@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.8 → 0.6.0

package/dist/{chunk-VZ3XFUQ7.js → chunk-LUYPYCHY.js}

@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
 import {
   generateULID
-} from "./chunk-ZJADGNYF.js";
+} from "./chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
 import {
+  buildRecordAad,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-3URQC7EH.js";
+} from "./chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
+import {
+  buildRecordEnvelope
+} from "./chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
 import {
   encrypt
-} from "./chunk-VCETL77O.js";
+} from "./chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/consent/consent.ts
 var CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION = "_consent_audit";
@@ -26,7 +30,7 @@ async function loadConsentEntries(adapter, vault, encrypted, getDEK, filter = {}
   for (const id of ids.sort()) {
     const envelope = await adapter.get(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id);
     if (!envelope) continue;
-    const entry = await decryptEntry(envelope, encrypted, getDEK);
+    const entry = await decryptEntry(id, envelope, encrypted, getDEK);
     if (!matchesFilter(entry, filter)) continue;
     entries.push(entry);
   }
@@ -34,28 +38,18 @@ async function loadConsentEntries(adapter, vault, encrypted, getDEK, filter = {}
 }
 async function buildEnvelope(entry, encrypted, getDEK) {
   const json = JSON.stringify(entry);
+  const identity = { collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id: entry.id, version: 1 };
+  const body = { ts: entry.timestamp };
   if (!encrypted) {
-    return {
-      _noydb: 1,
-      _v: 1,
-      _ts: entry.timestamp,
-      _iv: "",
-      _data: json
-    };
+    return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv: "", data: json });
   }
   const dek = await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION);
-  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek);
-  return {
-    _noydb: 1,
-    _v: 1,
-    _ts: entry.timestamp,
-    _iv: iv,
-    _data: data
-  };
+  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity));
+  return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv, data });
 }
-async function decryptEntry(envelope, encrypted, getDEK) {
+async function decryptEntry(id, envelope, encrypted, getDEK) {
   if (!encrypted) return JSON.parse(envelope._data);
-  const json = await openEnvelopeJson(envelope, await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION));
+  const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id }, envelope, await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION));
   return JSON.parse(json);
 }
 function matchesFilter(entry, f) {
@@ -72,4 +66,4 @@ export {
   writeConsentEntry,
   loadConsentEntries
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VZ3XFUQ7.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LUYPYCHY.js.map

package/dist/chunk-LUYPYCHY.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/consent/consent.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Consent boundaries — per-access audit log.\n *\n * ```ts\n * const audit = await vault.withConsent(\n *   { purpose: 'quarterly-review', consentHash: '7f3a...' },\n *   async () => {\n *     const invoices = await vault.collection<Invoice>('invoices').list()\n *     return invoices\n *   },\n * )\n *\n * const log = await vault.consentAudit({ since: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z' })\n * // → entries: { actor, purpose, consentHash, ts, op, collection, id }\n * ```\n *\n * ## Contract\n *\n * Every `get` / `put` / `delete` that happens inside a `withConsent`\n * callback writes one entry to the reserved `_consent_audit`\n * collection. Entries are encrypted with the vault's consent-audit\n * DEK (separate from per-user-collection DEKs so access-log queries\n * don't require unwrapping individual collection keys). Outside a\n * `withConsent` scope, no entries are written — consent is\n * opt-in by design (GDPR Art. 7: *demonstrable*, *specific*\n * consent).\n *\n * ## Why store the hash, not the consent text?\n *\n * The `consentHash` is the sha256 of whatever consent receipt the\n * actor presented (a signed GDPR banner click, a HIPAA authorisation\n * PDF, an API-level `X-Consent-Hash` header). Storing only the hash:\n *\n *   1. Keeps the audit log small and indexable.\n *   2. Preserves zero-knowledge at the adapter — adapters see\n *      ciphertext envelopes of `{ actor, purpose, consentHash, ts,\n *      op, collection, id }`, never the consent record itself.\n *   3. Lets the regulator verify a presented consent doc matches\n *      the logged hash at audit time without the system ever\n *      possessing the doc.\n *\n * ## Concurrency\n *\n * The consent context lives on the {@link Vault} instance. Two\n * concurrent `withConsent` calls on the same Vault would stomp each\n * other — documented limitation; adopters needing per-flight scope\n * should use separate Vault instances or an AsyncLocalStorage shim.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope, NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope, encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { generateULID } from '../../with-pod/ulid.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection for consent-audit entries. */\nexport const CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION = '_consent_audit'\n\n/**\n * The consent scope active for a block of work. Set via\n * `vault.withConsent()`; observed by the collection's access hooks.\n */\nexport interface ConsentContext {\n  /**\n   * What this access is for. Used by the audit query (`consentAudit\n   * ({ purpose })`) and carried in the stored entry. Free-form; the\n   * regulator or compliance tooling decides the vocabulary.\n   */\n  readonly purpose: string\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded sha256 of whatever consent artefact the actor\n   * presented. Stored as-is in each entry.\n   */\n  readonly consentHash: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Access operation recorded in an audit entry.\n *\n * Union-widening checklist (I-2) — these three sites widen together or a\n * downstream exhaustive switch breaks at its next in-range minor:\n *   1. `ConsentOp` here (public, re-exported at `index.ts`).\n *   2. `onAccess` op union on `kernel/collection-config.ts`.\n *   3. classified ctx `onAccess` op union on `port/with/classified-strategy.ts`\n *      (the `ClassifiedVerifyCtx` one — the `ClassifiedRevealCtx` one stays `'reveal'`-only).\n */\nexport type ConsentOp = 'get' | 'put' | 'delete' | 'reveal' | 'verify' | 'find'\n\n/** One consent-audit record, as decrypted for the caller. */\nexport interface ConsentAuditEntry {\n  /** ULID — stable insertion-order key. */\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly timestamp: string\n  readonly actor: string\n  readonly purpose: string\n  readonly consentHash: string\n  readonly op: ConsentOp\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly recordId: string\n}\n\n/** Filter passed to `vault.consentAudit()`. */\nexport interface ConsentAuditFilter {\n  /** Only entries at or after this ISO timestamp. */\n  readonly since?: string\n  /** Only entries at or before this ISO timestamp. */\n  readonly until?: string\n  /** Match entries targeting this collection. */\n  readonly collection?: string\n  /** Match entries written by this actor. */\n  readonly actor?: string\n  /** Match entries with this purpose. */\n  readonly purpose?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Write one audit entry. Called by Vault's onAccess hook when a\n * consent context is active.\n */\nexport async function writeConsentEntry(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  entry: Omit<ConsentAuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestamp'>,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const id = generateULID()\n  const full: ConsentAuditEntry = {\n    id,\n    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n    ...entry,\n  }\n  const envelope = await buildEnvelope(full, encrypted, getDEK)\n  await adapter.put(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id, envelope)\n}\n\n/** Load + decrypt + filter all entries. */\nexport async function loadConsentEntries(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n  filter: ConsentAuditFilter = {},\n): Promise<ConsentAuditEntry[]> {\n  const ids = await adapter.list(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION)\n  const entries: ConsentAuditEntry[] = []\n\n  for (const id of ids.sort()) {\n    const envelope = await adapter.get(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (!envelope) continue\n    const entry = await decryptEntry(id, envelope, encrypted, getDEK)\n    if (!matchesFilter(entry, filter)) continue\n    entries.push(entry)\n  }\n  return entries\n}\n\n// ── internals ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nasync function buildEnvelope(\n  entry: ConsentAuditEntry,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n  const json = JSON.stringify(entry)\n  // `entry.id` IS the record id the caller writes under, so identity needs no\n  // threading here (#1051).\n  const identity = { collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id: entry.id, version: 1 }\n  const body = { ts: entry.timestamp }\n  if (!encrypted) {\n    return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv: '', data: json })\n  }\n  const dek = await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION)\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity))\n  return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv, data })\n}\n\nasync function decryptEntry(\n  id: string,\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<ConsentAuditEntry> {\n  if (!encrypted) return JSON.parse(envelope._data) as ConsentAuditEntry\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id }, envelope, await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION))\n  return JSON.parse(json) as ConsentAuditEntry\n}\n\nfunction matchesFilter(entry: ConsentAuditEntry, f: ConsentAuditFilter): boolean {\n  if (f.since && entry.timestamp < f.since) return false\n  if (f.until && entry.timestamp > f.until) return false\n  if (f.collection && entry.collection !== f.collection) return false\n  if (f.actor && entry.actor !== f.actor) return false\n  if (f.purpose && entry.purpose !== f.purpose) return false\n  return true\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuDO,IAAM,2BAA2B;AA+DxC,eAAsB,kBACpB,SACA,OACA,WACA,OACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,KAAK,aAAa;AACxB,QAAM,OAA0B;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,IACA,YAAW,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAClC,GAAG;AAAA,EACL;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,cAAc,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM;AAC5D,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,IAAI,QAAQ;AACjE;AAGA,eAAsB,mBACpB,SACA,OACA,WACA,QACA,SAA6B,CAAC,GACA;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;AAC9D,QAAM,UAA+B,CAAC;AAEtC,aAAW,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG;AAC3B,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,EAAE;AACtE,QAAI,CAAC,SAAU;AACf,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,UAAU,WAAW,MAAM;AAChE,QAAI,CAAC,cAAc,OAAO,MAAM,EAAG;AACnC,YAAQ,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,EACpB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAIA,eAAe,cACb,OACA,WACA,QAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAGjC,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE;AAClF,QAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU;AACnC,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,WAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACtE,SAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAC5D;AAEA,eAAe,aACb,IACA,UACA,WACA,QAC4B;AAC5B,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAChD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,GAAG,GAAG,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAClI,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AACxB;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,OAA0B,GAAgC;AAC/E,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,MAAO,QAAO;AACjD,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,MAAO,QAAO;AACjD,MAAI,EAAE,cAAc,MAAM,eAAe,EAAE,WAAY,QAAO;AAC9D,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,UAAU,EAAE,MAAO,QAAO;AAC/C,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,QAAS,QAAO;AACrD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-G6S5VVHP.js → chunk-M7WBE3OR.js}

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
   buildStringFieldEntries,
   extractSnippet,
   searchScan
-} from "./chunk-3JVXVJ7L.js";
+} from "./chunk-7OBIBPCV.js";
 import {
   fuseRetrieval
 } from "./chunk-AURFOK3D.js";
@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ import {
   getAtPath,
   isStaticDictDescriptor,
   stripI18nFilled
-} from "./chunk-7G6VDWXB.js";
+} from "./chunk-XPEPMK4Y.js";
 import {
   liveRecordIsElevated
-} from "./chunk-3FSX6LDG.js";
+} from "./chunk-D2YFQ7XG.js";
 import {
   EmbeddingDimMismatchError,
   EmbeddingModelMismatchError
-} from "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
 
 // src/with-lookup/embeddings/cosine.ts
 function cosine(a, b) {
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ function buildVectorLoad(ctx) {
       if (!env) continue;
       let body;
       try {
-        body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString(env);
+        body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString({ collection: "_vec", id: vecId }, env);
       } catch {
         continue;
       }
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ function buildPersistedIndexCallbacks(provideCtx) {
       const ctx = provideCtx();
       const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name);
       if (!env) return null;
-      const body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString(env);
+      const body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString({ collection: FT, id: ctx.name }, env);
       if (body === null) return null;
       try {
         const wrapped = JSON.parse(body);
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ function buildPersistedIndexCallbacks(provideCtx) {
     save: async (json, fp, isStale) => {
       const ctx = provideCtx();
       const body = JSON.stringify({ fp, idx: json });
-      const env = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString(body, fp.count);
+      const env = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString({ collection: FT, id: ctx.name }, body, fp.count);
       if (isStale()) return;
       await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name, env);
     },
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ async function embedOnWrite(ctx, id, record, version) {
   const vec = await ctx.embeddings.encode(text);
   if (vec.length !== ctx.embeddings.dim) throw new EmbeddingDimMismatchError("embeddings", ctx.embeddings.dim, vec.length);
   const body = JSON.stringify({ vec: Array.from(vec), model: ctx.embeddings.model, dim: ctx.embeddings.dim });
-  const vecEnv = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString(body, version);
+  const vecEnv = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString({ collection: "_vec", id: encodeVecId(ctx.name, id) }, body, version);
   await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, "_vec", encodeVecId(ctx.name, id), vecEnv);
   ctx.vectorSet?.markDirty();
 }
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ async function rebuildEmbeddings(ctx) {
       skipped++;
       continue;
     }
-    const decoded = await ctx.codec.decryptRecord(env, { id });
+    const decoded = await ctx.codec.decryptRecord({ collection: ctx.name, id }, env);
     if (decoded === null) {
       skipped++;
       continue;
@@ -394,4 +394,4 @@ export {
   rebuildEmbeddings,
   syncTierSearch
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-G6S5VVHP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-M7WBE3OR.js.map

package/dist/chunk-M7WBE3OR.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-lookup/embeddings/cosine.ts","../src/with-lookup/embeddings/descriptor.ts","../src/with-lookup/embeddings/vector-set.ts","../src/with-lookup/embeddings/vec-id.ts","../src/with-lookup/search/collection-facade.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Cosine similarity in [-1,1]; 0 on zero-norm or length mismatch (no NaN). (L2) */\nexport function cosine(a: Float32Array | number[], b: Float32Array | number[]): number {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return 0\n  let dot = 0, na = 0, nb = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {\n    const x = a[i]!, y = b[i]!\n    dot += x * y; na += x * x; nb += y * y\n  }\n  if (na === 0 || nb === 0) return 0\n  return dot / (Math.sqrt(na) * Math.sqrt(nb))\n}\n","/** Per-collection embedding config (L2). The encode hook is host/remote — no bundled model. */\nimport { getAtPath } from '../../via/i18n/core.js'\n\nexport interface EmbeddingDescriptor {\n  readonly source: string | readonly string[]\n  readonly encode: (text: string) => Promise<Float32Array>\n  readonly dim: number\n  readonly model: string\n}\n\n/** Concatenate the record's source-field text (skips empties; supports nested/[]-wildcard paths). */\nexport function embeddingSourceText(record: Record<string, unknown>, source: string | readonly string[]): string {\n  const fields = typeof source === 'string' ? [source] : source\n  const parts: string[] = []\n  for (const f of fields) {\n    for (const leaf of getAtPath(record, f)) {\n      if (typeof leaf === 'string' && leaf !== '') parts.push(leaf)\n    }\n  }\n  return parts.join(' ')\n}\n","/** In-memory vector set for L2 semantic retrieval. Loaded once per session from\n *  decrypted _vec sidecars (injected loader), brute-force cosine kNN, model-guarded. */\nimport { cosine } from './cosine.js'\nimport { EmbeddingModelMismatchError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport interface StoredVector { readonly id: string; readonly vec: Float32Array; readonly model: string }\nexport interface VectorHit { readonly id: string; readonly score: number }\n\nexport class VectorSet {\n  private vectors: StoredVector[] | undefined\n  get loaded(): boolean { return this.vectors !== undefined }\n\n  async ensureLoaded(load: () => Promise<StoredVector[]>): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.vectors === undefined) this.vectors = await load()\n  }\n\n  markDirty(): void { this.vectors = undefined }\n\n  cosineTopK(query: Float32Array, k: number, opts: { minScore?: number; expectModel?: string } = {}): VectorHit[] {\n    const all = this.vectors ?? []\n    const minScore = opts.minScore ?? -Infinity\n    const hits: VectorHit[] = []\n    for (const v of all) {\n      if (opts.expectModel !== undefined && v.model !== opts.expectModel) {\n        throw new EmbeddingModelMismatchError(opts.expectModel, v.model)\n      }\n      const score = cosine(query, v.vec)\n      if (score >= minScore) hits.push({ id: v.id, score })\n    }\n    hits.sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score)\n    return hits.slice(0, k)\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Collection-namespaced `_vec` side-car ids (#726).\n *\n * `_vec` embedding side-cars used to be keyed by the bare record id,\n * vault-wide — two collections sharing a record id shared one `_vec` row.\n * This was verified to be a clobber/crash bug, NOT a confidentiality leak:\n * every collection has its own DEK, and AES-GCM auth-tag verification means\n * decrypting a foreign collection's `_vec` row under the wrong DEK throws\n * `TamperedError` rather than returning wrong plaintext — no disclosure\n * mechanism exists. The real bug was id collision: a same-id write/forget in\n * one collection could clobber or delete the other collection's row, and a\n * collection whose `similarTo()` / cold semantic `retrieve()` encountered a\n * foreign same-id row crashed with an uncaught `TamperedError` (a DoS). The\n * store-collection bucket stays the literal `'_vec'`; the id becomes\n * composite: `${collection}/${recordId}`. Mirrors `encodeIdxId`\n * (`../indexing/persisted-indexes.js`).\n *\n * Decode is deliberately NOT split-on-`/`: the collection is always known\n * at the decode site (`ctx.name`), so `decodeVecId` strips that known\n * prefix — correct even when `recordId` itself contains `/`.\n *\n * Precondition: `collection` itself must not contain `/` — otherwise\n * `${collection}/${recordId}` is ambiguous (e.g. collection `'a'` would\n * misattribute collection `'a/b'`'s rows via prefix match in `isVecIdFor`).\n * Collection names are NOT currently restricted to a `/`-free charset by\n * `vault.collection()`, so `encodeVecId` enforces the precondition itself,\n * failing loud at the write boundary rather than silently misencoding.\n */\n\n/**\n * Encode the `_vec` side-car id for a (collection, recordId) pair.\n * Format: `<collection>/<recordId>` — no escaping; `recordId` may contain `/`.\n *\n * Throws if `collection` contains `/`: that would make the composite id\n * ambiguous against `isVecIdFor`'s prefix match (collection `'a'` would\n * appear to own collection `'a/b'`'s rows), reintroducing the clobber/crash\n * risk the namespacing fix exists to close.\n */\nexport function encodeVecId(collection: string, recordId: string): string {\n  if (collection.includes('/')) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `encodeVecId: collection name \"${collection}\" must not contain \"/\" — ` +\n        `it would make the \"${collection}/${recordId}\" _vec id ambiguous against another collection's rows.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return `${collection}/${recordId}`\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a `_vec` id back to the bare record id, given the KNOWN owning\n * collection — strips the `<collection>/` prefix rather than splitting on\n * `/`, so a `recordId` containing `/` round-trips correctly. Returns `null`\n * if `vecId` does not belong to `collection`.\n */\nexport function decodeVecId(collection: string, vecId: string): string | null {\n  const prefix = `${collection}/`\n  if (!vecId.startsWith(prefix)) return null\n  return vecId.slice(prefix.length)\n}\n\n/** Predicate form of {@link decodeVecId} — used to filter `list()` results. */\nexport function isVecIdFor(collection: string, vecId: string): boolean {\n  return vecId.startsWith(`${collection}/`)\n}\n","/**\n * Collection-level search / retrieval (`search` / `retrieve` / `similarTo` +\n * the lexical-index build/flush/warm machinery).\n *\n * This is the retrieval surface: a pure client-side lexical scan\n * (`search`), the persisted-or-in-memory inverted-index lifecycle\n * (`flushIndex` / `warmIndex` / `buildRetrievalDocs` + the dict-label / blob-\n * filename resolvers that feed it), and the lexical / semantic / hybrid\n * `retrieve` fan-out plus raw-vector kNN (`similarTo`). None of it touches the\n * write path — it reads the live eager cache and the encrypted `_vec` / `_ftindex`\n * side-cars.\n *\n * Every function takes a small {@link SearchContext} instead of `this`,\n * mirroring the `record-keys/` siblings.\n *\n * The `cache` is the SAME `Map` reference `Collection` owns (passed by\n * reference, never copied) so the index always builds over the live working\n * set. {@link buildPersistedIndexCallbacks} is special: it is invoked from the\n * `Collection` constructor *before* `this.codec` exists, so it takes a context\n * THUNK and resolves the context lazily at each callback invocation.\n *\n * Internal service — not exported as a `@noy-db/hub/*` subpath.\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { RecordCodec } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { stripI18nFilled, type I18nTextDescriptor } from '../../via/i18n/core.js'\nimport { isStaticDictDescriptor, type DictKeyDescriptor, type StaticDictDescriptor, type DictionaryHandle } from '../../via/i18n/dictionary.js'\nimport type { BlobSet } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-set.js'\nimport type { BlobFieldsConfig } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-compaction.js'\nimport type { Query } from '../../kernel/query/index.js'\nimport { embeddingSourceText, type VectorSet, type EmbeddingDescriptor, type StoredVector } from '../embeddings/index.js'\nimport { encodeVecId, decodeVecId, isVecIdFor } from '../embeddings/vec-id.js'\nimport { EmbeddingDimMismatchError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { liveRecordIsElevated } from '../../kernel/tier-visibility.js'\nimport { searchScan, fuseRetrieval, type SearchOptions, type SearchResult } from './index.js'\nimport type { IndexStore } from './index-store.js'\nimport type { PersistedIndexCallbacks } from './persisted-index-store.js'\nimport { extractSnippet } from './snippet.js'\nimport { buildStringFieldEntries, buildI18nFieldEntries, buildDictKeyFieldEntries, buildBlobFieldEntries } from './build-docs.js'\nimport type { IndexDoc, IndexHit } from './inverted-index.js'\nimport type { RetrieveOptions, RetrieveHit } from './retrieve-types.js'\n\n/** Everything the moving search/retrieval methods touched on `this.*`. */\nexport interface SearchContext<T> {\n  /** Collection name — error context + `_ftindex` row key. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /** Vault namespace the side-cars (`_vec`, `_ftindex`) live under. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The ciphertext store. */\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** The record codec — decrypts the `_vec` / `_ftindex` side-car bodies. */\n  readonly codec: RecordCodec<T>\n  /** The eager working-set cache (SHARED `Map` reference, never copied). */\n  readonly cache: Map<string, { record: T; version: number }>\n  /** True in lazy mode — search/retrieve/warm require eager mode. */\n  readonly lazy: boolean\n  /** Declared text-index fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly textIndexes: readonly string[] | undefined\n  /** Declared i18n fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly i18nFields: Record<string, I18nTextDescriptor> | undefined\n  /** Declared dictionary-key fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly dictKeyFields: Record<string, DictKeyDescriptor | StaticDictDescriptor> | undefined\n  /** Declared blob fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly blobFields: BlobFieldsConfig | undefined\n  /** Dictionary handle resolver (dynamic dict-key labels), or undefined. */\n  readonly getDictionary: ((name: string) => Promise<DictionaryHandle>) | undefined\n  /** The lexical inverted-index store (in-memory or persisted), or undefined. */\n  readonly searchIndexStore: IndexStore | undefined\n  /** The vector set for semantic retrieval, or undefined. */\n  readonly vectorSet: VectorSet | undefined\n  /** The embeddings descriptor, or undefined. */\n  readonly embeddings: EmbeddingDescriptor | undefined\n  /** Hydrate the eager cache before reading it. */\n  ensureHydrated(): Promise<void>\n  /** Open the blob facade for a record (used to list indexed blob filenames). */\n  blob(id: string): BlobSet\n}\n\n/**\n * Client-side lexical scan over the live eager cache. Eager mode only;\n * nothing searchable is written to the store.\n */\nexport async function search<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, field: string, query: string, opts: SearchOptions = {}): Promise<SearchResult<T>[]> {\n  if (ctx.lazy) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": search() (scan mode) requires eager mode (prefetch: true). ` +\n        `A store-usable blind index for lazy / at-scale search is a separate gated opt-in (#308).`,\n    )\n  }\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const entries: { id: string; record: T }[] = []\n  // Strip the internal densify marker from the user-facing records.\n  // Non-mutating: never touches the cached record object. The search index\n  // is built over the same (marker-free) record, which is fine — the marker\n  // is never a searchable field.\n  for (const [id, e] of ctx.cache) entries.push({ id, record: stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>) as T })\n  return searchScan(entries, field, query, opts)\n}\n\n/** L1 — build IndexDoc[] for the configured text fields over the live cache. */\nexport function buildRetrievalDocs<T>(\n  ctx: SearchContext<T>,\n  labelMaps: Map<string, Map<string, Record<string, string>>>,\n  blobFilenames: Map<string, Map<string, string[]>>,\n  only?: readonly string[],\n): IndexDoc[] {\n  const docs: IndexDoc[] = []\n  for (const [id, e] of ctx.cache) {\n    const rec = stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>)\n    const fields = buildStringFieldEntries(rec, ctx.textIndexes ?? [], only)\n    if (ctx.i18nFields) fields.push(...buildI18nFieldEntries(rec, ctx.i18nFields, ctx.textIndexes ?? [], only))\n    if (ctx.dictKeyFields) fields.push(...buildDictKeyFieldEntries(rec, ctx.dictKeyFields, labelMaps, ctx.textIndexes ?? [], only))\n    const blobNames = blobFilenames.get(id)\n    if (blobNames) fields.push(...buildBlobFieldEntries(blobNames))\n    if (fields.length > 0) docs.push({ id, fields })\n  }\n  return docs\n}\n\n/** L1 — true iff any configured text index is also a blob field (gates ALL slot I/O). */\nexport function hasIndexedBlobFields<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, only?: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  if (!ctx.blobFields || !ctx.textIndexes) return false\n  const fields = only ? ctx.textIndexes.filter((f) => only.includes(f)) : ctx.textIndexes\n  return fields.some((f) => f in ctx.blobFields!)\n}\n\n/**\n * L1 — resolve `recordId -> (blobField -> filenames[])` by listing slots\n * for the configured blob fields of each cached record. Blob slot metadata is\n * NOT inline on the record: it lives in a separate `_blob_slots_*` collection,\n * so this costs ONE `blob(id).list()` (a `listSlots`) per record at build time\n * — the heaviest indexing source. Fully gated by {@link hasIndexedBlobFields};\n * non-blob (and blob-but-not-indexed) collections do ZERO slot I/O.\n */\nasync function resolveBlobFilenames<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, only?: readonly string[]): Promise<Map<string, Map<string, string[]>>> {\n  const out = new Map<string, Map<string, string[]>>()\n  if (!hasIndexedBlobFields(ctx, only)) return out\n  const indexed = (only ? ctx.textIndexes!.filter((f) => only.includes(f)) : ctx.textIndexes!)\n    .filter((f) => f in ctx.blobFields!)\n  const indexedSet = new Set(indexed)\n  for (const id of ctx.cache.keys()) {\n    let slots\n    try {\n      slots = await ctx.blob(id).list()\n    } catch {\n      continue\n    }\n    let byField: Map<string, string[]> | undefined\n    for (const slot of slots) {\n      if (!indexedSet.has(slot.name) || !slot.filename) continue\n      if (!byField) { byField = new Map(); out.set(id, byField) }\n      const names = byField.get(slot.name)\n      if (names) names.push(slot.filename)\n      else byField.set(slot.name, [slot.filename])\n    }\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** L1 — field -> (key -> {locale->label}) for dictKey fields; static from table, dynamic via getDictionary().list(). */\nasync function resolveDictLabelMaps<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<Map<string, Map<string, Record<string, string>>>> {\n  const maps = new Map<string, Map<string, Record<string, string>>>()\n  if (!ctx.dictKeyFields || !ctx.textIndexes) return maps\n  for (const field of ctx.textIndexes) {\n    const desc = ctx.dictKeyFields[field]\n    if (!desc) continue\n    const m = new Map<string, Record<string, string>>()\n    if (isStaticDictDescriptor(desc)) {\n      for (const [key, labels] of Object.entries(desc.table)) m.set(key, labels as Record<string, string>)\n    } else {\n      if (ctx.getDictionary) {\n        const handle = await ctx.getDictionary(desc.name)\n        for (const e of await handle.list()) m.set(e.key, e.labels)\n      }\n    }\n    maps.set(field, m)\n  }\n  return maps\n}\n\n/** L1.5 — force-persist the lexical index now (e.g. on save/idle). Persists only when textIndexPersist is enabled; a no-op otherwise. */\nexport async function flushIndex<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore) return\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const labelMaps = await resolveDictLabelMaps(ctx)\n  const blobFilenames = await resolveBlobFilenames(ctx)\n  await ctx.searchIndexStore.ensureBuilt(() => buildRetrievalDocs(ctx, labelMaps, blobFilenames))\n  await ctx.searchIndexStore.flush?.()\n}\n\n/** L2 — load + decrypt all _vec sidecars into StoredVector[] for the VectorSet. */\nfunction buildVectorLoad<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): () => Promise<StoredVector[]> {\n  return async () => {\n    const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, '_vec')\n    const out: StoredVector[] = []\n    for (const vecId of ids) {\n      // #726: _vec is a vault-wide bucket namespaced by collection prefix —\n      // skip rows belonging to other collections before touching this one's.\n      if (!isVecIdFor(ctx.name, vecId)) continue\n      const id = decodeVecId(ctx.name, vecId)!\n      // #721 defense-in-depth: a _vec row carries no _tier of its own; the purge\n      // on elevate is best-effort and cannot reach a legacy sidecar, so gate on\n      // the owning record's live tier. Envelope peek, no decryption.\n      if (await liveRecordIsElevated(ctx.adapter, ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)) continue\n      const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, '_vec', vecId)\n      if (!env) continue\n      // #726 fails-safe: a row can pass isVecIdFor's prefix filter yet still\n      // be undecryptable under THIS collection's DEK — a surviving legacy\n      // bare-id row whose record id happens to start with `<thisCollection>/`,\n      // or plain corruption. _vec sidecars are derived, re-derivable\n      // artifacts (embedOnWrite regenerates them on the record's next put()),\n      // so best-effort skip is correct: never let one poison row crash\n      // similarTo()/retrieve() for the whole collection.\n      let body: string | null\n      try {\n        body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString({ collection: '_vec', id: vecId }, env)\n      } catch {\n        continue\n      }\n      if (body === null) continue\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as { vec: number[]; model: string }\n      out.push({ id, vec: new Float32Array(parsed.vec), model: parsed.model })\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * L1.5 — build the PersistedIndexCallbacks bridge: crypto lives here\n * (collection has getDEK / encryptJsonString / decryptJsonString / adapter),\n * the index store itself is crypto-free.\n *\n * Fingerprint encoding: body-wrap approach — save(json, fp) stores\n * JSON.stringify({ fp, idx: json }) as the encrypted body so the standard\n * EncryptedEnvelope shape is never extended. load() decrypts and JSON.parses\n * the wrapper back out.\n *\n * Cache shape: ctx.cache stores { record, version } — currentFingerprint()\n * iterates over e.version.\n *\n * NOTE: this factory is invoked from the `Collection` constructor *before*\n * `this.codec` is assigned, so it takes a context THUNK and resolves the\n * context lazily inside each callback — by the time a callback actually runs,\n * the codec and cache are fully wired.\n */\nexport function buildPersistedIndexCallbacks<T>(provideCtx: () => SearchContext<T>): PersistedIndexCallbacks {\n  const FT = '_ftindex'\n  return {\n    load: async () => {\n      const ctx = provideCtx()\n      const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name)\n      if (!env) return null\n      const body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString({ collection: FT, id: ctx.name }, env)\n      if (body === null) return null\n      try {\n        const wrapped = JSON.parse(body) as { fp: { count: number; maxVersion: number }; idx: string }\n        return { json: wrapped.idx, fingerprint: wrapped.fp }\n      } catch {\n        return null\n      }\n    },\n    save: async (json, fp, isStale) => {\n      const ctx = provideCtx()\n      const body = JSON.stringify({ fp, idx: json })\n      const env = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString({ collection: FT, id: ctx.name }, body, fp.count)\n      // #725 review: a purge (removePersisted) can land while the encrypt above was\n      // in flight — check right before the write and skip it rather than resurrect a\n      // purged/forgotten record's blob. PersistedIndexStore's own post-save epoch\n      // check is the backstop for every other ordering (incl. a purge landing during\n      // this very put).\n      if (isStale()) return\n      await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name, env)\n    },\n    remove: async () => { const ctx = provideCtx(); await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name) },\n    currentFingerprint: () => {\n      const ctx = provideCtx()\n      let maxVersion = 0\n      for (const e of ctx.cache.values()) if (e.version > maxVersion) maxVersion = e.version\n      return { count: ctx.cache.size, maxVersion }\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/** L1 — pre-build the lexical index (e.g. on open) so the first retrieve() pays no build scan. */\nexport async function warmIndex<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore) return\n  if (ctx.lazy) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": warmIndex() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`,\n    )\n  }\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const built = ctx.searchIndexStore.built\n  const labelMaps = built ? new Map() : await resolveDictLabelMaps(ctx)\n  const blobFilenames = built ? new Map() : await resolveBlobFilenames(ctx)\n  await ctx.searchIndexStore.ensureBuilt(() => buildRetrievalDocs(ctx, labelMaps, blobFilenames))\n}\n\n/** Retrieval. mode: 'lexical' (default) | 'semantic' (L2) | 'hybrid' (L3). */\nexport async function retrieve<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T> = {}): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  const hits =\n    opts.mode === 'semantic' ? await retrieveSemantic(ctx, query, opts)\n    : opts.mode === 'hybrid' ? await retrieveHybrid(ctx, query, opts)\n    : await retrieveLexical(ctx, query, opts)\n  return opts.within ? applyWithin(hits, opts.within) : hits\n}\n\n/** L3 — keep only hits whose id matches the structured query, re-rank 1-based. */\nfunction applyWithin<T>(hits: RetrieveHit<T>[], within: Query<T>): RetrieveHit<T>[] {\n  const ids = new Set(within._idArray())\n  return hits.filter(h => ids.has(h.id)).map((h, i) => ({ ...h, rank: i + 1 }))\n}\n\n/** L1 — client-side lexical retrieval; ranked { id, score, field, snippet, locale? }. */\nasync function retrieveLexical<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T>): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore) {\n    throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve() requires a textIndexes config.`)\n  }\n  if (ctx.lazy) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`,\n    )\n  }\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const built = ctx.searchIndexStore.built\n  const labelMaps = built ? new Map() : await resolveDictLabelMaps(ctx)\n  const blobFilenames = built ? new Map() : await resolveBlobFilenames(ctx)\n  const index = await ctx.searchIndexStore.ensureBuilt(() => buildRetrievalDocs(ctx, labelMaps, blobFilenames))\n  const hits = index.query(query, {\n    ...(opts.limit !== undefined ? { limit: opts.limit } : {}),\n    ...(opts.match ? { match: opts.match } : {}),\n    ...(opts.prefix ? { prefix: opts.prefix } : {}),\n    ...(opts.fields ? { fields: opts.fields } : {}),\n  })\n  const window = opts.snippetWindow ?? 80\n  return hits.map((h: IndexHit, i: number) => {\n    const base: RetrieveHit<T> = {\n      id: h.id,\n      score: h.score,\n      rank: i + 1,\n      field: h.field,\n      snippet: extractSnippet(h.text, h.offset, window),\n      ...(h.locale !== undefined ? { locale: h.locale } : {}),\n      ...(opts.includeRecord\n        ? (() => {\n            const e = ctx.cache.get(h.id)\n            return e ? { record: stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>) as T } : {}\n          })()\n        : {}),\n    }\n    return base\n  })\n}\n\n/** L3 — hybrid: fuse lexical (L1) + semantic (L2) by RRF. Requires embeddings. */\nasync function retrieveHybrid<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T>): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) {\n    throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve({mode:'hybrid'}) requires an embeddings config.`)\n  }\n  const [lex, sem] = await Promise.all([\n    retrieveLexical(ctx, query, opts),\n    retrieveSemantic(ctx, query, opts),\n  ])\n  return fuseRetrieval([lex, sem], opts.limit !== undefined ? { limit: opts.limit } : {})\n}\n\n/** L2 — semantic branch of retrieve(): encode query → similarTo(). */\nasync function retrieveSemantic<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T>): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve({mode:'semantic'}) requires an embeddings config.`)\n  if (ctx.lazy) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`)\n  const qVec = await ctx.embeddings.encode(query)\n  return similarTo(ctx, qVec, {\n    ...(opts.limit !== undefined ? { k: opts.limit } : {}),\n    ...(opts.minScore !== undefined ? { minScore: opts.minScore } : {}),\n    ...(opts.includeRecord ? { includeRecord: true } : {}),\n  })\n}\n\n/** L2 — raw-vector kNN over the encrypted vector set (decrypted in the trusted tier).\n *  Snippet is '' for vector hits in v1 (semantic match isn't span-located). */\nexport async function similarTo<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, vector: Float32Array, opts: { k?: number; minScore?: number; includeRecord?: boolean } = {}): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings || !ctx.vectorSet) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": similarTo() requires an embeddings config.`)\n  if (ctx.lazy) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": similarTo() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`)\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  await ctx.vectorSet.ensureLoaded(buildVectorLoad(ctx))\n  const hits = ctx.vectorSet.cosineTopK(vector, opts.k ?? 10, {\n    ...(opts.minScore !== undefined ? { minScore: opts.minScore } : {}),\n    expectModel: ctx.embeddings.model,\n  })\n  return hits.map((h, i) => {\n    const base: RetrieveHit<T> = { id: h.id, score: h.score, rank: i + 1, field: '(vector)', snippet: '' }\n    if (opts.includeRecord) { const e = ctx.cache.get(h.id); if (e) (base as { record?: T }).record = stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>) as T }\n    return base\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * L2 — the embedding write-hook: derive a record's embedding vector at\n * write and persist it as the encrypted `_vec` side-car. Routed through the\n * search strategy so it runs only when `withSearch()` is opted in — computing\n * vectors that no gated `similarTo` / semantic `retrieve` could query would be\n * dead weight, so the compute is paired with the search capability. The caller\n * (`Collection.put`) only invokes this when `embeddings` is declared.\n */\nexport async function embedOnWrite<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, id: string, record: T, version: number): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) return\n  const text = embeddingSourceText(record as Record<string, unknown>, ctx.embeddings.source)\n  const vec = await ctx.embeddings.encode(text)\n  if (vec.length !== ctx.embeddings.dim) throw new EmbeddingDimMismatchError('embeddings', ctx.embeddings.dim, vec.length)\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ vec: Array.from(vec), model: ctx.embeddings.model, dim: ctx.embeddings.dim })\n  const vecEnv = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString({ collection: '_vec', id: encodeVecId(ctx.name, id) }, body, version)\n  await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, '_vec', encodeVecId(ctx.name, id), vecEnv)\n  ctx.vectorSet?.markDirty()\n}\n\n/**\n * Force-re-derive every eligible tier-0 record's `_vec` sidecar once (#788).\n * Opt-in bulk repair for the #726 re-namespace: legacy bare-id rows are\n * unreachable to `buildVectorLoad` (it only recognises `<collection>/<id>`\n * keys) and otherwise self-heal only when a record is next `put()` — this\n * lets an adopter recover recall immediately instead of waiting on writes.\n *\n * **Skips elevated records** (`liveRecordIsElevated`) rather than refusing\n * the whole walk — the OPPOSITE of `_applyCutoverTransform`'s\n * `assertCutoverTierSafe` refuse-whole-batch precedent. An elevated record is\n * SUPPOSED to have no `_vec` (`syncTierSearch` purges it on elevate);\n * re-embedding one here would write searchable plaintext-derived data above\n * tier 0. Load-bearing: never write a `_vec` row for an elevated record.\n *\n * Tombstones, delete markers, and a raw `get` racing a delete between `list`\n * and `get` all decrypt to `null` (`decryptRecord` already folds\n * tombstone/delete-marker into that null) and are skipped the same way.\n * Unconditional re-derive, no already-migrated check — safe to re-run after\n * a partial failure (each id is independently idempotent).\n */\nexport async function rebuildEmbeddings<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<{ rebuilt: number; skipped: number }> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) return { rebuilt: 0, skipped: 0 }\n  const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, ctx.name)\n  let rebuilt = 0\n  let skipped = 0\n  for (const id of ids) {\n    if (await liveRecordIsElevated(ctx.adapter, ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)) { skipped++; continue }\n    const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)\n    if (!env) { skipped++; continue }\n    const decoded = await ctx.codec.decryptRecord({ collection: ctx.name, id }, env)\n    if (decoded === null) { skipped++; continue }\n    await embedOnWrite(ctx, id, decoded, env._v ?? 1)\n    rebuilt++\n  }\n  return { rebuilt, skipped }\n}\n\n/**\n * Sync the collection's SEARCH artifacts after a tier move (#721). Both the\n * lexical `_ftindex` blob and the `_vec/<id>` embedding are encrypted under\n * the tier-0 DEK and hold the record's derived plaintext (full field text /\n * a text-invertible vector), so leaving them means elevation never hid what\n * the record was searchable by — the `forget()` precedent, unapplied to\n * elevate. `null` → the record left tier 0: purge its `_vec` sidecar (mirrors\n * `Collection._purgeVector`), and invalidate the `_ftindex` blob (mirrors\n * `Collection._purgeSearchIndex`: deletes the persisted blob when persisted,\n * else drops the in-memory index) so the next `retrieve()` rebuilds from the\n * elevated-free `ctx.cache`. A record → it is tier-0 again: re-embed it via\n * {@link embedOnWrite}, then invalidate `_ftindex` so the rebuild includes it\n * again. No-op fast when the collection has neither a lexical index nor a\n * vector set.\n */\nexport async function syncTierSearch<T>(\n  ctx: SearchContext<T>,\n  id: string,\n  record: T | null,\n  version?: number,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore && !ctx.vectorSet) return\n  if (record === null) {\n    await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, '_vec', encodeVecId(ctx.name, id))\n    ctx.vectorSet?.markDirty()\n  } else {\n    await embedOnWrite(ctx, id, record, version ?? 1)\n  }\n  const store = ctx.searchIndexStore\n  if (store && 'removePersisted' in store) await (store as { removePersisted(): Promise<void> }).removePersisted()\n  else 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package/dist/{chunk-VJFMXYKP.js → chunk-MPKP6L5E.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   AttestationNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/attestation/strategy.ts
 var NO_ATTESTATION = {
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ var NO_ATTESTATION = {
 export {
   NO_ATTESTATION
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VJFMXYKP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MPKP6L5E.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IGJCYUT5.js → chunk-NSITFOCJ.js}

@@ -96,4 +96,4 @@ export {
   evaluateClause,
   hasFnClause
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IGJCYUT5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NSITFOCJ.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NSITFOCJ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/query/predicate.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Operator implementations for the query DSL.\n *\n * All predicates run client-side, AFTER decryption — they never see ciphertext.\n * Field clauses over a Via-covered field (e.g. money) carry their own\n * evaluator closure (see {@link FieldClause.via}), so this module has no\n * dependency on any Via feature's implementation — still tree-shakeable.\n */\n\n/** Comparison operators supported by the where() builder. */\nexport type Operator =\n  | '=='\n  | '!='\n  | '<'\n  | '<='\n  | '>'\n  | '>='\n  | 'in'\n  | 'contains'\n  | 'startsWith'\n  | 'between'\n\n/**\n * A single field comparison clause inside a query plan.\n * Plans are JSON-serializable, so this type uses primitives only.\n */\nexport interface FieldClause {\n  readonly type: 'field'\n  readonly field: string\n  readonly op: Operator\n  readonly value: unknown\n  /**\n   * Present when `field` is covered by a Via feature binding (e.g. a\n   * declared money field): the opaque payload built by the binding's\n   * `buildClause` at query BUILD time, plus a closure that evaluates it\n   * per record via the binding's `evaluateClause`. Attached by\n   * `Query.where()` / `ScanBuilder.where()` when `source.via` covers the\n   * field. The closure keeps this module free of any dependency on a\n   * Via feature's implementation — clauses are in-memory only, never\n   * serialized, so carrying a function here is safe.\n   */\n  readonly via?: {\n    readonly brand: string\n    readonly payload: unknown\n    readonly evaluate: (actual: unknown, op: string) => boolean\n    /**\n     * The binding's `indexProbe` result for this clause's op/payload\n     * (#625) — the STORED-form operand `candidateRecords()` (`kernel/\n     * query/builder.ts`) can hand to `CollectionIndexes.lookupEqual`/\n     * `lookupIn` for a fast path. `undefined` (no `indexProbe` hook, or\n     * the binding declined to probe this op) means the field must fall\n     * back to a linear scan via `evaluate` above.\n     */\n    readonly indexValue?: unknown\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * A user-supplied predicate function escape hatch. Not serializable.\n *\n * The predicate accepts `unknown` at the type level so the surrounding\n * Clause type can stay non-parametric — this keeps Collection<T> covariant\n * in T at the public API surface. Builder methods cast user predicates\n * (typed `(record: T) => boolean`) into this shape on the way in.\n */\nexport interface FilterClause {\n  readonly type: 'filter'\n  readonly fn: (record: unknown) => boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * A declared deterministic predicate reference. The query\n * builder produces this via `.wherePredicate(name, ctx?)` when a\n * Query has been augmented with a predicates map (typically by the\n * materialized-view registry).\n *\n * `predicateHash` is the consumer-supplied stable hash for the\n * function body; `ctxHash` is the canonical-JSON SHA-256 of `ctx`.\n * Both fold into the MV's `queryHash` so a function or ctx change\n * forces refresh on next visit.\n *\n * `fn` is resolved at builder time from the predicates map and\n * embedded directly — so `evaluateClause` can fire it without a\n * runtime lookup.\n */\nexport interface WherePredicateClause {\n  readonly type: 'wherePredicate'\n  readonly name: string\n  readonly ctx: unknown\n  readonly predicateHash: string\n  readonly ctxHash: string\n  readonly fn: (record: unknown, ctx?: unknown) => boolean\n}\n\n/** A logical group of clauses combined by AND or OR. */\nexport interface GroupClause {\n  readonly type: 'group'\n  readonly op: 'and' | 'or'\n  readonly clauses: readonly Clause[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Cartesian-product expansion clause. Appended to `QueryPlan.clauses`\n * by `Query.crossJoin()`. Processed in declaration order by\n * `executeClausePipeline` — NOT by `evaluateClause` (which is a\n * per-record predicate and throws on this type).\n */\nexport interface CrossJoinClause {\n  readonly type: 'crossJoin'\n  /** Target collection name to cross-join against. */\n  readonly target: string\n  /** Alias under which the right-side record is exposed on each result row. */\n  readonly as: string\n  /**\n   * Lateral filter callback. `undefined` → full cartesian product.\n   * Two call shapes:\n   *   - Subset:    `(left) => TTarget[]`            — returns the right rows for this left row\n   *   - Predicate: `(left) => (right) => boolean`   — executor materializes then filters\n   */\n  readonly on?: (left: unknown) => unknown[] | ((right: unknown) => boolean)\n  /** When `on:` was supplied as `{ predicate: name }`, the name is stored here for queryHash. */\n  readonly onPredicateName?: string\n  /** Per-clause row ceiling override. `undefined` → `DEFAULT_CROSS_JOIN_MAX_ROWS`. */\n  readonly maxRows?: number\n  /**\n   * Left-outer mode (#1130). When the `on:` subset for a left row is empty,\n   * emit that row once with `null` under `as` instead of dropping it.\n   *\n   * Applies to both call shapes. With `on:` the empty thing is that left\n   * row's subset; without it, an empty TARGET collection is what would\n   * otherwise drop every left row.\n   */\n  readonly outer?: boolean\n}\n\nexport type Clause = FieldClause | FilterClause | WherePredicateClause | GroupClause | CrossJoinClause\n\n/**\n * Read a possibly nested field path like \"address.city\" from a record.\n * Returns undefined if any segment is missing.\n */\nexport function readPath(record: unknown, path: string): unknown {\n  if (record === null || record === undefined) return undefined\n  if (!path.includes('.')) {\n    return (record as Record<string, unknown>)[path]\n  }\n  const segments = path.split('.')\n  let cursor: unknown = record\n  for (const segment of segments) {\n    if (cursor === null || cursor === undefined) return undefined\n    cursor = (cursor as Record<string, unknown>)[segment]\n  }\n  return cursor\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluate a single field clause against a record.\n * Returns false on type mismatches rather than throwing — query results\n * exclude non-matching records by definition.\n */\nexport function evaluateFieldClause(record: unknown, clause: FieldClause): boolean {\n  const actual = readPath(record, clause.field)\n  const { op, value } = clause\n\n  // A Via-covered field (e.g. money) may store a transformed\n  // representation (money: BigInt-exact in scaled-integer space) that the\n  // generic paths below can't compare correctly — the operand was\n  // pre-built at query BUILD time and the binding's own evaluator knows\n  // how to compare it against the raw stored value.\n  if (clause.via) return clause.via.evaluate(actual, op)\n\n  switch (op) {\n    case '==':\n      return actual === value\n    case '!=':\n      return actual !== value\n    case '<':\n      return isComparable(actual, value) && (actual as number) < (value as number)\n    case '<=':\n      return isComparable(actual, value) && (actual as number) <= (value as number)\n    case '>':\n      return isComparable(actual, value) && (actual as number) > (value as number)\n    case '>=':\n      return isComparable(actual, value) && (actual as number) >= (value as number)\n    case 'in':\n      return Array.isArray(value) && value.includes(actual)\n    case 'contains':\n      if (typeof actual === 'string') return typeof value === 'string' && actual.includes(value)\n      if (Array.isArray(actual)) return actual.includes(value)\n      return false\n    case 'startsWith':\n      return typeof actual === 'string' && typeof value === 'string' && actual.startsWith(value)\n    case 'between': {\n      if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length !== 2) return false\n      const [lo, hi] = value\n      if (!isComparable(actual, lo) || !isComparable(actual, hi)) return false\n      return (actual as number) >= (lo as number) && (actual as number) <= (hi as number)\n    }\n    default: {\n      // Exhaustiveness — TS will error if a new operator is added without a case.\n      const _exhaustive: never = op\n      void _exhaustive\n      return false\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Two values are \"comparable\" if they share an order-defined runtime type.\n * Strings compare lexicographically; numbers and Dates numerically; otherwise false.\n */\nfunction isComparable(a: unknown, b: unknown): boolean {\n  if (typeof a === 'number' && typeof b === 'number') return true\n  if (typeof a === 'string' && typeof b === 'string') return true\n  if (a instanceof Date && b instanceof Date) return true\n  return false\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluate any clause (field / filter / group) against a record.\n * The recursion depth is bounded by the user's query expression — no risk of\n * blowing the stack on a 50K-record collection.\n *\n * `fnRecord`, when provided, is the view handed to USER CALLBACK clauses\n * (`filter` / `wherePredicate`) instead of `record` — the executor passes\n * the money-decoded view there so user code never sees the stored\n * scaled-int form, while field clauses keep evaluating against the raw\n * record (their money operands are pre-quantized to that space).\n */\nexport function evaluateClause(record: unknown, clause: Clause, fnRecord?: unknown): boolean {\n  switch (clause.type) {\n    case 'field':\n      return evaluateFieldClause(record, clause)\n    case 'filter':\n      return clause.fn(fnRecord !== undefined ? fnRecord : record)\n    case 'wherePredicate':\n      return clause.fn(fnRecord !== undefined ? fnRecord : record, clause.ctx)\n    case 'crossJoin':\n      throw new Error(\n        `evaluateClause: 'crossJoin' clauses are expansion primitives and are not ` +\n          `evaluated per-record. This is a query planner routing error — ` +\n          `crossJoin clauses must be extracted from the clause list before calling ` +\n          `evaluateClause or filterRecords.`,\n      )\n    case 'group':\n      if (clause.op === 'and') {\n        for (const child of clause.clauses) {\n          if (!evaluateClause(record, child, fnRecord)) return false\n        }\n        return true\n      } else {\n        for (const child of clause.clauses) {\n          if (evaluateClause(record, child, fnRecord)) return true\n        }\n        return false\n      }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the clause list contain any user-callback clause (filter /\n * wherePredicate), at any group nesting depth? Used by executors to\n * decide whether the per-record decoded view needs materializing.\n */\nexport function hasFnClause(clauses: readonly Clause[]): boolean {\n  for (const c of clauses) {\n    if (c.type === 'filter' || c.type === 'wherePredicate') return true\n    if (c.type === 'group' && hasFnClause(c.clauses)) return true\n  }\n  return false\n}\n"],"mappings":";AA6IO,SAAS,SAAS,QAAiB,MAAuB;AAC/D,MAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAW,QAAO;AACpD,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG;AACvB,WAAQ,OAAmC,IAAI;AAAA,EACjD;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAC/B,MAAI,SAAkB;AACtB,aAAW,WAAW,UAAU;AAC9B,QAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAW,QAAO;AACpD,aAAU,OAAmC,OAAO;AAAA,EACtD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAOO,SAAS,oBAAoB,QAAiB,QAA8B;AACjF,QAAM,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK;AAC5C,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI;AAOtB,MAAI,OAAO,IAAK,QAAO,OAAO,IAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,EAAE;AAErD,UAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IACV,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IACpB,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IACpB,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,aAAa,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAM,SAAqB;AAAA,IAC9D,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,aAAa,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAM,UAAsB;AAAA,IAC/D,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,aAAa,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAM,SAAqB;AAAA,IAC9D,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,aAAa,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAM,UAAsB;AAAA,IAC/D,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IACtD,KAAK;AACH,UAAI,OAAO,WAAW,SAAU,QAAO,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK;AACzF,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK;AACvD,aAAO;AAAA,IACT,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,OAAO,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAC3F,KAAK,WAAW;AACd,UAAI,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AACxD,YAAM,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI;AACjB,UAAI,CAAC,aAAa,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAG,QAAO;AACnE,aAAQ,UAAsB,MAAkB,UAAsB;AAAA,IACxE;AAAA,IACA,SAAS;AAEP,YAAM,cAAqB;AAC3B,WAAK;AACL,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAMA,SAAS,aAAa,GAAY,GAAqB;AACrD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAC3D,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAC3D,MAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,aAAa,KAAM,QAAO;AACnD,SAAO;AACT;AAaO,SAAS,eAAe,QAAiB,QAAgB,UAA6B;AAC3F,UAAQ,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACnB,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,oBAAoB,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAC3C,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,SAAY,WAAW,MAAM;AAAA,IAC7D,KAAK;AACH,aAAO,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,SAAY,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACzE,KAAK;AACH,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAIF;AAAA,IACF,KAAK;AACH,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AACvB,mBAAW,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS;AAClC,cAAI,CAAC,eAAe,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,QACvD;AACA,eAAO;AAAA,MACT,OAAO;AACL,mBAAW,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS;AAClC,cAAI,eAAe,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,QACtD;AACA,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,EACJ;AACF;AAOO,SAAS,YAAY,SAAqC;AAC/D,aAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AACvB,QAAI,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,iBAAkB,QAAO;AAC/D,QAAI,EAAE,SAAS,WAAW,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,EAC3D;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-FUHKW252.js → chunk-OCJ3JA4O.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   PortabilityNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/portability/strategy.ts
 var NO_PORTABILITY = {
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ var NO_PORTABILITY = {
 export {
   NO_PORTABILITY
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FUHKW252.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OCJ3JA4O.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-VCETL77O.js → chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   InvalidKeyError,
   TamperedError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
 
 // src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts
 var PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 6e5;
@@ -142,11 +142,15 @@ async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64, dek) {
 async function importCek(rawKey) {
   return subtle.importKey("raw", rawKey, { name: "AES-GCM", length: KEY_BITS }, false, ["decrypt"]);
 }
-async function encrypt(plaintext, dek) {
+async function encrypt(plaintext, dek, aad) {
   const iv = generateIV();
   const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext);
   const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(
-    { name: "AES-GCM", iv },
+    {
+      name: "AES-GCM",
+      iv,
+      ...aad !== void 0 && { additionalData: aad }
+    },
     dek,
     encoded
   );
@@ -155,25 +159,41 @@ async function encrypt(plaintext, dek) {
     data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext)
   };
 }
-async function decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek) {
+async function decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek, aad) {
   const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64);
   const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64);
   try {
     const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(
-      { name: "AES-GCM", iv },
+      {
+        name: "AES-GCM",
+        iv,
+        ...aad !== void 0 && { additionalData: aad }
+      },
       dek,
       ciphertext
     );
     return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext);
   } catch (err) {
     if (err instanceof Error && err.name === "OperationError") {
-      throw new TamperedError();
+      throw new TamperedError(...await classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad));
     }
     throw new DecryptionError(
       err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Decryption failed"
     );
   }
 }
+async function classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad) {
+  if (aad === void 0) return [];
+  try {
+    await subtle.decrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, dek, ciphertext);
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+  return [
+    "This record was sealed BEFORE record-identity binding (#1041) and cannot be read by this version. Its body decrypts correctly under the record key, so this is a data-format transition, not tampering \u2014 but it also means the record predates authenticated metadata. There is no migration path; see noy-db #1100.",
+    "unbound-legacy-format"
+  ];
+}
 async function encryptBytes(data, dek) {
   const iv = generateIV();
   const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(
@@ -209,6 +229,14 @@ async function sha256Hex(data) {
   const hash = await subtle.digest("SHA-256", data);
   return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash)).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
 }
+async function deriveBlobAddressKey(root, tier) {
+  const rawRoot = await subtle.exportKey("raw", root);
+  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey("raw", rawRoot, "HKDF", false, ["deriveBits"]);
+  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode("noydb-blob-address");
+  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`tier:${tier}`);
+  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: "HKDF", hash: "SHA-256", salt, info }, hkdfKey, KEY_BITS);
+  return subtle.importKey("raw", bits, { name: "AES-GCM" }, true, ["encrypt", "decrypt"]);
+}
 async function hmacSha256Hex(key, data) {
   const rawKey = await subtle.exportKey("raw", key);
   const hmacKey = await subtle.importKey(
@@ -405,6 +433,7 @@ export {
   encryptBytes,
   decryptBytes,
   sha256Hex,
+  deriveBlobAddressKey,
   hmacSha256Hex,
   encryptBytesWithAAD,
   decryptBytesWithAAD,
@@ -419,4 +448,4 @@ export {
   bufferToBase64,
   base64ToBuffer
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VCETL77O.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js.map

package/dist/chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cryptographic primitives — thin wrappers around the Web Crypto API.\n *\n * ## Design principle\n *\n * **Zero npm crypto dependencies.** Every operation uses `globalThis.crypto.subtle`,\n * which is available natively in Node.js ≥ 18, all modern browsers, and\n * Deno/Bun. This avoids supply-chain risk from third-party crypto packages and\n * ensures the library stays auditable.\n *\n * ## Algorithms\n *\n * | Use case | Algorithm | Parameters |\n * |----------|-----------|------------|\n * | Key derivation | PBKDF2-SHA256 | 600,000 iterations, 32-byte salt |\n * | Record encryption | AES-256-GCM | 12-byte random IV per operation |\n * | DEK wrapping | AES-KW (RFC 3394) | 256-bit KEK |\n * | Binary encrypt | AES-256-GCM | same as record encryption |\n * | Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 | for presence channels |\n * | Content hash | SHA-256 | for ledger and bundle integrity |\n *\n * ## Key lifecycle\n *\n * ```\n * secret + salt\n *   └─► deriveKey()       → KEK (CryptoKey, extractable: false)\n *         └─► wrapKey()   → wrapped DEK bytes  [stored in keyring]\n *         └─► unwrapKey() → DEK (CryptoKey)    [memory only during session]\n *               └─► encrypt() / decrypt()       → ciphertext / plaintext\n * ```\n *\n * IVs are generated fresh by {@link generateIV} on every encrypt call.\n * Reusing an IV with the same key would break GCM's authentication guarantee —\n * this function should be the only place IVs are produced.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { DecryptionError, InvalidKeyError, TamperedError, ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\n\n/**\n * **EnclaveKey** — the opaque key type at the enclave seam.\n *\n * In noy-db's reference enclave this is `CryptoKey` (the Web Crypto API's\n * key handle). A fork's enclave redefines this alias to its own key\n * representation (e.g. `type EnclaveKey = null` for a keyless HSM-backed\n * fork) — outside `kernel/enclave/**`, every consumer must treat it as\n * opaque: never construct, inspect, or serialize it directly, only pass it\n * between barrel functions (`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`/…).\n */\nexport type EnclaveKey = CryptoKey\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\nconst SALT_BYTES = 32\nconst IV_BYTES = 12\nconst KEY_BITS = 256\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n// ─── Key Derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Derive a KEK from a secret and salt using PBKDF2-SHA256. */\nexport async function deriveKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(new TextEncoder().encode(secret), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared PBKDF2 → AES-KW derivation core. `material` is the raw\n * pre-KDF input bytes (a UTF-8 phrase for standard mode, an\n * AG-1-encoded 3-part structure for echo mode).\n */\nasync function deriveKekFromMaterial(\n  material: Uint8Array,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey('raw', material as BufferSource, 'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey'])\n  return subtle.deriveKey(\n    { name: 'PBKDF2', salt: salt as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n  )\n}\n\n/** One three-part echo secret: prompt (typed) → echo (revealed) → key (typed). */\nexport interface EchoSecretParts {\n  readonly prompt: string\n  readonly echo: string\n  readonly key: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Domain context for the AG-1 encoding. The leading `0xFF` is the load-bearing\n * byte: it is not a legal UTF-8 lead byte, so `TextEncoder` can never emit it —\n * no string's UTF-8 encoding can equal an AG-1 encoding, whatever the string.\n */\nconst ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT = new Uint8Array([0xff, ...new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-echo-secret-v1')])\n\n/**\n * AG-1 encoding: domain context + 4-byte big-endian length prefix per\n * part. Two independent guarantees make a single typed string unable to\n * derive an echo vault's KEK (spec AG-1):\n *\n *   1. The `0xFF` context prefix — UTF-8 never produces that byte, so the\n *      encoding is provably not the encoding of ANY string (not merely of\n *      no separator-joined form).\n *   2. Structural length prefixes — part boundaries are key material, so\n *      re-splitting the same characters changes the derived KEK.\n *\n * @throws ValidationError when any part is not a string — the single\n * chokepoint every echo KEK derivation and block mint passes through, so a\n * malformed parts object cannot be `TextEncoder`-coerced into key material.\n */\nexport function encodeEchoParts(parts: EchoSecretParts): Uint8Array {\n  for (const name of ['prompt', 'echo', 'key'] as const) {\n    if (typeof parts?.[name] !== 'string') {\n      throw new ValidationError('echo secret parts must be three strings: prompt, echo, key')\n    }\n  }\n  const enc = new TextEncoder()\n  const segments = [parts.prompt, parts.echo, parts.key].map((p) => enc.encode(p))\n  const total = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length + segments.reduce((n, s) => n + 4 + s.length, 0)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total)\n  out.set(ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT, 0)\n  let offset = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length\n  for (const s of segments) {\n    new DataView(out.buffer).setUint32(offset, s.length, false)\n    out.set(s, offset + 4)\n    offset += 4 + s.length\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Derive the tier-1 KEK from a 3-part echo secret (spec: KEK from ALL parts). */\nexport async function deriveEchoKey(\n  parts: EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(encodeEchoParts(parts), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Which AES algorithm/usage a {@link deriveSecretKey} result is for:\n * `'aes-kw'` mints a key-wrapping key (`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`, e.g. for\n * KEK derivation); `'aes-gcm'` mints a direct encrypt/decrypt key (e.g.\n * for the wrap-DEKs primitive in `with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts`).\n */\nexport type SecretKeyUsage = 'aes-kw' | 'aes-gcm'\n\n/**\n * Derive a non-extractable AES key from a secret/credential and salt\n * via PBKDF2-SHA256, generalizing {@link deriveKey}'s AES-KW derivation to\n * also cover AES-GCM-usage keys. Callers pin their own `iterations` and\n * `keyUsage` so an existing call site's exact parameters (and thus its\n * derived-key bytes) are preserved verbatim when migrated onto this\n * shared primitive — this is call-site consolidation, not a KDF change.\n */\nexport async function deriveSecretKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  params: { iterations: number; keyUsage: SecretKeyUsage },\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return params.keyUsage === 'aes-gcm'\n    ? subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n      )\n    : subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n      )\n}\n\n// ─── DEK Generation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM data encryption key. */\nexport async function generateDEK(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true, // extractable — needed for AES-KW wrapping\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Key Wrapping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Wrap (encrypt) a DEK with a KEK using AES-KW. Returns base64 string. */\nexport async function wrapKey(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', dek, kek, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/** Unwrap (decrypt) a DEK from base64 string using a KEK. */\nexport async function unwrapKey(\n  wrappedBase64: string,\n  kek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kek,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Per-record CEK wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **dedicated** AES-KW wrapping key from a collection/tier DEK via\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to wrap/unwrap a per-record CEK.\n *\n * The collection/tier DEKs are AES-256-**GCM** keys (usages\n * `encrypt`/`decrypt`) and cannot themselves act as an AES-KW KEK. We do NOT\n * re-import the raw DEK bytes directly as an AES-KW key — that would reuse one\n * key across two primitives (AES-GCM for `_det`/presence, AES-KW for CEK\n * wrapping), violating key separation. Instead we HKDF-derive a domain-\n * separated KW key (salt `noydb-cek-wrap`), exactly as `derivePresenceKey`\n * derives a separate presence key. The derivation is deterministic, so\n * wrapping the same CEK under the same DEK always yields identical ciphertext\n * — which is what lets an update reuse a record's stable CEK and produce a\n * byte-identical `_cek`. The KW key is independent of the DEK's GCM key.\n *\n * The DEK must be extractable (it is — `generateDEK`/`unwrapKey` mint\n * extractable keys).\n */\nasync function asKwKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-cek-wrap')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode('v1')\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-KW', false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-KW-wrap a per-record CEK under a collection/tier DEK. Returns base64.\n * Deterministic over `(cek, dek)`.\n */\nexport async function wrapCek(cek: CryptoKey, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', cek, kw, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap a per-record CEK from base64 under a collection/tier DEK. Throws\n * `InvalidKeyError` if the wrapped bytes do not authenticate under the DEK.\n */\nexport async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64: string, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kw,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK (e.g. from a sealed-CEK\n * delivery binding). Non-extractable, decrypt-only — the imported key is\n * used solely to open the record's `_iv`/`_data` body under `decrypt()`.\n */\nexport async function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', rawKey as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['decrypt'])\n}\n\n// ─── Encrypt / Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface EncryptResult {\n  iv: string   // base64\n  data: string // base64\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt plaintext JSON string with AES-256-GCM. Fresh IV per call.\n *\n * `aad` binds the record's identity into the auth tag (#1041) — see\n * `record-aad.ts` for what is bound and why `_v` is not. A body sealed with\n * AAD can only be opened by a reader supplying the identical bytes, which is\n * what stops an untrusted store from relocating or re-tiering an envelope.\n *\n * Optional **only while the call-site sweep is in progress**. It becomes\n * mandatory once every `encrypt`/`decrypt` pair supplies it, at which point\n * the format version bumps and the reader rejects anything unbound. Until\n * then an omitted `aad` reproduces the previous, unauthenticated behaviour.\n */\nexport async function encrypt(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n    },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Throws on wrong key or tampered data.\n *\n * `aad` must be byte-identical to what {@link encrypt} was given, or the auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError` (#1041). Note the asymmetry that\n * makes this useful: a mismatched identity is indistinguishable from a\n * corrupted body, so relocation fails **closed** rather than returning a\n * plausible record in the wrong place.\n */\nexport async function decrypt(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError(...(await classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad)))\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Distinguish a FORMAT TRANSITION from an attack, when the enclave can (#1103).\n *\n * ## The problem\n *\n * Since #1041 switched identity AAD on, one `TamperedError` covers at least\n * four situations: legitimate pre-binding data, a store that reconstructs an\n * envelope and drops a bound field, a CEK/rotation mismatch, and actual\n * tampering. `SECURITY.md` and the subsystem docs teach the LAST reading — so a\n * user who upgrades, hits this on their own honest data, and consults the docs\n * is told their store has been compromised.\n *\n * That is a false positive on the product's central security claim, and the\n * cost is not merely a confusing message: **a tamper alarm that cries wolf is\n * one users learn to ignore.**\n *\n * ## Why the probe is sound, and why it is NOT a downgrade\n *\n * A body sealed before #1041 carries no AAD, so it opens under an empty one.\n * Retrying that way is **positive evidence** of the legacy format rather than a\n * guess: forging a body that decrypts under this DEK requires the DEK, and an\n * untrusted store does not hold one.\n *\n * ⚠️ **Classification ONLY — the plaintext is discarded and the caller still\n * throws.** That is the entire safety argument: the outcome is identical either\n * way, so this cannot become the lenient path #1041 exists to remove. A variant\n * that RETURNED the retry's plaintext would be exactly the accept-without-AAD\n * downgrade the binding was built to prevent. Do not \"optimise\" it into one.\n *\n * Note what the honest message concedes: pre-#1041 data had no authenticated\n * metadata, so a legacy record that was ALSO tampered with reads as legacy.\n * That is not a weakening — it is an accurate statement about data that\n * genuinely never carried a binding.\n */\nasync function classifyTagFailure(\n  iv: Uint8Array,\n  ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array | undefined,\n): Promise<[] | [string, 'unbound-legacy-format']> {\n  // Only meaningful when AAD was supplied: with none there is no second\n  // interpretation to test, and the failure is a plain tag mismatch.\n  if (aad === undefined) return []\n  try {\n    await subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, dek, ciphertext as BufferSource)\n  } catch {\n    return [] // no benign explanation — the security alert stands\n  }\n  return [\n    'This record was sealed BEFORE record-identity binding (#1041) and cannot be read by this ' +\n    'version. Its body decrypts correctly under the record key, so this is a data-format ' +\n    'transition, not tampering — but it also means the record predates authenticated metadata. ' +\n    'There is no migration path; see noy-db #1100.',\n    'unbound-legacy-format',\n  ]\n}\n\n// ─── Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ────────\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random IV.\n * Used by the attachment store so binary blobs avoid double base64 encoding\n * (the existing `encrypt()` function calls `TextEncoder` on a string — here\n * we pass the `Uint8Array` directly to `subtle.encrypt`).\n */\nexport async function encryptBytes(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to raw bytes.\n * Counterpart to `encryptBytes`. Throws `TamperedError` on auth-tag failure.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytes(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SHA-256 hex digest of raw bytes. Used to derive content-addressed\n * eTags for blob deduplication. Computed on plaintext bytes\n * before compression and encryption so the eTag identifies content, not\n * ciphertext, and survives re-encryption (key rotation, re-upload).\n */\nexport async function sha256Hex(data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const hash = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── HMAC-SHA-256 ─────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute HMAC-SHA-256(key, data) and return hex string.\n *\n * Used to derive content-addressed eTags that are opaque to the store:\n * ```\n * eTag = hmacSha256Hex(blobDEK, plaintext)\n * ```\n *\n * Unlike a plain SHA-256, the HMAC is keyed by the vault-shared `_blob` DEK,\n * so an attacker with store access cannot pre-compute eTags for known files.\n * Deduplication still works within a vault (same key + same content = same eTag).\n */\n/**\n * Derive the blob CONTENT-ADDRESSING key for one tier (#1126).\n *\n * The blob eTag is an HMAC over the plaintext. It used to be keyed by the\n * `_blob` DEK — the very key `rotateKeys` replaces — so after any rotation\n * `HMAC(live DEK, plaintext) !== storedETag` for every blob written before it,\n * permanently. `decryptResponse()` checks that unconditionally, so the\n * presigned-URL read path raised `TamperedError` on legitimate data forever;\n * dedup also split, minting a second address for identical bytes.\n *\n * The fix is a `root` that rotation never touches (`_blob_addr`, refused by\n * `rotateKeys` exactly as `_roster` is). Rotation then re-keys chunk BODIES\n * while every address stays stable, which is what makes the AAD\n * `{eTag}:{i}:{count}` and every `_blob_index` / `_blob_slots_*` /\n * `_blob_versions_*` row survive it untouched.\n *\n * **Derived PER TIER, deliberately.** A single vault-wide address would make an\n * elevated blob and a tier-0 blob with identical content share an eTag,\n * leaking equality across a boundary the tier system exists to enforce — and\n * `rehomeForTier` re-addresses on a tier move precisely because the address is\n * tier-scoped today. Domain separation keeps that property while removing the\n * rotation coupling: the two are independent axes, and only one of them was\n * ever meant to change the address.\n *\n * Same HKDF idiom as `asKwKey`, with its own salt so the addressing key can\n * never coincide with a wrapping or encryption key.\n */\nexport async function deriveBlobAddressKey(root: CryptoKey, tier: number): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawRoot = await subtle.exportKey('raw', root)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawRoot, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-blob-address')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`tier:${tier}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info }, hkdfKey, KEY_BITS)\n  // Imported as AES-GCM only because `hmacSha256Hex` re-exports raw and\n  // re-imports as HMAC; the algorithm tag here is a carrier, never used to\n  // encrypt anything.\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, { name: 'AES-GCM' }, true, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])\n}\n\nexport async function hmacSha256Hex(key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  // Export AES-GCM DEK raw bytes → import as HMAC key\n  const rawKey = await subtle.exportKey('raw', key)\n  const hmacKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawKey,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── AAD-aware Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ──\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using Additional Authenticated Data.\n *\n * The AAD binds each chunk to its parent blob and position, preventing\n * chunk reorder, substitution, and truncation attacks:\n * ```\n * AAD = UTF-8(\"{eTag}:{chunkIndex}:{chunkCount}\")\n * ```\n *\n * The AAD is NOT stored — the reader reconstructs it from `BlobObject`\n * metadata and passes it to `decryptBytesWithAAD`.\n */\nexport async function encryptBytesWithAAD(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n    },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with AAD verification.\n *\n * If the AAD does not match the one used at encryption time (e.g. because\n * a chunk was reordered or substituted from another blob), the GCM auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError`.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytesWithAAD(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Presence Key Derivation ──────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive an AES-256-GCM presence key from a collection DEK using HKDF-SHA256.\n *\n * The presence key is domain-separated from the data DEK by the fixed salt\n * `'noydb-presence'` and the `info` = collection name. This means:\n *  - The adapter never sees the presence key.\n *  - Presence payloads rotate automatically when the collection DEK is rotated.\n *  - Revoked users cannot derive the new presence key after a DEK rotation.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Used as the HKDF `info` parameter for domain separation.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key suitable for presence payload encryption.\n */\nexport async function derivePresenceKey(dek: CryptoKey, collectionName: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  // Step 1: export DEK raw bytes\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n\n  // Step 2: import as HKDF key material\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawDek,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  )\n\n  // Step 3: derive 256 bits with salt='noydb-presence' and info=collectionName\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-presence')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(collectionName)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n\n  // Step 4: import derived bits as AES-GCM key\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Sealed Field Key Derivation ──────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **per-field** AES-256-GCM key from a collection DEK using\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to encrypt a single sensitive field into its own\n * `_sealed[field]` envelope slot (structural group-encryption).\n *\n * Domain-separated from the data DEK (and from the presence/deterministic\n * channels) by the fixed salt `'noydb-sealed'` and an `info` of\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field])`. The JSON-array\n * encoding is injective — each element is separately quoted/escaped — so\n * collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with collection `a` +\n * field `b/sealed/c`. Each sensitive field gets a **distinct** key, so a\n * `_sealed[a]` ciphertext does not authenticate under field `b`'s key —\n * sealed fields are cryptographically isolated from one another. The\n * collection name keeps the same field name in two collections from sharing a\n * key, mirroring how `derivePresenceKey` / `encryptDeterministic` domain-separate.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKey(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed')\n  // JSON-array encoding is injective: each element is separately quoted/\n  // escaped, so collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with\n  // collection `a` + field `b/sealed/c`.\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a per-record sealed-field key from the record's **per-record CEK**\n * rather than the collection DEK. Same HKDF construction as\n * {@link deriveSealedFieldKey} but with salt `'noydb-sealed-cek'` (distinct\n * from `'noydb-sealed'`), so a CEK-derived key can never collide with a\n * DEK-derived one for the same `{collection, field}`.\n *\n * The point: the sealed ciphertext's only key now flows from the record's CEK.\n * Dropping the record's wrapped `_cek` (crypto-shred / `forget`) makes the key\n * — and thus `_sealed[field]` — unrecoverable, giving sealed fields the same\n * erasure guarantee `_data` already has. The CEK must be extractable (it is —\n * `unwrapCek`/`generateDEK` mint extractable keys).\n *\n * @param cek            The record's AES-256-GCM CEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(\n  cek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawCek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed-cek')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed-cek', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Deterministic Encryption ────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection's **dedicated deterministic-index key** from its DEK\n * via HKDF-SHA256 (L-1, #554).\n *\n * `_det` slots previously encrypted under the raw collection DEK — the same\n * key `_data` uses with a *randomized*-IV regime while `_det` uses a\n * *deterministic*-IV regime. Two IV regimes on one key is avoidable hygiene\n * debt (~2^-96 theoretical collision), so the deterministic index now gets its\n * own HKDF-separated key: salt `'noydb-det'`, info\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-det'])` (the injective JSON-array domain tag, same\n * convention as {@link deriveSealedFieldKey}). Per-field separation still\n * comes from the `'<collection>/<field>'` context inside\n * {@link encryptDeterministic}, exactly as before.\n *\n * The derived key stays **DEK-derived (collection-level)** on purpose: `_det`\n * is carried verbatim through per-record CEK rotation (see\n * `record-keys/sealing.ts`), so its key must not depend on the CEK. It rotates\n * with the collection DEK, like the presence key.\n *\n * The key is minted **extractable** — {@link encryptDeterministic} derives its\n * per-value IV via HKDF over the raw key bytes (an `exportKey` under the\n * hood), which a non-extractable key would forbid. Same in-memory posture as\n * the DEK itself (`generateDEK` mints extractable keys).\n *\n * @param dek The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @returns A dedicated AES-256-GCM key for the `_det` deterministic index.\n */\nexport async function deriveDeterministicKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-det')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-det']))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a deterministic 12-byte IV from `{ DEK, context, plaintext }`\n * via HKDF-SHA256. Given the same three inputs, the IV is identical, so\n * `encryptDeterministic` produces the same ciphertext on every call —\n * which is precisely what enables blind equality search on encrypted\n * fields.\n *\n * **The side channel this opens.** Two records whose field value is the\n * same produce the same ciphertext. An observer with store access can\n * therefore tell which records share a value — not *what* the value is,\n * but the equivalence class. This is the well-known trade-off of\n * deterministic encryption and is why the feature is strictly opt-in\n * per field, guarded by `acknowledgeDeterministicRisk: true` at\n * collection creation.\n *\n * The context string MUST include the collection name and field name,\n * so:\n *   - The same plaintext in two different fields encrypts differently\n *     (no cross-field equality leak).\n *   - The same plaintext in two different collections (different DEKs)\n *     encrypts differently by virtue of the key, even before HKDF\n *     domain separation kicks in.\n */\nasync function deriveDeterministicIV(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n  plaintext: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-deterministic-v1')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${context}\\x00${plaintext}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    IV_BYTES * 8,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt a plaintext string with AES-256-GCM and a deterministic,\n * HKDF-derived IV.\n *\n * The same `{ dek, context, plaintext }` triple always produces the\n * same `{ iv, data }` — call this twice and you can string-compare the\n * ciphertexts to check equality of the inputs without decrypting them.\n *\n * @param context  Domain-separation string — by convention\n *                 `'<collection>/<field>'`. Different contexts encrypt\n *                 the same plaintext to different ciphertexts, so\n *                 `email` in collection `users` does not collide with\n *                 `email` in collection `customers`.\n */\nexport async function encryptDeterministic(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = await deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Counterpart to {@link encryptDeterministic}. The IV is stored\n * alongside the ciphertext (exactly like the randomized path), so\n * decrypt uses the stored IV and verifies the GCM auth tag — a tampered\n * ciphertext throws `TamperedError` just like randomized AES-GCM.\n */\nexport async function decryptDeterministic(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek)\n}\n\n// ─── Random Generation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random 12-byte IV for AES-GCM. */\nexport function generateIV(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(IV_BYTES))\n}\n\n/** Generate a random 32-byte salt for PBKDF2. */\nexport function generateSalt(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(SALT_BYTES))\n}\n\n// ─── Base64 Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport function bufferToBase64(buffer: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n  const 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package/dist/{chunk-WLYIROCJ.js → chunk-OQMCFHUX.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   FieldFrozenError,
   InvariantError
-} from "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/guards/executor.ts
 var GuardExecutor = {
@@ -77,4 +77,4 @@ function deepEqual(a, b) {
 export {
   GuardExecutor
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WLYIROCJ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OQMCFHUX.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-JRCYZEHU.js → chunk-OR2FYRYR.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   ReadOnlyFrameError
-} from "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
 
 // src/with-fork/shadow/vault-frame.ts
 var VaultFrame = class {
@@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ export {
   VaultFrame,
   CollectionFrame
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JRCYZEHU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OR2FYRYR.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-HNHCQ556.js → chunk-PFWE7FJG.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   NoydbError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/links/names.ts
 var LINK_COLLECTION_PREFIX = "_links_";
@@ -60,4 +60,4 @@ export {
   linkRowKey,
   LinkIntegrityError
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HNHCQ556.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PFWE7FJG.js.map