@noy-db/hub 0.3.0-pre.9 → 0.4.0-pre.0

package/dist/kernel/noydb.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,836 @@
+import type { NoydbOptions, NoydbEventMap, GrantOptions, RevokeOptions, UpdateUserOptions, UserInfo, PushResult, PullResult, PushOptions, PullOptions, SyncStatus, NoydbStore, AccessibleVault, ListAccessibleVaultsOptions, QueryAcrossOptions, QueryAcrossResult, TranslatorAuditEntry, WriteConflict, UserApiFactory, ActiveTier, FactorProofBundle, GateName, VaultPolicy } from './types.js';
+import type { PassphrasePolicy } from './validation.js';
+import { type RotatePassphraseInput, type RecoverPassphraseInput, type RecoverPassphraseResult, type RotateRecoveryOptions, type RotateRecoveryResult, type EnrollRecoveryResult, type RecoveryEnrollmentInput, type RecoveryProof } from '../with-party/team/rotate-recover.js';
+import type { RecoverUserOptions } from '../with-party/team/peer-recover.js';
+import { type PaperRecoveryEntry, type ShamirRecoveryEntry } from '../with-party/team/recovery.js';
+import { type CoordinationProvider } from '../port/by/default-provider.js';
+import type { Cover } from '../with-party/directory/cover/types.js';
+import type { SetCoverInput } from '../with-party/directory/cover/schema.js';
+import { Vault } from './vault.js';
+import type { VaultMeta } from '../with-shape/introspection/meta.js';
+import { WriteQueueTracker, type WriteQueue } from './write-queue.js';
+import { WriteHookRegistry, type WriteHook, type Unsubscribe } from '../port/with/write-hooks.js';
+import { ServiceBus } from '../port/with/service-bus.js';
+import { type TabCoordinationOptions, type TabRole, type TabPresence } from '../with-party/tab-coordination.js';
+import type { UnlockedKeyring } from '../with-party/team/keyring.js';
+import { type EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, type UpdateAuthenticatorOptions } from '../with-party/team/authenticators.js';
+import { type QuickUnlockState } from '../with-party/session/unlock-state.js';
+import type { KeyringAuthenticator } from './types.js';
+import type { SyncEngine } from '../with-party/team/sync.js';
+import type { SyncTransaction } from '../with-party/team/sync-transaction.js';
+import { type SnapshotMeta } from '../with-fork/snapshots/strategy.js';
+import type { AmendmentTxOptions } from '../with-commit/tx/transaction.js';
+import { TxContext } from '../with-commit/tx/transaction.js';
+import type { DryRunResult } from '../with-commit/tx/dry-run.js';
+import { type ForgetStrategy } from '../with-audit/forget/strategy.js';
+import { type CustodyStrategy } from '../with-party/custody/strategy.js';
+/** NoydbOptions with the store resolved to a non-optional value (internal use only). */
+type ResolvedNoydbOptions = NoydbOptions & {
+    readonly store: NoydbStore;
+};
+/** The top-level NOYDB instance. */
+export declare class Noydb {
+    #private;
+    private readonly options;
+    private readonly emitter;
+    private readonly writeQueueTracker;
+    private readonly writeHooks;
+    private readonly subsystemBus;
+    private readonly clientId;
+    /** Session that owns this instance's writers (one user's writers across vaults). */
+    private readonly sessionId;
+    /** Drain-barrier coordination transport for the schema fence. */
+    private readonly coordinationProvider;
+    /** Pre-resolved `vault.user` API factory (mirrors `coordinationProvider` above). Public so `Vault` can call it. */
+    readonly userApiFactory: UserApiFactory;
+    private readonly vaultCache;
+    /**
+     * In-flight `openVault` promise per name — concurrent opens of the same
+     * vault must converge on ONE Vault instance. Without this, two callers
+     * racing past the `vaultCache` miss each construct a Vault (and later two
+     * Collections with independent DEKs for the same store slice), so a record
+     * written through one fails decryption through the other with a spurious
+     * `TamperedError` (#564).
+     */
+    private readonly vaultOpening;
+    private readonly keyringCache;
+    private readonly syncEngines;
+    /**
+     * Per-vault active session tier — defaults to `1` after a passphrase
+     * unlock; tier-2 / tier-3 unlocks downgrade it. Used by
+     * {@link checkGate} to evaluate `gate.minTier`.
+     */
+    private readonly activeTier;
+    /**
+     * Per-vault loaded policy. Cached after the first
+     * `_meta/policy` load; replaced by `db.updatePolicy()`.
+     */
+    private readonly policyCache;
+    /**
+     * One-shot bypass for the managed-mode strong-recovery check.
+     * Set true by {@link openVaultAndEnrollRecovery} for the duration of
+     * the bootstrap window so the keyring can be created before the
+     * strong recovery is enrolled. Always cleared (try/finally).
+     * @internal
+     */
+    private _skipNextManagedRecoveryCheck;
+    /** Per-vault tier-3 (PIN / quick-resume) state. */
+    private readonly quickUnlock;
+    private closed;
+    private sessionTimer;
+    /** Same-device multi-tab coordinator; created on `enableTabCoordination()`. */
+    private tabCoordinator;
+    /** Cross-tab write relay; created on `enableTabCoordination()`. */
+    private writeRelay;
+    /** Per-vault policy enforcers. */
+    private readonly policyEnforcers;
+    private readonly txStrategy;
+    private readonly forgetStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Opt-in sovereign-custody (FR-6) strategy — `NO_CUSTODY` (throwing) unless
+     * `withCustody()` was passed. Public so `Vault` routes `vault.custody.liberate`
+     * through it; grant/revoke route through it from this class. @internal
+     */
+    readonly custodyStrategy: CustodyStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Opt-in multi-user team strategy (#267 keyring-grant → team split) —
+     * `NO_TEAM` (throwing) unless `withTeam()` was passed; the keyring
+     * engines are linked only by the active strategy, not by this file. */
+    private readonly teamStrategy;
+    private readonly sessionStrategy;
+    private readonly syncStrategy;
+    private readonly snapshots;
+    private readonly policyManager;
+    /** Pre-resolved policy-gate engine function (mirrors `coordinationProvider`/`userApiFactory` above). */
+    private readonly policyCheckGate;
+    private readonly team;
+    /**
+     * Currently-running multi-record transaction, set by
+     * `runTransaction` at the start of Phase 2 (commit) and cleared in
+     * the same function's `finally` block. Side-effect writes triggered
+     * during a staged op's `Collection.put` (today: eager derivation
+     * outputs) register their pre-write envelope on `_executed` here so
+     * a mid-batch failure rolls them back alongside the main staged ops.
+     * `null` outside of Phase 2.
+     * @internal
+     */
+    private _activeTxContext;
+    /**
+     * In-process translation cache. Key is `"${field}\x00${collection}\x00${from}\x00${to}\x00${text}"`.
+     * Cleared on `close()` alongside the KEK and DEKs.
+     */
+    private readonly translatorCache;
+    /** Audit log for all translator invocations in this session. Cleared on `close()`. */
+    private readonly _translatorAuditLog;
+    constructor(options: ResolvedNoydbOptions);
+    /** @internal — resolved forget strategy (NO_FORGET when not configured). */
+    get _forgetStrategy(): ForgetStrategy;
+    private resetSessionTimer;
+    /**
+     * Touch the policy enforcer for a vault (records activity, resets
+     * idle timer). Also touches the legacy session timer. No-op if no enforcer.
+     */
+    private touchPolicy;
+    /**
+     * Check that a policy-guarded operation is permitted.
+     * Throws `SessionPolicyError` if re-auth is required.
+     */
+    private checkPolicyOperation;
+    /**
+     * Open a vault by name.
+     *
+     * @param name    Vault identifier.
+     * @param opts    Optional settings for this session.
+     * @param opts.locale  Default locale for i18n/dictKey field resolution
+     *. Set here to avoid passing `{ locale }`
+     *                     on every individual `get()`/`list()` call.
+     * @param opts.meta    Vault descriptive metadata (label, description, etc.). First-wins: applied on first open, ignored on subsequent opens.
+     */
+    openVault(name: string, opts?: {
+        locale?: string;
+        create?: boolean;
+        meta?: VaultMeta;
+    }): Promise<Vault>;
+    /** Synchronous vault access (must call openVault first, or auto-opens). */
+    vault(name: string): Vault;
+    /**
+     * Grant access to a user for a vault.
+     *
+     * Gated by `enroll-user`. `STRICT_POLICY` requires a TOTP / email-OTP
+     * factor proof so the operator affirmatively re-asserts identity at
+     * the moment of grant; `PERSONAL_POLICY` accepts a tier-1 unlock alone.
+     *
+     * The legacy `requireReAuthFor: ['grant']` session-policy check still
+     * fires on top — both are independent opt-ins.
+     * Opt-in (#267): throws {@link TeamNotEnabledError} without `withTeam()`.
+     */
+    grant(vault: string, options: GrantOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Revoke a user's access to a vault.
+     *
+     * Gated by `revoke-user`. `STRICT_POLICY` requires a TOTP / email-OTP
+     * factor proof; `PERSONAL_POLICY` accepts a tier-1 unlock alone.
+     *
+     * The legacy `requireReAuthFor: ['revoke']` session-policy check still
+     * fires on top — both are independent opt-ins.
+     * Opt-in (#267): throws {@link TeamNotEnabledError} without `withTeam()`.
+     */
+    revoke(vault: string, options: RevokeOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Grant the FR-6 `custodian` role to a user (owner-only custody API).
+     *
+     * A custodian operates every collection (rw + access) but is provably
+     * unable to grant / revoke / rotate / extract-and-sever. Only the Deed
+     * owner may mint one. Defended in depth: the `grant-custodian` gate
+     * (fail-closed) AND an explicit `keyring.role !== 'owner'` check — the
+     * gate enforces host policy, the role check enforces the cryptographic
+     * owner-only invariant even if a host mis-configures the gate.
+     */
+    grantCustodian(vault: string, options: Omit<GrantOptions, 'role'>, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** @internal — grant-custodian engine, reached only via withCustody(); the
+     * keyring engine arrives as an argument so the floor never carries it (#267). */
+    _grantCustodianImpl(engine: (adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: GrantOptions) => Promise<void>, vault: string, options: Omit<GrantOptions, 'role'>, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Revoke a custodian (owner-only custody API).
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link revoke} but pins the caller to the Deed owner: defended
+     * in depth by the `revoke-user` gate AND an explicit `keyring.role !==
+     * 'owner'` check, so an admin cannot unwind a custodianship.
+     */
+    revokeCustodian(vault: string, options: RevokeOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** @internal — revoke-custodian engine, reached only via withCustody().
+     * Mirrors `_grantCustodianImpl` (#267: engine passed in). */
+    _revokeCustodianImpl(engine: (adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: RevokeOptions) => Promise<void>, vault: string, options: RevokeOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Mutate post-grant identity fields on an existing keyring — `role`,
+     * `displayName`, and/or `permissions`. Pure plaintext-header rewrite:
+     * no DEK rewrap, no KEK required, no authenticator slots touched.
+     * Tier-2 enrollments and recovery codes survive.
+     *
+     * Different from `db.revoke + db.grant`:
+     *
+     *   - Same `userId`, same DEK wrappings, same `granted_by`, same
+     *     `_users/<keyringId>` envelope. Only the specified header
+     *     fields move. Last-write-wins via the standard keyring put.
+     *   - No cascade on role demotion (admins demoted to operator keep
+     *     the keyrings they previously granted; the cascade rules are
+     *     a `db.revoke` concern, not `db.updateUser`).
+     *   - Tier-2 slots NOT dropped — the wrapping is unaffected.
+     *
+     * Role-elevation guard: BOTH the old and new role must satisfy
+     * `db.grant`'s hierarchy. Owner can do anything; admin manages
+     * admin/operator/viewer/client laterally; admin cannot promote to
+     * owner OR demote from owner. The guard runs regardless of the
+     * `update-user` policy gate's settings — gates can only be more
+     * permissive than the structural floor, never less.
+     *
+     * Gated by `update-user`. `STRICT_POLICY` requires a TOTP/email-OTP
+     * factor proof so the operator affirmatively re-asserts identity at
+     * the moment of mutation; `PERSONAL_POLICY` accepts a tier-1 unlock
+     * alone.
+     *
+     * ```ts
+     * await db.updateUser('acme', {
+     *   userId: 'bob',
+     *   role: 'operator',                 // promote
+     *   permissions: { invoices: 'rw' },
+     * }, { factors: [{ kind: 'totp' }] })
+     * ```
+     *
+     * @throws `NoAccessError` when no keyring exists for the target.
+     * @throws `PermissionDeniedError` when the role hierarchy rejects.
+     * @throws `ValidationError` when no field is provided.
+     */
+    updateUser(vault: string, options: UpdateUserOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Rotate the DEKs for the given collections in a vault.
+     *
+     * Generates fresh DEKs, re-encrypts every record in each collection,
+     * and re-wraps the new DEKs into every remaining user's keyring. The
+     * old DEKs become unreachable — useful as a defense-in-depth measure
+     * after a suspected key leak, or as the scheduled half of a
+     * key-rotation policy.
+     *
+     * Unlike `revoke({ rotateKeys: true })`, this call does NOT remove
+     * any users — every current member keeps access, but with fresh
+     * keys. This is the "just rotate" path; the "revoke and rotate"
+     * path still lives in `revoke()`.
+     *
+     * Exposed on Noydb (rather than only on the lower-level keyring
+     * module) so CLI and admin tooling can trigger rotation without
+     * reaching into internals. See `noy-db rotate` for the CLI wrapper.
+     * Opt-in (#267): throws {@link TeamNotEnabledError} without `withTeam()`.
+     */
+    rotate(vault: string, collections: string[]): Promise<void>;
+    /** List all users with access to a vault. */
+    listUsers(vault: string): Promise<UserInfo[]>;
+    /**
+     * Enumerate every vault the calling principal can unwrap,
+     * optionally filtered by minimum role.
+     *
+     * The walk is a two-step pipeline: first ask the adapter for the
+     * universe of compartments it stores, then for each one attempt to
+     * load the calling user's keyring with the in-memory passphrase.
+     * Compartments where the user has no keyring file (`NoAccessError`)
+     * or where the passphrase doesn't unwrap (`InvalidKeyError`) are
+     * silently dropped from the result — the existence of those
+     * compartments is **not** confirmed in the return value.
+     *
+     * Requires the optional `NoydbStore.listVaults()` capability.
+     * Throws `StoreCapabilityError` against stores that don't
+     * implement it (today: store-aws-dynamo, store-aws-s3, store-browser-local, store-browser-idb). For those backends the
+     * consumer should either pass an explicit candidate list to
+     * `queryAcross()` directly, or maintain a vault index out of
+     * band.
+     *
+     * **Privacy note.** This method's return value never reveals the
+     * existence of a vault the caller cannot unwrap. The adapter
+     * sees the enumeration call (it has to — it owns the storage), but
+     * downstream consumers of `listAccessibleVaults()` only see
+     * the filtered list. That's the boundary the existence-leak
+     * guarantee draws.
+     *
+     * **Known edge case.** A vault whose keyring file
+     * happens to have an empty wrapped-DEKs map (because the owner
+     * granted access before any collection was created) will pass the
+     * `loadKeyring` probe with *any* passphrase — there are no DEKs to
+     * unwrap, so the integrity-checked unwrap that normally rejects
+     * wrong passphrases never runs. The result is that an unrelated
+     * principal who happens to know the user-id and the vault
+     * name can show up in `listAccessibleVaults()` as having
+     * access to that empty vault. They cannot read any actual
+     * data (their DEK set is empty), so this is a metadata leak
+     * (vault name + user-id), not a content leak. Hardening this
+     * via a passphrase canary in the keyring file is a deferred
+     * follow-up.
+     *
+     * **Cost.** O(compartments × keyring-load) — one `loadKeyring`
+     * attempt per vault in the universe. Each attempt does one
+     * adapter `get` + one PBKDF2 derivation + N AES-KW unwraps. For
+     * dozens of compartments this is fine; for thousands the consumer
+     * should cache the result and refresh on grant/revoke events. A
+     * future optimization could batch the keyring reads via
+     * `loadAll('_keyring')` if such a thing existed at the adapter
+     * layer, but the contract doesn't expose that.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```ts
+     * // All compartments I can unwrap
+     * const all = await db.listAccessibleVaults()
+     *
+     * // Only compartments where I'm at least admin
+     * const admin = await db.listAccessibleVaults({ minRole: 'admin' })
+     *
+     * // Only compartments I own
+     * const owned = await db.listAccessibleVaults({ minRole: 'owner' })
+     * ```
+     */
+    listAccessibleVaults(options?: ListAccessibleVaultsOptions): Promise<AccessibleVault[]>;
+    /**
+     * Run a per-vault callback against a list of compartments and
+     * collect the results.
+     *
+     * Pure orchestration — there is no new crypto, no new sync, no new
+     * authorization layer. Each vault is opened via the existing
+     * `openVault()` path (which honors the cache primed by
+     * `listAccessibleVaults`), the callback runs against the
+     * resulting `Vault` instance, and the result (or thrown
+     * error) is captured into the per-vault slot.
+     *
+     * **Per-vault errors do not abort the fan-out.** If one
+     * vault's callback throws, that vault's slot carries
+     * the error and the remaining compartments still run. The caller
+     * decides how to handle the partition between success and failure.
+     * This is the right shape for cross-tenant reports where one
+     * tenant's outage shouldn't hide the other tenants' data.
+     *
+     * **Concurrency** is opt-in via `options.concurrency`. The default
+     * is `1` (sequential) — conservative because per-vault
+     * callbacks typically do their own I/O and an unbounded fan-out
+     * can exhaust adapter connections (DynamoDB throughput, S3 socket
+     * limits, browser fetch concurrency). Bump to 4-8 for cloud-backed
+     * adapters where parallelism is the whole point.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```ts
+     * // Cross-tenant invoice totals as a flat list
+     * const accessible = await db.listAccessibleVaults({ minRole: 'admin' })
+     * const results = await db.queryAcross(
+     *   accessible.map((c) => c.id),
+     *   async (comp) => {
+     *     return comp.collection<Invoice>('invoices').query()
+     *       .where('month', '==', '2026-03')
+     *       .toArray()
+     *   },
+     *   { concurrency: 4 },
+     * )
+     * // results: Array<{ vault, result?: Invoice[], error?: Error }>
+     *
+     * // Compose with exportStream() — cross-vault plaintext export
+     * const exports = await db.queryAcross(accessible.map((c) => c.id), async (comp) => {
+     *   const out: unknown[] = []
+     *   for await (const chunk of comp.exportStream()) out.push(chunk)
+     *   return out
+     * })
+     * ```
+     */
+    queryAcross<T>(vaultIds: string[], fn: (vault: Vault) => Promise<T>, options?: QueryAcrossOptions): Promise<QueryAcrossResult<T>[]>;
+    /**
+     * @internal True once `close()` has been called. Read by outward
+     * orchestration frameworks whose entry points can't see the private
+     * `closed` field.
+     */
+    get isClosed(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * @internal — true when an encrypted shard vault is provisioned
+     * (its keyring exists in the store).
+     */
+    _shardVaultProvisioned(vaultId: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * @internal — the physical backend store a vault id maps to. A
+     * `routeStore` resolves the vault-prefix route via its `resolveBackend`;
+     * a plain store is its own backend. Used by the federation data-residency
+     * guard to read the placement backend's `capabilities.region`.
+     */
+    _resolveBackend(vaultId: string): NoydbStore;
+    /**
+     * Change the current user's passphrase for a vault.
+     *
+     * Validates the new passphrase against the strength rules. Pass
+     * `{ allowWeakPassphrase: true }` to skip — typically only useful for
+     * fixtures and migrations. Pass a `PassphrasePolicy` to override the
+     * default rules (e.g. consumer-tunable `pattern` / `customValidator`).
+     */
+    changeSecret(vault: string, newPassphrase: string, options?: PassphrasePolicy & {
+        allowWeakPassphrase?: boolean;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    /** Push local changes to remote for a vault. */
+    push(vault: string, options?: PushOptions): Promise<PushResult>;
+    /**
+     * Pull remote changes to local for a vault. A `backup`/`archive` primary is a
+     * push-only sink and is never pulled from (#616) — returns an empty result.
+     */
+    pull(vault: string, options?: PullOptions): Promise<PullResult>;
+    /**
+     * Bidirectional sync: pull then push for all targets.
+     * `sync-peer` targets do pull+push; `backup`/`archive` targets do push-only.
+     */
+    sync(vault: string, options?: {
+        push?: PushOptions;
+        pull?: PullOptions;
+    }): Promise<{
+        pull: PullResult;
+        push: PushResult;
+    }>;
+    /**
+     * Multi-record atomic transaction.
+     *
+     * The callback stages writes across any number of vaults /
+     * collections; on return the hub pre-flights version checks, then
+     * commits every staged op. If the body throws, nothing is
+     * persisted. If any staged op fails its `expectedVersion` check,
+     * the batch throws `ConflictError` with zero writes performed. If a
+     * mid-commit failure occurs after one or more ops have already
+     * written, each executed op is reverted best-effort (see
+     * `runTransaction` for the crash-window caveat).
+     *
+     * Distinct from `transaction(vault: string) → SyncTransaction`
+     * which batches push/pull across sync peers.
+     */
+    transaction<T>(fn: (tx: TxContext) => Promise<T> | T): Promise<T>;
+    /**
+     * Open an amendment-mode transaction. Requires `admin` or `owner`
+     * role on every vault touched by the body; throws
+     * `AmendmentForbiddenError` on first non-privileged `tx.vault(name)`
+     * call. Guard `check` callbacks are SKIPPED inside an amendment —
+     * the staged change-set is fed to each guard's `amendment.invariant`
+     * after the body returns, and the multi-record summary is appended
+     * to the vault's ledger as `op: 'amendment'`.
+     */
+    transaction<T>(options: AmendmentTxOptions, fn: (tx: TxContext) => Promise<T> | T): Promise<T>;
+    /**
+     * Dry-run a transaction: run the body to stage ops, then return
+     * the directly-affected diff + collected guard violations WITHOUT
+     * committing (no adapter writes, no write hooks). MV/derivation cascade
+     * is not simulated. Requires `withTransactions()`.
+     */
+    transaction(options: {
+        readonly dryRun: true;
+    }, fn: (tx: TxContext) => unknown): Promise<DryRunResult>;
+    /**
+     * Create a sync transaction for the given vault.
+     * The vault must already be open via `openVault()`.
+     * Call `tx.put()` / `tx.delete()` to stage changes, then `tx.commit()`
+     * to write all locally and push atomically to remote.
+     */
+    transaction(vault: string): SyncTransaction;
+    /**
+     * Internal accessor for the primary store — used by the tx
+     * executor to perform raw adapter reads for pre-flight CAS and
+     * raw writes for rollback. Not part of the public API.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    get _store(): NoydbStore;
+    /**
+     * Currently-running multi-record transaction, or `null` outside
+     * Phase 2. `Collection.dispatchDerivations` consults this so a
+     * recursive derived-output write inside `Collection.put` can register
+     * its envelope onto `ctx._executed` and roll back with the main
+     * staged ops on mid-batch failure.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    get _activeTxContextOrNull(): TxContext | null;
+    /**
+     * Called by `runTransaction` at Phase 2 start, and by
+     * `Collection.putManyAtomic` (via `derivationSource.setActiveTxContext`)
+     * for its own Phase 2 loop. Nested or concurrent (non-nested)
+     * transactions on the same Noydb instance are NOT supported —
+     * overwriting an active context means another transaction is still
+     * running and its `_executed` list would be cross-contaminated by
+     * the nested writes. We tolerate the overwrite (best-effort, no
+     * throw) to keep the rare interleaving from breaking consumers who
+     * currently get lucky with timing, but applications should ensure
+     * their multi-record commits are serialised on a single Noydb.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    _setActiveTxContext(ctx: TxContext): void;
+    /**
+     * Factory for a transient `TxContext` bound to this Noydb. Used by
+     * `Collection.putManyAtomic` (via `derivationSource.createTxContext`)
+     * to publish an active context for the duration of its bulk-atomic
+     * Phase 2 loop, so recursive derivation-output writes register on
+     * `ctx._executed` and roll back together with the source ops.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    _createTxContext(): TxContext;
+    /**
+     * Called by `runTransaction` in its `finally`. Only clears when the
+     * passed ctx matches the active one — a defensive no-op if some
+     * other code path already cleared it.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    _clearActiveTxContext(ctx: TxContext): void;
+    /** Get sync status for a vault. */
+    syncStatus(vault: string): SyncStatus;
+    private getSyncEngine;
+    _forEachSyncEngine(vault: string, fn: (engine: SyncEngine) => void): void;
+    on<K extends keyof NoydbEventMap>(event: K, handler: (data: NoydbEventMap[K]) => void): void;
+    off<K extends keyof NoydbEventMap>(event: K, handler: (data: NoydbEventMap[K]) => void): void;
+    /**
+     * Observable write-queue for this hub instance. Reflects outstanding
+     * in-flight writes across all collections. See {@link WriteQueue}.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * window.addEventListener('beforeunload', (e) => {
+     *   if (db.writeQueue.pending) { e.preventDefault(); e.returnValue = '' }
+     * })
+     */
+    get writeQueue(): WriteQueue;
+    /**
+     * @internal Mutable tracker behind {@link writeQueue}. Threaded into
+     * each Collection (via Vault) so `put`/`delete` can `track()` writes.
+     * Not part of the public surface — consumers use `writeQueue`.
+     */
+    get _writeQueueTracker(): WriteQueueTracker;
+    /**
+     * Register a hook that runs before each write. Awaited; a throw
+     * aborts the write. Returns an unsubscribe function.
+     */
+    onBeforeWrite(handler: WriteHook): Unsubscribe;
+    /**
+     * Register a hook that runs after each committed write. Awaited;
+     * a handler error is warned, never rolled back. Returns an unsubscribe fn.
+     */
+    onAfterWrite(handler: WriteHook): Unsubscribe;
+    /** Subscribe to cross-tab write conflicts. Returns an unsubscribe. */
+    onWriteConflict(fn: (c: WriteConflict) => void): Unsubscribe;
+    /**
+     * Enable same-device multi-tab coordination: primary/secondary
+     * election + presence. Browser-only — a graceful no-op (role 'unknown')
+     * when Web Locks / BroadcastChannel are unavailable and nothing is
+     * injected. Idempotent; returns a disposer.
+     */
+    enableTabCoordination(opts?: TabCoordinationOptions): {
+        dispose: () => void;
+    };
+    private disableTabCoordination;
+    get tabRole(): TabRole;
+    activeTabs(): TabPresence[];
+    onTabRoleChange(fn: (r: TabRole) => void): Unsubscribe;
+    onActiveTabsChange(fn: (t: TabPresence[]) => void): Unsubscribe;
+    /** @internal The write-hook registry, threaded into each Collection. */
+    get _writeHooks(): WriteHookRegistry;
+    /** @internal The observe bus, threaded into every Collection. */
+    get _subsystemBus(): ServiceBus;
+    /** @internal Stable per-instance id for schema-cutover coordination. */
+    get _clientId(): string;
+    /** @internal Session that owns this instance's writers. */
+    get _sessionId(): string;
+    /**
+     * @internal Drain-barrier coordination transport for the schema fence.
+     * The default store-backed provider reproduces today's fence behavior; a
+     * `by-*` real-time transport is injected via `coordinationStrategy`.
+     */
+    get coordination(): CoordinationProvider;
+    /**
+     * #693: true when multi-tab coordination is active at all — presence/election
+     * alone (`propagateWrites: false`) or full write-propagation — a peer tab can
+     * write this instance's shared store out-of-band either way, so per-collection
+     * marker-id sets are not authoritative and the re-create gate must fall back to
+     * a store read. Live (tab coordination is enable/disable-able at runtime).
+     */
+    get _tabCoordinationActive(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Soft-lock a single vault: clear its in-memory keyring, DEKs, vault
+     * instance, sync engine, policy enforcer, and active-tier entry —
+     * WITHOUT destroying the `Noydb` instance.
+     *
+     * Designed for "lock screen" UX: the user taps **Lock** and DEKs are
+     * scrubbed from memory immediately, but the same `Noydb` instance can
+     * be re-unlocked via {@link unlockViaAuthenticator} (tier 2) or
+     * {@link unlockViaPin} (tier 3) without re-running `createNoydb`.
+     *
+     * **QuickUnlock state is preserved.** That's the whole point — the
+     * user can still resume via PIN without a full credential re-prompt.
+     * The on-disk `_meta/policy` document is also kept in cache (it
+     * survives lock; nothing about it changes when DEKs are scrubbed).
+     *
+     * No-op when `vault` is not currently in cache (idempotent).
+     */
+    lockVault(vault: string): void;
+    close(): void;
+    /**
+     * Returns a snapshot of all translator invocations since the last
+     * `close()`. Useful for testing and compliance auditing. The log is
+     * in-memory only — it is cleared when `db.close()` is called.
+     *
+     * Entries deliberately omit content hashes. See `TranslatorAuditEntry`
+     * and issue  for the rationale.
+     */
+    translatorAuditLog(): readonly TranslatorAuditEntry[];
+    /**
+     * Invoke the configured `plaintextTranslator` (or serve from cache).
+     * Records one `TranslatorAuditEntry` per call regardless of cache hit.
+     * Called by `Vault` during `put()` for `autoTranslate: true` fields.
+     *
+     * @internal — not part of the public API surface
+     */
+    invokeTranslator(text: string, from: string, to: string, field: string, collection: string): Promise<string>;
+    /**
+     * Read the active policy for a vault. Loads from `_meta/policy` on
+     * first call; subsequent calls hit the in-memory cache. Throws
+     * `ValidationError` if the vault has not been opened.
+     */
+    getPolicy(vault: string): Promise<VaultPolicy>;
+    /**
+     * Replace the policy document at `_meta/policy` and update the
+     * in-memory cache. Gated by the `enroll-user` policy (a policy
+     * change is fundamentally a privilege-management action).
+     */
+    updatePolicy(vault: string, override: Partial<VaultPolicy>): Promise<VaultPolicy>;
+    /**
+     * Read the current vault-level user-directory toggle. Returns
+     * the default-on shape (`{ enabled: true }`) when no `_meta/directory`
+     * document has been persisted yet.
+     *
+     * No role gate — anyone who can open the vault can read the toggle.
+     */
+    getDirectoryEnabled(vault: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Toggle the vault's user-directory listing on or off.
+     * Owner-only. When disabled, `listUsersWithEnvelopes()` throws
+     * {@link import('./errors.js').DirectoryDisabledError} for callers
+     * whose role is neither `owner` nor `admin`.
+     *
+     * Honest caveat: this is a UX flag, not a privacy guarantee. The
+     * keyring file at `_keyring/<userId>` and the envelope ciphertext at
+     * `_users/<keyringId>` remain observable to anyone with direct store
+     * read access — only the hub-level enumeration is gated. See
+     * `https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/user-envelope.md` → "Directory visibility".
+     */
+    setDirectoryEnabled(vault: string, enabled: boolean): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Evaluate a policy gate against the active session tier and the
+     * presented factor proofs. Throws {@link PolicyDeniedError} on
+     * denial; resolves with `void` on success.
+     *
+     * @param vault    The vault whose policy applies.
+     * @param gate     Gate name — built-in (e.g. `'rotate-passphrase'`)
+     *                 or app-defined (`app:*`).
+     * @param presented Caller-supplied factor proofs.
+     */
+    checkGate(vault: string, gate: GateName, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** Read or persist the vault policy at `_meta/policy` on first open. */
+    private bootstrapPolicy;
+    /**
+     * Throw {@link RecoveryNotEnrolledError} or
+     * {@link ManagedRecoveryNotEnrolledError} when recovery enrollment
+     * is missing.
+     *
+     * Two enforcement modes:
+     *
+     * 1. **Managed-mode mandatory strong-recovery.** When
+     *    `passphraseMode === 'managed'`, the vault MUST have at least
+     *    one **strong** recovery profile (Shamir today). Paper alone is
+     *    rejected because under managed mode the user has no memorized
+     *    passphrase, so losing the paper sheet = losing every record.
+     *    This check is unconditional — independent of `requireRecovery`
+     *    and the `recover-passphrase` gate.
+     *
+     * 2. **Opt-in strict mandatory-recovery.** When
+     *    `requireRecovery: true` is set on createNoydb (and the gate is
+     *    not explicitly disabled), require ANY recovery profile (paper
+     *    or shamir). This is the v0.x default-off behavior; v1.0 may
+     *    flip it default-on.
+     *
+     * The managed-mode check fires from {@link bootstrapPolicy} unless
+     * the `skipManagedCheck` flag is set (used by
+     * {@link openVaultAndEnrollRecovery} to allow atomic create-and-enroll).
+     */
+    private assertRecoveryEnrolled;
+    /**
+     * Internal accessor used by tier-2/tier-3 unlock paths
+     * to mark the active session tier.
+     * @internal
+     */
+    _setActiveTier(vault: string, tier: ActiveTier): void;
+    /** Add a tier-2 authenticator slot — see {@link TeamFacade.enrollAuthenticator}. */
+    enrollAuthenticator(vault: string, options: EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** Remove a tier-2 authenticator slot — see {@link TeamFacade.removeAuthenticator}. */
+    removeAuthenticator(vault: string, slotId: string, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** Read the slot list for a vault — see {@link TeamFacade.listAuthenticators}. */
+    listAuthenticators(vault: string): Promise<ReadonlyArray<KeyringAuthenticator>>;
+    /** Mutate an authenticator slot's `meta` — see {@link TeamFacade.updateAuthenticator}. */
+    updateAuthenticator(vault: string, slotId: string, options: UpdateAuthenticatorOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** Native WebAuthn enrollment — see {@link TeamFacade.enrollWebAuthn}. */
+    enrollWebAuthn(vault: string, ceremony: (keyring: UnlockedKeyring) => Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions>, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<{
+        credentialId: string;
+    }>;
+    /** List webauthn-method slots — see {@link TeamFacade.listWebAuthnSlots}. */
+    listWebAuthnSlots(vault: string): Promise<ReadonlyArray<{
+        id: string;
+        enrolledAt: string;
+        credentialId: string;
+    }>>;
+    /** Unlock via a tier-2 authenticator slot — see {@link TeamFacade.unlockViaAuthenticator}. */
+    unlockViaAuthenticator(vault: string, slotId: string, verify: (slot: KeyringAuthenticator) => Promise<UnlockedKeyring>): Promise<UnlockedKeyring>;
+    /**
+     * Set the owner-curated cover for a vault. Throws
+     * `ValidationError` if the developer did not opt the hub into
+     * `cover` via `NoydbOptions`, or if the input violates
+     * the resolved schema (oversized icon, disallowed MIME, oversized
+     * string, unknown field).
+     *
+     * `createdAt` is set on the first write and preserved on every
+     * subsequent write. `updatedAt` is refreshed on every write.
+     * `version` is monotonic — increments on every successful write.
+     *
+     * `custom` (opt-in via `fields: [..., 'custom']`) patches at the
+     * namespace level — provided namespaces replace their previous
+     * value, absent ones are preserved, `null` deletes (#800).
+     */
+    setCover(vault: string, input: SetCoverInput): Promise<Cover>;
+    /**
+     * Read the cover for a vault. Returns `undefined` when none has
+     * been written. Pass `locale` to resolve any locale-map fields to
+     * plain strings; omitting `locale` returns the raw map.
+     *
+     * Works even when the developer didn't enable
+     * `cover` — reads are passive and never throw on a
+     * missing schema (the cover is plaintext and exists on disk
+     * regardless).
+     */
+    getCover(vault: string, opts?: {
+        readonly locale?: string;
+    }): Promise<Cover | undefined>;
+    /** @deprecated Use {@link Noydb.setCover} (#799 rename). */
+    setPublicEnvelope(vault: string, input: SetCoverInput): Promise<Cover>;
+    /** @deprecated Use {@link Noydb.getCover} (#799 rename). */
+    getPublicEnvelope(vault: string, opts?: {
+        readonly locale?: string;
+    }): Promise<Cover | undefined>;
+    /** English summary of the configured auth model — see {@link TeamFacade.describeAuthConfig}. */
+    describeAuthConfig(vault: string): Promise<string>;
+    /** Mermaid `flowchart TB` source for the auth graph — see {@link TeamFacade.diagramAuthConfig}. */
+    diagramAuthConfig(vault: string): Promise<string>;
+    /** Per-user enrollment summary — see {@link TeamFacade.describeUserAuth}. */
+    describeUserAuth(vault: string, userId: string, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<string>;
+    /** Bulk per-user enrollment summary — see {@link TeamFacade.describeAllUsersAuth}. */
+    describeAllUsersAuth(vault: string, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<Array<{
+        userId: string;
+        description: string;
+    }>>;
+    /** Rotate the user's passphrase (user remembers old) — see {@link TeamFacade.rotatePassphrase}. */
+    rotatePassphrase(vault: string, input: RotatePassphraseInput, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** Reset the passphrase using a recovery proof — see {@link TeamFacade.recoverPassphrase}. */
+    recoverPassphrase(vault: string, input: RecoverPassphraseInput, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<RecoverPassphraseResult>;
+    /** Deliberate paper/Shamir recovery-code regeneration — see {@link TeamFacade.rotateRecovery}. */
+    rotateRecovery(vault: string, options: RotateRecoveryOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<RotateRecoveryResult>;
+    /** Atomic create-and-enroll for managed-mode vaults — see {@link TeamFacade.openVaultAndEnrollRecovery}. */
+    openVaultAndEnrollRecovery(vault: string, opts: {
+        readonly recovery: ReadonlyArray<RecoveryEnrollmentInput>;
+        readonly locale?: string;
+    }): Promise<{
+        readonly vault: Vault;
+        readonly recoveryEnrollments: ReadonlyArray<EnrollRecoveryResult>;
+    }>;
+    /** Recovery flow under managed-passphrase mode — see {@link TeamFacade.recoverManagedPassphrase}. */
+    recoverManagedPassphrase(vault: string, options: {
+        readonly recoveryProof: RecoveryProof;
+        readonly passphrasePolicy?: PassphrasePolicy;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    /** Atomic peer-recovery of an existing user's keyring — see {@link TeamFacade.recoverUser}. */
+    recoverUser(vault: string, options: RecoverUserOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** Persist a recovery enrollment (paper or Shamir) — see {@link TeamFacade.enrollRecovery}. */
+    enrollRecovery(vault: string, enrollment: RecoveryEnrollmentInput): Promise<EnrollRecoveryResult>;
+    /** Read the persisted recovery entries (paper + Shamir) — see {@link TeamFacade.listRecoveryEntries}. */
+    listRecoveryEntries(vault: string): Promise<{
+        paper: ReadonlyArray<PaperRecoveryEntry>;
+        shamir: ReadonlyArray<ShamirRecoveryEntry>;
+    }>;
+    /** Register a tier-3 quick-unlock state — see {@link TeamFacade.enrollUnlock}. */
+    enrollUnlock(vault: string, state: QuickUnlockState, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
+    /** Resume a session via the registered tier-3 state — see {@link TeamFacade.unlockViaPin}. */
+    unlockViaPin(vault: string, resume: (state: QuickUnlockState) => Promise<UnlockedKeyring>): Promise<UnlockedKeyring | undefined>;
+    /** Drop the tier-3 state for a vault — see {@link TeamFacade.clearQuickUnlock}. */
+    clearQuickUnlock(vault: string): void;
+    /** Public defensive-copy accessor for the unlocked keyring — see {@link TeamFacade.getKeyring}. */
+    getKeyring(vault: string): Promise<UnlockedKeyring>;
+    /**
+     * Live-reference variant used by the hub's own code paths. Internal
+     * mutations on `deks` (e.g. {@link ensureCollectionDEK} adding a
+     * collection key) need to land on the cached keyring so subsequent
+     * accesses see them. Not exposed publicly — callers outside hub
+     * should use {@link getKeyring}, which returns a defensive copy.
+     */
+    private _getKeyringInternal;
+    /**
+     * Take an on-demand checkpoint of the given vault.
+     * Requires `snapshotStrategy: withSnapshots({ store })` in `createNoydb`.
+     * @throws ValidationError when the vault is not open
+     */
+    snapshot(vault: string, opts?: {
+        label?: string;
+        note?: string;
+    }): Promise<SnapshotMeta>;
+    /**
+     * List all snapshots for the given vault, newest first.
+     * Reads only the sidecar index — does not download snapshot bytes.
+     */
+    listSnapshots(vault: string): Promise<SnapshotMeta[]>;
+    /**
+     * Restore the vault to a previously snapshotted state.
+     * Runs `verifyBackupIntegrity()` automatically on restore.
+     * @throws SnapshotNotFoundError when `version` doesn't exist in the store
+     * @throws ValidationError when the vault is not open
+     */
+    restoreSnapshot(vault: string, version: string): Promise<void>;
+}
+/** Create a new NOYDB instance. */
+export declare function createNoydb(options: NoydbOptions): Promise<Noydb>;
+export {};