@noy-db/hub 0.3.0-pre.8 → 0.3.0

package/dist/chunk-EQO2UVP4.js

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+// src/via/classified/validators.ts
+function luhnCheck(pan) {
+  const digits = pan.replace(/[\s-]/g, "");
+  if (!/^\d{12,19}$/.test(digits)) return false;
+  let sum = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < digits.length; i++) {
+    let d = Number(digits[digits.length - 1 - i]);
+    if (i % 2 === 1) {
+      d *= 2;
+      if (d > 9) d -= 9;
+    }
+    sum += d;
+  }
+  return sum % 10 === 0;
+}
+
+// src/via/classified/presets.ts
+var digitsOf = (v) => String(v).replace(/\D/g, "");
+function panSpec() {
+  return {
+    _noydbClassified: true,
+    _viaBrand: "classified",
+    preset: "creditCard.pan",
+    storage: "recoverable",
+    sensitivity: "secret",
+    list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022 ${last4}" },
+    riders: { last4: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-4), bin: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(0, 6) },
+    validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && luhnCheck(v) ? null : "not a Luhn-valid card number"
+  };
+}
+function expirySpec() {
+  return {
+    _noydbClassified: true,
+    _viaBrand: "classified",
+    preset: "creditCard.expiry",
+    storage: "recoverable",
+    sensitivity: "pii",
+    list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022/\u2022\u2022" },
+    validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && /^(0[1-9]|1[0-2])\/\d{2}$/.test(v) ? null : "expected MM/YY"
+  };
+}
+function cvcSpec() {
+  return {
+    _noydbClassified: true,
+    _viaBrand: "classified",
+    preset: "creditCard.cvc",
+    storage: "never",
+    sensitivity: "secret",
+    list: { kind: "omit" },
+    validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && /^\d{3,4}$/.test(v) ? null : "expected 3-4 digits"
+  };
+}
+var classified = {
+  /** Composite card type. PAN sealed + last4/bin riders; CVC is storage:'never' (PCI-aware). */
+  creditCard(fields) {
+    const members = { [fields.pan]: panSpec() };
+    if (fields.expiry !== void 0) members[fields.expiry] = expirySpec();
+    if (fields.cvc !== void 0) members[fields.cvc] = cvcSpec();
+    return { _noydbClassifiedGroup: true, _viaBrand: "classified", preset: "creditCard", members };
+  },
+  birthDate() {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "birthDate",
+      storage: "recoverable",
+      sensitivity: "pii",
+      list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "${yob}-\u2022\u2022-\u2022\u2022" },
+      riders: { yob: (v) => String(v).slice(0, 4) },
+      validate: (v) => {
+        if (typeof v !== "string" || !/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(v)) return "expected ISO yyyy-mm-dd";
+        const parts = v.split("-").map(Number);
+        const year = parts[0], month = parts[1], day = parts[2];
+        if (month < 1 || month > 12) return "not a valid calendar date";
+        const daysInMonth = [31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31];
+        const isLeapYear = year % 4 === 0 && year % 100 !== 0 || year % 400 === 0;
+        const maxDay = month === 2 && isLeapYear ? 29 : daysInMonth[month - 1];
+        if (day < 1 || day > maxDay) return "not a valid calendar date";
+        return null;
+      }
+    };
+  },
+  email() {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "email",
+      storage: "recoverable",
+      sensitivity: "pii",
+      list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022\u2022@${domain}" },
+      riders: { domain: (v) => String(v).split("@")[1] ?? "" },
+      validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && v.includes("@") ? null : "expected an email address"
+    };
+  },
+  phone() {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "phone",
+      storage: "recoverable",
+      sensitivity: "pii",
+      list: { kind: "mask", pattern: "\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022${last2}" },
+      riders: { last2: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-2) },
+      validate: (v) => digitsOf(v).length >= 5 ? null : "expected at least 5 digits"
+    };
+  },
+  /** Digest-only password: verify-without-reveal; never listed, never revealed.
+   *  Enumeration math is on the caller for low-entropy values — see the
+   *  per-preset docs; the hub ships no rate limiter in this slice (spec §5).
+   *
+   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables
+   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:
+   *
+   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access
+   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —
+   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test
+   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),
+   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of
+   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret
+   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not
+   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the
+   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the
+   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does
+   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields
+   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being
+   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain
+   *  tags. */
+  password(opts = {}) {
+    const minLength = opts.minLength ?? 10;
+    const notLastN = opts.notLastN ?? 0;
+    if (!Number.isInteger(notLastN) || notLastN < 0 || notLastN > 8) {
+      throw new Error(`classified.password: notLastN must be an integer 0..8 (write cost is n \xD7 600K PBKDF2; ring blast radius is documented), got ${notLastN}`);
+    }
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "password",
+      storage: "digest-only",
+      sensitivity: "secret",
+      list: { kind: "omit" },
+      verifyNormalize: "password",
+      ...opts.rotateDays !== void 0 ? { rotateDays: opts.rotateDays } : {},
+      ...notLastN > 0 ? { notLastN } : {},
+      ...opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true } : {},
+      validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && v.normalize("NFC").length >= minLength ? null : `password must be at least ${minLength} characters`
+    };
+  },
+  /** Digest-only secret answer: normalized (casefold/trim/collapse), groupable
+   *  into k-of-n matchGroup challenges. Low-entropy by nature — document the
+   *  enumeration math to your users; add app-side rate limiting.
+   *
+   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables
+   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:
+   *
+   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access
+   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —
+   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test
+   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),
+   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of
+   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret
+   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not
+   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the
+   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the
+   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does
+   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields
+   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being
+   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain
+   *  tags. */
+  secretAnswer(opts = {}) {
+    return {
+      _noydbClassified: true,
+      _viaBrand: "classified",
+      preset: "secretAnswer",
+      storage: "digest-only",
+      sensitivity: "secret",
+      list: { kind: "omit" },
+      verifyNormalize: "secret-answer",
+      verifyGroupMember: true,
+      ...opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true } : {},
+      validate: (v) => typeof v === "string" && v.normalize("NFC").toLowerCase().trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").length > 0 ? null : "secret answer must be non-empty after normalization"
+    };
+  }
+};
+
+// src/via/classified/active.ts
+function policyOf(spec) {
+  return {
+    normalize: spec.verifyNormalize ?? "password",
+    notLastN: spec.notLastN ?? 0,
+    equatable: spec.equatable === true,
+    ...spec.rotateDays !== void 0 ? { rotateDays: spec.rotateDays } : {}
+  };
+}
+var engineCtx = (ctx) => ({
+  collection: ctx.collection,
+  getEnvelope: ctx.getEnvelope,
+  resolveCek: ctx.resolveCek,
+  getDEK: ctx.getDEK,
+  now: ctx.now
+});
+function withClassified() {
+  return {
+    async reveal(ctx, id, field) {
+      const { revealSealedField } = await import("./reveal-DIBHLUZX.js");
+      const value = await revealSealedField({
+        collection: ctx.collection,
+        encrypted: ctx.encrypted,
+        getEnvelope: ctx.getEnvelope,
+        resolveCek: ctx.resolveCek,
+        getDEK: ctx.getDEK
+      }, id, field);
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("reveal", id);
+      return value;
+    },
+    async verify(ctx, id, field, candidate) {
+      const { verifyDigestField } = await import("./verify-ZASTRNPR.js");
+      const verdict = await verifyDigestField(engineCtx(ctx), id, field, candidate, policyOf(ctx.spec));
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("verify", id);
+      return verdict;
+    },
+    async verifyText(ctx, id, field, candidate) {
+      const { verifyTextField } = await import("./verify-ZASTRNPR.js");
+      const verdict = await verifyTextField(engineCtx(ctx), id, field, candidate, ctx.spec.verifyNormalize ?? "password");
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("verify", id);
+      return verdict;
+    },
+    async matchGroup(ctx, id, answers, opts) {
+      const { matchGroupFields } = await import("./verify-ZASTRNPR.js");
+      const members = (ctx.groupMembers ?? []).map((m) => ({ field: m.field, policy: policyOf(m.spec) }));
+      const result = await matchGroupFields(engineCtx(ctx), id, answers, members, opts);
+      await ctx.onAccess?.("verify", id);
+      return result;
+    },
+    async computeTarget(ctx, field, candidate, costByte) {
+      const { computeBidxTarget } = await import("./find-N6345CNT.js");
+      const dek = await ctx.getDEK();
+      return computeBidxTarget(candidate, policyOf(ctx.spec).normalize, dek, ctx.collection, field, costByte);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+export {
+  luhnCheck,
+  classified,
+  withClassified
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-EQO2UVP4.js.map

package/dist/chunk-EQO2UVP4.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/via/classified/validators.ts","../src/via/classified/presets.ts","../src/via/classified/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Pure write-time validators. Exported so userland can validate storage:'never'\n *  fields (e.g. CVC) at capture, before dropping them. @module */\n\nexport function luhnCheck(pan: string): boolean {\n  const digits = pan.replace(/[\\s-]/g, '')\n  if (!/^\\d{12,19}$/.test(digits)) return false\n  let sum = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < digits.length; i++) {\n    let d = Number(digits[digits.length - 1 - i])\n    if (i % 2 === 1) { d *= 2; if (d > 9) d -= 9 }\n    sum += d\n  }\n  return sum % 10 === 0\n}\n","/** The preset catalog (stage 1). Presets are hub-owned; devs get declarative\n *  knobs, not read-side callbacks (design law D2/D3). @module */\n\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec, ClassifiedGroup } from './descriptor.js'\nimport { luhnCheck } from './validators.js'\n\nconst digitsOf = (v: unknown): string => String(v).replace(/\\D/g, '')\n\nfunction panSpec(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  return {\n    _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard.pan', storage: 'recoverable',\n    sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '•••• ${last4}' },\n    riders: { last4: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-4), bin: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(0, 6) },\n    validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && luhnCheck(v) ? null : 'not a Luhn-valid card number'),\n  }\n}\n\nfunction expirySpec(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  return {\n    _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard.expiry', storage: 'recoverable',\n    sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '••/••' },\n    validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && /^(0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/\\d{2}$/.test(v) ? null : 'expected MM/YY'),\n  }\n}\n\nfunction cvcSpec(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n  return {\n    _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard.cvc', storage: 'never',\n    sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'omit' },\n    validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && /^\\d{3,4}$/.test(v) ? null : 'expected 3-4 digits'),\n  }\n}\n\nexport const classified = {\n  /** Composite card type. PAN sealed + last4/bin riders; CVC is storage:'never' (PCI-aware). */\n  creditCard(fields: { pan: string; expiry?: string; cvc?: string }): ClassifiedGroup {\n    const members: Record<string, ClassifiedFieldSpec> = { [fields.pan]: panSpec() }\n    if (fields.expiry !== undefined) members[fields.expiry] = expirySpec()\n    if (fields.cvc !== undefined) members[fields.cvc] = cvcSpec()\n    return { _noydbClassifiedGroup: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'creditCard', members }\n  },\n\n  birthDate(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'birthDate', storage: 'recoverable',\n      sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '${yob}-••-••' },\n      riders: { yob: (v) => String(v).slice(0, 4) },\n      validate: (v) => {\n        if (typeof v !== 'string' || !/^\\d{4}-\\d{2}-\\d{2}$/.test(v)) return 'expected ISO yyyy-mm-dd'\n        const parts = v.split('-').map(Number)\n        const year = parts[0]!, month = parts[1]!, day = parts[2]!\n        if (month < 1 || month > 12) return 'not a valid calendar date'\n        const daysInMonth = [31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31]\n        const isLeapYear = (year % 4 === 0 && year % 100 !== 0) || year % 400 === 0\n        const maxDay = month === 2 && isLeapYear ? 29 : daysInMonth[month - 1]!\n        if (day < 1 || day > maxDay) return 'not a valid calendar date'\n        return null\n      },\n    }\n  },\n\n  email(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'email', storage: 'recoverable',\n      sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '•••@${domain}' },\n      riders: { domain: (v) => String(v).split('@')[1] ?? '' },\n      validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && v.includes('@') ? null : 'expected an email address'),\n    }\n  },\n\n  phone(): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'phone', storage: 'recoverable',\n      sensitivity: 'pii', list: { kind: 'mask', pattern: '•••••${last2}' },\n      riders: { last2: (v) => digitsOf(v).slice(-2) },\n      validate: (v) => (digitsOf(v).length >= 5 ? null : 'expected at least 5 digits'),\n    }\n  },\n\n  /** Digest-only password: verify-without-reveal; never listed, never revealed.\n   *  Enumeration math is on the caller for low-entropy values — see the\n   *  per-preset docs; the hub ships no rate limiter in this slice (spec §5).\n   *\n   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables\n   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:\n   *\n   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access\n   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —\n   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test\n   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),\n   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of\n   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret\n   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not\n   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the\n   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the\n   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does\n   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields\n   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being\n   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain\n   *  tags. */\n  password(opts: { minLength?: number; rotateDays?: number; notLastN?: number; equatable?: true } = {}): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    const minLength = opts.minLength ?? 10\n    const notLastN = opts.notLastN ?? 0\n    if (!Number.isInteger(notLastN) || notLastN < 0 || notLastN > 8) {\n      throw new Error(`classified.password: notLastN must be an integer 0..8 (write cost is n × 600K PBKDF2; ring blast radius is documented), got ${notLastN}`)\n    }\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'password', storage: 'digest-only',\n      sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'omit' },\n      verifyNormalize: 'password',\n      ...(opts.rotateDays !== undefined ? { rotateDays: opts.rotateDays } : {}),\n      ...(notLastN > 0 ? { notLastN } : {}),\n      ...(opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true as const } : {}),\n      validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string' && v.normalize('NFC').length >= minLength\n        ? null : `password must be at least ${minLength} characters`),\n    }\n  },\n\n  /** Digest-only secret answer: normalized (casefold/trim/collapse), groupable\n   *  into k-of-n matchGroup challenges. Low-entropy by nature — document the\n   *  enumeration math to your users; add app-side rate limiting.\n   *\n   *  @param opts.equatable — emit a store-visible `_bidx` equality tag (enables\n   *  `findByDigest`). Cost band you are accepting:\n   *\n   *  equal values produce equal store-visible tags: anyone with store access\n   *  learns which records share this secret and how many share each value —\n   *  never the value itself. A collection-DEK holder can additionally test\n   *  candidate values offline: the tag's inner digest is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600K),\n   *  which is GPU/ASIC-friendly — an offline attacker runs on the order of\n   *  10⁴–10⁸ guesses/second, so for low-entropy secrets (PINs, casefolded secret\n   *  answers) offline recovery of the equality partition is seconds-to-hours, not\n   *  years. `crypto.subtle` exposes no memory-hard KDF (no scrypt/argon2) and the\n   *  family's no-crypto-deps law forbids adding one, so PBKDF2-SHA256 is the\n   *  hardest primitive available; the iteration count raises the price but does\n   *  not make a low-entropy field safe. The real control for low-entropy fields\n   *  is the DOOR — do not enable `equatable` for them unless the partition being\n   *  learnable is acceptable — not the iteration count. Pre-forget backups retain\n   *  tags. */\n  secretAnswer(opts: { equatable?: true } = {}): ClassifiedFieldSpec {\n    return {\n      _noydbClassified: true, _viaBrand: 'classified', preset: 'secretAnswer', storage: 'digest-only',\n      sensitivity: 'secret', list: { kind: 'omit' },\n      verifyNormalize: 'secret-answer', verifyGroupMember: true,\n      ...(opts.equatable === true ? { equatable: true as const } : {}),\n      validate: (v) => (typeof v === 'string'\n        && v.normalize('NFC').toLowerCase().trim().replace(/\\s+/g, ' ').length > 0\n        ? null : 'secret answer must be non-empty after normalization'),\n    }\n  },\n}\n","import type { ClassifiedStrategy, ClassifiedVerifyCtx } from './strategy.js'\nimport type { VdigFieldPolicy } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { ClassifiedFieldSpec } from './descriptor.js'\n\nfunction policyOf(spec: ClassifiedFieldSpec): VdigFieldPolicy {\n  return {\n    normalize: spec.verifyNormalize ?? 'password',\n    notLastN: spec.notLastN ?? 0,\n    equatable: spec.equatable === true,\n    ...(spec.rotateDays !== undefined ? { rotateDays: spec.rotateDays } : {}),\n  }\n}\n\nconst engineCtx = (ctx: ClassifiedVerifyCtx) => ({\n  collection: ctx.collection,\n  getEnvelope: ctx.getEnvelope,\n  resolveCek: ctx.resolveCek,\n  getDEK: ctx.getDEK,\n  now: ctx.now,\n})\n\n/** Opt-in factory: enables reveal + verify/verifyText/matchGroup (stage 2). */\nexport function withClassified(): ClassifiedStrategy {\n  return {\n    async reveal(ctx, id, field) {\n      const { revealSealedField } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/classify/reveal.js')\n      const value = await revealSealedField({\n        collection: ctx.collection, encrypted: ctx.encrypted,\n        getEnvelope: ctx.getEnvelope, resolveCek: ctx.resolveCek, getDEK: ctx.getDEK,\n      }, id, field)\n      await ctx.onAccess?.('reveal', id)\n      return value\n    },\n    async verify(ctx, id, field, candidate) {\n      const { verifyDigestField } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/classify/verify.js')\n      const verdict = await verifyDigestField(engineCtx(ctx), id, field, candidate, policyOf(ctx.spec))\n      await ctx.onAccess?.('verify', id)                    // fires on ok AND fail (attempt audit)\n      return verdict\n    },\n    async verifyText(ctx, id, field, candidate) {\n      const { verifyTextField } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/classify/verify.js')\n      const verdict = await verifyTextField(engineCtx(ctx), id, field, candidate, ctx.spec.verifyNormalize ?? 'password')\n      await ctx.onAccess?.('verify', id)\n      return verdict\n    },\n    async matchGroup(ctx, id, answers, opts) {\n      const { matchGroupFields } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/classify/verify.js')\n      const members = (ctx.groupMembers ?? []).map((m) => ({ field: m.field, policy: policyOf(m.spec) }))\n      const result = await matchGroupFields(engineCtx(ctx), id, answers, members, opts)\n      await ctx.onAccess?.('verify', id)                    // ONE entry per call (Q6)\n      return result\n    },\n    async computeTarget(ctx, field, candidate, costByte) {\n      const { computeBidxTarget } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/classify/find.js')\n      const dek = await ctx.getDEK()\n      return computeBidxTarget(candidate, policyOf(ctx.spec).normalize, dek, ctx.collection, field, costByte)\n    },\n  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package/dist/chunk-ERJ7FU55.js

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+import {
+  loadVaultPolicy,
+  saveVaultPolicy
+} from "./chunk-CRI4OUV4.js";
+import {
+  PolicyDeniedError,
+  ValidationError
+} from "./chunk-BIOUI4HL.js";
+
+// src/with-party/policy/presets.ts
+var PERSONAL_POLICY = Object.freeze({
+  passphrase: {
+    minWords: 6,
+    minWordLength: 3,
+    rejectRepeatedAdjacent: true
+  },
+  gates: {
+    "rotate-passphrase": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      // Any second factor satisfies the gate — off-device kinds (TOTP,
+      // email-OTP, paper recovery, roaming WebAuthn) are the strongest;
+      // platform-bound kinds (platform WebAuthn, password, PIN) are
+      // accepted because requiring "something off-device" is overkill
+      // for personal/SMB threat models. Consumers needing the off-device
+      // guarantee should use STRICT_POLICY or override this gate.
+      factors: [{
+        anyOf: [
+          "totp",
+          "email-otp",
+          "recovery",
+          "webauthn-roaming",
+          "webauthn-platform",
+          "password",
+          "pin"
+        ]
+      }]
+    },
+    "recover-passphrase": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      enabled: true
+    },
+    // rotate-recovery: deliberate paper-sheet regeneration
+    // when the user remembers their passphrase. PERSONAL allows tier-1 —
+    // knowing the passphrase is enough.
+    "rotate-recovery": { minTier: 1 },
+    "enroll-authenticator": { minTier: 1 },
+    "remove-authenticator": { minTier: 1 },
+    // update-authenticator: meta-only mutation (slot rename, label
+    // changes). Symmetric with enroll/remove under PERSONAL — tier-1
+    // unlock alone. The structural anti-slot-swap guard inside the
+    // implementation enforces wrap-material/id/method immutability
+    // regardless of this gate's settings.
+    "update-authenticator": { minTier: 1 },
+    "rotate-unlock": { minTier: 2 },
+    "enroll-user": { minTier: 1 },
+    "revoke-user": { minTier: 1 },
+    // Peer-recovery is a high-trust intentional op — co-owners
+    // recovering each other should not need an off-device factor in
+    // the personal/SMB threat model (the partner is already vetted by
+    // virtue of being a co-owner). Tier-1 unlock is the floor; the
+    // STRICT preset adds a recovery/email-OTP requirement.
+    "peer-recover-user": { minTier: 1 },
+    // update-user: post-grant identity mutation (role/displayName/
+    // permissions). PERSONAL_POLICY treats this on par with enroll-user
+    // / revoke-user — tier-1 unlock alone. The role-elevation guard
+    // inside the implementation is the structural backstop that this
+    // gate's settings cannot weaken.
+    "update-user": { minTier: 1 },
+    "export-bundle": { minTier: 1 },
+    "export-plaintext": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    "view-user-auth": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      enabled: false
+    },
+    // ─── User envelope gates ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    // edit-own-profile: tier 3 floor — any active session can edit their
+    //   own profile/preferences. Tightening to require a TOTP for
+    //   profile changes is a one-line override.
+    // view-team-profiles: tier 2 floor — an authenticated session can
+    //   read teammates' profiles (display names, avatars, locales).
+    //   Setting `enabled: false` makes vault.user.list() return only
+    //   self (privacy-strict opt-out).
+    "edit-own-profile": { minTier: 3 },
+    "view-team-profiles": { minTier: 2 },
+    // client-unilateral-withdraw: a non-owner's self-service DESTRUCTIVE
+    // withdrawal (export-and-delete/freeze). Fail-closed by default —
+    // the firm opts in per jurisdiction/contract (e.g. GDPR Art. 17).
+    // Listed explicitly (not just relying on the built-in default) so it is
+    // discoverable in describeGate / policy dumps.
+    "client-unilateral-withdraw": { minTier: 1, enabled: false },
+    // Two-party withdrawal: filing a request is non-destructive
+    // (tier-1, enabled so a read-only client can ask); deciding it is the
+    // destructive step (tier-2 floor + owner/admin role, enforced in code).
+    "user-request-withdrawal": { minTier: 1 },
+    "approve-user-withdrawal": { minTier: 2 }
+  }
+});
+var STRICT_POLICY = Object.freeze({
+  passphrase: {
+    minWords: 8,
+    minWordLength: 3,
+    rejectRepeatedAdjacent: true
+  },
+  gates: {
+    "rotate-passphrase": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp", "recovery"], count: 2 }]
+    },
+    "recover-passphrase": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      enabled: true
+    },
+    // rotate-recovery: STRICT requires an off-device factor —
+    // rotating recovery is an off-site-trust event; a stolen unlocked
+    // laptop must not be able to silently mint a new sheet for the
+    // attacker. Matches the `peer-recover-user` STRICT default.
+    "rotate-recovery": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp", "webauthn-roaming"] }]
+    },
+    "enroll-authenticator": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    "remove-authenticator": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    // STRICT update-authenticator: same factor floor as enroll/remove.
+    // Even though meta changes don't touch wrap material, a malicious
+    // rename could mislead the user about which device a slot
+    // corresponds to ("MacBook Touch ID" → "iPhone Touch ID" on a
+    // shared workstation). STRICT requires a fresh factor proof.
+    "update-authenticator": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    "rotate-unlock": { minTier: 1 },
+    "enroll-user": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    "revoke-user": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    // STRICT peer-recovery: the issuer must present a recovery code
+    // OR a fresh off-device second factor at the moment of recovery.
+    // This binds the high-trust operation to a verifiable proof
+    // (recovery sheet photographed by an attacker won't suffice —
+    // they'd also need tier-1 unlock first; this gate is the freshness
+    // binding on top). Roaming WebAuthn (YubiKey-class hardware key)
+    // accepted; platform-bound kinds (Touch ID, password, PIN)
+    // intentionally excluded under STRICT because they don't survive
+    // device theft — the off-device requirement is the whole point.
+    "peer-recover-user": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["recovery", "totp", "email-otp", "webauthn-roaming"] }]
+    },
+    // STRICT update-user: matches the enroll-user / revoke-user shape
+    // (off-device factor required). Update-user is admin-shaped — it
+    // mutates someone else's role/permissions; STRICT requires a fresh
+    // off-device factor proof so the operator affirmatively re-asserts
+    // identity at the moment of mutation. Platform-bound factors
+    // (Touch ID / password / PIN) intentionally excluded: same logic as
+    // peer-recover-user — the off-device requirement is the whole
+    // point under STRICT.
+    "update-user": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    "export-bundle": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }],
+      warn: { sharedDevice: "block" }
+    },
+    "export-plaintext": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"], count: 2 }],
+      warn: { sharedDevice: "block" }
+    },
+    "view-user-auth": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      enabled: false
+    },
+    // ─── User envelope gates ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    // STRICT: profile edits require a TOTP/email-OTP factor (typical
+    // shared-workstation hardening — your name/avatar shouldn't change
+    // without a fresh second-factor proof).
+    "edit-own-profile": {
+      minTier: 2,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }]
+    },
+    "view-team-profiles": { minTier: 2 },
+    // STRICT: still fail-closed, but if a regulated firm flips enabled:true
+    // they inherit a two-factor proof + shared-device block for the
+    // destructive withdrawal (mirrors export-plaintext's hardening).
+    "client-unilateral-withdraw": {
+      minTier: 1,
+      enabled: false,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"], count: 2 }],
+      warn: { sharedDevice: "block" }
+    },
+    // STRICT: filing stays tier-1; the destructive APPROVE demands an
+    // off-device factor + shared-device block (mirrors export-bundle).
+    "user-request-withdrawal": { minTier: 1 },
+    "approve-user-withdrawal": {
+      minTier: 2,
+      factors: [{ anyOf: ["totp", "email-otp"] }],
+      warn: { sharedDevice: "block" }
+    }
+  }
+});
+function mergePolicy(base, override) {
+  if (!override) return base;
+  const passphrase = override.passphrase ?? base.passphrase;
+  return {
+    ...passphrase !== void 0 ? { passphrase } : {},
+    gates: {
+      ...base.gates,
+      ...override.gates ?? {}
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// src/with-party/policy/engine.ts
+var DEFAULT_FRESHNESS_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
+async function checkGate(policy, gate, context) {
+  const configured = policy.gates[gate];
+  if (!configured) {
+    if (gate.startsWith("app:")) {
+      return;
+    }
+    throw deny(gate, "disabled", { minTier: 1, enabled: false });
+  }
+  if (configured.enabled === false) {
+    throw deny(gate, "disabled", configured);
+  }
+  if (context.activeTier > configured.minTier) {
+    throw deny(gate, "insufficient-tier", configured);
+  }
+  if (configured.factors && configured.factors.length > 0) {
+    const presented = context.factors ?? [];
+    const now = context.now ?? Date.now();
+    for (const requirement of configured.factors) {
+      const matches = countMatchingFactors(presented, requirement, now);
+      const need = requirement.count ?? 1;
+      if (matches.fresh < need) {
+        if (matches.totalKindMatches < need) {
+          throw deny(gate, "missing-factor", configured);
+        }
+        throw deny(gate, "stale-proof", configured);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (configured.warn?.sharedDevice === "block" && context.sharedDevice === true) {
+    throw deny(gate, "shared-device-blocked", configured);
+  }
+}
+async function describeGate(policy, gate, context) {
+  try {
+    await checkGate(policy, gate, context);
+    return { ok: true };
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof PolicyDeniedError) {
+      return { ok: false, reason: err.reason, required: err.required };
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+function countMatchingFactors(presented, requirement, now) {
+  const freshnessMs = requirement.freshnessMs ?? DEFAULT_FRESHNESS_MS;
+  let totalKindMatches = 0;
+  let fresh = 0;
+  for (const proof of presented) {
+    if (!requirement.anyOf.includes(proof.kind)) continue;
+    totalKindMatches += 1;
+    const minted = proof.mintedAt ? Date.parse(proof.mintedAt) : now;
+    if (Number.isFinite(minted) && now - minted <= freshnessMs) {
+      fresh += 1;
+    }
+  }
+  return { totalKindMatches, fresh };
+}
+function deny(gate, reason, required) {
+  return new PolicyDeniedError(gate, reason, required);
+}
+
+// src/with-party/policy/noydb-facade.ts
+var NoydbPolicy = class {
+  constructor(deps) {
+    this.deps = deps;
+  }
+  deps;
+  /**
+   * Touch the policy enforcer for a vault (records activity, resets
+   * idle timer). Also touches the legacy session timer. No-op if no enforcer.
+   */
+  touchPolicy(vault) {
+    this.deps.resetSessionTimer();
+    if (vault) {
+      this.deps.policyEnforcers.get(vault)?.touch();
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * Check that a policy-guarded operation is permitted.
+   * Throws `SessionPolicyError` if re-auth is required.
+   */
+  checkPolicyOperation(vault, op) {
+    this.deps.policyEnforcers.get(vault)?.checkOperation(op);
+  }
+  /**
+   * Read the active policy for a vault. Loads from `_meta/policy` on
+   * first call; subsequent calls hit the in-memory cache. Throws
+   * `ValidationError` if the vault has not been opened.
+   */
+  async getPolicy(vault) {
+    if (this.deps.isClosed()) throw new ValidationError("Instance is closed");
+    const cached = this.deps.policyCache.get(vault);
+    if (cached) return cached;
+    await this.bootstrapPolicy(vault);
+    return this.deps.policyCache.get(vault) ?? PERSONAL_POLICY;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Replace the policy document at `_meta/policy` and update the
+   * in-memory cache. Gated by the `enroll-user` policy (a policy
+   * change is fundamentally a privilege-management action).
+   */
+  async updatePolicy(vault, override) {
+    if (this.deps.isClosed()) throw new ValidationError("Instance is closed");
+    const current = await this.getPolicy(vault);
+    const merged = mergePolicy(current, override);
+    if (this.deps.encrypted) {
+      await saveVaultPolicy(this.deps.store, vault, merged);
+    }
+    this.deps.policyCache.set(vault, merged);
+    return merged;
+  }
+  /** Read or persist the vault policy at `_meta/policy` on first open. */
+  async bootstrapPolicy(vault, opts) {
+    const onDisk = await loadVaultPolicy(this.deps.store, vault);
+    if (onDisk) {
+      this.deps.policyCache.set(vault, onDisk);
+      await this.deps.assertRecoveryEnrolled(vault, onDisk, opts);
+      return;
+    }
+    const initial = this.deps.policyOption ? mergePolicy(PERSONAL_POLICY, this.deps.policyOption) : PERSONAL_POLICY;
+    await saveVaultPolicy(this.deps.store, vault, initial);
+    this.deps.policyCache.set(vault, initial);
+    await this.deps.assertRecoveryEnrolled(vault, initial, opts);
+  }
+};
+var createNoydbPolicy = (deps) => new NoydbPolicy(deps);
+
+export {
+  PERSONAL_POLICY,
+  STRICT_POLICY,
+  mergePolicy,
+  DEFAULT_FRESHNESS_MS,
+  checkGate,
+  describeGate,
+  createNoydbPolicy
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ERJ7FU55.js.map