@node9/policy-engine 2.37.1 → 2.39.0

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package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ interface SmartCondition {
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  op: 'matches' | 'notMatches' | 'contains' | 'notContains' | 'exists' | 'notExists' | 'matchesGlob' | 'notMatchesGlob';
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  value?: string;
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  flags?: string;
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+ /**
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+ * Which reading of a `command` field the regex ops test. Absent: the whole
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+ * command text. 'access': the command as a file-access rule sees it, without
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+ * a script's interpreter line and with the program each command runs cut to
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+ * its name (fileAccessView). Set by the jail's path rules (fw#385).
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+ */
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+ reading?: 'access';
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  }
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  /**
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  * A user-defined or shield-defined rule. The matcher applies it to a
@@ -26,6 +33,20 @@ interface SmartCondition {
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  interface SmartRule {
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  name?: string;
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  tool: string;
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+ /**
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+ * Glob (case-insensitive) the call's MCP server label must match: the
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+ * gateway's resolved label, or `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>`
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+ * name. A call with no label (a shell command, a bare tool name) never
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+ * matches a rule that sets this. Lets an app's shield say "only Stripe's
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+ * create_refund", not every server's (node9Firewall#390).
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+ */
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+ server?: string;
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+ /**
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+ * Glob the call's MCP server label must NOT match. A call with no label
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+ * passes. The general action checks use it to stay off a server an app
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+ * shield claims, so turning that shield off makes the app quiet.
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+ */
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+ notServer?: string;
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  conditions: SmartCondition[];
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  conditionMode?: 'all' | 'any';
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  verdict: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
@@ -257,7 +278,7 @@ declare const VERDICTS: readonly Verdict[];
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  declare const CHECK_VERDICT_RANK: Record<Verdict, number>;
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  declare function isVerdict(v: unknown): v is Verdict;
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  /** Groups are by what the user fears, not by the mechanism that catches it. */
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- type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading';
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+ type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading' | 'actions';
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  declare const CHECK_GROUPS: readonly {
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  id: CheckGroup;
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  title: string;
@@ -372,7 +393,8 @@ interface ResolvedCheck {
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  * The value in force for one check, read from today's config shape, and
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  * where it came from. A locked check always answers its floor. A pack row is
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  * `off` unless its pack is applied. Anything the config does not set is the
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- * catalog default.
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+ * default of the level `settings.mode` names (levels.ts), which for most
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+ * checks is the catalog default.
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  */
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  declare function resolveCheck(settings: CatalogSettings, id: string): ResolvedCheck | undefined;
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  /** Every check resolved, in catalog order. */
@@ -433,11 +455,29 @@ interface FileAccessContext {
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  accesses?: FileAccess[];
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  }
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+ type InlineCodeCategory = 'deletes' | 'writes-outside' | 'sends' | 'listens' | 'runs-commands' | 'reads-protected' | 'builds-code' | 'permissions' | 'monitors' | 'amplifies';
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+
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  /**
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  * The POSIX reading of a command. Kept as the single-string API every existing
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  * caller (canonical.ts, the detectors, `explain`) already depends on.
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  */
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  declare function normalizeCommandForPolicy(command: string): string;
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+ /**
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+ * The command as a file-access rule sees it (node9Firewall#385). A jail of
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+ * /usr or /bin must not meet `#!/usr/bin/env bash` or `/usr/bin/python3 app.py`:
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+ * the interpreter line names the program that runs the script and the program
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+ * path names what runs; neither is a file the command reads. So the clean
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+ * interpreter line on the first line is dropped, and the program word of each
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+ * command (after `sudo`, `env` and the other wrappers) is cut to its name.
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+ * Every argument and redirect stays, so `cat /usr/share/x`, `bash /etc/x.sh`
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+ * (the script is read) and `wc < /etc/hosts` still meet the jail.
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+ *
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+ * Only a program in a system program directory, or a relative one, is cut
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+ * (PROGRAM_DIR): a script run from a jailed directory keeps its path and still
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+ * meets the jail. An unparsable command is returned unchanged (the strict
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+ * direction for a jail).
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+ */
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+ declare function fileAccessView(command: string): string;
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  /**
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  * AST-based detection of dangerous shell execution patterns.
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  *
@@ -559,10 +599,31 @@ declare function unwrapCommandHead(words: (string | null)[], stopAtFind?: boolea
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  /**
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  * AST-aware inline-execution detector. Returns true when the command runs code
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  * supplied on the command line, via stdin, or via a pipe into a bare
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- * interpreter. Structural, so it is not fooled by quoting, escapes, option
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- * bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure.
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+ * interpreter, whatever the code does. Structural, so it is not fooled by
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+ * quoting, escapes, option bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure. Strict mode asks
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+ * on this; every other mode asks on inlineExecReview.
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  */
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  declare function detectInlineExec(command: string): boolean;
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+ /** Why a command's inline code needs a review: what it does, in which language. */
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+ interface InlineExecReview {
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+ outcome: 'dangerous' | 'unreadable';
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+ interp: string;
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+ /** "deletes files", "reads its code from a pipe" ... */
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+ what: string;
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+ evidence?: string;
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+ category?: InlineCodeCategory;
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+ }
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+ /** What the approval prompt says about an inline-code review. */
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+ declare function inlineExecDescription(r: InlineExecReview | null | undefined): string;
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+ /** The approval prompt's reason for an inline-code review. */
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+ declare function inlineExecReason(r: InlineExecReview): string;
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+ /**
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+ * Does the inline code in this command need a review (node9Firewall#385)? Null
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+ * when every inline call is readable code that does nothing dangerous; else the
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+ * first dangerous finding, or the first unreadable one when none is dangerous.
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+ * A command with no inline code returns null.
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+ */
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+ declare function inlineExecReview(command: string): InlineExecReview | null;
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  /**
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  * True when `path` is under $HOME (~ or absolute /home/* or /root) AND not in
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  * the tool-managed cache allow-list. Used to gate `rm -rf` on home paths.
@@ -773,6 +834,9 @@ interface PolicyConfig {
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  * shape by hand; the catalog then answers from those knobs.
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  */
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  checks?: Record<string, string>;
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+ /** Where each `checks` value came from (the host's resolution). A pinned,
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+ * cloud-mandated pack rule follows only a `workspace` value (fw#390). */
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+ checkSources?: Record<string, 'local' | 'project' | 'workspace'>;
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  };
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  settings: {
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  mode: string;
@@ -805,6 +869,13 @@ interface PolicyContext extends FileAccessContext {
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  * trusted host code; absent means the engine scans.
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  */
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  argumentScan?: DlpMatch | null;
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+ /**
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+ * The MCP server label the host resolved for this call (the gateway's
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+ * `resolveServerLabel`, the hook's `mcp__<server>__` prefix). Absent: the
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+ * engine derives it from a namespaced tool name. Scopes rules that set
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+ * `server` / `notServer` (node9Firewall#390).
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+ */
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+ mcpServer?: string;
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  }
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  type ProvenanceTrust = 'system' | 'managed' | 'user' | 'suspect' | 'unknown';
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  interface ProvenanceLookup {
@@ -1147,6 +1218,15 @@ declare function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs, mode?: string
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  * legacy shape cannot carry the value.
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  */
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  declare function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy: Obj, id: string, v: Verdict): boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * The knob-governed checks a legacy policy block STATES: it sets the field
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+ * that picks the check's value. Presence, not value, decides, so a level
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+ * (levels.ts) leaves the check alone. A field that turns a check on without
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+ * choosing between its on values (`dlp.enabled: true` for the weak-credential
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+ * row, `untrustedContent.enabled: true`) does not pin it: older `node9 init`
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+ * runs wrote those into every config file.
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+ */
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+ declare function knobStatedChecks(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs): Set<string>;
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  /**
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  * Checks whose detector reads the resolved checks map: every value the
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  * catalog row offers works. Pack rows (`packs.*`) qualify too.
@@ -1169,6 +1249,37 @@ declare function configurableValues(id: string): readonly Verdict[];
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  /** The ids a config file or a workspace can state today. */
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  declare const CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS: readonly string[];
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+ declare const LEVELS: readonly ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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+ type Level = (typeof LEVELS)[number];
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+ /** Every value `settings.mode` accepts: the five levels plus `observe`, the
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+ * older name of Audit that the dashboard still stores. */
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+ declare const MODE_VALUES: readonly ["observe", "audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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+ type ModeValue = (typeof MODE_VALUES)[number];
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+ declare function isModeValue(v: unknown): v is ModeValue;
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+ /** The level a mode names. `observe` is Audit; anything unknown or unset is
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+ * Standard, the default of every install. */
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+ declare function levelOf(mode: string | undefined): Level;
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+ /** Audit: nothing is stopped; every check records what it would have done. */
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+ declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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+ /** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
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+ * dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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+ declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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+ /** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
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+ * `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
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+ * `strict` meant before the levels. */
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+ declare function isBlockAll(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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+ /** The value a level gives a check nobody stated, or undefined when the
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+ * level keeps the catalog default. */
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+ declare function levelCheckValue(mode: string | undefined, id: string): Verdict | undefined;
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+ /** Every check a level changes, with its value. */
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+ declare function levelChecks(mode: string | undefined): Readonly<Record<string, Verdict>>;
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+ /** The package registry signals (`loading.malicious-package` tuning), which
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+ * allow only review or off. Soft turns both off; the others keep review. */
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+ declare function levelPackageSignals(mode: string | undefined): {
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+ newPackage: 'review' | 'off';
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+ installScript: 'review' | 'off';
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+ } | undefined;
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+
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  interface PipeChainAnalysis {
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  isPipeline: boolean;
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  hasSensitiveSource: boolean;
@@ -1351,6 +1462,18 @@ declare function classifyShellExposure(command: string): ShellExposure;
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  * vice-versa so authoring is forgiving.
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  */
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  declare function matchesPattern(text: string, patterns: string[] | string): boolean;
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+ /** `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>` name: the hook's spelling. Same
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+ * pattern as the gateway's extractMcpServer. */
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+ declare function mcpServerFromToolName(toolName: string): string | undefined;
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+ /**
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+ * Whether a rule's server scope admits a call (node9Firewall#390). `server`
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+ * needs a label that matches; `notServer` refuses a label that matches and
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+ * admits a call with none.
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+ */
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+ declare function ruleServerMatches(rule: {
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+ server?: string;
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+ notServer?: string;
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+ }, serverLabel: string | undefined): boolean;
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  /**
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  * Reads `obj.a.b.c` style nested keys. Returns null when any segment is
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  * missing, the parent isn't an object, or the path attempts to walk the
@@ -1402,6 +1525,43 @@ declare function stripControlChars(s: string): string;
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  */
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  declare function safeMessage(value: unknown, max?: number): string;
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+ interface ApprovalRow {
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+ /** The rule or label the review carried (`shield:stripe:review-refund`, or
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+ * `Smart Rule: shield:stripe:review-refund`). */
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+ ruleName: string;
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+ decision: 'approved' | 'denied';
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+ sessionId?: string;
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+ /** The MCP server label, when the call came through one. */
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+ server?: string;
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+ }
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+ type Suggestion = {
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+ kind: 'quiet-rule';
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+ ruleName: string;
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+ shield: string;
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+ /** The rule's part after the shield (`review-refund`). */
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+ rule: string;
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+ /** Its pack row in the checks catalog (`packs.stripe.refund`). */
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+ checkId: string;
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+ approvals: number;
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+ sessions: number;
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+ } | {
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+ kind: 'link-server';
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+ server: string;
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+ /** The general check that asked (`actions.money`). */
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+ checkId: string;
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+ approvals: number;
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+ sessions: number;
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+ };
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+ interface SuggestOptions {
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+ minApprovals?: number;
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+ minSessions?: number;
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+ }
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+ /** `Smart Rule: shield:x:y` and the other wrapping labels -> `shield:x:y`;
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+ * anything else is returned as it is. The catalog's own reading, so a rule
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+ * name that only contains a shield-like part is not taken for one. */
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+ declare function unwrapRuleLabel(label: string): string;
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+ declare function suggestFromApprovals(rows: readonly ApprovalRow[], opts?: SuggestOptions): Suggestion[];
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+
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  interface ShieldDefinition {
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  name: string;
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  description: string;
@@ -1433,16 +1593,44 @@ declare function validateOverrides(raw: unknown): {
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  warnings: string[];
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  };
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  /**
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- * The 13 shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
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+ * The shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
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  * ~/.node9/shields/*.json are merged on top of these by the host.
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  */
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  declare const BUILTIN_SHIELDS: Record<string, ShieldDefinition>;
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- /**
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- * The category shields for dangerous actions on MCP apps (node9Firewall#385):
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- * enabled from the Apps page for the apps a user connects, not recommended by
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- * a repository or history scan, which has nothing to say about them.
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- */
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- declare const ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
1600
+
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+ type ActionTemplateName = 'finance' | 'identity' | 'publishing';
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+ declare const ACTION_TEMPLATES: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, readonly SmartRule[]>>;
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+ /** The general check each template feeds, and the word its rules carry. */
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+ declare const ACTION_CHECKS: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, {
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+ checkId: string;
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+ slug: string;
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+ label: string;
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+ }>>;
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+ interface AppShieldSpec {
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+ name: string;
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+ label: string;
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+ description: string;
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+ template: ActionTemplateName;
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+ /** Glob for the app's MCP server label (case-insensitive). */
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+ server: string;
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+ /** The app's other doors, as bash rules (the code door is a session script
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+ * judged as a Bash command, so it is a bash rule too). */
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+ doors: SmartRule[];
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+ /** Tools of the vendor's own MCP server that the template's names miss
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+ * (Square's single make_api_request); scoped to the server like the
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+ * template's. */
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+ mcpTools?: SmartRule[];
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+ }
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+ declare const APP_SHIELD_SPECS: readonly AppShieldSpec[];
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+ /** The app shields' names. node9 turns one on when it finds the app; a history
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+ * scan with no hit for it does not pitch it. */
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+ declare const APP_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
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+ /** Every MCP server an app shield claims, as one glob: `{*stripe*,*paypal*}`. */
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+ declare const APP_SERVER_GLOB: string;
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+ declare const GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: readonly SmartRule[];
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+ /** The three shields 2.37.0 shipped and this release replaces, with what to
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+ * use instead. `node9 shield enable finance` answers with this. */
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+ declare const REPLACED_SHIELDS: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
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  interface ToolCallRecord {
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  /** tool name */
@@ -2063,7 +2251,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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2251
  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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  * is loud, not silent.
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  */
2066
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
2254
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v30";
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2255
  /**
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  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2074,7 +2262,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
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  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
2075
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  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
2076
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  */
2077
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "3b936dab47d27942";
2265
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "d55f1f9e5bee7e41";
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  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
2079
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  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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2268
  /**
@@ -2186,5 +2374,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
2186
2374
  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
2187
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  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
2188
2376
 
2189
- export { ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2190
- export type { ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
2377
+ export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2378
+ export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };