@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard 0.2.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CONTRIBUTING.md +101 -0
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/README.md +558 -0
- package/README.zh-CN.md +488 -0
- package/adapters/INTEGRATION.md +94 -0
- package/adapters/claude/README.md +141 -0
- package/adapters/claude/compatibility.json +17 -0
- package/adapters/claude/harness/README.md +59 -0
- package/adapters/claude/harness/mock_anthropic_api.mjs +47 -0
- package/adapters/claude/harness/run_scenario.sh +79 -0
- package/adapters/claude/harness/run_scenario_no_python3.sh +49 -0
- package/adapters/claude/hook_bridge.sh +33 -0
- package/adapters/claude/pre_tool_use.py +264 -0
- package/adapters/claude/settings.example.json +16 -0
- package/adapters/codex/harness/README.md +53 -0
- package/adapters/codex/harness/acceptance.py +226 -0
- package/adapters/dsh/README.md +62 -0
- package/adapters/dsh/cordis.patch.yml +30 -0
- package/adapters/dsh/lib/index.js +500 -0
- package/adapters/kimi-code/README.md +169 -0
- package/adapters/kimi-code/compatibility.json +17 -0
- package/adapters/kimi-code/config.example.toml +26 -0
- package/adapters/kimi-code/hook_bridge.sh +32 -0
- package/adapters/kimi-code/pre_tool_use.py +72 -0
- package/core/__init__.py +47 -0
- package/core/audit.py +86 -0
- package/core/classifier.py +1175 -0
- package/core/dialects.py +898 -0
- package/core/policy.py +817 -0
- package/core/recovery.py +700 -0
- package/core/redaction.py +1096 -0
- package/core/safe_view.py +212 -0
- package/docs/architecture.md +223 -0
- package/docs/compatibility.md +142 -0
- package/docs/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md +187 -0
- package/docs/friction.md +266 -0
- package/docs/harness-capabilities.md +72 -0
- package/docs/host-drift.md +142 -0
- package/docs/publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md +104 -0
- package/docs/release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md +46 -0
- package/docs/release-notes-0.2.0.md +72 -0
- package/docs/release-notes-0.2.1.md +78 -0
- package/docs/release-notes-0.2.2.md +120 -0
- package/docs/secret-guard-analysis.md +416 -0
- package/docs/secret-guard-architecture.md +93 -0
- package/docs/secret-guard-design.md +649 -0
- package/docs/test-report-claude-code-harness.md +462 -0
- package/docs/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md +335 -0
- package/docs/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md +129 -0
- package/docs/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md +84 -0
- package/docs/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md +126 -0
- package/docs/test-report-kimi-code-block.md +198 -0
- package/docs/test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md +241 -0
- package/docs/threat-model.md +44 -0
- package/doctor.py +756 -0
- package/live_sentinel.py +339 -0
- package/package.json +69 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/SKILL.md +109 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/agents/openai.yaml +4 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/references/policy.md +161 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/_bootstrap.py +8 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py +370 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/gc.py +103 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py +98 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py +256 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py +130 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/SKILL.md +143 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/agents/openai.yaml +4 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/references/channels.md +58 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/references/rules.md +194 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/_bootstrap.py +8 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/check_span.py +250 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/sanitize.py +155 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/view.py +44 -0
- package/skills/recovery-audit/SKILL.md +283 -0
- package/skills/recovery-audit/agents/openai.yaml +4 -0
- package/skills/recovery-audit/references/evidence-records.md +85 -0
package/live_sentinel.py
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
|
2
|
+
"""Opt-in, low-token live-host sentinel for Claude Code and Kimi Code."""
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
5
|
+
|
|
6
|
+
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
|
7
|
+
import hashlib
|
|
8
|
+
import json
|
|
9
|
+
import os
|
|
10
|
+
from pathlib import Path
|
|
11
|
+
import secrets
|
|
12
|
+
import shutil
|
|
13
|
+
import signal
|
|
14
|
+
import subprocess
|
|
15
|
+
import sys
|
|
16
|
+
import tempfile
|
|
17
|
+
from typing import Optional, Sequence
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
BLOCK_FEEDBACK = b"[agent-guard] BLOCKED [BLOCK_DIALECT_UNKNOWN]"
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
@dataclass
|
|
24
|
+
class SentinelResult:
|
|
25
|
+
harness: str
|
|
26
|
+
status: str
|
|
27
|
+
alarm: str
|
|
28
|
+
reason: str
|
|
29
|
+
drift_status: str
|
|
30
|
+
host_exit_code: Optional[int]
|
|
31
|
+
host_timed_out: bool
|
|
32
|
+
receipt_match: bool
|
|
33
|
+
audit_match: bool
|
|
34
|
+
block_feedback_observed: bool
|
|
35
|
+
sentinel_exists: bool
|
|
36
|
+
command_sha256: str
|
|
37
|
+
stdout_bytes: int
|
|
38
|
+
stderr_bytes: int
|
|
39
|
+
stdout_sha256: str
|
|
40
|
+
stderr_sha256: str
|
|
41
|
+
evidence_dir: Path
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
def as_dict(self) -> dict:
|
|
44
|
+
return {
|
|
45
|
+
"schema_version": 1,
|
|
46
|
+
"harness": self.harness,
|
|
47
|
+
"status": self.status,
|
|
48
|
+
"alarm": self.alarm,
|
|
49
|
+
"reason": self.reason,
|
|
50
|
+
"drift_status": self.drift_status,
|
|
51
|
+
"host_exit_code": self.host_exit_code,
|
|
52
|
+
"host_timed_out": self.host_timed_out,
|
|
53
|
+
"receipt_match": self.receipt_match,
|
|
54
|
+
"audit_match": self.audit_match,
|
|
55
|
+
"block_feedback_observed": self.block_feedback_observed,
|
|
56
|
+
"sentinel_exists": self.sentinel_exists,
|
|
57
|
+
"command_sha256": self.command_sha256,
|
|
58
|
+
"host_output": {
|
|
59
|
+
"stdout_bytes": self.stdout_bytes,
|
|
60
|
+
"stderr_bytes": self.stderr_bytes,
|
|
61
|
+
"stdout_sha256": self.stdout_sha256,
|
|
62
|
+
"stderr_sha256": self.stderr_sha256,
|
|
63
|
+
"retained": False,
|
|
64
|
+
},
|
|
65
|
+
"evidence_dir": str(self.evidence_dir),
|
|
66
|
+
}
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
|
|
69
|
+
def _sha256_text(value: str) -> str:
|
|
70
|
+
return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
def _make_evidence_dir(explicit: Optional[Path], harness: str) -> Path:
|
|
74
|
+
if explicit is None:
|
|
75
|
+
path = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"agent-guard-{harness}-sentinel-"))
|
|
76
|
+
path.chmod(0o700)
|
|
77
|
+
return path
|
|
78
|
+
# The host changes cwd to the private fixture. Every path exported to a
|
|
79
|
+
# hook must therefore be absolute; otherwise a relative evidence path is
|
|
80
|
+
# reinterpreted below the fixture and the create-only receipt is lost.
|
|
81
|
+
path = explicit.expanduser().resolve()
|
|
82
|
+
if not path.parent.is_dir():
|
|
83
|
+
raise ValueError("sentinel output parent does not exist")
|
|
84
|
+
try:
|
|
85
|
+
path.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
|
86
|
+
except OSError as exc:
|
|
87
|
+
raise ValueError("sentinel output path must not already exist") from exc
|
|
88
|
+
return path
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
def _resolve_executable(explicit: Optional[str], candidates: Sequence[str]) -> str:
|
|
92
|
+
if explicit:
|
|
93
|
+
executable = shutil.which(explicit)
|
|
94
|
+
if executable:
|
|
95
|
+
return executable
|
|
96
|
+
else:
|
|
97
|
+
for candidate in candidates:
|
|
98
|
+
executable = shutil.which(candidate)
|
|
99
|
+
if executable:
|
|
100
|
+
return executable
|
|
101
|
+
raise ValueError("host executable was not found")
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
def _host_argv(
|
|
105
|
+
harness: str, executable: str, config_path: Path, prompt: str,
|
|
106
|
+
) -> list[str]:
|
|
107
|
+
if harness == "claude":
|
|
108
|
+
return [
|
|
109
|
+
executable, "-p", prompt,
|
|
110
|
+
"--output-format", "stream-json", "--verbose",
|
|
111
|
+
"--include-hook-events", "--no-session-persistence",
|
|
112
|
+
"--strict-mcp-config", "--setting-sources", "project",
|
|
113
|
+
"--settings", str(config_path.resolve()),
|
|
114
|
+
"--permission-mode", "dontAsk", "--permission-prompts", "none",
|
|
115
|
+
"--tools", "Bash", "--allowedTools", "Bash",
|
|
116
|
+
"--system-prompt",
|
|
117
|
+
"You are a one-call conformance probe. Use Bash exactly once "
|
|
118
|
+
"with the user's exact command, then stop.",
|
|
119
|
+
]
|
|
120
|
+
if config_path.name != "config.toml":
|
|
121
|
+
raise ValueError("Kimi live sentinel requires a selected config.toml")
|
|
122
|
+
# Prompt mode already uses Kimi's automatic permission policy. Keep its
|
|
123
|
+
# machine-readable event stream so a blocked tool result remains visible
|
|
124
|
+
# without adding --auto/--yolo, which Kimi 2.x rejects with --prompt.
|
|
125
|
+
return [executable, "-p", prompt, "--output-format", "stream-json"]
|
|
126
|
+
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
def _stop_process_group(process: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
|
|
129
|
+
try:
|
|
130
|
+
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
|
|
131
|
+
process.wait(timeout=5)
|
|
132
|
+
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
|
|
133
|
+
try:
|
|
134
|
+
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
|
|
135
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
136
|
+
pass
|
|
137
|
+
try:
|
|
138
|
+
process.wait(timeout=5)
|
|
139
|
+
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
|
140
|
+
pass
|
|
141
|
+
|
|
142
|
+
|
|
143
|
+
def _scan_output(output_file) -> tuple[int, str, bool]:
|
|
144
|
+
output_file.seek(0)
|
|
145
|
+
digest = hashlib.sha256()
|
|
146
|
+
size = 0
|
|
147
|
+
marker_seen = False
|
|
148
|
+
carry = b""
|
|
149
|
+
while True:
|
|
150
|
+
chunk = output_file.read(65536)
|
|
151
|
+
if not chunk:
|
|
152
|
+
break
|
|
153
|
+
size += len(chunk)
|
|
154
|
+
digest.update(chunk)
|
|
155
|
+
window = carry + chunk
|
|
156
|
+
if BLOCK_FEEDBACK in window:
|
|
157
|
+
marker_seen = True
|
|
158
|
+
carry = window[-len(BLOCK_FEEDBACK):]
|
|
159
|
+
return size, digest.hexdigest(), marker_seen
|
|
160
|
+
|
|
161
|
+
|
|
162
|
+
def _receipt_matches(
|
|
163
|
+
receipt_path: Path, nonce: str, command_hash: str, cwd_hash: str,
|
|
164
|
+
) -> bool:
|
|
165
|
+
try:
|
|
166
|
+
receipt = json.loads(receipt_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
|
|
167
|
+
except (OSError, UnicodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
|
|
168
|
+
return False
|
|
169
|
+
return bool(
|
|
170
|
+
isinstance(receipt, dict)
|
|
171
|
+
and receipt.get("schema_version") == 1
|
|
172
|
+
and receipt.get("nonce") == nonce
|
|
173
|
+
and receipt.get("hook_event_name") == "PreToolUse"
|
|
174
|
+
and str(receipt.get("tool_name", "")).lower() == "bash"
|
|
175
|
+
and receipt.get("command_sha256") == command_hash
|
|
176
|
+
and receipt.get("cwd_sha256") == cwd_hash
|
|
177
|
+
)
|
|
178
|
+
|
|
179
|
+
|
|
180
|
+
def _audit_matches(audit_path: Path) -> bool:
|
|
181
|
+
try:
|
|
182
|
+
with audit_path.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as audit_file:
|
|
183
|
+
for line in audit_file:
|
|
184
|
+
try:
|
|
185
|
+
entry = json.loads(line)
|
|
186
|
+
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
187
|
+
continue
|
|
188
|
+
if (isinstance(entry, dict)
|
|
189
|
+
and entry.get("event") == "enforce-block"
|
|
190
|
+
and entry.get("code") == "BLOCK_DIALECT_UNKNOWN"):
|
|
191
|
+
return True
|
|
192
|
+
except (OSError, UnicodeError):
|
|
193
|
+
return False
|
|
194
|
+
return False
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
def _write_result(path: Path, result: SentinelResult) -> None:
|
|
198
|
+
descriptor = os.open(
|
|
199
|
+
path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
|
|
200
|
+
| getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0), 0o600)
|
|
201
|
+
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as result_file:
|
|
202
|
+
json.dump(result.as_dict(), result_file, ensure_ascii=True, indent=2)
|
|
203
|
+
result_file.write("\n")
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
|
|
206
|
+
def _classify_result(
|
|
207
|
+
*, sentinel_exists: bool, start_failed: bool, timed_out: bool,
|
|
208
|
+
receipt_match: bool, audit_match: bool, block_feedback: bool,
|
|
209
|
+
drift_status: str,
|
|
210
|
+
) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
|
|
211
|
+
if sentinel_exists:
|
|
212
|
+
return "FAIL", "CRITICAL", "SENTINEL_EXECUTED"
|
|
213
|
+
if start_failed:
|
|
214
|
+
return "INCONCLUSIVE", "WARNING", "HOST_START_FAILED"
|
|
215
|
+
if timed_out:
|
|
216
|
+
return "INCONCLUSIVE", "WARNING", "HOST_TIMEOUT"
|
|
217
|
+
if receipt_match and audit_match and block_feedback:
|
|
218
|
+
return (
|
|
219
|
+
"PASS",
|
|
220
|
+
"NONE" if drift_status == "CURRENT" else "NOTICE",
|
|
221
|
+
"HOOK_ENFORCEMENT_OBSERVED",
|
|
222
|
+
)
|
|
223
|
+
if not receipt_match:
|
|
224
|
+
return "INCONCLUSIVE", "WARNING", "EXACT_HOOK_CALL_NOT_OBSERVED"
|
|
225
|
+
if not audit_match:
|
|
226
|
+
return "INCONCLUSIVE", "WARNING", "CORE_BLOCK_NOT_OBSERVED"
|
|
227
|
+
return "INCONCLUSIVE", "WARNING", "HOST_BLOCK_FEEDBACK_NOT_OBSERVED"
|
|
228
|
+
|
|
229
|
+
|
|
230
|
+
def run_live_sentinel(
|
|
231
|
+
harness: str, config_path: Path, executable_candidates: Sequence[str],
|
|
232
|
+
host_executable: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
233
|
+
output_dir: Optional[Path] = None, timeout: int = 180,
|
|
234
|
+
drift_status: str = "UNVERIFIED",
|
|
235
|
+
) -> SentinelResult:
|
|
236
|
+
"""Run one real-host tool call; never retain raw host/model output."""
|
|
237
|
+
if harness not in {"claude", "kimi"}:
|
|
238
|
+
raise ValueError("live sentinel supports only claude and kimi")
|
|
239
|
+
if not 15 <= timeout <= 600:
|
|
240
|
+
raise ValueError("sentinel timeout must be from 15 to 600 seconds")
|
|
241
|
+
executable = _resolve_executable(host_executable, executable_candidates)
|
|
242
|
+
nonce = secrets.token_hex(12)
|
|
243
|
+
sentinel_name = f"agent-guard-live-sentinel-{nonce}.txt"
|
|
244
|
+
command = f"touch {sentinel_name}"
|
|
245
|
+
command_hash = _sha256_text(command)
|
|
246
|
+
prompt = (
|
|
247
|
+
"This is an isolated Agent Guard conformance fixture containing no "
|
|
248
|
+
"user data. Call the Bash tool exactly once. Set its command field to "
|
|
249
|
+
f"exactly this single-line string: {command}. Do not add quotes, "
|
|
250
|
+
"leading or trailing whitespace, cd/pwd, a shell wrapper, a comment, "
|
|
251
|
+
"a newline, or any other prefix or suffix. Do not use another tool. "
|
|
252
|
+
"After the tool returns any result, including an error or block, do "
|
|
253
|
+
"not retry, explain, or call another tool; immediately end the turn."
|
|
254
|
+
)
|
|
255
|
+
argv = _host_argv(harness, executable, config_path, prompt)
|
|
256
|
+
evidence_dir = _make_evidence_dir(output_dir, harness)
|
|
257
|
+
project = evidence_dir / "project"
|
|
258
|
+
project.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
|
259
|
+
(project / "README.md").write_text(
|
|
260
|
+
"# Agent Guard live-host sentinel fixture\n", encoding="utf-8")
|
|
261
|
+
cwd_hash = _sha256_text(os.path.realpath(project))
|
|
262
|
+
receipt_path = evidence_dir / "hook-receipt.json"
|
|
263
|
+
env = dict(os.environ)
|
|
264
|
+
env.pop("AGENT_GUARD_SESSION", None)
|
|
265
|
+
env["AGENT_GUARD_DIALECT"] = f"live-sentinel-{nonce}"
|
|
266
|
+
env["AGENT_GUARD_WORKSPACE"] = str(project)
|
|
267
|
+
env["AGENT_GUARD_SENTINEL_RECEIPT"] = str(receipt_path)
|
|
268
|
+
env["AGENT_GUARD_SENTINEL_NONCE"] = nonce
|
|
269
|
+
if harness == "kimi":
|
|
270
|
+
env["KIMI_CODE_HOME"] = str(config_path.resolve().parent)
|
|
271
|
+
|
|
272
|
+
host_exit_code: Optional[int] = None
|
|
273
|
+
timed_out = False
|
|
274
|
+
start_failed = False
|
|
275
|
+
with tempfile.TemporaryFile() as stdout_file, tempfile.TemporaryFile() as stderr_file:
|
|
276
|
+
try:
|
|
277
|
+
process = subprocess.Popen(
|
|
278
|
+
argv, cwd=project, env=env, stdout=stdout_file,
|
|
279
|
+
stderr=stderr_file, start_new_session=True)
|
|
280
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
281
|
+
start_failed = True
|
|
282
|
+
else:
|
|
283
|
+
try:
|
|
284
|
+
host_exit_code = process.wait(timeout=timeout)
|
|
285
|
+
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
|
286
|
+
timed_out = True
|
|
287
|
+
_stop_process_group(process)
|
|
288
|
+
host_exit_code = process.returncode
|
|
289
|
+
stdout_bytes, stdout_sha256, stdout_block = _scan_output(stdout_file)
|
|
290
|
+
stderr_bytes, stderr_sha256, stderr_block = _scan_output(stderr_file)
|
|
291
|
+
|
|
292
|
+
sentinel_exists = (project / sentinel_name).exists()
|
|
293
|
+
receipt_match = _receipt_matches(
|
|
294
|
+
receipt_path, nonce, command_hash, cwd_hash)
|
|
295
|
+
audit_match = _audit_matches(project / ".agent-trash" / "audit.jsonl")
|
|
296
|
+
block_feedback = stdout_block or stderr_block
|
|
297
|
+
|
|
298
|
+
status, alarm, reason = _classify_result(
|
|
299
|
+
sentinel_exists=sentinel_exists,
|
|
300
|
+
start_failed=start_failed,
|
|
301
|
+
timed_out=timed_out,
|
|
302
|
+
receipt_match=receipt_match,
|
|
303
|
+
audit_match=audit_match,
|
|
304
|
+
block_feedback=block_feedback,
|
|
305
|
+
drift_status=drift_status,
|
|
306
|
+
)
|
|
307
|
+
|
|
308
|
+
result = SentinelResult(
|
|
309
|
+
harness=harness, status=status, alarm=alarm, reason=reason,
|
|
310
|
+
drift_status=drift_status,
|
|
311
|
+
host_exit_code=host_exit_code, host_timed_out=timed_out,
|
|
312
|
+
receipt_match=receipt_match, audit_match=audit_match,
|
|
313
|
+
block_feedback_observed=block_feedback,
|
|
314
|
+
sentinel_exists=sentinel_exists, command_sha256=command_hash,
|
|
315
|
+
stdout_bytes=stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes=stderr_bytes,
|
|
316
|
+
stdout_sha256=stdout_sha256, stderr_sha256=stderr_sha256,
|
|
317
|
+
evidence_dir=evidence_dir,
|
|
318
|
+
)
|
|
319
|
+
_write_result(evidence_dir / "result.json", result)
|
|
320
|
+
return result
|
|
321
|
+
|
|
322
|
+
|
|
323
|
+
def main(argv: Optional[Sequence[str]] = None) -> int:
|
|
324
|
+
"""Expose the sentinel as the npm bin promised by package.json.
|
|
325
|
+
|
|
326
|
+
The doctor owns preflight, drift detection, reporting, and exit-code
|
|
327
|
+
semantics. Delegate to that single CLI contract instead of maintaining a
|
|
328
|
+
second, subtly different sentinel frontend here.
|
|
329
|
+
"""
|
|
330
|
+
from doctor import main as doctor_main
|
|
331
|
+
|
|
332
|
+
arguments = list(sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv)
|
|
333
|
+
if "--live-sentinel" not in arguments:
|
|
334
|
+
arguments.append("--live-sentinel")
|
|
335
|
+
return doctor_main(arguments)
|
|
336
|
+
|
|
337
|
+
|
|
338
|
+
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
339
|
+
sys.exit(main())
|
package/package.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{
|
|
2
|
+
"name": "@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard",
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.2.2",
|
|
4
|
+
"description": "Harness-neutral reliability infrastructure for AI coding agents: reversible destructive actions, pre-emission redaction, recovery evidence, and a shared Decision Protocol with optional native adapters.",
|
|
5
|
+
"type": "module",
|
|
6
|
+
"main": "./adapters/dsh/lib/index.js",
|
|
7
|
+
"exports": {
|
|
8
|
+
".": "./adapters/dsh/lib/index.js",
|
|
9
|
+
"./dsh": "./adapters/dsh/lib/index.js",
|
|
10
|
+
"./cordis.patch.yml": "./adapters/dsh/cordis.patch.yml",
|
|
11
|
+
"./package.json": "./package.json"
|
|
12
|
+
},
|
|
13
|
+
"bin": {
|
|
14
|
+
"agent-guard-doctor": "./doctor.py",
|
|
15
|
+
"agent-guard-live-sentinel": "./live_sentinel.py",
|
|
16
|
+
"agent-guard-check": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py",
|
|
17
|
+
"agent-guard-safe-delete": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py",
|
|
18
|
+
"agent-guard-restore": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py",
|
|
19
|
+
"agent-guard-status": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py",
|
|
20
|
+
"agent-guard-exfil-check": "./skills/exfil-guard/scripts/check_span.py",
|
|
21
|
+
"agent-guard-exfil-sanitize": "./skills/exfil-guard/scripts/sanitize.py",
|
|
22
|
+
"agent-guard-config-view": "./skills/exfil-guard/scripts/view.py"
|
|
23
|
+
},
|
|
24
|
+
"scripts": {
|
|
25
|
+
"test": "python3 -m unittest discover tests -v && node tests/test_dsh_adapter.mjs",
|
|
26
|
+
"test:dsh": "node tests/test_dsh_adapter.mjs",
|
|
27
|
+
"prepublishOnly": "npm test"
|
|
28
|
+
},
|
|
29
|
+
"files": [
|
|
30
|
+
"adapters",
|
|
31
|
+
"core",
|
|
32
|
+
"skills",
|
|
33
|
+
"docs",
|
|
34
|
+
"doctor.py",
|
|
35
|
+
"live_sentinel.py",
|
|
36
|
+
"LICENSE",
|
|
37
|
+
"CONTRIBUTING.md",
|
|
38
|
+
"README.md",
|
|
39
|
+
"README.zh-CN.md",
|
|
40
|
+
"!**/__pycache__/**",
|
|
41
|
+
"!**/*.py[cod]"
|
|
42
|
+
],
|
|
43
|
+
"dsh": {
|
|
44
|
+
"engines": {
|
|
45
|
+
"dsh": "0.1.5-rc.1"
|
|
46
|
+
},
|
|
47
|
+
"bundle": {
|
|
48
|
+
"patch": "./adapters/dsh/cordis.patch.yml"
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
},
|
|
51
|
+
"keywords": [
|
|
52
|
+
"agent-guard", "ai-agents", "coding-agents", "agent-skills",
|
|
53
|
+
"llm-tools", "reliability", "recovery", "destructive-actions",
|
|
54
|
+
"redaction", "quarantine", "audit", "git", "safety",
|
|
55
|
+
"deepseek-harness", "dsh", "dsh-plugin", "cordis"
|
|
56
|
+
],
|
|
57
|
+
"license": "MIT",
|
|
58
|
+
"publishConfig": {
|
|
59
|
+
"access": "public"
|
|
60
|
+
},
|
|
61
|
+
"repository": {
|
|
62
|
+
"type": "git",
|
|
63
|
+
"url": "git+https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard.git"
|
|
64
|
+
},
|
|
65
|
+
"homepage": "https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard#readme",
|
|
66
|
+
"bugs": {
|
|
67
|
+
"url": "https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/issues"
|
|
68
|
+
}
|
|
69
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
---
|
|
2
|
+
name: delete-guard
|
|
3
|
+
description: >-
|
|
4
|
+
Recoverable deletion discipline for AI agents. Use whenever you need to
|
|
5
|
+
delete, clean, or discard files/directories or run destructive git
|
|
6
|
+
operations (clean, reset --hard, restore, force push) inside a workspace.
|
|
7
|
+
Routes supported operations through quarantine or Git snapshots, and
|
|
8
|
+
explains how to stop safely when compensation or policy blocks you.
|
|
9
|
+
---
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
# delete-guard
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
You operate inside a workspace where irreversible destruction is not a
|
|
14
|
+
default capability. This skill defines the deletion discipline the guard
|
|
15
|
+
enforces and how to work with it productively. The four pillars:
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
- **Scope** - you act inside the workspace; the workspace root, `.git`, and
|
|
18
|
+
everything outside are never yours to delete.
|
|
19
|
+
- **Recoverability** - deletions are compensated (relocated to `.agent-trash/`
|
|
20
|
+
with a manifest, or snapshotted as a git stash) before they take effect.
|
|
21
|
+
- **Authorization** - a human decides permission boundaries. You can be
|
|
22
|
+
*downgraded* to RESTRICTED mode; you can never promote yourself back.
|
|
23
|
+
- **Auditability** - every verdict, relocation, and restore is recorded in
|
|
24
|
+
JSONL. Nothing is invisible.
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
## The one rule
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
**Prefer `safe_delete` over `rm`. It is not slower for you - it is the
|
|
29
|
+
supported path.**
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
```bash
|
|
32
|
+
# delete files/dirs/globs - they are quarantined, not destroyed:
|
|
33
|
+
python3 <repo>/skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py src/old_module.py
|
|
34
|
+
python3 <repo>/skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py 'build/**/*.tmp' --reason "stale build output"
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
36
|
+
# undo a transaction (list first if unsure):
|
|
37
|
+
python3 <repo>/skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py list
|
|
38
|
+
python3 <repo>/skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py <txid>
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
# current guard state:
|
|
41
|
+
python3 <repo>/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py
|
|
42
|
+
```
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
Globs passed to `safe_delete` are expanded explicitly before anything moves.
|
|
45
|
+
That is why `safe_delete '*.log'` works while `rm *.log` is blocked: the
|
|
46
|
+
guard refuses opaque target sets, not cleanup work.
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
## If you run `rm` / destructive git anyway
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
A harness adapter may intercept the command before execution. Verdicts you
|
|
51
|
+
can receive:
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
| Verdict | Meaning | Your move |
|
|
54
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
55
|
+
| `ALLOW` (harness may show `PROCEED`) | safe as-is or compensation already applied | continue; record and verify any `txid` |
|
|
56
|
+
| `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | targets unresolvable (`$VAR`, `bash -c`, `find -delete`, `xargs`) | restate with explicit paths, or use `safe_delete` |
|
|
57
|
+
| `BLOCK_WILDCARD` | glob target set is opaque | use `safe_delete` with the glob |
|
|
58
|
+
| `BLOCK_OUT_OF_WORKSPACE` / `BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH` / `BLOCK_PROTECTED_ANCESTOR` | outside boundary, workspace root, `.git`, or a filesystem root (`/`, `/home`, `/usr`, `$HOME`) | do not retry; this is a hard boundary. Ask the human if it is truly needed |
|
|
59
|
+
| `BLOCK_RESTRICTED_MODE` | session is downgraded | only explicit single-file deletes are permitted; ask the human for anything more |
|
|
60
|
+
| `BLOCK_FORCE_PUSH` | remote history destruction | do not retry; escalate to the human |
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
Shape rules on compound commands: a single line that `cd`s anywhere before a
|
|
63
|
+
destructive op (F1), or that creates files (`touch/mkdir/cp/mv/tee`,
|
|
64
|
+
redirections) before destroying them (F2), is refused as undeterminable.
|
|
65
|
+
Run deletions as standalone commands with an explicit workdir.
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
A block is not an error to route around. Retrying the same operation in a
|
|
68
|
+
disguised form (`/bin/rm`, `python -c`, a script) is a violation of the
|
|
69
|
+
authorization pillar and is recorded in the audit log.
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
## Compensation preflight and verification
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
Before sandboxed use, ensure `.agent-trash/` is already ignored by a tracked
|
|
74
|
+
`.gitignore` or by host-managed `.git/info/exclude`. If Git metadata is
|
|
75
|
+
read-only and no ignore rule exists, the guard blocks before moving a source.
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
After a relocation or snapshot, verify that its `txid` appears as
|
|
78
|
+
`RESTORABLE` in `restore.py list` before running a related destructive command.
|
|
79
|
+
After restoration, verify that a consumed relocation shows `RESTORED`.
|
|
80
|
+
If the guard reports an internal, preflight, manifest, or compensation error,
|
|
81
|
+
stop immediately. Inspect both the origin and `.agent-trash/`; never infer
|
|
82
|
+
that an error means no filesystem change occurred. A durable
|
|
83
|
+
`relocate-intent` can keep an interrupted relocation discoverable.
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
## RESTRICTED mode
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
After a human veto, the session runs with narrowed powers: explicit
|
|
88
|
+
single-file deletes inside the workspace still work (quarantined as usual);
|
|
89
|
+
recursive deletes, globs, and destructive git operations are refused. Only a
|
|
90
|
+
human can restore NORMAL. If a task genuinely requires more, say so plainly
|
|
91
|
+
and ask.
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
## Regenerable artifacts
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
Provably regenerable targets (git-ignored AND matching known artifact names
|
|
96
|
+
like `node_modules/`, `dist/`, `__pycache__/`) are allowed to be deleted
|
|
97
|
+
directly - no quarantine overhead. If git cannot prove a target is ignored,
|
|
98
|
+
it is treated as valuable and quarantined. Uncertainty increases restriction.
|
|
99
|
+
|
|
100
|
+
## Recovery
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
Every relocation writes `origin -> trash` pairs into
|
|
103
|
+
`.agent-trash/manifest.jsonl`. Restore is non-destructive: it refuses to
|
|
104
|
+
overwrite anything that now exists at the origin unless a human passes
|
|
105
|
+
`--force`. Git snapshots are stored as stashes named `agent-guard:<txid>`;
|
|
106
|
+
restore applies them and never drops them.
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
See `references/policy.md` for the complete rule table, verdict codes, and
|
|
109
|
+
manifest format.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# delete-guard policy reference (V1)
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Platforms: Linux/macOS shells + git. Windows (cmd/PowerShell) is out of V1.
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
## Decision Protocol
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
The stable cross-harness interface is Decision + ReasonCode + Explanation
|
|
8
|
+
(+ RecoveryPlan in payload). Five decision classes:
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
| Decision | Meaning | Interaction tier |
|
|
11
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
12
|
+
| `ALLOW` | run unchanged (noop / provably regenerable / trash GC) | SAFE - silent |
|
|
13
|
+
| `RELOCATE` | quarantine targets, then run | SAFE - silent, txid audited |
|
|
14
|
+
| `SNAPSHOT` | git snapshot first, then run | SAFE - silent, txid audited |
|
|
15
|
+
| `ASK` | single-execution authorization (ASK_ONCE, never a rule exemption) | AMBIGUOUS |
|
|
16
|
+
| `BLOCK` | refuse: policy violation or true effect-uncertainty | FORBIDDEN |
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
ASK is reserved for well-understood operations whose safe *automation* is
|
|
19
|
+
unavailable (`COMPOUND_CWD_DELETE`, `COMPOUND_CREATE_DELETE`). True
|
|
20
|
+
effect-uncertainty (`BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT`: `$VAR`, `bash -c`,
|
|
21
|
+
`find -delete`, `xargs`-fed lists) stays on the BLOCK path - allowing it
|
|
22
|
+
would forfeit the core guarantee. Hard boundaries
|
|
23
|
+
(`BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH`, `BLOCK_OUT_OF_WORKSPACE`, `BLOCK_FORCE_PUSH`,
|
|
24
|
+
RESTRICTED prohibitions) are policy violations and never askable.
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
check.py exit codes: 0 proceed/advisory-ok · 2 blocked · 3 ask · 1 error.
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
### Dialects
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
`check.py` lexes the command line for a shell dialect: `--dialect posix`
|
|
31
|
+
(default) `| cmd | powershell`, or `AGENT_GUARD_DIALECT`. Native adapters
|
|
32
|
+
forward it from the payload, tool arguments, configuration, or environment.
|
|
33
|
+
An unusable selector is a BLOCK, never a silent POSIX fallback:
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
| Condition | Verdict code | Effect |
|
|
36
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
37
|
+
| dialect name not recognised (e.g. `fish`) | `BLOCK_DIALECT_UNKNOWN` | refuse; fix the selector |
|
|
38
|
+
| dialect selector malformed (e.g. `posix:cmd`) | `BLOCK_DIALECT_INVALID` | refuse; fix the selector |
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
Both are configuration defects rather than one-off authorization, so they
|
|
41
|
+
BLOCK instead of ASKing: the selector would fail again on the next command.
|
|
42
|
+
The command is never classified in that case, which is why allowing it is
|
|
43
|
+
not an option. Under PowerShell, unambiguous parameter prefixes (`-r`,
|
|
44
|
+
`-rec`, `-fo`) are expanded to their full names; a prefix matching two
|
|
45
|
+
different effects (`-wi`, `-c`, `-p`) stays unknown and BLOCKs.
|
|
46
|
+
|
|
47
|
+
## Rule table (first match wins)
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
| # | Condition | Verdict code | Effect |
|
|
50
|
+
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
51
|
+
| 1 | dry run / no targets | `ALLOW_NOOP` | proceed unchanged |
|
|
52
|
+
| 2 | unresolvable targets: shell vars, command substitution, unbalanced quotes, `bash -c` with destructive smell, `find -delete`, `find -exec rm`, stdin-fed (`xargs`) | `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | refuse - allowing it would forfeit the core guarantee |
|
|
53
|
+
| 2a | SHAPE F1: destructive op preceded by `cd` in the same command line, target in-workspace and resolvable | `ASK` (`COMPOUND_CWD_DELETE`) | single-execution authorization; splitting the command avoids the prompt. A shape rule describes *compensation* difficulty, never effect scope: if the target set also trips rule 2, 4, 5 or 6, that BLOCK wins (`tests/test_incident_regression.py`) |
|
|
54
|
+
| 2b | SHAPE F2: file-creation op (`touch/mkdir/cp/mv/install/ln/tee`, `>`/`>>`) precedes a target-dependent destructive op in the same line | `ASK` (`COMPOUND_CREATE_DELETE`) | single-execution authorization; `reset --hard`/force-push exempt (position-independent) |
|
|
55
|
+
| 2c | target *is* a filesystem root (`/`, `/home`, `/usr`, `/etc`, `/var`, `/tmp`, `/opt`, `/boot`, `$HOME`, ...) | `BLOCK_PROTECTED_ANCESTOR` | refuse. Matched exactly, so paths *under* these roots keep the ordinary codes; enforced by identity rather than workspace geometry, so it holds even when the workspace is `/` |
|
|
56
|
+
| 3 | any target inside quarantine (`.agent-trash/`) | `ALLOW_TRASH_GC` | direct delete permitted (housekeeping) |
|
|
57
|
+
| 4 | target outside workspace | `BLOCK_OUT_OF_WORKSPACE` | refuse |
|
|
58
|
+
| 5 | target is workspace root or `.git` (any depth) | `BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH` | refuse |
|
|
59
|
+
| 6 | any glob target | `BLOCK_WILDCARD` | refuse; use safe_delete which enumerates |
|
|
60
|
+
| 7 | RESTRICTED mode, git/remote destructive op | `BLOCK_RESTRICTED_MODE` | refuse |
|
|
61
|
+
| 8 | RESTRICTED mode, fs delete | narrow files only -> `RELOCATE_NARROW`, else `BLOCK_RESTRICTED_MODE` | refuse or quarantine |
|
|
62
|
+
| 9 | force/mirror/ref-deletion push | `BLOCK_FORCE_PUSH` | refuse |
|
|
63
|
+
| 10 | `git clean` dry run | `ALLOW_NOOP` | proceed |
|
|
64
|
+
| 11 | supported `git clean -f...` | `RELOCATE_VIA_CLEAN_ENUMERATE` | enumerate via `clean -n`, decode every Git-quoted path, relocate every match, proceed only on full coverage |
|
|
65
|
+
| 11a | `git clean -ff`, interactive `-i`, or exclude `-e` | `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | refuse; nested-repository and interactive/exclusion semantics are not safely mirrored |
|
|
66
|
+
| 11b | supported `git clean -f...` whose target set cannot be enumerated (not a repository, `git` cannot run) | `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | refuse; the targets exist but their set is unknowable, so nothing was attempted and nothing may be reported as a failed compensation |
|
|
67
|
+
| 12 | `git reset --hard`, `git restore <path>`, `git checkout -- <path>` | `SNAPSHOT_GIT_STASH` | `git stash create`+`store` first; any create/store failure blocks |
|
|
68
|
+
| 13 | all targets git-ignored AND match artifact patterns | `ALLOW_REGENERABLE` | direct delete |
|
|
69
|
+
| 14 | rooted recursive delete | `RELOCATE_TREE` | quarantine whole tree, proceed |
|
|
70
|
+
| 15 | named files/dirs | `RELOCATE_PATHS` | quarantine, proceed |
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
Precedence inside rule groups: `outside-workspace` > `workspace-root` >
|
|
73
|
+
`git-metadata`. RESTRICTED narrows before NORMAL relaxes.
|
|
74
|
+
|
|
75
|
+
## Verdict actions
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
- `ALLOW` - run unchanged.
|
|
78
|
+
- `RELOCATE` - move targets to quarantine, then run (the run itself then
|
|
79
|
+
finds nothing - effect preserved, loss reversed).
|
|
80
|
+
- `SNAPSHOT` - durably store a Git snapshot, then run.
|
|
81
|
+
- `BLOCK` - refuse; nothing is executed.
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
## Modes
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
```
|
|
86
|
+
NORMAL ──(human veto / high-risk event)──> RESTRICTED
|
|
87
|
+
RESTRICTED ──(interactive human terminal ONLY)──> NORMAL
|
|
88
|
+
```
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
State: `.agent-trash/state.json`. Non-interactive promotion raises
|
|
91
|
+
`AuthorizationRequired`. Harness adapters SHOULD keep the authoritative mode
|
|
92
|
+
in host memory instead (agent shells cannot touch it) and treat the file as
|
|
93
|
+
a portable fallback.
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
## Configuration (environment)
|
|
96
|
+
|
|
97
|
+
| Variable | Meaning |
|
|
98
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
99
|
+
| `AGENT_GUARD_WORKSPACE` | override workspace boundary discovery |
|
|
100
|
+
| `AGENT_GUARD_TRASH` | override quarantine location |
|
|
101
|
+
| `AGENT_GUARD_SESSION` | session identity recorded in audit/manifest |
|
|
102
|
+
| `AGENT_GUARD_ARTIFACTS` | `os.pathsep`-joined extra artifact patterns |
|
|
103
|
+
| `AGENT_GUARD_ALLOW_REGENERABLE` | `0` disables direct deletion of artifacts |
|
|
104
|
+
|
|
105
|
+
Default artifact patterns: `node_modules dist build out target __pycache__
|
|
106
|
+
.cache coverage .next .nuxt .venv venv .pytest_cache .mypy_cache .tox
|
|
107
|
+
.turbo .parcel-cache *.pyc *.pyo *.egg-info`
|
|
108
|
+
|
|
109
|
+
## Files
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
```
|
|
112
|
+
.agent-trash/
|
|
113
|
+
├── state.json # authorization mode (portable fallback)
|
|
114
|
+
├── manifest.jsonl # tx-start / relocate-intent / relocate / snapshot / restore
|
|
115
|
+
└── audit.jsonl # decisions, compensation intents, and outcomes
|
|
116
|
+
```
|
|
117
|
+
|
|
118
|
+
The guard accepts an existing `.gitignore` rule or writes a workspace-local
|
|
119
|
+
`.git/info/exclude` rule (the user's `.gitignore` is never modified).
|
|
120
|
+
Relocations use a durable write-ahead intent; an intent whose move completed
|
|
121
|
+
but whose completion record failed remains discoverable and restorable.
|
|
122
|
+
Retention/GC is intentionally manual in V1; `restore.py list` distinguishes
|
|
123
|
+
`RESTORABLE`, `RESTORED`, `FAILED`, and `PURGED` transaction state, while
|
|
124
|
+
`status.py` reports both historical and currently restorable counts.
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
126
|
+
## Retention / GC (B4)
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
Soft policy: 30-day retention, 5 GiB cap. Thresholds only MARK transactions
|
|
129
|
+
`GC_ELIGIBLE` (oldest first under the cap); purging is an explicit
|
|
130
|
+
`gc.py --execute` maintenance action. Lifecycle is fully audited:
|
|
131
|
+
`QUARANTINED -> RESTORABLE -> GC_ELIGIBLE -> PURGED`; the audit log itself
|
|
132
|
+
is never garbage-collected.
|
|
133
|
+
|
|
134
|
+
Authority model: `gc.py --execute` is intentionally permitted
|
|
135
|
+
non-interactively (scheduled maintenance is legitimate; purging
|
|
136
|
+
already-quarantined evidence is lower-risk than capability escalation,
|
|
137
|
+
which alone requires a human terminal). Every purge is audited with
|
|
138
|
+
session identity.
|
|
139
|
+
|
|
140
|
+
Hard principle: **capacity limits never downgrade to permanent deletion.**
|
|
141
|
+
If the quarantine cannot accept a relocation, the decision is
|
|
142
|
+
`RELOCATE_FAILED_STORAGE` -> BLOCK; the untouched target stays at its origin.
|
|
143
|
+
|
|
144
|
+
## Authorization scope
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
NORMAL/RESTRICTED is a **session/agent capability**, not workspace state:
|
|
147
|
+
one degraded agent must not DoS concurrent agents. State lives in
|
|
148
|
+
`.agent-trash/sessions/<id>.json` (portable fallback); harness adapters
|
|
149
|
+
SHOULD keep the authoritative mode in host memory. Promotion to NORMAL is
|
|
150
|
+
host-side authority (`policy.force_mode`); agents never receive it as a
|
|
151
|
+
model tool.
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
## Known limitations (V1)
|
|
154
|
+
|
|
155
|
+
- Command-level interception covers the recognized vocabulary; arbitrary
|
|
156
|
+
scripts that delete internally are invisible to `check.py` (see
|
|
157
|
+
`docs/threat-model.md`).
|
|
158
|
+
- `git stash create` captures tracked modifications; untracked files are not
|
|
159
|
+
affected by `reset --hard`, so they need no snapshot.
|
|
160
|
+
- Windows cmd/PowerShell, databases, cloud resources: future skills
|
|
161
|
+
(`git-guard`, `database-guard`, `cloud-guard`) on the same core.
|