@noy-db/hub 0.3.0-pre.8 → 0.3.0

package/dist/kernel/types.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3239 @@
+/**
+ * Core types — the {@link NoydbStore} interface, envelope format, roles, and
+ * all configuration shapes consumed by {@link createNoydb}.
+ *
+ * ## What lives here
+ *
+ * - **{@link NoydbStore}** — the 6-method contract every backend must implement
+ *   (`get`, `put`, `delete`, `list`, `loadAll`, `saveAll`).
+ * - **{@link EncryptedEnvelope}** — the wire format stored by backends:
+ *   `{ _noydb, _v, _ts, _iv, _data }`. Backends only ever see this shape.
+ * - **{@link Role} / {@link Permission}** — the access-control vocabulary
+ *   (`owner`, `admin`, `operator`, `viewer`, `client`).
+ * - **{@link NoydbOptions}** — the full configuration object passed to
+ *   {@link createNoydb}.
+ *
+ * ## Extending the store interface
+ *
+ * All optional store capabilities (`ping`, `listPage`, `listSince`,
+ * `presencePublish`, `presenceSubscribe`, `listVaults`) are additive extensions
+ * discovered via `'method' in store`. Implementing them unlocks features but
+ * is never required — core always falls back to the 6-method baseline.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+import type { StandardSchemaV1 } from './schema.js';
+import type { DeferredNumberingConfig } from '../with-commit/numbering/descriptor.js';
+import type { SyncPolicy } from './sync-policy.js';
+import type { BlobStrategy } from '../port/with/blob-strategy.js';
+import type { ArchiveStrategy } from '../with-fork/archive/index.js';
+import type { IndexStrategy } from '../with-lookup/indexing/strategy.js';
+import type { AggregateStrategy } from '../with-lookup/aggregate/strategy.js';
+import type { ConsentStrategy } from '../with-audit/consent/strategy.js';
+import type { PeriodsStrategy } from '../with-audit/periods/strategy.js';
+import type { ShadowStrategy } from '../with-fork/shadow/strategy.js';
+import type { TxStrategy } from '../with-commit/tx/strategy.js';
+import type { HistoryStrategy } from '../with-commit/history/strategy.js';
+import type { ForgetStrategy } from '../with-audit/forget/strategy.js';
+import type { SnapshotStrategy } from '../with-fork/snapshots/strategy.js';
+import type { DerivationSkippedFrozen } from './via/dispatch.js';
+import type { AttestationStrategy } from '../with-audit/attestation/strategy.js';
+import type { ClassifiedStrategy } from '../port/with/classified-strategy.js';
+import type { TiersStrategy } from '../with-audit/tiers/strategy.js';
+import type { SealedRecordStrategy } from '../with-audit/sealed-record/strategy.js';
+import type { PortabilityStrategy } from '../with-audit/portability/strategy.js';
+import type { SequenceStrategy } from '../with-commit/sequence/strategy.js';
+import type { CustodyStrategy } from '../with-party/custody/strategy.js';
+import type { TeamStrategy } from '../port/with/team-strategy.js';
+import type { BrokerStrategy } from '../port/with/broker-strategy.js';
+import type { LazyStrategy } from '../port/with/lazy-strategy.js';
+import type { SearchStrategy } from '../with-lookup/search/strategy.js';
+import type { CargoStrategy } from '../with-cargo/strategy.js';
+import type { Layer, I18nStrategy } from '../port/with/i18n-strategy.js';
+import type { SessionStrategy } from '../with-party/session/strategy.js';
+import type { SyncStrategy } from '../with-party/team/sync-strategy.js';
+import type { GuardStrategyHandleAny } from '../with-audit/guards/types.js';
+import type { DerivationStrategyHandle } from '../with-formula/derivations/types.js';
+import type { UnlockedKeyring } from '../with-party/team/keyring.js';
+import type { PassphrasePolicy } from './validation.js';
+import type { PublicEnvelopeSchema } from '../with-party/directory/public-envelope/types.js';
+import type { MaterializedViewStrategyHandle } from '../with-formula/materialized-views/types.js';
+import type { OverlayedViewStrategyHandle } from '../with-formula/overlay-views/types.js';
+import type { SealingKeyProvider, RecipientHint } from '../with-party/team/managed-passphrase.js';
+import type { ShamirRecoveryProvider } from '../with-party/team/shamir-recovery-provider.js';
+import type { ObjectProjection } from '../with-shape/blobs/object-projection.js';
+import type { CoordinationProvider } from '../port/by/types.js';
+import type { ScriptWarning } from '../port/with/i18n-strategy.js';
+import type { ViaDescriptor } from './via/index.js';
+import type { EnclaveKey } from './enclave/index.js';
+/** Format version for encrypted record envelopes. */
+export declare const NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION: 1;
+/** Format version for keyring files. */
+export declare const NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION: 1;
+/** Format version for backup files. */
+export declare const NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION: 1;
+/** Format version for sync metadata. */
+export declare const NOYDB_SYNC_VERSION: 1;
+/**
+ * Access role assigned to a user within a vault.
+ *
+ * Roles control both the operations a user can perform and which DEKs
+ * they receive in their keyring:
+ *
+ * | Role        | Collections      | Can grant/revoke | Can export |
+ * |-------------|-----------------|:----------------:|:----------:|
+ * | `owner`     | all (rw)        | Yes (all roles)  | Yes        |
+ * | `admin`     | all (rw)        | Yes (≤ admin)    | Yes        |
+ * | `custodian` | all (rw)        | No (see below)   | Yes        |
+ * | `operator`  | explicit (rw)   | No               | ACL-scoped |
+ * | `viewer`    | all (ro)        | No               | Yes        |
+ * | `client`    | explicit (ro)   | No               | ACL-scoped |
+ *
+ * **`custodian` (FR-6 sovereign custody).** Operationally admin-rank —
+ * rw + access on every collection, receives all collection DEKs on grant
+ * — but is *provably non-owning*: it CANNOT grant, revoke, rotate keys,
+ * destructively withdraw/sever, or extract-and-sever a partition (rotate is
+ * blocked in `rotateKeys`, sever in `withdrawAccessibleData`, and extract in
+ * `extractPartition`). Only the (sealed Deed) **owner** may
+ * mint or remove a custodian; an admin cannot. This is the inalienability
+ * floor — a custodian can run the vault day-to-day yet never escalate to
+ * the owner credential.
+ */
+export type Role = 'owner' | 'admin' | 'custodian' | 'operator' | 'viewer' | 'client';
+/**
+ * Read-write or read-only access on a collection.
+ * Stored per-collection in the user's keyring.
+ */
+export type Permission = 'rw' | 'ro';
+/**
+ * Map of collection name → permission level for a user's keyring entry.
+ * `'*'` is the wildcard collection matching all collections in the vault.
+ */
+export type Permissions = Record<string, Permission>;
+/** The encrypted wrapper stored by stores. Stores only ever see this. */
+export interface EncryptedEnvelope {
+    readonly _noydb: typeof NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION;
+    readonly _v: number;
+    readonly _ts: string;
+    readonly _iv: string;
+    readonly _data: string;
+    /** User who created this version (unencrypted metadata). */
+    readonly _by?: string;
+    /**
+     * Opaque provenance source id — which party/registry wrote this version.
+     * Unencrypted; present only when the collection opts into `provenance: true`
+     * and a `source` is supplied to `put()`. Off by default (zero cost).
+     */
+    readonly _source?: string;
+    /** ISO-8601 timestamp the provenance source was recorded. Present alongside `_source`. */
+    readonly _sourceTs?: string;
+    /**
+     * Hierarchical access tier. Omitted → tier 0.
+     *
+     * Unencrypted on purpose — the store reads it to route the envelope
+     * to the right DEK slot without having to try-decrypt against every
+     * tier. Only leaks the tier of each record, not any value
+     * equivalence.
+     */
+    readonly _tier?: number;
+    /**
+     * User id who last elevated this record. Used by
+     * `demote()` to gate the reverse operation: only the original
+     * elevator or an owner can demote a record back down. Cleared on
+     * every successful demote so a later re-elevate requires the new
+     * actor to own the demotion right.
+     */
+    readonly _elevatedBy?: string;
+    /**
+     * Deterministic-encryption index. Map of field name →
+     * base64 deterministic ciphertext. Present only when the collection
+     * declares `deterministicFields` and the feature is acknowledged. The
+     * field names are unencrypted (they're the index keys); the values
+     * are AES-GCM ciphertext with an HKDF-derived deterministic IV.
+     *
+     * Enables blind equality search (`collection.findByDet(field,
+     * value)`) without decrypting every record. Leaks equality as a known
+     * side channel.
+     */
+    readonly _det?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Structural group-encryption. Map of sensitive field name →
+     * per-field sealed ciphertext in `iv:data` form (same shape as a `_det`
+     * slot). Present only when the collection declares `sensitive` fields and
+     * at least one is present on the record. Each field is encrypted under its
+     * own HKDF-derived per-field key (`deriveSealedFieldKey`, domain-separated
+     * by `<collection>/sealed/<field>`), and is kept OUT of the open `_data`
+     * blob — so a reader who can open `_data` still cannot see sealed fields
+     * without re-deriving each field key. With no sensitive fields declared the
+     * map is absent and `_data` is unchanged (byte-identical to legacy output).
+     */
+    readonly _sealed?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Verify-digest slots (classified stage 2). Map of digest-only field name →
+     * AES-256-GCM `iv:data` blob sealed under the HKDF(CEK) vdig slot key with
+     * AAD ['noydb-classify-vdig', collection, recordId, field]. The store sees
+     * only ciphertext; only the enclave verify path can read the digest. At most
+     * one of `_sealed[field]` / `_vdig[field]` exists per field (I4).
+     */
+    readonly _vdig?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Equatable blind-index tags (classified slice 2b). Map of digest-only field
+     * name → base64 33-byte tag (1-byte cost/version discriminator ‖ 32-byte keyed
+     * MAC), CURRENT VALUE ONLY (the _vdig ring is never indexed). This is the ONLY
+     * store-visible classified artifact: a keyed MAC, comparable without a key
+     * ceremony, with NO inline cryptographic integrity by construction. Invariant:
+     * _bidx[field] present ⇒ _vdig[field] present. Confirm-by-verify (findByDigest)
+     * makes any read-side orphan/splice unreturnable.
+     */
+    readonly _bidx?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Per-record content-encryption key (CEK), base64 AES-KW-wrapped under
+     * the collection (or tier) DEK. Present only on records written by a
+     * collection opened with `perRecordKeys: true`. When present, the body
+     * (`_iv`/`_data`) is encrypted under the unwrapped CEK rather than the
+     * collection DEK directly.
+     *
+     * Presence is the format discriminant: `_cek` absent → legacy body
+     * keyed off the collection DEK (read unchanged); `_cek` present →
+     * unwrap under the collection DEK, then decrypt the body under the CEK.
+     *
+     * The CEK is stable across every version of a record (insert mints it;
+     * updates and history snapshots reuse it), so all `_history` envelopes
+     * for a record carry the same `_cek`. This is the foundation for
+     * per-record erasure and record-scoped sealing.
+     *
+     * `_det` slots are deliberately NOT keyed off the CEK — they remain
+     * keyed to the collection DEK so blind-equality search keeps working
+     * across records.
+     */
+    readonly _cek?: string;
+    /**
+     * Debug-plaintext marker. Present only on records written by a vault opened
+     * with `debugPlaintext: true` (which requires `encrypt: false`). When set,
+     * the record's own fields are inlined as top-level keys on this envelope
+     * (beside the reserved `_`-prefixed metadata) and `_data` is empty — so
+     * native store tooling (jq, S3 console) reads the record directly. The read
+     * path reconstructs the record from the non-`_` keys; the marker makes a
+     * debug envelope self-describing, so a classic plaintext reader handles it too.
+     */
+    readonly _debug?: typeof NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION;
+    /**
+     * #589: this envelope is a delete marker (ordinary `collection.delete()` under
+     * sync). Empty `_data`, no `_cek`, but version-ordered — a higher-`_v` re-create
+     * resurrects the id. Distinct from a forget crypto-shred tombstone, which is
+     * terminal. Reads treat it as absent.
+     */
+    readonly _del?: true;
+}
+/** Spine policy for one digest-only classified field — the enclave-consumable
+ *  projection of a ClassifiedFieldSpec (the enclave never imports with-*). */
+export interface VdigFieldPolicy {
+    readonly normalize: 'password' | 'secret-answer';
+    /** Ring size for reuse refusal; 0 = no ring. Cap 8 (spec Q4). */
+    readonly notLastN: number;
+    readonly rotateDays?: number;
+    /** default false — refused unless the double door is open (R8) */
+    readonly equatable: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * The persisted classified-fields config marker (C-A / R10). Reuses the
+ * stage-2 persisted-schema record; this is the shape of the marker stored
+ * there.
+ */
+export interface ClassifiedMarker {
+    /** field names declared digest-only (have _vdig); non-empty ⇒ writes need the classified codec */
+    readonly digestOnly: readonly string[];
+    /** field names additionally declared equatable (have _bidx when covered) */
+    readonly equatable: readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * Lifetime epoch (#597) — same shape/intent as `PairingMarker.epoch`
+     * (`with-shape/satellites/types.ts`): an opaque, stable-per-collection-
+     * lifetime stamp minted the first time this marker is persisted and
+     * carried forward unchanged by an IDENTICAL re-persist for the SAME
+     * collection (the equality fast path). NOTE: unlike `PairingMarker` (whose
+     * R-S9 refuses divergent redeclares), a classified marker IS rewritten
+     * wholesale on a genuine reconfiguration (changed digestOnly/equatable
+     * set) — so the epoch re-stamps to the fresh value then (see
+     * `config-drift.ts`'s `markerForFields`). Optional: markers persisted
+     * before this field existed have none. Deliberately excluded from the
+     * classified-marker equality check in
+     * `with-shape/persisted-schemas/register.ts`. ADDITIVE ONLY today: no
+     * delete-collection API exists yet, so a stale marker on a reused name is
+     * unreachable; the epoch-MISMATCH rejection this would enable is a
+     * deferred follow-up once name reuse is possible — whoever wires it must
+     * first make reconfiguration carry the prior epoch forward.
+     */
+    readonly epoch?: string;
+}
+/** Verdict-only egress of the enclave oracle (spec §3). */
+export interface ClassifiedVerdict {
+    readonly ok: boolean;
+    /** I1: present ONLY when ok === true — never computed for a false verdict. */
+    readonly mustRotate?: true;
+}
+/**
+ * Opaque access gate for a sealed (`sensitive`) field returned by a public
+ * read (the access layer). The handle carries only the per-field
+ * **ciphertext** — the plaintext is never materialised into the working-set
+ * cache. Call {@link Sealed.reveal} to decrypt the value on demand.
+ *
+ * A handle is intentionally NOT usable as `V`: it serialises to a non-leaking
+ * marker (`JSON.stringify` / structured logging emit `'[sealed]'`, never the
+ * value) and exposes no synchronous accessor.
+ */
+export interface Sealed<V> {
+    /** Discriminant — always `true`, lets callers narrow a field to a handle. */
+    readonly sealed: true;
+    /** Decrypt and return the underlying value. */
+    reveal(): Promise<V>;
+}
+/**
+ * The shape a public read returns for a collection that declares `sensitive`
+ * fields `S`: every sealed field becomes an opaque {@link Sealed} handle while
+ * the rest of the record is unchanged. The `[S] extends [never]` guard collapses
+ * `SealedView<T, never>` to exactly `T`, so collections with no sensitive fields
+ * are unaffected — a plain `Omit<T, never>` is *not* a faithful identity for
+ * generic intersection record types (it can degrade intersection-only members to
+ * `unknown`), which would break consumers like the derivation/MV `_derivedFrom` /
+ * `_materializedFrom` reads.
+ */
+export type SealedView<T, S extends keyof T> = [S] extends [never] ? T : Omit<T, S> & {
+    readonly [K in S]: Sealed<T[K]>;
+};
+/**
+ * The type of a field-name argument to the query/scan DSL (`where`, `orderBy`,
+ * …) for a collection whose sealed (`sensitive`) fields are `S`.
+ *
+ * Guarded so the common case is unchanged: with **no** sensitive fields
+ * (`S = never`) it is exactly `string` — collections that don't opt into
+ * `sensitive` keep today's permissive DSL, zero churn. Once a field is
+ * declared `sensitive`, the DSL narrows to the non-sensitive field names, so
+ * `where('ssn', …)` becomes a compile error. TypeScript cannot subtract a
+ * literal from `string`, so refusing a sensitive name necessarily means
+ * narrowing to the known field-name union — this is intentional and only
+ * affects collections that opted in.
+ *
+ * When `Q` (the indexed-field set) is given, `where()` is additionally
+ * restricted to `Q` minus any sensitive fields — the escape hatch for
+ * non-indexed filters is `scan()`. `Q = never` (the default) preserves the
+ * existing 2-param behaviour exactly (zero churn).
+ */
+export type QueryField<T, S extends keyof T = never, Q extends keyof T & string = never> = [
+    Q
+] extends [never] ? ([S] extends [never] ? string : Exclude<keyof T & string, S>) : Exclude<Q, S>;
+/**
+ * The type of a field-name reference in a collection's index-declaration
+ * options (`indexes`, `deterministicFields`, `textIndexes`). Same guarded
+ * narrowing as {@link QueryField}: permissive `string` until a field is
+ * declared `sensitive`, then the sensitive names are refused (a plaintext
+ * secondary index over a sealed field defeats non-residency). Kept distinct
+ * from `QueryField` so the two DSL surfaces can diverge later without coupling.
+ *
+ * When `Q` (the indexed-field set) is given, the `indexes` option is
+ * additionally restricted to `Q` minus any sensitive fields — declaring `Q`
+ * but listing a different field in `indexes` becomes a compile error.
+ * `Q = never` (the default) preserves the existing 2-param behaviour.
+ */
+export type IndexFieldName<T, S extends keyof T = never, Q extends keyof T & string = never> = [
+    Q
+] extends [never] ? ([S] extends [never] ? string : Exclude<keyof T & string, S>) : Exclude<Q, S>;
+/**
+ * Generic form of the runtime `IndexDef` (see `indexing/eager-indexes.ts`)
+ * parameterised by the allowed field-name set `F`. Used to refuse `sensitive`
+ * fields in the `indexes` collection option at compile time while leaving the
+ * runtime `IndexDef` (string-based) untouched. `IndexDefFor<string>` is
+ * structurally identical to `IndexDef`, which is why `vault.collection` can cast
+ * the narrowed public option to `IndexDef[]` at the runtime boundary (through
+ * `unknown`, solely to drop the `readonly`).
+ * **Keep this in sync with `IndexDef`** — if `IndexDef` gains a new union member,
+ * add it here too, or that boundary cast will silently admit shapes the runtime
+ * machinery does not narrow.
+ */
+export type IndexDefFor<F extends string> = F | {
+    readonly fields: readonly F[];
+    readonly unique?: boolean;
+} | readonly F[];
+/**
+ * The type of the `sensitive` collection option, conditional on whether the
+ * caller opted into compile-time refusal via an explicit second generic.
+ * With no 2nd generic (`S = never`) it accepts any field array — runtime
+ * sealing only, no compile refusal, non-breaking. With `S` given, it is
+ * `readonly S[]`, which ties the runtime array to the declared sensitive
+ * union so the two cannot drift.
+ */
+export type SensitiveOpt<T, S extends keyof T> = [S] extends [never] ? readonly (keyof T & string)[] : readonly S[];
+/**
+ * The type of the `moneyFields` collection option, conditional on whether the
+ * caller opted into compile-time money-field typing via the 4th generic `M`.
+ * Typed against the opaque {@link ViaDescriptor} marker rather than the
+ * concrete `MoneyDescriptor` — the kernel never inspects a Via feature's
+ * descriptor shape, only its declaring service does.
+ * A `money()` descriptor structurally satisfies `ViaDescriptor` (it carries
+ * `_viaBrand: 'money'`), so this stays publicly assignable from `money()`
+ * call sites. With no `M` (`M = never`) it accepts any
+ * `Record<string, ViaDescriptor>` — runtime money only, no compile-level
+ * narrowing, non-breaking. With `M` given, it is `Record<M, ViaDescriptor>`,
+ * tying the runtime map to the declared money-field union so the two cannot
+ * drift.
+ */
+export type MoneyFieldsOpt<T, M extends keyof T & string = never> = [
+    M
+] extends [never] ? Record<string, ViaDescriptor> : Record<M, ViaDescriptor>;
+/**
+ * Concrete {@link Sealed} handle. Holds the reveal closure (which captures the
+ * field's ciphertext blob and the unseal routine) in a private field, so it is
+ * invisible to `JSON.stringify`, `util.inspect`, and `Object.keys`. `toJSON`
+ * returns the marker `'[sealed]'` — a handle can never leak its value through
+ * serialisation or logging because the plaintext is not stored on it at all.
+ */
+export declare class SealedHandle<V> implements Sealed<V> {
+    #private;
+    readonly sealed: true;
+    constructor(reveal: () => Promise<V>);
+    reveal(): Promise<V>;
+    /** Non-leaking serialisation marker — never the underlying value. */
+    toJSON(): string;
+}
+/**
+ * Handover-capable provider. Implemented additionally by asymmetric/granted
+ * providers (cloud-KMS asymmetric, Azure RSA Key Vault, AWS KMS with grant).
+ * Self-only providers (macOS Keychain, env-var, WebAuthn-PRF) do NOT
+ * implement this — the §11.2 capability matrix lives in the type system.
+ *
+ * Per foundation §11.4. A function that requires recipient-target sealing
+ * takes `RecipientSealer`, not `SealingKeyProvider` — the compiler rejects
+ * passing a self-only provider at the spec site.
+ */
+export interface RecipientSealer {
+    readonly id: string;
+    /** Produce hint material a sender uses to seal-for-this-recipient. */
+    publishRecipientHint(): Promise<RecipientHint>;
+    /**
+     * Seal plaintext for the recipient described by `hint`. Returns opaque
+     * bytes — same contract as `SealingKeyProvider.seal()`. The bundle
+     * layer base64-encodes the bytes into `SealedAutoUnlockEntry.sealed`
+     * without inspecting them.
+     */
+    sealForRecipient(plaintext: Uint8Array, hint: RecipientHint): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+}
+/**
+ * Thin delivery envelope persisted at
+ * `_sealed_cek/<collection>/<id>/<pid>`. The grantor writes one per
+ * (record, recipient host) pair. `payload` is the base64 of the bytes returned
+ * by {@link RecipientSealer.sealForRecipient} over a UTF-8
+ * `JSON.stringify({@link SealedCekBinding})`.
+ *
+ * `expiresAt` is duplicated here for a cheap pre-unseal reject, but is NOT
+ * authoritative — the binding inside `payload` carries the expiry the host
+ * verifies after unsealing, so a tampered delivery envelope cannot extend a
+ * grant.
+ */
+export interface SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope {
+    /** Envelope schema version. */
+    readonly v: 1;
+    /** Magic marker for forensics + format detection. */
+    readonly _noydb_sealed_cek: 1;
+    /** Recipient host provider id; matches the sealer's `.id` / hint `pid`. */
+    readonly pid: string;
+    /** base64 of the sealed {@link SealedCekBinding} bytes. */
+    readonly payload: string;
+    /** Fast-path expiry hint (ISO 8601). Authoritative copy is inside `payload`. */
+    readonly expiresAt: string;
+}
+/**
+ * The plaintext struct sealed for the recipient host. After the host unseals
+ * `SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope.payload` it parses this and MUST verify:
+ *  - `collection` + `id` match the record envelope it is decrypting, and
+ *  - `expiresAt` has not passed (authoritative expiry check).
+ *
+ * `cek` is the base64 of the raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK.
+ */
+export interface SealedCekBinding {
+    /** Collection the CEK belongs to. */
+    readonly collection: string;
+    /** Record id the CEK belongs to. */
+    readonly id: string;
+    /** base64 of the raw AES-256-GCM CEK bytes. */
+    readonly cek: string;
+    /** Authoritative expiry (ISO 8601). */
+    readonly expiresAt: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Placeholder returned by `getAtTier()` in `'ghost'` mode when a
+ * record is at a tier the caller cannot decrypt. Record existence is
+ * advertised — the id and tier are visible — but contents are
+ * withheld. `canElevateFrom` lists user ids authorized to elevate
+ * access for this caller when known; absent when the workflow is
+ * not configured.
+ */
+export interface GhostRecord {
+    readonly _ghost: true;
+    readonly _tier: number;
+    readonly canElevateFrom?: readonly string[];
+}
+/** Control what lower-tier reads see above their clearance. */
+export type TierMode = 'invisibility' | 'ghost';
+/**
+ * Event emitted when a record at a tier above the caller's inherent
+ * clearance is read or written successfully (via elevation or
+ * delegation). Always written to the ledger; subscribers get a
+ * real-time feed.
+ */
+export interface CrossTierAccessEvent {
+    readonly actor: string;
+    readonly collection: string;
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly tier: number;
+    /** How the caller gained tier access: they elevated it, or a delegation is active. */
+    readonly authorization: 'elevation' | 'delegation' | 'inherent';
+    readonly op: 'get' | 'put' | 'elevate' | 'demote';
+    readonly ts: string;
+    /**
+     * When `authorization === 'elevation'`, the audit reason string the
+     * caller passed to `vault.elevate(...)`. Empty for inherent /
+     * delegation paths.
+     */
+    readonly reason?: string;
+    /**
+     * When `authorization === 'elevation'`, the tier the caller's
+     * keyring effectively held BEFORE elevation. Useful for audit
+     * dashboards distinguishing "operator elevating to 2" from
+     * "inherent tier-2 write."
+     */
+    readonly elevatedFrom?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * A single deterministic-ciphertext index slot on an envelope. Stored
+ * as `iv:data` (both base64, colon-separated) so a single string per
+ * field keeps the envelope compact.
+ */
+export type DeterministicCipher = string;
+/** All records across all collections for a compartment. */
+export type VaultSnapshot = Record<string, Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope>>;
+/**
+ * Result of a single page fetch via the optional `listPage` adapter extension.
+ *
+ * `items` carries the actual encrypted envelopes (not just ids) so the
+ * caller can decrypt and emit a single record without an extra `get()`
+ * round-trip per id. `nextCursor` is `null` on the final page.
+ */
+export interface ListPageResult {
+    /** Encrypted envelopes for this page, in adapter-defined order. */
+    items: Array<{
+        id: string;
+        envelope: EncryptedEnvelope;
+    }>;
+    /** Opaque cursor for the next page, or `null` if this was the last page. */
+    nextCursor: string | null;
+}
+export interface NoydbStore {
+    /**
+     * Optional human-readable store name (e.g. 'memory', 'file', 'dynamo').
+     * Used in diagnostic messages and the listPage fallback warning. Stores
+     * are encouraged to set this so logs are clearer about which backend is
+     * involved when something goes wrong.
+     */
+    name?: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional declared store capabilities (CAS atomicity, native tx, blob
+     * size limits, auth). Consumers that require a capability — e.g.
+     * `vault.sequence().next()` needs `casAtomic` — read it here.
+     */
+    capabilities?: StoreCapabilities;
+    /** Get a single record. Returns null if not found. */
+    get(vault: string, collection: string, id: string): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>;
+    /** Put a record. Throws ConflictError if expectedVersion doesn't match. */
+    put(vault: string, collection: string, id: string, envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, expectedVersion?: number): Promise<void>;
+    /** Delete a record. */
+    delete(vault: string, collection: string, id: string): Promise<void>;
+    /** List all record IDs in a collection. */
+    list(vault: string, collection: string): Promise<string[]>;
+    /** Load all records for a vault (initial hydration). */
+    loadAll(vault: string): Promise<VaultSnapshot>;
+    /** Save all records for a vault (bulk write / restore). */
+    saveAll(vault: string, data: VaultSnapshot): Promise<void>;
+    /** Optional connectivity check for sync engine. */
+    ping?(): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * The store's authoritative time as a bounded-uncertainty interval.
+     * Present iff `capabilities.serverWriteTime` is true. Monotonic
+     * non-decreasing across calls on a single store.
+     */
+    getStoreTime?(): Promise<StoreTime>;
+    /**
+     * Optional: list record IDs in a collection that have `_ts` after `since`.
+     * Used by partial sync (`pull({ modifiedSince })`). Stores that omit this
+     * fall back to a full `loadAll` + client-side timestamp filter.
+     */
+    listSince?(vault: string, collection: string, since: string): Promise<string[]>;
+    /**
+     * Optional pagination extension. Stores that implement `listPage` get
+     * the streaming `Collection.scan()` fast path; stores that don't are
+     * silently fallen back to a full `loadAll()` + slice (with a one-time
+     * console.warn).
+     *
+     * `cursor` is opaque to the core — each store encodes its own paging
+     * state (DynamoDB: base64 LastEvaluatedKey JSON; S3: ContinuationToken;
+     * memory/file/browser: numeric offset of a sorted id list). Pass
+     * `undefined` to start from the beginning.
+     *
+     * `limit` is a soft upper bound on `items.length`. Stores MAY return
+     * fewer items even when more exist (e.g. if the underlying store has
+     * its own page size cap), and MUST signal "no more pages" by returning
+     * `nextCursor: null`.
+     *
+     * The 6-method core contract is unchanged — this is an additive
+     * extension discovered via `'listPage' in adapter`.
+     */
+    listPage?(vault: string, collection: string, cursor?: string, limit?: number): Promise<ListPageResult>;
+    /**
+     * Optional pub/sub for real-time presence.
+     * Publish an encrypted payload to a presence channel.
+     * Falls back to storage-based polling when absent.
+     */
+    presencePublish?(channel: string, payload: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Optional pub/sub for real-time presence.
+     * Subscribe to a presence channel. Returns an unsubscribe function.
+     * Falls back to storage-based polling when absent.
+     */
+    presenceSubscribe?(channel: string, callback: (payload: string) => void): () => void;
+    /**
+     * Optional cross-vault enumeration extension.
+     *
+     * Returns the names of every top-level vault the store
+     * currently stores. Used by `Noydb.listAccessibleVaults()` to
+     * enumerate the universe of vaults before filtering down to
+     * the ones the calling principal can actually unwrap.
+     *
+     * **Why this is optional:** the storage shape of compartments
+     * differs across backends. Memory and file stores store
+     * vaults as top-level keys / directories and can enumerate
+     * them in O(1) calls. DynamoDB stores everything in a single table
+     * keyed by `(compartment#collection, id)` — enumerating compartments
+     * requires either a Scan (expensive, eventually consistent, leaks
+     * ciphertext metadata) or a dedicated GSI that the consumer
+     * provisioned. S3 needs a prefix list (cheap if enabled, ACL-sensitive
+     * otherwise). Browser localStorage can scan keys by prefix.
+     *
+     * Stores that cannot implement `listVaults` cheaply or
+     * cleanly should omit it. Core surfaces a `StoreCapabilityError`
+     * with a clear message when a caller invokes
+     * `listAccessibleVaults()` against a store that doesn't
+     * provide this method, so consumers know to either upgrade their
+     * store, provide a candidate list explicitly to `queryAcross()`,
+     * or fall back to maintaining the compartment index out of band.
+     *
+     * **Privacy note:** `listVaults` returns *every* compartment
+     * the store has, not just the ones the caller can access. The
+     * existence-leak filtering (returning only compartments whose
+     * keyring the caller can unwrap) happens in core, not in the
+     * store. The store is trusted to know its own contents — that
+     * is not a leak in the threat model. The leak the API guards
+     * against is the *return value* of `listAccessibleVaults()`
+     * exposing existence to a downstream observer who only sees that
+     * function's output.
+     *
+     * The 6-method core contract is unchanged — this is an additive
+     * extension discovered via `'listVaults' in store`.
+     */
+    listVaults?(): Promise<string[]>;
+    /**
+     * Optional: generate a presigned URL for direct client download.
+     * Only meaningful for object stores (S3, GCS) that support URL signing.
+     * Returns a time-limited URL that fetches the encrypted envelope directly.
+     * The caller must decrypt client-side (the URL returns ciphertext).
+     */
+    presignUrl?(vault: string, collection: string, id: string, expiresInSeconds?: number): Promise<string>;
+    /**
+     * Optional: estimate current storage usage.
+     * Returns `{ usedBytes, quotaBytes }` or null if the store cannot estimate.
+     * Used by quota-aware routing to detect overflow conditions.
+     */
+    estimateUsage?(): Promise<{
+        usedBytes: number;
+        quotaBytes: number;
+    } | null>;
+    /**
+     * Optional multi-record atomic write.
+     *
+     * When present, `db.transaction(async (tx) => { ... })` uses this to
+     * commit every staged op in one storage-layer transaction — either
+     * all ops land or none do, regardless of which records they touch.
+     * Every `TxOp.expectedVersion` (when set) must be honored atomically
+     * alongside the write; any violation throws `ConflictError` and the
+     * whole batch fails.
+     *
+     * Stores that omit this fall through to the hub's per-record OCC
+     * fallback: pre-flight CAS check, then sequential `put`/`delete`
+     * with best-effort unwind on mid-batch failure (see
+     * `runTransaction` for the exact semantics and crash window).
+     *
+     * Native implementations: `to-memory` (single Map mutation),
+     * `to-dynamo` (`TransactWriteItems`), `to-browser-idb` (one
+     * `readwrite` transaction). File / S3 cannot implement this
+     * atomically and should omit the method.
+     */
+    tx?(ops: readonly TxOp[]): Promise<void>;
+}
+/**
+ * A single staged operation inside a `db.transaction(fn)` commit. The
+ * hub assembles `TxOp[]` from the user's `tx.collection().put/delete`
+ * calls, encrypts any `record` values into `envelope`, and hands the
+ * array to `NoydbStore.tx()` when the store supports atomic batch
+ * writes. Stores that implement `tx()` MUST honor every
+ * `expectedVersion` atomically against the stored envelope version.
+ */
+export interface TxOp {
+    readonly type: 'put' | 'delete';
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly collection: string;
+    readonly id: string;
+    /** Populated for `type: 'put'` — the encrypted envelope to write. */
+    readonly envelope?: EncryptedEnvelope;
+    /** Optional per-record CAS. Mismatch must throw `ConflictError`. */
+    readonly expectedVersion?: number;
+}
+/** Type-safe helper for creating store factories. */
+export declare function createStore<TOptions>(factory: (options: TOptions) => NoydbStore): (options: TOptions) => NoydbStore;
+/**
+ * Interchange formats `@noy-db/as-*` packages can produce. `'*'` is a
+ * wildcard granting every current + future plaintext format.
+ */
+export type ExportFormat = 'xlsx' | 'csv' | 'json' | 'ndjson' | 'xml' | 'sql' | 'pdf' | 'blob' | 'zip' | '*';
+/**
+ * Owner-granted export capability on a keyring.
+ *
+ * Two independent dimensions:
+ *
+ * - `plaintext` — per-format allowlist for record formatters + blob
+ *   extractors that emit plaintext bytes (`as-xlsx`, `as-csv`,
+ *   `as-blob`, `as-zip`, …). **Defaults to empty** for every role;
+ *   the owner/admin must positively grant per-format (or `'*'`).
+ * - `bundle` — boolean for `.noydb` encrypted container export
+ *   (`as-noydb`). **Default policy: on for owner/admin, off for
+ *   operator/viewer/client** — applied when the field is absent or
+ *   undefined (see `hasExportCapability`).
+ */
+export interface ExportCapability {
+    readonly plaintext?: readonly ExportFormat[];
+    readonly bundle?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Owner-granted import capability on a keyring (sibling of
+ * `ExportCapability`, issue ).
+ *
+ * Two independent dimensions:
+ *
+ * - `plaintext` — per-format allowlist for `as-*` readers that ingest
+ *   plaintext bytes (`as-csv`, `as-json`, `as-ndjson`, `as-zip`, …).
+ *   Defaults to empty for every role; the owner/admin must positively
+ *   grant per-format (or `'*'`).
+ * - `bundle` — boolean gate for `.noydb` bundle import. **Defaults to
+ *   `false` for every role**, including owner/admin. Import is more
+ *   dangerous than export (corrupts vs leaks), so the policy is
+ *   default-closed across the board — the owner explicitly opts a
+ *   keyring in via `db.grant({ importCapability: { bundle: true } })`.
+ */
+export interface ImportCapability {
+    readonly plaintext?: readonly ExportFormat[];
+    readonly bundle?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Forward-declared on-disk shape for `VaultPolicy` — the actual policy
+ * model is declared further down in this file (#9), see {@link VaultPolicy}.
+ * Declared here as an `unknown`-typed map (rather than `VaultPolicy` itself)
+ * so the `KeyringFile.policy` field can still round-trip foreign/older
+ * documents that don't strictly satisfy the current shape.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export type VaultPolicyOnDisk = Record<string, unknown>;
+/**
+ * Recovery profile enrolled at vault creation.
+ *
+ * - `paper` — `on-recovery` codes (the standard end-to-end profile).
+ * - `shamir` / `multi-channel` / `admin-mediated` — API surface ships;
+ *   per-profile dispatch lands in follow-up issues. Calling
+ *   `db.recoverPassphrase` against these throws
+ *   {@link RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError}.
+ */
+export type RecoveryEnrollment = {
+    readonly profile: 'paper';
+    /** Number of single-use codes to print at enrollment. */
+    readonly codes: number;
+} | {
+    readonly profile: 'shamir';
+    readonly k: number;
+    readonly n: number;
+    readonly trustees: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+} | {
+    readonly profile: 'multi-channel';
+    readonly email?: string;
+    readonly pin?: boolean;
+    readonly paperCodes?: number;
+} | {
+    readonly profile: 'admin-mediated';
+    readonly grantorUserId: string;
+};
+/**
+ * One tier-2 authenticator slot inside a keyring file. Each slot
+ * independently wraps the SAME KEK under a method-specific derived key
+ * (LUKS pattern). Adding or removing a slot is a constant-time keyring
+ * write — no DEK re-keying required.
+ *
+ * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Tier 2 — Authenticate (multi-slot)
+ */
+/**
+ * Shared fields across all authenticator slot variants. The variant
+ * (`KeyringAuthenticatorWrappingKEK` vs `KeyringAuthenticatorWrappingDEKs`)
+ * carries the actual wrapped material; everything below is identity +
+ * metadata only.
+ */
+interface KeyringAuthenticatorBase {
+    /** Caller-chosen identifier — e.g. `'webauthn-yubikey-blue'`, `'oidc-google'`, `'password'`. */
+    readonly id: string;
+    /** Method family — selects which `@noy-db/on-*` package handles unlock. */
+    readonly method: 'webauthn' | 'oidc' | 'password';
+    /** ISO-8601 timestamp at which the slot was added. */
+    readonly enrolled_at: string;
+    /**
+     * Which session tier ENROLLED this slot. Tier 1 enrolls a fresh slot;
+     * tier 2 may add a sibling slot when the active policy permits.
+     */
+    readonly enrolled_via_tier: 1 | 2;
+    /**
+     * Method-specific metadata: WebAuthn cred id, OIDC issuer/sub, PBKDF2
+     * salt for `on-password`, etc. The schema is open by design — the
+     * `@noy-db/on-*` package owns the contents.
+     */
+    readonly meta: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+/**
+ * Slot that wraps the KEK directly under a method-derived AES-KW key.
+ * Used by ceremonies where the on-* package can produce/recover an
+ * extractable KEK from its own credential — WebAuthn (PRF-derived
+ * wrapping key) and split-key OIDC.
+ *
+ * `wrapKind` is optional/absent on older slots — those
+ * legacy slots are treated as wrap-KEK by default at unlock time.
+ */
+export interface KeyringAuthenticatorWrappingKEK extends KeyringAuthenticatorBase {
+    readonly wrapKind?: 'kek';
+    /** Base64 wrapped-KEK ciphertext under the method-derived key. */
+    readonly wrapped_kek: string;
+    /** XOR guard — wrap-KEK slots must NOT carry wrap-DEKs material. */
+    readonly wrapped_deks?: never;
+    /** XOR guard — wrap-KEK slots must NOT carry wrap-DEKs material. */
+    readonly iv?: never;
+}
+/**
+ * Slot that wraps the DEK set (not the KEK) under a method-derived
+ * AES-GCM key — sidesteps the non-extractable-KEK constraint by
+ * encrypting the serialized `{ deks: { collection: rawDekBase64 } }`
+ * directly. Mirrors the format used by `mintPaperRecoveryEntry`
+ * (`PaperRecoveryEntry`) and `@noy-db/on-pin`'s `PinResumeState` —
+ * the unified wrap-DEKs primitive across tier-0 / tier-2 / tier-3.
+ *
+ * Trade-off: a slot of this kind reconstructs `UnlockedKeyring` with
+ * `kek: null` after unlock. That is semantically correct for tier-2
+ * (sensitive ops like `enrollAuthenticator` / `rotatePassphrase`
+ * require a tier-1 unlock anyway) and matches how `@noy-db/on-pin`
+ * already behaves at tier 3.
+ *
+ * @see `mintPaperRecoveryEntry` in `team/recovery.ts` — same shape on
+ *      a different on-disk path (`_meta/recovery-paper`).
+ */
+export interface KeyringAuthenticatorWrappingDEKs extends KeyringAuthenticatorBase {
+    readonly wrapKind: 'deks';
+    /** Base64 AES-GCM ciphertext of `{ deks: { collection: base64rawDek } }`. */
+    readonly wrapped_deks: string;
+    /** Base64 AES-GCM IV used for the `wrapped_deks` ciphertext. */
+    readonly iv: string;
+    /** XOR guard — wrap-DEKs slots must NOT carry wrap-KEK material. */
+    readonly wrapped_kek?: never;
+}
+/**
+ * Discriminated union over the two wrap-format variants. Reads from
+ * disk should always go through this type so the variant is preserved.
+ *
+ * Discriminator: `wrapKind`. Absent → wrap-KEK (legacy / WebAuthn /
+ * OIDC). Present and `'deks'` → wrap-DEKs (password / future on-* that
+ * want to sidestep extractable-KEK).
+ *
+ * The type-level XOR enforces "exactly one of `wrapped_kek` /
+ * `wrapped_deks` is present" — a structural guarantee that the runtime
+ * dispatch is safe.
+ */
+export type KeyringAuthenticator = KeyringAuthenticatorWrappingKEK | KeyringAuthenticatorWrappingDEKs;
+export interface KeyringFile {
+    readonly _noydb_keyring: typeof NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION;
+    readonly user_id: string;
+    readonly display_name: string;
+    readonly role: Role;
+    readonly permissions: Permissions;
+    readonly deks: Record<string, string>;
+    readonly salt: string;
+    readonly created_at: string;
+    readonly granted_by: string;
+    /**
+     * Passphrase canary — base64 AES-KW-wrapped form of a known constant
+     * 256-bit value, wrapped under the keyring's KEK.
+     *
+     * Optional: older keyrings load with no canary and fall back to
+     * the multi-DEK corruption heuristic. Newer keyrings
+     * carry one and let `loadKeyring` distinguish wrong-passphrase
+     * from corruption even when ALL DEKs (including a single-DEK keyring's
+     * sole DEK) are corrupted.
+     *
+     * AES-KW is deterministic — every write site mints fresh on each
+     * persist; same KEK + same constant input always produces the same
+     * ciphertext, so this round-trips without state.
+     */
+    readonly canary?: string;
+    /**
+     * Tier-2 authenticator slots (multi-slot keyring extension).
+     * Optional / append-only: keyring files written before the
+     * extension load with an empty list. Each slot independently wraps
+     * the same KEK; any one of them unlocks.
+     *
+     * @see KeyringAuthenticator
+     */
+    readonly authenticators?: readonly KeyringAuthenticator[];
+    /**
+     * Per-keyring policy override (reserved). The on-disk format
+     * accepts the field for forward compatibility with the Option C
+     * merge engine deferred to a later release; v1.0 reads only the
+     * vault-level `_meta/policy` document, so this field is parsed and
+     * round-tripped but never enforced.
+     */
+    readonly policy?: VaultPolicyOnDisk;
+    /**
+     * Optional — authorization spec capability bits. Absent on keyrings written
+     * before the RFC implementation. Loading falls back to role-based
+     * defaults (owner/admin get bundle-on, everyone else off).
+     */
+    readonly export_capability?: ExportCapability;
+    /**
+     * Optional bundle-slot expiry. ISO-8601 timestamp; past
+     * the cutoff `loadKeyring` throws `KeyringExpiredError` before any
+     * DEK unwrap is attempted. Useful for time-boxed audit access:
+     * "this slot works for 30 days then becomes opaque to its holder."
+     *
+     * Absent on live keyrings written via `db.grant()` — the field is
+     * meaningful for `BundleRecipient` slots produced by
+     * `writePod({ recipients: [...] })`. Setting it on a live
+     * keyring is allowed but unusual.
+     */
+    readonly expires_at?: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional — issue  import-capability bits. Absent on keyrings
+     * written before  landed. Loading falls back to default-closed
+     * for every role and every format.
+     */
+    readonly import_capability?: ImportCapability;
+    /**
+     * hierarchical access clearance. Absent → 0 (advisory;
+     * the real check is whether the DEK map carries a `collection#tier`
+     * entry for the requested tier). Owners and admins default to the
+     * highest tier they have DEKs for at grant time.
+     */
+    readonly clearance?: number;
+}
+export interface VaultBackup {
+    readonly _noydb_backup: typeof NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION;
+    readonly _compartment: string;
+    readonly _exported_at: string;
+    readonly _exported_by: string;
+    readonly keyrings: Record<string, KeyringFile>;
+    readonly collections: VaultSnapshot;
+    /**
+     * Internal collections (`_ledger`, `_ledger_deltas`, `_history`, `_sync`, …)
+     * captured alongside the data collections. Optional for backwards
+     * compat with backups, which only stored data collections —
+     * loading a backup leaves the ledger empty (and `verifyBackupIntegrity`
+     * skips the chain check, surfacing only a console warning).
+     */
+    readonly _internal?: VaultSnapshot;
+    /**
+     * Verifiable-backup metadata. Embeds the ledger head at
+     * dump time so `load()` can cross-check that the loaded chain matches
+     * exactly what was exported. A backup whose chain has been tampered
+     * with — either by modifying ledger entries or by modifying data
+     * envelopes that the chain references — fails this check.
+     *
+     * Optional for backwards compat with backups; missing means
+     * "legacy backup, load with a warning, no integrity check".
+     */
+    readonly ledgerHead?: {
+        /** Hex sha256 of the canonical JSON of the last ledger entry. */
+        readonly hash: string;
+        /** Sequential index of the last ledger entry. */
+        readonly index: number;
+        /** ISO timestamp captured at dump time. */
+        readonly ts: string;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Options for `Vault.exportStream()` and `Vault.exportJSON()`.
+ *
+ * The defaults match the most common consumer pattern: one chunk per
+ * collection, no ledger metadata. Per-record streaming and ledger-head
+ * inclusion are opt-in because both add structure most consumers don't
+ * need.
+ */
+export interface ExportStreamOptions {
+    /**
+     * `'collection'` (default) yields one chunk per collection with all
+     * records bundled in `chunk.records`. `'record'` yields one chunk per
+     * record, useful for arbitrarily large collections that should never
+     * be materialized as a single array.
+     */
+    readonly granularity?: 'collection' | 'record';
+    /**
+     * When `true`, every chunk includes the current compartment ledger
+     * head under `chunk.ledgerHead`. The value is identical across every
+     * chunk in a single export (one ledger per compartment). Forward-
+     * compatible with future partition work where the head would become
+     * per-partition. Default: `false`.
+     */
+    readonly withLedgerHead?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Export locale (BCP 47, e.g. `'th'`). When set, records are read at this
+     * locale through the **`export` layer**: `i18nText` fields collapse to
+     * the locale string (honoring each field's `export`-layer `onMissing` policy)
+     * and `dictKey`/`staticDict` `<field>Label`s are resolved — a single-locale
+     * export. The raw `dictionaries` snapshot is then redundant and omitted. This
+     * applies to BOTH `exportStream()` and `exportJSON()`.
+     *
+     * Default: `undefined` — raw `{locale}` maps + the `_dictionaries` snapshot
+     * (a full, all-locale backup; format packages apply their own locale strategy).
+     */
+    readonly resolveLabels?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * One chunk yielded by `Vault.exportStream()`.
+ *
+ * `granularity: 'collection'` yields one chunk per collection with the
+ * full record array in `records`. `granularity: 'record'` yields one
+ * chunk per record with `records` containing exactly one element — the
+ * `schema` and `refs` metadata is repeated on every chunk so consumers
+ * doing per-record streaming don't have to thread state across yields.
+ */
+export interface ExportChunk<T = unknown> {
+    /** Collection name (no leading underscore — internal collections are filtered out). */
+    readonly collection: string;
+    /**
+     * Standard Schema validator attached to the collection at `collection()`
+     * construction time, or `null` if no schema was provided. Surfaced so
+     * downstream serializers (`@noy-db/as-*` packages, custom
+     * exporters) can produce schema-aware output (typed CSV headers, XSD
+     * generation, etc.) without poking at collection internals.
+     */
+    readonly schema: StandardSchemaV1<unknown, T> | null;
+    /**
+     * Foreign-key references declared on the collection via the `refs`
+     * option, as the `{ field → { target, mode } }` map produced by
+     * `RefRegistry.getOutbound`. Empty object when no refs were declared.
+     */
+    readonly refs: Record<string, {
+        readonly target: string;
+        readonly mode: 'strict' | 'warn' | 'cascade';
+    }>;
+    /**
+     * Decrypted, ACL-scoped, schema-validated records. Length 1 in
+     * `granularity: 'record'` mode, full collection in `granularity: 'collection'`
+     * mode. Records are returned by reference from the collection's eager
+     * cache where applicable — consumers must treat them as immutable.
+     */
+    readonly records: T[];
+    /**
+     * Dictionary snapshots for every `dictKey` field declared on this
+     * collection. Captured once at stream-start and held
+     * constant across all chunks within the same export — a rename
+     * mid-export does not change the snapshot. `undefined` when the
+     * collection has no `dictKeyFields`.
+     *
+     * Shape: `{ [fieldName]: { [stableKey]: { [locale]: label } } }`
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```ts
+     * chunk.dictionaries?.status?.paid?.th  // → 'ชำระแล้ว'
+     * ```
+     */
+    readonly dictionaries?: Record<string, // field name
+    Record<string, Record<string, string>>>;
+    /**
+     * Vault ledger head at export time. Present only when
+     * `exportStream({ withLedgerHead: true })` was called. Identical
+     * across every chunk in the same export — included on every chunk
+     * for forward-compatibility with future per-partition ledgers, where
+     * the value will differ per chunk.
+     */
+    readonly ledgerHead?: {
+        readonly hash: string;
+        readonly index: number;
+        readonly ts: string;
+    };
+}
+export interface DirtyEntry {
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly collection: string;
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly action: 'put' | 'delete';
+    readonly version: number;
+    readonly timestamp: string;
+}
+export interface SyncMetadata {
+    readonly _noydb_sync: typeof NOYDB_SYNC_VERSION;
+    readonly last_push: string | null;
+    readonly last_pull: string | null;
+    readonly dirty: DirtyEntry[];
+}
+export interface Conflict {
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly collection: string;
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly local: EncryptedEnvelope;
+    readonly remote: EncryptedEnvelope;
+    readonly localVersion: number;
+    readonly remoteVersion: number;
+    /**
+     * Present only when the collection uses `conflictPolicy: 'manual'`.
+     * Call `resolve(winner)` to commit the winning envelope, or
+     * `resolve(null)` to defer (conflict stays queued for the next sync).
+     * Called synchronously inside the `sync:conflict` event handler.
+     */
+    readonly resolve?: (winner: EncryptedEnvelope | null) => void;
+}
+/**
+ * #590: sync suppressed a live envelope because a crypto-shred tombstone is
+ * terminal for its record id. Reported on push/pull results (`erasures`) and
+ * via the `'sync:erasure'` event; conflict resolvers are never consulted for
+ * tombstone pairs.
+ */
+export interface ErasureEnforcement {
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly collection: string;
+    readonly id: string;
+    /** The winning tombstone (as stored after enforcement). */
+    readonly tombstone: EncryptedEnvelope;
+    /** The live envelope that lost: a suppressed dirty local edit, or the remote copy destroyed by re-assertion. */
+    readonly suppressed: EncryptedEnvelope;
+    readonly direction: 'pull' | 'push';
+}
+/**
+ * A same-device cross-tab write conflict: another tab overwrote a
+ * document this tab had written, having diverged from an older base. Records
+ * are decrypted (cross-tab handlers reconcile in plaintext). `base` is the
+ * common ancestor from history, or null when history is unavailable.
+ */
+export interface WriteConflict {
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly collection: string;
+    readonly docId: string;
+    readonly local: unknown;
+    readonly remote: unknown;
+    readonly base: unknown;
+    readonly localVersion: number;
+    readonly remoteVersion: number;
+    readonly baseVersion: number;
+}
+export type ConflictStrategy = 'local-wins' | 'remote-wins' | 'version' | ((conflict: Conflict) => 'local' | 'remote');
+/**
+ * Collection-level conflict policy.
+ * Overrides the db-level `conflict` option for the specific collection.
+ *
+ * - `'last-writer-wins'` — higher `_ts` wins (timestamp LWW).
+ * - `'first-writer-wins'` — lower `_v` wins (earlier version is preserved).
+ * - `'manual'` — emits `sync:conflict` with a `resolve` callback. Call
+ *   `resolve(winner)` synchronously to commit or `resolve(null)` to defer.
+ * - Custom fn — synchronous `(local: T, remote: T) => T`. Must be pure.
+ *
+ * **Delete-vs-edit caveat:** `'last-writer-wins'`, `'first-writer-wins'`,
+ * and `'manual'` compare/hand over raw envelopes, so an edit CAN win over
+ * a delete marker (a later `_ts`, an earlier `_v`, or the app's own
+ * `resolve()` choice). A custom fn, and the CRDT merge modes `'lww-map'`/
+ * `'rga'` (`crdtStrategy`), CANNOT: their shared resolver wrapper decrypts
+ * both sides first and short-circuits to whichever side is the
+ * shredded/tombstoned one *before* the merge function (or CRDT merge)
+ * ever runs — delete unconditionally wins. CRDT mode `'yjs'` is the
+ * exception among CRDT modes: it never decrypts and falls back to a
+ * plain higher-`_v`-wins compare, so an edit can beat a delete there too.
+ */
+export type ConflictPolicy<T> = 'last-writer-wins' | 'first-writer-wins' | 'manual' | ((local: T, remote: T) => T);
+/**
+ * Envelope-level resolver registered per collection with the SyncEngine.
+ * Receives the `id` of the conflicting record and both envelopes.
+ * Returns the winning envelope, or `null` to defer resolution.
+ * @internal
+ */
+export type CollectionConflictResolver = (id: string, local: EncryptedEnvelope, remote: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>;
+/** Options for targeted push operations. */
+export interface PushOptions {
+    /** Only push records belonging to these collections. Omit to push all dirty. */
+    collections?: string[];
+}
+/** Options for targeted pull operations. */
+export interface PullOptions {
+    /** Only pull these collections. Omit to pull all. */
+    collections?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Only pull records with `_ts` strictly after this ISO timestamp.
+     * Stores that implement `listSince` use it directly; others fall back
+     * to a full scan with client-side filtering.
+     */
+    modifiedSince?: string;
+}
+export interface PushResult {
+    readonly pushed: number;
+    readonly conflicts: Conflict[];
+    readonly errors: Error[];
+    /** #590: tombstone enforcements applied during this run (never resolver-visible). */
+    readonly erasures?: ErasureEnforcement[];
+}
+export interface PullResult {
+    readonly pulled: number;
+    readonly conflicts: Conflict[];
+    readonly errors: Error[];
+    /** #590: tombstone enforcements applied during this run (never resolver-visible). */
+    readonly erasures?: ErasureEnforcement[];
+}
+/** Result of a sync transaction commit. */
+export interface SyncTransactionResult {
+    readonly status: 'committed' | 'conflict';
+    readonly pushed: number;
+    readonly conflicts: Conflict[];
+    /** #590: staged writes suppressed by tombstone enforcement during commit. */
+    readonly erasures?: ErasureEnforcement[];
+}
+export interface SyncStatus {
+    readonly dirty: number;
+    readonly lastPush: string | null;
+    readonly lastPull: string | null;
+    readonly online: boolean;
+}
+export type SyncTargetRole = 'sync-peer' | 'backup' | 'archive';
+/**
+ * A sync target with role and optional per-target policy.
+ *
+ * | Role        | Direction     | Conflict resolution | Typical use              |
+ * |-------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
+ * | `sync-peer` | Bidirectional | ConflictStrategy    | DynamoDB live sync       |
+ * | `backup`    | Push-only     | N/A (receives merged)| S3 dump, Google Drive   |
+ * | `archive`   | Push-only     | N/A                 | IPFS, Git tags, S3 Lock  |
+ */
+export interface SyncTarget {
+    /** The store to sync with. */
+    readonly store: NoydbStore;
+    /** Role determines sync direction and conflict handling. */
+    readonly role: SyncTargetRole;
+    /** Per-target sync policy. Inherits store-category default when absent. */
+    readonly policy?: SyncPolicy;
+    /** Human-readable label for DevTools and audit logs. */
+    readonly label?: string;
+}
+export interface ChangeEvent {
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly collection: string;
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly action: 'put' | 'delete';
+}
+export interface NoydbEventMap {
+    'change': ChangeEvent;
+    'error': Error;
+    /**
+     * Same-instance signal that this vault's schema-fence state changed.
+     * For UI integration. Cross-client coordination goes
+     * through the store, not this event.
+     */
+    'schema:fence-changed': {
+        vault: string;
+        currentSchemaVersion: number;
+        fenceState: 'normal' | 'draining' | 'migrating' | 'complete';
+    };
+    'sync:push': PushResult;
+    'sync:pull': PullResult;
+    'sync:erasure': ErasureEnforcement;
+    'sync:conflict': Conflict;
+    'write:conflict': WriteConflict;
+    'sync:online': void;
+    'sync:offline': void;
+    'sync:backup-error': {
+        vault: string;
+        target: string;
+        error: Error;
+    };
+    'history:save': {
+        vault: string;
+        collection: string;
+        id: string;
+        version: number;
+    };
+    'history:prune': {
+        vault: string;
+        collection: string;
+        id: string;
+        pruned: number;
+    };
+    /**
+     * A non-fatal i18n script violation under `onScriptViolation: 'warn' | 'filter'`.
+     * 'warn' stored the value as-is; 'filter' stripped disallowed characters
+     * (the event is the only signal the stored data was mutated). 'reject'
+     * throws `ScriptViolationError` and emits nothing.
+     */
+    'i18n:script-violation': {
+        vault: string;
+        collection: string;
+        id: string;
+        mode: 'warn' | 'filter';
+        warning: ScriptWarning;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Emitted when a persisted-index side-car put/delete fails after the
+     * main record write already succeeded. The main record is durable; the
+     * index mirror may have drifted. Operators reconcile via
+     * `collection.reconcileIndex(field)`.
+     */
+    'index:write-partial': {
+        vault: string;
+        collection: string;
+        id: string;
+        action: 'put' | 'delete';
+        error: Error;
+    };
+    /**
+     * emitted by `Collection.ensurePersistedIndexesLoaded()`
+     * once per field on first lazy-mode query when
+     * `reconcileOnOpen: 'auto' | 'dry-run'` is configured. `applied` is
+     * `0` in `'dry-run'` mode. `skipped` is reserved for a future
+     * drift-stamp optimization that short-circuits the reconcile when
+     * the mirror version matches what's on disk — currently always
+     * `false` (the full reconcile runs every session).
+     */
+    'index:reconciled': {
+        vault: string;
+        collection: string;
+        field: string;
+        missing: readonly string[];
+        stale: readonly string[];
+        applied: number;
+        skipped: boolean;
+    };
+    /**
+     * #638 Task 5 — a dispatch-driven derivation/rollup/MV output write targeted a row whose
+     * period is closed. The write is SKIPPED (the historical value stands); the SOURCE write
+     * that triggered the recompute still succeeded. See `kernel/via/dispatch.ts#putDerivedOutput`.
+     * `source.id` may be a non-record sentinel (e.g. `'refreshView'`) for manual bulk-refresh-
+     * triggered skips, not a real source record id.
+     */
+    'derivation:skipped-frozen': DerivationSkippedFrozen;
+    /**
+     * #654 — an ordinary-delete lookup-ref `cascade`/`nullify` propagation edge whose compare-key
+     * could not be resolved from the backing row (matrix custom-key row unreadable — corruption
+     * class). The delete itself proceeds (only `restrict` edges fail closed, via
+     * `RestrictRefUnresolvableError`); this edge's propagation is skipped and reported here instead
+     * of silently dropped — the ordinary-delete counterpart of the forget path's
+     * `ForgetResult.lookupReferencesResidue` channel. `residue` entries are `backing:key:
+     * collection.field`, one per un-propagated edge (see `VaultLinks.applyLookupRefsPropagation`).
+     */
+    'lookup:propagation-residue': {
+        vault: string;
+        dimension: string;
+        key: string;
+        residue: readonly string[];
+    };
+    /**
+     * #640 rider (#644 item 3) — the sync/cutover/restore dispatch wave's per-id recompute failed
+     * (a genuine decrypt failure, a derive()/executor bug, a schema violation on the output, ...).
+     * ADDITIVE to the existing `console.warn` in `runGraphDispatchWave` — never replaces it, so no
+     * listener-dependent silence. One event per failed (collection, id); the wave still isolates
+     * the failure to just that one record. See `kernel/via/dispatch.ts#runGraphDispatchWave`.
+     */
+    'derivation:wave-error': {
+        collection: string;
+        id: string;
+        error: unknown;
+    };
+}
+export interface GrantOptions {
+    readonly userId: string;
+    readonly displayName: string;
+    readonly role: Role;
+    readonly passphrase: string;
+    readonly permissions?: Permissions;
+    /**
+     * Optional `@noy-db/as-*` export capability. Omit or
+     * leave undefined to apply role-based defaults (see
+     * `hasExportCapability` and `ExportCapability`).
+     */
+    readonly exportCapability?: ExportCapability;
+    /**
+     * Optional `@noy-db/as-*` import capability (issue ). Omit or
+     * leave undefined for default-closed semantics — no plaintext format
+     * is grantable until positively listed; bundle import is denied.
+     */
+    readonly importCapability?: ImportCapability;
+    /**
+     * Skip phrase-format strength validation (issue #7). Defaults to
+     * false — `grant()` rejects phrases that don't meet the configured
+     * `PassphrasePolicy`. Test fixtures and CLI scripts pass `true`.
+     */
+    readonly allowWeakPassphrase?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Initial user-envelope payload for the new principal. Sealed under
+     * the same vault DEK (the reserved `_users` collection's DEK) and
+     * persisted alongside the keyring during grant.
+     *
+     * **Bootstrap-only.** Once the new user activates and writes their
+     * own envelope, the own-only write rule kicks in — admins cannot
+     * edit a teammate's envelope after activation. Use this field for
+     * pre-fill at invite time (e.g. "displayName: Bob, locale: en-US")
+     * and let the user take over from there.
+     *
+     * Hub does not introspect the payload; it is JSON-serialized and
+     * encrypted opaquely. Apps own the schema.
+     *
+     * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md → Lifecycle
+     */
+    readonly initialProfile?: unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Caller payload for `db.updateUser`. Mutate one or more
+ * identity fields on an existing keyring without rotating any keys.
+ *
+ * `role`, `displayName`, and `permissions` live in the plaintext header
+ * of `_keyring/<userId>` (the sync engine reads them without keys).
+ * Mutating them is a JSON header swap — no DEK rewrap, no KEK
+ * required, no authenticator slots touched. Tier-2 slots and recovery
+ * enrollments survive unchanged. Last-write-wins through the existing
+ * keyring put (same concurrency story as `db.grant` / `db.revoke`).
+ *
+ * Top-level fields are partial-merge: absent fields are not modified.
+ * `null` on `displayName` clears the field (stored as the empty string;
+ * UI consumers typically render the empty case by falling back to the
+ * user id). `undefined` / absent leaves the field untouched. Mirrors
+ * the `null`-as-clear convention `UserApi.updateMe` uses.
+ *
+ * `permissions`, however, is a **full replacement** at the map level —
+ * passing `{ invoices: 'rw' }` REPLACES the entire permissions map,
+ * silently dropping any other entries. To partially update, read the
+ * current keyring and merge: `permissions: { ...current, invoices: 'rw' }`.
+ * To clear all permissions, pass `permissions: {}` explicitly.
+ *
+ * Role-elevation guard: the same hierarchy as `db.grant`. Admins can
+ * change `admin` / `operator` / `viewer` / `client` to and from each
+ * other; admins cannot promote to or demote from `owner`. Owners can
+ * do anything. Non-admin callers (operator/viewer/client) cannot call
+ * `db.updateUser` at all — for self-displayName changes, use
+ * `vault.user.updateMe` (the user-envelope API).
+ */
+export interface UpdateUserOptions {
+    readonly userId: string;
+    readonly role?: Role;
+    readonly displayName?: string | null;
+    readonly permissions?: Permissions;
+}
+export interface RevokeOptions {
+    readonly userId: string;
+    readonly rotateKeys?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Cascade behavior when the revoked user is an admin who has granted
+     * other admins.
+     *
+     * - `'strict'` (default) — recursively revoke every admin that the
+     *   target (transitively) granted. The cascade walks the
+     *   `granted_by` field on each keyring file and stops at non-admin
+     *   leaves. All affected collections are accumulated and rotated in
+     *   a single pass at the end, so cascade cost is O(records in
+     *   affected collections), not O(records × cascade depth).
+     *
+     * - `'warn'` — leave the descendant admins in place but emit a
+     *   `console.warn` listing them. Useful for diagnostic dry runs and
+     *   for environments where the operator wants to clean up the
+     *   delegation tree manually.
+     *
+     * No effect when the target is not an admin (operators, viewers, and
+     * clients cannot grant other users, so they have no delegation
+     * subtree to cascade through). Defaults to `'strict'`.
+     */
+    readonly cascade?: 'strict' | 'warn';
+}
+/**
+ * One entry returned by `Noydb.listAccessibleVaults()`. Carries
+ * the compartment id and the role the calling principal holds in it,
+ * so the consumer can decide how to fan out without re-checking
+ * permissions per vault.
+ */
+export interface AccessibleVault {
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly role: Role;
+}
+/**
+ * Options for `Noydb.listAccessibleVaults()`.
+ */
+export interface ListAccessibleVaultsOptions {
+    /**
+     * Minimum role the caller must hold to include a vault in the
+     * result. Vaults where the caller's role is strictly *below*
+     * this threshold are silently excluded. Defaults to `'client'`,
+     * which means "every vault I can unwrap is returned." Set to
+     * `'admin'` for "vaults where I can grant/revoke," or
+     * `'owner'` for "vaults I own."
+     *
+     * The privilege ordering used:
+     *   `client (1) < viewer (2) < operator (3) < admin (4) < owner (5)`
+     *
+     * Note: `viewer` and `client` are conceptually peers in the ACL
+     * (neither can grant), but `viewer` has read-all access while
+     * `client` has only explicit-collection read. The numeric order
+     * reflects "how much can this principal see," not "how much can
+     * this principal modify."
+     */
+    readonly minRole?: Role;
+}
+/**
+ * Options for `Noydb.queryAcross()`.
+ */
+export interface QueryAcrossOptions {
+    /**
+     * Maximum number of compartments to process in parallel. Defaults
+     * to `1` (sequential) — conservative because the per-compartment
+     * callback typically does its own I/O and an unbounded fan-out can
+     * exhaust adapter connections (DynamoDB throughput, S3 socket
+     * limits, browser fetch concurrency).
+     *
+     * Set to `4` or `8` for cloud-backed compartments where parallelism
+     * is the whole point of fanning out. Set to `1` (default) for local
+     * adapters where the disk I/O serializes anyway.
+     */
+    readonly concurrency?: number;
+    /**
+     * Open shards non-creatingly — a missing grant throws instead of
+     * self-provisioning. Default: `true` (create iff the vault has no
+     * `_keyring/*`). Pass `false` for strict open-existing semantics
+     * (e.g. federation read fan-out where shards are pre-provisioned
+     * and an absent grant should fail closed).
+     */
+    readonly create?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * One entry in the array returned by `Noydb.queryAcross()`. Either
+ * `result` is set (callback succeeded for this compartment) or
+ * `error` is set (callback threw, or compartment failed to open).
+ *
+ * Per-compartment errors do **not** abort the overall fan-out — every
+ * compartment is given a chance to run its callback, and the
+ * partition between success and failure is exposed in the return
+ * value. Consumers that want fail-fast semantics can check
+ * `r.error !== undefined` and short-circuit themselves.
+ */
+export type QueryAcrossResult<T> = {
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly result: T;
+    readonly error?: undefined;
+} | {
+    readonly vault: string;
+    readonly result?: undefined;
+    readonly error: Error;
+};
+export interface UserInfo {
+    readonly userId: string;
+    readonly displayName: string;
+    readonly role: Role;
+    readonly permissions: Permissions;
+    readonly createdAt: string;
+    readonly grantedBy: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Operations that a session policy can require re-authentication for.
+ * Passed as the `requireReAuthFor` array in `SessionPolicy`.
+ */
+export type ReAuthOperation = 'export' | 'grant' | 'revoke' | 'rotate' | 'changeSecret';
+/**
+ * Session policy controlling lifetime, re-auth requirements, and
+ * background-lock behavior.
+ *
+ * All timeout values are in milliseconds. `undefined` means "no limit."
+ * The policy is evaluated lazily — it does not start timers itself;
+ * enforcement happens at the Noydb call site.
+ */
+export interface SessionPolicy {
+    /**
+     * Idle timeout in ms. If no NOYDB operation is performed for this
+     * duration, the session is revoked on the next operation attempt
+     * (which will throw `SessionExpiredError`). The idle clock resets
+     * on every successful operation.
+     *
+     * Default: `undefined` (no idle timeout).
+     */
+    readonly idleTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /**
+     * Absolute timeout in ms from session creation. After this duration
+     * the session is unconditionally revoked regardless of activity.
+     *
+     * Default: `undefined` (no absolute timeout).
+     */
+    readonly absoluteTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /**
+     * Operations that require the user to re-authenticate (re-enter their
+     * passphrase or perform a fresh WebAuthn assertion) before proceeding,
+     * even if the session is still alive.
+     *
+     * Common pattern: `requireReAuthFor: ['export', 'grant']` — allow
+     * read/write operations in the background but demand a fresh credential
+     * for high-risk mutations.
+     *
+     * Default: `[]` (no extra re-auth requirements).
+     */
+    readonly requireReAuthFor?: readonly ReAuthOperation[];
+    /**
+     * If `true`, the session is revoked when the page goes to the background
+     * (visibilitychange event, `document.hidden === true`). Useful for
+     * high-sensitivity deployments where leaving the tab is treated as
+     * a session boundary.
+     *
+     * No-op in non-browser environments (Node.js, workers without document).
+     * Default: `false`.
+     */
+    readonly lockOnBackground?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Locale-aware read options. Pass to `Collection.get()`, `list()`,
+ * `query()`, and `scan()` to trigger per-record locale resolution for
+ * `dictKey` and `i18nText` fields.
+ *
+ * - **`locale: 'raw'`** — skip resolution for `i18nText` fields and
+ *   return the full `{ [locale]: string }` map. Dict key fields still
+ *   return the stable key (no `<field>Label` added).
+ * - **`fallback`** — single locale code or ordered list. Use `'any'` as
+ *   the last element to fall back to any present translation.
+ *
+ * When neither the call-level locale nor the compartment's default locale
+ * is set, reading a record with `i18nText` fields throws
+ * `LocaleNotSpecifiedError`.
+ */
+export interface LocaleReadOptions {
+    /**
+     * The target locale code (e.g. `'th'`), or `'raw'` to return the full
+     * language map without resolution.
+     */
+    readonly locale?: string;
+    /**
+     * Fallback locale or ordered fallback chain. Use `'any'` as the last
+     * element to fall back to any present translation.
+     */
+    readonly fallback?: string | readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * @internal — the resolution layer this read belongs to (`'read'` by
+     * default). Threaded by layer-tagged read facades (guard / derivation)
+     * so `applyI18nLocale` and dictKey `resolvePolicy` select that layer's
+     * `onMissing` policy instead of the `'read'` policy. Not part of the
+     * public read API — callers select policy via the field's `onMissing`
+     * map, not by setting this.
+     */
+    readonly _layer?: Layer;
+}
+/**
+ * Context passed to the consumer-supplied `plaintextTranslator` function.
+ * The hook receives the source text plus enough metadata to route it to the
+ * right translation service and record what it did.
+ */
+export interface PlaintextTranslatorContext {
+    /** The plaintext string to translate. */
+    readonly text: string;
+    /** BCP 47 source locale (the locale the text is written in). */
+    readonly from: string;
+    /** BCP 47 target locale to translate into. */
+    readonly to: string;
+    /** The schema field name that triggered the translation. */
+    readonly field: string;
+    /** The collection the record is being put into. */
+    readonly collection: string;
+}
+/**
+ * A consumer-supplied async function that translates a single string
+ * from one locale to another. noy-db ships no built-in translator.
+ *
+ * **Security:** this function receives plaintext. The consumer is
+ * responsible for the data policy of whatever service it calls. See
+ * `NOYDB_SPEC.md § Zero-Knowledge Storage` and the `plaintextTranslator`
+ * JSDoc on `NoydbOptions` for the full invariant statement.
+ */
+export type PlaintextTranslatorFn = (ctx: PlaintextTranslatorContext) => Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * One entry in the in-process translator audit log. Cleared when
+ * `db.close()` is called — same lifetime as the KEK and DEKs.
+ *
+ * Deliberately omits any content hash or translated-text fingerprint
+ * to prevent correlation attacks on the audit trail.
+ */
+export interface TranslatorAuditEntry {
+    readonly type: 'translator-invocation';
+    /** Schema field name that was translated. */
+    readonly field: string;
+    /** Collection the record belongs to. */
+    readonly collection: string;
+    /** Source locale. */
+    readonly fromLocale: string;
+    /** Target locale. */
+    readonly toLocale: string;
+    /**
+     * Consumer-provided translator name from
+     * `NoydbOptions.plaintextTranslatorName`. Defaults to `'anonymous'`
+     * when not supplied.
+     */
+    readonly translatorName: string;
+    /** ISO 8601 timestamp of the invocation. */
+    readonly timestamp: string;
+    /**
+     * `true` when the result was served from the in-process cache rather
+     * than by calling the translator function. Present only on cache hits
+     * so the absence of the field also communicates a cache miss.
+     */
+    readonly cached?: true;
+}
+/**
+ * A presence peer entry. `lastSeen` is an ISO timestamp set by core on each
+ * `update()` call. Stale entries (lastSeen older than `staleMs`) are filtered
+ * before delivering to the subscriber callback.
+ */
+export interface PresencePeer<P> {
+    readonly userId: string;
+    readonly payload: P;
+    readonly lastSeen: string;
+}
+/** Per-collection CRDT mode. */
+export type CrdtMode = 'lww-map' | 'rga' | 'yjs';
+/**
+ * Per-field last-write-wins registers.
+ * Each field carries its latest value and the ISO timestamp of the last write.
+ * Merge: for each field, keep the entry with the lexicographically higher `ts`.
+ */
+export interface LwwMapState {
+    readonly _crdt: 'lww-map';
+    readonly fields: Record<string, {
+        readonly v: unknown;
+        readonly ts: string;
+    }>;
+}
+/**
+ * Simplified Replicated Growable Array.
+ * Items are assigned stable NID (noy-db id) strings on first insertion.
+ * Deleted items are tracked as tombstones so concurrent removals commute.
+ *
+ * The resolved snapshot is the ordered list of non-tombstoned `v` values.
+ */
+export interface RgaState {
+    readonly _crdt: 'rga';
+    readonly items: ReadonlyArray<{
+        readonly nid: string;
+        readonly v: unknown;
+    }>;
+    readonly tombstones: readonly string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Yjs binary state marker. `update` is base64(Y.encodeStateAsUpdate()).
+ * Core stores and retrieves the blob opaquely. `@noy-db/yjs` is responsible
+ * for encoding, decoding, and merging via `Y.mergeUpdates`.
+ * Core falls back to last-write-wins (higher `_v`) for conflict resolution.
+ */
+export interface YjsState {
+    readonly _crdt: 'yjs';
+    /** base64-encoded Y.encodeStateAsUpdate() bytes. */
+    readonly update: string;
+}
+export type CrdtState = LwwMapState | RgaState | YjsState;
+/**
+ * Seam interface. `@internal`.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export interface CrdtStrategy {
+    buildLwwMapState(record: Record<string, unknown>, previous: LwwMapState | undefined, now: string): LwwMapState;
+    buildRgaState(items: readonly unknown[], previous: RgaState | undefined, idGen: () => string): RgaState;
+    mergeCrdtStates(local: CrdtState, remote: CrdtState): CrdtState;
+    resolveCrdtSnapshot(state: CrdtState): unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Second store shape for blob-store backends (Drive, WebDAV, Git, iCloud)
+ * that operate on whole-vault bundles rather than per-record KV.
+ *
+ * Implement `readBundle` / `writeBundle` instead of the six-method KV
+ * contract. Use `wrapBundleStore()` from `@noy-db/hub` to convert to a
+ * `NoydbStore` that the rest of the API consumes transparently.
+ *
+ * Named `NoydbPodStore` (not `NoydbBundleAdapter`) for consistency
+ * with the hub / to-* / in-* rename. Concrete implementations ship
+ * in `@noy-db/to-*` packages starting in.
+ */
+export interface NoydbPodStore {
+    /** Discriminant for engine auto-detection of store shape. */
+    readonly kind: 'bundle';
+    /** Human-readable name for diagnostics (e.g. `'drive'`, `'webdav'`). */
+    readonly name?: string;
+    /**
+     * Read the entire vault as raw bytes. Returns `null` if no bundle exists
+     * yet (first open of a brand-new vault).
+     */
+    readBundle(vaultId: string): Promise<{
+        bytes: Uint8Array;
+        version: string;
+    } | null>;
+    /**
+     * Write the entire vault as raw bytes. `expectedVersion` is the version
+     * token from the last `readBundle` (or `null` for a first write).
+     * Implementations MUST reject the write if the stored version has advanced
+     * past `expectedVersion` — throw `PodVersionConflictError`.
+     * Returns the new version token on success.
+     */
+    writeBundle(vaultId: string, bytes: Uint8Array, expectedVersion: string | null): Promise<{
+        version: string;
+    }>;
+    /** Delete a vault bundle. Idempotent — no-op if the bundle does not exist. */
+    deleteBundle(vaultId: string): Promise<void>;
+    /** List all vault bundles managed by this store. */
+    listBundles(): Promise<Array<{
+        vaultId: string;
+        version: string;
+        size: number;
+    }>>;
+}
+/** @deprecated Use `NoydbPodStore`. */
+export type NoydbBundleStore = NoydbPodStore;
+/**
+ * Content-addressed blob object stored in the vault-level blob index.
+ * Identified by HMAC-SHA-256(blobDEK, plaintext) — opaque to the store.
+ *
+ * Shared across all collections within a vault for deduplication: two
+ * records that attach identical byte content reference the same `eTag`
+ * and share a single set of encrypted chunks in `_blob_chunks`.
+ */
+export interface BlobObject {
+    /** HMAC-SHA-256 hex of the original plaintext bytes, keyed by `_blob` DEK. */
+    readonly eTag: string;
+    /** Original uncompressed size in bytes. */
+    readonly size: number;
+    /** Compressed size in bytes (the payload that is actually encrypted and chunked). */
+    readonly compressedSize: number;
+    /** Compression algorithm applied before encryption. */
+    readonly compression: 'gzip' | 'none';
+    /** Raw chunk size in bytes used at write time. Readers MUST use this value. */
+    readonly chunkSize: number;
+    /** Total number of chunks written. Reader expects exactly this many. */
+    readonly chunkCount: number;
+    /** MIME type if provided or auto-detected at upload time. */
+    readonly mimeType?: string;
+    /** ISO timestamp of first upload. */
+    readonly createdAt: string;
+    /** Live reference count — slots + published versions pointing to this blob. */
+    readonly refCount: number;
+    /**
+     * Base64 AES-KW-wrapped per-blob **content CEK** (wrapped under the `_blob`
+     * DEK). Present on erasable-collection blobs (`perRecordKeys`): the chunks
+     * are encrypted under this content CEK rather than directly under the `_blob`
+     * DEK, so deleting this BlobObject at `refCount → 0` crypto-shreds the chunks
+     * (they become permanently undecryptable). Absent → legacy blob, chunks
+     * decrypt directly under the `_blob` DEK (read unchanged). See
+     * docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-13-per-blob-cek-design.md.
+     */
+    readonly _cek?: string;
+    /**
+     * Transient migration marker. Present only while a legacy
+     * blob is being migrated to a content CEK: it holds the wrapped content CEK
+     * BEFORE the chunks have been re-encrypted under it. Readers **ignore**
+     * `_cekPending` (they key off `_cek`), so the blob stays readable under the
+     * `_blob` DEK during migration AND the content CEK survives a crash → a
+     * re-run resumes and promotes `_cekPending` → `_cek`. Never set on a settled blob.
+     */
+    readonly _cekPending?: string;
+    /**
+     * Hint indicating which store holds the chunk data.
+     * Used by `routeStore` size-tiered routing: `'default'` for small blobs
+     * stored inline (e.g. DynamoDB), `'blobs'` for large blobs in the overflow
+     * store (e.g. S3). Absent when no routing is configured.
+     */
+    readonly storeHint?: 'default' | 'blobs';
+    /**
+     * Bounded ring (K=8 — an AUDIT-VISIBLE concurrency bound, not an
+     * implementation detail) of the most recent op-stamp identities applied to
+     * this object's `refCount`. Appended in the SAME CAS write as the
+     * `refCount` change it stamps (`BlobSet`'s `casUpdateRefCountStamped`),
+     * never a separate write — no crash window between the two. Oldest entry
+     * is evicted once the ring exceeds K entries.
+     *
+     * The blob durability journal (#753, spec §7 C2/C4) uses membership here
+     * as its test-and-set: a stamped mutator re-reads this ring on every CAS
+     * attempt (including retries) BEFORE computing its delta — stamp already
+     * present → that mutation already landed → skip re-applying it. This is
+     * what makes a crash-resumed refCount decrement/increment exactly-once
+     * rather than at-least-once.
+     *
+     * Two acceptances, by design — SHRED only (see the #746 whole-branch
+     * review correction below for rehome):
+     *  - **Eviction beyond K, for SHRED.** More than 8 distinct in-flight
+     *    stamped operations racing the SAME object between reads is far
+     *    outside any expected co-ownership fan-out; a 9th racer whose stamp
+     *    gets evicted before it re-reads can only double-apply an idempotent
+     *    CAS delta — never silently lose one (the DECREMENT delta is bounded
+     *    by the marker's authoritative captured `hold.n`, applied as ONE CAS
+     *    per eTag — never per-row — so eviction has nothing row-scoped to
+     *    re-apply against). Not a data-loss risk for shred, just a documented
+     *    concurrency bound.
+     *  - **Stale stamps on a retained object.** A `retainedShared` object (one
+     *    reference released, others still live) keeps whatever stamp its last
+     *    CAS write appended even after that operation's marker is gone —
+     *    harmless bookkeeping, not crypto material (unlike `_cek`), that sits
+     *    inert until the object's next CAS write evicts or overwrites it.
+     *
+     * **#746 whole-branch review correction — this ring is NOT the sole
+     * idempotency source for REHOME.** Rehome's destination `+1`s are
+     * ROW-SCOPED (`${opId}:${slotName}` / `${opId}:${versionKey}`, one stamp
+     * PER CONTRIBUTING ROW, not one per eTag). Within a SINGLE op this ring is
+     * sufficient — rows are processed sequentially and each row's referencing
+     * update lands before the next row's `+1`, so a row whose stamp is later
+     * evicted is already seen as "moved" (skipped) on resume, never
+     * re-incremented. The genuine over-count is **concurrent independent ops**
+     * (distinct `opId`s) converging on one shared destination: ≥8 of them can
+     * evict a crashed op's row-stamp before it resumes, and a naive ring-only
+     * resume would then double-apply that row's `+1` — a real, silent,
+     * permanent-leak over-count, not merely eviction-tolerant like shred's.
+     * `BlobIntent.appliedStamps` (`blob-intent.ts`) is rehome's ring-INDEPENDENT
+     * backstop: an unbounded, per-op, per-record log of confirmed row-stamps,
+     * consulted BEFORE this ring on every resume (see
+     * `BlobSet.applyStampedIncrement`). This ring stays the fast first-line
+     * check; `appliedStamps` makes correctness independent of ring eviction
+     * **except** in one intrinsic non-atomic window: the destination `+1`/ring
+     * write (A) and the `appliedStamps` append (B) are separate object writes,
+     * A before B (deliberately — B-first could under-count and crypto-shred a
+     * still-referenced object, i.e. data loss, strictly worse than a
+     * retained-too-long leak). A crash BETWEEN A and B followed by ≥8 concurrent
+     * evictions before resume can still over-count. This window is intrinsic
+     * (rehome, unlike shred, cannot pre-capture destinations at mint time) and
+     * fail-safe-directed; it is a documented residual (see the arc changeset).
+     */
+    readonly lastOps?: readonly string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Slot record — mutable metadata linking a named slot on a record
+ * to a `BlobObject` via its eTag.
+ *
+ * Multiple slots (even across different records) may reference the same
+ * `eTag` — the underlying chunks are shared. Updating metadata creates
+ * a new envelope version (`_v++`) while the blob data is unchanged.
+ */
+export interface SlotRecord {
+    /**
+     * Reference to the `BlobObject` in `_blob_index` (chunk-based blobs).
+     * Empty string (`''`) for an `external` slot, whose bytes live in the
+     * `ObjectProjection` rather than `_blob_chunks` — read `external` instead.
+     */
+    readonly eTag: string;
+    /**
+     * External-projection reference. Present when the blob field is declared
+     * `external`: the raw bytes live in the vault's `ObjectProjection` at `key`
+     * (unencrypted), not in `_blob_chunks`. This slot record (in the encrypted
+     * collection) remains the catalog entry — the anchoring invariant.
+     */
+    readonly external?: {
+        readonly key: string;
+        readonly contentType?: string;
+        readonly public?: boolean;
+        /** Opaque-token backlink stamped on the object (when `backlink:'opaque-token'`). */
+        readonly backlink?: string;
+        /**
+         * Secondary metadata store synced from the object / its processing pipeline
+         * (e.g. video `duration`, image `width`/`height`, arbitrary metatags).
+         * Populated via `BlobSet.setExternalMeta()` — typically an AWS-side callback.
+         */
+        readonly meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    };
+    /** User-visible filename for the slot. */
+    readonly filename: string;
+    /** Original uncompressed size in bytes (denormalized from `BlobObject`). */
+    readonly size: number;
+    /** MIME type. Takes precedence over the MIME type stored in `BlobObject`. */
+    readonly mimeType?: string;
+    /** ISO timestamp of the upload that set this slot. */
+    readonly uploadedAt: string;
+    /** User ID of the uploader, if available. */
+    readonly uploadedBy?: string;
+    /**
+     * Internal rehome-journal bookkeeping (#746 spec §7 review, carried
+     * finding (b)) — NEVER part of the public `list()`/`SlotInfo` contract
+     * (`BlobSet.list()` filters it out explicitly). Set, in the SAME CAS
+     * write that points this slot at its new (rehomed) eTag, to the OLD eTag
+     * still awaiting its refCount release: `putUnderDEK`'s slot-CAS and its
+     * old-eTag release are two separate writes, and a crash between them
+     * would otherwise lose the only record of which object still needs
+     * releasing (the slot map itself has already moved past it) — a
+     * permanent stranded-refcount leak. Cleared once the release lands.
+     * Only ever set under a marker-governed (stamped) rehome; absent on
+     * every ordinary `put()`.
+     */
+    readonly pendingRelease?: string;
+}
+/** Result of `BlobSet.list()` — slot record plus its named slot key. */
+export interface SlotInfo extends SlotRecord {
+    /** The slot name (key in the record's slot map). */
+    readonly name: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Explicitly published version snapshot — an independent reference to a
+ * blob at a specific point in time.
+ */
+export interface VersionRecord {
+    /** User-defined label (e.g. `'issued-2025-01'`, `'amendment-2025-02'`). */
+    readonly label: string;
+    /** eTag of the blob snapshot at publish time — independent of the current slot. */
+    readonly eTag: string;
+    /** ISO timestamp when the version was published. */
+    readonly publishedAt: string;
+    /** User ID of the publisher, if available. */
+    readonly publishedBy?: string;
+}
+/** Options for `BlobSet.put()`. */
+export interface BlobPutOptions {
+    /** MIME type hint. If omitted, auto-detected from magic bytes. */
+    mimeType?: string;
+    /**
+     * Raw chunk size in bytes. Priority: this value > store.maxBlobBytes > 256 KB.
+     */
+    chunkSize?: number;
+    /**
+     * Whether to gzip-compress bytes before encrypting. Default: `true`.
+     * Auto-set to `false` for pre-compressed MIME types (JPEG, PNG, ZIP, etc.).
+     */
+    compress?: boolean;
+    /** User ID to record as `uploadedBy`. Defaults to the Noydb session user. */
+    uploadedBy?: string;
+    /**
+     * User-visible filename to store on the slot. Defaults to the slot name.
+     * Differs from the slot name when the caller wants a display/download name
+     * (e.g. slot `attachment` holding `invoice-2024.pdf`); this is the value
+     * that the L1 lexical index tokenizes for blob fields.
+     */
+    filename?: string;
+}
+/** Options for `BlobSet.response()` and `BlobSet.responseVersion()`. */
+export interface BlobResponseOptions {
+    /**
+     * When `true`, sets `Content-Disposition: inline; filename="..."` so
+     * the browser renders the file in the tab. Default (`false`) sets
+     * `attachment; filename="..."` which triggers a download.
+     */
+    inline?: boolean;
+    /** Override the filename in the Content-Disposition header. */
+    filename?: string;
+}
+export type StoreAuthKind = 'none' | 'filesystem' | 'api-key' | 'iam' | 'oauth' | 'kerberos' | 'browser-origin';
+export interface StoreAuth {
+    kind: StoreAuthKind | StoreAuthKind[];
+    required: boolean;
+    flow: 'static' | 'oauth' | 'kerberos' | 'implicit';
+}
+/** Vendor-neutral short-lived store credentials. `kind` is the credential-PAYLOAD
+ *  discriminator — orthogonal to StoreAuthKind ('iam'|'api-key'|…), which is unchanged. */
+export type StoreCredentials = {
+    readonly kind: 'aws';
+    readonly accessKeyId: string;
+    readonly secretAccessKey: string;
+    readonly sessionToken?: string;
+    readonly expiresAt?: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: 'token';
+    readonly token: string;
+    readonly expiresAt?: string;
+};
+/** Refresh hook a store calls when it has no credentials or they are near expiry. */
+export type StoreCredentialSource = () => Promise<StoreCredentials>;
+/**
+ * The store's authoritative clock as a bounded-uncertainty interval
+ * (Spanner TrueTime model). True time is provably within [earliest, latest];
+ * `latest - earliest` is the clock-uncertainty bound ε. Used by deferred
+ * numbering to order records by store-commit-time and to commit-wait. Never
+ * the client wall clock.
+ */
+export interface StoreTime {
+    readonly earliest: number;
+    readonly latest: number;
+}
+export interface StoreCapabilities {
+    /**
+     * true — the store's expectedVersion check and write are atomic at the
+     * storage layer. Two concurrent puts with the same expectedVersion will
+     * produce exactly one success and one ConflictError.
+     * false — check and write are separate operations with a race window.
+     */
+    casAtomic: boolean;
+    /**
+     * true — the store exposes an authoritative {@link NoydbStore.getStoreTime}
+     * clock and records are ordered by store-commit-time. Required for
+     * `withDeferredNumbering`. Absent/false — the store cannot back deferred
+     * numbering (use CAS `sequence().next()` or per-series).
+     */
+    serverWriteTime?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Advisory geographic region this store serves (e.g. `'eu'`, `'us'`).
+     * Purely declarative — no behavior change for stores that omit it. The
+     * federation data-residency guard compares this against a
+     * `sharding.regionOf(record)` to refuse non-compliant shard placement.
+     */
+    region?: string;
+    auth: StoreAuth;
+    /**
+     * true — the store implements {@link NoydbStore.tx} and commits
+     * every op atomically at the storage layer. The hub's
+     * `db.transaction(fn)` will delegate to `tx(ops)` and surface a
+     * single pass/fail outcome. false (or absent) — no native
+     * multi-record atomicity; the hub falls back to per-record OCC
+     * with best-effort unwind on partial failure.
+     */
+    txAtomic?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Maximum raw bytes per blob chunk record.
+     * `undefined` — no limit (S3, file, IDB); blob stored as single chunk.
+     * `256 * 1024` — DynamoDB (400 KB item limit minus envelope overhead).
+     * `5 * 1024 * 1024` — localStorage quota safety.
+     */
+    maxBlobBytes?: number;
+    /**
+     * true — the store is a tiered router (`routeStore`) with a cold route,
+     * so `compact(vault, { before })` can relocate records hot → cold and
+     * reads fall through to cold. `vault.archivePeriod()` requires this.
+     */
+    coldArchival?: boolean;
+}
+export interface NoydbOptions {
+    /** The ciphertext store. Optional — defaults to the built-in `memoryStore()` (non-persistent). */
+    readonly store?: NoydbStore;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional blob strategy. Pass `withBlobs()`
+     * from `@noy-db/hub/blobs` to enable `collection.blob(id)` storage.
+     * When omitted, hub's blob machinery stays out of the bundle (ESM
+     * tree-shaking) and `collection.blob(id)` throws with a pointer at
+     * the subpath. `BlobStrategy` is `@internal` — users only construct
+     * it via the subpath factory.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly blobStrategy?: BlobStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Cold-storage archival target. `withArchive({ store })` designates a
+     * second store that holds archived record envelopes. Enables
+     * `vault.archive()` / `vault.restore()` / `vault.listArchived()`.
+     */
+    readonly archiveStrategy?: ArchiveStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional indexing strategy. Pass
+     * `withIndexing()` from `@noy-db/hub/indexing` to enable eager-mode
+     * `==/in` fast-paths, lazy-mode `.lazyQuery()`, rebuild/reconcile,
+     * and auto-reconcile. When omitted, indexing code never reaches the
+     * bundle; `.lazyQuery()` throws with a pointer at the subpath, and
+     * eager-mode collections fall back to linear scans regardless of
+     * `indexes: [...]` declarations. `IndexStrategy` is `@internal` —
+     * users only construct it via the subpath factory.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly indexStrategy?: IndexStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional aggregate strategy. Pass
+     * `withAggregate()` from `@noy-db/hub/aggregate` to enable
+     * `.aggregate()` and `.groupBy()` on Query. When omitted, those
+     * methods throw with a pointer at the subpath; the ~886 LOC of
+     * Aggregation + GroupedQuery machinery never reaches the bundle.
+     * Streaming `scan().aggregate()` works independently of this
+     * strategy — it doesn't use the `Aggregation` class.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly aggregateStrategy?: AggregateStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional CRDT strategy. Required when
+     * any collection is declared with `crdt: 'lww-map' | 'rga' | 'yjs'`;
+     * otherwise the first put/sync-merge hitting the CRDT path throws.
+     * When omitted, ~221 LOC of LWW-Map / RGA / merge helpers never
+     * reach the bundle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly crdtStrategy?: CrdtStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — strategy for the collection-level hierarchical-tier
+     * operations. Pass `withTiers()` from `@noy-db/hub/tiers` to enable
+     * `putAtTier`/`getAtTier`/`listAtTier`/`elevate`/`demote` on collections
+     * declared with `{ tiers: [...] }`. When omitted, all five throw
+     * `TiersNotEnabledError` and the tier read/write/re-key engine never
+     * reaches the bundle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly tiersStrategy?: TiersStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional consent-audit strategy. Pass
+     * `withConsent()` from `@noy-db/hub/consent` to enable per-op audit
+     * writes into `_consent_audit` when a consent scope is active.
+     * When omitted, `vault.consentAudit()` returns `[]` and writes are
+     * no-ops; the consent module's ~194 LOC never reaches the bundle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly consentStrategy?: ConsentStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional periods strategy. Pass
+     * `withPeriods()` from `@noy-db/hub/periods` to enable
+     * `vault.closePeriod()` / `.openPeriod()` / write-guard on closed
+     * periods. When omitted, `vault.listPeriods()` returns `[]` and
+     * the write-guard is a no-op; the ~363 LOC of period validation +
+     * ledger appending stay out of the bundle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly periodsStrategy?: PeriodsStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional VaultFrame strategy. Pass
+     * `withShadow()` from `@noy-db/hub/shadow` to enable
+     * `vault.frame()`. Without it, calling `vault.frame()` throws.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly shadowStrategy?: ShadowStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional multi-record transactions. Pass
+     * `withTransactions()` from `@noy-db/hub/tx` to enable
+     * `db.transaction(fn)`. Without it, calling the method throws.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly txStrategy?: TxStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional history + ledger + time-machine.
+     * Pass `withHistory()` from `@noy-db/hub/history` to enable
+     * per-record version snapshots, the hash-chained audit ledger, JSON
+     * Patch deltas, `vault.ledger()`, `vault.at()`, and the
+     * `collection.history()` / `getVersion()` / `revert()` / `diff()` /
+     * `clearHistory()` / `pruneRecordHistory()` read APIs. When omitted,
+     * snapshots/prune/clear are silent no-ops, the read APIs throw with
+     * a pointer at the subpath, and ~1,880 LOC stay out of the bundle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly historyStrategy?: HistoryStrategy;
+    /**
+     * GDPR right-to-erasure. Pass `withForgetCascade({ subjects })`
+     * from `@noy-db/hub/forget` to declare which collections carry erasable
+     * subject data and the record field naming the data subject. Enables
+     * `vault.forget(subjectId)` crypto-shred (rewrite-to-tombstone of the live
+     * record + every history version → body permanently undecryptable, single
+     * `op:'forget'` ledger entry, chain still verifies). Each declared
+     * collection is forced to `perRecordKeys: true`. When omitted (the
+     * `NO_FORGET` default), `vault.forget()` throws
+     * `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError` and no subject-index write hooks run.
+     * Requires `historyStrategy` (the ledger) for the erasure-proof entry.
+     */
+    readonly forgetStrategy?: ForgetStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional i18n strategy. Pass `withI18n()`
+     * from `@noy-db/hub/i18n` to enable `i18nText`/`dictKey` field
+     * resolution on reads, `i18nText` validation on writes, and
+     * `vault.dictionary(name)`. When omitted, locale resolution is the
+     * identity (raw values returned), the validators throw with a
+     * pointer to the subpath, and ~854 LOC of dictionary + locale
+     * machinery stay out of the bundle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly i18nStrategy?: I18nStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional session-policy strategy. Pass
+     * `withSession()` from `@noy-db/hub/session` to enable
+     * `sessionPolicy` validation, `PolicyEnforcer` lifecycle (idle /
+     * absolute timeouts, lockOnBackground), and global session-token
+     * revocation. When omitted, setting `sessionPolicy` throws at
+     * `createNoydb()` time, and ~495 LOC of policy + token machinery
+     * stay out of the bundle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly sessionStrategy?: SessionStrategy;
+    /**
+     * tree-shake seam — optional sync engine + presence strategy.
+     * Pass `withSync()` from `@noy-db/hub/sync` to enable
+     * `db.push()` / `pull()` / replication, `db.transaction(vault)`
+     * for sync-aware transactions, and `collection.presence()`. When
+     * omitted, configuring `sync` / calling these surfaces throws with
+     * a pointer at the subpath, and ~856 LOC of replication + presence
+     * machinery stay out of the bundle. Keyring stays core; grant/
+     * revoke/magic-link/delegation tree-shake via direct imports.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly syncStrategy?: SyncStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional snapshot-lifecycle service. Pass
+     * `withSnapshots({ store })` from `@noy-db/hub/snapshots` to enable
+     * `db.snapshot()`, `db.listSnapshots()`, and `db.restoreSnapshot()`.
+     * When omitted, all three methods throw with a pointer at the subpath.
+     */
+    readonly snapshotStrategy?: SnapshotStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional attestation capability. Pass
+     * `withAttestation()` from `@noy-db/hub/attestation` to enable
+     * `vault.issueAttestation()`, `vault.getDocumentSigningPublicKey()`,
+     * `vault.revokeAttestation()`, `vault.unrevokeAttestation()`,
+     * `vault.getRevokedDocIds()`, and `vault.publishRevocationList()`. When
+     * omitted, all six throw `AttestationNotEnabledError` and the issue/revoke/
+     * signer engines are tree-shaken out.
+     */
+    readonly attestationStrategy?: AttestationStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional classified-field capability. Pass
+     * `withClassified()` from `@noy-db/hub/classified` to enable
+     * `collection.reveal()`. When omitted, `reveal()` throws
+     * `ClassifiedNotEnabledError` and the reveal engine is tree-shaken out.
+     */
+    readonly classifiedStrategy?: ClassifiedStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional sealed-record (grantor-side) capability. Pass
+     * `withSealedRecord()` from `@noy-db/hub/sealed-record` to enable
+     * `vault.sealRecordToHost()`, `vault.revokeSealedRecord()`, and
+     * `vault.rotateRecordCek()`. When omitted, all three throw
+     * `SealedRecordNotEnabledError` and the record-keys grantor engine is reached
+     * only via opt-in. The host-side `openSealedRecord` opener stays ungated.
+     */
+    readonly sealedRecordStrategy?: SealedRecordStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional portability (data-sovereignty) capability. Pass
+     * `withPortability()` from `@noy-db/hub/portability` to enable the
+     * `vault.user.*` export/withdrawal surface (`exportMyAccessibleData`,
+     * `unilateralWithdrawal`, `requestWithdrawal`, `listWithdrawalRequests`,
+     * `approveWithdrawal`, `rejectWithdrawal`). When omitted, all six throw
+     * `PortabilityNotEnabledError` and the export/withdraw/request engines are
+     * reached only via opt-in.
+     */
+    readonly portabilityStrategy?: PortabilityStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional atomic-sequence capability. Pass
+     * `withSequence()` from `@noy-db/hub` to enable `vault.sequence(name)`
+     * (`.next()` / `.peek()` / `.seedTo()`). When omitted, `vault.sequence()`
+     * throws `SequenceNotEnabledError` and the CAS `SequenceStore` engine is
+     * reached only via opt-in. Deferred-numbering series (`numbering:
+     * [withDeferredNumbering(...)]`) are a separate capability and stay live.
+     */
+    readonly sequenceStrategy?: SequenceStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional sovereign-custody (FR-6) capability. Pass
+     * `withCustody()` from `@noy-db/hub` to enable minting / removing a
+     * `custodian` (`db.grantCustodian` / `db.revokeCustodian` and the
+     * `vault.custody.*` facade) plus the `vault.custody.liberate()` ceremony.
+     * When omitted, those throw `CustodyNotEnabledError` and the liberate engine
+     * is reached only via opt-in. The lower-level `liberateVault` free function
+     * stays ungated (it has no createNoydb instance to gate against).
+     */
+    readonly custodyStrategy?: CustodyStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional multi-user team capability (#267
+     * keyring-grant → team split). Pass `withTeam()` from `@noy-db/hub/team`
+     * to enable `db.grant` / `db.revoke` / `db.rotate`. When omitted, those
+     * throw `TeamNotEnabledError` and the keyring grant/revoke/rotate engines
+     * are reached only via opt-in — the always-on floor is single-user.
+     * Single-user primitives (owner keyring, unlock, `listUsers`,
+     * `updateUser`, passphrase rotate/recover) stay ungated, as does the
+     * `createDeedOwner` free function (no createNoydb instance to gate
+     * against).
+     */
+    readonly teamStrategy?: TeamStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional credential-broker capability (#479). Pass
+     * `brokerStrategy: withBroker(config)` from `@noy-db/hub/broker` to
+     * enable `vault.broker()` (`.enroll()` / `.rotate()` /
+     * `.credentialSource(profile?)`). When omitted, `vault.broker()` throws
+     * `BrokerNotEnabledError` and the seed lifecycle + network/cache engine
+     * are reached only via opt-in.
+     */
+    readonly brokerStrategy?: BrokerStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Opt-in seam — the `lazy` service (#267). Pass `withLazy()` from
+     * `@noy-db/hub/lazy` to explicitly enable lazy mode's bounded-LRU
+     * working set for collections declared with `prefetch: false`. When
+     * omitted, `prefetch: false` still works via the deprecated implicit
+     * back-compat path (identical behavior, one-time deprecation warn);
+     * the implicit path will be removed at 1.0.
+     */
+    readonly lazyStrategy?: LazyStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional search / retrieval capability. Pass
+     * `withSearch()` from `@noy-db/hub` to enable a collection's `search`
+     * / `retrieve` / `similarTo` / `warmIndex` / `flushIndex` methods and the
+     * put()-time embedding-vector compute for collections declaring `embeddings`.
+     * When omitted, those throw `SearchNotEnabledError` and the search/retrieval
+     * engine is reached only via opt-in. Embedding compute is paired with search
+     * (a vector no gated retrieval could read would be dead weight).
+     */
+    readonly searchStrategy?: SearchStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Tree-shake seam — optional cargo (partition extraction) capability
+     * (FR-6/FR-7). Pass `withCargo()` from `@noy-db/hub/cargo` to enable the
+     * source-side `extractPartition(vault, …)` free function. When omitted, it
+     * throws `CargoNotEnabledError` and the extraction crypto is reached only via
+     * opt-in. The recipient-side `adoptPartition` / `decryptExtractedPartition`
+     * free functions — and `diffVault` (shared import/merge infra) — operate
+     * without a gated source instance and stay ungated.
+     */
+    readonly cargoStrategy?: CargoStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Optional guard strategies — collection-level write guards. Each
+     * handle is the output of `withGuard()` from `@noy-db/hub/guards`.
+     * Multiple guards per collection are allowed; they are dispatched
+     * in registration order on `collection.put()`.
+     */
+    readonly guardStrategies?: ReadonlyArray<GuardStrategyHandleAny>;
+    /**
+     * Deferred-numbering series declared via `withDeferredNumbering(...)`.
+     * `vault.sequence(series).next({ for })` then assigns gap-free serials at a
+     * numbering pass (`vault.runNumberingPass(series)`) instead of via CAS.
+     */
+    readonly numbering?: ReadonlyArray<DeferredNumberingConfig>;
+    /**
+     * Optional derivation strategies — source-to-output projections that
+     * fire on `collection.put()`. Each handle is the output of
+     * `withDerivation()` from `@noy-db/hub/derivations`. The vault
+     * validates the derivation graph for cycles on `openVault`; a cyclic
+     * graph throws `DerivationCycleError`.
+     */
+    readonly derivationStrategies?: ReadonlyArray<DerivationStrategyHandle>;
+    /**
+     * Optional materialized-view strategies.
+     * Each handle returned by `withMaterializedView()` from
+     * `@noy-db/hub/materialized-views`. The vault runs unified cycle
+     * detection across the MV + derivation graphs at `openVault`; a
+     * cyclic graph throws `MaterializedViewCycleError`.
+     */
+    readonly materializedViewStrategies?: ReadonlyArray<MaterializedViewStrategyHandle>;
+    /**
+     * Optional overlay strategies. Each handle returned by
+     * `withOverlayedView()` from `@noy-db/hub/overlay-views`. The vault
+     * validates name uniqueness + base concreteness + overlay
+     * availability at `openVault`; a clash throws one of the
+     * `Overlay*Error` family.
+     */
+    readonly overlayedViewStrategies?: ReadonlyArray<OverlayedViewStrategyHandle>;
+    /** Optional remote store(s) for sync. Accepts a single store, a SyncTarget, or an array. */
+    readonly sync?: NoydbStore | SyncTarget | SyncTarget[];
+    /** User identifier. */
+    readonly user: string;
+    /** Passphrase for key derivation. Required unless encrypt is false or `getKeyring` is provided. */
+    readonly secret?: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional callback that returns an unlocked keyring for a given vault.
+     * Use this to plug in WebAuthn / OIDC / Shamir / any unlock path that
+     * produces an `UnlockedKeyring` outside the passphrase model.
+     *
+     * When set, `secret` MUST NOT also be set — `createNoydb` throws if both
+     * are supplied. When neither is set (and `encrypt !== false`), `createNoydb`
+     * also throws.
+     *
+     * The callback is called lazily, on the first operation that needs the
+     * keyring for a given vault. Noydb caches the returned keyring per-vault
+     * for the lifetime of the instance, so the callback is invoked at most
+     * once per `(instance, vault)` pair (assuming the callback resolves
+     * successfully). If the callback rejects, the rejection surfaces from the
+     * first vault operation that triggered the unlock; subsequent operations
+     * will retry the callback.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```ts
+     * import { createNoydb } from '@noy-db/hub'
+     * import { unlockWebAuthn } from '@noy-db/on-webauthn'
+     *
+     * const enrollment = await loadEnrollment()
+     * const db = await createNoydb({
+     *   store,
+     *   user: 'alice',
+     *   getKeyring: (vault) => unlockWebAuthn(enrollment),
+     * })
+     * ```
+     *
+     * Note: this callback is responsible for both the "open existing vault"
+     * and the "create new vault" cases. Unlike the passphrase path, there is
+     * no automatic `NoAccessError` → `createOwnerKeyring` fallback, because
+     * the callback owner has the UI context to decide which path to run.
+     * For first-time bootstrap, use a passphrase or recovery code, enroll
+     * WebAuthn from the unlocked keyring, then swap to `getKeyring` on
+     * subsequent sessions.
+     */
+    readonly getKeyring?: (vault: string) => Promise<UnlockedKeyring>;
+    /**
+     * Passphrase mode. Default `'standard'`.
+     *
+     *   - `'standard'` — the legacy flow. `secret` supplies the
+     *     plaintext passphrase, the user knows it, and the policy gate
+     *     `rotate-passphrase` is enabled.
+     *   - `'managed'` — rubber-hose-resistant mode. Hub generates a
+     *     256-bit random passphrase at first open and seals it under
+     *     the provided `sealingKey`. The user never sees or types the
+     *     passphrase, defeating the $5-wrench attack. Mutually
+     *     exclusive with `secret` and `getKeyring`.
+     *
+     * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Managed-passphrase mode
+     */
+    readonly passphraseMode?: 'standard' | 'managed';
+    /**
+     * Provider that seals/unseals the auto-generated managed-mode
+     * passphrase. Required when `passphraseMode === 'managed'`; ignored
+     * otherwise. Implementations live in per-platform packages
+     * (`@noy-db/seal-macos-keychain`, `@noy-db/seal-wincred`,
+     * `@noy-db/seal-libsecret`, `@noy-db/seal-aws-kms`, …).
+     */
+    readonly sealingKey?: SealingKeyProvider;
+    /** Required to use `profile: 'shamir'` recovery. Pass
+     *  `shamirRecoveryProvider()` from `@noy-db/on-shamir`. */
+    readonly shamirRecovery?: ShamirRecoveryProvider;
+    /** Auth method. Default: 'passphrase'. */
+    readonly auth?: 'passphrase' | 'biometric';
+    /** Enable encryption. Default: true. */
+    readonly encrypt?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Debug-only: lay plaintext records out as directly-inspectable store
+     * objects (record fields inlined beside envelope metadata, `_debug: 1`) so
+     * native store tooling can read them without unwrapping `_data`. Requires
+     * `encrypt: false` — combining with encryption throws `DebugPlaintextError`
+     * at construction. NEVER enable for production or client data.
+     */
+    readonly debugPlaintext?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Object projection for direct-serve / external blob fields (`as-*`, e.g.
+     * `@noy-db/as-aws-s3`). Blob fields declared `external` route their RAW bytes
+     * to this projection as a single native object (servable from S3/CDN) instead
+     * of the encrypted-chunk path; the encrypted record/slot stays the catalog.
+     * Sees plaintext bytes — outside the zero-knowledge guarantee.
+     */
+    readonly objectStore?: ObjectProjection;
+    /** Conflict resolution strategy. Default: 'version'. */
+    readonly conflict?: ConflictStrategy;
+    /**
+     * Sync scheduling policy. Controls when push/pull fire.
+     * Default inferred from store category: per-record → `on-change`,
+     * bundle → `debounce 30s`.
+     */
+    readonly syncPolicy?: SyncPolicy;
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Use `syncPolicy` instead. Kept for backward compatibility.
+     * When both are supplied, `syncPolicy` takes precedence.
+     */
+    readonly autoSync?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Use `syncPolicy` instead. Kept for backward compatibility.
+     */
+    readonly syncInterval?: number;
+    /**
+     * Session timeout in ms. Clears keys after inactivity. Default: none.
+     * @deprecated Use `sessionPolicy.idleTimeoutMs` instead. This field is
+     * still honored for backwards compatibility but `sessionPolicy` takes
+     * precedence when both are supplied.
+     */
+    readonly sessionTimeout?: number;
+    /**
+     * Session policy controlling lifetime, re-auth requirements, and
+     * background-lock behavior. When supplied, replaces the
+     * legacy `sessionTimeout` field.
+     */
+    readonly sessionPolicy?: SessionPolicy;
+    /**
+     * Validate passphrase strength against the phrase format
+     * on first-time keyring creation. When
+     * `true`, weak phrases throw {@link WeakPassphraseError} from
+     * `createNoydb()` / `db.rotatePassphrase()`. Default: `false` for
+     * back-compat; planned to flip to `true` in a future major release.
+     */
+    readonly validatePassphrase?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Vault-level policy gate document. When present, the hub
+     * persists the merged policy at `_meta/policy` on first-time vault
+     * creation and gates sensitive operations (`db.rotatePassphrase`,
+     * `db.export*`, …) against it. Omitted ⇒ the engine uses
+     * {@link PERSONAL_POLICY}. Use {@link STRICT_POLICY} for regulated
+     * deployments.
+     *
+     * The on-disk document is the source of truth — the policy field
+     * is only honored at vault creation; subsequent runs read from
+     * `_meta/policy`. Use `db.updatePolicy()` to change it deliberately.
+     *
+     * Imported from `@noy-db/hub` as a type-only reference; the runtime
+     * import lives in `policy/index.ts`.
+     */
+    readonly policy?: VaultPolicy;
+    /**
+     * Mandatory recovery profile enrollment. Vaults with
+     * `recover-passphrase` enabled MUST register at least one profile
+     * before being production-ready, otherwise `createNoydb()` throws
+     * {@link RecoveryNotEnrolledError}. Set
+     * `policy.gates['recover-passphrase'].enabled = false` to
+     * deliberately opt out of recovery (passphrase loss = data loss).
+     *
+     * The `'paper'` profile is supported end-to-end. Other
+     * profiles ship the API shape and throw
+     * {@link RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError} during use.
+     */
+    readonly recovery?: ReadonlyArray<RecoveryEnrollment>;
+    /**
+     * When `true`, `createNoydb` rejects vaults with no recovery
+     * entries persisted (per the spec's mandatory-enrollment
+     * requirement). Default `false` for back-compat; planned to
+     * flip to `true` in a future major release. Apps in regulated
+     * environments should turn this on now.
+     */
+    readonly requireRecovery?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * What to do when `openVault` finds an existing keyring in the store that
+     * cannot be decrypted with the supplied credentials (`InvalidKeyError`).
+     *
+     * - `'error'` (default) — propagate the error. The app must prompt the user
+     *   to supply the correct credentials or clear both the data and auth stores.
+     * - `'reset'` — delete the stale keyring and re-initialise the vault from
+     *   scratch using the current credentials. Use this when the data store can
+     *   become detached from the auth store (e.g. the user cleared the IndexedDB
+     *   data records but not the keyring row, or a WebAuthn credential was rotated).
+     *   **All previously encrypted data is unrecoverable after a reset.**
+     *
+     * Only applies to the passphrase (`secret`) path. When `getKeyring` is used,
+     * the callback is responsible for handling stale-keyring detection itself.
+     */
+    readonly onInvalidKey?: 'error' | 'reset';
+    /**
+     * Enable the public envelope service (`https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/public-envelope.md`).
+     * Pass `true` for the default schema (every standard field, 256 KB
+     * icon cap, 200-char text cap), or a `PublicEnvelopeSchema` to
+     * narrow what the owner can set. Off by default — vaults written
+     * by hubs without this option carry no envelope, full stop.
+     */
+    readonly publicEnvelope?: true | PublicEnvelopeSchema;
+    /** Audit history configuration. */
+    readonly history?: HistoryConfig;
+    /**
+     * Consumer-supplied translation function for `i18nText` fields with
+     * `autoTranslate: true`.
+     *
+     * ⚠ **`plaintextTranslator` receives unencrypted text.** Configuring
+     * this hook causes plaintext to leave noy-db's zero-knowledge boundary
+     * over whatever channel the consumer's implementation uses. noy-db ships
+     * no built-in translator and adds no translator SDKs as dependencies.
+     * The consumer chooses and owns the data policy of the external service.
+     *
+     * Per-field opt-in via `autoTranslate: true` on `i18nText()`. Calling
+     * `put()` on a collection with `autoTranslate: true` fields while this
+     * option is absent throws `TranslatorNotConfiguredError`.
+     *
+     * See `NOYDB_SPEC.md § Zero-Knowledge Storage` for the invariant text.
+     */
+    readonly plaintextTranslator?: PlaintextTranslatorFn;
+    /**
+     * Human-readable name for the translator, recorded in the in-process
+     * audit log (e.g. `'deepl-pro-with-dpa'`, `'self-hosted-llama-7b'`).
+     * Defaults to `'anonymous'` when not supplied.
+     */
+    readonly plaintextTranslatorName?: string;
+    /**
+     * Drain-barrier coordination transport for the schema fence.
+     * When omitted, the kernel uses a {@link CoordinationProvider} backed by the
+     * primary store (`StoreCoordinationProvider`), reproducing today's
+     * store-polling fence behavior byte-for-byte. `@noy-db/by-tabs` /
+     * `@noy-db/by-peer` inject a real-time push transport here; an external
+     * orchestrator (`@klum-db/lobby`) drives it through the `Noydb` handle.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly coordinationStrategy?: CoordinationProvider;
+    /**
+     * Pre-resolved factory for the `vault.user` per-principal user-envelope
+     * API. `createNoydb()` always resolves this itself (dynamically
+     * importing `with-party/directory/user-envelope/api.js`) before
+     * constructing `Noydb` — mirrors the {@link coordinationStrategy}
+     * pre-resolve above. There is no supported way to override it; it exists
+     * as an options-bag field only so `createNoydb()` can thread the
+     * pre-resolved value into the constructor without a second parameter.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly userApiFactory?: UserApiFactory;
+    /**
+     * Pre-resolved factory for the `NoydbPolicy` service (vault-policy
+     * read/update/bootstrap + session-policy enforcer wiring).
+     * `createNoydb()` always resolves this itself (dynamically importing
+     * `with-party/policy/index.js`) before constructing `Noydb` — mirrors the
+     * {@link coordinationStrategy} / {@link userApiFactory} pre-resolves
+     * above. There is no supported way to override it.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly policyFactory?: NoydbPolicyFactory;
+    /**
+     * Pre-resolved policy-gate engine function (`checkGate`).
+     * `createNoydb()` always resolves this itself (dynamically importing
+     * `with-party/policy/index.js`) before constructing `Noydb` — same
+     * pre-resolve pattern as {@link policyFactory}.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly policyCheckGateFn?: PolicyCheckGateFn;
+    /**
+     * Stable id for the session that owns this instance's writers (one user's
+     * writers across vaults). Tags every {@link WriterPresence} the fence
+     * watcher reports. Defaults to a fresh ULID per `Noydb` instance.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly sessionId?: string;
+}
+/** History configuration. */
+export interface HistoryConfig {
+    /** Enable history tracking. Default: true. */
+    readonly enabled?: boolean;
+    /** Maximum history entries per record. Oldest pruned on overflow. Default: unlimited. */
+    readonly maxVersions?: number;
+    /**
+     * Participate in the vault-wide hash-chained tamper ledger. Default:
+     * `true` (every write of this collection appends a ledger entry when
+     * `withHistory()` is active). Set `false` to exclude this collection's
+     * writes from the chain — its puts/deletes leave no ledger entry,
+     * confining tamper-evidence to the collections where it carries weight.
+     * Independent of `enabled`, which gates per-record snapshots. Has no
+     * effect when `withHistory()` is not active (there is no ledger).
+     */
+    readonly ledger?: boolean;
+}
+/** Options for querying history. */
+export interface HistoryOptions {
+    /** Start date (inclusive), ISO 8601. */
+    readonly from?: string;
+    /** End date (inclusive), ISO 8601. */
+    readonly to?: string;
+    /** Maximum entries to return. */
+    readonly limit?: number;
+}
+/** Options for pruning history. */
+export interface PruneOptions {
+    /** Keep only the N most recent versions. */
+    readonly keepVersions?: number;
+    /** Delete versions older than this date, ISO 8601. */
+    readonly beforeDate?: string;
+}
+/** A decrypted history entry. */
+export interface HistoryEntry<T> {
+    readonly version: number;
+    readonly timestamp: string;
+    readonly userId: string;
+    readonly record: T;
+}
+/** Per-item options for `Collection.putMany()`. */
+export interface PutManyItemOptions {
+    /**
+     * Optimistic-concurrency check: fail this item if the stored version
+     * is not `expectedVersion`. Honored only in `atomic: true` mode;
+     * ignored in the default best-effort loop.
+     */
+    readonly expectedVersion?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Batch-level options for `Collection.putMany()` and `deleteMany()`.
+ *
+ * `atomic: true` switches the call from best-effort loop
+ * to all-or-nothing: a pre-flight CAS check runs first, then every op
+ * is executed; any mid-batch failure triggers a best-effort revert.
+ * On failure in atomic mode the whole call throws — you won't get a
+ * partial `PutManyResult`. On success the result mirrors the default
+ * loop's shape.
+ */
+export interface PutManyOptions {
+    readonly atomic?: boolean;
+}
+/** Result of `Collection.putMany()`. */
+export interface PutManyResult {
+    /** `true` iff every entry succeeded. */
+    readonly ok: boolean;
+    /** IDs that were successfully written. */
+    readonly success: readonly string[];
+    /** Entries that failed, with the error that prevented each write. */
+    readonly failures: ReadonlyArray<{
+        readonly id: string;
+        readonly error: Error;
+    }>;
+}
+/** Result of `Collection.deleteMany()`. Same shape as `PutManyResult`. */
+export interface DeleteManyResult {
+    readonly ok: boolean;
+    readonly success: readonly string[];
+    readonly failures: ReadonlyArray<{
+        readonly id: string;
+        readonly error: Error;
+    }>;
+}
+/**
+ * Thin reader view of a user envelope. The on-disk shape is the standard
+ * {@link EncryptedEnvelope}; this is what callers see after the storage
+ * layer has decrypted the payload.
+ *
+ * Hub commits to the `keyringId` ⇔ `userId` identity and the `_v` / `_ts`
+ * envelope metadata. The `data` payload is fully app-defined — hub does
+ * not introspect, validate, or reserve any keys inside it.
+ */
+export interface UserEnvelope<T> {
+    /** The principal id this envelope belongs to. Equals the keyring `user_id`. */
+    readonly keyringId: string;
+    /** App-owned payload. Opaque to hub. */
+    readonly data: T;
+    /** Optimistic-concurrency version. Increments on every write. */
+    readonly _v: number;
+    /** ISO timestamp of the last write. */
+    readonly _ts: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Recursive partial. Used for `updateMe(patch)` so callers can hand in
+ * deeply-nested partial shapes and have them deep-merged onto the
+ * current envelope.
+ */
+export type DeepPartial<T> = T extends object ? {
+    [P in keyof T]?: DeepPartial<T[P]>;
+} : T;
+/**
+ * Recursive partial with `null` allowed at every level — used by
+ * `updateMe` to express deletion intent in addition to merge.
+ *
+ * Semantics inside `updateMe`:
+ *   - `undefined` (or absent key) — skip; source value preserved
+ *   - `null` — delete the key from the resulting envelope
+ *   - any other value — overwrite (deep-merge for plain objects,
+ *     replace for primitives / arrays)
+ *
+ * Matches lodash `_.merge` behavior on `null` and Firestore's
+ * `FieldValue.delete()` semantics. Loosened from `DeepPartial<T>`.
+ * Consumers wanting the original "merge-only" surface can keep
+ * importing `DeepPartial` and avoid passing `null`.
+ */
+export type DeepPartialOrNull<T> = T extends object ? {
+    [P in keyof T]?: DeepPartialOrNull<T[P]> | null;
+} : T;
+/** Cancel a previously-registered subscription. */
+export type Unsubscribe = () => void;
+/**
+ * Optional factor-proof bundle threaded into gated user-envelope
+ * operations. Same shape as `Noydb.checkGate(vault, gate, presented)`
+ * accepts elsewhere — apps that have already presented a TOTP/email-OTP
+ * for this session pass it here to satisfy tightened policies.
+ */
+export interface UserEnvelopePresented {
+    readonly factors?: readonly FactorProof[];
+    readonly sharedDevice?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Callback used by `UserApi` to validate the active session against a
+ * policy gate. Provided by the `Vault` constructor; in production this
+ * delegates to `Noydb.checkGate(vault, gate, presented)`. In tests, a
+ * no-op stub is fine.
+ */
+export type UserEnvelopeCheckGate = (gate: 'edit-own-profile' | 'view-team-profiles' | 'client-unilateral-withdraw' | 'user-request-withdrawal' | 'approve-user-withdrawal', presented?: UserEnvelopePresented) => Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Reactive handle returned by `live()`. `current` is the most recently
+ * observed value; `subscribe(cb)` fires on subsequent local writes.
+ * `stop()` releases the underlying subscription.
+ */
+export interface LiveUserEnvelope<T> {
+    current(): UserEnvelope<T> | null;
+    subscribe(cb: (env: UserEnvelope<T> | null) => void): Unsubscribe;
+    stop(): void;
+}
+/**
+ * The 2nd positional parameter of a {@link PortabilityStrategy} method
+ * (index 1, right after the leading `vault` argument).
+ */
+type PortabilityParam1<K extends keyof PortabilityStrategy> = Parameters<PortabilityStrategy[K]>[1];
+/**
+ * The 3rd positional parameter (index 2) — only present on
+ * `approveWithdrawal` / `rejectWithdrawal` (requestId is index 1 there).
+ */
+type PortabilityParam2<K extends keyof PortabilityStrategy> = Parameters<PortabilityStrategy[K]>[2];
+type PortabilityReturn<K extends keyof PortabilityStrategy> = ReturnType<PortabilityStrategy[K]>;
+/**
+ * Public `vault.user.*` API surface — the CONTRACT. The implementation
+ * (`UserApi`) lives at `with-party/directory/user-envelope/api.ts` and
+ * `implements` this interface; `createNoydb()` wires it in via the
+ * pre-resolved {@link UserApiFactory}.
+ *
+ * Three families:
+ *  - Write-self: `me` / `updateMe` / `setMe` — always target the writer's
+ *    own keyringId. **Own-only write rule** is structural — no method
+ *    exists to write someone else's envelope.
+ *  - Read-anyone: `get` / `list` — read other principals' envelopes
+ *    (subject to `view-team-profiles` policy gate).
+ *  - Reactive: `subscribe` / `live` — in-process event emission on local
+ *    writes. Cross-instance updates land via the team/sync engine and
+ *    surface to subscribers when the sync diff replays through this API.
+ *
+ * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md
+ */
+export interface VaultUserApi {
+    requestWithdrawal(opts?: PortabilityParam1<'requestWithdrawal'>): PortabilityReturn<'requestWithdrawal'>;
+    listWithdrawalRequests(opts?: PortabilityParam1<'listWithdrawalRequests'>): PortabilityReturn<'listWithdrawalRequests'>;
+    approveWithdrawal(requestId: PortabilityParam1<'approveWithdrawal'>, opts?: PortabilityParam2<'approveWithdrawal'>): PortabilityReturn<'approveWithdrawal'>;
+    rejectWithdrawal(requestId: PortabilityParam1<'rejectWithdrawal'>, opts?: PortabilityParam2<'rejectWithdrawal'>): PortabilityReturn<'rejectWithdrawal'>;
+    unilateralWithdrawal(opts: PortabilityParam1<'withdrawAccessibleData'>): PortabilityReturn<'withdrawAccessibleData'>;
+    exportMyAccessibleData(opts?: PortabilityParam1<'exportAccessibleData'>): PortabilityReturn<'exportAccessibleData'>;
+    me<T = unknown>(): Promise<UserEnvelope<T> | null>;
+    updateMe<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>>(patch: DeepPartialOrNull<T>, presented?: UserEnvelopePresented): Promise<UserEnvelope<T>>;
+    setMe<T = unknown>(payload: T, presented?: UserEnvelopePresented): Promise<UserEnvelope<T>>;
+    getMyVisibility(): Promise<{
+        readonly hidden: boolean;
+    }>;
+    setMyVisibility(visibility: {
+        readonly hidden: boolean;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    get<T = unknown>(keyringId: string, presented?: UserEnvelopePresented): Promise<UserEnvelope<T> | null>;
+    list<T = unknown>(presented?: UserEnvelopePresented): Promise<UserEnvelope<T>[]>;
+    subscribe<T = unknown>(keyringId: string, cb: (env: UserEnvelope<T> | null) => void): Unsubscribe;
+    live<T = unknown>(keyringId: string): LiveUserEnvelope<T>;
+}
+/**
+ * Constructor dependencies for `UserApi` (the {@link VaultUserApi}
+ * implementation). Built by `Vault`'s constructor and passed to the
+ * pre-resolved {@link UserApiFactory}.
+ */
+export interface UserApiDeps {
+    readonly adapter: NoydbStore;
+    readonly vaultName: string;
+    /** The writer's own keyringId. Frozen at construction time. */
+    readonly writerKeyringId: string;
+    readonly getDek: () => Promise<EnclaveKey>;
+    /**
+     * Policy-gate validator. When omitted, gates are skipped — useful
+     * for low-level tests that exercise the storage layer directly.
+     * Production paths always wire the Noydb-backed implementation.
+     */
+    readonly checkGate?: UserEnvelopeCheckGate;
+    /**
+     * Noydb-backed `exportMyAccessibleData`, injected by the Vault
+     * (which holds the keyring + bundle machinery). Omitted in low-level tests.
+     */
+    readonly exportAccessible?: (opts: PortabilityParam1<'exportAccessibleData'>) => PortabilityReturn<'exportAccessibleData'>;
+    /**
+     * Noydb-backed `unilateralWithdrawal`, injected by the Vault.
+     * Destructive — extract + dispose (delete | freeze). Omitted in low-level tests.
+     */
+    readonly unilateralWithdraw?: (opts: PortabilityParam1<'withdrawAccessibleData'>) => PortabilityReturn<'withdrawAccessibleData'>;
+    /**
+     * Noydb-backed two-party withdrawal ceremony, injected by the
+     * Vault. requestWithdraw = requester side; the rest = owner side.
+     */
+    readonly requestWithdraw?: (opts: PortabilityParam1<'requestWithdrawal'>) => PortabilityReturn<'requestWithdrawal'>;
+    readonly listWithdrawals?: (opts: PortabilityParam1<'listWithdrawalRequests'>) => PortabilityReturn<'listWithdrawalRequests'>;
+    readonly approveWithdraw?: (requestId: PortabilityParam1<'approveWithdrawal'>, opts: PortabilityParam2<'approveWithdrawal'>) => PortabilityReturn<'approveWithdrawal'>;
+    readonly rejectWithdraw?: (requestId: PortabilityParam1<'rejectWithdrawal'>, opts: PortabilityParam2<'rejectWithdrawal'>) => PortabilityReturn<'rejectWithdrawal'>;
+}
+/**
+ * Factory that builds the `vault.user` API implementation from its
+ * dependencies. `createNoydb()` pre-resolves the real implementation
+ * (`with-party/directory/user-envelope/api.js#createUserApi`) via a
+ * dynamic import before constructing `Noydb`, so `Vault`'s constructor
+ * can call it synchronously — the two sync `subscribe`/`live` methods on
+ * `VaultUserApi` are why `vault.user` must be built synchronously.
+ */
+export type UserApiFactory = (deps: UserApiDeps) => VaultUserApi;
+/**
+ * A single factor surface — the proof an actor presents at gate time.
+ *
+ * | Kind | Source | Off-device? |
+ * |---|---|---|
+ * | `totp` | RFC 6238 authenticator app (Google Auth, 1Password) | yes |
+ * | `email-otp` | one-time code mailed to the user | yes |
+ * | `recovery` | printable Base32 code (`@noy-db/on-recovery`) | yes (paper) |
+ * | `shamir` | k-of-n threshold share (`@noy-db/on-shamir`) | yes |
+ * | `webauthn-roaming` | hardware key (YubiKey, SoloKey, Titan) | yes (key portable) |
+ * | `webauthn-platform` | platform passkey (Touch ID, Face ID, Hello) | no (device-bound) |
+ * | `password` | tier-2 password (`@noy-db/on-password`) | no |
+ * | `pin` | tier-3 quick-resume PIN (`@noy-db/on-pin`) | no |
+ *
+ * Off-device kinds (TOTP, email-OTP, recovery, shamir, roaming WebAuthn)
+ * are the strongest factor proofs because they require something
+ * separate from the device the user just unlocked. Platform / password /
+ * PIN are useful for "fresh proof of *this* user" but don't bind across
+ * devices — policies can require ANY of them or insist on a count of 2
+ * to force a mix.
+ *
+ * `webauthn-platform`, `password`, `pin` — for consumers with no
+ * off-device infrastructure (no TOTP, no email-OTP, paper recovery not
+ * enrolled) who want to require "any second factor I have wired"
+ * without losing the freshness guarantee.
+ */
+export type FactorKind = 'totp' | 'email-otp' | 'recovery' | 'shamir' | 'webauthn-roaming' | 'webauthn-platform' | 'password' | 'pin';
+/**
+ * One factor requirement entry. The default is "any one of the listed
+ * factors, fresh within the last 5 minutes". Bumping `count` requires N
+ * distinct fresh proofs; bumping `freshnessMs` widens the acceptance
+ * window.
+ */
+export interface FactorRequirement {
+    readonly anyOf: ReadonlyArray<FactorKind>;
+    /** Number of distinct factors required. Default 1. */
+    readonly count?: number;
+    /** How recent each proof must be. Default 5 minutes. */
+    readonly freshnessMs?: number;
+}
+/** Soft signals layered on top of the gate verdict — never block on their own. */
+export interface WarningRules {
+    /** Behavior on shared-device tier-1 ops. `'block'` raises a `PolicyDeniedError`. */
+    readonly sharedDevice?: 'warn' | 'block';
+    /** Behavior on weak tier-2 (e.g. password-only) for sensitive ops. */
+    readonly weakAuthenticator?: 'warn' | 'block';
+}
+/**
+ * Policy applied to one named gate. `enabled: false` disables the
+ * action entirely (useful in managed-passphrase mode where rotation is
+ * impossible by construction).
+ */
+export interface GatePolicy {
+    /** Minimum tier the active session must hold. */
+    readonly minTier: 1 | 2 | 3;
+    /** Extra freshness-bound proofs required at gate time. */
+    readonly factors?: ReadonlyArray<FactorRequirement>;
+    readonly warn?: WarningRules;
+    readonly enabled?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Built-in gate names. App-defined gates live in the `app:*` namespace
+ * and use the same engine; the engine treats unknown names with no
+ * configured policy as "no gate" (no-op).
+ */
+export type BuiltInGateName = 'rotate-passphrase' | 'recover-passphrase' | 'enroll-authenticator' | 'remove-authenticator'
+/**
+ * Authorize a deliberate paper-recovery-code regeneration —
+ * `db.rotateRecovery`. Symmetric to `rotate-passphrase` for
+ * the case where the user remembers their passphrase but wants a
+ * fresh sheet (lost the printout, suspect compromise of the off-site
+ * copy). PERSONAL allows tier-1; STRICT requires an off-device
+ * factor so a stolen unlocked laptop cannot silently mint a new
+ * sheet for an attacker.
+ */
+ | 'rotate-recovery'
+/**
+ * Authorize a meta-only mutation on an existing authenticator slot —
+ * `db.updateAuthenticator`. The slot's wrap material, id, and
+ * method are immutable through this gate; only the `meta` blob
+ * (nicknames, method-specific labels) can change. Anti-slot-swap
+ * guard is preserved structurally regardless of this gate's
+ * settings.
+ */
+ | 'update-authenticator' | 'rotate-unlock' | 'enroll-user' | 'revoke-user' | 'export-bundle' | 'export-plaintext' | 'view-user-auth'
+/** Authorize a write to one's own user envelope. */
+ | 'edit-own-profile'
+/** Authorize reading other principals' user envelopes. */
+ | 'view-team-profiles'
+/**
+ * Authorize an atomic peer-recovery — `db.recoverUser`.
+ * Distinct from `revoke-user` because peer-recovery is intentional
+ * re-issuance of someone's keyring under a temp passphrase, NOT
+ * removal. Allows owner→owner natively (matches the threat model:
+ * a co-owner explicitly recovering another co-owner). Ships with a
+ * factor-proof default in `STRICT_POLICY` so the issuer must
+ * affirmatively prove identity at the moment of recovery.
+ */
+ | 'peer-recover-user'
+/**
+ * Authorize a post-grant identity mutation — `db.updateUser`.
+ * Covers `role`, `displayName`, `permissions` changes on an existing
+ * keyring. Pure plaintext-header rewrite — no DEKs touched, no KEK
+ * required. The role-elevation guard inside the implementation
+ * mirrors `db.grant`'s hierarchy (admin cannot promote to owner)
+ * regardless of this gate's settings.
+ */
+ | 'update-user'
+/**
+ * Authorize a non-owner's self-service **destructive** withdrawal —
+ * `vault.user.unilateralWithdrawal`. The actor exports their
+ * own re-keyed copy and then removes (delete-closure) or freezes the
+ * source records. Because it both egresses data AND destroys the
+ * firm's live copy, it MUST fail closed: undefined in a policy = denied.
+ * Hosts opt in explicitly (and typically pin `minTier`/factor proofs).
+ */
+ | 'client-unilateral-withdraw'
+/**
+ * Authorize FILING a two-party withdrawal request —
+ * `vault.user.requestWithdrawal`. Non-destructive (writes a
+ * pending request only); enabled by default so a read-only client can ask.
+ */
+ | 'user-request-withdrawal'
+/**
+ * Authorize DECIDING a two-party withdrawal request (approve/reject) —
+ * `vault.user.approveWithdrawal` / `rejectWithdrawal`. The approve
+ * path is destructive (extract-and-dispose under firm authority), so it
+ * defaults to a tier-2 floor; owner/admin role is enforced structurally.
+ */
+ | 'approve-user-withdrawal'
+/**
+ * Authorize minting a **custodian** — `db.grantCustodian` (FR-6). The
+ * custodian is the de-facto operational authority on a sealed-owner (Deed)
+ * vault, so granting one is an ownership-level act: this gate MUST fail
+ * closed (undefined in a policy = denied) and owner-only role is enforced
+ * structurally. Hosts opt in explicitly, typically pinning factor proofs.
+ */
+ | 'grant-custodian'
+/**
+ * Authorize the audited **Liberate** ceremony — `vault.custody.liberate`
+ * (FR-6). The custodian (holding the live DEKs) claims ownership of a
+ * sealed-owner vault under a recorded legal basis, minting a NEW owner
+ * keyring. Destructive-of-the-old-ownership and irreversible, so it MUST
+ * fail closed (undefined = denied); the caller-is-custodian check is
+ * enforced structurally in the ceremony.
+ */
+ | 'liberate-vault';
+/** Either a built-in gate name or an `app:*` custom gate. */
+export type GateName = BuiltInGateName | `app:${string}`;
+/**
+ * Top-level policy object. Persisted at `_meta/policy` once at vault
+ * creation. The `passphrase` block configures the strength rules
+ * applied at every passphrase ingress; `gates` configures
+ * the action-level requirements.
+ */
+export interface VaultPolicy {
+    readonly passphrase?: PassphrasePolicy;
+    readonly gates: Partial<Record<GateName, GatePolicy>>;
+}
+/** Concrete proof an actor presents to {@link checkGate}. */
+export interface FactorProof {
+    readonly kind: FactorKind;
+    /** ISO-8601 timestamp the proof was minted at. Compared against `freshnessMs`. */
+    readonly mintedAt?: string;
+    /** Method-specific payload. The engine treats it as opaque — verification is delegated. */
+    readonly payload?: unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Bundle of factor proofs + session-context flags passed to a gated
+ * Noydb method. Used as the optional last parameter of every method
+ * that runs through `checkGate`: `db.grant`, `db.revoke`, `db.updateUser`,
+ * `db.enrollAuthenticator`, `db.removeAuthenticator`, `db.updateAuthenticator`,
+ * `db.enrollWebAuthn`, `db.rotatePassphrase`, `db.recoverPassphrase`,
+ * `db.recoverUser`, `db.enrollUnlock`, `db.describeUserAuth`,
+ * `db.describeAllUsersAuth`.
+ *
+ * Previously this type was inlined at every call site as
+ * `{ factors?: ReadonlyArray<FactorProof>; sharedDevice?: boolean }`
+ * and parameter names alternated between `factors` and `presented`.
+ * Now exported so consumers can name their helpers and so the param
+ * name converges to `factors` everywhere.
+ */
+export interface FactorProofBundle {
+    readonly factors?: ReadonlyArray<FactorProof>;
+    readonly sharedDevice?: boolean;
+}
+/** Active session tier — what the engine compares against `gate.minTier`. */
+export type ActiveTier = 1 | 2 | 3;
+/**
+ * Caller-supplied context for the policy engine's `checkGate`/`describeGate`.
+ * Structural mirror of `with-party/policy/engine.ts`'s `CheckGateContext` —
+ * duplicated here (rather than imported) because the kernel spine may not
+ * statically import a with-* service; see {@link PolicyCheckGateFn}.
+ */
+export interface PolicyCheckGateContext {
+    /** Tier the active session currently holds. */
+    readonly activeTier: ActiveTier;
+    /** Proofs the actor is presenting for this gate. */
+    readonly factors?: ReadonlyArray<FactorProof>;
+    /**
+     * If the host knows the actor is on a shared device, set this to
+     * `true` so the engine can apply `warn.sharedDevice` rules. Defaults
+     * to `false`.
+     */
+    readonly sharedDevice?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Override `now()` for tests. Defaults to `Date.now()`.
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly now?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Structural type of the policy engine's `checkGate` function. The real
+ * implementation lives at `with-party/policy/engine.ts#checkGate`;
+ * `createNoydb()` pre-resolves it via a dynamic import (mirrors
+ * {@link UserApiFactory}) so `Noydb.checkGate` can call it without the
+ * spine statically importing the service.
+ */
+export type PolicyCheckGateFn = (policy: VaultPolicy, gate: GateName, context: PolicyCheckGateContext) => Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Public `NoydbPolicy` surface — the CONTRACT. The implementation
+ * (`NoydbPolicy` class) lives at `with-party/policy/noydb-facade.ts`;
+ * `createNoydb()` wires it in via the pre-resolved {@link NoydbPolicyFactory}.
+ */
+export interface NoydbPolicyApi {
+    /**
+     * Touch the policy enforcer for a vault (records activity, resets
+     * idle timer). Also touches the legacy session timer. No-op if no enforcer.
+     */
+    touchPolicy(vault?: string): void;
+    /**
+     * Check that a policy-guarded operation is permitted.
+     * Throws `SessionPolicyError` if re-auth is required.
+     */
+    checkPolicyOperation(vault: string, op: ReAuthOperation): void;
+    /**
+     * Read the active policy for a vault. Loads from `_meta/policy` on
+     * first call; subsequent calls hit the in-memory cache. Throws
+     * `ValidationError` if the vault has not been opened.
+     */
+    getPolicy(vault: string): Promise<VaultPolicy>;
+    /**
+     * Replace the policy document at `_meta/policy` and update the
+     * in-memory cache. Gated by the `enroll-user` policy (a policy
+     * change is fundamentally a privilege-management action).
+     */
+    updatePolicy(vault: string, override: Partial<VaultPolicy>): Promise<VaultPolicy>;
+    /** Read or persist the vault policy at `_meta/policy` on first open. */
+    bootstrapPolicy(vault: string, opts?: {
+        skipManagedCheck?: boolean;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+}
+/**
+ * Constructor dependencies for `NoydbPolicy` (the {@link NoydbPolicyApi}
+ * implementation). Everything the policy/session-policy methods touch on
+ * the owning `Noydb` instance's `this.*`.
+ *
+ * The `policyEnforcers` map is typed structurally (rather than importing
+ * `PolicyEnforcer` from `with-party/session/session-policy.ts`) so this
+ * spine-resident interface never needs a with-* import; the real
+ * `PolicyEnforcer` class satisfies this shape.
+ */
+export interface NoydbPolicyDeps {
+    /** In-memory vault-policy cache (Noydb-resident; read/written by reference). */
+    readonly policyCache: Map<string, VaultPolicy>;
+    /** Per-vault session-policy enforcers (Noydb-resident; read/written by reference). */
+    readonly policyEnforcers: Map<string, {
+        touch(): void;
+        destroy(): void;
+        checkOperation(op: ReAuthOperation): void;
+    }>;
+    /** The ciphertext store. */
+    readonly store: NoydbStore;
+    /** Whether records are encrypted (`options.encrypt !== false`). */
+    readonly encrypted: boolean;
+    /** The configured session policy, or undefined. */
+    readonly sessionPolicy: SessionPolicy | undefined;
+    /** The developer-supplied default policy, or undefined. */
+    readonly policyOption: VaultPolicy | undefined;
+    /** Whether the owning instance has been closed. */
+    isClosed(): boolean;
+    /** Reset the kernel-resident idle/session timer. */
+    resetSessionTimer(): void;
+    /** Managed-recovery enrolment check (kernel-resident; called on bootstrap). */
+    assertRecoveryEnrolled(vault: string, policy: VaultPolicy, opts?: {
+        skipManagedCheck?: boolean;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    /** Evict the keyring + vault caches when a session is revoked. */
+    onSessionRevoke(vault: string): void;
+}
+/**
+ * Factory that builds the `NoydbPolicy` service implementation from its
+ * dependencies. `createNoydb()` pre-resolves the real implementation
+ * (`with-party/policy/noydb-facade.js#createNoydbPolicy`) via a dynamic
+ * import before constructing `Noydb`, so the constructor can call it
+ * synchronously — mirrors {@link UserApiFactory}.
+ */
+export type NoydbPolicyFactory = (deps: NoydbPolicyDeps) => NoydbPolicyApi;
+export {};