@node9/policy-engine 2.37.0 → 2.38.0

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package/dist/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ interface SmartCondition {
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  op: 'matches' | 'notMatches' | 'contains' | 'notContains' | 'exists' | 'notExists' | 'matchesGlob' | 'notMatchesGlob';
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  value?: string;
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  flags?: string;
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+ /**
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+ * Which reading of a `command` field the regex ops test. Absent: the whole
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+ * command text. 'access': the command as a file-access rule sees it, without
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+ * a script's interpreter line and with the program each command runs cut to
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+ * its name (fileAccessView). Set by the jail's path rules (fw#385).
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+ */
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+ reading?: 'access';
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  }
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  /**
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  * A user-defined or shield-defined rule. The matcher applies it to a
@@ -26,6 +33,20 @@ interface SmartCondition {
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  interface SmartRule {
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  name?: string;
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  tool: string;
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+ /**
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+ * Glob (case-insensitive) the call's MCP server label must match: the
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+ * gateway's resolved label, or `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>`
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+ * name. A call with no label (a shell command, a bare tool name) never
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+ * matches a rule that sets this. Lets an app's shield say "only Stripe's
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+ * create_refund", not every server's (node9Firewall#390).
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+ */
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+ server?: string;
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+ /**
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+ * Glob the call's MCP server label must NOT match. A call with no label
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+ * passes. The general action checks use it to stay off a server an app
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+ * shield claims, so turning that shield off makes the app quiet.
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+ */
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+ notServer?: string;
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  conditions: SmartCondition[];
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  conditionMode?: 'all' | 'any';
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  verdict: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
@@ -257,7 +278,7 @@ declare const VERDICTS: readonly Verdict[];
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  declare const CHECK_VERDICT_RANK: Record<Verdict, number>;
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  declare function isVerdict(v: unknown): v is Verdict;
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  /** Groups are by what the user fears, not by the mechanism that catches it. */
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- type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading';
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+ type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading' | 'actions';
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  declare const CHECK_GROUPS: readonly {
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  id: CheckGroup;
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  title: string;
@@ -433,11 +454,29 @@ interface FileAccessContext {
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  accesses?: FileAccess[];
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  }
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+ type InlineCodeCategory = 'deletes' | 'writes-outside' | 'sends' | 'listens' | 'runs-commands' | 'reads-protected' | 'builds-code' | 'permissions' | 'monitors' | 'amplifies';
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+
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  /**
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  * The POSIX reading of a command. Kept as the single-string API every existing
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  * caller (canonical.ts, the detectors, `explain`) already depends on.
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  */
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  declare function normalizeCommandForPolicy(command: string): string;
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+ /**
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+ * The command as a file-access rule sees it (node9Firewall#385). A jail of
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+ * /usr or /bin must not meet `#!/usr/bin/env bash` or `/usr/bin/python3 app.py`:
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+ * the interpreter line names the program that runs the script and the program
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+ * path names what runs; neither is a file the command reads. So the clean
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+ * interpreter line on the first line is dropped, and the program word of each
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+ * command (after `sudo`, `env` and the other wrappers) is cut to its name.
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+ * Every argument and redirect stays, so `cat /usr/share/x`, `bash /etc/x.sh`
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+ * (the script is read) and `wc < /etc/hosts` still meet the jail.
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+ *
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+ * Only a program in a system program directory, or a relative one, is cut
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+ * (PROGRAM_DIR): a script run from a jailed directory keeps its path and still
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+ * meets the jail. An unparsable command is returned unchanged (the strict
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+ * direction for a jail).
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+ */
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+ declare function fileAccessView(command: string): string;
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  /**
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  * AST-based detection of dangerous shell execution patterns.
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  *
@@ -559,10 +598,31 @@ declare function unwrapCommandHead(words: (string | null)[], stopAtFind?: boolea
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  /**
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  * AST-aware inline-execution detector. Returns true when the command runs code
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  * supplied on the command line, via stdin, or via a pipe into a bare
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- * interpreter. Structural, so it is not fooled by quoting, escapes, option
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- * bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure.
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+ * interpreter, whatever the code does. Structural, so it is not fooled by
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+ * quoting, escapes, option bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure. Strict mode asks
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+ * on this; every other mode asks on inlineExecReview.
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  */
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  declare function detectInlineExec(command: string): boolean;
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+ /** Why a command's inline code needs a review: what it does, in which language. */
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+ interface InlineExecReview {
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+ outcome: 'dangerous' | 'unreadable';
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+ interp: string;
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+ /** "deletes files", "reads its code from a pipe" ... */
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+ what: string;
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+ evidence?: string;
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+ category?: InlineCodeCategory;
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+ }
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+ /** What the approval prompt says about an inline-code review. */
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+ declare function inlineExecDescription(r: InlineExecReview | null | undefined): string;
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+ /** The approval prompt's reason for an inline-code review. */
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+ declare function inlineExecReason(r: InlineExecReview): string;
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+ /**
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+ * Does the inline code in this command need a review (node9Firewall#385)? Null
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+ * when every inline call is readable code that does nothing dangerous; else the
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+ * first dangerous finding, or the first unreadable one when none is dangerous.
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+ * A command with no inline code returns null.
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+ */
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+ declare function inlineExecReview(command: string): InlineExecReview | null;
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  /**
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  * True when `path` is under $HOME (~ or absolute /home/* or /root) AND not in
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  * the tool-managed cache allow-list. Used to gate `rm -rf` on home paths.
@@ -773,6 +833,9 @@ interface PolicyConfig {
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  * shape by hand; the catalog then answers from those knobs.
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  */
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  checks?: Record<string, string>;
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+ /** Where each `checks` value came from (the host's resolution). A pinned,
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+ * cloud-mandated pack rule follows only a `workspace` value (fw#390). */
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+ checkSources?: Record<string, 'local' | 'project' | 'workspace'>;
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  };
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  settings: {
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  mode: string;
@@ -805,6 +868,13 @@ interface PolicyContext extends FileAccessContext {
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  * trusted host code; absent means the engine scans.
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  */
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  argumentScan?: DlpMatch | null;
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+ /**
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+ * The MCP server label the host resolved for this call (the gateway's
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+ * `resolveServerLabel`, the hook's `mcp__<server>__` prefix). Absent: the
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+ * engine derives it from a namespaced tool name. Scopes rules that set
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+ * `server` / `notServer` (node9Firewall#390).
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+ */
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+ mcpServer?: string;
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  }
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  type ProvenanceTrust = 'system' | 'managed' | 'user' | 'suspect' | 'unknown';
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  interface ProvenanceLookup {
@@ -1351,6 +1421,18 @@ declare function classifyShellExposure(command: string): ShellExposure;
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  * vice-versa so authoring is forgiving.
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  */
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  declare function matchesPattern(text: string, patterns: string[] | string): boolean;
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+ /** `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>` name: the hook's spelling. Same
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+ * pattern as the gateway's extractMcpServer. */
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+ declare function mcpServerFromToolName(toolName: string): string | undefined;
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+ /**
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+ * Whether a rule's server scope admits a call (node9Firewall#390). `server`
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+ * needs a label that matches; `notServer` refuses a label that matches and
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+ * admits a call with none.
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+ */
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+ declare function ruleServerMatches(rule: {
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+ server?: string;
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+ notServer?: string;
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+ }, serverLabel: string | undefined): boolean;
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  /**
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  * Reads `obj.a.b.c` style nested keys. Returns null when any segment is
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  * missing, the parent isn't an object, or the path attempts to walk the
@@ -1402,6 +1484,43 @@ declare function stripControlChars(s: string): string;
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  */
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  declare function safeMessage(value: unknown, max?: number): string;
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+ interface ApprovalRow {
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+ /** The rule or label the review carried (`shield:stripe:review-refund`, or
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+ * `Smart Rule: shield:stripe:review-refund`). */
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+ ruleName: string;
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+ decision: 'approved' | 'denied';
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+ sessionId?: string;
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+ /** The MCP server label, when the call came through one. */
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+ server?: string;
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+ }
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+ type Suggestion = {
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+ kind: 'quiet-rule';
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+ ruleName: string;
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+ shield: string;
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+ /** The rule's part after the shield (`review-refund`). */
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+ rule: string;
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+ /** Its pack row in the checks catalog (`packs.stripe.refund`). */
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+ checkId: string;
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+ approvals: number;
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+ sessions: number;
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+ } | {
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+ kind: 'link-server';
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+ server: string;
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+ /** The general check that asked (`actions.money`). */
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+ checkId: string;
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+ approvals: number;
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+ sessions: number;
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+ };
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+ interface SuggestOptions {
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+ minApprovals?: number;
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+ minSessions?: number;
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+ }
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+ /** `Smart Rule: shield:x:y` and the other wrapping labels -> `shield:x:y`;
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+ * anything else is returned as it is. The catalog's own reading, so a rule
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+ * name that only contains a shield-like part is not taken for one. */
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+ declare function unwrapRuleLabel(label: string): string;
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+ declare function suggestFromApprovals(rows: readonly ApprovalRow[], opts?: SuggestOptions): Suggestion[];
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+
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  interface ShieldDefinition {
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  name: string;
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  description: string;
@@ -1433,16 +1552,44 @@ declare function validateOverrides(raw: unknown): {
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  warnings: string[];
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  };
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  /**
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- * The 13 shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
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+ * The shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
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  * ~/.node9/shields/*.json are merged on top of these by the host.
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  */
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  declare const BUILTIN_SHIELDS: Record<string, ShieldDefinition>;
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- /**
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- * The category shields for dangerous actions on MCP apps (node9Firewall#385):
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- * enabled from the Apps page for the apps a user connects, not recommended by
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- * a repository or history scan, which has nothing to say about them.
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- */
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- declare const ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
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+
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+ type ActionTemplateName = 'finance' | 'identity' | 'publishing';
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+ declare const ACTION_TEMPLATES: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, readonly SmartRule[]>>;
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+ /** The general check each template feeds, and the word its rules carry. */
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+ declare const ACTION_CHECKS: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, {
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+ checkId: string;
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+ slug: string;
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+ label: string;
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+ }>>;
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+ interface AppShieldSpec {
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+ name: string;
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+ label: string;
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+ description: string;
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+ template: ActionTemplateName;
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+ /** Glob for the app's MCP server label (case-insensitive). */
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+ server: string;
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+ /** The app's other doors, as bash rules (the code door is a session script
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+ * judged as a Bash command, so it is a bash rule too). */
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+ doors: SmartRule[];
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+ /** Tools of the vendor's own MCP server that the template's names miss
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+ * (Square's single make_api_request); scoped to the server like the
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+ * template's. */
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+ mcpTools?: SmartRule[];
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+ }
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+ declare const APP_SHIELD_SPECS: readonly AppShieldSpec[];
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+ /** The app shields' names. node9 turns one on when it finds the app; a history
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+ * scan with no hit for it does not pitch it. */
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+ declare const APP_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
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+ /** Every MCP server an app shield claims, as one glob: `{*stripe*,*paypal*}`. */
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+ declare const APP_SERVER_GLOB: string;
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+ declare const GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: readonly SmartRule[];
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+ /** The three shields 2.37.0 shipped and this release replaces, with what to
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+ * use instead. `node9 shield enable finance` answers with this. */
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+ declare const REPLACED_SHIELDS: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
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  interface ToolCallRecord {
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  /** tool name */
@@ -2063,7 +2210,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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  * is loud, not silent.
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v30";
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  /**
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  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2074,7 +2221,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
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  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "3b936dab47d27942";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "d55f1f9e5bee7e41";
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  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  /**
@@ -2186,5 +2333,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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- export { ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2190
- export type { ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
2336
+ export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2337
+ export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ interface SmartCondition {
13
13
  op: 'matches' | 'notMatches' | 'contains' | 'notContains' | 'exists' | 'notExists' | 'matchesGlob' | 'notMatchesGlob';
14
14
  value?: string;
15
15
  flags?: string;
16
+ /**
17
+ * Which reading of a `command` field the regex ops test. Absent: the whole
18
+ * command text. 'access': the command as a file-access rule sees it, without
19
+ * a script's interpreter line and with the program each command runs cut to
20
+ * its name (fileAccessView). Set by the jail's path rules (fw#385).
21
+ */
22
+ reading?: 'access';
16
23
  }
17
24
  /**
18
25
  * A user-defined or shield-defined rule. The matcher applies it to a
@@ -26,6 +33,20 @@ interface SmartCondition {
26
33
  interface SmartRule {
27
34
  name?: string;
28
35
  tool: string;
36
+ /**
37
+ * Glob (case-insensitive) the call's MCP server label must match: the
38
+ * gateway's resolved label, or `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>`
39
+ * name. A call with no label (a shell command, a bare tool name) never
40
+ * matches a rule that sets this. Lets an app's shield say "only Stripe's
41
+ * create_refund", not every server's (node9Firewall#390).
42
+ */
43
+ server?: string;
44
+ /**
45
+ * Glob the call's MCP server label must NOT match. A call with no label
46
+ * passes. The general action checks use it to stay off a server an app
47
+ * shield claims, so turning that shield off makes the app quiet.
48
+ */
49
+ notServer?: string;
29
50
  conditions: SmartCondition[];
30
51
  conditionMode?: 'all' | 'any';
31
52
  verdict: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
@@ -257,7 +278,7 @@ declare const VERDICTS: readonly Verdict[];
257
278
  declare const CHECK_VERDICT_RANK: Record<Verdict, number>;
258
279
  declare function isVerdict(v: unknown): v is Verdict;
259
280
  /** Groups are by what the user fears, not by the mechanism that catches it. */
260
- type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading';
281
+ type CheckGroup = 'commands' | 'data' | 'network' | 'files' | 'behavior' | 'loading' | 'actions';
261
282
  declare const CHECK_GROUPS: readonly {
262
283
  id: CheckGroup;
263
284
  title: string;
@@ -433,11 +454,29 @@ interface FileAccessContext {
433
454
  accesses?: FileAccess[];
434
455
  }
435
456
 
457
+ type InlineCodeCategory = 'deletes' | 'writes-outside' | 'sends' | 'listens' | 'runs-commands' | 'reads-protected' | 'builds-code' | 'permissions' | 'monitors' | 'amplifies';
458
+
436
459
  /**
437
460
  * The POSIX reading of a command. Kept as the single-string API every existing
438
461
  * caller (canonical.ts, the detectors, `explain`) already depends on.
439
462
  */
440
463
  declare function normalizeCommandForPolicy(command: string): string;
464
+ /**
465
+ * The command as a file-access rule sees it (node9Firewall#385). A jail of
466
+ * /usr or /bin must not meet `#!/usr/bin/env bash` or `/usr/bin/python3 app.py`:
467
+ * the interpreter line names the program that runs the script and the program
468
+ * path names what runs; neither is a file the command reads. So the clean
469
+ * interpreter line on the first line is dropped, and the program word of each
470
+ * command (after `sudo`, `env` and the other wrappers) is cut to its name.
471
+ * Every argument and redirect stays, so `cat /usr/share/x`, `bash /etc/x.sh`
472
+ * (the script is read) and `wc < /etc/hosts` still meet the jail.
473
+ *
474
+ * Only a program in a system program directory, or a relative one, is cut
475
+ * (PROGRAM_DIR): a script run from a jailed directory keeps its path and still
476
+ * meets the jail. An unparsable command is returned unchanged (the strict
477
+ * direction for a jail).
478
+ */
479
+ declare function fileAccessView(command: string): string;
441
480
  /**
442
481
  * AST-based detection of dangerous shell execution patterns.
443
482
  *
@@ -559,10 +598,31 @@ declare function unwrapCommandHead(words: (string | null)[], stopAtFind?: boolea
559
598
  /**
560
599
  * AST-aware inline-execution detector. Returns true when the command runs code
561
600
  * supplied on the command line, via stdin, or via a pipe into a bare
562
- * interpreter. Structural, so it is not fooled by quoting, escapes, option
563
- * bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure.
601
+ * interpreter, whatever the code does. Structural, so it is not fooled by
602
+ * quoting, escapes, option bundles, or wrapper nesting. Pure. Strict mode asks
603
+ * on this; every other mode asks on inlineExecReview.
564
604
  */
565
605
  declare function detectInlineExec(command: string): boolean;
606
+ /** Why a command's inline code needs a review: what it does, in which language. */
607
+ interface InlineExecReview {
608
+ outcome: 'dangerous' | 'unreadable';
609
+ interp: string;
610
+ /** "deletes files", "reads its code from a pipe" ... */
611
+ what: string;
612
+ evidence?: string;
613
+ category?: InlineCodeCategory;
614
+ }
615
+ /** What the approval prompt says about an inline-code review. */
616
+ declare function inlineExecDescription(r: InlineExecReview | null | undefined): string;
617
+ /** The approval prompt's reason for an inline-code review. */
618
+ declare function inlineExecReason(r: InlineExecReview): string;
619
+ /**
620
+ * Does the inline code in this command need a review (node9Firewall#385)? Null
621
+ * when every inline call is readable code that does nothing dangerous; else the
622
+ * first dangerous finding, or the first unreadable one when none is dangerous.
623
+ * A command with no inline code returns null.
624
+ */
625
+ declare function inlineExecReview(command: string): InlineExecReview | null;
566
626
  /**
567
627
  * True when `path` is under $HOME (~ or absolute /home/* or /root) AND not in
568
628
  * the tool-managed cache allow-list. Used to gate `rm -rf` on home paths.
@@ -773,6 +833,9 @@ interface PolicyConfig {
773
833
  * shape by hand; the catalog then answers from those knobs.
774
834
  */
775
835
  checks?: Record<string, string>;
836
+ /** Where each `checks` value came from (the host's resolution). A pinned,
837
+ * cloud-mandated pack rule follows only a `workspace` value (fw#390). */
838
+ checkSources?: Record<string, 'local' | 'project' | 'workspace'>;
776
839
  };
777
840
  settings: {
778
841
  mode: string;
@@ -805,6 +868,13 @@ interface PolicyContext extends FileAccessContext {
805
868
  * trusted host code; absent means the engine scans.
806
869
  */
807
870
  argumentScan?: DlpMatch | null;
871
+ /**
872
+ * The MCP server label the host resolved for this call (the gateway's
873
+ * `resolveServerLabel`, the hook's `mcp__<server>__` prefix). Absent: the
874
+ * engine derives it from a namespaced tool name. Scopes rules that set
875
+ * `server` / `notServer` (node9Firewall#390).
876
+ */
877
+ mcpServer?: string;
808
878
  }
809
879
  type ProvenanceTrust = 'system' | 'managed' | 'user' | 'suspect' | 'unknown';
810
880
  interface ProvenanceLookup {
@@ -1351,6 +1421,18 @@ declare function classifyShellExposure(command: string): ShellExposure;
1351
1421
  * vice-versa so authoring is forgiving.
1352
1422
  */
1353
1423
  declare function matchesPattern(text: string, patterns: string[] | string): boolean;
1424
+ /** `<server>` from a `mcp__<server>__<tool>` name: the hook's spelling. Same
1425
+ * pattern as the gateway's extractMcpServer. */
1426
+ declare function mcpServerFromToolName(toolName: string): string | undefined;
1427
+ /**
1428
+ * Whether a rule's server scope admits a call (node9Firewall#390). `server`
1429
+ * needs a label that matches; `notServer` refuses a label that matches and
1430
+ * admits a call with none.
1431
+ */
1432
+ declare function ruleServerMatches(rule: {
1433
+ server?: string;
1434
+ notServer?: string;
1435
+ }, serverLabel: string | undefined): boolean;
1354
1436
  /**
1355
1437
  * Reads `obj.a.b.c` style nested keys. Returns null when any segment is
1356
1438
  * missing, the parent isn't an object, or the path attempts to walk the
@@ -1402,6 +1484,43 @@ declare function stripControlChars(s: string): string;
1402
1484
  */
1403
1485
  declare function safeMessage(value: unknown, max?: number): string;
1404
1486
 
1487
+ interface ApprovalRow {
1488
+ /** The rule or label the review carried (`shield:stripe:review-refund`, or
1489
+ * `Smart Rule: shield:stripe:review-refund`). */
1490
+ ruleName: string;
1491
+ decision: 'approved' | 'denied';
1492
+ sessionId?: string;
1493
+ /** The MCP server label, when the call came through one. */
1494
+ server?: string;
1495
+ }
1496
+ type Suggestion = {
1497
+ kind: 'quiet-rule';
1498
+ ruleName: string;
1499
+ shield: string;
1500
+ /** The rule's part after the shield (`review-refund`). */
1501
+ rule: string;
1502
+ /** Its pack row in the checks catalog (`packs.stripe.refund`). */
1503
+ checkId: string;
1504
+ approvals: number;
1505
+ sessions: number;
1506
+ } | {
1507
+ kind: 'link-server';
1508
+ server: string;
1509
+ /** The general check that asked (`actions.money`). */
1510
+ checkId: string;
1511
+ approvals: number;
1512
+ sessions: number;
1513
+ };
1514
+ interface SuggestOptions {
1515
+ minApprovals?: number;
1516
+ minSessions?: number;
1517
+ }
1518
+ /** `Smart Rule: shield:x:y` and the other wrapping labels -> `shield:x:y`;
1519
+ * anything else is returned as it is. The catalog's own reading, so a rule
1520
+ * name that only contains a shield-like part is not taken for one. */
1521
+ declare function unwrapRuleLabel(label: string): string;
1522
+ declare function suggestFromApprovals(rows: readonly ApprovalRow[], opts?: SuggestOptions): Suggestion[];
1523
+
1405
1524
  interface ShieldDefinition {
1406
1525
  name: string;
1407
1526
  description: string;
@@ -1433,16 +1552,44 @@ declare function validateOverrides(raw: unknown): {
1433
1552
  warnings: string[];
1434
1553
  };
1435
1554
  /**
1436
- * The 13 shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
1555
+ * The shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
1437
1556
  * ~/.node9/shields/*.json are merged on top of these by the host.
1438
1557
  */
1439
1558
  declare const BUILTIN_SHIELDS: Record<string, ShieldDefinition>;
1440
- /**
1441
- * The category shields for dangerous actions on MCP apps (node9Firewall#385):
1442
- * enabled from the Apps page for the apps a user connects, not recommended by
1443
- * a repository or history scan, which has nothing to say about them.
1444
- */
1445
- declare const ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
1559
+
1560
+ type ActionTemplateName = 'finance' | 'identity' | 'publishing';
1561
+ declare const ACTION_TEMPLATES: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, readonly SmartRule[]>>;
1562
+ /** The general check each template feeds, and the word its rules carry. */
1563
+ declare const ACTION_CHECKS: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, {
1564
+ checkId: string;
1565
+ slug: string;
1566
+ label: string;
1567
+ }>>;
1568
+ interface AppShieldSpec {
1569
+ name: string;
1570
+ label: string;
1571
+ description: string;
1572
+ template: ActionTemplateName;
1573
+ /** Glob for the app's MCP server label (case-insensitive). */
1574
+ server: string;
1575
+ /** The app's other doors, as bash rules (the code door is a session script
1576
+ * judged as a Bash command, so it is a bash rule too). */
1577
+ doors: SmartRule[];
1578
+ /** Tools of the vendor's own MCP server that the template's names miss
1579
+ * (Square's single make_api_request); scoped to the server like the
1580
+ * template's. */
1581
+ mcpTools?: SmartRule[];
1582
+ }
1583
+ declare const APP_SHIELD_SPECS: readonly AppShieldSpec[];
1584
+ /** The app shields' names. node9 turns one on when it finds the app; a history
1585
+ * scan with no hit for it does not pitch it. */
1586
+ declare const APP_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
1587
+ /** Every MCP server an app shield claims, as one glob: `{*stripe*,*paypal*}`. */
1588
+ declare const APP_SERVER_GLOB: string;
1589
+ declare const GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: readonly SmartRule[];
1590
+ /** The three shields 2.37.0 shipped and this release replaces, with what to
1591
+ * use instead. `node9 shield enable finance` answers with this. */
1592
+ declare const REPLACED_SHIELDS: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
1446
1593
 
1447
1594
  interface ToolCallRecord {
1448
1595
  /** tool name */
@@ -2063,7 +2210,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
2063
2210
  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
2064
2211
  * is loud, not silent.
2065
2212
  */
2066
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
2213
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v30";
2067
2214
  /**
2068
2215
  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
2069
2216
  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2074,7 +2221,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
2074
2221
  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
2075
2222
  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
2076
2223
  */
2077
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "3b936dab47d27942";
2224
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "d55f1f9e5bee7e41";
2078
2225
  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
2079
2226
  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
2080
2227
  /**
@@ -2186,5 +2333,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
2186
2333
  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
2187
2334
  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
2188
2335
 
2189
- export { ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2190
- export type { ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
2336
+ export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2337
+ export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };