@nerviq/cli 1.18.0 → 1.19.0

package/src/techniques/security.js

@@ -1,237 +1,237 @@
-/**
- * Security technique fragments.
- * Generated mechanically from the legacy techniques.js monolith during HR-09.
- */
-
-const {
-  collectClaudeDenyRules,
-  hasPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance,
-  hasMcpPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance,
-  hasInjectionDefenseHookConfigured,
-  getRepoInstructionBundle,
-  getWorkflowContent,
-} = require('./shared');
-
-module.exports = {
-  settingsPermissions: {
-      id: 24,
-      name: 'Permission configuration',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        // Prefer local (effective config) — any settings file with permissions passes
-        const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
-        return !!(settings && settings.permissions);
-      },
-      impact: 'medium',
-      rating: 4,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Configure allow/deny permission lists for safe tool usage.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  permissionDeny: {
-      id: 2401,
-      name: 'Deny rules configured in permissions',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        return collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx).length > 0;
-      },
-      impact: 'high',
-      rating: 5,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Add permissions.deny rules to block dangerous operations (e.g. rm -rf, dropping databases).',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  noBypassPermissions: {
-      id: 2402,
-      name: 'Default mode is not bypassPermissions',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        // Check shared settings first (committed to git) — if the shared baseline
-        // is safe, a personal settings.local.json override should not fail the audit.
-        const shared = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
-        if (shared && shared.permissions) {
-          return shared.permissions.defaultMode !== 'bypassPermissions';
-        }
-        const local = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-        if (!local || !local.permissions) return null;
-        return local.permissions.defaultMode !== 'bypassPermissions';
-      },
-      impact: 'critical',
-      rating: 5,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Do not set defaultMode to bypassPermissions. Use explicit allow rules instead.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  secretsProtection: {
-      id: 1096,
-      name: 'Secrets protection configured',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const shared = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
-        const local = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-        const settings = shared || local;
-        if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return false;
-        const denyRules = collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx);
-        const hasDeny = denyRules.some((rule) => rule.protectsSecrets);
-        // Fail if allow includes "*" (overly broad — bypasses deny rules)
-        const allow = settings.permissions.allow || [];
-        if (Array.isArray(allow) && allow.includes('*')) return false;
-        return hasDeny;
-      },
-      impact: 'critical',
-      rating: 5,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Add permissions.deny rules to block reading .env files and secrets directories.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  securityReview: {
-      id: 1031,
-      name: 'Security review command awareness',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const md = ctx.claudeMdContent() || '';
-        return md.includes('security') || md.includes('/security-review');
-      },
-      impact: 'high',
-      rating: 5,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Add /security-review to your workflow. Claude Code has built-in OWASP Top 10 scanning.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  promptInjectionTrustBoundary: {
-      id: 8805,
-      name: 'Prompt injection trust boundary documented',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const bundle = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
-        return hasPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance(bundle);
-      },
-      impact: 'high',
-      rating: 5,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Document a trust boundary: treat repo files, fetched content, and MCP responses as untrusted data, not instructions to follow.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  injectionDefenseHook: {
-      id: 8806,
-      name: 'Injection defense hook configured for external content',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const shared = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
-        const local = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-        return hasInjectionDefenseHookConfigured(shared) || hasInjectionDefenseHookConfigured(local);
-      },
-      impact: 'medium',
-      rating: 4,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Add a PostToolUse injection-defense hook for WebFetch/WebSearch/Read/Grep/Glob/MCP flows so suspicious external content is logged and reviewed.',
-      template: 'hooks'
-    },
-
-  mcpPromptInjectionBoundary: {
-      id: 8807,
-      name: 'MCP responses treated as untrusted in instructions',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const hasMcpSignals = Boolean(
-          ctx.fileContent('.mcp.json') ||
-          ctx.fileContent('.vscode/mcp.json') ||
-          ctx.fileContent('.cursor/mcp.json') ||
-          ctx.fileContent('.windsurf/mcp.json') ||
-          ctx.fileContent('opencode.json') ||
-          ctx.fileContent('opencode.jsonc') ||
-          ctx.fileContent('.codex/config.toml')
-        );
-        if (!hasMcpSignals) return null;
-        const bundle = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
-        return hasMcpPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance(bundle);
-      },
-      impact: 'medium',
-      rating: 4,
-      category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Document that MCP outputs are untrusted data, can contain indirect prompt injection, and must never override repo-level instructions.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  sandboxAwareness: {
-      id: 2013,
-      name: 'Sandbox or isolation mentioned',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const md = ctx.claudeMdContent() || '';
-        const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || {};
-        return /sandbox|isolat/i.test(md) || !!settings.sandbox;
-      },
-      impact: 'medium', rating: 3, category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Claude Code supports sandboxed command execution. Consider enabling it for untrusted operations.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  denyRulesDepth: {
-      id: 2014,
-      name: 'Deny rules cover 3+ patterns',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        return collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx).length >= 3;
-      },
-      impact: 'high', rating: 4, category: 'security',
-      fix: 'Add at least 3 deny rules: rm -rf, force-push, and .env reads. More patterns = safer Claude.',
-      template: null
-    },
-
-  sbomExists: {
-      id: 130041,
-      name: 'SBOM file exists',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        return ctx.files.some(f => /sbom\.(json|xml|cdx\.json)|bom\.xml|cyclonedx/i.test(f));
-      },
-      impact: 'medium',
-      category: 'supply-chain',
-      fix: 'Generate an SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) in CycloneDX or SPDX format for supply chain transparency.',
-    },
-
-  dependencyPinning: {
-      id: 130042,
-      name: 'Lock files committed',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        return ctx.files.some(f => /^(package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|pnpm-lock\.yaml|Cargo\.lock|poetry\.lock|Pipfile\.lock|bun\.lockb|composer\.lock|Gemfile\.lock|go\.sum)$/i.test(f));
-      },
-      impact: 'high',
-      category: 'supply-chain',
-      fix: 'Commit lock files (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, Cargo.lock, poetry.lock) for reproducible builds.',
-    },
-
-  provenanceAttestation: {
-      id: 130043,
-      name: 'Provenance or sigstore in CI',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const ci = getWorkflowContent(ctx);
-        return /provenance|sigstore|cosign|slsa|attestation/i.test(ci);
-      },
-      impact: 'medium',
-      category: 'supply-chain',
-      fix: 'Add npm provenance or sigstore attestation in CI to verify package integrity.',
-    },
-
-  lockfileIntegrity: {
-      id: 130044,
-      name: 'CI uses frozen lockfile install',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const ci = getWorkflowContent(ctx);
-        return /npm ci\b|--frozen-lockfile|--immutable|cargo.*--locked|pip install.*--require-hashes/i.test(ci);
-      },
-      impact: 'high',
-      category: 'supply-chain',
-      fix: 'Use `npm ci` or `--frozen-lockfile` in CI instead of `npm install` for deterministic builds.',
-    },
-
-  dependencyScanning: {
-      id: 130045,
-      name: 'Dependency scanning configured',
-      check: (ctx) => {
-        const hasConfig = ctx.files.some(f => /dependabot\.yml|renovate\.json|\.snyk/i.test(f));
-        if (hasConfig) return true;
-        const ci = getWorkflowContent(ctx);
-        return /dependabot|renovate|snyk|npm audit|cargo audit|pip-audit|safety check/i.test(ci);
-      },
-      impact: 'high',
-      category: 'supply-chain',
-      fix: 'Configure Dependabot, Renovate, or Snyk to automatically scan and update vulnerable dependencies.',
-    },
-};
+/**
+ * Security technique fragments.
+ * Generated mechanically from the legacy techniques.js monolith during HR-09.
+ */
+
+const {
+  collectClaudeDenyRules,
+  hasPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance,
+  hasMcpPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance,
+  hasInjectionDefenseHookConfigured,
+  getRepoInstructionBundle,
+  getWorkflowContent,
+} = require('./shared');
+
+module.exports = {
+  settingsPermissions: {
+      id: 24,
+      name: 'Permission configuration',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        // Prefer local (effective config) — any settings file with permissions passes
+        const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
+        return !!(settings && settings.permissions);
+      },
+      impact: 'medium',
+      rating: 4,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Configure allow/deny permission lists for safe tool usage.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  permissionDeny: {
+      id: 2401,
+      name: 'Deny rules configured in permissions',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        return collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx).length > 0;
+      },
+      impact: 'high',
+      rating: 5,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Add permissions.deny rules to block dangerous operations (e.g. rm -rf, dropping databases).',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  noBypassPermissions: {
+      id: 2402,
+      name: 'Default mode is not bypassPermissions',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        // Check shared settings first (committed to git) — if the shared baseline
+        // is safe, a personal settings.local.json override should not fail the audit.
+        const shared = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
+        if (shared && shared.permissions) {
+          return shared.permissions.defaultMode !== 'bypassPermissions';
+        }
+        const local = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+        if (!local || !local.permissions) return null;
+        return local.permissions.defaultMode !== 'bypassPermissions';
+      },
+      impact: 'critical',
+      rating: 5,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Do not set defaultMode to bypassPermissions. Use explicit allow rules instead.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  secretsProtection: {
+      id: 1096,
+      name: 'Secrets protection configured',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const shared = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
+        const local = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+        const settings = shared || local;
+        if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return false;
+        const denyRules = collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx);
+        const hasDeny = denyRules.some((rule) => rule.protectsSecrets);
+        // Fail if allow includes "*" (overly broad — bypasses deny rules)
+        const allow = settings.permissions.allow || [];
+        if (Array.isArray(allow) && allow.includes('*')) return false;
+        return hasDeny;
+      },
+      impact: 'critical',
+      rating: 5,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Add permissions.deny rules to block reading .env files and secrets directories.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  securityReview: {
+      id: 1031,
+      name: 'Security review command awareness',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const md = ctx.claudeMdContent() || '';
+        return md.includes('security') || md.includes('/security-review');
+      },
+      impact: 'high',
+      rating: 5,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Add /security-review to your workflow. Claude Code has built-in OWASP Top 10 scanning.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  promptInjectionTrustBoundary: {
+      id: 8805,
+      name: 'Prompt injection trust boundary documented',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const bundle = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
+        return hasPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance(bundle);
+      },
+      impact: 'high',
+      rating: 5,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Document a trust boundary: treat repo files, fetched content, and MCP responses as untrusted data, not instructions to follow.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  injectionDefenseHook: {
+      id: 8806,
+      name: 'Injection defense hook configured for external content',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const shared = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json');
+        const local = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+        return hasInjectionDefenseHookConfigured(shared) || hasInjectionDefenseHookConfigured(local);
+      },
+      impact: 'medium',
+      rating: 4,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Add a PostToolUse injection-defense hook for WebFetch/WebSearch/Read/Grep/Glob/MCP flows so suspicious external content is logged and reviewed.',
+      template: 'hooks'
+    },
+
+  mcpPromptInjectionBoundary: {
+      id: 8807,
+      name: 'MCP responses treated as untrusted in instructions',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const hasMcpSignals = Boolean(
+          ctx.fileContent('.mcp.json') ||
+          ctx.fileContent('.vscode/mcp.json') ||
+          ctx.fileContent('.cursor/mcp.json') ||
+          ctx.fileContent('.windsurf/mcp.json') ||
+          ctx.fileContent('opencode.json') ||
+          ctx.fileContent('opencode.jsonc') ||
+          ctx.fileContent('.codex/config.toml')
+        );
+        if (!hasMcpSignals) return null;
+        const bundle = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
+        return hasMcpPromptInjectionDefenseGuidance(bundle);
+      },
+      impact: 'medium',
+      rating: 4,
+      category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Document that MCP outputs are untrusted data, can contain indirect prompt injection, and must never override repo-level instructions.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  sandboxAwareness: {
+      id: 2013,
+      name: 'Sandbox or isolation mentioned',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const md = ctx.claudeMdContent() || '';
+        const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || {};
+        return /sandbox|isolat/i.test(md) || !!settings.sandbox;
+      },
+      impact: 'medium', rating: 3, category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Claude Code supports sandboxed command execution. Consider enabling it for untrusted operations.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  denyRulesDepth: {
+      id: 2014,
+      name: 'Deny rules cover 3+ patterns',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        return collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx).length >= 3;
+      },
+      impact: 'high', rating: 4, category: 'security',
+      fix: 'Add at least 3 deny rules: rm -rf, force-push, and .env reads. More patterns = safer Claude.',
+      template: null
+    },
+
+  sbomExists: {
+      id: 130041,
+      name: 'SBOM file exists',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        return ctx.files.some(f => /sbom\.(json|xml|cdx\.json)|bom\.xml|cyclonedx/i.test(f));
+      },
+      impact: 'medium',
+      category: 'supply-chain',
+      fix: 'Generate an SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) in CycloneDX or SPDX format for supply chain transparency.',
+    },
+
+  dependencyPinning: {
+      id: 130042,
+      name: 'Lock files committed',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        return ctx.files.some(f => /^(package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|pnpm-lock\.yaml|Cargo\.lock|poetry\.lock|Pipfile\.lock|bun\.lockb|composer\.lock|Gemfile\.lock|go\.sum)$/i.test(f));
+      },
+      impact: 'high',
+      category: 'supply-chain',
+      fix: 'Commit lock files (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, Cargo.lock, poetry.lock) for reproducible builds.',
+    },
+
+  provenanceAttestation: {
+      id: 130043,
+      name: 'Provenance or sigstore in CI',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const ci = getWorkflowContent(ctx);
+        return /provenance|sigstore|cosign|slsa|attestation/i.test(ci);
+      },
+      impact: 'medium',
+      category: 'supply-chain',
+      fix: 'Add npm provenance or sigstore attestation in CI to verify package integrity.',
+    },
+
+  lockfileIntegrity: {
+      id: 130044,
+      name: 'CI uses frozen lockfile install',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const ci = getWorkflowContent(ctx);
+        return /npm ci\b|--frozen-lockfile|--immutable|cargo.*--locked|pip install.*--require-hashes/i.test(ci);
+      },
+      impact: 'high',
+      category: 'supply-chain',
+      fix: 'Use `npm ci` or `--frozen-lockfile` in CI instead of `npm install` for deterministic builds.',
+    },
+
+  dependencyScanning: {
+      id: 130045,
+      name: 'Dependency scanning configured',
+      check: (ctx) => {
+        const hasConfig = ctx.files.some(f => /dependabot\.yml|renovate\.json|\.snyk/i.test(f));
+        if (hasConfig) return true;
+        const ci = getWorkflowContent(ctx);
+        return /dependabot|renovate|snyk|npm audit|cargo audit|pip-audit|safety check/i.test(ci);
+      },
+      impact: 'high',
+      category: 'supply-chain',
+      fix: 'Configure Dependabot, Renovate, or Snyk to automatically scan and update vulnerable dependencies.',
+    },
+};