@node9/policy-engine 2.37.1 → 2.39.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -30,9 +30,13 @@ var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: tru
30
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  // src/index.ts
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  var src_exports = {};
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  __export(src_exports, {
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- ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES: () => ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES,
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+ ACTION_CHECKS: () => ACTION_CHECKS,
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+ ACTION_TEMPLATES: () => ACTION_TEMPLATES,
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  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS: () => AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS,
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  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES: () => AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES,
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+ APP_SERVER_GLOB: () => APP_SERVER_GLOB,
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+ APP_SHIELD_NAMES: () => APP_SHIELD_NAMES,
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+ APP_SHIELD_SPECS: () => APP_SHIELD_SPECS,
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  ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS: () => ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS,
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  AST_FS_REGEX_RULES: () => AST_FS_REGEX_RULES,
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  BASH_TOOL_NAMES: () => BASH_TOOL_NAMES,
@@ -59,17 +63,21 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  FILE_TOOLS: () => FILE_TOOLS,
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  FLAGS_WITH_VALUES: () => FLAGS_WITH_VALUES,
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  FS_READ_TOOLS: () => FS_READ_TOOLS,
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+ GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: () => GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
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  KNOB_GOVERNED: () => KNOB_GOVERNED,
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+ LEVELS: () => LEVELS,
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  LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: () => LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
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  LOOP_MAX_RECORDS: () => LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
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  LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE: () => LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
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  MAP_GOVERNED: () => MAP_GOVERNED,
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  MAX_BLAST_PATH: () => MAX_BLAST_PATH,
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  MAX_DESTINATIONS: () => MAX_DESTINATIONS,
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+ MODE_VALUES: () => MODE_VALUES,
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  NET_BINARIES: () => NET_BINARIES,
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  PATTERN_VERB_NAMES: () => PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
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  PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE: () => PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
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  REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS: () => REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS,
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+ REPLACED_SHIELDS: () => REPLACED_SHIELDS,
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  SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS: () => SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS,
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  SENSITIVE_PATH_RE: () => SENSITIVE_PATH_RE,
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  SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES: () => SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES,
@@ -130,6 +138,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  extractShellDestTokens: () => extractShellDestTokens,
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  extractShellDestinations: () => extractShellDestinations,
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  extractToolDestinations: () => extractToolDestinations,
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+ fileAccessView: () => fileAccessView,
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  fileOperandFlagsOf: () => fileOperandFlagsOf,
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  fileToolOperation: () => fileToolOperation,
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  foldHomoglyphs: () => foldHomoglyphs,
@@ -140,11 +149,15 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  hashDestination: () => hashDestination,
141
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  hostMatches: () => hostMatches,
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  incompleteFileVerdict: () => incompleteFileVerdict,
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+ inlineExecDescription: () => inlineExecDescription,
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+ inlineExecReason: () => inlineExecReason,
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+ inlineExecReview: () => inlineExecReview,
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  inspectArgumentSecrets: () => inspectArgumentSecrets,
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  inspectionEntry: () => inspectionEntry,
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  inspectionLayers: () => inspectionLayers,
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  isAgentInstructionPath: () => isAgentInstructionPath,
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  isBashTool: () => isBashTool,
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+ isBlockAll: () => isBlockAll,
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  isDestructiveToolName: () => isDestructiveToolName,
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  isHashedEntry: () => isHashedEntry,
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  isIgnoredTool: () => isIgnoredTool,
@@ -154,13 +167,20 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  isLockedCheck: () => isLockedCheck,
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  isLoopbackHost: () => isLoopbackHost,
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  isMaskedKind: () => isMaskedKind,
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+ isModeValue: () => isModeValue,
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  isPasswordHashPath: () => isPasswordHashPath,
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  isPrivateHost: () => isPrivateHost,
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  isProtectedHomePath: () => isProtectedHomePath,
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+ isRecordOnly: () => isRecordOnly,
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  isShellShapedTool: () => isShellShapedTool,
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  isShieldVerdict: () => isShieldVerdict,
162
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  isStrictGatedTier: () => isStrictGatedTier,
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  isVerdict: () => isVerdict,
179
+ knobStatedChecks: () => knobStatedChecks,
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+ levelCheckValue: () => levelCheckValue,
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+ levelChecks: () => levelChecks,
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+ levelOf: () => levelOf,
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+ levelPackageSignals: () => levelPackageSignals,
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  maskDestination: () => maskDestination,
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  maskPersonalData: () => maskPersonalData,
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  maskPersonalValue: () => maskPersonalValue,
@@ -170,6 +190,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  matchesPattern: () => matchesPattern,
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  matchesTrustedEntry: () => matchesTrustedEntry,
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  matchesTrustedList: () => matchesTrustedList,
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+ mcpServerFromToolName: () => mcpServerFromToolName,
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  narrativeRuleLabel: () => narrativeRuleLabel,
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  normalizeCommandForPolicy: () => normalizeCommandForPolicy,
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  normalizeDestination: () => normalizeDestination,
@@ -190,6 +211,8 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  resolveCheckMap: () => resolveCheckMap,
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  resolvePinned: () => resolvePinned,
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  resolveShellInput: () => resolveShellInput,
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+ reviewsEveryInline: () => reviewsEveryInline,
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+ ruleServerMatches: () => ruleServerMatches,
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  safeMessage: () => safeMessage,
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  sampleCopyCommand: () => sampleCopyCommand,
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  scanArgs: () => scanArgs,
@@ -208,6 +231,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  stripControlChars: () => stripControlChars,
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  stripInvisible: () => stripInvisible,
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  stripTerminalEscapes: () => stripTerminalEscapes,
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+ suggestFromApprovals: () => suggestFromApprovals,
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  summarizeBlast: () => summarizeBlast,
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  summarizeScan: () => summarizeScan,
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  toScanFinding: () => toScanFinding,
@@ -217,6 +241,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  tuningFromLegacyPolicy: () => tuningFromLegacyPolicy,
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  tuningToLegacyPolicy: () => tuningToLegacyPolicy,
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  unwrapCommandHead: () => unwrapCommandHead,
244
+ unwrapRuleLabel: () => unwrapRuleLabel,
220
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  validateOverrides: () => validateOverrides,
221
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  validateRegex: () => validateRegex,
222
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  validateShieldDefinition: () => validateShieldDefinition
@@ -226,8 +251,45 @@ module.exports = __toCommonJS(src_exports);
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  // src/files/protected-access.ts
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  var import_picomatch2 = __toESM(require("picomatch"));
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- // src/shields/index.ts
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+ // src/utils/regex.ts
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  var import_safe_regex2 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
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+ var MAX_REGEX_LENGTH = 256;
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+ var REGEX_CACHE_MAX = 500;
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+ var regexCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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+ function validateRegex(pattern) {
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+ if (!pattern) return "Pattern is required";
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+ if (pattern.length > MAX_REGEX_LENGTH) return `Pattern exceeds max length of ${MAX_REGEX_LENGTH}`;
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+ try {
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+ new RegExp(pattern);
264
+ } catch (e) {
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+ return `Invalid regex syntax: ${e.message}`;
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+ }
267
+ if (/\\\d+[*+{]/.test(pattern)) return "Quantified backreferences are forbidden (ReDoS risk)";
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+ if (!(0, import_safe_regex2.default)(pattern)) return "Pattern rejected: potential ReDoS vulnerability detected";
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ function getCompiledRegex(pattern, flags = "") {
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+ if (flags && !/^[gimsuy]+$/.test(flags)) return null;
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+ const key = `${pattern}\0${flags}`;
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+ if (regexCache.has(key)) {
275
+ const cached = regexCache.get(key);
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+ regexCache.delete(key);
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+ regexCache.set(key, cached);
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+ return cached;
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+ }
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+ if (validateRegex(pattern) !== null) return null;
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+ try {
282
+ const re = new RegExp(pattern, flags);
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+ if (regexCache.size >= REGEX_CACHE_MAX) {
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+ const oldest = regexCache.keys().next().value;
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+ if (oldest) regexCache.delete(oldest);
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+ }
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+ regexCache.set(key, re);
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+ return re;
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+ } catch {
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+ return null;
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+ }
292
+ }
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232
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  // src/shields/builtin/aws.json
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  var aws_default = {
@@ -538,79 +600,6 @@ var filesystem_default = {
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  dangerousWords: ["wipefs"]
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  };
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541
- // src/shields/builtin/finance.json
542
- var finance_default = {
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- name: "finance",
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- description: "Asks before money moves through a payment or banking app (refunds, payouts, transfers, charges, invoices), whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
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- aliases: ["payments", "money"],
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- smartRules: [
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- {
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- name: "shield:finance:review-refund",
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- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_refund,refund_payment,refund_charge,refund_order,issue_refund}",
550
- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
552
- reason: "A refund returns money to a customer. node9 asks before money moves, whatever the request said (Finance shield)."
553
- },
554
- {
555
- name: "shield:finance:review-payout",
556
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payout,send_payout,payout,create_payouts_batch}",
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- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
559
- reason: "A payout moves the balance to a bank account. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
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- },
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- {
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- name: "shield:finance:review-transfer",
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- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{transfer_create,transfer_authorization_create,create_transfer,transfer_money,transfer_funds,send_money,wire_transfer,create_wire,schedule_transaction,update_scheduled_transaction,create_transaction}",
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- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
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- reason: "A transfer moves money between accounts. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
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- },
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- {
569
- name: "shield:finance:review-charge",
570
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_intent,confirm_payment_intent,capture_payment_intent,create_charge,create_payment,capture_payment,capture_order,create_order,authorize_order,create_checkout_session}",
571
- conditions: [],
572
- verdict: "review",
573
- reason: "This charges a card or captures a payment. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
574
- },
575
- {
576
- name: "shield:finance:review-payment-link",
577
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_link,create_invoice,finalize_invoice,send_invoice,pay_invoice,create_invoice_item}",
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- conditions: [],
579
- verdict: "review",
580
- reason: "This bills someone or creates a link that charges a card. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
581
- },
582
- {
583
- name: "shield:finance:review-subscription",
584
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_subscription,cancel_subscription,update_subscription,pause_subscription,resume_subscription}",
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- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
587
- reason: "A subscription starts or stops recurring charges. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
588
- },
589
- {
590
- name: "shield:finance:review-dispute",
591
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{update_dispute,accept_dispute,close_dispute}",
592
- conditions: [],
593
- verdict: "review",
594
- reason: "This answers or concedes a chargeback. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
595
- },
596
- {
597
- name: "shield:finance:review-card",
598
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{issue_card,create_virtual_card,create_issuing_card,update_card_limit}",
599
- conditions: [],
600
- verdict: "review",
601
- reason: "This issues a card or changes its limit. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
602
- },
603
- {
604
- name: "shield:finance:review-withdraw",
605
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{withdraw,withdraw_funds,create_withdrawal,request_withdrawal}",
606
- conditions: [],
607
- verdict: "review",
608
- reason: "A withdrawal moves money out. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
609
- }
610
- ],
611
- dangerousWords: []
612
- };
613
-
614
603
  // src/shields/builtin/github.json
615
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  var github_default = {
616
605
  name: "github",
@@ -639,58 +628,6 @@ var github_default = {
639
628
  dangerousWords: []
640
629
  };
641
630
 
642
- // src/shields/builtin/identity.json
643
- var identity_default = {
644
- name: "identity",
645
- description: "Asks before a password, a key, a token, a role or a user changes in an identity or admin app, whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
646
- aliases: ["access", "iam"],
647
- smartRules: [
648
- {
649
- name: "shield:identity:review-password",
650
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{change_password,update_password,reset_password,set_password,expire_password,force_password_reset}",
651
- conditions: [],
652
- verdict: "review",
653
- reason: "This changes or resets a password. node9 asks before credentials change, whatever the request said (Identity shield)."
654
- },
655
- {
656
- name: "shield:identity:review-key",
657
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{rotate_key,rotate_api_key,create_api_key,create_token,create_access_token,create_personal_access_token,regenerate_secret,rotate_secret,create_service_account_key,create_credential}",
658
- conditions: [],
659
- verdict: "review",
660
- reason: "This creates or rotates a key, token or secret. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
661
- },
662
- {
663
- name: "shield:identity:review-access",
664
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{grant_access,grant_permission,grant_role,revoke_access,revoke_permission,revoke_role,revoke_token,set_permission,set_permissions,set_role,assign_role,update_role,add_permission,remove_permission,attach_policy,detach_policy}",
665
- conditions: [],
666
- verdict: "review",
667
- reason: "This grants or revokes access. node9 asks before access changes (Identity shield)."
668
- },
669
- {
670
- name: "shield:identity:review-membership",
671
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{add_member,remove_member,add_user_to_group,remove_user_from_group,add_collaborator,remove_collaborator,invite_user,invite_member,invite_user_to_slack,invite_users,add_org_member,remove_org_member,add_team_member,remove_team_member}",
672
- conditions: [],
673
- verdict: "review",
674
- reason: "This changes who belongs where. node9 asks before membership changes (Identity shield)."
675
- },
676
- {
677
- name: "shield:identity:review-user",
678
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_user,delete_user,deactivate_user,suspend_user,activate_user,unlock_user,make_admin,promote_user,demote_user,update_user_role}",
679
- conditions: [],
680
- verdict: "review",
681
- reason: "This creates, removes or promotes an account. node9 asks before accounts change (Identity shield)."
682
- },
683
- {
684
- name: "shield:identity:review-mfa",
685
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{reset_mfa,reset_factors,disable_mfa,enroll_factor,deactivate_factor}",
686
- conditions: [],
687
- verdict: "review",
688
- reason: "This changes a second factor. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
689
- }
690
- ],
691
- dangerousWords: []
692
- };
693
-
694
631
  // src/shields/builtin/k8s.json
695
632
  var k8s_default = {
696
633
  name: "k8s",
@@ -950,7 +887,7 @@ var project_jail_default = {
950
887
  {
951
888
  field: "command",
952
889
  op: "matches",
953
- value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim|vi|emacs|code|type|grep|egrep|fgrep|rg|ag|ack|awk|gawk|sed|cut|tr|jq|yq|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*?\\.env(\\.(local|production|staging|development|production\\.local|staging\\.local|development\\.local))?(?=\\s|$|[;&|>)<])",
890
+ value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim?|emacs|code|type|[ef]?grep|rg|ag|ack|g?awk|sed|cut|tr|[jy]q|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*?\\.env(\\.(local|production|staging|development)){0,2}(?=[\\s;&|>)<]|$)",
954
891
  flags: "i"
955
892
  }
956
893
  ],
@@ -964,7 +901,7 @@ var project_jail_default = {
964
901
  {
965
902
  field: "command",
966
903
  op: "matches",
967
- value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim|vi|emacs|code|type|grep|egrep|fgrep|rg|ag|ack|awk|gawk|sed|cut|tr|jq|yq|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*(credentials\\.json|\\.netrc|\\.npmrc|\\.docker[\\/\\\\]config\\.json|gcloud[\\/\\\\]credentials)",
904
+ value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim?|emacs|code|type|[ef]?grep|rg|ag|ack|g?awk|sed|cut|tr|[jy]q|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*(credentials\\.json|\\.netrc|\\.npmrc|\\.docker[\\/\\\\]config\\.json|gcloud[\\/\\\\]credentials)",
968
905
  flags: "i"
969
906
  }
970
907
  ],
@@ -1031,6 +968,212 @@ var project_jail_default = {
1031
968
  dangerousWords: []
1032
969
  };
1033
970
 
971
+ // src/shields/builtin/redis.json
972
+ var redis_default = {
973
+ name: "redis",
974
+ description: "Protects Redis instances from destructive AI operations",
975
+ aliases: [],
976
+ _scopeNote: "Every rule requires Redis to actually be involved: a client in the command (redis-cli / valkey-cli, in either order \u2014 `redis-cli FLUSHALL` and `echo FLUSHALL | redis-cli` are both real), OR the command field holding the bare keyword, which is what the MCP redis_command tool sends ({ command: 'FLUSHALL', args: [] }). Without the client requirement these rules matched the WORD anywhere \u2014 including prose in a heredoc writing a file \u2014 which produced two observed false positives: a test fixture describing the shield, and a commit message naming the rule. Every other builtin shield already scopes this way (aws s3, docker system prune, kubectl delete, gh repo delete). See redis-scope.spec.ts.",
977
+ smartRules: [
978
+ {
979
+ name: "shield:redis:block-flushall",
980
+ tool: "*",
981
+ conditions: [
982
+ {
983
+ field: "command",
984
+ op: "matches",
985
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHALL\\b|\\bFLUSHALL\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHALL\\b|\\.flushall\\s*\\(",
986
+ flags: "i"
987
+ }
988
+ ],
989
+ verdict: "block",
990
+ reason: "FLUSHALL deletes every key in every database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
991
+ },
992
+ {
993
+ name: "shield:redis:block-flushdb",
994
+ tool: "*",
995
+ conditions: [
996
+ {
997
+ field: "command",
998
+ op: "matches",
999
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHDB\\b|\\bFLUSHDB\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHDB\\b|\\.flushdb\\s*\\(",
1000
+ flags: "i"
1001
+ }
1002
+ ],
1003
+ verdict: "block",
1004
+ reason: "FLUSHDB deletes all keys in the current database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1005
+ },
1006
+ {
1007
+ name: "shield:redis:block-config-resetstat",
1008
+ tool: "*",
1009
+ conditions: [
1010
+ {
1011
+ field: "command",
1012
+ op: "matches",
1013
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT|^ ?CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT",
1014
+ flags: "i"
1015
+ }
1016
+ ],
1017
+ verdict: "block",
1018
+ reason: "CONFIG RESETSTAT resets server statistics irreversibly \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1019
+ },
1020
+ {
1021
+ name: "shield:redis:review-config-set",
1022
+ tool: "*",
1023
+ conditions: [
1024
+ {
1025
+ field: "command",
1026
+ op: "matches",
1027
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b|\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?CONFIG\\s+SET\\b",
1028
+ flags: "i"
1029
+ }
1030
+ ],
1031
+ verdict: "review",
1032
+ reason: "CONFIG SET changes live server configuration and requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1033
+ },
1034
+ {
1035
+ name: "shield:redis:review-del-wildcard",
1036
+ tool: "*",
1037
+ conditions: [
1038
+ {
1039
+ field: "command",
1040
+ op: "matches",
1041
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bDEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|^ ?DEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|-cli.*--scan.*xargs.*del",
1042
+ flags: "i"
1043
+ }
1044
+ ],
1045
+ verdict: "review",
1046
+ reason: "Wildcard key deletion requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1047
+ }
1048
+ ],
1049
+ dangerousWords: ["FLUSHALL", "FLUSHDB"]
1050
+ };
1051
+
1052
+ // src/shields/builtin/finance.json
1053
+ var finance_default = {
1054
+ name: "finance",
1055
+ description: "Asks before money moves through a payment or banking app (refunds, payouts, transfers, charges, invoices), whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
1056
+ aliases: ["payments", "money"],
1057
+ smartRules: [
1058
+ {
1059
+ name: "shield:finance:review-refund",
1060
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_refund,refund_payment,refund_charge,refund_order,issue_refund}",
1061
+ conditions: [],
1062
+ verdict: "review",
1063
+ reason: "A refund returns money to a customer. node9 asks before money moves, whatever the request said (Finance shield)."
1064
+ },
1065
+ {
1066
+ name: "shield:finance:review-payout",
1067
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payout,send_payout,payout,create_payouts_batch}",
1068
+ conditions: [],
1069
+ verdict: "review",
1070
+ reason: "A payout moves the balance to a bank account. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1071
+ },
1072
+ {
1073
+ name: "shield:finance:review-transfer",
1074
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{transfer_create,transfer_authorization_create,create_transfer,transfer_money,transfer_funds,send_money,wire_transfer,create_wire,schedule_transaction,update_scheduled_transaction}",
1075
+ conditions: [],
1076
+ verdict: "review",
1077
+ reason: "A transfer moves money between accounts. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1078
+ },
1079
+ {
1080
+ name: "shield:finance:review-charge",
1081
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_intent,confirm_payment_intent,capture_payment_intent,create_charge,create_payment,capture_payment,capture_order,create_order,authorize_order,create_checkout_session}",
1082
+ conditions: [],
1083
+ verdict: "review",
1084
+ reason: "This charges a card or captures a payment. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1085
+ },
1086
+ {
1087
+ name: "shield:finance:review-payment-link",
1088
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_link,create_invoice,finalize_invoice,send_invoice,pay_invoice,create_invoice_item}",
1089
+ conditions: [],
1090
+ verdict: "review",
1091
+ reason: "This bills someone or creates a link that charges a card. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1092
+ },
1093
+ {
1094
+ name: "shield:finance:review-subscription",
1095
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_subscription,cancel_subscription,update_subscription,pause_subscription,resume_subscription}",
1096
+ conditions: [],
1097
+ verdict: "review",
1098
+ reason: "A subscription starts or stops recurring charges. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1099
+ },
1100
+ {
1101
+ name: "shield:finance:review-dispute",
1102
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{update_dispute,accept_dispute,close_dispute}",
1103
+ conditions: [],
1104
+ verdict: "review",
1105
+ reason: "This answers or concedes a chargeback. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1106
+ },
1107
+ {
1108
+ name: "shield:finance:review-card",
1109
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{issue_card,create_virtual_card,create_issuing_card,update_card_limit}",
1110
+ conditions: [],
1111
+ verdict: "review",
1112
+ reason: "This issues a card or changes its limit. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1113
+ },
1114
+ {
1115
+ name: "shield:finance:review-withdraw",
1116
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{withdraw,withdraw_funds,create_withdrawal,request_withdrawal}",
1117
+ conditions: [],
1118
+ verdict: "review",
1119
+ reason: "A withdrawal moves money out. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1120
+ }
1121
+ ],
1122
+ dangerousWords: []
1123
+ };
1124
+
1125
+ // src/shields/builtin/identity.json
1126
+ var identity_default = {
1127
+ name: "identity",
1128
+ description: "Asks before a password, a key, a token, a role or a user changes in an identity or admin app, whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
1129
+ aliases: ["access", "iam"],
1130
+ smartRules: [
1131
+ {
1132
+ name: "shield:identity:review-password",
1133
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{change_password,update_password,reset_password,set_password,expire_password,force_password_reset}",
1134
+ conditions: [],
1135
+ verdict: "review",
1136
+ reason: "This changes or resets a password. node9 asks before credentials change, whatever the request said (Identity shield)."
1137
+ },
1138
+ {
1139
+ name: "shield:identity:review-key",
1140
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{rotate_key,rotate_api_key,create_api_key,create_token,create_access_token,create_personal_access_token,regenerate_secret,rotate_secret,create_service_account_key,create_credential}",
1141
+ conditions: [],
1142
+ verdict: "review",
1143
+ reason: "This creates or rotates a key, token or secret. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
1144
+ },
1145
+ {
1146
+ name: "shield:identity:review-access",
1147
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{grant_access,grant_permission,grant_role,revoke_access,revoke_permission,revoke_role,revoke_token,set_permission,set_permissions,set_role,assign_role,update_role,add_permission,remove_permission,attach_policy,detach_policy,share_file}",
1148
+ conditions: [],
1149
+ verdict: "review",
1150
+ reason: "This grants or revokes access. node9 asks before access changes (Identity shield)."
1151
+ },
1152
+ {
1153
+ name: "shield:identity:review-membership",
1154
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{add_member,remove_member,add_user_to_group,remove_user_from_group,add_collaborator,remove_collaborator,invite_user,invite_member,invite_user_to_slack,invite_users,add_org_member,remove_org_member,add_team_member,remove_team_member,add_user_to_channel,remove_user_from_slack}",
1155
+ conditions: [],
1156
+ verdict: "review",
1157
+ reason: "This changes who belongs where. node9 asks before membership changes (Identity shield)."
1158
+ },
1159
+ {
1160
+ name: "shield:identity:review-user",
1161
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_user,delete_user,delete_deactivated_user,deactivate_user,suspend_user,activate_user,unlock_user,make_admin,promote_user,demote_user,update_user_role}",
1162
+ conditions: [],
1163
+ verdict: "review",
1164
+ reason: "This creates, removes or promotes an account. node9 asks before accounts change (Identity shield)."
1165
+ },
1166
+ {
1167
+ name: "shield:identity:review-mfa",
1168
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{reset_mfa,reset_factors,disable_mfa,enroll_factor,deactivate_factor}",
1169
+ conditions: [],
1170
+ verdict: "review",
1171
+ reason: "This changes a second factor. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
1172
+ }
1173
+ ],
1174
+ dangerousWords: []
1175
+ };
1176
+
1034
1177
  // src/shields/builtin/publishing.json
1035
1178
  var publishing_default = {
1036
1179
  name: "publishing",
@@ -1202,85 +1345,554 @@ var publishing_default = {
1202
1345
  dangerousWords: []
1203
1346
  };
1204
1347
 
1205
- // src/shields/builtin/redis.json
1206
- var redis_default = {
1207
- name: "redis",
1208
- description: "Protects Redis instances from destructive AI operations",
1209
- aliases: [],
1210
- _scopeNote: "Every rule requires Redis to actually be involved: a client in the command (redis-cli / valkey-cli, in either order \u2014 `redis-cli FLUSHALL` and `echo FLUSHALL | redis-cli` are both real), OR the command field holding the bare keyword, which is what the MCP redis_command tool sends ({ command: 'FLUSHALL', args: [] }). Without the client requirement these rules matched the WORD anywhere \u2014 including prose in a heredoc writing a file \u2014 which produced two observed false positives: a test fixture describing the shield, and a commit message naming the rule. Every other builtin shield already scopes this way (aws s3, docker system prune, kubectl delete, gh repo delete). See redis-scope.spec.ts.",
1211
- smartRules: [
1212
- {
1213
- name: "shield:redis:block-flushall",
1214
- tool: "*",
1215
- conditions: [
1216
- {
1217
- field: "command",
1218
- op: "matches",
1219
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHALL\\b|\\bFLUSHALL\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHALL\\b|\\.flushall\\s*\\(",
1220
- flags: "i"
1221
- }
1222
- ],
1223
- verdict: "block",
1224
- reason: "FLUSHALL deletes every key in every database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1225
- },
1226
- {
1227
- name: "shield:redis:block-flushdb",
1228
- tool: "*",
1229
- conditions: [
1230
- {
1231
- field: "command",
1232
- op: "matches",
1233
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHDB\\b|\\bFLUSHDB\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHDB\\b|\\.flushdb\\s*\\(",
1234
- flags: "i"
1235
- }
1236
- ],
1237
- verdict: "block",
1238
- reason: "FLUSHDB deletes all keys in the current database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1239
- },
1240
- {
1241
- name: "shield:redis:block-config-resetstat",
1242
- tool: "*",
1243
- conditions: [
1244
- {
1245
- field: "command",
1246
- op: "matches",
1247
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT|^ ?CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT",
1248
- flags: "i"
1249
- }
1250
- ],
1251
- verdict: "block",
1252
- reason: "CONFIG RESETSTAT resets server statistics irreversibly \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1253
- },
1254
- {
1255
- name: "shield:redis:review-config-set",
1256
- tool: "*",
1257
- conditions: [
1258
- {
1259
- field: "command",
1260
- op: "matches",
1261
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b|\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?CONFIG\\s+SET\\b",
1262
- flags: "i"
1263
- }
1264
- ],
1265
- verdict: "review",
1266
- reason: "CONFIG SET changes live server configuration and requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1267
- },
1268
- {
1269
- name: "shield:redis:review-del-wildcard",
1270
- tool: "*",
1271
- conditions: [
1272
- {
1273
- field: "command",
1274
- op: "matches",
1275
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bDEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|^ ?DEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|-cli.*--scan.*xargs.*del",
1276
- flags: "i"
1277
- }
1278
- ],
1279
- verdict: "review",
1280
- reason: "Wildcard key deletion requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1348
+ // src/shields/apps.ts
1349
+ var ACTION_TEMPLATES = {
1350
+ finance: finance_default.smartRules,
1351
+ identity: identity_default.smartRules,
1352
+ publishing: publishing_default.smartRules
1353
+ };
1354
+ var ACTION_CHECKS = {
1355
+ finance: { checkId: "actions.money", slug: "money", label: "Money check" },
1356
+ identity: { checkId: "actions.access", slug: "access", label: "Accounts and access check" },
1357
+ publishing: { checkId: "actions.publish", slug: "publish", label: "Publishing check" }
1358
+ };
1359
+ function isToolRule(rule) {
1360
+ return rule.tool.startsWith("{,mcp__*__}");
1361
+ }
1362
+ function actionPart(ruleName) {
1363
+ const m = /^shield:[^:]+:(.+)$/.exec(ruleName ?? "");
1364
+ return m ? m[1] : ruleName ?? "rule";
1365
+ }
1366
+ function ownReason(reason, owner) {
1367
+ if (!reason) return reason;
1368
+ return reason.replace(/\((?:Finance|Identity|Publishing) shield\)\.?$/, `(${owner}).`);
1369
+ }
1370
+ var GAP = "[^;&|]{0,200}?";
1371
+ var prog = (alt) => `(?:^|[^\\w-])(?:${alt})(?![\\w-])`;
1372
+ var httpTo = (host2) => prog("curl|wget|http|https|xh") + "[^;&|]{0,400}?" + host2;
1373
+ var httpWrite = (methods) => ({
1374
+ field: "command",
1375
+ op: "matches",
1376
+ value: `-X\\s*(?:${methods})|--(?:request|method)[=\\s]+(?:${methods})|--post-(?:data|file)|\\s(?:${methods}|${methods.toLowerCase()})\\s|^(?!.*\\s(?:-[a-zA-Z]*G|--get)(?![\\w-])).*(?:\\s-d[\\s'"@]|\\s--data|\\s--json\\s|\\s-F\\s|\\s--form\\s)`
1377
+ });
1378
+ var HTTP_WRITE = httpWrite("POST|DELETE");
1379
+ var HTTP_WRITE_ANY = httpWrite("POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE");
1380
+ var NOT_STRIPE_TEST = {
1381
+ field: "command",
1382
+ op: "notMatches",
1383
+ value: "\\b[sr]k_test_"
1384
+ };
1385
+ var postTo = (host2) => `\\.post\\(\\s*["'\`][^"'\`]{0,80}${host2}`;
1386
+ var STRIPE_OBJECTS = "refunds|payouts|charges|transfers|payment_intents|payment_links|invoices|subscriptions|topups";
1387
+ var APP_SHIELD_SPECS = [
1388
+ {
1389
+ name: "stripe",
1390
+ label: "Stripe",
1391
+ description: "Asks before money moves in Stripe (refunds, payouts, charges, invoices, subscriptions), whether the agent uses the Stripe MCP server, the stripe CLI, the API or the Stripe library in a script. Reads are never asked about.",
1392
+ template: "finance",
1393
+ server: "*stripe*",
1394
+ doors: [
1395
+ {
1396
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-cli",
1397
+ tool: "bash",
1398
+ conditions: [
1399
+ {
1400
+ field: "command",
1401
+ op: "matches",
1402
+ value: prog("stripe") + GAP + `\\s(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})\\s+(?:create|cancel|capture|confirm|update|pay|finalize_invoice|send_invoice|void_invoice)(?![\\w-])`,
1403
+ flags: "i"
1404
+ },
1405
+ {
1406
+ field: "command",
1407
+ op: "matches",
1408
+ // The stripe CLI works in test mode unless told otherwise.
1409
+ value: "\\s--live(?![\\w-])|\\b[sr]k_live_"
1410
+ }
1411
+ ],
1412
+ conditionMode: "all",
1413
+ verdict: "review",
1414
+ reason: "The stripe CLI is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1415
+ },
1416
+ {
1417
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-cli-request",
1418
+ tool: "bash",
1419
+ conditions: [
1420
+ {
1421
+ field: "command",
1422
+ op: "matches",
1423
+ value: prog("stripe") + GAP + `\\s(?:post|delete)\\s+/?v1/(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})(?![\\w-])`,
1424
+ flags: "i"
1425
+ },
1426
+ {
1427
+ field: "command",
1428
+ op: "matches",
1429
+ // The stripe CLI works in test mode unless told otherwise.
1430
+ value: "\\s--live(?![\\w-])|\\b[sr]k_live_"
1431
+ }
1432
+ ],
1433
+ conditionMode: "all",
1434
+ verdict: "review",
1435
+ reason: "A raw stripe CLI request is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1436
+ },
1437
+ {
1438
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-api",
1439
+ tool: "bash",
1440
+ conditions: [
1441
+ {
1442
+ field: "command",
1443
+ op: "matches",
1444
+ value: httpTo(`api\\.stripe\\.com/v1/(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})(?![\\w-])`),
1445
+ flags: "i"
1446
+ },
1447
+ HTTP_WRITE,
1448
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1449
+ ],
1450
+ conditionMode: "all",
1451
+ verdict: "review",
1452
+ reason: "A request to the Stripe API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1453
+ },
1454
+ {
1455
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-code",
1456
+ tool: "bash",
1457
+ conditions: [
1458
+ {
1459
+ field: "command",
1460
+ op: "matches",
1461
+ // Python: stripe.Refund.create(...)
1462
+ value: "\\bstripe\\.(?:Refund|Payout|Transfer|Charge|PaymentIntent|PaymentLink|Invoice|Subscription|Topup)\\.(?:create|cancel|capture|confirm|modify|pay|finalize_invoice|send_invoice|void_invoice)\\b"
1463
+ },
1464
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1465
+ ],
1466
+ conditionMode: "all",
1467
+ verdict: "review",
1468
+ reason: "This code moves money through the Stripe library. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1469
+ },
1470
+ {
1471
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-code-node",
1472
+ tool: "bash",
1473
+ conditions: [
1474
+ {
1475
+ field: "command",
1476
+ op: "matches",
1477
+ // Node: stripe.refunds.create(...)
1478
+ value: "\\bstripe\\.(?:refunds|payouts|transfers|charges|paymentIntents|paymentLinks|invoices|subscriptions|topups)\\.(?:create|cancel|capture|confirm|update|pay|finalizeInvoice|sendInvoice|voidInvoice)\\s*\\("
1479
+ },
1480
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1481
+ ],
1482
+ conditionMode: "all",
1483
+ verdict: "review",
1484
+ reason: "This code moves money through the Stripe library. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1485
+ },
1486
+ {
1487
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-code-http",
1488
+ tool: "bash",
1489
+ conditions: [
1490
+ {
1491
+ field: "command",
1492
+ op: "matches",
1493
+ // requests.post("https://api.stripe.com/v1/refunds", ...)
1494
+ value: `\\.post\\(\\s*["'\`][^"'\`]{0,80}api\\.stripe\\.com/v1/(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})`
1495
+ },
1496
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1497
+ ],
1498
+ conditionMode: "all",
1499
+ verdict: "review",
1500
+ reason: "This code posts to the Stripe API. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1501
+ }
1502
+ ]
1503
+ },
1504
+ {
1505
+ name: "paypal",
1506
+ label: "PayPal",
1507
+ description: "Asks before money moves in PayPal (refunds, payouts, captured orders, invoices, subscriptions), whether the agent uses a PayPal MCP server, the API or the PayPal SDK in a script. The sandbox is never asked about, and neither are reads.",
1508
+ template: "finance",
1509
+ server: "*paypal*",
1510
+ doors: [
1511
+ {
1512
+ name: "shield:paypal:review-api",
1513
+ tool: "bash",
1514
+ conditions: [
1515
+ {
1516
+ field: "command",
1517
+ op: "matches",
1518
+ // The live hosts only: api.paypal.com and api-m.paypal.com. The
1519
+ // sandbox (api-m.sandbox.paypal.com) moves no money.
1520
+ value: httpTo("api(?:-m)?\\.paypal\\.com/v[12]/"),
1521
+ flags: "i"
1522
+ },
1523
+ {
1524
+ field: "command",
1525
+ op: "matches",
1526
+ // The endpoints that move money.
1527
+ value: "\\.paypal\\.com/v[12]/(?:payments/(?:captures|authorizations|sale|payouts|payment|referenced-payouts)|checkout/orders/[^\\s/]{1,64}/(?:capture|authorize)|invoicing/invoices|billing/subscriptions)",
1528
+ flags: "i"
1529
+ },
1530
+ HTTP_WRITE
1531
+ ],
1532
+ conditionMode: "all",
1533
+ verdict: "review",
1534
+ reason: "A request to the PayPal API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (PayPal)."
1535
+ },
1536
+ {
1537
+ name: "shield:paypal:review-code",
1538
+ tool: "bash",
1539
+ conditions: [
1540
+ {
1541
+ field: "command",
1542
+ op: "matches",
1543
+ // The Node SDKs (checkout-server-sdk, paypal-server-sdk) and the
1544
+ // Python paypalrestsdk.
1545
+ value: "\\b(?:CapturesRefundRequest|OrdersCaptureRequest|AuthorizationsCaptureRequest|PayoutsPostRequest)\\b|\\b(?:captureOrder|refundCapturedPayment|captureAuthorizedPayment|createBatchPayout)\\s*\\(|\\bpaypalrestsdk\\.(?:Payout|Sale|Capture|Invoice|BillingAgreement)\\b"
1546
+ }
1547
+ ],
1548
+ verdict: "review",
1549
+ reason: "This code moves money through PayPal. node9 asks before money moves (PayPal)."
1550
+ },
1551
+ {
1552
+ name: "shield:paypal:review-code-http",
1553
+ tool: "bash",
1554
+ conditions: [
1555
+ {
1556
+ field: "command",
1557
+ op: "matches",
1558
+ // The endpoints that move money; the token call every script
1559
+ // starts with (/v1/oauth2/token) is not one.
1560
+ value: postTo(
1561
+ "api(?:-m)?\\.paypal\\.com/v[12]/(?:payments/(?:captures|authorizations|sale|payouts|payment|referenced-payouts)|checkout/orders/[^\\s/\"'`]{1,64}/(?:capture|authorize)|invoicing/invoices|billing/subscriptions)"
1562
+ )
1563
+ }
1564
+ ],
1565
+ verdict: "review",
1566
+ reason: "This code posts to the PayPal API. node9 asks before money moves (PayPal)."
1567
+ }
1568
+ ]
1569
+ },
1570
+ {
1571
+ name: "square",
1572
+ label: "Square",
1573
+ description: "Asks before money moves in Square (refunds, payments, paid orders, invoices, subscriptions), whether the agent uses a Square MCP server, the API or the Square SDK in a script. The sandbox host is never asked about, and neither are reads.",
1574
+ template: "finance",
1575
+ // Square's servers, never Squarespace (a website builder).
1576
+ server: "{*square,*square[-_]*,*squareup*}",
1577
+ mcpTools: [
1578
+ {
1579
+ // Square's official MCP server has one tool for every API call; the
1580
+ // service and method name what it does.
1581
+ name: "shield:square:review-mcp-request",
1582
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}make_api_request",
1583
+ conditions: [
1584
+ {
1585
+ field: "service",
1586
+ op: "matches",
1587
+ value: "^(?:refunds|payments|orders|invoices|subscriptions|disputes|gift_cards|gift_card_activities|checkout|terminal)$",
1588
+ flags: "i"
1589
+ },
1590
+ {
1591
+ field: "method",
1592
+ op: "notMatches",
1593
+ value: "^(?:list|get|retrieve|search|batch_?retrieve|calculate)",
1594
+ flags: "i"
1595
+ }
1596
+ ],
1597
+ conditionMode: "all",
1598
+ verdict: "review",
1599
+ reason: "A request through the Square MCP server is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1600
+ }
1601
+ ],
1602
+ doors: [
1603
+ {
1604
+ name: "shield:square:review-api",
1605
+ tool: "bash",
1606
+ conditions: [
1607
+ {
1608
+ field: "command",
1609
+ op: "matches",
1610
+ // The live host only; the sandbox is connect.squareupsandbox.com.
1611
+ value: httpTo(
1612
+ "connect\\.squareup\\.com/v2/(?:refunds|payments|orders/[^\\s/?]{1,64}/pay|invoices|subscriptions|disputes|gift-cards/activities)(?![\\w-]|/search)"
1613
+ ),
1614
+ flags: "i"
1615
+ },
1616
+ HTTP_WRITE_ANY
1617
+ ],
1618
+ conditionMode: "all",
1619
+ verdict: "review",
1620
+ reason: "A request to the Square API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1621
+ },
1622
+ {
1623
+ name: "shield:square:review-code",
1624
+ tool: "bash",
1625
+ conditions: [
1626
+ {
1627
+ field: "command",
1628
+ op: "matches",
1629
+ // The Square SDK in the script: Node (`square`) or Python (`square`, `squareup`).
1630
+ value: `\\bSquareClient\\b|\\bsquare\\.client\\b|from\\s+square[.\\s]|from\\s+["']square["']|require\\(\\s*["']square["']`
1631
+ },
1632
+ {
1633
+ field: "command",
1634
+ op: "matches",
1635
+ value: "\\.refunds(?:Api)?\\.refund(?:Payment|_payment)\\s*\\(|\\.payments(?:Api)?\\.(?:create|complete)(?:Payment|_payment)?\\s*\\(|\\.orders(?:Api)?\\.pay(?:Order|_order)?\\s*\\(|\\.invoices(?:Api)?\\.publish(?:Invoice|_invoice)?\\s*\\("
1636
+ }
1637
+ ],
1638
+ conditionMode: "all",
1639
+ verdict: "review",
1640
+ reason: "This code moves money through the Square SDK. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1641
+ },
1642
+ {
1643
+ name: "shield:square:review-code-http",
1644
+ tool: "bash",
1645
+ conditions: [
1646
+ {
1647
+ field: "command",
1648
+ op: "matches",
1649
+ value: postTo(
1650
+ "connect\\.squareup\\.com/v2/(?:refunds|payments|orders/[^\\s/?\"'`]{1,64}/pay|invoices|subscriptions|disputes|gift-cards/activities)(?![\\w-]|/search)"
1651
+ )
1652
+ }
1653
+ ],
1654
+ verdict: "review",
1655
+ reason: "This code posts to the Square API. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1656
+ }
1657
+ ]
1658
+ },
1659
+ {
1660
+ name: "plaid",
1661
+ label: "Plaid",
1662
+ description: "Asks before money moves through Plaid (transfers, transfer authorizations, payment initiation), whether the agent uses a Plaid MCP server, the API or the Plaid SDK in a script. The sandbox host is never asked about, and neither are reads such as balances or transactions.",
1663
+ template: "finance",
1664
+ server: "*plaid*",
1665
+ doors: [
1666
+ {
1667
+ name: "shield:plaid:review-api",
1668
+ tool: "bash",
1669
+ conditions: [
1670
+ {
1671
+ field: "command",
1672
+ op: "matches",
1673
+ // Every Plaid endpoint is a POST, so the path is what tells a
1674
+ // write; the live host only, never sandbox.plaid.com. A script
1675
+ // that posts to the URL meets this door too.
1676
+ value: httpTo(
1677
+ "production\\.plaid\\.com/(?:transfer/(?:create|authorization/create|recurring/create)|payment_initiation/payment/create|bank_transfer/create)(?![\\w-])"
1678
+ ),
1679
+ flags: "i"
1680
+ }
1681
+ ],
1682
+ verdict: "review",
1683
+ reason: "A request to the Plaid API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Plaid)."
1684
+ },
1685
+ {
1686
+ name: "shield:plaid:review-code",
1687
+ tool: "bash",
1688
+ conditions: [
1689
+ { field: "command", op: "matches", value: "\\bplaid", flags: "i" },
1690
+ {
1691
+ field: "command",
1692
+ op: "matches",
1693
+ value: "\\b(?:transfer(?:Authorization|Recurring)?Create|paymentInitiationPaymentCreate|bankTransferCreate|transfer_(?:authorization_|recurring_)?create|payment_initiation_payment_create|bank_transfer_create)\\s*\\("
1694
+ }
1695
+ ],
1696
+ conditionMode: "all",
1697
+ verdict: "review",
1698
+ reason: "This code moves money through Plaid. node9 asks before money moves (Plaid)."
1699
+ }
1700
+ ]
1701
+ },
1702
+ {
1703
+ name: "okta",
1704
+ label: "Okta",
1705
+ description: "Asks before a user, a group member, a role, a password or a key changes in Okta, whether the agent uses an Okta MCP server, the API or the Okta SDK in a script. Reads and signing in are never asked about.",
1706
+ template: "identity",
1707
+ server: "*okta*",
1708
+ doors: [
1709
+ {
1710
+ name: "shield:okta:review-api",
1711
+ tool: "bash",
1712
+ conditions: [
1713
+ {
1714
+ field: "command",
1715
+ op: "matches",
1716
+ // The management API only: sign-in (/api/v1/authn, /sessions,
1717
+ // /oauth2) is not under these paths.
1718
+ value: httpTo(
1719
+ "[\\w-]+\\.okta(?:-emea)?\\.com/api/v1/(?:users|groups|apps|iam|api-tokens|idps|authorizationServers|policies)(?![\\w-])"
1720
+ ),
1721
+ flags: "i"
1722
+ },
1723
+ HTTP_WRITE_ANY
1724
+ ],
1725
+ conditionMode: "all",
1726
+ verdict: "review",
1727
+ reason: "A request to the Okta API is about to change who has access. node9 asks before access changes (Okta)."
1728
+ },
1729
+ {
1730
+ name: "shield:okta:review-code",
1731
+ tool: "bash",
1732
+ conditions: [
1733
+ {
1734
+ field: "command",
1735
+ op: "matches",
1736
+ // The Okta SDK in the script: a method named createUser alone is
1737
+ // in half the applications ever written.
1738
+ value: "@okta/okta-sdk|\\bokta\\.Client\\b|from\\s+okta[.\\s]|\\bimport\\s+okta\\b"
1739
+ },
1740
+ {
1741
+ field: "command",
1742
+ op: "matches",
1743
+ value: "\\b(?:(?:create|delete|deactivate|suspend|unlock|activate)User|(?:reset|expire)Password|resetFactors|(?:assign|unassign)User(?:To|From)Group|assignRoleTo(?:User|Group))\\s*\\("
1744
+ }
1745
+ ],
1746
+ conditionMode: "all",
1747
+ verdict: "review",
1748
+ reason: "This code changes who has access in Okta. node9 asks before access changes (Okta)."
1749
+ },
1750
+ {
1751
+ name: "shield:okta:review-code-py",
1752
+ tool: "bash",
1753
+ conditions: [
1754
+ {
1755
+ field: "command",
1756
+ op: "matches",
1757
+ value: "@okta/okta-sdk|\\bokta\\.Client\\b|from\\s+okta[.\\s]|\\bimport\\s+okta\\b"
1758
+ },
1759
+ {
1760
+ field: "command",
1761
+ op: "matches",
1762
+ value: "\\b(?:(?:create|delete|deactivate|deactivate_or_delete|suspend|unlock|activate)_user|(?:reset|expire)_password|reset_factors|(?:add|remove)_user_(?:to|from)_group|assign_role_to_(?:user|group))\\s*\\("
1763
+ }
1764
+ ],
1765
+ conditionMode: "all",
1766
+ verdict: "review",
1767
+ reason: "This code changes who has access in Okta. node9 asks before access changes (Okta)."
1768
+ }
1769
+ ]
1770
+ },
1771
+ {
1772
+ name: "auth0",
1773
+ label: "Auth0",
1774
+ description: "Asks before a user, a role, an application or its permissions change in Auth0, whether the agent uses an Auth0 MCP server, the auth0 CLI, the Management API or the Auth0 SDK in a script. Reads and signing in are never asked about.",
1775
+ template: "identity",
1776
+ server: "*auth0*",
1777
+ mcpTools: [
1778
+ {
1779
+ // Auth0's official MCP server: applications (their secrets and
1780
+ // callbacks), APIs and their scopes, and Actions (code that runs at
1781
+ // every sign-in).
1782
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-tenant-config",
1783
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{auth0_create_application,auth0_update_application,auth0_create_resource_server,auth0_update_resource_server,auth0_create_action,auth0_update_action,auth0_deploy_action}",
1784
+ conditions: [],
1785
+ verdict: "review",
1786
+ reason: "This changes an Auth0 application, API or sign-in Action. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1787
+ }
1788
+ ],
1789
+ doors: [
1790
+ {
1791
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-cli",
1792
+ tool: "bash",
1793
+ conditions: [
1794
+ {
1795
+ field: "command",
1796
+ op: "matches",
1797
+ value: prog("auth0") + GAP + "\\s(?:(?:users|roles|apps|orgs)\\s+(?:create|update|delete|rm)|users\\s+roles\\s+(?:assign|add|remove|rm)|roles\\s+permissions\\s+(?:add|remove|rm)|users\\s+blocks\\s+unblock|api\\s+(?:post|put|patch|delete))(?![\\w-])",
1798
+ flags: "i"
1799
+ }
1800
+ ],
1801
+ verdict: "review",
1802
+ reason: "The auth0 CLI is about to change who has access. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1803
+ },
1804
+ {
1805
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-api",
1806
+ tool: "bash",
1807
+ conditions: [
1808
+ {
1809
+ field: "command",
1810
+ op: "matches",
1811
+ // The Management API only; /oauth/token is signing in.
1812
+ value: httpTo(
1813
+ "\\.auth0\\.com/api/v2/(?:users|roles|clients|grants|client-grants|organizations|tickets|jobs/users-imports|device-credentials)(?![\\w-])"
1814
+ ),
1815
+ flags: "i"
1816
+ },
1817
+ HTTP_WRITE_ANY
1818
+ ],
1819
+ conditionMode: "all",
1820
+ verdict: "review",
1821
+ reason: "A request to the Auth0 Management API is about to change who has access. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1822
+ },
1823
+ {
1824
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-code",
1825
+ tool: "bash",
1826
+ conditions: [
1827
+ {
1828
+ field: "command",
1829
+ op: "matches",
1830
+ // The Auth0 SDK in the script (Node `auth0`, Python `auth0`).
1831
+ value: `\\bManagementClient\\b|from\\s+auth0[.\\s]|from\\s+["']auth0["']|require\\(\\s*["']auth0["']`
1832
+ },
1833
+ {
1834
+ field: "command",
1835
+ op: "matches",
1836
+ value: "\\.(?:users|roles|organizations|clients)\\.(?:create|delete|update|assignRoles|deleteRoles|assignUsers|addPermissions|deletePermissions|addMembers|deleteMembers|add_roles|remove_roles|add_users|add_permissions|remove_permissions)\\s*\\("
1837
+ }
1838
+ ],
1839
+ conditionMode: "all",
1840
+ verdict: "review",
1841
+ reason: "This code changes who has access in Auth0. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1842
+ }
1843
+ ]
1844
+ }
1845
+ ];
1846
+ function buildAppShield(spec) {
1847
+ const owner = spec.label;
1848
+ const toolRules = ACTION_TEMPLATES[spec.template].filter(isToolRule).map((rule) => ({
1849
+ ...rule,
1850
+ name: `shield:${spec.name}:${actionPart(rule.name)}`,
1851
+ server: spec.server,
1852
+ reason: ownReason(rule.reason, owner)
1853
+ }));
1854
+ const ownTools = (spec.mcpTools ?? []).map((rule) => ({
1855
+ ...rule,
1856
+ server: spec.server
1857
+ }));
1858
+ return {
1859
+ name: spec.name,
1860
+ description: spec.description,
1861
+ aliases: [],
1862
+ smartRules: [...toolRules, ...ownTools, ...spec.doors],
1863
+ dangerousWords: []
1864
+ };
1865
+ }
1866
+ var APP_SHIELDS = APP_SHIELD_SPECS.map(buildAppShield);
1867
+ var APP_SHIELD_NAMES = new Set(APP_SHIELD_SPECS.map((s) => s.name));
1868
+ var APP_SERVER_GLOB = `{${APP_SHIELD_SPECS.map((s) => s.server).join(",")}}`;
1869
+ function buildGeneralRules() {
1870
+ const out = [];
1871
+ for (const name of Object.keys(ACTION_TEMPLATES)) {
1872
+ const { slug, label } = ACTION_CHECKS[name];
1873
+ for (const rule of ACTION_TEMPLATES[name].filter(isToolRule)) {
1874
+ const part = actionPart(rule.name).replace(/^review-/, "");
1875
+ out.push({
1876
+ ...rule,
1877
+ name: `review-action-${slug}-${part}`,
1878
+ notServer: APP_SERVER_GLOB,
1879
+ reason: ownReason(rule.reason, label)
1880
+ });
1281
1881
  }
1282
- ],
1283
- dangerousWords: ["FLUSHALL", "FLUSHDB"]
1882
+ }
1883
+ return out;
1884
+ }
1885
+ var GENERAL_ACTION_RULES = buildGeneralRules();
1886
+ function generalActionRuleNames(template) {
1887
+ const { slug } = ACTION_CHECKS[template];
1888
+ return GENERAL_ACTION_RULES.filter((r) => r.name?.startsWith(`review-action-${slug}-`)).map(
1889
+ (r) => r.name
1890
+ );
1891
+ }
1892
+ var REPLACED_SHIELDS = {
1893
+ finance: "finance is now the Money check (actions.money), on by default. For an app: node9 shield enable stripe (or paypal).",
1894
+ identity: "identity is now the Accounts and access check (actions.access), on by default.",
1895
+ publishing: "publishing is now the Publishing check (actions.publish), on by default."
1284
1896
  };
1285
1897
 
1286
1898
  // src/shields/index.ts
@@ -1325,36 +1937,36 @@ var BUILTIN_SHIELDS = {
1325
1937
  [bash_safe_default.name]: bash_safe_default,
1326
1938
  [docker_default.name]: docker_default,
1327
1939
  [filesystem_default.name]: filesystem_default,
1328
- // Dangerous actions as category shields (node9Firewall#385): an MCP app's
1329
- // money, credential and publishing tools, asked about whatever the request
1330
- // said. One glob per rule covers the bare name the gateway sends and the
1331
- // mcp__<server>__ name the agent hook sends.
1332
- [finance_default.name]: finance_default,
1333
1940
  [github_default.name]: github_default,
1334
- [identity_default.name]: identity_default,
1335
1941
  [k8s_default.name]: k8s_default,
1336
1942
  [mongodb_default.name]: mongodb_default,
1337
1943
  [postgres_default.name]: postgres_default,
1338
1944
  [project_jail_default.name]: project_jail_default,
1339
- [publishing_default.name]: publishing_default,
1340
- [redis_default.name]: redis_default
1945
+ [redis_default.name]: redis_default,
1946
+ // App shields generated from the action templates (node9Firewall#390): one
1947
+ // per app, every door (MCP server, CLI, API, library), off by default.
1948
+ ...Object.fromEntries(APP_SHIELDS.map((s) => [s.name, s]))
1341
1949
  };
1342
- var ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
1343
- "finance",
1344
- "identity",
1345
- "publishing"
1346
- ]);
1347
1950
  function assertBuiltinShieldRegexesAreSafe() {
1348
- for (const shield of Object.values(BUILTIN_SHIELDS)) {
1951
+ const sets = [
1952
+ ...Object.values(BUILTIN_SHIELDS).map((sh) => ({
1953
+ name: sh.name,
1954
+ smartRules: sh.smartRules
1955
+ })),
1956
+ ...Object.entries(ACTION_TEMPLATES).map(([name, smartRules]) => ({ name, smartRules })),
1957
+ { name: "general-action-checks", smartRules: GENERAL_ACTION_RULES }
1958
+ ];
1959
+ for (const shield of sets) {
1349
1960
  for (const rule of shield.smartRules) {
1350
1961
  const conditions = rule.conditions ?? [];
1351
1962
  for (const cond of conditions) {
1352
1963
  if (cond.op !== "matches" && cond.op !== "notMatches") continue;
1353
1964
  const pattern = cond.value;
1354
1965
  if (!pattern) continue;
1355
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex2.default)(pattern)) {
1966
+ const problem = validateRegex(pattern);
1967
+ if (problem) {
1356
1968
  throw new Error(
1357
- `[node9 engine] Shield '${shield.name}' rule '${rule.name ?? rule.tool}' has unsafe regex: ${pattern}`
1969
+ `[node9 engine] Shield '${shield.name}' rule '${rule.name ?? rule.tool}' has a regex the runtime refuses (${problem}): ${pattern}`
1358
1970
  );
1359
1971
  }
1360
1972
  }
@@ -1648,9 +2260,9 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
1648
2260
  },
1649
2261
  // ── Commands ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1650
2262
  "commands.inline-exec": {
1651
- plain: "The agent runs a small program written inside the command itself.",
2263
+ plain: "The agent runs a small program written inside the command itself, and node9 reads it: ordinary code runs, code that deletes, sends data out, runs other commands or reads protected files is held, and so is code node9 cannot read.",
1652
2264
  example: `node -e "require('fs').rmSync('dist', {recursive: true})"`,
1653
- advice: "Agents do this often for harmless tasks. Set Log if your team finds the review prompts noisy; keep Review if agents work near production."
2265
+ advice: "Keep Review. Strict mode reviews every inline call, harmless or not; Log or Off only if inline code never reaches anything that matters."
1654
2266
  },
1655
2267
  "commands.eval-dynamic": {
1656
2268
  plain: "The agent runs code whose content is built at run time, so node9 cannot read it in advance.",
@@ -1682,6 +2294,21 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
1682
2294
  example: "chmod 777 deploy.sh",
1683
2295
  advice: "Keep Review. A narrower permission (755, 644) almost always does the job."
1684
2296
  },
2297
+ "actions.money": {
2298
+ plain: "The agent moves money (a refund, a payout, a transfer, a charge) through an app node9 has no protection for, such as an internal billing server.",
2299
+ example: "refund_order on a server called acme-billing",
2300
+ advice: "Keep Review. When the app is Stripe or PayPal, turn on its own protection instead: it covers the CLI, the API and scripts too, and a call from it no longer comes here."
2301
+ },
2302
+ "actions.access": {
2303
+ plain: "The agent changes a password, a key, a role or who belongs to a team, through an app node9 has no protection for.",
2304
+ example: "invite_user or grant_role on a company admin server",
2305
+ advice: "Keep Review. Set Log on a sandbox workspace where agents manage test users all day."
2306
+ },
2307
+ "actions.publish": {
2308
+ plain: "The agent publishes something outside the organisation (a release, a package, a deploy, a public post) through an app node9 has no protection for.",
2309
+ example: "create_release or deploy_to_production on a company MCP server",
2310
+ advice: "Keep Review. Set Log on a release machine whose pipeline publishes on purpose, never on a developer laptop."
2311
+ },
1685
2312
  "commands.sudo": {
1686
2313
  plain: "The agent runs a command as the administrator (root).",
1687
2314
  example: "sudo apt-get install -y nginx",
@@ -1842,12 +2469,86 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
1842
2469
  advice: "Fixed at Block. A person accepts the change on the machine (node9 mcp pin update)."
1843
2470
  },
1844
2471
  "loading.malicious-package": {
1845
- plain: "The agent installs a package that the public malicious-package database (OSV) lists, or one published minutes ago. Covers npm, PyPI, RubyGems, crates.io, Go, NuGet, Maven, Packagist and VS Code extensions; the publish-age and install-script signals are npm and PyPI only.",
2472
+ plain: "The agent installs a package that the public malicious-package database (OSV) lists, or one published minutes ago. Covers npm, PyPI, RubyGems, crates.io, Go, NuGet, Maven, Packagist and VS Code extensions; the publish-age and install-script signals are npm and PyPI only. A new release built from the same repository as the one before it (registry provenance) and an install script the package has always run do not stop; a release that lost the provenance its previous release had does.",
1846
2473
  example: "npm install of a package flagged as malware",
1847
2474
  advice: "Keep Block for known-malicious packages; brand-new packages already stop for Review."
1848
2475
  }
1849
2476
  };
1850
2477
 
2478
+ // src/levels.ts
2479
+ var LEVELS = ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
2480
+ var MODE_VALUES = ["observe", ...LEVELS];
2481
+ function isModeValue(v) {
2482
+ return typeof v === "string" && MODE_VALUES.includes(v);
2483
+ }
2484
+ function levelOf(mode) {
2485
+ if (mode === "observe") return "audit";
2486
+ return LEVELS.includes(mode ?? "") ? mode : "standard";
2487
+ }
2488
+ function isRecordOnly(mode) {
2489
+ return levelOf(mode) === "audit";
2490
+ }
2491
+ function reviewsEveryInline(mode) {
2492
+ const level = levelOf(mode);
2493
+ return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
2494
+ }
2495
+ function isBlockAll(mode) {
2496
+ return levelOf(mode) === "block-all";
2497
+ }
2498
+ var SOFT = {
2499
+ "commands.inline-exec": "log",
2500
+ "commands.eval-dynamic": "log",
2501
+ "commands.rm": "log",
2502
+ "commands.chmod": "log",
2503
+ "commands.sudo": "log",
2504
+ "commands.git-destructive": "log",
2505
+ "commands.sql-ddl": "log",
2506
+ "commands.sql-no-where": "log",
2507
+ "commands.temp-binary": "log",
2508
+ "commands.disk-destroy": "log",
2509
+ "commands.dangerous-word": "log",
2510
+ "files.system-dirs": "log",
2511
+ "files.shell-startup": "log",
2512
+ "files.password-hashes": "log",
2513
+ "data.pipe-chain": "log",
2514
+ "behavior.untrusted-content": "log"
2515
+ };
2516
+ var STRICT = {
2517
+ "commands.sql-ddl": "block",
2518
+ "commands.disk-destroy": "block",
2519
+ "commands.node9-disarm": "block",
2520
+ "files.system-dirs": "block",
2521
+ "files.shell-startup": "block",
2522
+ "files.password-hashes": "block",
2523
+ "data.secrets-weak": "block",
2524
+ "data.pipe-chain": "block",
2525
+ "network.unknown-host": "review",
2526
+ "network.internal-addresses": "block",
2527
+ "behavior.prompt-injection": "log",
2528
+ "loading.skill-tamper": "block"
2529
+ };
2530
+ var BLOCK_ALL = {
2531
+ ...STRICT,
2532
+ "commands.unknown": "review",
2533
+ "commands.temp-binary": "block"
2534
+ };
2535
+ var LEVEL_CHECKS = {
2536
+ audit: {},
2537
+ soft: SOFT,
2538
+ standard: {},
2539
+ strict: STRICT,
2540
+ "block-all": BLOCK_ALL
2541
+ };
2542
+ function levelCheckValue(mode, id) {
2543
+ return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)][id];
2544
+ }
2545
+ function levelChecks(mode) {
2546
+ return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)];
2547
+ }
2548
+ function levelPackageSignals(mode) {
2549
+ return levelOf(mode) === "soft" ? { newPackage: "off", installScript: "off" } : void 0;
2550
+ }
2551
+
1851
2552
  // src/catalog.ts
1852
2553
  var VERDICTS = ["off", "log", "review", "block"];
1853
2554
  var CHECK_VERDICT_RANK = { off: 0, log: 1, review: 2, block: 3 };
@@ -1860,7 +2561,8 @@ var CHECK_GROUPS = [
1860
2561
  { id: "network", title: "Network" },
1861
2562
  { id: "files", title: "Files" },
1862
2563
  { id: "behavior", title: "Agent behavior" },
1863
- { id: "loading", title: "What the agent loads" }
2564
+ { id: "loading", title: "What the agent loads" },
2565
+ { id: "actions", title: "Actions in apps" }
1864
2566
  ];
1865
2567
  var ALL = VERDICTS;
1866
2568
  var BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS = ["mkfs", "shred"];
@@ -1907,7 +2609,7 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
1907
2609
  id: "commands.inline-exec",
1908
2610
  group: "commands",
1909
2611
  title: "Inline code execution",
1910
- catches: "node -e, python -c, bash -c, a heredoc into an interpreter",
2612
+ catches: "inline code (python -c, node -e, a heredoc into an interpreter) that deletes, sends, opens a socket, runs commands, reads protected files or decodes and runs; unreadable inline code",
1911
2613
  values: ALL,
1912
2614
  defaultValue: "review",
1913
2615
  legacy: ["Node9 Standard (Inline Execution)"]
@@ -2264,6 +2966,38 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
2264
2966
  values: ALL,
2265
2967
  defaultValue: "block",
2266
2968
  legacy: ["\u{1F4E6} Node9 Package Check (Malicious)", "\u{1F4E6} Node9 Package Check (Review)"]
2969
+ },
2970
+ // ── Actions in apps (node9Firewall#390) ──────────────────────────────────
2971
+ // The safety net under the app shields: an action that moves money, changes
2972
+ // access or publishes, on an MCP server no app shield claims (an internal
2973
+ // billing server, a vendor with no shield, Zapier). Review by default; the
2974
+ // rules come from the action templates (shields/apps.ts).
2975
+ {
2976
+ id: "actions.money",
2977
+ group: "actions",
2978
+ title: "Money moves",
2979
+ catches: "a refund, payout, transfer, charge or withdrawal through an app with no protection of its own",
2980
+ values: ALL,
2981
+ defaultValue: "review",
2982
+ legacy: generalActionRuleNames("finance")
2983
+ },
2984
+ {
2985
+ id: "actions.access",
2986
+ group: "actions",
2987
+ title: "Accounts and access change",
2988
+ catches: "a password, key, role, permission or user changed through an app with no protection of its own",
2989
+ values: ALL,
2990
+ defaultValue: "review",
2991
+ legacy: generalActionRuleNames("identity")
2992
+ },
2993
+ {
2994
+ id: "actions.publish",
2995
+ group: "actions",
2996
+ title: "Something is published",
2997
+ catches: "a release, package, deploy or public post through an app with no protection of its own",
2998
+ values: ALL,
2999
+ defaultValue: "review",
3000
+ legacy: generalActionRuleNames("publishing")
2267
3001
  }
2268
3002
  ];
2269
3003
  var SHIELD_RULE_NAME = /^shield:([^:]+):(block|review|allow)-(.+)$/;
@@ -2325,7 +3059,7 @@ function ssrfCheckId(tier) {
2325
3059
  var PROJECT_JAIL_BLOCK_READ = /^shield:project-jail:block-read-(ssh|aws|env)(-any-tool)?$/;
2326
3060
  var OVERRIDE_PREFIX = "Override block rule:";
2327
3061
  var LABEL_WRAPPERS = ["Smart Rule:", "Node9 (AST):", "project-jail (AST):"];
2328
- function unwrapRuleLabel(s) {
3062
+ function ruleNameInLabel(s) {
2329
3063
  let rest = s;
2330
3064
  const override = rest.lastIndexOf(OVERRIDE_PREFIX);
2331
3065
  if (override >= 0) rest = rest.slice(override + OVERRIDE_PREFIX.length).trimStart();
@@ -2341,7 +3075,7 @@ function checkIdForRule(nameOrLabel) {
2341
3075
  const s = nameOrLabel.trim();
2342
3076
  const exact = LEGACY_TO_ID.get(s);
2343
3077
  if (exact) return exact;
2344
- const unwrapped = unwrapRuleLabel(s);
3078
+ const unwrapped = ruleNameInLabel(s);
2345
3079
  if (unwrapped !== void 0) return checkIdForRule(unwrapped);
2346
3080
  if (s.startsWith("shield:project-jail:")) {
2347
3081
  return PROJECT_JAIL_BLOCK_READ.test(s) ? "data.credential-files" : "data.credential-files-other";
@@ -2421,7 +3155,7 @@ var LEGACY_READERS = {
2421
3155
  "commands.rm": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.rmAdvisory),
2422
3156
  "commands.chmod": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.chmod),
2423
3157
  "commands.sql-ddl": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.sqlDdl),
2424
- "commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : s.mode === "strict" ? "review" : "off",
3158
+ "commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : isBlockAll(s.mode) ? "review" : "off",
2425
3159
  "data.secrets": (s) => enabledOr(s.dlp?.enabled, "block"),
2426
3160
  "data.secrets-weak": (s) => {
2427
3161
  if (s.dlp?.enabled === false) return "off";
@@ -2460,19 +3194,21 @@ function resolveCheck(settings, id) {
2460
3194
  if (!def) return void 0;
2461
3195
  if (isLockedCheck(def)) return { id, value: "block", source: "locked" };
2462
3196
  const floor = def.floor ? CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[def.floor] : 0;
3197
+ const levelDefault = levelCheckValue(settings.mode, id) ?? def.defaultValue;
3198
+ const sourceOf = (value2) => value2 === levelDefault ? "default" : "configured";
2463
3199
  const explicit = settings.checks?.[id];
2464
3200
  if (isVerdict(explicit)) {
2465
3201
  const value2 = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[explicit] < floor ? def.floor : explicit;
2466
- return { id, value: value2, source: value2 === def.defaultValue ? "default" : "configured" };
3202
+ return { id, value: value2, source: sourceOf(value2) };
2467
3203
  }
2468
3204
  if (def.pack) {
2469
3205
  const on = settings.appliedShields?.includes(def.pack) ?? false;
2470
3206
  return { id, value: on ? def.defaultValue : "off", source: "default" };
2471
3207
  }
2472
3208
  const read = LEGACY_READERS[id]?.(settings);
2473
- if (read === void 0) return { id, value: def.defaultValue, source: "default" };
3209
+ if (read === void 0) return { id, value: levelDefault, source: "default" };
2474
3210
  const value = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[read] < floor ? def.floor : read;
2475
- return { id, value, source: value === def.defaultValue ? "default" : "configured" };
3211
+ return { id, value, source: sourceOf(value) };
2476
3212
  }
2477
3213
  function resolveAllChecks(settings) {
2478
3214
  return CHECKS.map((c) => resolveCheck(settings, c.id));
@@ -2584,45 +3320,356 @@ function looksLikeText(buf) {
2584
3320
  }
2585
3321
  return printable / buf.length >= 0.9;
2586
3322
  }
2587
- var BASE64_RUN_RE = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{32,}={0,2}|[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}/g;
2588
- function decodeEmbeddedBase64(text) {
2589
- const out = [];
2590
- for (const m of text.matchAll(BASE64_RUN_RE)) {
2591
- if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
2592
- const run = m[0];
2593
- if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(run)) continue;
2594
- const buf = Buffer.from(run, "base64");
2595
- if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3323
+ var BASE64_RUN_RE = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{32,}={0,2}|[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}/g;
3324
+ function decodeEmbeddedBase64(text) {
3325
+ const out = [];
3326
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(BASE64_RUN_RE)) {
3327
+ if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
3328
+ const run = m[0];
3329
+ if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(run)) continue;
3330
+ const buf = Buffer.from(run, "base64");
3331
+ if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3332
+ }
3333
+ return out;
3334
+ }
3335
+ var HEX_RUN_RE = /\b(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){24,}\b/g;
3336
+ var HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE = /(?:\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){16,}/g;
3337
+ function decodeEmbeddedHex(text) {
3338
+ const out = [];
3339
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_RUN_RE)) {
3340
+ if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
3341
+ const buf = Buffer.from(m[0], "hex");
3342
+ if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3343
+ }
3344
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE)) {
3345
+ if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
3346
+ const buf = Buffer.from(m[0].replace(/\\x/g, ""), "hex");
3347
+ if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3348
+ }
3349
+ return out;
3350
+ }
3351
+ function scanViews(text) {
3352
+ const views = [{ kind: "original", text }];
3353
+ const normalized = normalizeForScan(text);
3354
+ if (normalized !== text) views.push({ kind: "normalized", text: normalized });
3355
+ for (const t of decodeEmbeddedBase64(normalized)) {
3356
+ views.push({ kind: "base64", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3357
+ }
3358
+ for (const t of decodeEmbeddedHex(normalized)) {
3359
+ views.push({ kind: "hex", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3360
+ }
3361
+ return views;
3362
+ }
3363
+
3364
+ // src/files/paths.ts
3365
+ var SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES = [
3366
+ "/etc/passwd",
3367
+ "/etc/shadow",
3368
+ "/etc/group",
3369
+ "/etc/gshadow",
3370
+ "/etc/sudoers"
3371
+ ];
3372
+ var SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS = ["/etc/security", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/sudoers.d"];
3373
+ var PASSWORD_HASH_FILES = ["/etc/shadow", "/etc/gshadow"];
3374
+ var STARTUP_NAMES = [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile"];
3375
+ var SYSTEM_DIRS = [
3376
+ "/usr",
3377
+ "/etc",
3378
+ "/boot",
3379
+ "/bin",
3380
+ "/sbin",
3381
+ "/lib",
3382
+ "/lib64",
3383
+ "/var/log"
3384
+ ];
3385
+ var SYSTEM_DIRS_EXEMPT = ["/usr/local", "/usr/src"];
3386
+ var UPLOAD_SYSTEM_DIRS = [...SYSTEM_DIRS, "/proc", "/sys", "/root"];
3387
+ var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES = [
3388
+ ".gitlab-ci.yml",
3389
+ "CLAUDE.md",
3390
+ "AGENTS.md",
3391
+ ".cursorrules",
3392
+ ".mcp.json",
3393
+ ".vscode/settings.json",
3394
+ "package.json"
3395
+ ];
3396
+ var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS = [
3397
+ ".github/workflows",
3398
+ ".claude",
3399
+ ".cursor",
3400
+ ".git/hooks",
3401
+ ".husky"
3402
+ ];
3403
+ function isAgentInstructionPath(absPath, root) {
3404
+ const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "");
3405
+ if (!(absPath === r || absPath.startsWith(r + "/"))) return false;
3406
+ const rel = absPath.slice(r.length + 1);
3407
+ if (AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES.includes(rel)) return true;
3408
+ return AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS.some((d) => rel === d || rel.startsWith(d + "/"));
3409
+ }
3410
+ function isInside(root, p) {
3411
+ const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "") || "/";
3412
+ return p === r || p.startsWith(r === "/" ? "/" : r + "/");
3413
+ }
3414
+ var LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z]:)?\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers)$/;
3415
+ function isPasswordHashPath(p) {
3416
+ return PASSWORD_HASH_FILES.includes(p);
3417
+ }
3418
+ function isLegacySystemPath(p) {
3419
+ return LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE.test(p);
3420
+ }
3421
+ function normalizeFilePath(p, cwd = "", home = "~") {
3422
+ if (!p.startsWith("/") && !p.startsWith("~") && cwd) p = `${cwd}/${p}`;
3423
+ if (p === "~" || p.startsWith("~/")) p = home + p.slice(1);
3424
+ const rooted = p.startsWith("/");
3425
+ const parts = [];
3426
+ for (const part of p.split("/")) {
3427
+ if (!part || part === ".") continue;
3428
+ if (part === ".." && parts.length && parts.at(-1) !== "..") parts.pop();
3429
+ else if (part !== ".." || !rooted) parts.push(part);
3430
+ }
3431
+ return (rooted ? "/" : "") + parts.join("/");
3432
+ }
3433
+
3434
+ // src/shell/inline-code.ts
3435
+ var MAX_INLINE_CODE = 64 * 1024;
3436
+ var WHAT = {
3437
+ deletes: "deletes files",
3438
+ "writes-outside": "writes a file outside the project",
3439
+ sends: "sends data over the network",
3440
+ listens: "opens a listening socket or a shell",
3441
+ "runs-commands": "runs other commands or processes",
3442
+ "reads-protected": "reads a protected file",
3443
+ "builds-code": "runs code it builds at run time",
3444
+ permissions: "changes permissions or ownership",
3445
+ monitors: "captures the screen, the clipboard or the keyboard",
3446
+ amplifies: "writes or sends in an endless loop"
3447
+ };
3448
+ var OUTSIDE = String.raw`(?:~|\.\.[\\/]|/(?!(?:tmp|var/tmp)/(?![^'"\n]*\.\.)|dev/(?:null|stdout|stderr)\b))`;
3449
+ var pyImport = (mods) => new RegExp(String.raw`\b(?:import\s+(?:[\w.]+(?:\s+as\s+\w+)?\s*,\s*)*|from\s+)(?:${mods})\b`);
3450
+ var either = (...res) => new RegExp(res.map((r) => `(?:${r.source})`).join("|"), "m");
3451
+ var PYTHON = [
3452
+ [
3453
+ "deletes",
3454
+ /\bos\.(?:remove|unlink|rmdir|removedirs)\s*\(|\bshutil\.rmtree\s*\(|\.(?:unlink|rmdir)\s*\(|\bfrom\s+(?:os|shutil)\s+import\s+[^\n]*\b(?:remove|unlink|rmdir|removedirs|rmtree)\b/
3455
+ ],
3456
+ [
3457
+ "writes-outside",
3458
+ new RegExp(
3459
+ String.raw`\bopen\s*\(\s*[rRbBuU]?['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*,\s*(?:mode\s*=\s*)?[rRbB]?['"][^'"\n]*[wax+]|\bPath\s*\(\s*[rR]?['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*\)\s*\.(?:write_text|write_bytes|touch|mkdir|symlink_to)\s*\(|\bshutil\.(?:copy\w*|move)\s*\([^)\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}|\bos\.(?:rename|replace|symlink|link|truncate|makedirs|mkdir)\s*\([^)\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}`
3460
+ )
3461
+ ],
3462
+ [
3463
+ "sends",
3464
+ either(
3465
+ pyImport(
3466
+ String.raw`socket|requests|urllib2|urllib3|http\.client|httplib|smtplib|ftplib|paramiko|telnetlib|aiohttp|httpx|websockets?|xmlrpc|poplib|imaplib|pycurl|scapy`
3467
+ ),
3468
+ /\burllib\.request\b|\burlopen\s*\(|\bfrom\s+urllib\s+import\s+[^\n;]*\brequest\b|\basyncio\.open_connection\s*\(/
3469
+ )
3470
+ ],
3471
+ [
3472
+ "listens",
3473
+ either(
3474
+ pyImport(String.raw`pty|socketserver|http\.server`),
3475
+ /\bpty\.spawn\s*\(|\.bind\s*\(\s*\(|\basyncio\.start_server\s*\(/
3476
+ )
3477
+ ],
3478
+ [
3479
+ "runs-commands",
3480
+ either(
3481
+ pyImport("subprocess|pexpect|commands|psutil"),
3482
+ /\bos\.(?:system|popen|exec\w*|spawn\w*|posix_spawn\w*|fork|forkpty|kill|killpg)\s*\(|\bfrom\s+os\s+import\s+[^\n;]*\b(?:system|popen|exec\w*|spawn\w*|fork|kill)\b|\bfrom\s+(?:os|shutil|pty|ctypes)\s+import\s+\*/
3483
+ )
3484
+ ],
3485
+ [
3486
+ "builds-code",
3487
+ /(?<![\w.])(?:exec|eval|compile|execfile)\s*\(|\b__import__\s*\(|\bimportlib\b|\b(?:c?pickle|dill|marshal|shelve)\.loads?\s*\(|\byaml\.(?:unsafe_)?load\s*\((?![^)\n]*SafeLoader)|\bctypes\b|\b(?:getattr|vars)\s*\(\s*(?:os|subprocess|shutil|socket|sys|pty|builtins|__builtins__)\b|\b(?:os|subprocess|shutil|socket|sys|pty|builtins)\.__dict__\b|\b__builtins__\b|\bsys\.modules\b|\bglobals\s*\(\s*\)\s*\[/
3488
+ ],
3489
+ [
3490
+ // Spyware shapes: a screenshot, the clipboard, a key logger.
3491
+ "monitors",
3492
+ either(
3493
+ pyImport(String.raw`pyperclip|pynput|keyboard|pyautogui|pyscreenshot|mss|clipboard`),
3494
+ /\bImageGrab\b|\bpyautogui\.screenshot\b|\bscreencapture\b/
3495
+ )
3496
+ ],
3497
+ [
3498
+ "permissions",
3499
+ /\bos\.(?:chmod|lchmod|fchmod|chown|lchown|fchown|setuid|setgid|seteuid|setegid|setreuid|setregid|setresuid)\s*\(|\.chmod\s*\(|\bshutil\.chown\s*\(/
3500
+ ]
3501
+ ];
3502
+ var NODE = [
3503
+ [
3504
+ "deletes",
3505
+ /\.(?:rm|rmSync|rmdir|rmdirSync|unlink|unlinkSync)\s*\(|\brimraf\b|\bDeno\.remove(?:Sync)?\s*\(/
3506
+ ],
3507
+ [
3508
+ "writes-outside",
3509
+ new RegExp(
3510
+ String.raw`(?:\.(?:writeFile|writeFileSync|appendFile|appendFileSync|createWriteStream|copyFile|copyFileSync|cp|cpSync|rename|renameSync|truncate|truncateSync|symlink|symlinkSync|mkdir|mkdirSync)|\bDeno\.(?:writeTextFile|writeFile|rename|mkdir)(?:Sync)?|\bBun\.write)\s*\(\s*['"\x60]${OUTSIDE}`
3511
+ )
3512
+ ],
3513
+ [
3514
+ "sends",
3515
+ /\bfetch\s*\(|(?:\brequire\s*\(\s*|\bfrom\s+|\bimport\s+)['"\x60](?:node:)?(?:http|https|http2|net|dgram|tls|axios|node-fetch|ws|request|got|undici|nodemailer)['"\x60]|\bnew\s+WebSocket\b|\bXMLHttpRequest\b|\b(?:Deno|Bun)\.connect\w*\s*\(/
3516
+ ],
3517
+ ["listens", /\bcreateServer\s*\(|\b(?:Deno\.(?:listen\w*|serve)|Bun\.(?:listen|serve))\s*\(/],
3518
+ [
3519
+ "runs-commands",
3520
+ /\bchild_process\b|\bprocess\.(?:binding|dlopen|kill)\s*\(|\bDeno\.(?:run|Command)\b|\bBun\.(?:spawn|spawnSync|\$)\b|\bexecSync\s*\(|\bspawnSync\s*\(/
3521
+ ],
3522
+ [
3523
+ "builds-code",
3524
+ /(?<![\w.])eval\s*\(|\bnew\s+Function\s*\(|(?<![\w.])Function\s*\(|(?:\brequire\s*\(\s*|\bfrom\s+)['"\x60](?:node:)?vm['"\x60]|\bvm\.\w+|\brequire\s*\(\s*[^'"\x60\s)]|\bimport\s*\(\s*[^'"\x60\s)]/
3525
+ ],
3526
+ [
3527
+ "permissions",
3528
+ /\.(?:chmod|chmodSync|chown|chownSync|lchown|lchownSync|fchmod|fchmodSync|fchown|fchownSync)\s*\(|\bprocess\.set(?:e)?[ug]id\s*\(|\bDeno\.(?:chmod|chown)(?:Sync)?\s*\(/
3529
+ ]
3530
+ ];
3531
+ var PERL = [
3532
+ ["deletes", /\b(?:unlink|rmdir|rmtree|remove_tree)\b/],
3533
+ [
3534
+ "writes-outside",
3535
+ new RegExp(
3536
+ String.raw`['"]\s*(?:\+?>>?|\+<)\s*['"]?\s*,?\s*['"]?${OUTSIDE}|\b(?:rename|symlink|link|copy|move)\s*\(?[^;\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}`
3537
+ )
3538
+ ],
3539
+ [
3540
+ "sends",
3541
+ /\b(?:IO::Socket|Socket|LWP|HTTP::Tiny|Net::\w+|Mojo::UserAgent|WWW::Mechanize|IO::Socket::INET)\b/
3542
+ ],
3543
+ [
3544
+ "runs-commands",
3545
+ /\b(?:system|exec|fork|kill|syscall)\b|`[^`]*`|\bqx\s*[{([/|!'"]|\bopen\s*\(?[^;\n]*(?:['"]\s*\||\|\s*['"]|['"]-\|['"])/
3546
+ ],
3547
+ ["builds-code", /\beval\b|\bStorable::thaw\b|\bdo\s+['"]/],
3548
+ ["permissions", /\b(?:chmod|chown)\b/]
3549
+ ];
3550
+ var RUBY = [
3551
+ [
3552
+ "deletes",
3553
+ /\bFile\.(?:delete|unlink)\b|\bFileUtils\.(?:rm\w*|remove\w*)\b|\bDir\.(?:rmdir|delete|unlink)\b|\.(?:rmtree|delete_all)\b/
3554
+ ],
3555
+ [
3556
+ "writes-outside",
3557
+ new RegExp(
3558
+ String.raw`\bFile\.(?:write|binwrite|symlink|rename)\s*\(?\s*['"]${OUTSIDE}|\bFile\.open\s*\(?\s*['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*,\s*['"][wa+]|\bFileUtils\.(?:cp\w*|mv|install|ln\w*|mkdir_p|touch)\s*\(?[^\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}`
3559
+ )
3560
+ ],
3561
+ [
3562
+ "sends",
3563
+ /\bNet::\w+|\b(?:TCPSocket|UDPSocket|UNIXSocket|Socket)\b|\bopen-uri\b|\bURI\.open\b|\b(?:HTTParty|Faraday|RestClient|Excon|Typhoeus)\b|\brequire\s+['"](?:socket|net\/\w+|open-uri)['"]/
3564
+ ],
3565
+ ["listens", /\b(?:TCPServer|UNIXServer|WEBrick|PTY)\b/],
3566
+ [
3567
+ "runs-commands",
3568
+ /(?<![\w.])(?:system|exec|spawn|fork)\b|`[^`]*`|%x[{([|!]|(?<![\w.])open\s*\(?\s*['"]\||\bIO\.popen\b|\bOpen3\b|\bProcess\.(?:spawn|kill|exec)\b|\bKernel\.(?:system|exec|spawn|open)\b/
3569
+ ],
3570
+ [
3571
+ "builds-code",
3572
+ /(?<![\w.])eval\b|\b(?:instance|class|module)_eval\b|\b(?:send|public_send)\s*\(?\s*:?['"]?(?:system|eval|exec|spawn)\b|\bMarshal\.load\b|\bYAML\.(?:unsafe_)?load\b|\bconst_get\b/
3573
+ ],
3574
+ ["permissions", /\b(?:File|FileUtils)\.(?:chmod|chown|lchmod|lchown)\w*\b/]
3575
+ ];
3576
+ var PHP = [
3577
+ ["deletes", /\b(?:unlink|rmdir)\s*\(/],
3578
+ [
3579
+ "writes-outside",
3580
+ new RegExp(
3581
+ String.raw`\b(?:file_put_contents|symlink|link|copy|rename|mkdir|touch)\s*\([^)\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}|\bfopen\s*\(\s*['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*,\s*['"][waxc+]`
3582
+ )
3583
+ ],
3584
+ [
3585
+ "sends",
3586
+ /\b(?:curl_exec|curl_init|fsockopen|pfsockopen|stream_socket_client|socket_create|socket_connect|mail|ftp_connect)\s*\(|\b(?:file_get_contents|fopen|file|readfile)\s*\(\s*['"](?:https?|ftp):/
3587
+ ],
3588
+ ["listens", /\b(?:stream_socket_server|socket_bind|socket_listen)\s*\(/],
3589
+ [
3590
+ "runs-commands",
3591
+ /\b(?:system|exec|shell_exec|passthru|proc_open|popen|pcntl_exec|pcntl_fork|posix_kill)\s*\(|`[^`]*`/
3592
+ ],
3593
+ [
3594
+ "builds-code",
3595
+ /\b(?:eval|assert|create_function|unserialize|call_user_func(?:_array)?)\s*\(|\bbase64_decode\b/
3596
+ ],
3597
+ ["permissions", /\b(?:chmod|chown|chgrp|lchown|lchgrp)\s*\(/]
3598
+ ];
3599
+ var TABLES = {
3600
+ python: PYTHON,
3601
+ node: NODE,
3602
+ perl: PERL,
3603
+ ruby: RUBY,
3604
+ php: PHP
3605
+ };
3606
+ function inlineLanguageOf(interp) {
3607
+ const i = interp.toLowerCase();
3608
+ if (/^python[\d.]*$/.test(i)) return "python";
3609
+ if (/^(?:node|tsx|ts-node|deno|bun)$/.test(i)) return "node";
3610
+ if (i === "perl") return "perl";
3611
+ if (i === "ruby" || i === "irb") return "ruby";
3612
+ if (i === "php") return "php";
3613
+ return null;
3614
+ }
3615
+ function resolvePythonAliases(code) {
3616
+ const aliases = [...code.matchAll(/\bimport\s+([\w.]+)\s+as\s+(\w+)/g)].slice(0, 32);
3617
+ let out = code;
3618
+ for (const [, mod, alias] of aliases) {
3619
+ if (alias === mod) continue;
3620
+ out = out.replace(new RegExp(String.raw`(?<![\w.])${alias}\b`, "g"), mod);
2596
3621
  }
2597
3622
  return out;
2598
3623
  }
2599
- var HEX_RUN_RE = /\b(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){24,}\b/g;
2600
- var HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE = /(?:\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){16,}/g;
2601
- function decodeEmbeddedHex(text) {
2602
- const out = [];
2603
- for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_RUN_RE)) {
2604
- if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
2605
- const buf = Buffer.from(m[0], "hex");
2606
- if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
2607
- }
2608
- for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE)) {
2609
- if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
2610
- const buf = Buffer.from(m[0].replace(/\\x/g, ""), "hex");
2611
- if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3624
+ var STRING_LITERAL = /(['"`])((?:\\.|(?!\1)[^\\\n]){1,4096})\1/g;
3625
+ function protectedLiteral(code, isProtected) {
3626
+ let n = 0;
3627
+ for (const m of code.matchAll(STRING_LITERAL)) {
3628
+ if (++n > 2048) break;
3629
+ const value = m[2].trim();
3630
+ if (value && isProtected(value)) return value;
2612
3631
  }
2613
- return out;
3632
+ return null;
2614
3633
  }
2615
- function scanViews(text) {
2616
- const views = [{ kind: "original", text }];
2617
- const normalized = normalizeForScan(text);
2618
- if (normalized !== text) views.push({ kind: "normalized", text: normalized });
2619
- for (const t of decodeEmbeddedBase64(normalized)) {
2620
- views.push({ kind: "base64", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3634
+ function amplifies(language, code) {
3635
+ const loop = language === "python" ? /\bwhile\s+(?:True|1)\s*:/ : language === "node" ? /\bwhile\s*\(\s*(?:true|1)\s*\)|\bfor\s*\(\s*;\s*;\s*\)|\bsetInterval\s*\(/ : /\bwhile\s*\(?\s*(?:1|true)\s*\)?|\bloop\s+do\b|\bfor\s*\(\s*;\s*;\s*\)/;
3636
+ const m = loop.exec(code);
3637
+ if (!m) return null;
3638
+ const body = code.slice(m.index);
3639
+ return /\.write\s*\(|\.(?:append|write)File(?:Sync)?\s*\(|\bopen\s*\(|\bprint\s*\(\s*[^)\n]*\bfile\s*=|\.send(?:all|to)?\s*\(|\bfwrite\s*\(|\bfile_put_contents\s*\(|\bsyswrite\b/.test(
3640
+ body
3641
+ ) ? m[0] : null;
3642
+ }
3643
+ function judgeInlineCode(language, code, isProtected) {
3644
+ if (code.length > MAX_INLINE_CODE) {
3645
+ return { outcome: "unreadable", what: "is too long for node9 to read" };
3646
+ }
3647
+ const text = language === "python" ? resolvePythonAliases(code) : code;
3648
+ for (const [category, re] of TABLES[language]) {
3649
+ const m = re.exec(text);
3650
+ if (!m) continue;
3651
+ const evidence = m[0].trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").slice(0, 60);
3652
+ return {
3653
+ outcome: category === "builds-code" ? "unreadable" : "dangerous",
3654
+ what: WHAT[category],
3655
+ evidence,
3656
+ category
3657
+ };
2621
3658
  }
2622
- for (const t of decodeEmbeddedHex(normalized)) {
2623
- views.push({ kind: "hex", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3659
+ const path = protectedLiteral(text, isProtected);
3660
+ if (path) {
3661
+ return {
3662
+ outcome: "dangerous",
3663
+ what: WHAT["reads-protected"],
3664
+ evidence: path.slice(0, 60),
3665
+ category: "reads-protected"
3666
+ };
2624
3667
  }
2625
- return views;
3668
+ const loop = amplifies(language, text);
3669
+ if (loop) {
3670
+ return { outcome: "dangerous", what: WHAT.amplifies, evidence: loop, category: "amplifies" };
3671
+ }
3672
+ return null;
2626
3673
  }
2627
3674
 
2628
3675
  // src/shell/index.ts
@@ -2731,6 +3778,59 @@ function cachedNormalize(command, compute) {
2731
3778
  function normalizeCommandForPolicy(command) {
2732
3779
  return commandReadingsImpl(command).posix;
2733
3780
  }
3781
+ var INTERPRETER_LINE = /^#![ \t]*[\w./+-]+(?:[ \t]+[\w./+=:-]+)*[ \t]*\r?(?=\n|$)/;
3782
+ function fileAccessView(command) {
3783
+ const hit = accessViewCache.get(command);
3784
+ if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
3785
+ const view = fileAccessViewImpl(command);
3786
+ if (accessViewCache.size >= ACCESS_VIEW_CACHE_MAX) {
3787
+ const oldest = accessViewCache.keys().next().value;
3788
+ if (oldest !== void 0) accessViewCache.delete(oldest);
3789
+ }
3790
+ accessViewCache.set(command, view);
3791
+ return view;
3792
+ }
3793
+ var PROGRAM_DIR = /^(?:\/usr(?:\/local)?|\/opt\/homebrew|\/home\/linuxbrew\/\.linuxbrew)?\/s?bin\/[^/]+$|^\/snap\/bin\/[^/]+$|^(?![/~\\]|[A-Za-z]:|.*\.\.)/;
3794
+ var ACCESS_VIEW_CACHE_MAX = 1e3;
3795
+ var accessViewCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
3796
+ function fileAccessViewImpl(command) {
3797
+ const text = command.replace(INTERPRETER_LINE, "");
3798
+ const f = parseShared(text);
3799
+ if (f === PARSE_FAIL) return text;
3800
+ const toCharIndex = byteOffsetToCharIndex(text);
3801
+ const at = (byteOffset) => toCharIndex === null ? byteOffset : toCharIndex(byteOffset);
3802
+ const edits = [];
3803
+ try {
3804
+ syntax.Walk(f, (node) => {
3805
+ if (!node) return false;
3806
+ const n = node;
3807
+ if (syntax.NodeType(n) !== "CallExpr") return true;
3808
+ const args = n.Args || [];
3809
+ const words = args.map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
3810
+ const head = unwrapCommandHead(words);
3811
+ for (const i of /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([0, head])) {
3812
+ const word = words[i];
3813
+ if (i >= args.length || word === null || word === void 0 || !/[\\/]/.test(word)) {
3814
+ continue;
3815
+ }
3816
+ if (!PROGRAM_DIR.test(word)) continue;
3817
+ const name = word.split(/[\\/]/).pop() ?? "";
3818
+ if (!name) continue;
3819
+ const s = at(args[i].Pos().Offset());
3820
+ const e = at(args[i].End().Offset());
3821
+ if (s < 0 || e < 0) continue;
3822
+ edits.push([s, e, name]);
3823
+ }
3824
+ return true;
3825
+ });
3826
+ } catch {
3827
+ return text;
3828
+ }
3829
+ edits.sort((a, b) => b[0] - a[0]);
3830
+ let out = text;
3831
+ for (const [s, e, rep] of edits) out = out.slice(0, s) + rep + out.slice(e);
3832
+ return out;
3833
+ }
2734
3834
  function commandReadings(command) {
2735
3835
  const r = commandReadingsImpl(command);
2736
3836
  const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([r.posix, r.separator, r.folded]);
@@ -3896,53 +4996,119 @@ function unwrapCommandHead(words, stopAtFind = false, stopAtDynamic = false) {
3896
4996
  }
3897
4997
  return i;
3898
4998
  }
3899
- function inlineExecStmt(stmt, pipeFed) {
4999
+ function heredocText(word) {
5000
+ const parts = word?.Parts ?? [];
5001
+ let out = "";
5002
+ for (const p of parts) {
5003
+ if (syntax.NodeType(p) !== "Lit") return null;
5004
+ out += p.Value ?? "";
5005
+ }
5006
+ return out;
5007
+ }
5008
+ function stdinCodeOf(redirs) {
5009
+ const heredoc = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([deriveRedirOp("cat <<X\nX"), deriveRedirOp("cat <<-X\nX")]);
5010
+ const herestring = deriveRedirOp("cat <<< x");
5011
+ for (const r of redirs) {
5012
+ if (!r || !redirStdinOps().has(r.Op)) continue;
5013
+ if (heredoc.has(r.Op)) {
5014
+ const text = heredocText(r.Hdoc);
5015
+ return text === null ? { code: null, source: "variable" } : { code: text };
5016
+ }
5017
+ if (r.Op === herestring) {
5018
+ const text = resolveWordLiteral(r.Word);
5019
+ return text === null ? { code: null, source: "variable" } : { code: text };
5020
+ }
5021
+ return { code: null, source: "file" };
5022
+ }
5023
+ return { code: null, source: "file" };
5024
+ }
5025
+ function attachedCode(interp, flag) {
5026
+ const eq = flag.indexOf("=");
5027
+ if (flag.startsWith("--")) return eq >= 0 ? flag.slice(eq + 1) : null;
5028
+ if (/^(pwsh|powershell)/.test(interp)) return null;
5029
+ const letters = /^(perl|ruby|lua|bun|osascript|rscript|irb)$/.test(interp) ? "e" : /^(node|tsx|ts-node)$/.test(interp) ? "ep" : interp === "php" ? "r" : "c";
5030
+ const body = flag.slice(1);
5031
+ const at = [...body].findIndex((ch) => letters.includes(ch.toLowerCase()));
5032
+ if (at < 0) return null;
5033
+ let rest = body.slice(at + 1);
5034
+ if (letters === "ep" && /^[ep]*$/i.test(rest)) rest = "";
5035
+ return rest === "" ? null : rest;
5036
+ }
5037
+ function inlineExecCall(stmt, pipeFed) {
3900
5038
  const cmd = stmt?.Cmd;
3901
- if (!cmd || syntax.NodeType(cmd) !== "CallExpr") return false;
5039
+ if (!cmd || syntax.NodeType(cmd) !== "CallExpr") return null;
3902
5040
  const words = (cmd.Args || []).map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
3903
- if (words.length === 0) return false;
5041
+ if (words.length === 0) return null;
3904
5042
  const headIdx = unwrapCommandHead(words);
3905
5043
  const rawHead = words[headIdx];
3906
- if (rawHead == null) return false;
5044
+ if (rawHead == null) return null;
3907
5045
  const interp = (rawHead.split("/").pop() ?? "").toLowerCase();
3908
- if (!INLINE_INTERPRETER.test(interp)) return false;
5046
+ if (!INLINE_INTERPRETER.test(interp)) return null;
3909
5047
  let args = words.slice(headIdx + 1);
3910
- if (interp === "deno" && (args[0] ?? "").toLowerCase() === "eval") return true;
5048
+ if (interp === "deno" && (args[0] ?? "").toLowerCase() === "eval") {
5049
+ const code = args[1] ?? null;
5050
+ return { interp, code: [code], source: code === null ? "variable" : void 0 };
5051
+ }
3911
5052
  if (INTERP_LEADING_TARGET.has(interp)) {
3912
5053
  const firstFlag = args.findIndex((a) => a == null || a.startsWith("-"));
3913
5054
  args = firstFlag >= 0 ? args.slice(firstFlag) : [];
3914
5055
  }
5056
+ const redirs = stmt.Redirs || cmd.Redirs || [];
5057
+ const stdinFed = redirs.some((r) => r && redirStdinOps().has(r.Op));
5058
+ const fromStdin = () => {
5059
+ if (stdinFed) {
5060
+ const { code, source } = stdinCodeOf(redirs);
5061
+ return { interp, code: [code], source };
5062
+ }
5063
+ return { interp, code: [null], source: "pipe" };
5064
+ };
3915
5065
  let positionals2 = 0;
3916
5066
  let selectedProgram = false;
5067
+ const codes = [];
3917
5068
  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
3918
5069
  const a = args[i];
3919
5070
  if (a == null) {
5071
+ if (codes.length > 0) break;
3920
5072
  positionals2++;
3921
5073
  selectedProgram = true;
3922
5074
  continue;
3923
5075
  }
3924
5076
  if (!selectedProgram && isInlineCodeFlag(interp, a)) {
3925
- if (!/^(bash|sh|zsh|dash|ksh)$/.test(interp)) return true;
3926
- const payload = args[i + 1];
3927
- if (payload == null) return true;
3928
- return shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload);
5077
+ if (/^(bash|sh|zsh|dash|ksh)$/.test(interp)) {
5078
+ const payload = args[i + 1];
5079
+ if (payload == null) return { interp, code: [null], source: "variable" };
5080
+ return shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload) ? { interp, code: [null], source: "payload" } : null;
5081
+ }
5082
+ const attached = attachedCode(interp, a);
5083
+ if (attached !== null) {
5084
+ codes.push(attached);
5085
+ } else {
5086
+ codes.push(args[i + 1] ?? null);
5087
+ i++;
5088
+ }
5089
+ continue;
5090
+ }
5091
+ if (codes.length > 0) {
5092
+ if (a.startsWith("-")) continue;
5093
+ break;
3929
5094
  }
3930
5095
  if (a === "-m") {
3931
5096
  selectedProgram = true;
3932
5097
  continue;
3933
5098
  }
3934
- if (a === "-" && !selectedProgram) return true;
5099
+ if (a === "-" && !selectedProgram) return fromStdin();
3935
5100
  if (!a.startsWith("-")) {
3936
5101
  positionals2++;
3937
5102
  selectedProgram = true;
3938
5103
  }
3939
5104
  }
3940
- const redirs = stmt.Redirs || cmd.Redirs || [];
3941
- const stdinFed = redirs.some((r) => r && redirStdinOps().has(r.Op));
5105
+ if (codes.length > 0) {
5106
+ return { interp, code: codes, source: codes.includes(null) ? "variable" : void 0 };
5107
+ }
3942
5108
  if (positionals2 === 0 && (stdinFed || pipeFed)) {
3943
- if (!/^(bash|sh|zsh)$/i.test(interp)) return true;
5109
+ if (!/^(bash|sh|zsh)$/i.test(interp)) return fromStdin();
3944
5110
  }
3945
- return false;
5111
+ return null;
3946
5112
  }
3947
5113
  var MAX_PAYLOAD_NESTING = 8;
3948
5114
  var payloadNesting = 0;
@@ -3977,7 +5143,7 @@ function shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload) {
3977
5143
  payload
3978
5144
  ))
3979
5145
  review = true;
3980
- if (!review && detectInlineExec(payload)) review = true;
5146
+ if (!review && inlineExecReview(payload) !== null) review = true;
3981
5147
  } catch {
3982
5148
  review = true;
3983
5149
  } finally {
@@ -3985,35 +5151,85 @@ function shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload) {
3985
5151
  }
3986
5152
  return review;
3987
5153
  }
3988
- function detectInlineExec(command) {
5154
+ var MAX_INLINE_CALLS = 16;
5155
+ function inlineExecCalls(command) {
3989
5156
  const f = parseShared(command);
3990
- if (f === PARSE_FAIL) {
3991
- return /(^|[|;&]|&&)\s*(?:[\w./-]*\/)?(python[\d.]*|perl|ruby|node|php|lua|deno|bun|pwsh|osascript|rscript|bash|sh|zsh)\s+-{1,2}[a-z]*[ceEr]/i.test(
3992
- command
3993
- );
3994
- }
3995
- let found = false;
5157
+ if (f === PARSE_FAIL) return PARSE_FAIL;
5158
+ const calls = [];
3996
5159
  try {
3997
5160
  syntax.Walk(f, (node) => {
3998
- if (!node || found) return false;
5161
+ if (!node || calls.length >= MAX_INLINE_CALLS) return false;
3999
5162
  const n = node;
4000
5163
  const t = syntax.NodeType(n);
4001
5164
  if (t === "BinaryCmd" && n.Y && !listOps().has(n.Op)) {
4002
- if (inlineExecStmt(n.Y, true)) {
4003
- found = true;
4004
- return false;
4005
- }
5165
+ const call = inlineExecCall(n.Y, true);
5166
+ if (call) calls.push(call);
4006
5167
  }
4007
- if (t === "Stmt" && inlineExecStmt(n, false)) {
4008
- found = true;
4009
- return false;
5168
+ if (t === "Stmt") {
5169
+ const call = inlineExecCall(n, false);
5170
+ if (call) calls.push(call);
4010
5171
  }
4011
5172
  return true;
4012
5173
  });
4013
5174
  } catch {
4014
- return found;
4015
5175
  }
4016
- return found;
5176
+ return calls;
5177
+ }
5178
+ var INLINE_EXEC_FALLBACK = /(^|[|;&]|&&)\s*(?:[\w./-]*\/)?(python[\d.]*|perl|ruby|node|php|lua|deno|bun|pwsh|osascript|rscript|bash|sh|zsh)\s+-{1,2}[a-z]*[ceEr]/i;
5179
+ function detectInlineExec(command) {
5180
+ const calls = inlineExecCalls(command);
5181
+ if (calls === PARSE_FAIL) return INLINE_EXEC_FALLBACK.test(command);
5182
+ return calls.length > 0;
5183
+ }
5184
+ var UNREADABLE_SOURCE = {
5185
+ pipe: "reads its code from another program through a pipe",
5186
+ file: "reads its code from a file on stdin",
5187
+ variable: "runs code the shell fills in at run time",
5188
+ payload: "runs a shell payload that evaluates, sources or runs further code"
5189
+ };
5190
+ function isProtectedCodePath(p) {
5191
+ if (matchSensitivePath(p) !== null) return true;
5192
+ return SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES.includes(p) || SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS.some((d) => p === d || p.startsWith(d + "/"));
5193
+ }
5194
+ function inlineExecDescription(r) {
5195
+ const lead = r ? `The AI is running code directly from the command line: ${inlineExecReason(r).replace(/^This/, "this")}.` : "The AI is running code directly from the command line.";
5196
+ return `${lead} Review the full script below before allowing it to execute.`;
5197
+ }
5198
+ function inlineExecReason(r) {
5199
+ const who = r.interp ? `This inline ${r.interp} code` : "This inline code";
5200
+ return r.evidence ? `${who} ${r.what} (${r.evidence})` : `${who} ${r.what}`;
5201
+ }
5202
+ function inlineExecReview(command) {
5203
+ const calls = inlineExecCalls(command);
5204
+ if (calls === PARSE_FAIL) {
5205
+ return INLINE_EXEC_FALLBACK.test(command) ? { outcome: "unreadable", interp: "", what: "could not be parsed" } : null;
5206
+ }
5207
+ let unreadable = calls.length >= MAX_INLINE_CALLS ? { outcome: "unreadable", interp: "", what: "runs more inline programs than node9 reads" } : null;
5208
+ for (const call of calls) {
5209
+ const language = inlineLanguageOf(call.interp);
5210
+ for (const code of call.code) {
5211
+ let finding = null;
5212
+ if (code === null) {
5213
+ finding = {
5214
+ outcome: "unreadable",
5215
+ interp: call.interp,
5216
+ what: UNREADABLE_SOURCE[call.source ?? "variable"]
5217
+ };
5218
+ } else if (language === null) {
5219
+ finding = {
5220
+ outcome: "unreadable",
5221
+ interp: call.interp,
5222
+ what: `is ${call.interp} code, which node9 does not read`
5223
+ };
5224
+ } else {
5225
+ const judged = judgeInlineCode(language, code, isProtectedCodePath);
5226
+ if (judged) finding = { ...judged, interp: call.interp };
5227
+ }
5228
+ if (finding?.outcome === "dangerous") return finding;
5229
+ if (finding && !unreadable) unreadable = finding;
5230
+ }
5231
+ }
5232
+ return unreadable;
4017
5233
  }
4018
5234
  function analyzeChmod777(command) {
4019
5235
  if (!/chmod/i.test(command.replace(/[\\'"]/g, ""))) return null;
@@ -5481,46 +6697,6 @@ function analyzeShellCommand(command) {
5481
6697
  return { actions, paths, allTokens };
5482
6698
  }
5483
6699
 
5484
- // src/utils/regex.ts
5485
- var import_safe_regex22 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
5486
- var MAX_REGEX_LENGTH = 256;
5487
- var REGEX_CACHE_MAX = 500;
5488
- var regexCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
5489
- function validateRegex(pattern) {
5490
- if (!pattern) return "Pattern is required";
5491
- if (pattern.length > MAX_REGEX_LENGTH) return `Pattern exceeds max length of ${MAX_REGEX_LENGTH}`;
5492
- try {
5493
- new RegExp(pattern);
5494
- } catch (e) {
5495
- return `Invalid regex syntax: ${e.message}`;
5496
- }
5497
- if (/\\\d+[*+{]/.test(pattern)) return "Quantified backreferences are forbidden (ReDoS risk)";
5498
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex22.default)(pattern)) return "Pattern rejected: potential ReDoS vulnerability detected";
5499
- return null;
5500
- }
5501
- function getCompiledRegex(pattern, flags = "") {
5502
- if (flags && !/^[gimsuy]+$/.test(flags)) return null;
5503
- const key = `${pattern}\0${flags}`;
5504
- if (regexCache.has(key)) {
5505
- const cached = regexCache.get(key);
5506
- regexCache.delete(key);
5507
- regexCache.set(key, cached);
5508
- return cached;
5509
- }
5510
- if (validateRegex(pattern) !== null) return null;
5511
- try {
5512
- const re = new RegExp(pattern, flags);
5513
- if (regexCache.size >= REGEX_CACHE_MAX) {
5514
- const oldest = regexCache.keys().next().value;
5515
- if (oldest) regexCache.delete(oldest);
5516
- }
5517
- regexCache.set(key, re);
5518
- return re;
5519
- } catch {
5520
- return null;
5521
- }
5522
- }
5523
-
5524
6700
  // src/rules/index.ts
5525
6701
  function matchesPattern(text, patterns) {
5526
6702
  const p = Array.isArray(patterns) ? patterns : [patterns];
@@ -5532,6 +6708,18 @@ function matchesPattern(text, patterns) {
5532
6708
  const withoutDotSlash = text.replace(/^\.\//, "");
5533
6709
  return isMatch(withoutDotSlash) || isMatch(`./${withoutDotSlash}`);
5534
6710
  }
6711
+ function mcpServerFromToolName(toolName) {
6712
+ const match = toolName.match(/^mcp__([^_](?:[^_]|_(?!_))*?)__/i);
6713
+ return match?.[1];
6714
+ }
6715
+ function ruleServerMatches(rule, serverLabel) {
6716
+ const label = typeof serverLabel === "string" ? serverLabel.trim().replace(/[\\/]/g, "-") || void 0 : void 0;
6717
+ if (rule.server) {
6718
+ if (!label || !matchesPattern(label, rule.server)) return false;
6719
+ }
6720
+ if (rule.notServer && label && matchesPattern(label, rule.notServer)) return false;
6721
+ return true;
6722
+ }
5535
6723
  var FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"]);
5536
6724
  function getNestedValue(obj, path) {
5537
6725
  if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object") return null;
@@ -5555,23 +6743,26 @@ function evaluateSmartConditions(args, rule) {
5555
6743
  return val;
5556
6744
  };
5557
6745
  const readingsCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
5558
- const resolveFieldReadings = (field) => {
5559
- const cached = readingsCache.get(field);
6746
+ const resolveFieldReadings = (field, reading) => {
6747
+ const access = reading === "access" && field === "command";
6748
+ const key = access ? `${field}\0access` : field;
6749
+ const cached = readingsCache.get(key);
5560
6750
  if (cached) return cached;
5561
6751
  const primary = resolveField(field);
5562
6752
  if (primary === null) {
5563
- readingsCache.set(field, []);
6753
+ readingsCache.set(key, []);
5564
6754
  return [];
5565
6755
  }
5566
6756
  let out = [primary];
5567
6757
  if (field === "command") {
5568
6758
  const raw = getNestedValue(args, field);
5569
6759
  if (typeof raw === "string") {
5570
- const collapsed = commandReadings(raw).map((r) => r.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim());
5571
- out = [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([primary, ...collapsed])];
6760
+ const text = access ? fileAccessView(raw) : raw;
6761
+ const collapsed = commandReadings(text).map((r) => r.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim());
6762
+ out = access ? [...new Set(collapsed)] : [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([primary, ...collapsed])];
5572
6763
  }
5573
6764
  }
5574
- readingsCache.set(field, out);
6765
+ readingsCache.set(key, out);
5575
6766
  return out;
5576
6767
  };
5577
6768
  const results = rule.conditions.map((cond) => {
@@ -5589,14 +6780,14 @@ function evaluateSmartConditions(args, rule) {
5589
6780
  if (val === null || !cond.value) return false;
5590
6781
  const reM = getCompiledRegex(cond.value, cond.flags ?? "");
5591
6782
  if (!reM) return false;
5592
- return resolveFieldReadings(cond.field).some((v) => reM.test(v));
6783
+ return resolveFieldReadings(cond.field, cond.reading).some((v) => reM.test(v));
5593
6784
  }
5594
6785
  case "notMatches": {
5595
6786
  if (!cond.value) return false;
5596
6787
  if (val === null) return true;
5597
6788
  const reN = getCompiledRegex(cond.value, cond.flags ?? "");
5598
6789
  if (!reN) return false;
5599
- return !resolveFieldReadings(cond.field).some((v) => reN.test(v));
6790
+ return !resolveFieldReadings(cond.field, cond.reading).some((v) => reN.test(v));
5600
6791
  }
5601
6792
  case "matchesGlob":
5602
6793
  return val !== null && cond.value ? import_picomatch.default.isMatch(val, cond.value) : false;
@@ -6557,76 +7748,6 @@ function collectShellFileAccesses(command, context = {}) {
6557
7748
  return out;
6558
7749
  }
6559
7750
 
6560
- // src/files/paths.ts
6561
- var SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES = [
6562
- "/etc/passwd",
6563
- "/etc/shadow",
6564
- "/etc/group",
6565
- "/etc/gshadow",
6566
- "/etc/sudoers"
6567
- ];
6568
- var SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS = ["/etc/security", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/sudoers.d"];
6569
- var PASSWORD_HASH_FILES = ["/etc/shadow", "/etc/gshadow"];
6570
- var STARTUP_NAMES = [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile"];
6571
- var SYSTEM_DIRS = [
6572
- "/usr",
6573
- "/etc",
6574
- "/boot",
6575
- "/bin",
6576
- "/sbin",
6577
- "/lib",
6578
- "/lib64",
6579
- "/var/log"
6580
- ];
6581
- var SYSTEM_DIRS_EXEMPT = ["/usr/local", "/usr/src"];
6582
- var UPLOAD_SYSTEM_DIRS = [...SYSTEM_DIRS, "/proc", "/sys", "/root"];
6583
- var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES = [
6584
- ".gitlab-ci.yml",
6585
- "CLAUDE.md",
6586
- "AGENTS.md",
6587
- ".cursorrules",
6588
- ".mcp.json",
6589
- ".vscode/settings.json",
6590
- "package.json"
6591
- ];
6592
- var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS = [
6593
- ".github/workflows",
6594
- ".claude",
6595
- ".cursor",
6596
- ".git/hooks",
6597
- ".husky"
6598
- ];
6599
- function isAgentInstructionPath(absPath, root) {
6600
- const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "");
6601
- if (!(absPath === r || absPath.startsWith(r + "/"))) return false;
6602
- const rel = absPath.slice(r.length + 1);
6603
- if (AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES.includes(rel)) return true;
6604
- return AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS.some((d) => rel === d || rel.startsWith(d + "/"));
6605
- }
6606
- function isInside(root, p) {
6607
- const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "") || "/";
6608
- return p === r || p.startsWith(r === "/" ? "/" : r + "/");
6609
- }
6610
- var LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z]:)?\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers)$/;
6611
- function isPasswordHashPath(p) {
6612
- return PASSWORD_HASH_FILES.includes(p);
6613
- }
6614
- function isLegacySystemPath(p) {
6615
- return LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE.test(p);
6616
- }
6617
- function normalizeFilePath(p, cwd = "", home = "~") {
6618
- if (!p.startsWith("/") && !p.startsWith("~") && cwd) p = `${cwd}/${p}`;
6619
- if (p === "~" || p.startsWith("~/")) p = home + p.slice(1);
6620
- const rooted = p.startsWith("/");
6621
- const parts = [];
6622
- for (const part of p.split("/")) {
6623
- if (!part || part === ".") continue;
6624
- if (part === ".." && parts.length && parts.at(-1) !== "..") parts.pop();
6625
- else if (part !== ".." || !rooted) parts.push(part);
6626
- }
6627
- return (rooted ? "/" : "") + parts.join("/");
6628
- }
6629
-
6630
7751
  // src/files/protected-access.ts
6631
7752
  function incompleteFileVerdict(operation = "write") {
6632
7753
  return {
@@ -6809,7 +7930,7 @@ function evaluateProtectedFileAccess(accesses, context, settings) {
6809
7930
  }
6810
7931
 
6811
7932
  // src/dlp/index.ts
6812
- var import_safe_regex23 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
7933
+ var import_safe_regex22 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
6813
7934
 
6814
7935
  // src/dlp/mnemonic.ts
6815
7936
  var import_node_crypto = require("crypto");
@@ -10542,14 +11663,14 @@ var SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES = [
10542
11663
  ];
10543
11664
  function assertBuiltinPatternsAreSafe() {
10544
11665
  for (const p of DLP_PATTERNS) {
10545
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex23.default)(p.regex.source)) {
11666
+ if (!(0, import_safe_regex22.default)(p.regex.source)) {
10546
11667
  throw new Error(
10547
11668
  `[node9 engine] Builtin DLP pattern '${p.name}' is vulnerable to ReDoS: ${p.regex.source}`
10548
11669
  );
10549
11670
  }
10550
11671
  }
10551
11672
  for (const re of SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS) {
10552
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex23.default)(re.source)) {
11673
+ if (!(0, import_safe_regex22.default)(re.source)) {
10553
11674
  throw new Error(
10554
11675
  `[node9 engine] Builtin sensitive-path pattern is vulnerable to ReDoS: ${re.source}`
10555
11676
  );
@@ -11882,7 +13003,7 @@ function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy, mode) {
11882
13003
  if (uc?.enabled === false) out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = "off";
11883
13004
  else if (uc?.enabled === true)
11884
13005
  out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = uc.afterExposure === "log-only" ? "log" : "review";
11885
- if (mode === "strict") out["commands.unknown"] = "review";
13006
+ if (isBlockAll(mode)) out["commands.unknown"] = "review";
11886
13007
  return out;
11887
13008
  }
11888
13009
  function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
@@ -11974,6 +13095,25 @@ function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
11974
13095
  return false;
11975
13096
  }
11976
13097
  }
13098
+ function knobStatedChecks(policy) {
13099
+ const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
13100
+ const has = (o, key) => !!o && typeof o === "object" && o[key] !== void 0;
13101
+ const { dlp, egress, loopDetection, injectionScan, skillPinning, packageCheck } = policy;
13102
+ const uc = policy.untrustedContent;
13103
+ if (has(dlp, "enabled")) out.add("data.secrets");
13104
+ if (has(dlp, "reviewAction") || dlp?.enabled === false) out.add("data.secrets-weak");
13105
+ if (has(dlp, "pii")) out.add("data.pii");
13106
+ if (has(egress, "enabled") || has(egress, "mode")) out.add("network.unknown-host");
13107
+ if (has(egress, "ssrfStrict")) out.add("network.internal-addresses");
13108
+ if (has(loopDetection, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.loops");
13109
+ if (has(injectionScan, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.prompt-injection");
13110
+ if (has(skillPinning, "enabled") || has(skillPinning, "mode")) out.add("loading.skill-tamper");
13111
+ if (has(packageCheck, "enabled") || has(packageCheck, "onMalicious"))
13112
+ out.add("loading.malicious-package");
13113
+ if (uc && typeof uc === "object" && (uc.enabled === false || has(uc, "afterExposure")))
13114
+ out.add("behavior.untrusted-content");
13115
+ return out;
13116
+ }
11977
13117
  var MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
11978
13118
  "files.shell-startup",
11979
13119
  "files.password-hashes",
@@ -11991,7 +13131,11 @@ var MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
11991
13131
  "commands.disk-destroy",
11992
13132
  "commands.dangerous-word",
11993
13133
  "commands.node9-disarm",
11994
- "data.pipe-chain"
13134
+ "data.pipe-chain",
13135
+ // The general action checks (node9Firewall#390): smart rules the map governs.
13136
+ "actions.money",
13137
+ "actions.access",
13138
+ "actions.publish"
11995
13139
  ]);
11996
13140
  var KNOB_GOVERNED = {
11997
13141
  "data.secrets": ["off", "block"],
@@ -12940,11 +14084,15 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
12940
14084
  };
12941
14085
  const ruleCheck = (rule) => {
12942
14086
  if (rule.verdict === "allow") return void 0;
12943
- if (!rule.builtin || rule.pinned) return void 0;
14087
+ if (!rule.builtin) return void 0;
12944
14088
  const id = checkIdForRule(rule.name);
12945
14089
  if (!id) return void 0;
12946
14090
  const def = getCheck(id);
12947
14091
  if (!def) return void 0;
14092
+ if (rule.pinned) {
14093
+ const explicit = config.policy.checks?.[id];
14094
+ return def.pack && config.policy.checkSources?.[id] === "workspace" && isVerdict(explicit) ? { id, value: explicit } : void 0;
14095
+ }
12948
14096
  if (rule.name?.startsWith("shield:") && !def.pack) return void 0;
12949
14097
  if (def.pack) {
12950
14098
  const explicit = config.policy.checks?.[id];
@@ -12952,8 +14100,10 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
12952
14100
  }
12953
14101
  return { id, value: cv(id) };
12954
14102
  };
14103
+ const serverLabel = context.mcpServer ?? mcpServerFromToolName(toolName);
12955
14104
  const matches = config.policy.smartRules.filter((rule) => {
12956
14105
  if (!toolMatchesRule(toolName, rule.tool, layers)) return false;
14106
+ if (!ruleServerMatches(rule, serverLabel)) return false;
12957
14107
  if (astSuppressed(rule)) return false;
12958
14108
  if (rmCleanupWaiver && rule.name === "review-rm" && rule.verdict === "review") return false;
12959
14109
  if (!evaluateSmartConditions(shellRuleArgs(toolName, args, rule.tool, layers), rule))
@@ -13030,11 +14180,13 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
13030
14180
  if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
13031
14181
  else if (v) candidates.push(v);
13032
14182
  };
13033
- if (detectInlineExec(shellCommand)) {
14183
+ const inline = reviewsEveryInline(config.settings.mode) ? detectInlineExec(shellCommand) ? void 0 : null : inlineExecReview(shellCommand);
14184
+ if (inline !== null) {
13034
14185
  consider("commands.inline-exec", {
13035
14186
  decision: "review",
13036
14187
  blockedByLabel: "Node9 Standard (Inline Execution)",
13037
- ruleDescription: "The AI is running code directly from the command line. Review the full script below before allowing it to execute.",
14188
+ ...inline ? { reason: inlineExecReason(inline) } : {},
14189
+ ruleDescription: inlineExecDescription(inline),
13038
14190
  tier: 3,
13039
14191
  checkId: "commands.inline-exec"
13040
14192
  });
@@ -13088,21 +14240,17 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
13088
14240
  if (firstToken && firstToken.startsWith("/") && checkProvenance) {
13089
14241
  const prov = checkProvenance(firstToken, cwd);
13090
14242
  if (prov.trustLevel === "suspect") {
13091
- const value = cv("commands.temp-binary");
13092
- const v = applyCheckValue(
13093
- value === "review" && config.settings.mode === "strict" ? "block" : value,
13094
- {
13095
- decision: "review",
13096
- blockedByLabel: "Node9: Suspect Binary",
13097
- reason: `Binary "${firstToken}" resolved to ${prov.resolvedPath} \u2014 ${prov.reason}`,
13098
- tier: 3,
13099
- checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
13100
- }
13101
- );
14243
+ const v = applyCheckValue(cv("commands.temp-binary"), {
14244
+ decision: "review",
14245
+ blockedByLabel: "Node9: Suspect Binary",
14246
+ reason: `Binary "${firstToken}" resolved to ${prov.resolvedPath} \u2014 ${prov.reason}`,
14247
+ tier: 3,
14248
+ checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
14249
+ });
13102
14250
  if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
13103
14251
  else if (v) return v;
13104
14252
  }
13105
- if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && config.settings.mode === "strict") {
14253
+ if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
13106
14254
  return {
13107
14255
  decision: "review",
13108
14256
  blockedByLabel: "Node9: Unknown Binary (strict mode)",
@@ -13193,7 +14341,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
13193
14341
  if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
13194
14342
  else if (v) return v;
13195
14343
  }
13196
- if (config.settings.mode === "strict") {
14344
+ if (isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
13197
14345
  if (activeEnvironment?.requireApproval === false) return allowed();
13198
14346
  return {
13199
14347
  decision: "review",
@@ -14249,6 +15397,74 @@ function safeMessage(value, max = 300) {
14249
15397
  return s.length > max ? s.slice(0, max - 1) + "\u2026" : s;
14250
15398
  }
14251
15399
 
15400
+ // src/suggest.ts
15401
+ function unwrapRuleLabel(label) {
15402
+ return ruleNameInLabel(label.trim()) ?? label.trim();
15403
+ }
15404
+ var SHIELD_RULE = /^shield:([a-z0-9-]+):((?:review|block)-[a-z0-9-]+)$/;
15405
+ var ACTION_RULE = /^review-action-(money|access|publish)-/;
15406
+ function packRowOf(ruleName, shield) {
15407
+ const id = checkIdForRule(ruleName);
15408
+ const def = id ? CHECK_BY_ID.get(id) : void 0;
15409
+ return def?.pack === shield && def.legacy?.includes(ruleName) ? id : void 0;
15410
+ }
15411
+ function suggestFromApprovals(rows, opts = {}) {
15412
+ const minApprovals = opts.minApprovals ?? 3;
15413
+ const minSessions = opts.minSessions ?? 2;
15414
+ const byKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
15415
+ for (const r of rows) {
15416
+ const ruleName = unwrapRuleLabel(r.ruleName);
15417
+ const action = ACTION_RULE.exec(ruleName);
15418
+ if (action && checkIdForRule(ruleName) !== `actions.${action[1]}`) continue;
15419
+ if (action && !r.server) continue;
15420
+ const key = action ? `server:${r.server.toLowerCase()}:${action[1]}` : `rule:${ruleName}`;
15421
+ const isAction = action !== null;
15422
+ const acc = byKey.get(key) ?? {
15423
+ ruleName,
15424
+ server: isAction ? r.server : void 0,
15425
+ approvals: 0,
15426
+ sessions: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
15427
+ denied: false
15428
+ };
15429
+ if (r.decision === "denied") acc.denied = true;
15430
+ else {
15431
+ acc.approvals += 1;
15432
+ if (r.sessionId) acc.sessions.add(r.sessionId);
15433
+ }
15434
+ byKey.set(key, acc);
15435
+ }
15436
+ const out = [];
15437
+ for (const acc of byKey.values()) {
15438
+ if (acc.denied || acc.approvals < minApprovals || acc.sessions.size < minSessions) continue;
15439
+ const shieldRule = SHIELD_RULE.exec(acc.ruleName);
15440
+ if (shieldRule) {
15441
+ const checkId = packRowOf(acc.ruleName, shieldRule[1]);
15442
+ if (!checkId) continue;
15443
+ out.push({
15444
+ kind: "quiet-rule",
15445
+ ruleName: acc.ruleName,
15446
+ shield: shieldRule[1],
15447
+ rule: shieldRule[2],
15448
+ checkId,
15449
+ approvals: acc.approvals,
15450
+ sessions: acc.sessions.size
15451
+ });
15452
+ continue;
15453
+ }
15454
+ const action = ACTION_RULE.exec(acc.ruleName);
15455
+ if (action && acc.server) {
15456
+ out.push({
15457
+ kind: "link-server",
15458
+ server: acc.server,
15459
+ checkId: `actions.${action[1]}`,
15460
+ approvals: acc.approvals,
15461
+ sessions: acc.sessions.size
15462
+ });
15463
+ }
15464
+ }
15465
+ return out.sort((a, b) => b.approvals - a.approvals);
15466
+ }
15467
+
14252
15468
  // src/loop/index.ts
14253
15469
  var import_crypto3 = __toESM(require("crypto"));
14254
15470
  var LOOP_MAX_RECORDS = 500;
@@ -14720,8 +15936,8 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
14720
15936
 
14721
15937
  // src/scan/canonical.ts
14722
15938
  var LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
14723
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
14724
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "3b936dab47d27942";
15939
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v30";
15940
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "d55f1f9e5bee7e41";
14725
15941
  var DEDUPE_PREVIEW_LEN = 120;
14726
15942
  function extractCanonicalFindings(call, ctx) {
14727
15943
  const out = [];
@@ -15092,9 +16308,13 @@ function* stringValues(obj, depth = 0) {
15092
16308
  var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15093
16309
  // Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
15094
16310
  0 && (module.exports = {
15095
- ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES,
16311
+ ACTION_CHECKS,
16312
+ ACTION_TEMPLATES,
15096
16313
  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS,
15097
16314
  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES,
16315
+ APP_SERVER_GLOB,
16316
+ APP_SHIELD_NAMES,
16317
+ APP_SHIELD_SPECS,
15098
16318
  ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS,
15099
16319
  AST_FS_REGEX_RULES,
15100
16320
  BASH_TOOL_NAMES,
@@ -15121,17 +16341,21 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15121
16341
  FILE_TOOLS,
15122
16342
  FLAGS_WITH_VALUES,
15123
16343
  FS_READ_TOOLS,
16344
+ GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
15124
16345
  KNOB_GOVERNED,
16346
+ LEVELS,
15125
16347
  LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
15126
16348
  LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
15127
16349
  LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
15128
16350
  MAP_GOVERNED,
15129
16351
  MAX_BLAST_PATH,
15130
16352
  MAX_DESTINATIONS,
16353
+ MODE_VALUES,
15131
16354
  NET_BINARIES,
15132
16355
  PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
15133
16356
  PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
15134
16357
  REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS,
16358
+ REPLACED_SHIELDS,
15135
16359
  SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS,
15136
16360
  SENSITIVE_PATH_RE,
15137
16361
  SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES,
@@ -15192,6 +16416,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15192
16416
  extractShellDestTokens,
15193
16417
  extractShellDestinations,
15194
16418
  extractToolDestinations,
16419
+ fileAccessView,
15195
16420
  fileOperandFlagsOf,
15196
16421
  fileToolOperation,
15197
16422
  foldHomoglyphs,
@@ -15202,11 +16427,15 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15202
16427
  hashDestination,
15203
16428
  hostMatches,
15204
16429
  incompleteFileVerdict,
16430
+ inlineExecDescription,
16431
+ inlineExecReason,
16432
+ inlineExecReview,
15205
16433
  inspectArgumentSecrets,
15206
16434
  inspectionEntry,
15207
16435
  inspectionLayers,
15208
16436
  isAgentInstructionPath,
15209
16437
  isBashTool,
16438
+ isBlockAll,
15210
16439
  isDestructiveToolName,
15211
16440
  isHashedEntry,
15212
16441
  isIgnoredTool,
@@ -15216,13 +16445,20 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15216
16445
  isLockedCheck,
15217
16446
  isLoopbackHost,
15218
16447
  isMaskedKind,
16448
+ isModeValue,
15219
16449
  isPasswordHashPath,
15220
16450
  isPrivateHost,
15221
16451
  isProtectedHomePath,
16452
+ isRecordOnly,
15222
16453
  isShellShapedTool,
15223
16454
  isShieldVerdict,
15224
16455
  isStrictGatedTier,
15225
16456
  isVerdict,
16457
+ knobStatedChecks,
16458
+ levelCheckValue,
16459
+ levelChecks,
16460
+ levelOf,
16461
+ levelPackageSignals,
15226
16462
  maskDestination,
15227
16463
  maskPersonalData,
15228
16464
  maskPersonalValue,
@@ -15232,6 +16468,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15232
16468
  matchesPattern,
15233
16469
  matchesTrustedEntry,
15234
16470
  matchesTrustedList,
16471
+ mcpServerFromToolName,
15235
16472
  narrativeRuleLabel,
15236
16473
  normalizeCommandForPolicy,
15237
16474
  normalizeDestination,
@@ -15252,6 +16489,8 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15252
16489
  resolveCheckMap,
15253
16490
  resolvePinned,
15254
16491
  resolveShellInput,
16492
+ reviewsEveryInline,
16493
+ ruleServerMatches,
15255
16494
  safeMessage,
15256
16495
  sampleCopyCommand,
15257
16496
  scanArgs,
@@ -15270,6 +16509,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15270
16509
  stripControlChars,
15271
16510
  stripInvisible,
15272
16511
  stripTerminalEscapes,
16512
+ suggestFromApprovals,
15273
16513
  summarizeBlast,
15274
16514
  summarizeScan,
15275
16515
  toScanFinding,
@@ -15279,6 +16519,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15279
16519
  tuningFromLegacyPolicy,
15280
16520
  tuningToLegacyPolicy,
15281
16521
  unwrapCommandHead,
16522
+ unwrapRuleLabel,
15282
16523
  validateOverrides,
15283
16524
  validateRegex,
15284
16525
  validateShieldDefinition