@noy-db/hub 0.3.0-pre.9 → 0.4.0-pre.0

package/dist/chunk-KPZS5QAQ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-lookup/indexing/eager-indexes.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Secondary indexes for the query DSL.\n *\n * ships **in-memory hash indexes**:\n *   - Built during `Collection.ensureHydrated()` from the decrypted cache\n *   - Maintained incrementally on `put` and `delete`\n *   - Consulted by the query executor for `==` and `in` operators on\n *     indexed fields, falling back to a linear scan otherwise\n *   - Live entirely in memory — no adapter writes for the index itself\n *\n * Persistent encrypted index blobs (the spec's \"store as a separate\n * AES-256-GCM blob\" note) are deferred to a follow-up issue. The reasons\n * are documented in the PR body — short version: at the target\n * scale of 1K–50K records, building the index during hydrate is free,\n * so persistence buys nothing measurable.\n */\n\nimport { readPath } from '../../kernel/query/predicate.js'\n\n/**\n * Index declaration accepted by `Collection`'s constructor.\n *\n * Accepts:\n *   - `string` — a single-field hash index (`'clientId'`)\n *   - `{ fields: [...] }` or `readonly string[]` — a composite index\n *     over an ordered field tuple. Only lazy-mode\n *     collections consume composite declarations today; eager mode\n *     silently treats a composite as equivalent to declaring each\n *     component field as its own single-field index.\n *\n * Additive variants (unique constraints, partial indexes) will land as\n * further union members without breaking existing declarations.\n */\nexport type IndexDef =\n  | string\n  | { readonly fields: readonly string[]; readonly unique?: boolean }\n  | readonly string[]\n\n/**\n * Internal representation of a built hash index.\n *\n * Maps stringified field values to the set of record ids whose value\n * for that field matches. Stringification keeps the index simple and\n * works uniformly for primitives (`'open'`, `'42'`, `'true'`).\n *\n * Records whose indexed field is `undefined` or `null` are NOT inserted\n * — `query().where('field', '==', undefined)` falls back to a linear\n * scan, which is the conservative behavior.\n */\nexport interface HashIndex {\n  readonly field: string\n  readonly buckets: Map<string, Set<string>>\n}\n\n/**\n * Container for all indexes on a single collection.\n *\n * Methods are pure with respect to the in-memory `buckets` Map — they\n * never touch the adapter or the keyring. The Collection class owns\n * lifecycle (build on hydrate, maintain on put/delete).\n */\nexport class CollectionIndexes {\n  private readonly indexes = new Map<string, HashIndex>()\n\n  /**\n   * Per-field bucket-key canonicalizer (#672 review C1), registered ONCE\n   * via {@link setCanonicalizer} when the collection wires indexing up\n   * (money-aware via `ViaPipeline.canonicalizeIndexKey`). Consulted by\n   * EVERY bucket-mutation site — `build`/`upsert`/`remove` — so bucket\n   * membership is symmetric by construction: a value can never be added\n   * under a canonical key and later removed under the raw one (or vice\n   * versa), which is what stranded ids on `put`/`delete` before this fix.\n   */\n  private canonicalize?: (field: string, value: unknown) => string | undefined\n\n  /**\n   * Register the bucket-key canonicalizer. Called once, where the\n   * collection constructs its indexing state — safe to call again (the\n   * closure is simply replaced) but there is normally only one caller.\n   */\n  setCanonicalizer(fn: (field: string, value: unknown) => string | undefined): void {\n    this.canonicalize = fn\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Declare an index. Subsequent record additions are tracked under it.\n   * Calling this twice for the same field is a no-op (idempotent).\n   */\n  declare(field: string): void {\n    if (this.indexes.has(field)) return\n    this.indexes.set(field, { field, buckets: new Map() })\n  }\n\n  /** True if the given field has a declared index. */\n  has(field: string): boolean {\n    return this.indexes.has(field)\n  }\n\n  /** All declared field names, in declaration order. */\n  fields(): string[] {\n    return [...this.indexes.keys()]\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Build all declared indexes from a snapshot of records.\n   * Called once per hydration. O(N × indexes.size). Buckets through the\n   * registered {@link setCanonicalizer} closure, same as `upsert`/`remove`.\n   */\n  build<T>(records: ReadonlyArray<{ id: string; record: T }>): void {\n    for (const idx of this.indexes.values()) {\n      idx.buckets.clear()\n      for (const { id, record } of records) {\n        addToIndex(idx, id, record, this.canonicalize)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Insert or update a single record across all indexes.\n   * Called by `Collection.put()` after the encrypted write succeeds.\n   *\n   * If `previousRecord` is provided, the record is removed from any old\n   * buckets first — this is the update path. Pass `null` for fresh adds.\n   */\n  upsert<T>(id: string, newRecord: T, previousRecord: T | null): void {\n    if (this.indexes.size === 0) return\n    if (previousRecord !== null) {\n      this.remove(id, previousRecord)\n    }\n    for (const idx of this.indexes.values()) {\n      addToIndex(idx, id, newRecord, this.canonicalize)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Remove a record from all indexes. Called by `Collection.delete()`\n   * (and as the first half of `upsert` for the update path).\n   */\n  remove<T>(id: string, record: T): void {\n    if (this.indexes.size === 0) return\n    for (const idx of this.indexes.values()) {\n      removeFromIndex(idx, id, record, this.canonicalize)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Drop all index data. Called when the collection is invalidated. */\n  clear(): void {\n    for (const idx of this.indexes.values()) {\n      idx.buckets.clear()\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Equality lookup: return the set of record ids whose `field` matches\n   * the given value. Returns `null` if no index covers the field — the\n   * caller should fall back to a linear scan.\n   *\n   * The returned Set is a reference to the index's internal storage —\n   * callers must NOT mutate it.\n   */\n  lookupEqual(field: string, value: unknown): ReadonlySet<string> | null {\n    const idx = this.indexes.get(field)\n    if (!idx) return null\n    const key = stringifyKey(value)\n    return idx.buckets.get(key) ?? EMPTY_SET\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Set lookup: return the union of record ids whose `field` matches any\n   * of the given values. Returns `null` if no index covers the field.\n   */\n  lookupIn(field: string, values: readonly unknown[]): ReadonlySet<string> | null {\n    const idx = this.indexes.get(field)\n    if (!idx) return null\n    const out = new Set<string>()\n    for (const value of values) {\n      const key = stringifyKey(value)\n      const bucket = idx.buckets.get(key)\n      if (bucket) {\n        for (const id of bucket) out.add(id)\n      }\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\nconst EMPTY_SET: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set()\n\n/**\n * Stringify a value into a stable bucket key.\n *\n * `null`/`undefined` produce a sentinel that records will never match\n * (so we never index nullish values — `where('x', '==', null)` falls back\n * to a linear scan). Numbers, booleans, strings, and Date objects are\n * coerced via `String()`. Objects produce a sentinel that no real record\n * will match — querying with object values is a code smell.\n */\nfunction stringifyKey(value: unknown): string {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) return '\\0NULL\\0'\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value\n  if (typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean') return String(value)\n  if (value instanceof Date) return value.toISOString()\n  return '\\0OBJECT\\0'\n}\n\nfunction addToIndex<T>(\n  idx: HashIndex,\n  id: string,\n  record: T,\n  canonicalize?: (field: string, value: unknown) => string | undefined,\n): void {\n  const value = readPath(record, idx.field)\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) return\n  const key = canonicalize?.(idx.field, value) ?? stringifyKey(value)\n  let bucket = idx.buckets.get(key)\n  if (!bucket) {\n    bucket = new Set()\n    idx.buckets.set(key, bucket)\n  }\n  bucket.add(id)\n}\n\nfunction removeFromIndex<T>(\n  idx: HashIndex,\n  id: string,\n  record: T,\n  canonicalize?: (field: string, value: unknown) => string | undefined,\n): void {\n  const value = readPath(record, idx.field)\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) return\n  const key = canonicalize?.(idx.field, value) ?? stringifyKey(value)\n  const bucket = idx.buckets.get(key)\n  if (!bucket) return\n  bucket.delete(id)\n  // Clean up empty buckets so the Map doesn't accumulate dead keys.\n  if (bucket.size === 0) idx.buckets.delete(key)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AA6DO,IAAM,oBAAN,MAAwB;AAAA,EACZ,UAAU,oBAAI,IAAuB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAW9C;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOR,iBAAiB,IAAiE;AAChF,SAAK,eAAe;AAAA,EACtB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,QAAQ,OAAqB;AAC3B,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG;AAC7B,SAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,oBAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,IAAI,OAAwB;AAC1B,WAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,EAC/B;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,SAAmB;AACjB,WAAO,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAChC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,MAAS,SAAyD;AAChE,eAAW,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACvC,UAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAClB,iBAAW,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS;AACpC,mBAAW,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,MAC/C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EASA,OAAU,IAAY,WAAc,gBAAgC;AAClE,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAG;AAC7B,QAAI,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAC3B,WAAK,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc;AAAA,IAChC;AACA,eAAW,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACvC,iBAAW,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,IAClD;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,OAAU,IAAY,QAAiB;AACrC,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAG;AAC7B,eAAW,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACvC,sBAAgB,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,QAAc;AACZ,eAAW,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACvC,UAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAUA,YAAY,OAAe,OAA4C;AACrE,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAClC,QAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO;AACjB,UAAM,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK;AAC9B,WAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK;AAAA,EACjC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,SAAS,OAAe,QAAwD;AAC9E,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAClC,QAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO;AACjB,UAAM,MAAM,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC5B,eAAW,SAAS,QAAQ;AAC1B,YAAM,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK;AAC9B,YAAM,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAClC,UAAI,QAAQ;AACV,mBAAW,MAAM,OAAQ,KAAI,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,MACrC;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,IAAM,YAAiC,oBAAI,IAAI;AAW/C,SAAS,aAAa,OAAwB;AAC5C,MAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAW,QAAO;AAClD,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,UAAW,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAChF,MAAI,iBAAiB,KAAM,QAAO,MAAM,YAAY;AACpD,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,WACP,KACA,IACA,QACA,cACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AACxC,MAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAW;AAC3C,QAAM,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK;AAClE,MAAI,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;AACX,aAAS,oBAAI,IAAI;AACjB,QAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,EAC7B;AACA,SAAO,IAAI,EAAE;AACf;AAEA,SAAS,gBACP,KACA,IACA,QACA,cACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AACxC,MAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAW;AAC3C,QAAM,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK;AAClE,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAClC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,SAAO,OAAO,EAAE;AAEhB,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,KAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/C;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-KS6SAVCZ.js

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+// src/via/classified/validators.ts
+function luhnCheck(pan) {
+  const digits = pan.replace(/[\s-]/g, "");
+  if (!/^\d{12,19}$/.test(digits)) return false;
+  let sum = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < digits.length; i++) {
+    let d = Number(digits[digits.length - 1 - i]);
+    if (i % 2 === 1) {
+      d *= 2;
+      if (d > 9) d -= 9;
+    }
+    sum += d;
+  }
+  return sum % 10 === 0;
+}
+
+// src/via/classified/presets.ts
+var digitsOf = (v) => String(v).replace(/\D/g, "");
+function panSpec() {
+  return {
+    _noydbClassified: true,
+    _viaBrand: "classified",
+    preset: "creditCard.pan",
+    storage: "recoverable",
+    sensitivity: "secret",
+    list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022 ${last4}" },
+    riders: { last4: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-4), bin: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(0, 6) },
+    validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && luhnCheck(v) ? null : "not a Luhn-valid card number"
+  };
+}
+function expirySpec() {
+  return {
+    _noydbClassified: true,
+    _viaBrand: "classified",
+    preset: "creditCard.expiry",
+    storage: "recoverable",
+    sensitivity: "pii",
+    list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022/\u2022\u2022" },
+    validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && /^(0[1-9]|1[0-2])\/\d{2}$/.test(v) ? null : "expected MM/YY"
+  };
+}
+function cvcSpec() {
+  return {
+    _noydbClassified: true,
+    _viaBrand: "classified",
+    preset: "creditCard.cvc",
+    storage: "never",
+    sensitivity: "secret",
+    list: { kind: "omit" },
+    validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && /^\d{3,4}$/.test(v) ? null : "expected 3-4 digits"
+  };
+}
+var classified = {
+  /** Composite card type. PAN sealed + last4/bin riders; CVC is storage:'never' (PCI-aware). */
+  creditCard(fields) {
+    const members = { [fields.pan]: panSpec() };
+    if (fields.expiry !== void 0) members[fields.expiry] = expirySpec();
+    if (fields.cvc !== void 0) members[fields.cvc] = cvcSpec();
+    return { _noydbClassifiedGroup: true, _viaBrand: "classified", preset: "creditCard", members };
+  },
+  birthDate() {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "birthDate",
+      storage: "recoverable",
+      sensitivity: "pii",
+      list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "${yob}-\u2022\u2022-\u2022\u2022" },
+      riders: { yob: (v) => String(v).slice(0, 4) },
+      validate: (v) => {
+        if (typeof v !== "string" || !/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(v)) return "expected ISO yyyy-mm-dd";
+        const parts = v.split("-").map(Number);
+        const year = parts[0], month = parts[1], day = parts[2];
+        if (month < 1 || month > 12) return "not a valid calendar date";
+        const daysInMonth = [31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31];
+        const isLeapYear = year % 4 === 0 && year % 100 !== 0 || year % 400 === 0;
+        const maxDay = month === 2 && isLeapYear ? 29 : daysInMonth[month - 1];
+        if (day < 1 || day > maxDay) return "not a valid calendar date";
+        return null;
+      }
+    };
+  },
+  email() {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "email",
+      storage: "recoverable",
+      sensitivity: "pii",
+      list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022\u2022@${domain}" },
+      riders: { domain: (v) => String(v).split("@")[1] ?? "" },
+      validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && v.includes("@") ? null : "expected an email address"
+    };
+  },
+  phone() {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "phone",
+      storage: "recoverable",
+      sensitivity: "pii",
+      list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022${last2}" },
+      riders: { last2: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-2) },
+      validate: (v) => digitsOf(v).length >= 5 ? null : "expected at least 5 digits"
+    };
+  },
+  /** Digest-only password: verify-without-reveal; never listed, never revealed.
+   *  Enumeration math is on the caller for low-entropy values — see the
+   *  per-preset docs; the hub ships no rate limiter in this slice (spec §5).
+   *
+   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables
+   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:
+   *
+   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access
+   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —
+   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test
+   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),
+   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of
+   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret
+   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not
+   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the
+   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the
+   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does
+   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields
+   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being
+   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain
+   *  tags. */
+  password(opts = {}) {
+    const minLength = opts.minLength ?? 10;
+    const notLastN = opts.notLastN ?? 0;
+    if (!Number.isInteger(notLastN) || notLastN < 0 || notLastN > 8) {
+      throw new Error(`classified.password: notLastN must be an integer 0..8 (write cost is n \xD7 600K PBKDF2; ring blast radius is documented), got ${notLastN}`);
+    }
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "password",
+      storage: "digest-only",
+      sensitivity: "secret",
+      list: { kind: "omit" },
+      verifyNormalize: "password",
+      ...opts.rotateDays !== void 0 ? { rotateDays: opts.rotateDays } : {},
+      ...notLastN > 0 ? { notLastN } : {},
+      ...opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true } : {},
+      validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && v.normalize("NFC").length >= minLength ? null : `password must be at least ${minLength} characters`
+    };
+  },
+  /** Digest-only secret answer: normalized (casefold/trim/collapse), groupable
+   *  into k-of-n matchGroup challenges. Low-entropy by nature — document the
+   *  enumeration math to your users; add app-side rate limiting.
+   *
+   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables
+   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:
+   *
+   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access
+   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —
+   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test
+   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),
+   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of
+   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret
+   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not
+   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the
+   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the
+   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does
+   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields
+   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being
+   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain
+   *  tags. */
+  secretAnswer(opts = {}) {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "secretAnswer",
+      storage: "digest-only",
+      sensitivity: "secret",
+      list: { kind: "omit" },
+      verifyNormalize: "secret-answer",
+      verifyGroupMember: true,
+      ...opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true } : {},
+      validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && v.normalize("NFC").toLowerCase().trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").length > 0 ? null : "secret answer must be non-empty after normalization"
+    };
+  }
+};
+
+// src/via/classified/active.ts
+function policyOf(spec) {
+  return {
+    normalize: spec.verifyNormalize ?? "password",
+    notLastN: spec.notLastN ?? 0,
+    equatable: spec.equatable === true,
+    ...spec.rotateDays !== void 0 ? { rotateDays: spec.rotateDays } : {}
+  };
+}
+var engineCtx = (ctx) => ({
+  collection: ctx.collection,
+  getEnvelope: ctx.getEnvelope,
+  resolveCek: ctx.resolveCek,
+  getDEK: ctx.getDEK,
+  now: ctx.now
+});
+function withClassified() {
+  return {
+    async reveal(ctx, id, field) {
+      const { revealSealedField } = await import("./reveal-HWO4YMTJ.js");
+      const value = await revealSealedField({
+        collection: ctx.collection,
+        encrypted: ctx.encrypted,
+        getEnvelope: ctx.getEnvelope,
+        resolveCek: ctx.resolveCek,
+        getDEK: ctx.getDEK
+      }, id, field);
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("reveal", id);
+      return value;
+    },
+    async verify(ctx, id, field, candidate) {
+      const { verifyDigestField } = await import("./verify-26Y5GNMK.js");
+      const verdict = await verifyDigestField(engineCtx(ctx), id, field, candidate, policyOf(ctx.spec));
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("verify", id);
+      return verdict;
+    },
+    async verifyText(ctx, id, field, candidate) {
+      const { verifyTextField } = await import("./verify-26Y5GNMK.js");
+      const verdict = await verifyTextField(engineCtx(ctx), id, field, candidate, ctx.spec.verifyNormalize ?? "password");
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("verify", id);
+      return verdict;
+    },
+    async matchGroup(ctx, id, answers, opts) {
+      const { matchGroupFields } = await import("./verify-26Y5GNMK.js");
+      const members = (ctx.groupMembers ?? []).map((m) => ({ field: m.field, policy: policyOf(m.spec) }));
+      const result = await matchGroupFields(engineCtx(ctx), id, answers, members, opts);
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("verify", id);
+      return result;
+    },
+    async computeTarget(ctx, field, candidate, costByte) {
+      const { computeBidxTarget } = await import("./find-YS6XWB46.js");
+      const dek = await ctx.getDEK();
+      return computeBidxTarget(candidate, policyOf(ctx.spec).normalize, dek, ctx.collection, field, costByte);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+export {
+  luhnCheck,
+  classified,
+  withClassified
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-KS6SAVCZ.js.map

package/dist/chunk-KS6SAVCZ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/via/classified/validators.ts","../src/via/classified/presets.ts","../src/via/classified/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Pure write-time validators. Exported so userland can validate storage:'never'\n *  fields (e.g. CVC) at capture, before dropping them. @module */\n\nexport function luhnCheck(pan: string): boolean {\n  const digits = pan.replace(/[\\s-]/g, '')\n  if (!/^\\d{12,19}$/.test(digits)) return false\n  let sum = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < digits.length; i++) {\n    let d = Number(digits[digits.length - 1 - i])\n    if (i % 2 === 1) { d *= 2; if (d > 9) d -= 9 }\n    sum += d\n  }\n  return sum % 10 === 0\n}\n","/** The preset catalog (stage 1). Presets are hub-owned; devs get declarative\n *  knobs, not read-side callbacks (design law D2/D3). @module */\n\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec, ClassifiedGroup } from './descriptor.js'\nimport { luhnCheck } from './validators.js'\n\nconst digitsOf = (v: unknown): string => String(v).replace(/\\D/g, '')\n\nfunction panSpec(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  return {\n    _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard.pan', storage: 'recoverable',\n    sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '•••• ${last4}' },\n    riders: { last4: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-4), bin: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(0, 6) },\n    validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && luhnCheck(v) ? null : 'not a Luhn-valid card number'),\n  }\n}\n\nfunction expirySpec(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  return {\n    _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard.expiry', storage: 'recoverable',\n    sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '••/••' },\n    validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && /^(0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/\\d{2}$/.test(v) ? null : 'expected MM/YY'),\n  }\n}\n\nfunction cvcSpec(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  return {\n    _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard.cvc', storage: 'never',\n    sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'omit' },\n    validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && /^\\d{3,4}$/.test(v) ? null : 'expected 3-4 digits'),\n  }\n}\n\nexport const classified = {\n  /** Composite card type. PAN sealed + last4/bin riders; CVC is storage:'never' (PCI-aware). */\n  creditCard(fields: { pan: string; expiry?: string; cvc?: string }): ClassifiedGroup {\n    const members: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec> = { [fields.pan]: panSpec() }\n    if (fields.expiry !== undefined) members[fields.expiry] = expirySpec()\n    if (fields.cvc !== undefined) members[fields.cvc] = cvcSpec()\n    return { _noydbClassifiedGroup: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard', members }\n  },\n\n  birthDate(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'birthDate', storage: 'recoverable',\n      sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '${yob}-••-••' },\n      riders: { yob: (v) => String(v).slice(0, 4) },\n      validate: (v) => {\n        if (typeof v !== 'string' || !/^\\d{4}-\\d{2}-\\d{2}$/.test(v)) return 'expected ISO yyyy-mm-dd'\n        const parts = v.split('-').map(Number)\n        const year = parts[0]!, month = parts[1]!, day = parts[2]!\n        if (month < 1 || month > 12) return 'not a valid calendar date'\n        const daysInMonth = [31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31]\n        const isLeapYear = (year % 4 === 0 && year % 100 !== 0) || year % 400 === 0\n        const maxDay = month === 2 && isLeapYear ? 29 : daysInMonth[month - 1]!\n        if (day < 1 || day > maxDay) return 'not a valid calendar date'\n        return null\n      },\n    }\n  },\n\n  email(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'email', storage: 'recoverable',\n      sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '•••@${domain}' },\n      riders: { domain: (v) => String(v).split('@')[1] ?? '' },\n      validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && v.includes('@') ? null : 'expected an email address'),\n    }\n  },\n\n  phone(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'phone', storage: 'recoverable',\n      sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '•••••${last2}' },\n      riders: { last2: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-2) },\n      validate: (v) => (digitsOf(v).length >= 5 ? null : 'expected at least 5 digits'),\n    }\n  },\n\n  /** Digest-only password: verify-without-reveal; never listed, never revealed.\n   *  Enumeration math is on the caller for low-entropy values — see the\n   *  per-preset docs; the hub ships no rate limiter in this slice (spec §5).\n   *\n   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables\n   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:\n   *\n   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access\n   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —\n   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test\n   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),\n   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of\n   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret\n   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not\n   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the\n   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the\n   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does\n   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields\n   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being\n   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain\n   *  tags. */\n  password(opts: { minLength?: number; rotateDays?: number; notLastN?: number; equatable?: true } = {}): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    const minLength = opts.minLength ?? 10\n    const notLastN = opts.notLastN ?? 0\n    if (!Number.isInteger(notLastN) || notLastN < 0 || notLastN > 8) {\n      throw new Error(`classified.password: notLastN must be an integer 0..8 (write cost is n × 600K PBKDF2; ring blast radius is documented), got ${notLastN}`)\n    }\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'password', storage: 'digest-only',\n      sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'omit' },\n      verifyNormalize: 'password',\n      ...(opts.rotateDays !== undefined ? { rotateDays: opts.rotateDays } : {}),\n      ...(notLastN > 0 ? { notLastN } : {}),\n      ...(opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true as const } : {}),\n      validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && v.normalize('NFC').length >= minLength\n        ? null : `password must be at least ${minLength} characters`),\n    }\n  },\n\n  /** Digest-only secret answer: normalized (casefold/trim/collapse), groupable\n   *  into k-of-n matchGroup challenges. Low-entropy by nature — document the\n   *  enumeration math to your users; add app-side rate limiting.\n   *\n   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables\n   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:\n   *\n   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access\n   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —\n   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test\n   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),\n   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of\n   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret\n   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not\n   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the\n   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the\n   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does\n   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields\n   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being\n   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain\n   *  tags. */\n  secretAnswer(opts: { equatable?: true } = {}): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'secretAnswer', storage: 'digest-only',\n      sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'omit' },\n      verifyNormalize: 'secret-answer', verifyGroupMember: true,\n      ...(opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true as const } : {}),\n      validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string'\n        && v.normalize('NFC').toLowerCase().trim().replace(/\\s+/g, ' ').length > 0\n        ? null : 'secret answer must be non-empty after normalization'),\n    }\n  },\n}\n","import type { ClassifiedStrategy, ClassifiedVerifyCtx } from './strategy.js'\nimport type { VdigFieldPolicy } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec } from './descriptor.js'\n\nfunction policyOf(spec: ClassifiedFieldSpec): VdigFieldPolicy {\n  return {\n    normalize: spec.verifyNormalize ?? 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