@node9/policy-engine 2.37.1 → 2.39.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.d.mts +203 -15
- package/dist/index.d.ts +203 -15
- package/dist/index.js +1682 -441
- package/dist/index.mjs +1656 -440
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ interface SmartCondition {
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13
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op: 'matches' | 'notMatches' | 'contains' | 'notContains' | 'exists' | 'notExists' | 'matchesGlob' | 'notMatchesGlob';
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value?: string;
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flags?: string;
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/**
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* Which reading of a `command` field the regex ops test. Absent: the whole
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* command text. 'access': the command as a file-access rule sees it, without
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* a script's interpreter line and with the program each command runs cut to
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* its name (fileAccessView). Set by the jail's path rules (fw#385).
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*/
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reading?: 'access';
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}
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/**
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* A user-defined or shield-defined rule. The matcher applies it to a
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@@ -26,6 +33,20 @@ interface SmartCondition {
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interface SmartRule {
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name?: string;
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tool: string;
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/**
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* Glob (case-insensitive) the call's MCP server label must match: the
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* gateway's resolved label, or `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>`
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* name. A call with no label (a shell command, a bare tool name) never
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* matches a rule that sets this. Lets an app's shield say "only Stripe's
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* create_refund", not every server's (node9Firewall#390).
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*/
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server?: string;
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/**
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* Glob the call's MCP server label must NOT match. A call with no label
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* passes. The general action checks use it to stay off a server an app
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* shield claims, so turning that shield off makes the app quiet.
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*/
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notServer?: string;
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conditions: SmartCondition[];
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conditionMode?: 'all' | 'any';
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verdict: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
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@@ -257,7 +278,7 @@ declare const VERDICTS: readonly Verdict[];
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declare const CHECK_VERDICT_RANK: Record<Verdict, number>;
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declare function isVerdict(v: unknown): v is Verdict;
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/** Groups are by what the user fears, not by the mechanism that catches it. */
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-
type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading';
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+
type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading' | 'actions';
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declare const CHECK_GROUPS: readonly {
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id: CheckGroup;
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title: string;
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@@ -372,7 +393,8 @@ interface ResolvedCheck {
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* The value in force for one check, read from today's config shape, and
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* where it came from. A locked check always answers its floor. A pack row is
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* `off` unless its pack is applied. Anything the config does not set is the
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-
*
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* default of the level `settings.mode` names (levels.ts), which for most
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* checks is the catalog default.
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*/
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declare function resolveCheck(settings: CatalogSettings, id: string): ResolvedCheck | undefined;
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/** Every check resolved, in catalog order. */
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@@ -433,11 +455,29 @@ interface FileAccessContext {
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accesses?: FileAccess[];
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}
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type InlineCodeCategory = 'deletes' | 'writes-outside' | 'sends' | 'listens' | 'runs-commands' | 'reads-protected' | 'builds-code' | 'permissions' | 'monitors' | 'amplifies';
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+
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/**
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* The POSIX reading of a command. Kept as the single-string API every existing
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* caller (canonical.ts, the detectors, `explain`) already depends on.
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*/
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declare function normalizeCommandForPolicy(command: string): string;
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/**
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* The command as a file-access rule sees it (node9Firewall#385). A jail of
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* /usr or /bin must not meet `#!/usr/bin/env bash` or `/usr/bin/python3 app.py`:
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* the interpreter line names the program that runs the script and the program
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* path names what runs; neither is a file the command reads. So the clean
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* interpreter line on the first line is dropped, and the program word of each
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* command (after `sudo`, `env` and the other wrappers) is cut to its name.
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* Every argument and redirect stays, so `cat /usr/share/x`, `bash /etc/x.sh`
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* (the script is read) and `wc < /etc/hosts` still meet the jail.
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*
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* Only a program in a system program directory, or a relative one, is cut
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* (PROGRAM_DIR): a script run from a jailed directory keeps its path and still
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* meets the jail. An unparsable command is returned unchanged (the strict
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* direction for a jail).
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*/
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declare function fileAccessView(command: string): string;
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/**
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* AST-based detection of dangerous shell execution patterns.
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*
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@@ -559,10 +599,31 @@ declare function unwrapCommandHead(words: (string | null)[], stopAtFind?: boolea
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/**
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* AST-aware inline-execution detector. Returns true when the command runs code
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* supplied on the command line, via stdin, or via a pipe into a bare
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* interpreter. Structural, so it is not fooled by
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* bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure.
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* interpreter, whatever the code does. Structural, so it is not fooled by
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* quoting, escapes, option bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure. Strict mode asks
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* on this; every other mode asks on inlineExecReview.
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*/
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declare function detectInlineExec(command: string): boolean;
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/** Why a command's inline code needs a review: what it does, in which language. */
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interface InlineExecReview {
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outcome: 'dangerous' | 'unreadable';
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interp: string;
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/** "deletes files", "reads its code from a pipe" ... */
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what: string;
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evidence?: string;
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category?: InlineCodeCategory;
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}
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/** What the approval prompt says about an inline-code review. */
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declare function inlineExecDescription(r: InlineExecReview | null | undefined): string;
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/** The approval prompt's reason for an inline-code review. */
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declare function inlineExecReason(r: InlineExecReview): string;
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/**
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* Does the inline code in this command need a review (node9Firewall#385)? Null
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* when every inline call is readable code that does nothing dangerous; else the
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* first dangerous finding, or the first unreadable one when none is dangerous.
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* A command with no inline code returns null.
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*/
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declare function inlineExecReview(command: string): InlineExecReview | null;
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/**
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* True when `path` is under $HOME (~ or absolute /home/* or /root) AND not in
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* the tool-managed cache allow-list. Used to gate `rm -rf` on home paths.
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@@ -773,6 +834,9 @@ interface PolicyConfig {
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834
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* shape by hand; the catalog then answers from those knobs.
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835
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*/
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checks?: Record<string, string>;
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837
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+
/** Where each `checks` value came from (the host's resolution). A pinned,
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838
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* cloud-mandated pack rule follows only a `workspace` value (fw#390). */
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checkSources?: Record<string, 'local' | 'project' | 'workspace'>;
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};
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settings: {
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mode: string;
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@@ -805,6 +869,13 @@ interface PolicyContext extends FileAccessContext {
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* trusted host code; absent means the engine scans.
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*/
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argumentScan?: DlpMatch | null;
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/**
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873
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* The MCP server label the host resolved for this call (the gateway's
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* `resolveServerLabel`, the hook's `mcp__<server>__` prefix). Absent: the
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* engine derives it from a namespaced tool name. Scopes rules that set
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* `server` / `notServer` (node9Firewall#390).
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*/
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mcpServer?: string;
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}
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type ProvenanceTrust = 'system' | 'managed' | 'user' | 'suspect' | 'unknown';
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interface ProvenanceLookup {
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@@ -1147,6 +1218,15 @@ declare function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs, mode?: string
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* legacy shape cannot carry the value.
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*/
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declare function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy: Obj, id: string, v: Verdict): boolean;
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/**
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* The knob-governed checks a legacy policy block STATES: it sets the field
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* that picks the check's value. Presence, not value, decides, so a level
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* (levels.ts) leaves the check alone. A field that turns a check on without
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* choosing between its on values (`dlp.enabled: true` for the weak-credential
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* row, `untrustedContent.enabled: true`) does not pin it: older `node9 init`
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* runs wrote those into every config file.
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*/
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declare function knobStatedChecks(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs): Set<string>;
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/**
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* Checks whose detector reads the resolved checks map: every value the
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* catalog row offers works. Pack rows (`packs.*`) qualify too.
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@@ -1169,6 +1249,37 @@ declare function configurableValues(id: string): readonly Verdict[];
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/** The ids a config file or a workspace can state today. */
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declare const CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS: readonly string[];
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declare const LEVELS: readonly ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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type Level = (typeof LEVELS)[number];
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/** Every value `settings.mode` accepts: the five levels plus `observe`, the
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* older name of Audit that the dashboard still stores. */
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declare const MODE_VALUES: readonly ["observe", "audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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type ModeValue = (typeof MODE_VALUES)[number];
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declare function isModeValue(v: unknown): v is ModeValue;
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/** The level a mode names. `observe` is Audit; anything unknown or unset is
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* Standard, the default of every install. */
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declare function levelOf(mode: string | undefined): Level;
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1262
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/** Audit: nothing is stopped; every check records what it would have done. */
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declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
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* dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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1267
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/** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
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* `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
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* `strict` meant before the levels. */
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declare function isBlockAll(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** The value a level gives a check nobody stated, or undefined when the
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* level keeps the catalog default. */
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declare function levelCheckValue(mode: string | undefined, id: string): Verdict | undefined;
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1274
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/** Every check a level changes, with its value. */
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declare function levelChecks(mode: string | undefined): Readonly<Record<string, Verdict>>;
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/** The package registry signals (`loading.malicious-package` tuning), which
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* allow only review or off. Soft turns both off; the others keep review. */
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declare function levelPackageSignals(mode: string | undefined): {
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newPackage: 'review' | 'off';
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installScript: 'review' | 'off';
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} | undefined;
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+
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interface PipeChainAnalysis {
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isPipeline: boolean;
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hasSensitiveSource: boolean;
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@@ -1351,6 +1462,18 @@ declare function classifyShellExposure(command: string): ShellExposure;
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* vice-versa so authoring is forgiving.
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*/
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declare function matchesPattern(text: string, patterns: string[] | string): boolean;
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/** `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>` name: the hook's spelling. Same
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1466
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* pattern as the gateway's extractMcpServer. */
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declare function mcpServerFromToolName(toolName: string): string | undefined;
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/**
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* Whether a rule's server scope admits a call (node9Firewall#390). `server`
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* needs a label that matches; `notServer` refuses a label that matches and
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* admits a call with none.
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*/
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1473
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declare function ruleServerMatches(rule: {
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server?: string;
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notServer?: string;
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}, serverLabel: string | undefined): boolean;
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/**
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* Reads `obj.a.b.c` style nested keys. Returns null when any segment is
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* missing, the parent isn't an object, or the path attempts to walk the
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@@ -1402,6 +1525,43 @@ declare function stripControlChars(s: string): string;
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*/
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declare function safeMessage(value: unknown, max?: number): string;
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interface ApprovalRow {
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/** The rule or label the review carried (`shield:stripe:review-refund`, or
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* `Smart Rule: shield:stripe:review-refund`). */
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ruleName: string;
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decision: 'approved' | 'denied';
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sessionId?: string;
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/** The MCP server label, when the call came through one. */
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server?: string;
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}
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type Suggestion = {
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kind: 'quiet-rule';
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ruleName: string;
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shield: string;
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/** The rule's part after the shield (`review-refund`). */
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rule: string;
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/** Its pack row in the checks catalog (`packs.stripe.refund`). */
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checkId: string;
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approvals: number;
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sessions: number;
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} | {
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kind: 'link-server';
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server: string;
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/** The general check that asked (`actions.money`). */
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checkId: string;
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approvals: number;
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sessions: number;
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};
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interface SuggestOptions {
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minApprovals?: number;
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minSessions?: number;
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}
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/** `Smart Rule: shield:x:y` and the other wrapping labels -> `shield:x:y`;
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* anything else is returned as it is. The catalog's own reading, so a rule
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* name that only contains a shield-like part is not taken for one. */
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declare function unwrapRuleLabel(label: string): string;
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declare function suggestFromApprovals(rows: readonly ApprovalRow[], opts?: SuggestOptions): Suggestion[];
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+
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interface ShieldDefinition {
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name: string;
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description: string;
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@@ -1433,16 +1593,44 @@ declare function validateOverrides(raw: unknown): {
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warnings: string[];
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};
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/**
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-
* The
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* The shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
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* ~/.node9/shields/*.json are merged on top of these by the host.
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*/
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declare const BUILTIN_SHIELDS: Record<string, ShieldDefinition>;
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-
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-
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-
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1600
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+
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type ActionTemplateName = 'finance' | 'identity' | 'publishing';
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declare const ACTION_TEMPLATES: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, readonly SmartRule[]>>;
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/** The general check each template feeds, and the word its rules carry. */
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|
+
declare const ACTION_CHECKS: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, {
|
|
1605
|
+
checkId: string;
|
|
1606
|
+
slug: string;
|
|
1607
|
+
label: string;
|
|
1608
|
+
}>>;
|
|
1609
|
+
interface AppShieldSpec {
|
|
1610
|
+
name: string;
|
|
1611
|
+
label: string;
|
|
1612
|
+
description: string;
|
|
1613
|
+
template: ActionTemplateName;
|
|
1614
|
+
/** Glob for the app's MCP server label (case-insensitive). */
|
|
1615
|
+
server: string;
|
|
1616
|
+
/** The app's other doors, as bash rules (the code door is a session script
|
|
1617
|
+
* judged as a Bash command, so it is a bash rule too). */
|
|
1618
|
+
doors: SmartRule[];
|
|
1619
|
+
/** Tools of the vendor's own MCP server that the template's names miss
|
|
1620
|
+
* (Square's single make_api_request); scoped to the server like the
|
|
1621
|
+
* template's. */
|
|
1622
|
+
mcpTools?: SmartRule[];
|
|
1623
|
+
}
|
|
1624
|
+
declare const APP_SHIELD_SPECS: readonly AppShieldSpec[];
|
|
1625
|
+
/** The app shields' names. node9 turns one on when it finds the app; a history
|
|
1626
|
+
* scan with no hit for it does not pitch it. */
|
|
1627
|
+
declare const APP_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
|
|
1628
|
+
/** Every MCP server an app shield claims, as one glob: `{*stripe*,*paypal*}`. */
|
|
1629
|
+
declare const APP_SERVER_GLOB: string;
|
|
1630
|
+
declare const GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: readonly SmartRule[];
|
|
1631
|
+
/** The three shields 2.37.0 shipped and this release replaces, with what to
|
|
1632
|
+
* use instead. `node9 shield enable finance` answers with this. */
|
|
1633
|
+
declare const REPLACED_SHIELDS: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
|
|
1446
1634
|
|
|
1447
1635
|
interface ToolCallRecord {
|
|
1448
1636
|
/** tool name */
|
|
@@ -2063,7 +2251,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
|
|
|
2063
2251
|
* and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
|
|
2064
2252
|
* is loud, not silent.
|
|
2065
2253
|
*/
|
|
2066
|
-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-
|
|
2254
|
+
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v30";
|
|
2067
2255
|
/**
|
|
2068
2256
|
* SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
|
|
2069
2257
|
* (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
|
|
@@ -2074,7 +2262,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
|
|
|
2074
2262
|
* files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
|
|
2075
2263
|
* decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
|
|
2076
2264
|
*/
|
|
2077
|
-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "
|
|
2265
|
+
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "d55f1f9e5bee7e41";
|
|
2078
2266
|
declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
|
|
2079
2267
|
declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
|
|
2080
2268
|
/**
|
|
@@ -2186,5 +2374,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
|
|
|
2186
2374
|
/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
|
|
2187
2375
|
declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
2188
2376
|
|
|
2189
|
-
export {
|
|
2190
|
-
export type { ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|
|
2377
|
+
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
|
|
2378
|
+
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|