {\n  const result = validateSecret(secret)\n  if (!result.ok) return 0\n  return Math.round(result.words * Math.log2(7776))\n}\n\n/**\n * Internal compatibility shim. Older code paths used the throwing\n * `validateSecret(s)` directly; some still do via re-exports. Routes\n * to the new `assertStrongSecret` so the contract holds for both\n * shapes during the transition. New code should call\n * {@link assertStrongSecret} directly.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function legacyAssertSecret(s: string): void {\n  try {\n    assertStrongSecret(s)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof WeakSecretError) {\n      throw new ValidationError(err.message)\n    }\n    throw err\n  }\n}\n\n/** Dedicated floors for the echo mode's three parts (spec resolved Q1/Q5). */\nexport interface EchoSecretPolicy {\n  /** Floor for the typed prompt — the brute-forceable-in-isolation part. */\n  readonly prompt?: SecretPolicy\n  /** Policy for the combined parts (defaults to the standard whole-secret rules). */\n  readonly combined?: SecretPolicy\n}\n\nexport const DEFAULT_ECHO_PROMPT_MIN_WORDS = 3\n/**\n * Default per-word character floor for echo-mode validation (prompt AND\n * combined checks). Relaxed to 1 from the standard 3-char floor\n * ({@link DEFAULT_MIN_WORD_LENGTH}) — echo secrets are natural-language\n * sentences (spec #940's canonical example is Italian), and Romance\n * languages are full of 2-letter function words (\"mi\", \"da\", \"al\") that\n * the standard floor would otherwise reject even though the combined\n * secret is plenty strong. Word-COUNT floors (prompt 3, combined 6) are\n * unchanged — this only relaxes per-word length.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_ECHO_MIN_WORD_LENGTH = 1\n\n/** Which of `validateEchoSecret`'s three internal checks produced a result. */\ntype EchoSecretCheck = 'empty' | 'prompt' | 'combined'\n\n/**\n * `validateEchoSecret` plus which check produced the result — lets\n * `assertStrongEchoSecret` pick the prompt-specific suggestion without\n * re-running `validateSecret` on the failure path. Internal: NOT\n * package-exported (the public `validateEchoSecret`/`SecretValidationResult`\n * contract stays exactly as before).\n */\nfunction validateEchoSecretDetailed(\n  parts: { readonly prompt: string; readonly echo: string; readonly key: string },\n  opts?: EchoSecretPolicy,\n): { readonly result: SecretValidationResult; readonly failedCheck: EchoSecretCheck } {\n  // Trimmed: a whitespace-only part carries no secret material, so it is\n  // 'empty' rather than a confusing spacing complaint.\n  for (const part of [parts.prompt, parts.echo, parts.key]) {\n    if (part.trim().length === 0) return { result: { ok: false, reason: 'empty' }, failedCheck: 'empty' }\n  }\n  // Field-by-field construction (not a spread of `opts?.prompt`) so an\n  // explicit `{ prompt: { minWords: undefined } }` override falls back to\n  // the ECHO prompt default (3) rather than reintroducing `undefined` as\n  // an own property that would then hit `validateSecret`'s STANDARD\n  // default (6) — a spread copies an explicit-`undefined` key verbatim and\n  // clobbers the default set here. Each optional field is included only\n  // when actually set (`exactOptionalPropertyTypes`).\n  const promptPolicy: SecretPolicy = {\n    minWords: opts?.prompt?.minWords ?? DEFAULT_ECHO_PROMPT_MIN_WORDS,\n    minWordLength: opts?.prompt?.minWordLength ?? DEFAULT_ECHO_MIN_WORD_LENGTH,\n    ...(opts?.prompt?.rejectRepeatedAdjacent !== undefined\n      && { rejectRepeatedAdjacent: opts.prompt.rejectRepeatedAdjacent }),\n    ...(opts?.prompt?.pattern !== undefined && { pattern: opts.prompt.pattern }),\n    ...(opts?.prompt?.customValidator !== undefined && { customValidator: opts.prompt.customValidator }),\n  }\n  const promptResult = validateSecret(parts.prompt, promptPolicy)\n  if (!promptResult.ok) return { result: promptResult, failedCheck: 'prompt' }\n  // Same field-by-field construction as promptPolicy above (not a spread of\n  // `opts?.combined`) so the combined check's minWordLength defaults to the\n  // echo floor too, while minWords keeps the standard whole-secret default\n  // (6) when the caller doesn't override it.\n  const combinedPolicy: SecretPolicy = {\n    ...(opts?.combined?.minWords !== undefined && { minWords: opts.combined.minWords }),\n    minWordLength: opts?.combined?.minWordLength ?? DEFAULT_ECHO_MIN_WORD_LENGTH,\n    ...(opts?.combined?.rejectRepeatedAdjacent !== undefined\n      && { rejectRepeatedAdjacent: opts.combined.rejectRepeatedAdjacent }),\n    ...(opts?.combined?.pattern !== undefined && { pattern: opts.combined.pattern }),\n    ...(opts?.combined?.customValidator !== undefined && { customValidator: opts.combined.customValidator }),\n  }\n  const combinedResult = validateSecret(`${parts.prompt} ${parts.echo} ${parts.key}`, combinedPolicy)\n  return { result: combinedResult, failedCheck: 'combined' }\n}\n\n/** Validate a 3-part echo secret. Never throws. */\nexport function validateEchoSecret(\n  parts: { readonly prompt: string; readonly echo: string; readonly key: string },\n  opts?: EchoSecretPolicy,\n): SecretValidationResult {\n  return validateEchoSecretDetailed(parts, opts).result\n}\n\n/**\n * Suggestion copy for a failure that came from the PROMPT's dedicated floor.\n * The generic `SUGGESTIONS` copy quotes the 6-word whole-secret floor, which\n * misdirects an owner whose prompt only has to clear 3 words.\n */\nfunction promptSuggestion(reason: WeakSecretReason, minWords: number): string {\n  if (reason === 'too-few-words') {\n    return `The prompt (the part you type first) must be at least ${minWords} words. Example: \"sono chiamato vicio\".`\n  }\n  return `The prompt (the part you type first) is the problem. ${SUGGESTIONS[reason]}`\n}\n\n/** Throwing form of {@link validateEchoSecret}. */\nexport function assertStrongEchoSecret(\n  parts: { readonly prompt: string; readonly echo: string; readonly key: string },\n  opts?: EchoSecretPolicy & { allowWeakSecret?: boolean },\n): void {\n  if (opts?.allowWeakSecret) return\n  const { result, failedCheck } = validateEchoSecretDetailed(parts, opts)\n  if (result.ok) return\n\n  const promptMinWords = opts?.prompt?.minWords ?? DEFAULT_ECHO_PROMPT_MIN_WORDS\n  const suggestion = failedCheck === 'prompt'\n    ? promptSuggestion(result.reason, promptMinWords)\n    : SUGGESTIONS[result.reason]\n\n  throw new WeakSecretError(result.reason, suggestion)\n}\n","/**\n * Echo-block builders + verifiers (spec\n * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, #940).\n *\n * Builds and verifies the on-keyring {@link KeyringEchoBlock} declaration\n * for the 3-part echo ceremony (prompt → echo → key). This module owns:\n *\n *   - Minting the prompt/echo canary verifiers (the \"canary trick\": AES-KW\n *     wrap a constant 32-byte key under `deriveSecretKey(part, salt, …)`;\n *     verify = unwrap succeeds).\n *   - Building the reveal blob per the hybrid reveal policy (spec decision\n *     4): `portable` (AES-GCM under the prompt, own salt), `sealed`\n *     (opaque to hub, unsealed only by the enrolling device's\n *     {@link DeviceSealProvider}), or `none`.\n *   - Resolving the echo for display (`resolveEchoReveal`, `null` ⇒\n *     degraded typed-echo path) and verifying a typed echo\n *     (`verifyTypedEcho`) for that degraded path.\n *\n * Deriving the actual KEK from all three parts together is\n * `deriveEchoKey`/`encodeEchoParts` (`kernel/enclave/crypto.ts`) — a\n * separate concern from this module's per-part verifiers.\n *\n * Known, accepted disclosure: `prompt_verifier` and `echo_verifier` are\n * offline brute-force oracles for anyone holding the keyring file (600K\n * PBKDF2 per guess), and the `sealed` reveal blob is unpadded so its length\n * discloses the echo's UTF-8 byte length — see the threat model in\n * `design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md`.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport {\n  deriveSecretKey,\n  generateSalt,\n  generateIV,\n  wrapKey,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  encodeEchoParts,\n  type EchoSecretParts,\n} from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { KeyringEchoBlock } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { DeviceSealProvider } from './device-seal.js'\nimport { WrongPromptError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/** Same iteration floor as the KEK (spec resolved question 1). */\nexport const ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS = 600_000\n\nconst VERIFIER_PLAINTEXT = new Uint8Array(32).fill(0x5a)\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\nasync function getVerifierKey(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', VERIFIER_PLAINTEXT as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM' }, true, ['encrypt'])\n}\n\nasync function mintVerifier(part: string, salt: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const kek = await deriveSecretKey(part, salt, { iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS, keyUsage: 'aes-kw' })\n  return wrapKey(await getVerifierKey(), kek)\n}\n\n/**\n * `saltB64` and `verifier` are both decoded INSIDE the guarded region so a\n * tampered/corrupt base64 salt or verifier surfaces as `false`, not a raw\n * `DOMException` (InvalidCharacterError) escaping to the caller.\n */\nasync function checkVerifier(verifier: string, part: string, saltB64: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  try {\n    const kek = await deriveSecretKey(part, base64ToBuffer(saltB64), { iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS, keyUsage: 'aes-kw' })\n    await subtle.unwrapKey('raw', base64ToBuffer(verifier) as BufferSource, kek, 'AES-KW', { name: 'AES-GCM' }, false, ['encrypt'])\n    return true\n  } catch {\n    return false\n  }\n}\n\nexport type EchoRevealChoice =\n  | { readonly kind: 'portable' }\n  | { readonly kind: 'sealed'; readonly deviceSeal: DeviceSealProvider }\n  | { readonly kind: 'none' }\n\n/** Build the on-keyring echo declaration for a fresh enrollment. */\nexport async function buildEchoBlock(\n  parts: EchoSecretParts,\n  reveal: EchoRevealChoice,\n  maskHint?: string,\n): Promise<KeyringEchoBlock> {\n  // Validate the 3-part shape through the SAME chokepoint the KEK derivation\n  // uses (result deliberately discarded — only its guard is wanted here). A\n  // malformed parts object would otherwise be TextEncoder-coerced below and\n  // mint verifiers that no owner-derivable KEK matches.\n  encodeEchoParts(parts)\n  const promptSalt = generateSalt()\n  const echoSalt = generateSalt()\n  let revealField: KeyringEchoBlock['reveal']\n  if (reveal.kind === 'portable') {\n    const blobSalt = generateSalt()\n    const iv = generateIV()\n    const gcmKey = await deriveSecretKey(parts.prompt, blobSalt, { iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS, keyUsage: 'aes-gcm' })\n    const ct = new Uint8Array(\n      await subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, gcmKey, new TextEncoder().encode(parts.echo)),\n    )\n    revealField = { kind: 'portable', blob: bufferToBase64(ct), iv: bufferToBase64(iv), salt: bufferToBase64(blobSalt) }\n  } else if (reveal.kind === 'sealed') {\n    const sealed = await reveal.deviceSeal.seal(new TextEncoder().encode(parts.echo))\n    revealField = { kind: 'sealed', blob: bufferToBase64(sealed), provider_hint: reveal.deviceSeal.id }\n  } else {\n    revealField = { kind: 'none' }\n  }\n  return {\n    v: 1,\n    prompt_salt: bufferToBase64(promptSalt),\n    prompt_verifier: await mintVerifier(parts.prompt, promptSalt),\n    echo_salt: bufferToBase64(echoSalt),\n    echo_verifier: await mintVerifier(parts.echo, echoSalt),\n    reveal: revealField,\n    ...(maskHint !== undefined ? { mask_hint: maskHint } : {}),\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function verifyPrompt(block: KeyringEchoBlock, prompt: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  return checkVerifier(block.prompt_verifier, prompt, block.prompt_salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the echo for display. `null` ⇒ degraded path: the player\n * must ask the owner to TYPE the echo (verify via {@link verifyTypedEcho}).\n * Callers MUST verify the prompt first — this assumes it.\n *\n * @throws WrongPromptError when the prompt cannot open the portable reveal\n * (callers should verifyPrompt first for a boolean check).\n */\nexport async function resolveEchoReveal(\n  block: KeyringEchoBlock,\n  prompt: string,\n  deviceSeal?: DeviceSealProvider,\n): Promise<string | null> {\n  if (block.reveal.kind === 'portable') {\n    try {\n      const gcmKey = await deriveSecretKey(prompt, base64ToBuffer(block.reveal.salt), {\n        iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS,\n        keyUsage: 'aes-gcm',\n      })\n      const plain = await subtle.decrypt(\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: base64ToBuffer(block.reveal.iv) as BufferSource },\n        gcmKey,\n        base64ToBuffer(block.reveal.blob) as BufferSource,\n      )\n      return new TextDecoder().decode(plain)\n    } catch {\n      // Wrong prompt (or corrupt salt/iv/blob) — a wrong prompt must NOT\n      // silently degrade to the typed-echo path, that would weaken mutual\n      // auth. Surface a typed error instead of the raw DOMException.\n      throw new WrongPromptError()\n    }\n  }\n  if (block.reveal.kind === 'sealed' && deviceSeal !== undefined) {\n    if (deviceSeal.id !== block.reveal.provider_hint) {\n      // Legitimate foreign-device-with-its-own-provider case (spec's\n      // degradation matrix) — degrade to the typed-echo path rather than\n      // attempting (and failing) an unseal under the wrong provider.\n      return null\n    }\n    // Same provider id: a thrown error here is a genuine tamper/wrong-device\n    // anomaly and must surface, not be silently masked.\n    const plain = await deviceSeal.unseal(base64ToBuffer(block.reveal.blob))\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plain)\n  }\n  return null\n}\n\nexport async function verifyTypedEcho(block: KeyringEchoBlock, echo: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  return checkVerifier(block.echo_verifier, echo, block.echo_salt)\n}\n","/**\n * Secret-bearing reserved collections — the `_`-prefixed reserved collections\n * whose record CONTENTS are directly-usable secrets (transport OAuth tokens,\n * connection strings, API keys), as opposed to the *operational* reserved\n * collections (`_ledger`, `_history`, `_sync`, …) whose contents are metadata\n * (collection names, record ids, ciphertext hashes).\n *\n * This distinction matters at two trust-boundary seams:\n *\n *  1. `vault.collection()` — a secret-bearing reserved name must never be\n *     reachable through the generic public collection handle. It is served\n *     ONLY by its dedicated, role-gated API (e.g. `_sync_credentials` →\n *     `getCredential`/`putCredential`, which enforce owner/admin access).\n *\n *  2. `grant()` DEK propagation — a sub-admin grantee (operator, viewer,\n *     client, custodian) must NOT receive a secret-bearing collection's DEK.\n *     Operational reserved DEKs still propagate to every role (grantees must\n *     write ledger/history entries on every mutation), but handing a\n *     sub-admin the `_sync_credentials` DEK would let them decrypt the firm's\n *     transport secrets — a plaintext leak, not a metadata leak.\n *\n * Kept dependency-free so both the kernel (`vault.ts`) and the team layer\n * (`keyring.ts`) can import it without an import cycle.\n */\n\n/** Reserved collection holding per-adapter sync transport secrets. */\nexport const SYNC_CREDENTIALS_COLLECTION = '_sync_credentials'\n\n/**\n * Reserved (pre-allocated) name for the future credential broker (#479).\n * Not yet implemented — reserved now so that neither the public collection\n * handle nor grant propagation can ever expose it before its dedicated,\n * role-gated API lands.\n */\nexport const BROKER_COLLECTION = '_broker'\n\n/**\n * The set of reserved collection names whose record contents are\n * directly-usable secrets. Membership here means: never served via\n * `vault.collection()`, never propagated to sub-admin grantees.\n */\nexport const SECRET_BEARING_RESERVED_COLLECTIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  SYNC_CREDENTIALS_COLLECTION,\n  BROKER_COLLECTION,\n])\n\n/** True when `name` is a secret-bearing reserved collection. */\nexport function isSecretBearingReservedCollection(name: string): boolean {\n  return SECRET_BEARING_RESERVED_COLLECTIONS.has(name)\n}\n","import type { NoydbStore, KeyringFile, KeyringAuthenticator, Role, Permissions, GrantOptions, RevokeOptions, UpdateUserOptions, UserInfo, EncryptedEnvelope, ExportCapability, ExportFormat, ImportCapability, VaultPolicyOnDisk, UserEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION, NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION } from '../../kernel/constants.js'\nimport {\n  deriveKey,\n  deriveEchoKey,\n  generateDEK,\n  generateSalt,\n  wrapKey,\n  unwrapKey,\n  encrypt,\n  decrypt,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  type EnclaveKey,\n  type EchoSecretParts,\n} from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { NoAccessError, PermissionDeniedError, PrivilegeEscalationError, KeyringExpiredError, KeyringCorruptError, InvalidKeyError, ValidationError, DirectoryDisabledError, EchoCeremonyRequiredError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { readDirectoryConfig } from '../directory/storage.js'\nimport { readUserVisibility, deleteUserVisibility } from '../directory/visibility.js'\nimport {\n  assertStrongSecret,\n  assertStrongEchoSecret,\n  type SecretPolicy,\n  type EchoSecretPolicy,\n} from '../../kernel/validation.js'\nimport { buildEchoBlock } from './echo-secret.js'\nimport type { DeviceSealProvider } from './device-seal.js'\nimport {\n  saveUserEnvelope,\n  loadUserEnvelope as loadUserEnvelopeFn,\n  deleteUserEnvelope,\n} from '../directory/user-envelope/index.js'\nimport { isSecretBearingReservedCollection } from './reserved-secret-collections.js'\n\n// ─── Roles that can grant/revoke ───────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Roles that an `admin` is allowed to grant and revoke.\n *\n * Includes `'admin'` itself: the model bottlenecked all admin\n * onboarding through the single `owner` principal, which made lateral\n * delegation impossible and left a single-owner bus-factor risk\n * unresolved even when multiple trusted humans existed. opens up\n * admin↔admin lateral delegation, with two guardrails:\n *\n *   1. **No privilege escalation.** Enforced in `grant()`: every DEK\n *      wrapped into the new admin's keyring must be present in the\n *      grantor's own DEK set. Today this is structurally trivially\n *      true (admin grants always inherit the full caller DEK set),\n *      but the check is wired in so future per-collection admin scoping\n *      cannot accidentally bypass it. See `PrivilegeEscalationError`.\n *\n *   2. **Cascade on revoke.** Enforced in `revoke()`: when an admin is\n *      revoked, every admin they (transitively) granted is either\n *      revoked too (`cascade: 'strict'`, default) or left in place with\n *      a console warning (`cascade: 'warn'`). The walk uses the\n *      `granted_by` field on each keyring file as the parent pointer.\n */\n// FR-6: 'custodian' is deliberately ABSENT here. An admin must not be able\n// to mint (or revoke) a custodian — only the (sealed Deed) owner can, because\n// the custodian is the de-facto operational authority and granting one is an\n// ownership-level act. `canGrant(admin, 'custodian')` therefore returns false.\nconst ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS: readonly Role[] = ['operator', 'viewer', 'client', 'admin']\n\nfunction canGrant(callerRole: Role, targetRole: Role): boolean {\n  if (callerRole === 'owner') return true\n  // FR-6: a custodian can never grant — it holds the DEKs to OPERATE the\n  // vault but no authority to widen the principal set. Explicit + fail-safe\n  // (it would also fall through to `return false`, but spell it out).\n  if (callerRole === 'custodian') return false\n  if (callerRole === 'admin') return ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS.includes(targetRole)\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction canRevoke(callerRole: Role, targetRole: Role): boolean {\n  if (targetRole === 'owner') return false // owner cannot be revoked\n  if (callerRole === 'owner') return true\n  // FR-6: a custodian can never revoke — same non-owning rationale as canGrant.\n  if (callerRole === 'custodian') return false\n  if (callerRole === 'admin') return ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS.includes(targetRole)\n  return false\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether `callerRole` can mutate a keyring whose role is (or becomes)\n * `targetRole`. Used by `updateKeyringIdentity`.\n *\n * Mirrors `canGrant`'s hierarchy: admins manage admin/operator/viewer/\n * client laterally; admins cannot create or destroy `owner`-shaped\n * keyrings. Owner can do anything.\n *\n * Both the OLD role and the NEW role must satisfy this check —\n * otherwise admin could elevate themselves (`admin → owner`) or demote\n * an owner (`owner → admin`) under cover of \"update.\"\n */\nfunction canUpdateRole(callerRole: Role, targetRole: Role): boolean {\n  if (callerRole === 'owner') return true\n  if (callerRole === 'admin') return ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS.includes(targetRole)\n  return false\n}\n\n// ─── Unlocked Keyring ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** In-memory representation of an unlocked keyring. */\nexport interface UnlockedKeyring {\n  readonly userId: string\n  readonly displayName: string\n  readonly role: Role\n  readonly permissions: Permissions\n  readonly deks: Map<string, EnclaveKey>\n  /**\n   * The KEK, when this keyring was unlocked via tier 1 (secret) or\n   * a wrap-KEK tier-2 method (WebAuthn / OIDC). `null` when the\n   * keyring was opened via:\n   *\n   *   - Unencrypted mode (no KEK exists)\n   *   - Tier-3 PIN quick-resume (`@noy-db/on-pin`)\n   *   - Wrap-DEKs tier-2 unlock (`@noy-db/on-password`'s\n   *     `verifyPasswordSlot`)\n   *   - Session-state restore (`session/session.ts`)\n   *   - Dev-unlock fixture (`session/dev-unlock.ts`)\n   *\n   * Consumers performing tier-1 operations that need the KEK\n   * (DEK rewrap, keyring persist, delegation issue/unwrap) must\n   * null-check and throw a clear error if absent — re-authenticate\n   * at tier 1 first to recover the KEK.\n   *\n   * Tightened from `EnclaveKey` to `EnclaveKey | null`; the runtime\n   * contract has always allowed null, the type now matches reality.\n   */\n  readonly kek: EnclaveKey | null\n  readonly salt: Uint8Array\n  /**\n   * Debug-plaintext layout flag. Set only on the plaintext keyring created\n   * in `encrypt: false` + `debugPlaintext: true` mode — it lives here\n   * because its lifecycle is identical to the plaintext keyring's (no\n   * encrypted vault ever has it, so this never widens the encrypted surface).\n   * When true, user-collection records are written with their fields inlined\n   * beside the envelope metadata (`_debug: 1`) so native store tooling can\n   * read them without unwrapping `_data`.\n   */\n  readonly debugPlaintext?: boolean\n  /**\n   * `@noy-db/as-*` export capability. Absent when the\n   * keyring was written before this RFC landed — role-based defaults\n   * apply via `hasExportCapability`.\n   */\n  readonly exportCapability?: ExportCapability\n  /**\n   * `@noy-db/as-*` import capability. Absent when the\n   * keyring was written before the import-capability extension\n   * landed — default-closed semantics\n   * apply via `hasImportCapability` (no plaintext format granted, no\n   * bundle import granted, regardless of role).\n   */\n  readonly importCapability?: ImportCapability\n  /**\n   * Tier-2 authenticator slots — readonly snapshot loaded from the\n   * keyring file. Mutations go through `enrollAuthenticator` /\n   * `removeAuthenticator`, which write back via\n   * `persistKeyring`. Always defined; loads with an empty array for\n   * keyrings written before the multi-slot extension landed.\n   */\n  readonly authenticators: readonly KeyringAuthenticator[]\n  /**\n   * Reserved per-keyring policy override (forward-compat for Option C\n   * — see {@link VaultPolicyOnDisk}). v1.0 round-trips this field but\n   * never enforces it; the gate engine uses `_meta/policy` only.\n   */\n  readonly policy?: VaultPolicyOnDisk\n}\n\n// ─── Secret canary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// The canary is a fixed 256-bit AES-GCM key (32 zero bytes), wrapped\n// under the keyring's KEK with AES-KW. Because AES-KW is deterministic\n// (RFC 3394 fixed IV), wrapping the same constant under the same KEK\n// always yields the same ciphertext — so every write site can mint\n// fresh on each persist without round-tripping a `canary` field\n// through UnlockedKeyring.\n//\n// On load, the canary unwraps cleanly iff the KEK is correct AND the\n// canary bytes on disk are intact. Combined with each-DEK try/catch,\n// this distinguishes wrong-secret (canary fails AND every DEK fails)\n// from corruption (canary succeeds OR at least one DEK succeeds) —\n// closing the all-DEKs-corrupt and single-DEK ambiguities that the\n// pre-canary heuristic left open.\n\nconst CANARY_PLAINTEXT_BYTES = new Uint8Array(32)\nlet canaryKeyPromise: Promise<EnclaveKey> | null = null\n\nfunction getCanaryKey(): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  if (canaryKeyPromise === null) {\n    canaryKeyPromise = globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n      'raw',\n      CANARY_PLAINTEXT_BYTES as BufferSource,\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n      true, // extractable so AES-KW can wrap it\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  }\n  return canaryKeyPromise\n}\n\n/** Mint a fresh wrapped-canary string. Deterministic for a given KEK. */\nexport async function mintKeyringCanary(kek: EnclaveKey): Promise<string> {\n  const canaryKey = await getCanaryKey()\n  return wrapKey(canaryKey, kek)\n}\n\n/** Try to unwrap the canary. Returns true iff KEK + canary bytes are intact. */\nasync function verifyKeyringCanary(wrappedCanary: string, kek: EnclaveKey): Promise<boolean> {\n  try {\n    await unwrapKey(wrappedCanary, kek)\n    return true\n  } catch {\n    return false\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Load / Create ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Options for {@link loadKeyring} (#846b). */\nexport interface LoadKeyringOptions {\n  /** The user whose keyring to unlock. */\n  readonly userId: string\n  /**\n   * That user's secret — a single string for a standard keyring, or the\n   * structured 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts} for an echo keyring (spec\n   * #940, AG-1: a single string can never unlock an echo keyring).\n   */\n  readonly secret: string | EchoSecretParts\n}\n\n/**\n * KDF dispatch for tier-1 unlock (spec #940). An echo keyring accepts\n * ONLY structured parts (AG-1 — no single string is key-equivalent);\n * a standard keyring accepts only a string.\n */\nexport async function deriveKekForKeyring(\n  file: KeyringFile,\n  secret: string | EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  if (file.echo !== undefined) {\n    if (typeof secret === 'string') throw new EchoCeremonyRequiredError()\n    return deriveEchoKey(secret, salt)\n  }\n  if (typeof secret !== 'string') {\n    throw new ValidationError('This keyring uses a standard secret — pass a string, not echo parts.')\n  }\n  return deriveKey(secret, salt)\n}\n\n// ─── Raw keyring reads (#951) ───────────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// Single sanctioned reader of a keyring file's `_data`, plus the fetch+parse\n// and expiry-gate wrappers built on it. Every keyring.ts / echo-ceremony.ts\n// call site that used to inline `JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile`\n// (each with its own missing-row semantics — throw / skip / continue) now\n// goes through `readKeyringFile`, which stays neutral on the missing-row\n// case (`undefined`) and lets each caller keep its own decision.\n\n/** Parse a raw keyring envelope. Single sanctioned reader of `_data` for keyring files. */\nexport function parseKeyringEnvelope(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): KeyringFile {\n  return JSON.parse(envelope._data) as KeyringFile\n}\n\n/** Fetch + parse a user's keyring file; undefined when the row is missing. */\nexport async function readKeyringFile(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n): Promise<{ readonly envelope: EncryptedEnvelope; readonly file: KeyringFile } | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_keyring', userId)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  return { envelope, file: parseKeyringEnvelope(envelope) }\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared expiry gate — refuse to unwrap an expired slot. Call before any\n * KEK derivation so an expired slot doesn't leak timing on the secret.\n * Comparison uses Date.parse → ms-since-epoch; an unparseable expires_at is\n * treated as \"no expiry\" so a malformed value can't silently lock users out\n * (it'll surface in tests).\n */\nexport function assertKeyringNotExpired(file: KeyringFile): void {\n  if (file.expires_at !== undefined) {\n    const cutoff = Date.parse(file.expires_at)\n    if (Number.isFinite(cutoff) && Date.now() >= cutoff) {\n      throw new KeyringExpiredError({ userId: file.user_id, expiresAt: file.expires_at })\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** Load and unlock a user's keyring for a vault. */\nexport async function loadKeyring(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  opts: LoadKeyringOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  const { userId, secret } = opts\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`No keyring found for user \"${userId}\" in vault \"${vault}\"`)\n  }\n\n  const { file: keyringFile } = found\n\n  assertKeyringNotExpired(keyringFile)\n\n  const salt = base64ToBuffer(keyringFile.salt)\n  const kek = await deriveKekForKeyring(keyringFile, secret, salt)\n\n  // Verify the canary first when present. A canary success proves the\n  // KEK is correct independent of any DEK byte — so subsequent DEK\n  // unwrap failures are unambiguously corruption, not wrong-pass. A\n  // canary failure with at least one DEK success indicates the KEK\n  // is correct but the canary itself is corrupt.\n  // `null` sentinel = legacy keyring without canary; falls back to the\n  // multi-DEK heuristic.\n  const canaryOk: boolean | null = keyringFile.canary !== undefined\n    ? await verifyKeyringCanary(keyringFile.canary, kek)\n    : null\n\n  // Unwrap each DEK independently — collect successes and failures.\n  const deks = new Map<string, EnclaveKey>()\n  const failedCollections: string[] = []\n  let firstUnwrapError: unknown = null\n  for (const [collName, wrappedDek] of Object.entries(keyringFile.deks)) {\n    try {\n      const dek = await unwrapKey(wrappedDek, kek)\n      deks.set(collName, dek)\n    } catch (err) {\n      failedCollections.push(collName)\n      if (firstUnwrapError === null) firstUnwrapError = err\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (canaryOk === true) {\n    // KEK proven correct by the canary. Any DEK failure is corruption.\n    if (failedCollections.length > 0) {\n      throw new KeyringCorruptError({ failedCollections, intactCount: deks.size })\n    }\n  } else if (canaryOk === false) {\n    // Canary failed. If any DEK unwrapped, KEK is correct → canary bytes\n    // are corrupted (rare; reported under the '_canary' sentinel).\n    if (deks.size > 0) {\n      throw new KeyringCorruptError({\n        failedCollections: [...failedCollections, '_canary'],\n        intactCount: deks.size,\n      })\n    }\n    // Canary failed AND no DEK unwrapped — wrong KEK (or whole-file\n    // corruption). Surface the original InvalidKeyError so\n    // onInvalidKey: 'reset' can fire its documented recovery path.\n    throw firstUnwrapError instanceof Error ? firstUnwrapError : new InvalidKeyError()\n  } else {\n    // Legacy keyring (no canary). Fall back to the multi-DEK heuristic.\n    if (failedCollections.length > 0) {\n      if (deks.size > 0) {\n        throw new KeyringCorruptError({ failedCollections, intactCount: deks.size })\n      }\n      throw firstUnwrapError instanceof Error ? firstUnwrapError : new InvalidKeyError()\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    userId: keyringFile.user_id,\n    displayName: keyringFile.display_name,\n    role: keyringFile.role,\n    permissions: keyringFile.permissions,\n    deks,\n    kek,\n    salt,\n    authenticators: keyringFile.authenticators ?? [],\n    ...(keyringFile.export_capability !== undefined && { exportCapability: keyringFile.export_capability }),\n    ...(keyringFile.import_capability !== undefined && { importCapability: keyringFile.import_capability }),\n    ...(keyringFile.policy !== undefined && { policy: keyringFile.policy }),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Open-policy pre-gate: decide create-vs-fail-closed **before** any\n * vault write. `openVault` must not self-provision an owner keyring into a\n * vault held by other principals; create-on-open is allowed only for a\n * genuinely-new vault (no `_keyring/*` at all). Capability-free — one\n * `store.list`. Returns when the open may proceed (the caller is a member, or\n * the vault is genuinely-new and `create` is allowed, in which case the caller\n * falls through to the normal `createOwnerKeyring` path); throws `NoAccessError`\n * otherwise. Placed before managed-secret secret resolution (which persists\n * on first open), so a fail-closed open writes nothing.\n */\nexport async function assertKeyringOpenAllowed(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n  create: boolean,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const keyringUsers = await store.list(vault, '_keyring')\n  if (keyringUsers.includes(userId)) return // caller is a member → load existing\n  if (!create) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`Vault \"${vault}\" not opened: create disabled and no keyring for \"${userId}\".`)\n  }\n  if (keyringUsers.length > 0) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(\n      `No keyring for user \"${userId}\" in vault \"${vault}\" (held by other principals) — refusing to self-provision.`,\n    )\n  }\n  // empty → genuinely-new vault → caller proceeds to the create path\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link createOwnerKeyring} (#846b). The `SecretPolicy` knobs are\n * flattened into the same bag rather than nested, so `assertStrongSecret` can\n * take `opts` directly.\n */\nexport interface CreateOwnerKeyringOptions extends SecretPolicy {\n  /** The owner to create. */\n  readonly userId: string\n  /**\n   * The owner's secret — a plain string for a standard keyring, or the\n   * structured 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts} to enroll an echo keyring\n   * (spec #940). The shape alone selects the KDF and whether an `echo`\n   * block is written.\n   */\n  readonly secret: string | EchoSecretParts\n  /** Gate creation on the phrase-format strength rules. Default false. */\n  readonly validate?: boolean\n  /** Escape hatch for fixtures and migrations — skips the strength gate. */\n  readonly allowWeakSecret?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Echo enrollment only: device-local sealer for the reveal blob. Present\n   * ⇒ `reveal: 'sealed'` (attacker-B resistance); absent ⇒ `reveal:\n   * 'portable'` (spec resolved question 4). Ignored for a string secret.\n   */\n  readonly deviceSeal?: DeviceSealProvider\n  /** Echo enrollment only: optional display hint for the masked echo. */\n  readonly echoMaskHint?: string\n  /**\n   * Echo enrollment only: strength-policy knobs for the 3-part secret's\n   * prompt / combined floors — the parts-path counterpart of the\n   * flattened `SecretPolicy` fields this options bag already extends\n   * (those apply to a STRING secret via `assertStrongSecret`; this\n   * applies to {@link EchoSecretParts} via `assertStrongEchoSecret`).\n   * Ignored for a string secret.\n   */\n  readonly echoSecretPolicy?: EchoSecretPolicy\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the initial owner keyring for a new vault.\n *\n * Pass `{ validate: true }` (or any `SecretPolicy` knob) to gate creation\n * on the phrase-format strength rules — `Noydb` threads this from\n * `NoydbOptions.validateSecret`. Direct callers (CLI, scripts,\n * test fixtures) opt in explicitly.\n */\nexport async function createOwnerKeyring(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  opts: CreateOwnerKeyringOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  const { userId, secret } = opts\n  if (opts.validate && !opts.allowWeakSecret) {\n    // `buildEchoBlock` only type-validates the 3-part secret via the\n    // `encodeEchoParts` chokepoint — the STRENGTH gate for it still has to\n    // fire here, exactly like `assertStrongSecret` does for a string.\n    if (typeof secret === 'string') assertStrongSecret(secret, opts)\n    else {\n      assertStrongEchoSecret(secret, {\n        ...opts.echoSecretPolicy,\n        ...(opts.allowWeakSecret !== undefined && { allowWeakSecret: opts.allowWeakSecret }),\n      })\n    }\n  }\n  const salt = generateSalt()\n  const kek = typeof secret === 'string'\n    ? await deriveKey(secret, salt)\n    : await deriveEchoKey(secret, salt)\n\n  // Eager-provision the _users DEK at owner creation. This guarantees\n  // every subsequent grant inherits it via the existing\n  // collName.startsWith('_') propagation in grant() — so multi-principal\n  // user-envelope reads (alice reading bob's profile) work for new\n  // vaults without any per-keyring DEK rotation. Pre-existing vaults\n  // get the DEK lazily on first vault.user.* access (which only\n  // materializes a single-principal DEK that won't propagate\n  // retroactively — that's the documented \"lazy creation for\n  // pre-existing keyrings\" rollout note in the spec).\n  const userEnvelopeDek = await generateDEK()\n  const wrappedUserEnvelopeDek = await wrapKey(userEnvelopeDek, kek)\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(kek)\n\n  const keyringFile: KeyringFile = {\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    user_id: userId,\n    display_name: userId,\n    role: 'owner',\n    permissions: {},\n    deks: { [USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION]: wrappedUserEnvelopeDek },\n    salt: bufferToBase64(salt),\n    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    granted_by: userId,\n    canary,\n    // The presence of this block is what makes the keyring an echo keyring —\n    // `deriveKekForKeyring` reads it to refuse a single-string unlock (AG-1).\n    ...(typeof secret !== 'string'\n      ? {\n          echo: await buildEchoBlock(\n            secret,\n            opts.deviceSeal ? { kind: 'sealed', deviceSeal: opts.deviceSeal } : { kind: 'portable' },\n            opts.echoMaskHint,\n          ),\n        }\n      : {}),\n  }\n\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, userId, keyringFile)\n\n  return {\n    userId,\n    displayName: userId,\n    role: 'owner',\n    permissions: {},\n    deks: new Map([[USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION, userEnvelopeDek]]),\n    kek,\n    salt,\n    authenticators: [],\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Grant ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Grant access to a new user. Caller must have grant privilege. */\nexport async function grant(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  options: GrantOptions,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!callerKeyring.kek) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'grant: caller keyring has no KEK — tier-2 wrap-DEKs and tier-3 PIN-resume ' +\n        'sessions cannot grant access to other users. Re-authenticate at tier 1 ' +\n        '(secret) before granting.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  if (!canGrant(callerKeyring.role, options.role)) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Role \"${callerKeyring.role}\" cannot grant role \"${options.role}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // PRESENCE check — distinct from, and unskippable by, the strength check\n  // below. `GrantOptions.secret` is a required field, so only an untypechecked\n  // call site can omit it (a build script outside the typecheck project, a\n  // stale `passphrase` key surviving the 0.4.0-pre rename). Before #1004 that\n  // call derived a KEK from `undefined`, minted a real keyring slot, and\n  // surfaced as `InvalidKeyError` whenever the grantee first tried to unlock —\n  // arbitrarily far from the call that caused it. Fail at the grant instead.\n  // `allowWeakSecret` deliberately does NOT skip this: it waives the strength\n  // POLICY, not the existence of a secret.\n  const secret: unknown = options.secret\n  if (typeof secret !== 'string' || secret.trim() === '') {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `grant: \\`secret\\` is required and must be a non-empty string (got ${\n        secret === undefined ? 'undefined' : typeof secret === 'string' ? 'an empty string' : typeof secret\n      }). The grantee's key is derived from it, so a missing secret produces a ` +\n        'keyring slot nobody can unlock. Note the 0.4.0-pre rename: the option is ' +\n        '`secret`, not `passphrase`.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Optional strength validation — opt-in via grant({ validateSecret: true })\n  // or via the calling Noydb's NoydbOptions.validateSecret flag.\n  // The override `allowWeakSecret: true` skips even when validate is on.\n  if (\n    (options as { validateSecret?: boolean }).validateSecret &&\n    !options.allowWeakSecret\n  ) {\n    assertStrongSecret(options.secret)\n  }\n\n  // Determine which collections the new user gets access to\n  const permissions = resolvePermissions(options.role, options.permissions)\n\n  // Derive the new user's KEK from their secret\n  const newSalt = generateSalt()\n  const newKek = await deriveKey(options.secret, newSalt)\n\n  // Only owner and admin may ever hold a secret-bearing reserved DEK\n  // (`_sync_credentials`, `_broker`) — they are the roles the dedicated\n  // credential API admits. Every other grantee (custodian, viewer, operator,\n  // client) is excluded, even from the \"wrap ALL\" branches below: a custodian\n  // operates the DATA but must never read the firm's transport secrets (see\n  // `requireAdminAccess` in sync-credentials.ts), and handing any sub-admin\n  // one of these DEKs is a plaintext leak, not a metadata leak.\n  const granteeMayHoldSecrets =\n    options.role === 'owner' || options.role === 'admin'\n\n  // A grantee's DEKs can only ever be wrapped HERE, at grant time: wrapping\n  // needs the grantee's KEK, which is derived from a secret the vault never\n  // stores, so there is no later moment at which a newly-minted collection DEK\n  // could be back-filled into an existing keyring. #1004: granting\n  // `{ invoices: 'rw' }` before `invoices` existed therefore wrapped nothing\n  // and left a permanently blind slot. Mint the DEK now so the grant is\n  // honoured whichever order the caller works in.\n  //\n  // Only for collections that do not exist yet. If a collection HAS records\n  // and the grantor still lacks its DEK, minting would fabricate a key that\n  // decrypts nothing AND would hand the anti-privilege-escalation check below\n  // a DEK the grantor never legitimately held — turning a structural guarantee\n  // into a no-op. Leave those unwrapped and let the read path deny.\n  let mintedForGrant = false\n  for (const collName of Object.keys(permissions)) {\n    // `'*'` is a marker, not a collection — minting a DEK for it would create a\n    // literal `*` collection and cover nothing (#1010).\n    if (collName === PERMISSION_WILDCARD) continue\n    if (isSecretBearingReservedCollection(collName) && !granteeMayHoldSecrets) continue\n    if (callerKeyring.deks.has(collName)) continue\n    if (await collectionHasRecords(store, vault, collName)) continue\n    callerKeyring.deks.set(collName, await generateDEK())\n    mintedForGrant = true\n  }\n  // Only when we actually minted: the grantor's own keyring file has to record\n  // the new DEK, or their next write to that collection would mint a SECOND,\n  // different one and orphan the copy we are about to wrap for the grantee.\n  if (mintedForGrant) await persistKeyring(store, vault, callerKeyring)\n\n  // Wrap the appropriate DEKs with the new user's KEK\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const collName of Object.keys(permissions)) {\n    if (collName === PERMISSION_WILDCARD) continue\n    // Never hand a secret-bearing reserved DEK to a sub-admin, even if the\n    // grantor explicitly names it in `permissions` — that path is served\n    // only by the owner/admin-gated credential API, not per-collection grants.\n    if (isSecretBearingReservedCollection(collName) && !granteeMayHoldSecrets) continue\n    const dek = callerKeyring.deks.get(collName)\n    if (dek) {\n      wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // For owner/admin/custodian/viewer roles, wrap ALL known DEKs.\n  // FR-6: a custodian operates EVERY collection, so — like admin — it must\n  // receive every collection DEK on grant. Without this branch a custodian\n  // could neither read nor write and the role would be inert.\n  // #1010 — `permissions: { '*': ... }` puts a permission-scoped grantee on the\n  // same footing as the whole-vault roles: every DEK the grantor holds. Note the\n  // inherent limit the caller must know about — this covers the collections that\n  // exist NOW. A wildcard cannot enumerate collections created later, and a DEK\n  // can only ever be wrapped at grant time, so a later collection needs a\n  // re-grant (the read path says so explicitly).\n  if (\n    options.role === 'owner' ||\n    options.role === 'admin' ||\n    options.role === 'custodian' ||\n    options.role === 'viewer' ||\n    permissionsAreWildcard(options.permissions)\n  ) {\n    for (const [collName, dek] of callerKeyring.deks) {\n      if (collName in wrappedDeks) continue\n      if (isSecretBearingReservedCollection(collName) && !granteeMayHoldSecrets) continue\n      wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // For ALL roles, propagate system-prefixed collection DEKs\n  // (`_ledger`, `_history`, `_sync`, …). These are internal collections\n  // that any user with access to the vault must be able to\n  // read and write — for example, the hash-chained ledger writes\n  // an entry on every put/delete, so operators and clients with write\n  // access to a single data collection still need the `_ledger` DEK.\n  //\n  // Trade-off: a granted user can decrypt every system-collection\n  // entry, including ones they would not otherwise have access to\n  // (e.g., an operator on `invoices` can read ledger entries for\n  // mutations in `salaries`). This is a metadata leak, not a\n  // plaintext leak — the ledger entries record collection names,\n  // record ids, and ciphertext hashes, but never plaintext records.\n  // Per-collection ledger DEKs are tracked as a follow-up.\n  //\n  // EXCEPTION — secret-bearing reserved collections (`_sync_credentials`,\n  // `_broker`) whose record CONTENTS are directly-usable secrets are NOT\n  // propagated to sub-admin grantees. Unlike the operational collections\n  // above, handing an operator/viewer/client/custodian one of these DEKs\n  // IS a plaintext leak (the firm's transport OAuth tokens). Only owner and\n  // admin — the roles the dedicated `getCredential`/`putCredential` API\n  // admits — receive them, so the legit admin-reads-existing-credential\n  // flow (which needs the DEK to decrypt, not regenerate) still works.\n  for (const [collName, dek] of callerKeyring.deks) {\n    if (!collName.startsWith('_') || collName in wrappedDeks) continue\n    if (isSecretBearingReservedCollection(collName) && !granteeMayHoldSecrets) continue\n    wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n  }\n\n  // Anti-privilege-escalation check. Every DEK we just\n  // wrapped into the new keyring must come from the caller's own DEK\n  // set — the grantor cannot give the grantee access to a collection\n  // they themselves can't read. Today this is structurally trivially\n  // satisfied because every wrapped DEK was looked up in\n  // `callerKeyring.deks` above, but the explicit check is wired in\n  // so a future change (per-collection admin scoping, escrow-based\n  // re-wrapping, etc.) cannot accidentally let a widening grant\n  // through. See `PrivilegeEscalationError` for the rationale.\n  for (const collName of Object.keys(wrappedDeks)) {\n    if (!callerKeyring.deks.has(collName)) {\n      throw new PrivilegeEscalationError(collName)\n    }\n  }\n\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(newKek)\n  const keyringFile: KeyringFile = {\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    user_id: options.userId,\n    display_name: options.displayName,\n    role: options.role,\n    permissions,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(newSalt),\n    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    granted_by: callerKeyring.userId,\n    canary,\n    ...(options.exportCapability !== undefined && { export_capability: options.exportCapability }),\n    ...(options.importCapability !== undefined && { import_capability: options.importCapability }),\n  }\n\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, options.userId, keyringFile)\n\n  // User envelope bootstrap. Seeded with `options.initialProfile` if\n  // provided, otherwise an empty `{}`. Encrypted with the caller's\n  // _users DEK — which is the same DEK that was wrapped into the new\n  // keyring's `wrappedDeks[USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION]` above (system-\n  // collection propagation), so the new user can decrypt it on first\n  // open. Skipped silently if the caller has no _users DEK (pre-feature\n  // vault upgrade path — documented \"lazy creation for pre-existing\n  // keyrings\" in the spec).\n  const userEnvelopeDek = callerKeyring.deks.get(USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION)\n  if (userEnvelopeDek) {\n    const initialPayload = options.initialProfile ?? {}\n    await saveUserEnvelope(\n      store,\n      vault,\n      options.userId,\n      initialPayload,\n      userEnvelopeDek,\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Revoke ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Walk every keyring in the vault to find admins that the given\n * `rootUserId` (transitively) granted, via the `granted_by` parent\n * pointer recorded on each keyring file.\n *\n * Returns the set of descendant admin user-ids in DFS order, NOT\n * including the root itself. Non-admin descendants are excluded\n * because operators/viewers/clients cannot grant other users — they\n * are leaves in the delegation tree and cleaning them up is the\n * caller's job (or the next rotate, since they'd lose key access\n * anyway when the cascading admin's collections rotate).\n *\n * The walk uses a visited set keyed by user-id so cycles introduced\n * by re-grants (admin-A revoked, then re-granted later by admin-B who\n * was originally granted by A) terminate cleanly.\n */\nasync function findAdminDescendants(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  rootUserId: string,\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  const allUserIds = await store.list(vault, '_keyring')\n\n  // Build a map: parentUserId → child KeyringFiles. We only ever\n  // descend into admins, so non-admin children are skipped at the\n  // edge level rather than after a recursive call.\n  const childrenByParent = new Map<string, string[]>()\n  for (const userId of allUserIds) {\n    const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n    if (!found) continue\n    const kf = found.file\n    // Only admins can grant, so only admins have a delegation subtree to\n    // cascade. FR-6: a custodian is intentionally EXCLUDED here — it cannot\n    // grant (canGrant(custodian,*) === false), so it is never a cascade root\n    // and never a descendant edge. Treating it as an admin-descendant would\n    // wrongly sweep it into an admin's revoke cascade.\n    if (kf.role !== 'admin') continue // only admins can grant — leaves are uninteresting\n    if (kf.user_id === rootUserId) continue // self-edges are noise\n    const list = childrenByParent.get(kf.granted_by) ?? []\n    list.push(kf.user_id)\n    childrenByParent.set(kf.granted_by, list)\n  }\n\n  const visited = new Set<string>()\n  const order: string[] = []\n  const stack: string[] = [...(childrenByParent.get(rootUserId) ?? [])]\n  while (stack.length > 0) {\n    const next = stack.pop()!\n    if (visited.has(next)) continue\n    visited.add(next)\n    order.push(next)\n    for (const grandchild of childrenByParent.get(next) ?? []) {\n      if (!visited.has(grandchild)) stack.push(grandchild)\n    }\n  }\n  return order\n}\n\n/** Revoke a user's access. Optionally rotate keys for affected collections. */\nexport async function revoke(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  options: RevokeOptions,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // Load the target's keyring to check their role\n  const targetFound = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, options.userId)\n  if (!targetFound) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`User \"${options.userId}\" has no keyring in vault \"${vault}\"`)\n  }\n\n  const targetKeyring = targetFound.file\n\n  if (!canRevoke(callerKeyring.role, targetKeyring.role)) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Role \"${callerKeyring.role}\" cannot revoke role \"${targetKeyring.role}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Cascade-on-revoke. Only meaningful when the target is\n  // an admin — operators/viewers/clients cannot grant other users so\n  // they have no delegation subtree to walk.\n  const cascadeMode = options.cascade ?? 'strict'\n  const usersToRevoke: string[] = [options.userId]\n  const affectedCollections = new Set(Object.keys(targetKeyring.deks))\n\n  if (targetKeyring.role === 'admin') {\n    const descendants = await findAdminDescendants(store, vault, options.userId)\n    if (descendants.length > 0) {\n      if (cascadeMode === 'warn') {\n        // Diagnostic mode: leave the descendants in place but make\n        // them visible. The owner / a different admin can clean up\n        // manually. The single console.warn is intentionally noisy\n        // (a list, not a count) so the operator sees exactly which\n        // keyrings will become orphans.\n        console.warn(\n          `[noy-db] revoke(${options.userId}): cascade='warn' — leaving ` +\n            `${descendants.length} descendant admin(s) in place: ` +\n            `${descendants.join(', ')}. These admins were granted by the revoked user ` +\n            `(transitively) and will become orphans in the delegation tree.`,\n        )\n      } else {\n        // Strict mode (default): pull every descendant into the\n        // revoke set. We collect their affected collections too so\n        // the single rotation pass at the end covers everything.\n        for (const userId of descendants) {\n          const descFound = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n          if (!descFound) continue\n          usersToRevoke.push(userId)\n          for (const c of Object.keys(descFound.file.deks)) affectedCollections.add(c)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Delete every keyring in the revoke set. Order doesn't matter\n  // because each keyring file is independent on disk; we don't have\n  // referential integrity to maintain across deletes.\n  for (const userId of usersToRevoke) {\n    await store.delete(vault, '_keyring', userId)\n    // Cascade-delete the principal's user envelope. Idempotent — no\n    // error when the envelope was never written (e.g. the user was\n    // granted but never authenticated to write their own profile).\n    await deleteUserEnvelope(store, vault, userId)\n    // Also drop the visibility sidecar at `_meta/visibility/<userId>`.\n    // If the same `userId` is re-granted later (rare for humans,\n    // possible for service accounts and test fixtures), the new\n    // principal must start with a fresh visibility state instead of\n    // silently inheriting the revoked user's `hidden` flag.\n    await deleteUserVisibility(store, vault, userId)\n  }\n\n  // Single rotation pass at the end. The cost is O(records in\n  // affected collections), NOT O(records × cascade depth) — every\n  // descendant's collections were unioned into `affectedCollections`\n  // before we got here, so the rotation re-encrypts each affected\n  // record exactly once regardless of how deep the cascade went.\n  if (options.rotateKeys !== false && affectedCollections.size > 0) {\n    await rotateKeys(store, vault, callerKeyring, { collections: [...affectedCollections] })\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Update User ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Mutate `role`, `displayName`, and/or `permissions` on an existing\n * keyring. Pure plaintext-header rewrite — no DEK rewrap, no KEK\n * required, no authenticator slots touched. Tier-2 enrollments and\n * recovery codes survive the operation.\n *\n * Role-elevation guard: BOTH the old role AND the new role must\n * satisfy `canUpdateRole(callerRole, _)`. This blocks the two\n * privilege-escalation shapes:\n *   - admin elevates someone (or themselves) to owner\n *   - admin demotes an owner to a role they then control\n *\n * Owner is always allowed. Admin manages admin / operator / viewer /\n * client laterally.\n *\n * Identity preserved: same userId, same DEK wrappings. Last-write-wins\n * through the standard keyring put (same concurrency story as `grant`\n * and `revoke`).\n *\n * @throws `NoAccessError` when no keyring exists for the target.\n * @throws `PermissionDeniedError` when the role hierarchy rejects.\n * @throws `ValidationError` when the diff is empty (nothing to update).\n *\n */\nexport async function updateKeyringIdentity(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  options: UpdateUserOptions,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (\n    options.role === undefined &&\n    options.displayName === undefined &&\n    options.permissions === undefined\n  ) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `updateUser: at least one of role / displayName / permissions must be provided ` +\n        `(userId: \"${options.userId}\").`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, options.userId)\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(\n      `updateUser: user \"${options.userId}\" has no keyring in vault \"${vault}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n  const target = found.file\n\n  // Role-elevation guard. The OLD role must be one this caller is\n  // allowed to manage, AND the NEW role (if changing) must be too.\n  // Two-sided check: blocks admin→owner promotion (new side) and\n  // demoting an owner (old side).\n  if (!canUpdateRole(callerKeyring.role, target.role)) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Role \"${callerKeyring.role}\" cannot update a keyring with role \"${target.role}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (\n    options.role !== undefined &&\n    options.role !== target.role &&\n    !canUpdateRole(callerKeyring.role, options.role)\n  ) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Role \"${callerKeyring.role}\" cannot promote target to role \"${options.role}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const next: KeyringFile = {\n    ...target,\n    ...(options.role !== undefined && { role: options.role }),\n    ...(options.displayName !== undefined && {\n      // null clears the field (stored as \"\"); a string sets it.\n      display_name: options.displayName ?? '',\n    }),\n    ...(options.permissions !== undefined && { permissions: options.permissions }),\n  }\n\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, options.userId, next)\n}\n\n// ─── Key Rotation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Rotate DEKs for specified collections:\n * 1. Generate new DEKs\n * 2. Re-encrypt all records in affected collections\n * 3. Re-wrap new DEKs for all remaining users\n */\n/**\n * What a DEK rotation leaves behind (#854).\n *\n * A member's DEKs are wrapped under that member's KEK, and a KEK derives only\n * from that member's secret — so the caller cannot re-wrap a fresh DEK for\n * anyone else. That is the zero-knowledge property working as designed, but it\n * means rotation necessarily DROPS the rotated collections from every other\n * member's keyring rather than re-keying them.\n *\n * `needsRegrant` names exactly who lost what, so the caller can re-run\n * `grant()` instead of discovering the access loss later.\n */\nexport interface RotateResult {\n  /** (member, collection) pairs whose access was dropped by the rotation. */\n  readonly needsRegrant: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly userId: string; readonly collection: string }>\n}\n\n/** Options for {@link rotateKeys} (#846b — was a bare `string[]`). */\nexport interface RotateKeysOptions {\n  /** Collections whose DEKs are re-minted. */\n  readonly collections: readonly string[]\n}\n\nexport async function rotateKeys(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  opts: RotateKeysOptions,\n): Promise<RotateResult> {\n  const { collections } = opts\n  // FR-6: re-keying is an owner-only meta-capability. A custodian operates the\n  // vault fully but must NOT rotate — rotation would let it mint fresh DEKs and\n  // strip the sealed owner's access, breaking the inalienability floor.\n  if (callerKeyring.role === 'custodian') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      'custodian cannot rotate keys (FR-6: re-key is an owner-only meta-capability; use the Deed owner)',\n    )\n  }\n  // Generate new DEKs for each affected collection\n  const newDeks = new Map<string, EnclaveKey>()\n  for (const collName of collections) {\n    newDeks.set(collName, await generateDEK())\n  }\n\n  // Re-encrypt all records in affected collections\n  //\n  // FORWARD REQUIREMENT (not implemented here — DEK rotation predates\n  // perRecordKeys/classified fields): a future perRecordKeys-aware DEK\n  // rotation MUST DROP `_bidx` here rather than carry it forward. `_bidx` is\n  // rooted in the (soon-to-be-dead) old DEK; a stale tag surviving under the\n  // new DEK is unreturnable garbage (no key can ever re-derive it to match a\n  // query again) that still LEAKS the old equality partition. Unlike\n  // `rotateRecordCek` (record-keys/sealing.ts), which carries `_bidx`\n  // verbatim because it is CEK-rotation-only and the DEK is unchanged, a DEK\n  // rotation changes the root the tag is derived from, so index coverage can\n  // only regrow per-record, the next time each record is `put()` under the\n  // new DEK.\n  //\n  // D-5 (pre-existing hazard, flagged not fixed): in a mixed collection, bare\n  // (non-`_cek`) records below are re-encrypted and `put()` in this loop\n  // *before* any `_cek` record is reached; if a later record in the same\n  // collection throws (e.g. an unwrap failure), those already-rewritten bare\n  // records are left persisted under the new DEK while `callerKeyring` is\n  // never updated with it (the `deks.set` below hasn't run) — an unsaved-DEK\n  // state with no rollback.\n  for (const collName of collections) {\n    const oldDek = callerKeyring.deks.get(collName)\n    const newDek = newDeks.get(collName)!\n    if (!oldDek) continue\n\n    const ids = await store.list(vault, collName)\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      const envelope = await store.get(vault, collName, id)\n      if (!envelope || !envelope._iv) continue\n\n      // Decrypt with old DEK\n      const plaintext = await decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, oldDek)\n\n      // Re-encrypt with new DEK\n      const { iv, data } = await encrypt(plaintext, newDek)\n      const newEnvelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n        _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n        _v: envelope._v,\n        _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n        _iv: iv,\n        _data: data,\n      }\n      await store.put(vault, collName, id, newEnvelope)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Update caller's keyring with new DEKs\n  for (const [collName, newDek] of newDeks) {\n    callerKeyring.deks.set(collName, newDek)\n  }\n  await persistKeyring(store, vault, callerKeyring)\n\n  // Drop the rotated collections from every OTHER member's keyring.\n  //\n  // The old comment here said these were \"re-wrapped\", which is what\n  // `Noydb.rotate`'s jsdoc promised too — but re-wrapping is impossible and\n  // always was (#854). See the note below.\n  const needsRegrant: Array<{ userId: string; collection: string }> = []\n  const userIds = await store.list(vault, '_keyring')\n  for (const userId of userIds) {\n    if (userId === callerKeyring.userId) continue\n\n    const userFound = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n    if (!userFound) continue\n\n    const userKeyringFile = userFound.file\n    // A user's DEKs are wrapped with that user's KEK, and a KEK derives only\n    // from the user's secret — the caller can never derive another user's\n    // KEK, so re-wrapping the new DEKs for them is impossible. Rotation\n    // therefore REMOVES the rotated collections' DEK entries (and permissions)\n    // from each remaining user's keyring: secure (revoked keys are gone) but\n    // the owner must re-run grant() for those users/collections.\n\n    const updatedDeks = { ...userKeyringFile.deks }\n    const updatedPermissions = { ...userKeyringFile.permissions }\n    for (const collName of collections) {\n      // Report only what the member actually held — a user who never had the\n      // collection does not \"need a re-grant\".\n      if (collName in updatedDeks || collName in updatedPermissions) {\n        needsRegrant.push({ userId, collection: collName })\n      }\n      delete updatedDeks[collName]\n      delete updatedPermissions[collName]\n    }\n\n    const updatedKeyring: KeyringFile = {\n      ...userKeyringFile,\n      deks: updatedDeks,\n      permissions: updatedPermissions,\n    }\n\n    await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, userId, updatedKeyring)\n  }\n\n  return { needsRegrant }\n}\n\n// ─── Change Secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Options for {@link changeSecret} (#846b). */\nexport interface ChangeSecretOptions extends SecretPolicy {\n  /** The replacement secret. */\n  readonly newSecret: string\n  /** Escape hatch for fixtures and migrations — skips the strength gate. */\n  readonly allowWeakSecret?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Change the user's secret. Re-wraps every DEK under the new KEK.\n *\n * Validates the new secret against the strength rules unless\n * `allowWeakSecret: true` is passed. Mirrors `rotateSecret`'s\n * default-on validation contract.\n *\n * `db.team.rotateSecret()` adds a `checkGate('rotate-secret')` step\n * on top of this primitive and additionally requires the OLD secret\n * for re-derivation; `changeSecret` reuses the cached unlocked KEK so\n * the OLD secret is not retyped.\n */\nexport async function changeSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  opts: ChangeSecretOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  // An echo keyring rotates via `rotateSecret` only — `changeSecret`\n  // rebuilds the keyring file literal below and would silently DROP the\n  // `echo` block, permanently losing the ceremony. Guard on the file as\n  // persisted (not `keyring`, which carries no echo info) before any\n  // derivation.\n  const existingFound = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, keyring.userId)\n  if (existingFound && existingFound.file.echo !== undefined) throw new EchoCeremonyRequiredError()\n\n  const { newSecret } = opts\n  if (!opts.allowWeakSecret) {\n    assertStrongSecret(newSecret, opts)\n  }\n  const newSalt = generateSalt()\n  const newKek = await deriveKey(newSecret, newSalt)\n\n  // Re-wrap all DEKs with the new KEK\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [collName, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n  }\n\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(newKek)\n  const keyringFile: KeyringFile = {\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    user_id: keyring.userId,\n    display_name: keyring.displayName,\n    role: keyring.role,\n    permissions: keyring.permissions,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(newSalt),\n    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    granted_by: keyring.userId,\n    canary,\n  }\n\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, keyring.userId, keyringFile)\n\n  return {\n    userId: keyring.userId,\n    displayName: keyring.displayName,\n    role: keyring.role,\n    permissions: keyring.permissions,\n    deks: keyring.deks, // Same DEKs, different wrapping\n    kek: newKek,\n    salt: newSalt,\n    // Tier-2 slots are NOT preserved through `changeSecret` —\n    // each slot wraps the OLD KEK, so the new keyring has no\n    // authenticator slots until the user re-enrolls. The higher-level\n    // `db.team.rotateSecret()` preserves slots by rewrapping the\n    // KEK reference, not the KEK itself.\n    authenticators: [],\n    ...(keyring.policy !== undefined && { policy: keyring.policy }),\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Bundle recipients ──────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Echo-mode recipient secret (spec #940). A pod slot may embed the reveal\n * (`'portable'`, default) or omit it (`'none'`) — `'sealed'` is\n * live-device-only and unavailable here: `writePod` has no device context\n * to seal the reveal blob against.\n */\nexport interface EchoRecipientSecret extends EchoSecretParts {\n  readonly reveal?: 'portable' | 'none'\n}\n\n/**\n * Recipient slot in a re-keyed `.noydb` bundle. Each slot becomes its\n * own keyring file inside the bundle, sealed with its own secret.\n * Same role/permission semantics as `db.grant()` but no store side\n * effect — the slot only exists inside the bundle bytes.\n *\n * @public\n */\nexport interface BundleRecipient {\n  /** User id stamped onto the keyring file in the bundle. */\n  readonly id: string\n  /** Optional display name. Defaults to `id`. */\n  readonly displayName?: string\n  /**\n   * Secret the recipient will type to unlock — a plain string for a\n   * standard keyring, or the structured 3-part {@link EchoRecipientSecret}\n   * to embed an echo keyring so the anti-phishing ceremony travels with\n   * the pod (spec #940).\n   */\n  readonly secret: string | EchoRecipientSecret\n  /** Role on the destination vault. Defaults to `'viewer'`. */\n  readonly role?: Role\n  /**\n   * Per-collection permissions. When omitted, role defaults apply.\n   * Restricting permissions here ALSO restricts which DEKs are wrapped\n   * into the slot — a slot with `{ invoices: 'ro' }` cannot decrypt\n   * other collections even though their ciphertext sits in the bundle.\n   */\n  readonly permissions?: Permissions\n  /**\n   * Optional `as-*` export grants on the destination vault.\n   * Mirrors the `exportCapability` field on a live keyring.\n   */\n  readonly exportCapability?: ExportCapability\n  /**\n   * Optional `as-*` import grants on the destination vault.\n   * Mirrors the `importCapability` field on a live keyring.\n   * Default-closed: no plaintext format granted, no bundle import.\n   */\n  readonly importCapability?: ImportCapability\n  /**\n   * Optional bundle-slot expiry. ISO-8601 timestamp; past the\n   * cutoff this slot's keyring refuses to load with\n   * `KeyringExpiredError`. Time-boxed audit access pattern: \"this\n   * slot works for 30 days then becomes opaque to its holder.\"\n   */\n  readonly expiresAt?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a `KeyringFile` for one bundle recipient, given the source\n * vault's unwrapped DEKs. Mirrors `grant()` minus the store write —\n * the produced file is meant to be embedded in the bundle's\n * `keyrings` map, never persisted to the source vault.\n *\n * Privilege-escalation check still runs: every DEK wrapped into the\n * recipient's keyring must come from the source's own DEK set.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function buildRecipientKeyringFile(\n  callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  recipient: BundleRecipient,\n): Promise<KeyringFile> {\n  if (!callerKeyring.kek) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'buildRecipientKeyringFile: caller keyring has no KEK — tier-2 wrap-DEKs ' +\n        'and tier-3 PIN-resume sessions cannot create bundle recipients. ' +\n        'Re-authenticate at tier 1 (secret) before building a bundle.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const role: Role = recipient.role ?? 'viewer'\n  const permissions = resolvePermissions(role, recipient.permissions)\n\n  const newSalt = generateSalt()\n  const newKek = typeof recipient.secret === 'string'\n    ? await deriveKey(recipient.secret, newSalt)\n    : await deriveEchoKey(recipient.secret, newSalt)\n\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n\n  // Collections the recipient was explicitly granted permission to.\n  for (const collName of Object.keys(permissions)) {\n    const dek = callerKeyring.deks.get(collName)\n    if (dek) {\n      wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // owner / admin / custodian / viewer: wrap every known DEK (matches grant).\n  // FR-6: a custodian recipient operates every collection, so it receives all\n  // DEKs just like admin (kept in lockstep with grant()'s all-DEKs branch).\n  if (role === 'owner' || role === 'admin' || role === 'custodian' || role === 'viewer') {\n    for (const [collName, dek] of callerKeyring.deks) {\n      if (!(collName in wrappedDeks)) {\n        wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Always propagate system-prefixed collection DEKs (`_ledger`, etc.) —\n  // the recipient needs them to verify the bundle on import.\n  for (const [collName, dek] of callerKeyring.deks) {\n    if (collName.startsWith('_') && !(collName in wrappedDeks)) {\n      wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Anti-privilege-escalation: every wrapped DEK must come from the\n  // caller's own DEK set. Belt-and-braces with the lookups above.\n  for (const collName of Object.keys(wrappedDeks)) {\n    if (!callerKeyring.deks.has(collName)) {\n      throw new PrivilegeEscalationError(collName)\n    }\n  }\n\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(newKek)\n  return {\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    user_id: recipient.id,\n    display_name: recipient.displayName ?? recipient.id,\n    role,\n    permissions,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(newSalt),\n    created_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    granted_by: callerKeyring.userId,\n    canary,\n    ...(recipient.exportCapability !== undefined\n      ? { export_capability: recipient.exportCapability }\n      : {}),\n    ...(recipient.importCapability !== undefined\n      ? { import_capability: recipient.importCapability }\n      : {}),\n    ...(recipient.expiresAt !== undefined\n      ? { expires_at: recipient.expiresAt }\n      : {}),\n    // The presence of this block is what makes the recipient's slot an\n    // echo keyring — mirrors `createOwnerKeyring`'s same dance so the\n    // ceremony (prompt → echo → key) travels with the pod, not just a\n    // live owner keyring.\n    ...(typeof recipient.secret !== 'string'\n      ? { echo: await buildEchoBlock(recipient.secret, { kind: recipient.secret.reveal ?? 'portable' }) }\n      : {}),\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── List Users ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** List all users with access to a vault. */\nexport async function listUsers(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<UserInfo[]> {\n  const userIds = await store.list(vault, '_keyring')\n  const users: UserInfo[] = []\n\n  for (const userId of userIds) {\n    const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n    if (!found) continue\n    const kf = found.file\n    users.push({\n      userId: kf.user_id,\n      displayName: kf.display_name,\n      role: kf.role,\n      permissions: kf.permissions,\n      createdAt: kf.created_at,\n      grantedBy: kf.granted_by,\n    })\n  }\n\n  return users\n}\n\n/**\n * Optional filter knobs for {@link listUsersWithEnvelopes}.\n *\n * - `includeHidden` — when true, principals with `_meta/visibility/<id>`\n *   set to `{ hidden: true }` are returned alongside everyone else.\n *   Requires `owner` or `admin` callerRole; lower roles get\n *   {@link import('../../kernel/errors.js').PermissionDeniedError}.\n */\nexport interface ListUsersOptions {\n  readonly includeHidden?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Joined enumeration: every keyring + its `_users/<keyringId>`\n * envelope side by side. Convenience for admin UIs that want to\n * render team-member lists with profile data (\"Bob — operator —\n * 'Bob the Auditor' avatar X locale fr-FR\") in a single pass.\n *\n * `userEnvelopeDek` is the vault's `_users` collection DEK\n * (`vault.getDEK('_users')`); used to decrypt every envelope.\n *\n * `callerRole` drives the directory-visibility checks:\n *\n *  - When the vault's `_meta/directory` document has `enabled: false`,\n *    only `owner` and `admin` callers may enumerate; anyone else gets\n *    {@link import('../../kernel/errors.js').DirectoryDisabledError}.\n *  - Principals with `_meta/visibility/<id>` set to `{ hidden: true }`\n *    are filtered out by default. `owner`/`admin` callers can pass\n *    `{ includeHidden: true }` to see them; lower roles passing that\n *    option get `PermissionDeniedError`.\n *\n * Honest caveat: these filters are a UX hint, not a security\n * boundary. The keyring file is still listed at `_keyring/*` and the\n * envelope ciphertext at `_users/*`. A caller with direct store access\n * — or a caller that calls this function with `callerRole: 'owner'`\n * unconditionally — sees every principal. The protection is only as\n * strong as the role the calling layer passes in. The hub-level wrapper\n * on `Vault` sources `callerRole` from the unlocked keyring's `role`\n * field, which is signed-by-construction (it lives in the user's own\n * keyring file). See `https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/user-envelope.md` →\n * \"Directory visibility\".\n *\n * Principals without a persisted envelope (legacy keyrings predating\n * the user-envelope feature) come back with `envelope: null`. The\n * caller chooses how to render — usually \"fall back to keyring's\n * `displayName`\".\n *\n * Order matches `listUsers()` (store-defined; sort if you need a\n * stable display order).\n */\nexport async function listUsersWithEnvelopes<T = unknown>(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userEnvelopeDek: EnclaveKey,\n  callerRole: Role,\n  options: ListUsersOptions = {},\n): Promise<Array<{ user: UserInfo; envelope: UserEnvelope<T> | null }>> {\n  // FR-6: custodian is INTENTIONALLY treated as NON-privileged here (SAFER\n  // default — review flag). Directory-privilege is a team-MANAGEMENT capability\n  // (bypassing the visibility toggle + listing hidden principals); a custodian\n  // is non-owning and cannot grant/revoke, so it should not see the hidden\n  // team membership. It still gets the normal (non-hidden) directory view.\n  const isPrivileged = callerRole === 'owner' || callerRole === 'admin'\n\n  // 1. Vault-level directory toggle.\n  const dirConfig = await readDirectoryConfig(store, vault)\n  if (dirConfig?.enabled === false && !isPrivileged) {\n    throw new DirectoryDisabledError(vault)\n  }\n\n  // 2. `includeHidden` requires admin/owner.\n  if (options.includeHidden && !isPrivileged) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      'Permission denied — listUsersWithEnvelopes({ includeHidden: true }) requires owner or admin role',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const users = await listUsers(store, vault)\n  const out: Array<{ user: UserInfo; envelope: UserEnvelope<T> | null }> = []\n  for (const user of users) {\n    if (!options.includeHidden) {\n      const visibility = await readUserVisibility(store, vault, user.userId)\n      if (visibility?.hidden) continue\n    }\n    const envelope = await loadUserEnvelopeFn<T>(\n      store,\n      vault,\n      user.userId,\n      userEnvelopeDek,\n    )\n    out.push({ user, envelope })\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n\n// ─── DEK Management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Ensure a DEK exists for a collection. Generates one if new. */\n/**\n * Does this collection already hold persisted records?\n *\n * The one question that separates \"I am creating this collection\" from \"I was\n * never given the key to this collection\" (#1004). Kept deliberately narrow:\n * it asks the store, not the schema registry, because the store is the only\n * authority on what ciphertext actually exists.\n */\nasync function collectionHasRecords(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collectionName: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const ids = await store.list(vault, collectionName)\n  return ids.length > 0\n}\n\n/**\n * Re-read this principal's persisted keyring and adopt the DEK for one\n * collection if it has appeared there since this handle unlocked (#1010).\n *\n * Returns the DEK (also caching it into `keyring.deks`) or `null` when the\n * persisted keyring genuinely does not carry it. Only ever called on the\n * miss path, so an up-to-date handle never pays for it.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nasync function reloadPersistedDEK(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  collectionName: string,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey | null> {\n  if (!keyring.kek) return null\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, keyring.userId)\n  const wrapped = found?.file.deks[collectionName]\n  if (wrapped === undefined) return null\n  try {\n    const dek = await unwrapKey(wrapped, keyring.kek)\n    keyring.deks.set(collectionName, dek)\n    return dek\n  } catch {\n    // A DEK that will not unwrap under this KEK is corruption, not access —\n    // fall through to the caller's denial rather than masking it as success.\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function ensureCollectionDEK(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n): Promise<(collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>> {\n  // Dedupe concurrent first-time DEK creates per collection. Without\n  // this, two concurrent `getDEK('foo')` calls both pass the `existing`\n  // check (the Map is empty), both generate fresh DEKs, and the second\n  // `set` overwrites the first — making any envelope encrypted with\n  // the discarded DEK fail to decrypt later (TamperedError on read).\n  // Pre-existing race exposed by the multi-writer ledger work.\n  const inFlight = new Map<string, Promise<EnclaveKey>>()\n  return async (collectionName: string): Promise<EnclaveKey> => {\n    const existing = keyring.deks.get(collectionName)\n    if (existing) return existing\n    const pending = inFlight.get(collectionName)\n    if (pending) return pending\n\n    const promise = (async () => {\n      // #1004 — minting on a DEK miss is only correct when the caller is\n      // ENTITLED to the collection (they are creating it, or they were granted\n      // it and it did not exist at grant time). For an unentitled caller the\n      // miss IS the denial, and minting fabricated a key that decrypts none of\n      // the stored envelopes — so the denial re-emerged from the enclave as an\n      // AES-GCM tag failure, i.e. `TamperedError`, the signal reserved for\n      // genuine ciphertext corruption. In a zero-knowledge design the DEK is\n      // the access control, so an unentitled miss is exactly `NoAccessError`.\n      //\n      // Entitlement is read straight off the keyring — no store round-trip, so\n      // the authorized mint path costs exactly what it did before.\n      //\n      // System collections (`_ledger`, `_meta`, `_history`, the fanout\n      // sidecars …) are exempt: their DEKs are propagated to every role at\n      // grant time and they are minted lazily by machinery running on behalf\n      // of a user who may hold no explicit permission for them. They are never\n      // addressable by user code, so nothing is being protected by denying\n      // here — only internal writes would break.\n      if (!collectionName.startsWith('_')) {\n        if (!hasAccess(keyring, collectionName)) {\n          throw new NoAccessError(\n            `No access — user does not have a key for collection \"${collectionName}\". ` +\n              'Grant them this collection in `permissions` to give them one.',\n          )\n        }\n        // #1010 — the ENTITLED half of the same defect. Being allowed to read a\n        // collection is not the same as holding its key: a grant only ever\n        // wraps the DEKs that exist at grant time, and re-wrapping later is\n        // impossible because it needs the grantee's KEK, derived from a secret\n        // the vault never stores. So a principal granted BEFORE a collection\n        // existed is entitled to it and has no key for it — and minting one\n        // here produced a key that decrypts nothing, resurfacing as\n        // `TamperedError`. This is reachable for every whole-vault role\n        // (`admin`, `viewer`, `custodian`) and for a `'*'` wildcard grantee.\n        //\n        // Costs one `list()`, and only on this path: an entitled principal\n        // whose keyring is missing a DEK. Creating a genuinely new collection\n        // finds no records and mints exactly as before.\n        if (await collectionHasRecords(store, vault, collectionName)) {\n          // Before denying: the in-memory keyring may simply be STALE. A DEK is\n          // minted lazily by whichever handle first touches a collection and\n          // persisted to the keyring file — so a second live handle for the\n          // SAME principal (a second tab, a second `createNoydb` over one\n          // store) that was opened before the collection existed holds a\n          // keyring snapshot without it. That principal is not unauthorized;\n          // their own key is already on disk. Re-read it.\n          //\n          // This is what separates \"my snapshot is behind\" from \"I was granted\n          // before this collection existed\": only the latter finds nothing.\n          const refreshed = await reloadPersistedDEK(store, vault, keyring, collectionName)\n          if (refreshed) return refreshed\n          throw new NoAccessError(\n            `No access — user \"${keyring.userId}\" is entitled to collection \"${collectionName}\" ` +\n              'but holds no key for it, because the collection was created AFTER their grant. ' +\n              'A collection DEK can only be wrapped at grant time (wrapping needs the grantee\\'s ' +\n              'secret, which the vault never stores), so this cannot be back-filled — re-grant ' +\n              'the user to give them the key.',\n          )\n        }\n      }\n      const dek = await generateDEK()\n      keyring.deks.set(collectionName, dek)\n      await persistKeyring(store, vault, keyring)\n      return dek\n    })()\n    inFlight.set(collectionName, promise)\n    try {\n      return await promise\n    } finally {\n      inFlight.delete(collectionName)\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Permission Checks ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * The `Permissions` catch-all key (#1010). `Permissions` has always documented\n * `'*'` as \"the wildcard collection matching all collections in the vault\", but\n * nothing expanded it — a grantee handed the documented catch-all got no keys\n * at all. It is honoured in three places, and they must agree: the DEK wrapping\n * in `grant()`, and both permission checks below.\n */\nexport const PERMISSION_WILDCARD = '*'\n\n/** Does this permission map hand over the whole vault? */\nexport function permissionsAreWildcard(permissions: Permissions | undefined): boolean {\n  return permissions !== undefined && PERMISSION_WILDCARD in permissions\n}\n\n/** Check if a user has write permission for a collection. */\nexport function hasWritePermission(keyring: UnlockedKeyring, collectionName: string): boolean {\n  // FR-6: custodian writes every collection (admin-level operational rw).\n  if (keyring.role === 'owner' || keyring.role === 'admin' || keyring.role === 'custodian') return true\n  if (keyring.role === 'viewer' || keyring.role === 'client') return false\n  if (keyring.permissions[PERMISSION_WILDCARD] === 'rw') return true\n  return keyring.permissions[collectionName] === 'rw'\n}\n\n/** Check if a user has any access to a collection. */\nexport function hasAccess(keyring: UnlockedKeyring, collectionName: string): boolean {\n  // FR-6: custodian reads every collection (admin-level operational access).\n  if (\n    keyring.role === 'owner' ||\n    keyring.role === 'admin' ||\n    keyring.role === 'custodian' ||\n    keyring.role === 'viewer'\n  )\n    return true\n  if (PERMISSION_WILDCARD in keyring.permissions) return true\n  return collectionName in keyring.permissions\n}\n\n// ─── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Persist a keyring file to the store. */\nexport async function persistKeyring(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!keyring.kek) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'persistKeyring: keyring.kek is null — cannot wrap DEKs without the KEK. ' +\n        'This typically means the keyring was opened via tier-3 PIN resume, ' +\n        'session restore, or a wrap-DEKs tier-2 unlock. Re-authenticate at ' +\n        'tier 1 (secret) before persisting.',\n    )\n  }\n  // Carry the `echo` block forward (#940). This function rebuilds the file\n  // from the `UnlockedKeyring`, which deliberately carries no echo info (same\n  // rationale as the `changeSecret` guard), so it has to be read back off the\n  // persisted file — otherwise the first DEK-provisioning write would drop it\n  // and silently degrade an echo keyring into a standard one that no secret\n  // shape can open (the KEK stays echo-derived).\n  const existingFound = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, keyring.userId)\n  const existingEcho = existingFound?.file.echo\n  // Same carry-forward rationale as `echo`, for two fields that describe the\n  // keyring's ORIGIN rather than its current contents. `UnlockedKeyring` does\n  // not carry either, so rebuilding the file from it defaulted `granted_by` to\n  // the holder themselves and stamped a fresh `created_at` — meaning any\n  // DEK-provisioning write silently re-parented the holder to themselves and\n  // collapsed the admin delegation subtree that `granted_by` encodes.\n  const existingGrantedBy = existingFound?.file.granted_by\n  const existingCreatedAt = existingFound?.file.created_at\n\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [collName, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, keyring.kek)\n  }\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(keyring.kek)\n\n  const keyringFile: KeyringFile = {\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    user_id: keyring.userId,\n    display_name: keyring.displayName,\n    role: keyring.role,\n    permissions: keyring.permissions,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(keyring.salt),\n    created_at: existingCreatedAt ?? new Date().toISOString(),\n    granted_by: existingGrantedBy ?? keyring.userId,\n    canary,\n    ...(keyring.exportCapability !== undefined && { export_capability: keyring.exportCapability }),\n    ...(keyring.importCapability !== undefined && { import_capability: keyring.importCapability }),\n    ...(keyring.authenticators.length > 0 && { authenticators: keyring.authenticators }),\n    ...(keyring.policy !== undefined && { policy: keyring.policy }),\n    ...(existingEcho !== undefined && { echo: existingEcho }),\n  }\n\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, keyring.userId, keyringFile)\n}\n\n// ─── Export capability ──────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Role-based default policy for the encrypted-bundle capability.\n *\n * Applied when `keyring.exportCapability` is absent or\n * `exportCapability.bundle` is undefined:\n *\n * - `owner` / `admin` → `true` (happy-path backup without friction)\n * - `operator` / `viewer` / `client` → `false` (explicit grant required)\n *\n * Rationale: a bundle is inert without the KEK, so an owner backing up\n * their own vault doesn't need friction; a non-admin role producing a\n * bundle for an external party does, because the bundle outlives\n * keyring revocation.\n */\nfunction defaultBundleCapability(role: Role): boolean {\n  // FR-6: custodian is INTENTIONALLY not in the default-true set (SAFER\n  // default — review flag). A bundle is an external artifact that outlives\n  // keyring revocation; the owner can still grant a custodian\n  // `exportCapability.bundle = true` explicitly when an offline backup is\n  // part of the custody contract. Defaulting it off keeps a custodian from\n  // silently minting a revocation-surviving copy of the whole vault.\n  return role === 'owner' || role === 'admin'\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether a keyring is authorised for a given `@noy-db/as-*`\n * export tier.\n *\n * - `tier: 'plaintext'` — returns true iff `exportCapability.plaintext`\n *   contains the requested `format` or the `'*'` wildcard. Default for\n *   every role is empty — no grant, no plaintext export.\n * - `tier: 'bundle'` — returns `exportCapability.bundle` if present, or\n *   the role-based default otherwise (owner/admin → true, else false).\n *\n * `@noy-db/as-*` packages MUST call this before invoking the underlying\n * export primitive. Rogue forks that skip the check are caught by code\n * review — the single-entry-point contract is a convention, not a\n * runtime invariant. Vault-level gated wrappers\n * (`vault.exportRecords` / `exportBlobs` / `writeBundle`) will land in a\n * follow-up PR to enforce at the primitive level.\n */\nexport function hasExportCapability(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  tier: 'plaintext',\n  format: ExportFormat,\n): boolean\nexport function hasExportCapability(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  tier: 'bundle',\n): boolean\nexport function hasExportCapability(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  tier: 'plaintext' | 'bundle',\n  format?: ExportFormat,\n): boolean {\n  const cap = keyring.exportCapability\n  if (tier === 'plaintext') {\n    const allowed = cap?.plaintext ?? []\n    return allowed.includes('*') || (format !== undefined && allowed.includes(format))\n  }\n  // tier === 'bundle'\n  return cap?.bundle ?? defaultBundleCapability(keyring.role)\n}\n\n/**\n * Same-shape inspector for an `ExportCapability` value that isn't yet\n * attached to a keyring (e.g. for previewing a grant before applying).\n * Role must be supplied separately so bundle defaults can be computed.\n */\nexport function evaluateExportCapability(\n  capability: ExportCapability | undefined,\n  role: Role,\n  tier: 'plaintext',\n  format: ExportFormat,\n): boolean\nexport function evaluateExportCapability(\n  capability: ExportCapability | undefined,\n  role: Role,\n  tier: 'bundle',\n): boolean\nexport function evaluateExportCapability(\n  capability: ExportCapability | undefined,\n  role: Role,\n  tier: 'plaintext' | 'bundle',\n  format?: ExportFormat,\n): boolean {\n  if (tier === 'plaintext') {\n    const allowed = capability?.plaintext ?? []\n    return allowed.includes('*') || (format !== undefined && allowed.includes(format))\n  }\n  return capability?.bundle ?? defaultBundleCapability(role)\n}\n\n// ─── Import capability (issue ) ────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Check whether a keyring is authorised for a given `@noy-db/as-*`\n * import tier (issue ).\n *\n * - `tier: 'plaintext'` — true iff `importCapability.plaintext`\n *   contains the requested `format` or the `'*'` wildcard.\n * - `tier: 'bundle'` — true iff `importCapability.bundle === true`.\n *\n * **Default-closed for every role on every dimension** — including\n * owner. Import is more dangerous than export (corrupts vs leaks), so\n * the policy refuses to assume intent. Owners must positively grant\n * the capability via `vault.grant({ importCapability: ... })`.\n */\nexport function hasImportCapability(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  tier: 'plaintext',\n  format: ExportFormat,\n): boolean\nexport function hasImportCapability(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  tier: 'bundle',\n): boolean\nexport function hasImportCapability(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  tier: 'plaintext' | 'bundle',\n  format?: ExportFormat,\n): boolean {\n  const cap = keyring.importCapability\n  if (tier === 'plaintext') {\n    const allowed = cap?.plaintext ?? []\n    return allowed.includes('*') || (format !== undefined && allowed.includes(format))\n  }\n  // tier === 'bundle' — closed default for every role\n  return cap?.bundle === true\n}\n\n/**\n * Same-shape inspector for an `ImportCapability` value that isn't yet\n * attached to a keyring (e.g. previewing a grant before applying).\n * `role` is accepted for symmetry with `evaluateExportCapability` even\n * though the import policy ignores it — bundle defaults are\n * role-agnostic and closed.\n */\nexport function evaluateImportCapability(\n  capability: ImportCapability | undefined,\n  role: Role,\n  tier: 'plaintext',\n  format: ExportFormat,\n): boolean\nexport function evaluateImportCapability(\n  capability: ImportCapability | undefined,\n  role: Role,\n  tier: 'bundle',\n): boolean\nexport function evaluateImportCapability(\n  capability: ImportCapability | undefined,\n  _role: Role,\n  tier: 'plaintext' | 'bundle',\n  format?: ExportFormat,\n): boolean {\n  if (tier === 'plaintext') {\n    const allowed = capability?.plaintext ?? []\n    return allowed.includes('*') || (format !== undefined && allowed.includes(format))\n  }\n  return capability?.bundle === true\n}\n\nfunction resolvePermissions(role: Role, explicit?: Permissions): Permissions {\n  // FR-6: custodian is full-access-by-role (hasAccess/hasWritePermission\n  // short-circuit on the role), so — like admin — its permissions map is\n  // empty. Returning {} also prevents a caller-supplied `permissions` from\n  // accidentally NARROWING a custodian below its role guarantee.\n  if (role === 'owner' || role === 'admin' || role === 'custodian' || role === 'viewer') return {}\n  return explicit ?? {}\n}\n\nasync function writeKeyringFile(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n  keyringFile: KeyringFile,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope = {\n    _noydb: 1 as const,\n    _v: 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify(keyringFile),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, '_keyring', userId, 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package/dist/chunk-JXIDGFKS.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/periods/window.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Pure period-window primitives — the reserved collection names and the\n * exclusive-upper-bound computation shared by freeze (#604), archive (#613),\n * target-purge (#615) and the period-scoped sync pull (#807).\n *\n * Deliberately dependency-light (kernel errors only): the sync engine\n * (`with-sync/period-scope.ts`) imports THIS module, not\n * `periods.ts`, so a period-scoped pull never drags the ledger hash-chain\n * machinery (`sha256Hex`/`canonicalJson`) into a bundle that opted out of\n * the periods service.\n */\nimport { ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/** The reserved collection name holding closed-period metadata. */\nexport const PERIODS_COLLECTION = '_periods'\n\n/** Sibling of {@link PERIODS_COLLECTION} holding freeze companions (#604). */\nexport const PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION = '_period_freezes'\n\n/** Sibling of {@link PERIODS_COLLECTION} holding archive companions (#613). */\nexport const PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION = '_period_archives'\n\n/** Sibling of {@link PERIODS_COLLECTION} holding target-purge companions (#615). */\nexport const PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION = '_period_target_purges'\n\n/**\n * Exclusive upper bound for a period's delete-marker purge window (#604).\n * Markers carry no business date (empty body), only write-time `_ts`, so freeze\n * purges markers with `_ts < bound`, `bound` being the instant just after the\n * period's inclusive `endDate`: a date-only `endDate` seals through end-of-day\n * → next midnight; a full-timestamp `endDate` seals through that instant → +1ms.\n */\nexport function periodExclusiveUpperBound(endDate: string): string {\n  const ms = Date.parse(endDate)\n  if (Number.isNaN(ms)) throw new ValidationError(`freezePeriod: unparseable period endDate \"${endDate}\".`)\n  const dateOnly = /^\\d{4}-\\d{2}-\\d{2}$/.test(endDate)\n  return new Date(ms + (dateOnly ? 86_400_000 : 1)).toISOString()\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAcO,IAAM,qBAAqB;AAG3B,IAAM,4BAA4B;AAGlC,IAAM,6BAA6B;AAGnC,IAAM,kCAAkC;AASxC,SAAS,0BAA0B,SAAyB;AACjE,QAAM,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;AAC7B,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,EAAG,OAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,6CAA6C,OAAO,IAAI;AACxG,QAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB,KAAK,OAAO;AACnD,SAAO,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,QAAa,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAChE;","names":[]}