@node9/policy-engine 2.37.0 → 2.38.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -30,9 +30,13 @@ var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: tru
30
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  // src/index.ts
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  var src_exports = {};
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  __export(src_exports, {
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- ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES: () => ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES,
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+ ACTION_CHECKS: () => ACTION_CHECKS,
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+ ACTION_TEMPLATES: () => ACTION_TEMPLATES,
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  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS: () => AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS,
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  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES: () => AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES,
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+ APP_SERVER_GLOB: () => APP_SERVER_GLOB,
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+ APP_SHIELD_NAMES: () => APP_SHIELD_NAMES,
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+ APP_SHIELD_SPECS: () => APP_SHIELD_SPECS,
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  ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS: () => ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS,
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  AST_FS_REGEX_RULES: () => AST_FS_REGEX_RULES,
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  BASH_TOOL_NAMES: () => BASH_TOOL_NAMES,
@@ -59,6 +63,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  FILE_TOOLS: () => FILE_TOOLS,
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  FLAGS_WITH_VALUES: () => FLAGS_WITH_VALUES,
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  FS_READ_TOOLS: () => FS_READ_TOOLS,
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+ GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: () => GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
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  KNOB_GOVERNED: () => KNOB_GOVERNED,
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  LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: () => LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
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  LOOP_MAX_RECORDS: () => LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
@@ -70,6 +75,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  PATTERN_VERB_NAMES: () => PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
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  PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE: () => PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
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  REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS: () => REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS,
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+ REPLACED_SHIELDS: () => REPLACED_SHIELDS,
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  SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS: () => SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS,
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  SENSITIVE_PATH_RE: () => SENSITIVE_PATH_RE,
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  SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES: () => SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES,
@@ -130,6 +136,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  extractShellDestTokens: () => extractShellDestTokens,
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  extractShellDestinations: () => extractShellDestinations,
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  extractToolDestinations: () => extractToolDestinations,
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+ fileAccessView: () => fileAccessView,
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  fileOperandFlagsOf: () => fileOperandFlagsOf,
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  fileToolOperation: () => fileToolOperation,
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  foldHomoglyphs: () => foldHomoglyphs,
@@ -140,6 +147,9 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  hashDestination: () => hashDestination,
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  hostMatches: () => hostMatches,
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  incompleteFileVerdict: () => incompleteFileVerdict,
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+ inlineExecDescription: () => inlineExecDescription,
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+ inlineExecReason: () => inlineExecReason,
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+ inlineExecReview: () => inlineExecReview,
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  inspectArgumentSecrets: () => inspectArgumentSecrets,
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  inspectionEntry: () => inspectionEntry,
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  inspectionLayers: () => inspectionLayers,
@@ -170,6 +180,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  matchesPattern: () => matchesPattern,
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  matchesTrustedEntry: () => matchesTrustedEntry,
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  matchesTrustedList: () => matchesTrustedList,
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+ mcpServerFromToolName: () => mcpServerFromToolName,
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  narrativeRuleLabel: () => narrativeRuleLabel,
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  normalizeCommandForPolicy: () => normalizeCommandForPolicy,
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  normalizeDestination: () => normalizeDestination,
@@ -190,6 +201,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  resolveCheckMap: () => resolveCheckMap,
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  resolvePinned: () => resolvePinned,
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  resolveShellInput: () => resolveShellInput,
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+ ruleServerMatches: () => ruleServerMatches,
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  safeMessage: () => safeMessage,
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  sampleCopyCommand: () => sampleCopyCommand,
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  scanArgs: () => scanArgs,
@@ -208,6 +220,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  stripControlChars: () => stripControlChars,
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  stripInvisible: () => stripInvisible,
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  stripTerminalEscapes: () => stripTerminalEscapes,
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+ suggestFromApprovals: () => suggestFromApprovals,
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  summarizeBlast: () => summarizeBlast,
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  summarizeScan: () => summarizeScan,
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  toScanFinding: () => toScanFinding,
@@ -217,6 +230,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
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  tuningFromLegacyPolicy: () => tuningFromLegacyPolicy,
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  tuningToLegacyPolicy: () => tuningToLegacyPolicy,
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  unwrapCommandHead: () => unwrapCommandHead,
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+ unwrapRuleLabel: () => unwrapRuleLabel,
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  validateOverrides: () => validateOverrides,
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  validateRegex: () => validateRegex,
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  validateShieldDefinition: () => validateShieldDefinition
@@ -226,8 +240,45 @@ module.exports = __toCommonJS(src_exports);
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  // src/files/protected-access.ts
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  var import_picomatch2 = __toESM(require("picomatch"));
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- // src/shields/index.ts
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+ // src/utils/regex.ts
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  var import_safe_regex2 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
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+ var MAX_REGEX_LENGTH = 256;
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+ var REGEX_CACHE_MAX = 500;
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+ var regexCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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+ function validateRegex(pattern) {
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+ if (!pattern) return "Pattern is required";
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+ if (pattern.length > MAX_REGEX_LENGTH) return `Pattern exceeds max length of ${MAX_REGEX_LENGTH}`;
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+ try {
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+ new RegExp(pattern);
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+ } catch (e) {
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+ return `Invalid regex syntax: ${e.message}`;
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+ }
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+ if (/\\\d+[*+{]/.test(pattern)) return "Quantified backreferences are forbidden (ReDoS risk)";
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+ if (!(0, import_safe_regex2.default)(pattern)) return "Pattern rejected: potential ReDoS vulnerability detected";
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ function getCompiledRegex(pattern, flags = "") {
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+ if (flags && !/^[gimsuy]+$/.test(flags)) return null;
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+ const key = `${pattern}\0${flags}`;
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+ if (regexCache.has(key)) {
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+ const cached = regexCache.get(key);
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+ regexCache.delete(key);
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+ regexCache.set(key, cached);
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+ return cached;
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+ }
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+ if (validateRegex(pattern) !== null) return null;
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+ try {
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+ const re = new RegExp(pattern, flags);
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+ if (regexCache.size >= REGEX_CACHE_MAX) {
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+ const oldest = regexCache.keys().next().value;
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+ if (oldest) regexCache.delete(oldest);
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+ }
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+ regexCache.set(key, re);
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+ return re;
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+ } catch {
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+ return null;
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+ }
281
+ }
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232
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  // src/shields/builtin/aws.json
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  var aws_default = {
@@ -538,79 +589,6 @@ var filesystem_default = {
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  dangerousWords: ["wipefs"]
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  };
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- // src/shields/builtin/finance.json
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- var finance_default = {
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- name: "finance",
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- description: "Asks before money moves through a payment or banking app (refunds, payouts, transfers, charges, invoices), whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
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- aliases: ["payments", "money"],
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- smartRules: [
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- {
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- name: "shield:finance:review-refund",
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- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_refund,refund_payment,refund_charge,refund_order,issue_refund}",
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- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
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- reason: "A refund returns money to a customer. node9 asks before money moves, whatever the request said (Finance shield)."
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- },
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- {
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- name: "shield:finance:review-payout",
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- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payout,send_payout,payout,create_payouts_batch}",
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- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
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- reason: "A payout moves the balance to a bank account. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
560
- },
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- {
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- name: "shield:finance:review-transfer",
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- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{transfer_create,transfer_authorization_create,create_transfer,transfer_money,transfer_funds,send_money,wire_transfer,create_wire,schedule_transaction,update_scheduled_transaction,create_transaction}",
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- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
566
- reason: "A transfer moves money between accounts. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
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- },
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- {
569
- name: "shield:finance:review-charge",
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- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_intent,confirm_payment_intent,capture_payment_intent,create_charge,create_payment,capture_payment,capture_order,create_order,authorize_order,create_checkout_session}",
571
- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
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- reason: "This charges a card or captures a payment. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
574
- },
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- {
576
- name: "shield:finance:review-payment-link",
577
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_link,create_invoice,finalize_invoice,send_invoice,pay_invoice,create_invoice_item}",
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- conditions: [],
579
- verdict: "review",
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- reason: "This bills someone or creates a link that charges a card. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
581
- },
582
- {
583
- name: "shield:finance:review-subscription",
584
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_subscription,cancel_subscription,update_subscription,pause_subscription,resume_subscription}",
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- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
587
- reason: "A subscription starts or stops recurring charges. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
588
- },
589
- {
590
- name: "shield:finance:review-dispute",
591
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{update_dispute,accept_dispute,close_dispute}",
592
- conditions: [],
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- verdict: "review",
594
- reason: "This answers or concedes a chargeback. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
595
- },
596
- {
597
- name: "shield:finance:review-card",
598
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{issue_card,create_virtual_card,create_issuing_card,update_card_limit}",
599
- conditions: [],
600
- verdict: "review",
601
- reason: "This issues a card or changes its limit. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
602
- },
603
- {
604
- name: "shield:finance:review-withdraw",
605
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{withdraw,withdraw_funds,create_withdrawal,request_withdrawal}",
606
- conditions: [],
607
- verdict: "review",
608
- reason: "A withdrawal moves money out. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
609
- }
610
- ],
611
- dangerousWords: []
612
- };
613
-
614
592
  // src/shields/builtin/github.json
615
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  var github_default = {
616
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  name: "github",
@@ -639,58 +617,6 @@ var github_default = {
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  dangerousWords: []
640
618
  };
641
619
 
642
- // src/shields/builtin/identity.json
643
- var identity_default = {
644
- name: "identity",
645
- description: "Asks before a password, a key, a token, a role or a user changes in an identity or admin app, whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
646
- aliases: ["access", "iam"],
647
- smartRules: [
648
- {
649
- name: "shield:identity:review-password",
650
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{change_password,update_password,reset_password,set_password,expire_password,force_password_reset}",
651
- conditions: [],
652
- verdict: "review",
653
- reason: "This changes or resets a password. node9 asks before credentials change, whatever the request said (Identity shield)."
654
- },
655
- {
656
- name: "shield:identity:review-key",
657
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{rotate_key,rotate_api_key,create_api_key,create_token,create_access_token,create_personal_access_token,regenerate_secret,rotate_secret,create_service_account_key,create_credential}",
658
- conditions: [],
659
- verdict: "review",
660
- reason: "This creates or rotates a key, token or secret. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
661
- },
662
- {
663
- name: "shield:identity:review-access",
664
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{grant_access,grant_permission,grant_role,revoke_access,revoke_permission,revoke_role,revoke_token,set_permission,set_permissions,set_role,assign_role,update_role,add_permission,remove_permission,attach_policy,detach_policy}",
665
- conditions: [],
666
- verdict: "review",
667
- reason: "This grants or revokes access. node9 asks before access changes (Identity shield)."
668
- },
669
- {
670
- name: "shield:identity:review-membership",
671
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{add_member,remove_member,add_user_to_group,remove_user_from_group,add_collaborator,remove_collaborator,invite_user,invite_member,invite_user_to_slack,invite_users,add_org_member,remove_org_member,add_team_member,remove_team_member}",
672
- conditions: [],
673
- verdict: "review",
674
- reason: "This changes who belongs where. node9 asks before membership changes (Identity shield)."
675
- },
676
- {
677
- name: "shield:identity:review-user",
678
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_user,delete_user,deactivate_user,suspend_user,activate_user,unlock_user,make_admin,promote_user,demote_user,update_user_role}",
679
- conditions: [],
680
- verdict: "review",
681
- reason: "This creates, removes or promotes an account. node9 asks before accounts change (Identity shield)."
682
- },
683
- {
684
- name: "shield:identity:review-mfa",
685
- tool: "{,mcp__*__}{reset_mfa,reset_factors,disable_mfa,enroll_factor,deactivate_factor}",
686
- conditions: [],
687
- verdict: "review",
688
- reason: "This changes a second factor. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
689
- }
690
- ],
691
- dangerousWords: []
692
- };
693
-
694
620
  // src/shields/builtin/k8s.json
695
621
  var k8s_default = {
696
622
  name: "k8s",
@@ -950,7 +876,7 @@ var project_jail_default = {
950
876
  {
951
877
  field: "command",
952
878
  op: "matches",
953
- value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim|vi|emacs|code|type|grep|egrep|fgrep|rg|ag|ack|awk|gawk|sed|cut|tr|jq|yq|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*?\\.env(\\.(local|production|staging|development|production\\.local|staging\\.local|development\\.local))?(?=\\s|$|[;&|>)<])",
879
+ value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim?|emacs|code|type|[ef]?grep|rg|ag|ack|g?awk|sed|cut|tr|[jy]q|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*?\\.env(\\.(local|production|staging|development)){0,2}(?=[\\s;&|>)<]|$)",
954
880
  flags: "i"
955
881
  }
956
882
  ],
@@ -964,7 +890,7 @@ var project_jail_default = {
964
890
  {
965
891
  field: "command",
966
892
  op: "matches",
967
- value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim|vi|emacs|code|type|grep|egrep|fgrep|rg|ag|ack|awk|gawk|sed|cut|tr|jq|yq|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*(credentials\\.json|\\.netrc|\\.npmrc|\\.docker[\\/\\\\]config\\.json|gcloud[\\/\\\\]credentials)",
893
+ value: "(cat|less|head|tail|bat|more|open|print|nano|vim?|emacs|code|type|[ef]?grep|rg|ag|ack|g?awk|sed|cut|tr|[jy]q|od|xxd|hexdump|strings|base64|sort|uniq|tac|nl|dd)\\s+.*(credentials\\.json|\\.netrc|\\.npmrc|\\.docker[\\/\\\\]config\\.json|gcloud[\\/\\\\]credentials)",
968
894
  flags: "i"
969
895
  }
970
896
  ],
@@ -1031,6 +957,212 @@ var project_jail_default = {
1031
957
  dangerousWords: []
1032
958
  };
1033
959
 
960
+ // src/shields/builtin/redis.json
961
+ var redis_default = {
962
+ name: "redis",
963
+ description: "Protects Redis instances from destructive AI operations",
964
+ aliases: [],
965
+ _scopeNote: "Every rule requires Redis to actually be involved: a client in the command (redis-cli / valkey-cli, in either order \u2014 `redis-cli FLUSHALL` and `echo FLUSHALL | redis-cli` are both real), OR the command field holding the bare keyword, which is what the MCP redis_command tool sends ({ command: 'FLUSHALL', args: [] }). Without the client requirement these rules matched the WORD anywhere \u2014 including prose in a heredoc writing a file \u2014 which produced two observed false positives: a test fixture describing the shield, and a commit message naming the rule. Every other builtin shield already scopes this way (aws s3, docker system prune, kubectl delete, gh repo delete). See redis-scope.spec.ts.",
966
+ smartRules: [
967
+ {
968
+ name: "shield:redis:block-flushall",
969
+ tool: "*",
970
+ conditions: [
971
+ {
972
+ field: "command",
973
+ op: "matches",
974
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHALL\\b|\\bFLUSHALL\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHALL\\b|\\.flushall\\s*\\(",
975
+ flags: "i"
976
+ }
977
+ ],
978
+ verdict: "block",
979
+ reason: "FLUSHALL deletes every key in every database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
980
+ },
981
+ {
982
+ name: "shield:redis:block-flushdb",
983
+ tool: "*",
984
+ conditions: [
985
+ {
986
+ field: "command",
987
+ op: "matches",
988
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHDB\\b|\\bFLUSHDB\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHDB\\b|\\.flushdb\\s*\\(",
989
+ flags: "i"
990
+ }
991
+ ],
992
+ verdict: "block",
993
+ reason: "FLUSHDB deletes all keys in the current database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
994
+ },
995
+ {
996
+ name: "shield:redis:block-config-resetstat",
997
+ tool: "*",
998
+ conditions: [
999
+ {
1000
+ field: "command",
1001
+ op: "matches",
1002
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT|^ ?CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT",
1003
+ flags: "i"
1004
+ }
1005
+ ],
1006
+ verdict: "block",
1007
+ reason: "CONFIG RESETSTAT resets server statistics irreversibly \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1008
+ },
1009
+ {
1010
+ name: "shield:redis:review-config-set",
1011
+ tool: "*",
1012
+ conditions: [
1013
+ {
1014
+ field: "command",
1015
+ op: "matches",
1016
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b|\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?CONFIG\\s+SET\\b",
1017
+ flags: "i"
1018
+ }
1019
+ ],
1020
+ verdict: "review",
1021
+ reason: "CONFIG SET changes live server configuration and requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1022
+ },
1023
+ {
1024
+ name: "shield:redis:review-del-wildcard",
1025
+ tool: "*",
1026
+ conditions: [
1027
+ {
1028
+ field: "command",
1029
+ op: "matches",
1030
+ value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bDEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|^ ?DEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|-cli.*--scan.*xargs.*del",
1031
+ flags: "i"
1032
+ }
1033
+ ],
1034
+ verdict: "review",
1035
+ reason: "Wildcard key deletion requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1036
+ }
1037
+ ],
1038
+ dangerousWords: ["FLUSHALL", "FLUSHDB"]
1039
+ };
1040
+
1041
+ // src/shields/builtin/finance.json
1042
+ var finance_default = {
1043
+ name: "finance",
1044
+ description: "Asks before money moves through a payment or banking app (refunds, payouts, transfers, charges, invoices), whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
1045
+ aliases: ["payments", "money"],
1046
+ smartRules: [
1047
+ {
1048
+ name: "shield:finance:review-refund",
1049
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_refund,refund_payment,refund_charge,refund_order,issue_refund}",
1050
+ conditions: [],
1051
+ verdict: "review",
1052
+ reason: "A refund returns money to a customer. node9 asks before money moves, whatever the request said (Finance shield)."
1053
+ },
1054
+ {
1055
+ name: "shield:finance:review-payout",
1056
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payout,send_payout,payout,create_payouts_batch}",
1057
+ conditions: [],
1058
+ verdict: "review",
1059
+ reason: "A payout moves the balance to a bank account. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1060
+ },
1061
+ {
1062
+ name: "shield:finance:review-transfer",
1063
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{transfer_create,transfer_authorization_create,create_transfer,transfer_money,transfer_funds,send_money,wire_transfer,create_wire,schedule_transaction,update_scheduled_transaction}",
1064
+ conditions: [],
1065
+ verdict: "review",
1066
+ reason: "A transfer moves money between accounts. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1067
+ },
1068
+ {
1069
+ name: "shield:finance:review-charge",
1070
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_intent,confirm_payment_intent,capture_payment_intent,create_charge,create_payment,capture_payment,capture_order,create_order,authorize_order,create_checkout_session}",
1071
+ conditions: [],
1072
+ verdict: "review",
1073
+ reason: "This charges a card or captures a payment. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1074
+ },
1075
+ {
1076
+ name: "shield:finance:review-payment-link",
1077
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_payment_link,create_invoice,finalize_invoice,send_invoice,pay_invoice,create_invoice_item}",
1078
+ conditions: [],
1079
+ verdict: "review",
1080
+ reason: "This bills someone or creates a link that charges a card. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1081
+ },
1082
+ {
1083
+ name: "shield:finance:review-subscription",
1084
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_subscription,cancel_subscription,update_subscription,pause_subscription,resume_subscription}",
1085
+ conditions: [],
1086
+ verdict: "review",
1087
+ reason: "A subscription starts or stops recurring charges. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1088
+ },
1089
+ {
1090
+ name: "shield:finance:review-dispute",
1091
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{update_dispute,accept_dispute,close_dispute}",
1092
+ conditions: [],
1093
+ verdict: "review",
1094
+ reason: "This answers or concedes a chargeback. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1095
+ },
1096
+ {
1097
+ name: "shield:finance:review-card",
1098
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{issue_card,create_virtual_card,create_issuing_card,update_card_limit}",
1099
+ conditions: [],
1100
+ verdict: "review",
1101
+ reason: "This issues a card or changes its limit. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1102
+ },
1103
+ {
1104
+ name: "shield:finance:review-withdraw",
1105
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{withdraw,withdraw_funds,create_withdrawal,request_withdrawal}",
1106
+ conditions: [],
1107
+ verdict: "review",
1108
+ reason: "A withdrawal moves money out. node9 asks before money moves (Finance shield)."
1109
+ }
1110
+ ],
1111
+ dangerousWords: []
1112
+ };
1113
+
1114
+ // src/shields/builtin/identity.json
1115
+ var identity_default = {
1116
+ name: "identity",
1117
+ description: "Asks before a password, a key, a token, a role or a user changes in an identity or admin app, whatever the request said. Reads are never asked about.",
1118
+ aliases: ["access", "iam"],
1119
+ smartRules: [
1120
+ {
1121
+ name: "shield:identity:review-password",
1122
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{change_password,update_password,reset_password,set_password,expire_password,force_password_reset}",
1123
+ conditions: [],
1124
+ verdict: "review",
1125
+ reason: "This changes or resets a password. node9 asks before credentials change, whatever the request said (Identity shield)."
1126
+ },
1127
+ {
1128
+ name: "shield:identity:review-key",
1129
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{rotate_key,rotate_api_key,create_api_key,create_token,create_access_token,create_personal_access_token,regenerate_secret,rotate_secret,create_service_account_key,create_credential}",
1130
+ conditions: [],
1131
+ verdict: "review",
1132
+ reason: "This creates or rotates a key, token or secret. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
1133
+ },
1134
+ {
1135
+ name: "shield:identity:review-access",
1136
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{grant_access,grant_permission,grant_role,revoke_access,revoke_permission,revoke_role,revoke_token,set_permission,set_permissions,set_role,assign_role,update_role,add_permission,remove_permission,attach_policy,detach_policy,share_file}",
1137
+ conditions: [],
1138
+ verdict: "review",
1139
+ reason: "This grants or revokes access. node9 asks before access changes (Identity shield)."
1140
+ },
1141
+ {
1142
+ name: "shield:identity:review-membership",
1143
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{add_member,remove_member,add_user_to_group,remove_user_from_group,add_collaborator,remove_collaborator,invite_user,invite_member,invite_user_to_slack,invite_users,add_org_member,remove_org_member,add_team_member,remove_team_member,add_user_to_channel,remove_user_from_slack}",
1144
+ conditions: [],
1145
+ verdict: "review",
1146
+ reason: "This changes who belongs where. node9 asks before membership changes (Identity shield)."
1147
+ },
1148
+ {
1149
+ name: "shield:identity:review-user",
1150
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{create_user,delete_user,delete_deactivated_user,deactivate_user,suspend_user,activate_user,unlock_user,make_admin,promote_user,demote_user,update_user_role}",
1151
+ conditions: [],
1152
+ verdict: "review",
1153
+ reason: "This creates, removes or promotes an account. node9 asks before accounts change (Identity shield)."
1154
+ },
1155
+ {
1156
+ name: "shield:identity:review-mfa",
1157
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{reset_mfa,reset_factors,disable_mfa,enroll_factor,deactivate_factor}",
1158
+ conditions: [],
1159
+ verdict: "review",
1160
+ reason: "This changes a second factor. node9 asks before credentials change (Identity shield)."
1161
+ }
1162
+ ],
1163
+ dangerousWords: []
1164
+ };
1165
+
1034
1166
  // src/shields/builtin/publishing.json
1035
1167
  var publishing_default = {
1036
1168
  name: "publishing",
@@ -1202,85 +1334,554 @@ var publishing_default = {
1202
1334
  dangerousWords: []
1203
1335
  };
1204
1336
 
1205
- // src/shields/builtin/redis.json
1206
- var redis_default = {
1207
- name: "redis",
1208
- description: "Protects Redis instances from destructive AI operations",
1209
- aliases: [],
1210
- _scopeNote: "Every rule requires Redis to actually be involved: a client in the command (redis-cli / valkey-cli, in either order \u2014 `redis-cli FLUSHALL` and `echo FLUSHALL | redis-cli` are both real), OR the command field holding the bare keyword, which is what the MCP redis_command tool sends ({ command: 'FLUSHALL', args: [] }). Without the client requirement these rules matched the WORD anywhere \u2014 including prose in a heredoc writing a file \u2014 which produced two observed false positives: a test fixture describing the shield, and a commit message naming the rule. Every other builtin shield already scopes this way (aws s3, docker system prune, kubectl delete, gh repo delete). See redis-scope.spec.ts.",
1211
- smartRules: [
1212
- {
1213
- name: "shield:redis:block-flushall",
1214
- tool: "*",
1215
- conditions: [
1216
- {
1217
- field: "command",
1218
- op: "matches",
1219
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHALL\\b|\\bFLUSHALL\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHALL\\b|\\.flushall\\s*\\(",
1220
- flags: "i"
1221
- }
1222
- ],
1223
- verdict: "block",
1224
- reason: "FLUSHALL deletes every key in every database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1225
- },
1226
- {
1227
- name: "shield:redis:block-flushdb",
1228
- tool: "*",
1229
- conditions: [
1230
- {
1231
- field: "command",
1232
- op: "matches",
1233
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bFLUSHDB\\b|\\bFLUSHDB\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?FLUSHDB\\b|\\.flushdb\\s*\\(",
1234
- flags: "i"
1235
- }
1236
- ],
1237
- verdict: "block",
1238
- reason: "FLUSHDB deletes all keys in the current database \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1239
- },
1240
- {
1241
- name: "shield:redis:block-config-resetstat",
1242
- tool: "*",
1243
- conditions: [
1244
- {
1245
- field: "command",
1246
- op: "matches",
1247
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT|^ ?CONFIG\\s+RESETSTAT",
1248
- flags: "i"
1249
- }
1250
- ],
1251
- verdict: "block",
1252
- reason: "CONFIG RESETSTAT resets server statistics irreversibly \u2014 blocked by Redis shield"
1253
- },
1254
- {
1255
- name: "shield:redis:review-config-set",
1256
- tool: "*",
1257
- conditions: [
1258
- {
1259
- field: "command",
1260
- op: "matches",
1261
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b|\\bCONFIG\\s+SET\\b.*(redis|valkey)-cli|^ ?CONFIG\\s+SET\\b",
1262
- flags: "i"
1263
- }
1264
- ],
1265
- verdict: "review",
1266
- reason: "CONFIG SET changes live server configuration and requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1267
- },
1268
- {
1269
- name: "shield:redis:review-del-wildcard",
1270
- tool: "*",
1271
- conditions: [
1272
- {
1273
- field: "command",
1274
- op: "matches",
1275
- value: "(redis|valkey)-cli.*\\bDEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|^ ?DEL\\b.*[*?\\[]|-cli.*--scan.*xargs.*del",
1276
- flags: "i"
1277
- }
1278
- ],
1279
- verdict: "review",
1280
- reason: "Wildcard key deletion requires human approval (Redis shield)"
1337
+ // src/shields/apps.ts
1338
+ var ACTION_TEMPLATES = {
1339
+ finance: finance_default.smartRules,
1340
+ identity: identity_default.smartRules,
1341
+ publishing: publishing_default.smartRules
1342
+ };
1343
+ var ACTION_CHECKS = {
1344
+ finance: { checkId: "actions.money", slug: "money", label: "Money check" },
1345
+ identity: { checkId: "actions.access", slug: "access", label: "Accounts and access check" },
1346
+ publishing: { checkId: "actions.publish", slug: "publish", label: "Publishing check" }
1347
+ };
1348
+ function isToolRule(rule) {
1349
+ return rule.tool.startsWith("{,mcp__*__}");
1350
+ }
1351
+ function actionPart(ruleName) {
1352
+ const m = /^shield:[^:]+:(.+)$/.exec(ruleName ?? "");
1353
+ return m ? m[1] : ruleName ?? "rule";
1354
+ }
1355
+ function ownReason(reason, owner) {
1356
+ if (!reason) return reason;
1357
+ return reason.replace(/\((?:Finance|Identity|Publishing) shield\)\.?$/, `(${owner}).`);
1358
+ }
1359
+ var GAP = "[^;&|]{0,200}?";
1360
+ var prog = (alt) => `(?:^|[^\\w-])(?:${alt})(?![\\w-])`;
1361
+ var httpTo = (host2) => prog("curl|wget|http|https|xh") + "[^;&|]{0,400}?" + host2;
1362
+ var httpWrite = (methods) => ({
1363
+ field: "command",
1364
+ op: "matches",
1365
+ value: `-X\\s*(?:${methods})|--(?:request|method)[=\\s]+(?:${methods})|--post-(?:data|file)|\\s(?:${methods}|${methods.toLowerCase()})\\s|^(?!.*\\s(?:-[a-zA-Z]*G|--get)(?![\\w-])).*(?:\\s-d[\\s'"@]|\\s--data|\\s--json\\s|\\s-F\\s|\\s--form\\s)`
1366
+ });
1367
+ var HTTP_WRITE = httpWrite("POST|DELETE");
1368
+ var HTTP_WRITE_ANY = httpWrite("POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE");
1369
+ var NOT_STRIPE_TEST = {
1370
+ field: "command",
1371
+ op: "notMatches",
1372
+ value: "\\b[sr]k_test_"
1373
+ };
1374
+ var postTo = (host2) => `\\.post\\(\\s*["'\`][^"'\`]{0,80}${host2}`;
1375
+ var STRIPE_OBJECTS = "refunds|payouts|charges|transfers|payment_intents|payment_links|invoices|subscriptions|topups";
1376
+ var APP_SHIELD_SPECS = [
1377
+ {
1378
+ name: "stripe",
1379
+ label: "Stripe",
1380
+ description: "Asks before money moves in Stripe (refunds, payouts, charges, invoices, subscriptions), whether the agent uses the Stripe MCP server, the stripe CLI, the API or the Stripe library in a script. Reads are never asked about.",
1381
+ template: "finance",
1382
+ server: "*stripe*",
1383
+ doors: [
1384
+ {
1385
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-cli",
1386
+ tool: "bash",
1387
+ conditions: [
1388
+ {
1389
+ field: "command",
1390
+ op: "matches",
1391
+ value: prog("stripe") + GAP + `\\s(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})\\s+(?:create|cancel|capture|confirm|update|pay|finalize_invoice|send_invoice|void_invoice)(?![\\w-])`,
1392
+ flags: "i"
1393
+ },
1394
+ {
1395
+ field: "command",
1396
+ op: "matches",
1397
+ // The stripe CLI works in test mode unless told otherwise.
1398
+ value: "\\s--live(?![\\w-])|\\b[sr]k_live_"
1399
+ }
1400
+ ],
1401
+ conditionMode: "all",
1402
+ verdict: "review",
1403
+ reason: "The stripe CLI is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1404
+ },
1405
+ {
1406
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-cli-request",
1407
+ tool: "bash",
1408
+ conditions: [
1409
+ {
1410
+ field: "command",
1411
+ op: "matches",
1412
+ value: prog("stripe") + GAP + `\\s(?:post|delete)\\s+/?v1/(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})(?![\\w-])`,
1413
+ flags: "i"
1414
+ },
1415
+ {
1416
+ field: "command",
1417
+ op: "matches",
1418
+ // The stripe CLI works in test mode unless told otherwise.
1419
+ value: "\\s--live(?![\\w-])|\\b[sr]k_live_"
1420
+ }
1421
+ ],
1422
+ conditionMode: "all",
1423
+ verdict: "review",
1424
+ reason: "A raw stripe CLI request is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1425
+ },
1426
+ {
1427
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-api",
1428
+ tool: "bash",
1429
+ conditions: [
1430
+ {
1431
+ field: "command",
1432
+ op: "matches",
1433
+ value: httpTo(`api\\.stripe\\.com/v1/(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})(?![\\w-])`),
1434
+ flags: "i"
1435
+ },
1436
+ HTTP_WRITE,
1437
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1438
+ ],
1439
+ conditionMode: "all",
1440
+ verdict: "review",
1441
+ reason: "A request to the Stripe API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1442
+ },
1443
+ {
1444
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-code",
1445
+ tool: "bash",
1446
+ conditions: [
1447
+ {
1448
+ field: "command",
1449
+ op: "matches",
1450
+ // Python: stripe.Refund.create(...)
1451
+ value: "\\bstripe\\.(?:Refund|Payout|Transfer|Charge|PaymentIntent|PaymentLink|Invoice|Subscription|Topup)\\.(?:create|cancel|capture|confirm|modify|pay|finalize_invoice|send_invoice|void_invoice)\\b"
1452
+ },
1453
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1454
+ ],
1455
+ conditionMode: "all",
1456
+ verdict: "review",
1457
+ reason: "This code moves money through the Stripe library. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1458
+ },
1459
+ {
1460
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-code-node",
1461
+ tool: "bash",
1462
+ conditions: [
1463
+ {
1464
+ field: "command",
1465
+ op: "matches",
1466
+ // Node: stripe.refunds.create(...)
1467
+ value: "\\bstripe\\.(?:refunds|payouts|transfers|charges|paymentIntents|paymentLinks|invoices|subscriptions|topups)\\.(?:create|cancel|capture|confirm|update|pay|finalizeInvoice|sendInvoice|voidInvoice)\\s*\\("
1468
+ },
1469
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1470
+ ],
1471
+ conditionMode: "all",
1472
+ verdict: "review",
1473
+ reason: "This code moves money through the Stripe library. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1474
+ },
1475
+ {
1476
+ name: "shield:stripe:review-code-http",
1477
+ tool: "bash",
1478
+ conditions: [
1479
+ {
1480
+ field: "command",
1481
+ op: "matches",
1482
+ // requests.post("https://api.stripe.com/v1/refunds", ...)
1483
+ value: `\\.post\\(\\s*["'\`][^"'\`]{0,80}api\\.stripe\\.com/v1/(?:${STRIPE_OBJECTS})`
1484
+ },
1485
+ NOT_STRIPE_TEST
1486
+ ],
1487
+ conditionMode: "all",
1488
+ verdict: "review",
1489
+ reason: "This code posts to the Stripe API. node9 asks before money moves (Stripe)."
1490
+ }
1491
+ ]
1492
+ },
1493
+ {
1494
+ name: "paypal",
1495
+ label: "PayPal",
1496
+ description: "Asks before money moves in PayPal (refunds, payouts, captured orders, invoices, subscriptions), whether the agent uses a PayPal MCP server, the API or the PayPal SDK in a script. The sandbox is never asked about, and neither are reads.",
1497
+ template: "finance",
1498
+ server: "*paypal*",
1499
+ doors: [
1500
+ {
1501
+ name: "shield:paypal:review-api",
1502
+ tool: "bash",
1503
+ conditions: [
1504
+ {
1505
+ field: "command",
1506
+ op: "matches",
1507
+ // The live hosts only: api.paypal.com and api-m.paypal.com. The
1508
+ // sandbox (api-m.sandbox.paypal.com) moves no money.
1509
+ value: httpTo("api(?:-m)?\\.paypal\\.com/v[12]/"),
1510
+ flags: "i"
1511
+ },
1512
+ {
1513
+ field: "command",
1514
+ op: "matches",
1515
+ // The endpoints that move money.
1516
+ value: "\\.paypal\\.com/v[12]/(?:payments/(?:captures|authorizations|sale|payouts|payment|referenced-payouts)|checkout/orders/[^\\s/]{1,64}/(?:capture|authorize)|invoicing/invoices|billing/subscriptions)",
1517
+ flags: "i"
1518
+ },
1519
+ HTTP_WRITE
1520
+ ],
1521
+ conditionMode: "all",
1522
+ verdict: "review",
1523
+ reason: "A request to the PayPal API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (PayPal)."
1524
+ },
1525
+ {
1526
+ name: "shield:paypal:review-code",
1527
+ tool: "bash",
1528
+ conditions: [
1529
+ {
1530
+ field: "command",
1531
+ op: "matches",
1532
+ // The Node SDKs (checkout-server-sdk, paypal-server-sdk) and the
1533
+ // Python paypalrestsdk.
1534
+ value: "\\b(?:CapturesRefundRequest|OrdersCaptureRequest|AuthorizationsCaptureRequest|PayoutsPostRequest)\\b|\\b(?:captureOrder|refundCapturedPayment|captureAuthorizedPayment|createBatchPayout)\\s*\\(|\\bpaypalrestsdk\\.(?:Payout|Sale|Capture|Invoice|BillingAgreement)\\b"
1535
+ }
1536
+ ],
1537
+ verdict: "review",
1538
+ reason: "This code moves money through PayPal. node9 asks before money moves (PayPal)."
1539
+ },
1540
+ {
1541
+ name: "shield:paypal:review-code-http",
1542
+ tool: "bash",
1543
+ conditions: [
1544
+ {
1545
+ field: "command",
1546
+ op: "matches",
1547
+ // The endpoints that move money; the token call every script
1548
+ // starts with (/v1/oauth2/token) is not one.
1549
+ value: postTo(
1550
+ "api(?:-m)?\\.paypal\\.com/v[12]/(?:payments/(?:captures|authorizations|sale|payouts|payment|referenced-payouts)|checkout/orders/[^\\s/\"'`]{1,64}/(?:capture|authorize)|invoicing/invoices|billing/subscriptions)"
1551
+ )
1552
+ }
1553
+ ],
1554
+ verdict: "review",
1555
+ reason: "This code posts to the PayPal API. node9 asks before money moves (PayPal)."
1556
+ }
1557
+ ]
1558
+ },
1559
+ {
1560
+ name: "square",
1561
+ label: "Square",
1562
+ description: "Asks before money moves in Square (refunds, payments, paid orders, invoices, subscriptions), whether the agent uses a Square MCP server, the API or the Square SDK in a script. The sandbox host is never asked about, and neither are reads.",
1563
+ template: "finance",
1564
+ // Square's servers, never Squarespace (a website builder).
1565
+ server: "{*square,*square[-_]*,*squareup*}",
1566
+ mcpTools: [
1567
+ {
1568
+ // Square's official MCP server has one tool for every API call; the
1569
+ // service and method name what it does.
1570
+ name: "shield:square:review-mcp-request",
1571
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}make_api_request",
1572
+ conditions: [
1573
+ {
1574
+ field: "service",
1575
+ op: "matches",
1576
+ value: "^(?:refunds|payments|orders|invoices|subscriptions|disputes|gift_cards|gift_card_activities|checkout|terminal)$",
1577
+ flags: "i"
1578
+ },
1579
+ {
1580
+ field: "method",
1581
+ op: "notMatches",
1582
+ value: "^(?:list|get|retrieve|search|batch_?retrieve|calculate)",
1583
+ flags: "i"
1584
+ }
1585
+ ],
1586
+ conditionMode: "all",
1587
+ verdict: "review",
1588
+ reason: "A request through the Square MCP server is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1589
+ }
1590
+ ],
1591
+ doors: [
1592
+ {
1593
+ name: "shield:square:review-api",
1594
+ tool: "bash",
1595
+ conditions: [
1596
+ {
1597
+ field: "command",
1598
+ op: "matches",
1599
+ // The live host only; the sandbox is connect.squareupsandbox.com.
1600
+ value: httpTo(
1601
+ "connect\\.squareup\\.com/v2/(?:refunds|payments|orders/[^\\s/?]{1,64}/pay|invoices|subscriptions|disputes|gift-cards/activities)(?![\\w-]|/search)"
1602
+ ),
1603
+ flags: "i"
1604
+ },
1605
+ HTTP_WRITE_ANY
1606
+ ],
1607
+ conditionMode: "all",
1608
+ verdict: "review",
1609
+ reason: "A request to the Square API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1610
+ },
1611
+ {
1612
+ name: "shield:square:review-code",
1613
+ tool: "bash",
1614
+ conditions: [
1615
+ {
1616
+ field: "command",
1617
+ op: "matches",
1618
+ // The Square SDK in the script: Node (`square`) or Python (`square`, `squareup`).
1619
+ value: `\\bSquareClient\\b|\\bsquare\\.client\\b|from\\s+square[.\\s]|from\\s+["']square["']|require\\(\\s*["']square["']`
1620
+ },
1621
+ {
1622
+ field: "command",
1623
+ op: "matches",
1624
+ value: "\\.refunds(?:Api)?\\.refund(?:Payment|_payment)\\s*\\(|\\.payments(?:Api)?\\.(?:create|complete)(?:Payment|_payment)?\\s*\\(|\\.orders(?:Api)?\\.pay(?:Order|_order)?\\s*\\(|\\.invoices(?:Api)?\\.publish(?:Invoice|_invoice)?\\s*\\("
1625
+ }
1626
+ ],
1627
+ conditionMode: "all",
1628
+ verdict: "review",
1629
+ reason: "This code moves money through the Square SDK. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1630
+ },
1631
+ {
1632
+ name: "shield:square:review-code-http",
1633
+ tool: "bash",
1634
+ conditions: [
1635
+ {
1636
+ field: "command",
1637
+ op: "matches",
1638
+ value: postTo(
1639
+ "connect\\.squareup\\.com/v2/(?:refunds|payments|orders/[^\\s/?\"'`]{1,64}/pay|invoices|subscriptions|disputes|gift-cards/activities)(?![\\w-]|/search)"
1640
+ )
1641
+ }
1642
+ ],
1643
+ verdict: "review",
1644
+ reason: "This code posts to the Square API. node9 asks before money moves (Square)."
1645
+ }
1646
+ ]
1647
+ },
1648
+ {
1649
+ name: "plaid",
1650
+ label: "Plaid",
1651
+ description: "Asks before money moves through Plaid (transfers, transfer authorizations, payment initiation), whether the agent uses a Plaid MCP server, the API or the Plaid SDK in a script. The sandbox host is never asked about, and neither are reads such as balances or transactions.",
1652
+ template: "finance",
1653
+ server: "*plaid*",
1654
+ doors: [
1655
+ {
1656
+ name: "shield:plaid:review-api",
1657
+ tool: "bash",
1658
+ conditions: [
1659
+ {
1660
+ field: "command",
1661
+ op: "matches",
1662
+ // Every Plaid endpoint is a POST, so the path is what tells a
1663
+ // write; the live host only, never sandbox.plaid.com. A script
1664
+ // that posts to the URL meets this door too.
1665
+ value: httpTo(
1666
+ "production\\.plaid\\.com/(?:transfer/(?:create|authorization/create|recurring/create)|payment_initiation/payment/create|bank_transfer/create)(?![\\w-])"
1667
+ ),
1668
+ flags: "i"
1669
+ }
1670
+ ],
1671
+ verdict: "review",
1672
+ reason: "A request to the Plaid API is about to move money. node9 asks before money moves (Plaid)."
1673
+ },
1674
+ {
1675
+ name: "shield:plaid:review-code",
1676
+ tool: "bash",
1677
+ conditions: [
1678
+ { field: "command", op: "matches", value: "\\bplaid", flags: "i" },
1679
+ {
1680
+ field: "command",
1681
+ op: "matches",
1682
+ value: "\\b(?:transfer(?:Authorization|Recurring)?Create|paymentInitiationPaymentCreate|bankTransferCreate|transfer_(?:authorization_|recurring_)?create|payment_initiation_payment_create|bank_transfer_create)\\s*\\("
1683
+ }
1684
+ ],
1685
+ conditionMode: "all",
1686
+ verdict: "review",
1687
+ reason: "This code moves money through Plaid. node9 asks before money moves (Plaid)."
1688
+ }
1689
+ ]
1690
+ },
1691
+ {
1692
+ name: "okta",
1693
+ label: "Okta",
1694
+ description: "Asks before a user, a group member, a role, a password or a key changes in Okta, whether the agent uses an Okta MCP server, the API or the Okta SDK in a script. Reads and signing in are never asked about.",
1695
+ template: "identity",
1696
+ server: "*okta*",
1697
+ doors: [
1698
+ {
1699
+ name: "shield:okta:review-api",
1700
+ tool: "bash",
1701
+ conditions: [
1702
+ {
1703
+ field: "command",
1704
+ op: "matches",
1705
+ // The management API only: sign-in (/api/v1/authn, /sessions,
1706
+ // /oauth2) is not under these paths.
1707
+ value: httpTo(
1708
+ "[\\w-]+\\.okta(?:-emea)?\\.com/api/v1/(?:users|groups|apps|iam|api-tokens|idps|authorizationServers|policies)(?![\\w-])"
1709
+ ),
1710
+ flags: "i"
1711
+ },
1712
+ HTTP_WRITE_ANY
1713
+ ],
1714
+ conditionMode: "all",
1715
+ verdict: "review",
1716
+ reason: "A request to the Okta API is about to change who has access. node9 asks before access changes (Okta)."
1717
+ },
1718
+ {
1719
+ name: "shield:okta:review-code",
1720
+ tool: "bash",
1721
+ conditions: [
1722
+ {
1723
+ field: "command",
1724
+ op: "matches",
1725
+ // The Okta SDK in the script: a method named createUser alone is
1726
+ // in half the applications ever written.
1727
+ value: "@okta/okta-sdk|\\bokta\\.Client\\b|from\\s+okta[.\\s]|\\bimport\\s+okta\\b"
1728
+ },
1729
+ {
1730
+ field: "command",
1731
+ op: "matches",
1732
+ value: "\\b(?:(?:create|delete|deactivate|suspend|unlock|activate)User|(?:reset|expire)Password|resetFactors|(?:assign|unassign)User(?:To|From)Group|assignRoleTo(?:User|Group))\\s*\\("
1733
+ }
1734
+ ],
1735
+ conditionMode: "all",
1736
+ verdict: "review",
1737
+ reason: "This code changes who has access in Okta. node9 asks before access changes (Okta)."
1738
+ },
1739
+ {
1740
+ name: "shield:okta:review-code-py",
1741
+ tool: "bash",
1742
+ conditions: [
1743
+ {
1744
+ field: "command",
1745
+ op: "matches",
1746
+ value: "@okta/okta-sdk|\\bokta\\.Client\\b|from\\s+okta[.\\s]|\\bimport\\s+okta\\b"
1747
+ },
1748
+ {
1749
+ field: "command",
1750
+ op: "matches",
1751
+ value: "\\b(?:(?:create|delete|deactivate|deactivate_or_delete|suspend|unlock|activate)_user|(?:reset|expire)_password|reset_factors|(?:add|remove)_user_(?:to|from)_group|assign_role_to_(?:user|group))\\s*\\("
1752
+ }
1753
+ ],
1754
+ conditionMode: "all",
1755
+ verdict: "review",
1756
+ reason: "This code changes who has access in Okta. node9 asks before access changes (Okta)."
1757
+ }
1758
+ ]
1759
+ },
1760
+ {
1761
+ name: "auth0",
1762
+ label: "Auth0",
1763
+ description: "Asks before a user, a role, an application or its permissions change in Auth0, whether the agent uses an Auth0 MCP server, the auth0 CLI, the Management API or the Auth0 SDK in a script. Reads and signing in are never asked about.",
1764
+ template: "identity",
1765
+ server: "*auth0*",
1766
+ mcpTools: [
1767
+ {
1768
+ // Auth0's official MCP server: applications (their secrets and
1769
+ // callbacks), APIs and their scopes, and Actions (code that runs at
1770
+ // every sign-in).
1771
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-tenant-config",
1772
+ tool: "{,mcp__*__}{auth0_create_application,auth0_update_application,auth0_create_resource_server,auth0_update_resource_server,auth0_create_action,auth0_update_action,auth0_deploy_action}",
1773
+ conditions: [],
1774
+ verdict: "review",
1775
+ reason: "This changes an Auth0 application, API or sign-in Action. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1776
+ }
1777
+ ],
1778
+ doors: [
1779
+ {
1780
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-cli",
1781
+ tool: "bash",
1782
+ conditions: [
1783
+ {
1784
+ field: "command",
1785
+ op: "matches",
1786
+ value: prog("auth0") + GAP + "\\s(?:(?:users|roles|apps|orgs)\\s+(?:create|update|delete|rm)|users\\s+roles\\s+(?:assign|add|remove|rm)|roles\\s+permissions\\s+(?:add|remove|rm)|users\\s+blocks\\s+unblock|api\\s+(?:post|put|patch|delete))(?![\\w-])",
1787
+ flags: "i"
1788
+ }
1789
+ ],
1790
+ verdict: "review",
1791
+ reason: "The auth0 CLI is about to change who has access. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1792
+ },
1793
+ {
1794
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-api",
1795
+ tool: "bash",
1796
+ conditions: [
1797
+ {
1798
+ field: "command",
1799
+ op: "matches",
1800
+ // The Management API only; /oauth/token is signing in.
1801
+ value: httpTo(
1802
+ "\\.auth0\\.com/api/v2/(?:users|roles|clients|grants|client-grants|organizations|tickets|jobs/users-imports|device-credentials)(?![\\w-])"
1803
+ ),
1804
+ flags: "i"
1805
+ },
1806
+ HTTP_WRITE_ANY
1807
+ ],
1808
+ conditionMode: "all",
1809
+ verdict: "review",
1810
+ reason: "A request to the Auth0 Management API is about to change who has access. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1811
+ },
1812
+ {
1813
+ name: "shield:auth0:review-code",
1814
+ tool: "bash",
1815
+ conditions: [
1816
+ {
1817
+ field: "command",
1818
+ op: "matches",
1819
+ // The Auth0 SDK in the script (Node `auth0`, Python `auth0`).
1820
+ value: `\\bManagementClient\\b|from\\s+auth0[.\\s]|from\\s+["']auth0["']|require\\(\\s*["']auth0["']`
1821
+ },
1822
+ {
1823
+ field: "command",
1824
+ op: "matches",
1825
+ value: "\\.(?:users|roles|organizations|clients)\\.(?:create|delete|update|assignRoles|deleteRoles|assignUsers|addPermissions|deletePermissions|addMembers|deleteMembers|add_roles|remove_roles|add_users|add_permissions|remove_permissions)\\s*\\("
1826
+ }
1827
+ ],
1828
+ conditionMode: "all",
1829
+ verdict: "review",
1830
+ reason: "This code changes who has access in Auth0. node9 asks before access changes (Auth0)."
1831
+ }
1832
+ ]
1833
+ }
1834
+ ];
1835
+ function buildAppShield(spec) {
1836
+ const owner = spec.label;
1837
+ const toolRules = ACTION_TEMPLATES[spec.template].filter(isToolRule).map((rule) => ({
1838
+ ...rule,
1839
+ name: `shield:${spec.name}:${actionPart(rule.name)}`,
1840
+ server: spec.server,
1841
+ reason: ownReason(rule.reason, owner)
1842
+ }));
1843
+ const ownTools = (spec.mcpTools ?? []).map((rule) => ({
1844
+ ...rule,
1845
+ server: spec.server
1846
+ }));
1847
+ return {
1848
+ name: spec.name,
1849
+ description: spec.description,
1850
+ aliases: [],
1851
+ smartRules: [...toolRules, ...ownTools, ...spec.doors],
1852
+ dangerousWords: []
1853
+ };
1854
+ }
1855
+ var APP_SHIELDS = APP_SHIELD_SPECS.map(buildAppShield);
1856
+ var APP_SHIELD_NAMES = new Set(APP_SHIELD_SPECS.map((s) => s.name));
1857
+ var APP_SERVER_GLOB = `{${APP_SHIELD_SPECS.map((s) => s.server).join(",")}}`;
1858
+ function buildGeneralRules() {
1859
+ const out = [];
1860
+ for (const name of Object.keys(ACTION_TEMPLATES)) {
1861
+ const { slug, label } = ACTION_CHECKS[name];
1862
+ for (const rule of ACTION_TEMPLATES[name].filter(isToolRule)) {
1863
+ const part = actionPart(rule.name).replace(/^review-/, "");
1864
+ out.push({
1865
+ ...rule,
1866
+ name: `review-action-${slug}-${part}`,
1867
+ notServer: APP_SERVER_GLOB,
1868
+ reason: ownReason(rule.reason, label)
1869
+ });
1281
1870
  }
1282
- ],
1283
- dangerousWords: ["FLUSHALL", "FLUSHDB"]
1871
+ }
1872
+ return out;
1873
+ }
1874
+ var GENERAL_ACTION_RULES = buildGeneralRules();
1875
+ function generalActionRuleNames(template) {
1876
+ const { slug } = ACTION_CHECKS[template];
1877
+ return GENERAL_ACTION_RULES.filter((r) => r.name?.startsWith(`review-action-${slug}-`)).map(
1878
+ (r) => r.name
1879
+ );
1880
+ }
1881
+ var REPLACED_SHIELDS = {
1882
+ finance: "finance is now the Money check (actions.money), on by default. For an app: node9 shield enable stripe (or paypal).",
1883
+ identity: "identity is now the Accounts and access check (actions.access), on by default.",
1884
+ publishing: "publishing is now the Publishing check (actions.publish), on by default."
1284
1885
  };
1285
1886
 
1286
1887
  // src/shields/index.ts
@@ -1325,36 +1926,36 @@ var BUILTIN_SHIELDS = {
1325
1926
  [bash_safe_default.name]: bash_safe_default,
1326
1927
  [docker_default.name]: docker_default,
1327
1928
  [filesystem_default.name]: filesystem_default,
1328
- // Dangerous actions as category shields (node9Firewall#385): an MCP app's
1329
- // money, credential and publishing tools, asked about whatever the request
1330
- // said. One glob per rule covers the bare name the gateway sends and the
1331
- // mcp__<server>__ name the agent hook sends.
1332
- [finance_default.name]: finance_default,
1333
1929
  [github_default.name]: github_default,
1334
- [identity_default.name]: identity_default,
1335
1930
  [k8s_default.name]: k8s_default,
1336
1931
  [mongodb_default.name]: mongodb_default,
1337
1932
  [postgres_default.name]: postgres_default,
1338
1933
  [project_jail_default.name]: project_jail_default,
1339
- [publishing_default.name]: publishing_default,
1340
- [redis_default.name]: redis_default
1934
+ [redis_default.name]: redis_default,
1935
+ // App shields generated from the action templates (node9Firewall#390): one
1936
+ // per app, every door (MCP server, CLI, API, library), off by default.
1937
+ ...Object.fromEntries(APP_SHIELDS.map((s) => [s.name, s]))
1341
1938
  };
1342
- var ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
1343
- "finance",
1344
- "identity",
1345
- "publishing"
1346
- ]);
1347
1939
  function assertBuiltinShieldRegexesAreSafe() {
1348
- for (const shield of Object.values(BUILTIN_SHIELDS)) {
1940
+ const sets = [
1941
+ ...Object.values(BUILTIN_SHIELDS).map((sh) => ({
1942
+ name: sh.name,
1943
+ smartRules: sh.smartRules
1944
+ })),
1945
+ ...Object.entries(ACTION_TEMPLATES).map(([name, smartRules]) => ({ name, smartRules })),
1946
+ { name: "general-action-checks", smartRules: GENERAL_ACTION_RULES }
1947
+ ];
1948
+ for (const shield of sets) {
1349
1949
  for (const rule of shield.smartRules) {
1350
1950
  const conditions = rule.conditions ?? [];
1351
1951
  for (const cond of conditions) {
1352
1952
  if (cond.op !== "matches" && cond.op !== "notMatches") continue;
1353
1953
  const pattern = cond.value;
1354
1954
  if (!pattern) continue;
1355
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex2.default)(pattern)) {
1955
+ const problem = validateRegex(pattern);
1956
+ if (problem) {
1356
1957
  throw new Error(
1357
- `[node9 engine] Shield '${shield.name}' rule '${rule.name ?? rule.tool}' has unsafe regex: ${pattern}`
1958
+ `[node9 engine] Shield '${shield.name}' rule '${rule.name ?? rule.tool}' has a regex the runtime refuses (${problem}): ${pattern}`
1358
1959
  );
1359
1960
  }
1360
1961
  }
@@ -1648,9 +2249,9 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
1648
2249
  },
1649
2250
  // ── Commands ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1650
2251
  "commands.inline-exec": {
1651
- plain: "The agent runs a small program written inside the command itself.",
2252
+ plain: "The agent runs a small program written inside the command itself, and node9 reads it: ordinary code runs, code that deletes, sends data out, runs other commands or reads protected files is held, and so is code node9 cannot read.",
1652
2253
  example: `node -e "require('fs').rmSync('dist', {recursive: true})"`,
1653
- advice: "Agents do this often for harmless tasks. Set Log if your team finds the review prompts noisy; keep Review if agents work near production."
2254
+ advice: "Keep Review. Strict mode reviews every inline call, harmless or not; Log or Off only if inline code never reaches anything that matters."
1654
2255
  },
1655
2256
  "commands.eval-dynamic": {
1656
2257
  plain: "The agent runs code whose content is built at run time, so node9 cannot read it in advance.",
@@ -1682,6 +2283,21 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
1682
2283
  example: "chmod 777 deploy.sh",
1683
2284
  advice: "Keep Review. A narrower permission (755, 644) almost always does the job."
1684
2285
  },
2286
+ "actions.money": {
2287
+ plain: "The agent moves money (a refund, a payout, a transfer, a charge) through an app node9 has no protection for, such as an internal billing server.",
2288
+ example: "refund_order on a server called acme-billing",
2289
+ advice: "Keep Review. When the app is Stripe or PayPal, turn on its own protection instead: it covers the CLI, the API and scripts too, and a call from it no longer comes here."
2290
+ },
2291
+ "actions.access": {
2292
+ plain: "The agent changes a password, a key, a role or who belongs to a team, through an app node9 has no protection for.",
2293
+ example: "invite_user or grant_role on a company admin server",
2294
+ advice: "Keep Review. Set Log on a sandbox workspace where agents manage test users all day."
2295
+ },
2296
+ "actions.publish": {
2297
+ plain: "The agent publishes something outside the organisation (a release, a package, a deploy, a public post) through an app node9 has no protection for.",
2298
+ example: "create_release or deploy_to_production on a company MCP server",
2299
+ advice: "Keep Review. Set Log on a release machine whose pipeline publishes on purpose, never on a developer laptop."
2300
+ },
1685
2301
  "commands.sudo": {
1686
2302
  plain: "The agent runs a command as the administrator (root).",
1687
2303
  example: "sudo apt-get install -y nginx",
@@ -1842,7 +2458,7 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
1842
2458
  advice: "Fixed at Block. A person accepts the change on the machine (node9 mcp pin update)."
1843
2459
  },
1844
2460
  "loading.malicious-package": {
1845
- plain: "The agent installs a package that the public malicious-package database (OSV) lists, or one published minutes ago. Covers npm, PyPI, RubyGems, crates.io, Go, NuGet, Maven, Packagist and VS Code extensions; the publish-age and install-script signals are npm and PyPI only.",
2461
+ plain: "The agent installs a package that the public malicious-package database (OSV) lists, or one published minutes ago. Covers npm, PyPI, RubyGems, crates.io, Go, NuGet, Maven, Packagist and VS Code extensions; the publish-age and install-script signals are npm and PyPI only. A new release built from the same repository as the one before it (registry provenance) and an install script the package has always run do not stop; a release that lost the provenance its previous release had does.",
1846
2462
  example: "npm install of a package flagged as malware",
1847
2463
  advice: "Keep Block for known-malicious packages; brand-new packages already stop for Review."
1848
2464
  }
@@ -1860,7 +2476,8 @@ var CHECK_GROUPS = [
1860
2476
  { id: "network", title: "Network" },
1861
2477
  { id: "files", title: "Files" },
1862
2478
  { id: "behavior", title: "Agent behavior" },
1863
- { id: "loading", title: "What the agent loads" }
2479
+ { id: "loading", title: "What the agent loads" },
2480
+ { id: "actions", title: "Actions in apps" }
1864
2481
  ];
1865
2482
  var ALL = VERDICTS;
1866
2483
  var BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS = ["mkfs", "shred"];
@@ -1907,7 +2524,7 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
1907
2524
  id: "commands.inline-exec",
1908
2525
  group: "commands",
1909
2526
  title: "Inline code execution",
1910
- catches: "node -e, python -c, bash -c, a heredoc into an interpreter",
2527
+ catches: "inline code (python -c, node -e, a heredoc into an interpreter) that deletes, sends, opens a socket, runs commands, reads protected files or decodes and runs; unreadable inline code",
1911
2528
  values: ALL,
1912
2529
  defaultValue: "review",
1913
2530
  legacy: ["Node9 Standard (Inline Execution)"]
@@ -2264,6 +2881,38 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
2264
2881
  values: ALL,
2265
2882
  defaultValue: "block",
2266
2883
  legacy: ["\u{1F4E6} Node9 Package Check (Malicious)", "\u{1F4E6} Node9 Package Check (Review)"]
2884
+ },
2885
+ // ── Actions in apps (node9Firewall#390) ──────────────────────────────────
2886
+ // The safety net under the app shields: an action that moves money, changes
2887
+ // access or publishes, on an MCP server no app shield claims (an internal
2888
+ // billing server, a vendor with no shield, Zapier). Review by default; the
2889
+ // rules come from the action templates (shields/apps.ts).
2890
+ {
2891
+ id: "actions.money",
2892
+ group: "actions",
2893
+ title: "Money moves",
2894
+ catches: "a refund, payout, transfer, charge or withdrawal through an app with no protection of its own",
2895
+ values: ALL,
2896
+ defaultValue: "review",
2897
+ legacy: generalActionRuleNames("finance")
2898
+ },
2899
+ {
2900
+ id: "actions.access",
2901
+ group: "actions",
2902
+ title: "Accounts and access change",
2903
+ catches: "a password, key, role, permission or user changed through an app with no protection of its own",
2904
+ values: ALL,
2905
+ defaultValue: "review",
2906
+ legacy: generalActionRuleNames("identity")
2907
+ },
2908
+ {
2909
+ id: "actions.publish",
2910
+ group: "actions",
2911
+ title: "Something is published",
2912
+ catches: "a release, package, deploy or public post through an app with no protection of its own",
2913
+ values: ALL,
2914
+ defaultValue: "review",
2915
+ legacy: generalActionRuleNames("publishing")
2267
2916
  }
2268
2917
  ];
2269
2918
  var SHIELD_RULE_NAME = /^shield:([^:]+):(block|review|allow)-(.+)$/;
@@ -2325,7 +2974,7 @@ function ssrfCheckId(tier) {
2325
2974
  var PROJECT_JAIL_BLOCK_READ = /^shield:project-jail:block-read-(ssh|aws|env)(-any-tool)?$/;
2326
2975
  var OVERRIDE_PREFIX = "Override block rule:";
2327
2976
  var LABEL_WRAPPERS = ["Smart Rule:", "Node9 (AST):", "project-jail (AST):"];
2328
- function unwrapRuleLabel(s) {
2977
+ function ruleNameInLabel(s) {
2329
2978
  let rest = s;
2330
2979
  const override = rest.lastIndexOf(OVERRIDE_PREFIX);
2331
2980
  if (override >= 0) rest = rest.slice(override + OVERRIDE_PREFIX.length).trimStart();
@@ -2341,7 +2990,7 @@ function checkIdForRule(nameOrLabel) {
2341
2990
  const s = nameOrLabel.trim();
2342
2991
  const exact = LEGACY_TO_ID.get(s);
2343
2992
  if (exact) return exact;
2344
- const unwrapped = unwrapRuleLabel(s);
2993
+ const unwrapped = ruleNameInLabel(s);
2345
2994
  if (unwrapped !== void 0) return checkIdForRule(unwrapped);
2346
2995
  if (s.startsWith("shield:project-jail:")) {
2347
2996
  return PROJECT_JAIL_BLOCK_READ.test(s) ? "data.credential-files" : "data.credential-files-other";
@@ -2584,45 +3233,356 @@ function looksLikeText(buf) {
2584
3233
  }
2585
3234
  return printable / buf.length >= 0.9;
2586
3235
  }
2587
- var BASE64_RUN_RE = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{32,}={0,2}|[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}/g;
2588
- function decodeEmbeddedBase64(text) {
2589
- const out = [];
2590
- for (const m of text.matchAll(BASE64_RUN_RE)) {
2591
- if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
2592
- const run = m[0];
2593
- if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(run)) continue;
2594
- const buf = Buffer.from(run, "base64");
2595
- if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3236
+ var BASE64_RUN_RE = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{32,}={0,2}|[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}/g;
3237
+ function decodeEmbeddedBase64(text) {
3238
+ const out = [];
3239
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(BASE64_RUN_RE)) {
3240
+ if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
3241
+ const run = m[0];
3242
+ if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(run)) continue;
3243
+ const buf = Buffer.from(run, "base64");
3244
+ if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3245
+ }
3246
+ return out;
3247
+ }
3248
+ var HEX_RUN_RE = /\b(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){24,}\b/g;
3249
+ var HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE = /(?:\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){16,}/g;
3250
+ function decodeEmbeddedHex(text) {
3251
+ const out = [];
3252
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_RUN_RE)) {
3253
+ if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
3254
+ const buf = Buffer.from(m[0], "hex");
3255
+ if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3256
+ }
3257
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE)) {
3258
+ if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
3259
+ const buf = Buffer.from(m[0].replace(/\\x/g, ""), "hex");
3260
+ if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3261
+ }
3262
+ return out;
3263
+ }
3264
+ function scanViews(text) {
3265
+ const views = [{ kind: "original", text }];
3266
+ const normalized = normalizeForScan(text);
3267
+ if (normalized !== text) views.push({ kind: "normalized", text: normalized });
3268
+ for (const t of decodeEmbeddedBase64(normalized)) {
3269
+ views.push({ kind: "base64", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3270
+ }
3271
+ for (const t of decodeEmbeddedHex(normalized)) {
3272
+ views.push({ kind: "hex", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3273
+ }
3274
+ return views;
3275
+ }
3276
+
3277
+ // src/files/paths.ts
3278
+ var SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES = [
3279
+ "/etc/passwd",
3280
+ "/etc/shadow",
3281
+ "/etc/group",
3282
+ "/etc/gshadow",
3283
+ "/etc/sudoers"
3284
+ ];
3285
+ var SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS = ["/etc/security", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/sudoers.d"];
3286
+ var PASSWORD_HASH_FILES = ["/etc/shadow", "/etc/gshadow"];
3287
+ var STARTUP_NAMES = [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile"];
3288
+ var SYSTEM_DIRS = [
3289
+ "/usr",
3290
+ "/etc",
3291
+ "/boot",
3292
+ "/bin",
3293
+ "/sbin",
3294
+ "/lib",
3295
+ "/lib64",
3296
+ "/var/log"
3297
+ ];
3298
+ var SYSTEM_DIRS_EXEMPT = ["/usr/local", "/usr/src"];
3299
+ var UPLOAD_SYSTEM_DIRS = [...SYSTEM_DIRS, "/proc", "/sys", "/root"];
3300
+ var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES = [
3301
+ ".gitlab-ci.yml",
3302
+ "CLAUDE.md",
3303
+ "AGENTS.md",
3304
+ ".cursorrules",
3305
+ ".mcp.json",
3306
+ ".vscode/settings.json",
3307
+ "package.json"
3308
+ ];
3309
+ var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS = [
3310
+ ".github/workflows",
3311
+ ".claude",
3312
+ ".cursor",
3313
+ ".git/hooks",
3314
+ ".husky"
3315
+ ];
3316
+ function isAgentInstructionPath(absPath, root) {
3317
+ const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "");
3318
+ if (!(absPath === r || absPath.startsWith(r + "/"))) return false;
3319
+ const rel = absPath.slice(r.length + 1);
3320
+ if (AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES.includes(rel)) return true;
3321
+ return AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS.some((d) => rel === d || rel.startsWith(d + "/"));
3322
+ }
3323
+ function isInside(root, p) {
3324
+ const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "") || "/";
3325
+ return p === r || p.startsWith(r === "/" ? "/" : r + "/");
3326
+ }
3327
+ var LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z]:)?\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers)$/;
3328
+ function isPasswordHashPath(p) {
3329
+ return PASSWORD_HASH_FILES.includes(p);
3330
+ }
3331
+ function isLegacySystemPath(p) {
3332
+ return LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE.test(p);
3333
+ }
3334
+ function normalizeFilePath(p, cwd = "", home = "~") {
3335
+ if (!p.startsWith("/") && !p.startsWith("~") && cwd) p = `${cwd}/${p}`;
3336
+ if (p === "~" || p.startsWith("~/")) p = home + p.slice(1);
3337
+ const rooted = p.startsWith("/");
3338
+ const parts = [];
3339
+ for (const part of p.split("/")) {
3340
+ if (!part || part === ".") continue;
3341
+ if (part === ".." && parts.length && parts.at(-1) !== "..") parts.pop();
3342
+ else if (part !== ".." || !rooted) parts.push(part);
3343
+ }
3344
+ return (rooted ? "/" : "") + parts.join("/");
3345
+ }
3346
+
3347
+ // src/shell/inline-code.ts
3348
+ var MAX_INLINE_CODE = 64 * 1024;
3349
+ var WHAT = {
3350
+ deletes: "deletes files",
3351
+ "writes-outside": "writes a file outside the project",
3352
+ sends: "sends data over the network",
3353
+ listens: "opens a listening socket or a shell",
3354
+ "runs-commands": "runs other commands or processes",
3355
+ "reads-protected": "reads a protected file",
3356
+ "builds-code": "runs code it builds at run time",
3357
+ permissions: "changes permissions or ownership",
3358
+ monitors: "captures the screen, the clipboard or the keyboard",
3359
+ amplifies: "writes or sends in an endless loop"
3360
+ };
3361
+ var OUTSIDE = String.raw`(?:~|\.\.[\\/]|/(?!(?:tmp|var/tmp)/(?![^'"\n]*\.\.)|dev/(?:null|stdout|stderr)\b))`;
3362
+ var pyImport = (mods) => new RegExp(String.raw`\b(?:import\s+(?:[\w.]+(?:\s+as\s+\w+)?\s*,\s*)*|from\s+)(?:${mods})\b`);
3363
+ var either = (...res) => new RegExp(res.map((r) => `(?:${r.source})`).join("|"), "m");
3364
+ var PYTHON = [
3365
+ [
3366
+ "deletes",
3367
+ /\bos\.(?:remove|unlink|rmdir|removedirs)\s*\(|\bshutil\.rmtree\s*\(|\.(?:unlink|rmdir)\s*\(|\bfrom\s+(?:os|shutil)\s+import\s+[^\n]*\b(?:remove|unlink|rmdir|removedirs|rmtree)\b/
3368
+ ],
3369
+ [
3370
+ "writes-outside",
3371
+ new RegExp(
3372
+ String.raw`\bopen\s*\(\s*[rRbBuU]?['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*,\s*(?:mode\s*=\s*)?[rRbB]?['"][^'"\n]*[wax+]|\bPath\s*\(\s*[rR]?['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*\)\s*\.(?:write_text|write_bytes|touch|mkdir|symlink_to)\s*\(|\bshutil\.(?:copy\w*|move)\s*\([^)\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}|\bos\.(?:rename|replace|symlink|link|truncate|makedirs|mkdir)\s*\([^)\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}`
3373
+ )
3374
+ ],
3375
+ [
3376
+ "sends",
3377
+ either(
3378
+ pyImport(
3379
+ String.raw`socket|requests|urllib2|urllib3|http\.client|httplib|smtplib|ftplib|paramiko|telnetlib|aiohttp|httpx|websockets?|xmlrpc|poplib|imaplib|pycurl|scapy`
3380
+ ),
3381
+ /\burllib\.request\b|\burlopen\s*\(|\bfrom\s+urllib\s+import\s+[^\n;]*\brequest\b|\basyncio\.open_connection\s*\(/
3382
+ )
3383
+ ],
3384
+ [
3385
+ "listens",
3386
+ either(
3387
+ pyImport(String.raw`pty|socketserver|http\.server`),
3388
+ /\bpty\.spawn\s*\(|\.bind\s*\(\s*\(|\basyncio\.start_server\s*\(/
3389
+ )
3390
+ ],
3391
+ [
3392
+ "runs-commands",
3393
+ either(
3394
+ pyImport("subprocess|pexpect|commands|psutil"),
3395
+ /\bos\.(?:system|popen|exec\w*|spawn\w*|posix_spawn\w*|fork|forkpty|kill|killpg)\s*\(|\bfrom\s+os\s+import\s+[^\n;]*\b(?:system|popen|exec\w*|spawn\w*|fork|kill)\b|\bfrom\s+(?:os|shutil|pty|ctypes)\s+import\s+\*/
3396
+ )
3397
+ ],
3398
+ [
3399
+ "builds-code",
3400
+ /(?<![\w.])(?:exec|eval|compile|execfile)\s*\(|\b__import__\s*\(|\bimportlib\b|\b(?:c?pickle|dill|marshal|shelve)\.loads?\s*\(|\byaml\.(?:unsafe_)?load\s*\((?![^)\n]*SafeLoader)|\bctypes\b|\b(?:getattr|vars)\s*\(\s*(?:os|subprocess|shutil|socket|sys|pty|builtins|__builtins__)\b|\b(?:os|subprocess|shutil|socket|sys|pty|builtins)\.__dict__\b|\b__builtins__\b|\bsys\.modules\b|\bglobals\s*\(\s*\)\s*\[/
3401
+ ],
3402
+ [
3403
+ // Spyware shapes: a screenshot, the clipboard, a key logger.
3404
+ "monitors",
3405
+ either(
3406
+ pyImport(String.raw`pyperclip|pynput|keyboard|pyautogui|pyscreenshot|mss|clipboard`),
3407
+ /\bImageGrab\b|\bpyautogui\.screenshot\b|\bscreencapture\b/
3408
+ )
3409
+ ],
3410
+ [
3411
+ "permissions",
3412
+ /\bos\.(?:chmod|lchmod|fchmod|chown|lchown|fchown|setuid|setgid|seteuid|setegid|setreuid|setregid|setresuid)\s*\(|\.chmod\s*\(|\bshutil\.chown\s*\(/
3413
+ ]
3414
+ ];
3415
+ var NODE = [
3416
+ [
3417
+ "deletes",
3418
+ /\.(?:rm|rmSync|rmdir|rmdirSync|unlink|unlinkSync)\s*\(|\brimraf\b|\bDeno\.remove(?:Sync)?\s*\(/
3419
+ ],
3420
+ [
3421
+ "writes-outside",
3422
+ new RegExp(
3423
+ String.raw`(?:\.(?:writeFile|writeFileSync|appendFile|appendFileSync|createWriteStream|copyFile|copyFileSync|cp|cpSync|rename|renameSync|truncate|truncateSync|symlink|symlinkSync|mkdir|mkdirSync)|\bDeno\.(?:writeTextFile|writeFile|rename|mkdir)(?:Sync)?|\bBun\.write)\s*\(\s*['"\x60]${OUTSIDE}`
3424
+ )
3425
+ ],
3426
+ [
3427
+ "sends",
3428
+ /\bfetch\s*\(|(?:\brequire\s*\(\s*|\bfrom\s+|\bimport\s+)['"\x60](?:node:)?(?:http|https|http2|net|dgram|tls|axios|node-fetch|ws|request|got|undici|nodemailer)['"\x60]|\bnew\s+WebSocket\b|\bXMLHttpRequest\b|\b(?:Deno|Bun)\.connect\w*\s*\(/
3429
+ ],
3430
+ ["listens", /\bcreateServer\s*\(|\b(?:Deno\.(?:listen\w*|serve)|Bun\.(?:listen|serve))\s*\(/],
3431
+ [
3432
+ "runs-commands",
3433
+ /\bchild_process\b|\bprocess\.(?:binding|dlopen|kill)\s*\(|\bDeno\.(?:run|Command)\b|\bBun\.(?:spawn|spawnSync|\$)\b|\bexecSync\s*\(|\bspawnSync\s*\(/
3434
+ ],
3435
+ [
3436
+ "builds-code",
3437
+ /(?<![\w.])eval\s*\(|\bnew\s+Function\s*\(|(?<![\w.])Function\s*\(|(?:\brequire\s*\(\s*|\bfrom\s+)['"\x60](?:node:)?vm['"\x60]|\bvm\.\w+|\brequire\s*\(\s*[^'"\x60\s)]|\bimport\s*\(\s*[^'"\x60\s)]/
3438
+ ],
3439
+ [
3440
+ "permissions",
3441
+ /\.(?:chmod|chmodSync|chown|chownSync|lchown|lchownSync|fchmod|fchmodSync|fchown|fchownSync)\s*\(|\bprocess\.set(?:e)?[ug]id\s*\(|\bDeno\.(?:chmod|chown)(?:Sync)?\s*\(/
3442
+ ]
3443
+ ];
3444
+ var PERL = [
3445
+ ["deletes", /\b(?:unlink|rmdir|rmtree|remove_tree)\b/],
3446
+ [
3447
+ "writes-outside",
3448
+ new RegExp(
3449
+ String.raw`['"]\s*(?:\+?>>?|\+<)\s*['"]?\s*,?\s*['"]?${OUTSIDE}|\b(?:rename|symlink|link|copy|move)\s*\(?[^;\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}`
3450
+ )
3451
+ ],
3452
+ [
3453
+ "sends",
3454
+ /\b(?:IO::Socket|Socket|LWP|HTTP::Tiny|Net::\w+|Mojo::UserAgent|WWW::Mechanize|IO::Socket::INET)\b/
3455
+ ],
3456
+ [
3457
+ "runs-commands",
3458
+ /\b(?:system|exec|fork|kill|syscall)\b|`[^`]*`|\bqx\s*[{([/|!'"]|\bopen\s*\(?[^;\n]*(?:['"]\s*\||\|\s*['"]|['"]-\|['"])/
3459
+ ],
3460
+ ["builds-code", /\beval\b|\bStorable::thaw\b|\bdo\s+['"]/],
3461
+ ["permissions", /\b(?:chmod|chown)\b/]
3462
+ ];
3463
+ var RUBY = [
3464
+ [
3465
+ "deletes",
3466
+ /\bFile\.(?:delete|unlink)\b|\bFileUtils\.(?:rm\w*|remove\w*)\b|\bDir\.(?:rmdir|delete|unlink)\b|\.(?:rmtree|delete_all)\b/
3467
+ ],
3468
+ [
3469
+ "writes-outside",
3470
+ new RegExp(
3471
+ String.raw`\bFile\.(?:write|binwrite|symlink|rename)\s*\(?\s*['"]${OUTSIDE}|\bFile\.open\s*\(?\s*['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*,\s*['"][wa+]|\bFileUtils\.(?:cp\w*|mv|install|ln\w*|mkdir_p|touch)\s*\(?[^\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}`
3472
+ )
3473
+ ],
3474
+ [
3475
+ "sends",
3476
+ /\bNet::\w+|\b(?:TCPSocket|UDPSocket|UNIXSocket|Socket)\b|\bopen-uri\b|\bURI\.open\b|\b(?:HTTParty|Faraday|RestClient|Excon|Typhoeus)\b|\brequire\s+['"](?:socket|net\/\w+|open-uri)['"]/
3477
+ ],
3478
+ ["listens", /\b(?:TCPServer|UNIXServer|WEBrick|PTY)\b/],
3479
+ [
3480
+ "runs-commands",
3481
+ /(?<![\w.])(?:system|exec|spawn|fork)\b|`[^`]*`|%x[{([|!]|(?<![\w.])open\s*\(?\s*['"]\||\bIO\.popen\b|\bOpen3\b|\bProcess\.(?:spawn|kill|exec)\b|\bKernel\.(?:system|exec|spawn|open)\b/
3482
+ ],
3483
+ [
3484
+ "builds-code",
3485
+ /(?<![\w.])eval\b|\b(?:instance|class|module)_eval\b|\b(?:send|public_send)\s*\(?\s*:?['"]?(?:system|eval|exec|spawn)\b|\bMarshal\.load\b|\bYAML\.(?:unsafe_)?load\b|\bconst_get\b/
3486
+ ],
3487
+ ["permissions", /\b(?:File|FileUtils)\.(?:chmod|chown|lchmod|lchown)\w*\b/]
3488
+ ];
3489
+ var PHP = [
3490
+ ["deletes", /\b(?:unlink|rmdir)\s*\(/],
3491
+ [
3492
+ "writes-outside",
3493
+ new RegExp(
3494
+ String.raw`\b(?:file_put_contents|symlink|link|copy|rename|mkdir|touch)\s*\([^)\n]*['"]${OUTSIDE}|\bfopen\s*\(\s*['"]${OUTSIDE}[^'"\n]*['"]\s*,\s*['"][waxc+]`
3495
+ )
3496
+ ],
3497
+ [
3498
+ "sends",
3499
+ /\b(?:curl_exec|curl_init|fsockopen|pfsockopen|stream_socket_client|socket_create|socket_connect|mail|ftp_connect)\s*\(|\b(?:file_get_contents|fopen|file|readfile)\s*\(\s*['"](?:https?|ftp):/
3500
+ ],
3501
+ ["listens", /\b(?:stream_socket_server|socket_bind|socket_listen)\s*\(/],
3502
+ [
3503
+ "runs-commands",
3504
+ /\b(?:system|exec|shell_exec|passthru|proc_open|popen|pcntl_exec|pcntl_fork|posix_kill)\s*\(|`[^`]*`/
3505
+ ],
3506
+ [
3507
+ "builds-code",
3508
+ /\b(?:eval|assert|create_function|unserialize|call_user_func(?:_array)?)\s*\(|\bbase64_decode\b/
3509
+ ],
3510
+ ["permissions", /\b(?:chmod|chown|chgrp|lchown|lchgrp)\s*\(/]
3511
+ ];
3512
+ var TABLES = {
3513
+ python: PYTHON,
3514
+ node: NODE,
3515
+ perl: PERL,
3516
+ ruby: RUBY,
3517
+ php: PHP
3518
+ };
3519
+ function inlineLanguageOf(interp) {
3520
+ const i = interp.toLowerCase();
3521
+ if (/^python[\d.]*$/.test(i)) return "python";
3522
+ if (/^(?:node|tsx|ts-node|deno|bun)$/.test(i)) return "node";
3523
+ if (i === "perl") return "perl";
3524
+ if (i === "ruby" || i === "irb") return "ruby";
3525
+ if (i === "php") return "php";
3526
+ return null;
3527
+ }
3528
+ function resolvePythonAliases(code) {
3529
+ const aliases = [...code.matchAll(/\bimport\s+([\w.]+)\s+as\s+(\w+)/g)].slice(0, 32);
3530
+ let out = code;
3531
+ for (const [, mod, alias] of aliases) {
3532
+ if (alias === mod) continue;
3533
+ out = out.replace(new RegExp(String.raw`(?<![\w.])${alias}\b`, "g"), mod);
2596
3534
  }
2597
3535
  return out;
2598
3536
  }
2599
- var HEX_RUN_RE = /\b(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){24,}\b/g;
2600
- var HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE = /(?:\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){16,}/g;
2601
- function decodeEmbeddedHex(text) {
2602
- const out = [];
2603
- for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_RUN_RE)) {
2604
- if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
2605
- const buf = Buffer.from(m[0], "hex");
2606
- if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
2607
- }
2608
- for (const m of text.matchAll(HEX_ESCAPE_RUN_RE)) {
2609
- if (out.length >= MAX_BLOBS) break;
2610
- const buf = Buffer.from(m[0].replace(/\\x/g, ""), "hex");
2611
- if (looksLikeText(buf)) out.push(buf.toString("utf8"));
3537
+ var STRING_LITERAL = /(['"`])((?:\\.|(?!\1)[^\\\n]){1,4096})\1/g;
3538
+ function protectedLiteral(code, isProtected) {
3539
+ let n = 0;
3540
+ for (const m of code.matchAll(STRING_LITERAL)) {
3541
+ if (++n > 2048) break;
3542
+ const value = m[2].trim();
3543
+ if (value && isProtected(value)) return value;
2612
3544
  }
2613
- return out;
3545
+ return null;
2614
3546
  }
2615
- function scanViews(text) {
2616
- const views = [{ kind: "original", text }];
2617
- const normalized = normalizeForScan(text);
2618
- if (normalized !== text) views.push({ kind: "normalized", text: normalized });
2619
- for (const t of decodeEmbeddedBase64(normalized)) {
2620
- views.push({ kind: "base64", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3547
+ function amplifies(language, code) {
3548
+ const loop = language === "python" ? /\bwhile\s+(?:True|1)\s*:/ : language === "node" ? /\bwhile\s*\(\s*(?:true|1)\s*\)|\bfor\s*\(\s*;\s*;\s*\)|\bsetInterval\s*\(/ : /\bwhile\s*\(?\s*(?:1|true)\s*\)?|\bloop\s+do\b|\bfor\s*\(\s*;\s*;\s*\)/;
3549
+ const m = loop.exec(code);
3550
+ if (!m) return null;
3551
+ const body = code.slice(m.index);
3552
+ return /\.write\s*\(|\.(?:append|write)File(?:Sync)?\s*\(|\bopen\s*\(|\bprint\s*\(\s*[^)\n]*\bfile\s*=|\.send(?:all|to)?\s*\(|\bfwrite\s*\(|\bfile_put_contents\s*\(|\bsyswrite\b/.test(
3553
+ body
3554
+ ) ? m[0] : null;
3555
+ }
3556
+ function judgeInlineCode(language, code, isProtected) {
3557
+ if (code.length > MAX_INLINE_CODE) {
3558
+ return { outcome: "unreadable", what: "is too long for node9 to read" };
3559
+ }
3560
+ const text = language === "python" ? resolvePythonAliases(code) : code;
3561
+ for (const [category, re] of TABLES[language]) {
3562
+ const m = re.exec(text);
3563
+ if (!m) continue;
3564
+ const evidence = m[0].trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").slice(0, 60);
3565
+ return {
3566
+ outcome: category === "builds-code" ? "unreadable" : "dangerous",
3567
+ what: WHAT[category],
3568
+ evidence,
3569
+ category
3570
+ };
2621
3571
  }
2622
- for (const t of decodeEmbeddedHex(normalized)) {
2623
- views.push({ kind: "hex", text: normalizeForScan(t) });
3572
+ const path = protectedLiteral(text, isProtected);
3573
+ if (path) {
3574
+ return {
3575
+ outcome: "dangerous",
3576
+ what: WHAT["reads-protected"],
3577
+ evidence: path.slice(0, 60),
3578
+ category: "reads-protected"
3579
+ };
2624
3580
  }
2625
- return views;
3581
+ const loop = amplifies(language, text);
3582
+ if (loop) {
3583
+ return { outcome: "dangerous", what: WHAT.amplifies, evidence: loop, category: "amplifies" };
3584
+ }
3585
+ return null;
2626
3586
  }
2627
3587
 
2628
3588
  // src/shell/index.ts
@@ -2731,6 +3691,59 @@ function cachedNormalize(command, compute) {
2731
3691
  function normalizeCommandForPolicy(command) {
2732
3692
  return commandReadingsImpl(command).posix;
2733
3693
  }
3694
+ var INTERPRETER_LINE = /^#![ \t]*[\w./+-]+(?:[ \t]+[\w./+=:-]+)*[ \t]*\r?(?=\n|$)/;
3695
+ function fileAccessView(command) {
3696
+ const hit = accessViewCache.get(command);
3697
+ if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
3698
+ const view = fileAccessViewImpl(command);
3699
+ if (accessViewCache.size >= ACCESS_VIEW_CACHE_MAX) {
3700
+ const oldest = accessViewCache.keys().next().value;
3701
+ if (oldest !== void 0) accessViewCache.delete(oldest);
3702
+ }
3703
+ accessViewCache.set(command, view);
3704
+ return view;
3705
+ }
3706
+ var PROGRAM_DIR = /^(?:\/usr(?:\/local)?|\/opt\/homebrew|\/home\/linuxbrew\/\.linuxbrew)?\/s?bin\/[^/]+$|^\/snap\/bin\/[^/]+$|^(?![/~\\]|[A-Za-z]:|.*\.\.)/;
3707
+ var ACCESS_VIEW_CACHE_MAX = 1e3;
3708
+ var accessViewCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
3709
+ function fileAccessViewImpl(command) {
3710
+ const text = command.replace(INTERPRETER_LINE, "");
3711
+ const f = parseShared(text);
3712
+ if (f === PARSE_FAIL) return text;
3713
+ const toCharIndex = byteOffsetToCharIndex(text);
3714
+ const at = (byteOffset) => toCharIndex === null ? byteOffset : toCharIndex(byteOffset);
3715
+ const edits = [];
3716
+ try {
3717
+ syntax.Walk(f, (node) => {
3718
+ if (!node) return false;
3719
+ const n = node;
3720
+ if (syntax.NodeType(n) !== "CallExpr") return true;
3721
+ const args = n.Args || [];
3722
+ const words = args.map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
3723
+ const head = unwrapCommandHead(words);
3724
+ for (const i of /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([0, head])) {
3725
+ const word = words[i];
3726
+ if (i >= args.length || word === null || word === void 0 || !/[\\/]/.test(word)) {
3727
+ continue;
3728
+ }
3729
+ if (!PROGRAM_DIR.test(word)) continue;
3730
+ const name = word.split(/[\\/]/).pop() ?? "";
3731
+ if (!name) continue;
3732
+ const s = at(args[i].Pos().Offset());
3733
+ const e = at(args[i].End().Offset());
3734
+ if (s < 0 || e < 0) continue;
3735
+ edits.push([s, e, name]);
3736
+ }
3737
+ return true;
3738
+ });
3739
+ } catch {
3740
+ return text;
3741
+ }
3742
+ edits.sort((a, b) => b[0] - a[0]);
3743
+ let out = text;
3744
+ for (const [s, e, rep] of edits) out = out.slice(0, s) + rep + out.slice(e);
3745
+ return out;
3746
+ }
2734
3747
  function commandReadings(command) {
2735
3748
  const r = commandReadingsImpl(command);
2736
3749
  const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([r.posix, r.separator, r.folded]);
@@ -3896,53 +4909,119 @@ function unwrapCommandHead(words, stopAtFind = false, stopAtDynamic = false) {
3896
4909
  }
3897
4910
  return i;
3898
4911
  }
3899
- function inlineExecStmt(stmt, pipeFed) {
4912
+ function heredocText(word) {
4913
+ const parts = word?.Parts ?? [];
4914
+ let out = "";
4915
+ for (const p of parts) {
4916
+ if (syntax.NodeType(p) !== "Lit") return null;
4917
+ out += p.Value ?? "";
4918
+ }
4919
+ return out;
4920
+ }
4921
+ function stdinCodeOf(redirs) {
4922
+ const heredoc = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([deriveRedirOp("cat <<X\nX"), deriveRedirOp("cat <<-X\nX")]);
4923
+ const herestring = deriveRedirOp("cat <<< x");
4924
+ for (const r of redirs) {
4925
+ if (!r || !redirStdinOps().has(r.Op)) continue;
4926
+ if (heredoc.has(r.Op)) {
4927
+ const text = heredocText(r.Hdoc);
4928
+ return text === null ? { code: null, source: "variable" } : { code: text };
4929
+ }
4930
+ if (r.Op === herestring) {
4931
+ const text = resolveWordLiteral(r.Word);
4932
+ return text === null ? { code: null, source: "variable" } : { code: text };
4933
+ }
4934
+ return { code: null, source: "file" };
4935
+ }
4936
+ return { code: null, source: "file" };
4937
+ }
4938
+ function attachedCode(interp, flag) {
4939
+ const eq = flag.indexOf("=");
4940
+ if (flag.startsWith("--")) return eq >= 0 ? flag.slice(eq + 1) : null;
4941
+ if (/^(pwsh|powershell)/.test(interp)) return null;
4942
+ const letters = /^(perl|ruby|lua|bun|osascript|rscript|irb)$/.test(interp) ? "e" : /^(node|tsx|ts-node)$/.test(interp) ? "ep" : interp === "php" ? "r" : "c";
4943
+ const body = flag.slice(1);
4944
+ const at = [...body].findIndex((ch) => letters.includes(ch.toLowerCase()));
4945
+ if (at < 0) return null;
4946
+ let rest = body.slice(at + 1);
4947
+ if (letters === "ep" && /^[ep]*$/i.test(rest)) rest = "";
4948
+ return rest === "" ? null : rest;
4949
+ }
4950
+ function inlineExecCall(stmt, pipeFed) {
3900
4951
  const cmd = stmt?.Cmd;
3901
- if (!cmd || syntax.NodeType(cmd) !== "CallExpr") return false;
4952
+ if (!cmd || syntax.NodeType(cmd) !== "CallExpr") return null;
3902
4953
  const words = (cmd.Args || []).map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
3903
- if (words.length === 0) return false;
4954
+ if (words.length === 0) return null;
3904
4955
  const headIdx = unwrapCommandHead(words);
3905
4956
  const rawHead = words[headIdx];
3906
- if (rawHead == null) return false;
4957
+ if (rawHead == null) return null;
3907
4958
  const interp = (rawHead.split("/").pop() ?? "").toLowerCase();
3908
- if (!INLINE_INTERPRETER.test(interp)) return false;
4959
+ if (!INLINE_INTERPRETER.test(interp)) return null;
3909
4960
  let args = words.slice(headIdx + 1);
3910
- if (interp === "deno" && (args[0] ?? "").toLowerCase() === "eval") return true;
4961
+ if (interp === "deno" && (args[0] ?? "").toLowerCase() === "eval") {
4962
+ const code = args[1] ?? null;
4963
+ return { interp, code: [code], source: code === null ? "variable" : void 0 };
4964
+ }
3911
4965
  if (INTERP_LEADING_TARGET.has(interp)) {
3912
4966
  const firstFlag = args.findIndex((a) => a == null || a.startsWith("-"));
3913
4967
  args = firstFlag >= 0 ? args.slice(firstFlag) : [];
3914
4968
  }
4969
+ const redirs = stmt.Redirs || cmd.Redirs || [];
4970
+ const stdinFed = redirs.some((r) => r && redirStdinOps().has(r.Op));
4971
+ const fromStdin = () => {
4972
+ if (stdinFed) {
4973
+ const { code, source } = stdinCodeOf(redirs);
4974
+ return { interp, code: [code], source };
4975
+ }
4976
+ return { interp, code: [null], source: "pipe" };
4977
+ };
3915
4978
  let positionals2 = 0;
3916
4979
  let selectedProgram = false;
4980
+ const codes = [];
3917
4981
  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
3918
4982
  const a = args[i];
3919
4983
  if (a == null) {
4984
+ if (codes.length > 0) break;
3920
4985
  positionals2++;
3921
4986
  selectedProgram = true;
3922
4987
  continue;
3923
4988
  }
3924
4989
  if (!selectedProgram && isInlineCodeFlag(interp, a)) {
3925
- if (!/^(bash|sh|zsh|dash|ksh)$/.test(interp)) return true;
3926
- const payload = args[i + 1];
3927
- if (payload == null) return true;
3928
- return shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload);
4990
+ if (/^(bash|sh|zsh|dash|ksh)$/.test(interp)) {
4991
+ const payload = args[i + 1];
4992
+ if (payload == null) return { interp, code: [null], source: "variable" };
4993
+ return shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload) ? { interp, code: [null], source: "payload" } : null;
4994
+ }
4995
+ const attached = attachedCode(interp, a);
4996
+ if (attached !== null) {
4997
+ codes.push(attached);
4998
+ } else {
4999
+ codes.push(args[i + 1] ?? null);
5000
+ i++;
5001
+ }
5002
+ continue;
5003
+ }
5004
+ if (codes.length > 0) {
5005
+ if (a.startsWith("-")) continue;
5006
+ break;
3929
5007
  }
3930
5008
  if (a === "-m") {
3931
5009
  selectedProgram = true;
3932
5010
  continue;
3933
5011
  }
3934
- if (a === "-" && !selectedProgram) return true;
5012
+ if (a === "-" && !selectedProgram) return fromStdin();
3935
5013
  if (!a.startsWith("-")) {
3936
5014
  positionals2++;
3937
5015
  selectedProgram = true;
3938
5016
  }
3939
5017
  }
3940
- const redirs = stmt.Redirs || cmd.Redirs || [];
3941
- const stdinFed = redirs.some((r) => r && redirStdinOps().has(r.Op));
5018
+ if (codes.length > 0) {
5019
+ return { interp, code: codes, source: codes.includes(null) ? "variable" : void 0 };
5020
+ }
3942
5021
  if (positionals2 === 0 && (stdinFed || pipeFed)) {
3943
- if (!/^(bash|sh|zsh)$/i.test(interp)) return true;
5022
+ if (!/^(bash|sh|zsh)$/i.test(interp)) return fromStdin();
3944
5023
  }
3945
- return false;
5024
+ return null;
3946
5025
  }
3947
5026
  var MAX_PAYLOAD_NESTING = 8;
3948
5027
  var payloadNesting = 0;
@@ -3977,7 +5056,7 @@ function shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload) {
3977
5056
  payload
3978
5057
  ))
3979
5058
  review = true;
3980
- if (!review && detectInlineExec(payload)) review = true;
5059
+ if (!review && inlineExecReview(payload) !== null) review = true;
3981
5060
  } catch {
3982
5061
  review = true;
3983
5062
  } finally {
@@ -3985,35 +5064,85 @@ function shellPayloadNeedsReview(payload) {
3985
5064
  }
3986
5065
  return review;
3987
5066
  }
3988
- function detectInlineExec(command) {
5067
+ var MAX_INLINE_CALLS = 16;
5068
+ function inlineExecCalls(command) {
3989
5069
  const f = parseShared(command);
3990
- if (f === PARSE_FAIL) {
3991
- return /(^|[|;&]|&&)\s*(?:[\w./-]*\/)?(python[\d.]*|perl|ruby|node|php|lua|deno|bun|pwsh|osascript|rscript|bash|sh|zsh)\s+-{1,2}[a-z]*[ceEr]/i.test(
3992
- command
3993
- );
3994
- }
3995
- let found = false;
5070
+ if (f === PARSE_FAIL) return PARSE_FAIL;
5071
+ const calls = [];
3996
5072
  try {
3997
5073
  syntax.Walk(f, (node) => {
3998
- if (!node || found) return false;
5074
+ if (!node || calls.length >= MAX_INLINE_CALLS) return false;
3999
5075
  const n = node;
4000
5076
  const t = syntax.NodeType(n);
4001
5077
  if (t === "BinaryCmd" && n.Y && !listOps().has(n.Op)) {
4002
- if (inlineExecStmt(n.Y, true)) {
4003
- found = true;
4004
- return false;
4005
- }
5078
+ const call = inlineExecCall(n.Y, true);
5079
+ if (call) calls.push(call);
4006
5080
  }
4007
- if (t === "Stmt" && inlineExecStmt(n, false)) {
4008
- found = true;
4009
- return false;
5081
+ if (t === "Stmt") {
5082
+ const call = inlineExecCall(n, false);
5083
+ if (call) calls.push(call);
4010
5084
  }
4011
5085
  return true;
4012
5086
  });
4013
5087
  } catch {
4014
- return found;
4015
5088
  }
4016
- return found;
5089
+ return calls;
5090
+ }
5091
+ var INLINE_EXEC_FALLBACK = /(^|[|;&]|&&)\s*(?:[\w./-]*\/)?(python[\d.]*|perl|ruby|node|php|lua|deno|bun|pwsh|osascript|rscript|bash|sh|zsh)\s+-{1,2}[a-z]*[ceEr]/i;
5092
+ function detectInlineExec(command) {
5093
+ const calls = inlineExecCalls(command);
5094
+ if (calls === PARSE_FAIL) return INLINE_EXEC_FALLBACK.test(command);
5095
+ return calls.length > 0;
5096
+ }
5097
+ var UNREADABLE_SOURCE = {
5098
+ pipe: "reads its code from another program through a pipe",
5099
+ file: "reads its code from a file on stdin",
5100
+ variable: "runs code the shell fills in at run time",
5101
+ payload: "runs a shell payload that evaluates, sources or runs further code"
5102
+ };
5103
+ function isProtectedCodePath(p) {
5104
+ if (matchSensitivePath(p) !== null) return true;
5105
+ return SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES.includes(p) || SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS.some((d) => p === d || p.startsWith(d + "/"));
5106
+ }
5107
+ function inlineExecDescription(r) {
5108
+ const lead = r ? `The AI is running code directly from the command line: ${inlineExecReason(r).replace(/^This/, "this")}.` : "The AI is running code directly from the command line.";
5109
+ return `${lead} Review the full script below before allowing it to execute.`;
5110
+ }
5111
+ function inlineExecReason(r) {
5112
+ const who = r.interp ? `This inline ${r.interp} code` : "This inline code";
5113
+ return r.evidence ? `${who} ${r.what} (${r.evidence})` : `${who} ${r.what}`;
5114
+ }
5115
+ function inlineExecReview(command) {
5116
+ const calls = inlineExecCalls(command);
5117
+ if (calls === PARSE_FAIL) {
5118
+ return INLINE_EXEC_FALLBACK.test(command) ? { outcome: "unreadable", interp: "", what: "could not be parsed" } : null;
5119
+ }
5120
+ let unreadable = calls.length >= MAX_INLINE_CALLS ? { outcome: "unreadable", interp: "", what: "runs more inline programs than node9 reads" } : null;
5121
+ for (const call of calls) {
5122
+ const language = inlineLanguageOf(call.interp);
5123
+ for (const code of call.code) {
5124
+ let finding = null;
5125
+ if (code === null) {
5126
+ finding = {
5127
+ outcome: "unreadable",
5128
+ interp: call.interp,
5129
+ what: UNREADABLE_SOURCE[call.source ?? "variable"]
5130
+ };
5131
+ } else if (language === null) {
5132
+ finding = {
5133
+ outcome: "unreadable",
5134
+ interp: call.interp,
5135
+ what: `is ${call.interp} code, which node9 does not read`
5136
+ };
5137
+ } else {
5138
+ const judged = judgeInlineCode(language, code, isProtectedCodePath);
5139
+ if (judged) finding = { ...judged, interp: call.interp };
5140
+ }
5141
+ if (finding?.outcome === "dangerous") return finding;
5142
+ if (finding && !unreadable) unreadable = finding;
5143
+ }
5144
+ }
5145
+ return unreadable;
4017
5146
  }
4018
5147
  function analyzeChmod777(command) {
4019
5148
  if (!/chmod/i.test(command.replace(/[\\'"]/g, ""))) return null;
@@ -5481,46 +6610,6 @@ function analyzeShellCommand(command) {
5481
6610
  return { actions, paths, allTokens };
5482
6611
  }
5483
6612
 
5484
- // src/utils/regex.ts
5485
- var import_safe_regex22 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
5486
- var MAX_REGEX_LENGTH = 256;
5487
- var REGEX_CACHE_MAX = 500;
5488
- var regexCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
5489
- function validateRegex(pattern) {
5490
- if (!pattern) return "Pattern is required";
5491
- if (pattern.length > MAX_REGEX_LENGTH) return `Pattern exceeds max length of ${MAX_REGEX_LENGTH}`;
5492
- try {
5493
- new RegExp(pattern);
5494
- } catch (e) {
5495
- return `Invalid regex syntax: ${e.message}`;
5496
- }
5497
- if (/\\\d+[*+{]/.test(pattern)) return "Quantified backreferences are forbidden (ReDoS risk)";
5498
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex22.default)(pattern)) return "Pattern rejected: potential ReDoS vulnerability detected";
5499
- return null;
5500
- }
5501
- function getCompiledRegex(pattern, flags = "") {
5502
- if (flags && !/^[gimsuy]+$/.test(flags)) return null;
5503
- const key = `${pattern}\0${flags}`;
5504
- if (regexCache.has(key)) {
5505
- const cached = regexCache.get(key);
5506
- regexCache.delete(key);
5507
- regexCache.set(key, cached);
5508
- return cached;
5509
- }
5510
- if (validateRegex(pattern) !== null) return null;
5511
- try {
5512
- const re = new RegExp(pattern, flags);
5513
- if (regexCache.size >= REGEX_CACHE_MAX) {
5514
- const oldest = regexCache.keys().next().value;
5515
- if (oldest) regexCache.delete(oldest);
5516
- }
5517
- regexCache.set(key, re);
5518
- return re;
5519
- } catch {
5520
- return null;
5521
- }
5522
- }
5523
-
5524
6613
  // src/rules/index.ts
5525
6614
  function matchesPattern(text, patterns) {
5526
6615
  const p = Array.isArray(patterns) ? patterns : [patterns];
@@ -5532,6 +6621,18 @@ function matchesPattern(text, patterns) {
5532
6621
  const withoutDotSlash = text.replace(/^\.\//, "");
5533
6622
  return isMatch(withoutDotSlash) || isMatch(`./${withoutDotSlash}`);
5534
6623
  }
6624
+ function mcpServerFromToolName(toolName) {
6625
+ const match = toolName.match(/^mcp__([^_](?:[^_]|_(?!_))*?)__/i);
6626
+ return match?.[1];
6627
+ }
6628
+ function ruleServerMatches(rule, serverLabel) {
6629
+ const label = typeof serverLabel === "string" ? serverLabel.trim().replace(/[\\/]/g, "-") || void 0 : void 0;
6630
+ if (rule.server) {
6631
+ if (!label || !matchesPattern(label, rule.server)) return false;
6632
+ }
6633
+ if (rule.notServer && label && matchesPattern(label, rule.notServer)) return false;
6634
+ return true;
6635
+ }
5535
6636
  var FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"]);
5536
6637
  function getNestedValue(obj, path) {
5537
6638
  if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object") return null;
@@ -5555,23 +6656,26 @@ function evaluateSmartConditions(args, rule) {
5555
6656
  return val;
5556
6657
  };
5557
6658
  const readingsCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
5558
- const resolveFieldReadings = (field) => {
5559
- const cached = readingsCache.get(field);
6659
+ const resolveFieldReadings = (field, reading) => {
6660
+ const access = reading === "access" && field === "command";
6661
+ const key = access ? `${field}\0access` : field;
6662
+ const cached = readingsCache.get(key);
5560
6663
  if (cached) return cached;
5561
6664
  const primary = resolveField(field);
5562
6665
  if (primary === null) {
5563
- readingsCache.set(field, []);
6666
+ readingsCache.set(key, []);
5564
6667
  return [];
5565
6668
  }
5566
6669
  let out = [primary];
5567
6670
  if (field === "command") {
5568
6671
  const raw = getNestedValue(args, field);
5569
6672
  if (typeof raw === "string") {
5570
- const collapsed = commandReadings(raw).map((r) => r.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim());
5571
- out = [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([primary, ...collapsed])];
6673
+ const text = access ? fileAccessView(raw) : raw;
6674
+ const collapsed = commandReadings(text).map((r) => r.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim());
6675
+ out = access ? [...new Set(collapsed)] : [.../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([primary, ...collapsed])];
5572
6676
  }
5573
6677
  }
5574
- readingsCache.set(field, out);
6678
+ readingsCache.set(key, out);
5575
6679
  return out;
5576
6680
  };
5577
6681
  const results = rule.conditions.map((cond) => {
@@ -5589,14 +6693,14 @@ function evaluateSmartConditions(args, rule) {
5589
6693
  if (val === null || !cond.value) return false;
5590
6694
  const reM = getCompiledRegex(cond.value, cond.flags ?? "");
5591
6695
  if (!reM) return false;
5592
- return resolveFieldReadings(cond.field).some((v) => reM.test(v));
6696
+ return resolveFieldReadings(cond.field, cond.reading).some((v) => reM.test(v));
5593
6697
  }
5594
6698
  case "notMatches": {
5595
6699
  if (!cond.value) return false;
5596
6700
  if (val === null) return true;
5597
6701
  const reN = getCompiledRegex(cond.value, cond.flags ?? "");
5598
6702
  if (!reN) return false;
5599
- return !resolveFieldReadings(cond.field).some((v) => reN.test(v));
6703
+ return !resolveFieldReadings(cond.field, cond.reading).some((v) => reN.test(v));
5600
6704
  }
5601
6705
  case "matchesGlob":
5602
6706
  return val !== null && cond.value ? import_picomatch.default.isMatch(val, cond.value) : false;
@@ -6557,76 +7661,6 @@ function collectShellFileAccesses(command, context = {}) {
6557
7661
  return out;
6558
7662
  }
6559
7663
 
6560
- // src/files/paths.ts
6561
- var SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES = [
6562
- "/etc/passwd",
6563
- "/etc/shadow",
6564
- "/etc/group",
6565
- "/etc/gshadow",
6566
- "/etc/sudoers"
6567
- ];
6568
- var SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS = ["/etc/security", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/sudoers.d"];
6569
- var PASSWORD_HASH_FILES = ["/etc/shadow", "/etc/gshadow"];
6570
- var STARTUP_NAMES = [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile"];
6571
- var SYSTEM_DIRS = [
6572
- "/usr",
6573
- "/etc",
6574
- "/boot",
6575
- "/bin",
6576
- "/sbin",
6577
- "/lib",
6578
- "/lib64",
6579
- "/var/log"
6580
- ];
6581
- var SYSTEM_DIRS_EXEMPT = ["/usr/local", "/usr/src"];
6582
- var UPLOAD_SYSTEM_DIRS = [...SYSTEM_DIRS, "/proc", "/sys", "/root"];
6583
- var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES = [
6584
- ".gitlab-ci.yml",
6585
- "CLAUDE.md",
6586
- "AGENTS.md",
6587
- ".cursorrules",
6588
- ".mcp.json",
6589
- ".vscode/settings.json",
6590
- "package.json"
6591
- ];
6592
- var AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS = [
6593
- ".github/workflows",
6594
- ".claude",
6595
- ".cursor",
6596
- ".git/hooks",
6597
- ".husky"
6598
- ];
6599
- function isAgentInstructionPath(absPath, root) {
6600
- const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "");
6601
- if (!(absPath === r || absPath.startsWith(r + "/"))) return false;
6602
- const rel = absPath.slice(r.length + 1);
6603
- if (AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES.includes(rel)) return true;
6604
- return AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS.some((d) => rel === d || rel.startsWith(d + "/"));
6605
- }
6606
- function isInside(root, p) {
6607
- const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "") || "/";
6608
- return p === r || p.startsWith(r === "/" ? "/" : r + "/");
6609
- }
6610
- var LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z]:)?\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers)$/;
6611
- function isPasswordHashPath(p) {
6612
- return PASSWORD_HASH_FILES.includes(p);
6613
- }
6614
- function isLegacySystemPath(p) {
6615
- return LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE.test(p);
6616
- }
6617
- function normalizeFilePath(p, cwd = "", home = "~") {
6618
- if (!p.startsWith("/") && !p.startsWith("~") && cwd) p = `${cwd}/${p}`;
6619
- if (p === "~" || p.startsWith("~/")) p = home + p.slice(1);
6620
- const rooted = p.startsWith("/");
6621
- const parts = [];
6622
- for (const part of p.split("/")) {
6623
- if (!part || part === ".") continue;
6624
- if (part === ".." && parts.length && parts.at(-1) !== "..") parts.pop();
6625
- else if (part !== ".." || !rooted) parts.push(part);
6626
- }
6627
- return (rooted ? "/" : "") + parts.join("/");
6628
- }
6629
-
6630
7664
  // src/files/protected-access.ts
6631
7665
  function incompleteFileVerdict(operation = "write") {
6632
7666
  return {
@@ -6809,7 +7843,7 @@ function evaluateProtectedFileAccess(accesses, context, settings) {
6809
7843
  }
6810
7844
 
6811
7845
  // src/dlp/index.ts
6812
- var import_safe_regex23 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
7846
+ var import_safe_regex22 = __toESM(require("safe-regex2"));
6813
7847
 
6814
7848
  // src/dlp/mnemonic.ts
6815
7849
  var import_node_crypto = require("crypto");
@@ -10542,14 +11576,14 @@ var SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES = [
10542
11576
  ];
10543
11577
  function assertBuiltinPatternsAreSafe() {
10544
11578
  for (const p of DLP_PATTERNS) {
10545
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex23.default)(p.regex.source)) {
11579
+ if (!(0, import_safe_regex22.default)(p.regex.source)) {
10546
11580
  throw new Error(
10547
11581
  `[node9 engine] Builtin DLP pattern '${p.name}' is vulnerable to ReDoS: ${p.regex.source}`
10548
11582
  );
10549
11583
  }
10550
11584
  }
10551
11585
  for (const re of SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS) {
10552
- if (!(0, import_safe_regex23.default)(re.source)) {
11586
+ if (!(0, import_safe_regex22.default)(re.source)) {
10553
11587
  throw new Error(
10554
11588
  `[node9 engine] Builtin sensitive-path pattern is vulnerable to ReDoS: ${re.source}`
10555
11589
  );
@@ -11991,7 +13025,11 @@ var MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
11991
13025
  "commands.disk-destroy",
11992
13026
  "commands.dangerous-word",
11993
13027
  "commands.node9-disarm",
11994
- "data.pipe-chain"
13028
+ "data.pipe-chain",
13029
+ // The general action checks (node9Firewall#390): smart rules the map governs.
13030
+ "actions.money",
13031
+ "actions.access",
13032
+ "actions.publish"
11995
13033
  ]);
11996
13034
  var KNOB_GOVERNED = {
11997
13035
  "data.secrets": ["off", "block"],
@@ -12940,11 +13978,15 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
12940
13978
  };
12941
13979
  const ruleCheck = (rule) => {
12942
13980
  if (rule.verdict === "allow") return void 0;
12943
- if (!rule.builtin || rule.pinned) return void 0;
13981
+ if (!rule.builtin) return void 0;
12944
13982
  const id = checkIdForRule(rule.name);
12945
13983
  if (!id) return void 0;
12946
13984
  const def = getCheck(id);
12947
13985
  if (!def) return void 0;
13986
+ if (rule.pinned) {
13987
+ const explicit = config.policy.checks?.[id];
13988
+ return def.pack && config.policy.checkSources?.[id] === "workspace" && isVerdict(explicit) ? { id, value: explicit } : void 0;
13989
+ }
12948
13990
  if (rule.name?.startsWith("shield:") && !def.pack) return void 0;
12949
13991
  if (def.pack) {
12950
13992
  const explicit = config.policy.checks?.[id];
@@ -12952,8 +13994,10 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
12952
13994
  }
12953
13995
  return { id, value: cv(id) };
12954
13996
  };
13997
+ const serverLabel = context.mcpServer ?? mcpServerFromToolName(toolName);
12955
13998
  const matches = config.policy.smartRules.filter((rule) => {
12956
13999
  if (!toolMatchesRule(toolName, rule.tool, layers)) return false;
14000
+ if (!ruleServerMatches(rule, serverLabel)) return false;
12957
14001
  if (astSuppressed(rule)) return false;
12958
14002
  if (rmCleanupWaiver && rule.name === "review-rm" && rule.verdict === "review") return false;
12959
14003
  if (!evaluateSmartConditions(shellRuleArgs(toolName, args, rule.tool, layers), rule))
@@ -13030,11 +14074,13 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
13030
14074
  if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
13031
14075
  else if (v) candidates.push(v);
13032
14076
  };
13033
- if (detectInlineExec(shellCommand)) {
14077
+ const inline = config.settings.mode === "strict" ? detectInlineExec(shellCommand) ? void 0 : null : inlineExecReview(shellCommand);
14078
+ if (inline !== null) {
13034
14079
  consider("commands.inline-exec", {
13035
14080
  decision: "review",
13036
14081
  blockedByLabel: "Node9 Standard (Inline Execution)",
13037
- ruleDescription: "The AI is running code directly from the command line. Review the full script below before allowing it to execute.",
14082
+ ...inline ? { reason: inlineExecReason(inline) } : {},
14083
+ ruleDescription: inlineExecDescription(inline),
13038
14084
  tier: 3,
13039
14085
  checkId: "commands.inline-exec"
13040
14086
  });
@@ -14249,6 +15295,74 @@ function safeMessage(value, max = 300) {
14249
15295
  return s.length > max ? s.slice(0, max - 1) + "\u2026" : s;
14250
15296
  }
14251
15297
 
15298
+ // src/suggest.ts
15299
+ function unwrapRuleLabel(label) {
15300
+ return ruleNameInLabel(label.trim()) ?? label.trim();
15301
+ }
15302
+ var SHIELD_RULE = /^shield:([a-z0-9-]+):((?:review|block)-[a-z0-9-]+)$/;
15303
+ var ACTION_RULE = /^review-action-(money|access|publish)-/;
15304
+ function packRowOf(ruleName, shield) {
15305
+ const id = checkIdForRule(ruleName);
15306
+ const def = id ? CHECK_BY_ID.get(id) : void 0;
15307
+ return def?.pack === shield && def.legacy?.includes(ruleName) ? id : void 0;
15308
+ }
15309
+ function suggestFromApprovals(rows, opts = {}) {
15310
+ const minApprovals = opts.minApprovals ?? 3;
15311
+ const minSessions = opts.minSessions ?? 2;
15312
+ const byKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
15313
+ for (const r of rows) {
15314
+ const ruleName = unwrapRuleLabel(r.ruleName);
15315
+ const action = ACTION_RULE.exec(ruleName);
15316
+ if (action && checkIdForRule(ruleName) !== `actions.${action[1]}`) continue;
15317
+ if (action && !r.server) continue;
15318
+ const key = action ? `server:${r.server.toLowerCase()}:${action[1]}` : `rule:${ruleName}`;
15319
+ const isAction = action !== null;
15320
+ const acc = byKey.get(key) ?? {
15321
+ ruleName,
15322
+ server: isAction ? r.server : void 0,
15323
+ approvals: 0,
15324
+ sessions: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
15325
+ denied: false
15326
+ };
15327
+ if (r.decision === "denied") acc.denied = true;
15328
+ else {
15329
+ acc.approvals += 1;
15330
+ if (r.sessionId) acc.sessions.add(r.sessionId);
15331
+ }
15332
+ byKey.set(key, acc);
15333
+ }
15334
+ const out = [];
15335
+ for (const acc of byKey.values()) {
15336
+ if (acc.denied || acc.approvals < minApprovals || acc.sessions.size < minSessions) continue;
15337
+ const shieldRule = SHIELD_RULE.exec(acc.ruleName);
15338
+ if (shieldRule) {
15339
+ const checkId = packRowOf(acc.ruleName, shieldRule[1]);
15340
+ if (!checkId) continue;
15341
+ out.push({
15342
+ kind: "quiet-rule",
15343
+ ruleName: acc.ruleName,
15344
+ shield: shieldRule[1],
15345
+ rule: shieldRule[2],
15346
+ checkId,
15347
+ approvals: acc.approvals,
15348
+ sessions: acc.sessions.size
15349
+ });
15350
+ continue;
15351
+ }
15352
+ const action = ACTION_RULE.exec(acc.ruleName);
15353
+ if (action && acc.server) {
15354
+ out.push({
15355
+ kind: "link-server",
15356
+ server: acc.server,
15357
+ checkId: `actions.${action[1]}`,
15358
+ approvals: acc.approvals,
15359
+ sessions: acc.sessions.size
15360
+ });
15361
+ }
15362
+ }
15363
+ return out.sort((a, b) => b.approvals - a.approvals);
15364
+ }
15365
+
14252
15366
  // src/loop/index.ts
14253
15367
  var import_crypto3 = __toESM(require("crypto"));
14254
15368
  var LOOP_MAX_RECORDS = 500;
@@ -14720,8 +15834,8 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
14720
15834
 
14721
15835
  // src/scan/canonical.ts
14722
15836
  var LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
14723
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
14724
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "3b936dab47d27942";
15837
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v30";
15838
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "d55f1f9e5bee7e41";
14725
15839
  var DEDUPE_PREVIEW_LEN = 120;
14726
15840
  function extractCanonicalFindings(call, ctx) {
14727
15841
  const out = [];
@@ -15092,9 +16206,13 @@ function* stringValues(obj, depth = 0) {
15092
16206
  var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15093
16207
  // Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
15094
16208
  0 && (module.exports = {
15095
- ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES,
16209
+ ACTION_CHECKS,
16210
+ ACTION_TEMPLATES,
15096
16211
  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS,
15097
16212
  AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES,
16213
+ APP_SERVER_GLOB,
16214
+ APP_SHIELD_NAMES,
16215
+ APP_SHIELD_SPECS,
15098
16216
  ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS,
15099
16217
  AST_FS_REGEX_RULES,
15100
16218
  BASH_TOOL_NAMES,
@@ -15121,6 +16239,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15121
16239
  FILE_TOOLS,
15122
16240
  FLAGS_WITH_VALUES,
15123
16241
  FS_READ_TOOLS,
16242
+ GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
15124
16243
  KNOB_GOVERNED,
15125
16244
  LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
15126
16245
  LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
@@ -15132,6 +16251,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15132
16251
  PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
15133
16252
  PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
15134
16253
  REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS,
16254
+ REPLACED_SHIELDS,
15135
16255
  SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS,
15136
16256
  SENSITIVE_PATH_RE,
15137
16257
  SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES,
@@ -15192,6 +16312,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15192
16312
  extractShellDestTokens,
15193
16313
  extractShellDestinations,
15194
16314
  extractToolDestinations,
16315
+ fileAccessView,
15195
16316
  fileOperandFlagsOf,
15196
16317
  fileToolOperation,
15197
16318
  foldHomoglyphs,
@@ -15202,6 +16323,9 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15202
16323
  hashDestination,
15203
16324
  hostMatches,
15204
16325
  incompleteFileVerdict,
16326
+ inlineExecDescription,
16327
+ inlineExecReason,
16328
+ inlineExecReview,
15205
16329
  inspectArgumentSecrets,
15206
16330
  inspectionEntry,
15207
16331
  inspectionLayers,
@@ -15232,6 +16356,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15232
16356
  matchesPattern,
15233
16357
  matchesTrustedEntry,
15234
16358
  matchesTrustedList,
16359
+ mcpServerFromToolName,
15235
16360
  narrativeRuleLabel,
15236
16361
  normalizeCommandForPolicy,
15237
16362
  normalizeDestination,
@@ -15252,6 +16377,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15252
16377
  resolveCheckMap,
15253
16378
  resolvePinned,
15254
16379
  resolveShellInput,
16380
+ ruleServerMatches,
15255
16381
  safeMessage,
15256
16382
  sampleCopyCommand,
15257
16383
  scanArgs,
@@ -15270,6 +16396,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15270
16396
  stripControlChars,
15271
16397
  stripInvisible,
15272
16398
  stripTerminalEscapes,
16399
+ suggestFromApprovals,
15273
16400
  summarizeBlast,
15274
16401
  summarizeScan,
15275
16402
  toScanFinding,
@@ -15279,6 +16406,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
15279
16406
  tuningFromLegacyPolicy,
15280
16407
  tuningToLegacyPolicy,
15281
16408
  unwrapCommandHead,
16409
+ unwrapRuleLabel,
15282
16410
  validateOverrides,
15283
16411
  validateRegex,
15284
16412
  validateShieldDefinition