@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard 0.2.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (77) hide show
  1. package/CONTRIBUTING.md +101 -0
  2. package/LICENSE +21 -0
  3. package/README.md +558 -0
  4. package/README.zh-CN.md +488 -0
  5. package/adapters/INTEGRATION.md +94 -0
  6. package/adapters/claude/README.md +141 -0
  7. package/adapters/claude/compatibility.json +17 -0
  8. package/adapters/claude/harness/README.md +59 -0
  9. package/adapters/claude/harness/mock_anthropic_api.mjs +47 -0
  10. package/adapters/claude/harness/run_scenario.sh +79 -0
  11. package/adapters/claude/harness/run_scenario_no_python3.sh +49 -0
  12. package/adapters/claude/hook_bridge.sh +33 -0
  13. package/adapters/claude/pre_tool_use.py +264 -0
  14. package/adapters/claude/settings.example.json +16 -0
  15. package/adapters/codex/harness/README.md +53 -0
  16. package/adapters/codex/harness/acceptance.py +226 -0
  17. package/adapters/dsh/README.md +62 -0
  18. package/adapters/dsh/cordis.patch.yml +30 -0
  19. package/adapters/dsh/lib/index.js +500 -0
  20. package/adapters/kimi-code/README.md +169 -0
  21. package/adapters/kimi-code/compatibility.json +17 -0
  22. package/adapters/kimi-code/config.example.toml +26 -0
  23. package/adapters/kimi-code/hook_bridge.sh +32 -0
  24. package/adapters/kimi-code/pre_tool_use.py +72 -0
  25. package/core/__init__.py +47 -0
  26. package/core/audit.py +86 -0
  27. package/core/classifier.py +1175 -0
  28. package/core/dialects.py +898 -0
  29. package/core/policy.py +817 -0
  30. package/core/recovery.py +700 -0
  31. package/core/redaction.py +1096 -0
  32. package/core/safe_view.py +212 -0
  33. package/docs/architecture.md +223 -0
  34. package/docs/compatibility.md +142 -0
  35. package/docs/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md +187 -0
  36. package/docs/friction.md +266 -0
  37. package/docs/harness-capabilities.md +72 -0
  38. package/docs/host-drift.md +142 -0
  39. package/docs/publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md +104 -0
  40. package/docs/release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md +46 -0
  41. package/docs/release-notes-0.2.0.md +72 -0
  42. package/docs/release-notes-0.2.1.md +78 -0
  43. package/docs/release-notes-0.2.2.md +120 -0
  44. package/docs/secret-guard-analysis.md +416 -0
  45. package/docs/secret-guard-architecture.md +93 -0
  46. package/docs/secret-guard-design.md +649 -0
  47. package/docs/test-report-claude-code-harness.md +462 -0
  48. package/docs/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md +335 -0
  49. package/docs/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md +129 -0
  50. package/docs/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md +84 -0
  51. package/docs/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md +126 -0
  52. package/docs/test-report-kimi-code-block.md +198 -0
  53. package/docs/test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md +241 -0
  54. package/docs/threat-model.md +44 -0
  55. package/doctor.py +756 -0
  56. package/live_sentinel.py +339 -0
  57. package/package.json +69 -0
  58. package/skills/delete-guard/SKILL.md +109 -0
  59. package/skills/delete-guard/agents/openai.yaml +4 -0
  60. package/skills/delete-guard/references/policy.md +161 -0
  61. package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/_bootstrap.py +8 -0
  62. package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py +370 -0
  63. package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/gc.py +103 -0
  64. package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py +98 -0
  65. package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py +256 -0
  66. package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py +130 -0
  67. package/skills/exfil-guard/SKILL.md +143 -0
  68. package/skills/exfil-guard/agents/openai.yaml +4 -0
  69. package/skills/exfil-guard/references/channels.md +58 -0
  70. package/skills/exfil-guard/references/rules.md +194 -0
  71. package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/_bootstrap.py +8 -0
  72. package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/check_span.py +250 -0
  73. package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/sanitize.py +155 -0
  74. package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/view.py +44 -0
  75. package/skills/recovery-audit/SKILL.md +283 -0
  76. package/skills/recovery-audit/agents/openai.yaml +4 -0
  77. package/skills/recovery-audit/references/evidence-records.md +85 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
1
+ # Publishing to GitHub from ephemeral environments
2
+
3
+ A field guide for pushing a repository from a sandbox, container, or cloud
4
+ agent workspace - written from a live session where every step was exercised.
5
+ Your computer is broken; your project still ships.
6
+
7
+ ## Overview
8
+
9
+ ```
10
+ sandbox workspace ──▶ deploy key (repo-scoped, revocable)
11
+ │ +
12
+ ├─ bundle backup fingerprint-pinned known_hosts
13
+ ▼ +
14
+ GitHub ◀────────────── GIT_SSH_COMMAND (IPv4 forced)
15
+ ```
16
+
17
+ ## 1. Use a deploy key, not an account key
18
+
19
+ A private key living in an ephemeral environment is a consumable, not an
20
+ asset. Scope the blast radius:
21
+
22
+ - **Deploy key** binds to ONE repository. Leaked = one repo exposed,
23
+ revocable independently in the repo's Settings → Deploy keys.
24
+ - An account-level SSH key exposes EVERY repository you own.
25
+
26
+ Generate inside the workspace boundary:
27
+
28
+ ```bash
29
+ mkdir -p .deploy-keys && chmod 700 .deploy-keys
30
+ ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f .deploy-keys/id_ed25519 -N "" \
31
+ -C "user/repo deploy key (sandbox)"
32
+ chmod 600 .deploy-keys/id_ed25519
33
+ ```
34
+
35
+ No passphrase keeps non-interactive pushes working; compensating controls
36
+ are the tiny scope and instant revocation. (A passphrase would require
37
+ interactive pushes or ssh-agent - pick deliberately.)
38
+
39
+ ## 2. Pin the host fingerprint - never trust-on-first-use
40
+
41
+ Fetch GitHub's official fingerprints from their meta endpoint and compare
42
+ against the live handshake BEFORE writing known_hosts:
43
+
44
+ ```bash
45
+ curl -s https://api.github.com/meta | python3 -c \
46
+ "import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['ssh_key_fingerprints']['ed25519'])"
47
+ ssh-keyscan -t ed25519 github.com 2>/dev/null | ssh-keygen -lf -
48
+ # both must print: SHA256:+DiY3wvvV6TuJJhbpZisF/zLDA0zPMSvHdkr4UvCOqU
49
+ ssh-keyscan -t ed25519 github.com 2>/dev/null > .deploy-keys/known_hosts
50
+ chmod 600 .deploy-keys/known_hosts
51
+ ```
52
+
53
+ ## 3. Push through GIT_SSH_COMMAND (no ~/.ssh needed)
54
+
55
+ Everything stays inside the workspace boundary - no writes outside it:
56
+
57
+ ```bash
58
+ export GIT_SSH_COMMAND='ssh -4 -i .deploy-keys/id_ed25519 \
59
+ -o UserKnownHostsFile=.deploy-keys/known_hosts -o IdentitiesOnly=yes'
60
+ git remote add origin git@github.com:user/repo.git
61
+ git push -u origin main
62
+ ```
63
+
64
+ Field notes from a real session:
65
+
66
+ - **Force IPv4 (`-4`).** Dual-stack environments occasionally fail host-key
67
+ verification over IPv6 while IPv4 works; the flake costs minutes.
68
+ - If a push fails transiently ("repository exists" style errors), simply
69
+ retry - the second attempt carried what the first dropped.
70
+ - `ssh -T git@github.com` always exits 1 even on success; read the
71
+ greeting. Deploy keys greet as `Hi user/repo!`.
72
+
73
+ ## 4. On the GitHub side (do these yourself - account operations)
74
+
75
+ 1. Create the repository EMPTY: no README, no .gitignore, no license -
76
+ anything initialized will diverge from your local history.
77
+ 2. Repo → Settings → Deploy keys → Add deploy key → paste the `.pub`
78
+ content → **check "Allow write access"** (default is read-only).
79
+ 3. Settings → Emails → enable both privacy checkboxes so a misconfigured
80
+ future commit cannot leak your real address.
81
+
82
+ ## 5. Back up before rewriting anything
83
+
84
+ Before identity rewrites or force operations, snapshot all refs:
85
+
86
+ ```bash
87
+ git bundle create ../backup.bundle --all
88
+ ```
89
+
90
+ Restore later with `git clone backup.bundle restored/`. Keep the bundle
91
+ outside the repository directory.
92
+
93
+ ## 6. Identity hygiene
94
+
95
+ Use GitHub's noreply address (`ID+username@users.noreply.github.com`) in
96
+ commits - it becomes permanently public in every commit. Rewriting identity
97
+ before first push is safe; after push it means force-push coordination.
98
+
99
+ ---
100
+
101
+ *This document exists because agent-guard itself blocked its own maintainer
102
+ twice while being published from a sandbox - once correctly (the boundary),
103
+ once due to a parser bug (F5/F6). Both are why the guide prefers adapting
104
+ operations to fit boundaries over weakening them.*
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
1
+ # 0.2.0-rc1 source-preview notes
2
+
3
+ The `0.2.0-rc1` Git tag is a **source preview**. It is not a GitHub Release,
4
+ an npm package, a security sandbox, or a claim of universal tool interception.
5
+ Those distribution steps remain separate maintainer decisions.
6
+
7
+ ## What changed since 0.1.1
8
+
9
+ - A harness-neutral Python Core and Decision Protocol now support shell
10
+ dialect selection (`posix`, `cmd`, `powershell`) and fail closed on unknown
11
+ selectors. Windows logic is unit-tested; real Windows host E2E is open.
12
+ - Delete-guard's compensation, transaction, GC, command segmentation and
13
+ hard-refusal handling have additional incident regressions.
14
+ - Exfil-guard provides a cooperative CLI for text-span inspection and
15
+ channel-specific allow/sanitize/ask/block decisions. It does not hook every
16
+ file read, upload or model-context path.
17
+ - Recovery-audit provides a Skill and evidence schemas for rebuilding a
18
+ project from surviving Git, AI-session and cache material. It cannot
19
+ recover bytes for which no copy survives.
20
+ - Claude Code and DSH adapters, Codex/ZCode Skill/CLI evaluations, and the
21
+ bounded Kimi Code 0.42.0 hook observations are documented separately in
22
+ the [harness capability matrix](harness-capabilities.md).
23
+
24
+ ## Known limits and release gates
25
+
26
+ - Kimi Code's `ASK` hook response is not an approval prompt in the tested
27
+ version; the adapter denies such calls. Its real-host execution-level
28
+ `BLOCK` remains unproved. Two `local/kimi-k3` sandboxes established only
29
+ the sampled root/subagent hook and compensation paths.
30
+ - DSH 0.1.5-rc.1 has adapter-level smoke tests but not a completed real-host
31
+ plugin-load and denied-command sentinel trial. The older DSH v0.1.1 report
32
+ does not substitute for current-version evidence.
33
+ - Codex has no native interception adapter in this repository. Its Skill/CLI
34
+ acceptance driver needs an explicit checkout path and does not prove
35
+ automatic interception.
36
+ - Native adapters cover their listed shell tools, not all filesystem,
37
+ network or subagent paths. No claim is made against a malicious same-UID
38
+ harness, deliberate bypass, or arbitrary prompt injection.
39
+ - Original Secret Guard safe config view/edit, general audit redaction,
40
+ trusted read interception and the proposed offline guard-lab are not in
41
+ this candidate.
42
+ - The npm root manifest remains private; its current package selection is
43
+ DSH-oriented and is **not** a complete harness-neutral distribution.
44
+
45
+ See the [compatibility contract](compatibility.md) and
46
+ [threat model](threat-model.md) before treating any host as protected.
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
1
+ # Agent Guard 0.2.0 — GitHub Release notes
2
+
3
+ These notes describe the `0.2.0` source. See
4
+ [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/releases) for
5
+ publication status. The `0.2.0-rc1` and `0.2.0-rc2` tags were source
6
+ previews; npm publication is a separate decision.
7
+
8
+ ## What 0.2.0 brings
9
+
10
+ - A harness-neutral Python Core and Decision Protocol for recoverable
11
+ destructive actions. Supported file deletion can relocate targets to
12
+ `.agent-trash/`; supported destructive Git operations can take a snapshot
13
+ before proceeding. Unrecoverable or indeterminate effects are refused.
14
+ - Stronger incident regressions for transaction IDs, GC, command boundaries,
15
+ protected paths, and hard refusals. Shell classification has opt-in `cmd`
16
+ and PowerShell dialects alongside POSIX; real Windows host end-to-end
17
+ coverage is still open.
18
+ - `exfil-guard` text CLI: a cooperative pre-emission check for known credential
19
+ shapes and host-identifying paths, with channel-specific decisions and a
20
+ redaction plan for the caller to apply. It does not own arbitrary output
21
+ channels or transparently intercept model traffic.
22
+ - An explicit, read-only safe view for selected JSON and strict single-line
23
+ dotenv configs. It returns structure, types, and `set`/`empty` state rather
24
+ than scalar values, and refuses unsafe paths/files and unsupported formats.
25
+ This is **new since `0.2.0-rc2`**. It does not stop a harness from reading
26
+ the original file by another route; unknown secret-bearing field names
27
+ may still be visible. Never write the view back over the configuration.
28
+ - A `recovery-audit` Skill for evidence-led reconstruction after accidental
29
+ deletion. It can organize surviving Git, sessions, and caches; it cannot
30
+ recreate bytes that have no surviving copy.
31
+
32
+ ## Integration evidence and limits
33
+
34
+ The [harness capability matrix](harness-capabilities.md) separates CLI use,
35
+ adapter tests, observed hooks, and observed execution-level enforcement.
36
+ Claude Code has a bounded real CLI/hook test with a scripted model endpoint.
37
+ DSH 0.1.5-rc.1 has adapter smoke tests, not a confirmed current-version
38
+ plugin-load and rejected-execution trial. Kimi Code 0.42.0 has two isolated
39
+ `local/kimi-k3` sandboxes showing sampled hook and compensation paths,
40
+ including sampled subagents; execution-level `BLOCK` remains unproven. In
41
+ that Kimi version, `ASK` is mapped to a hard refusal, not an approval prompt.
42
+ Codex and ZCode evidence covers cooperative Skill/CLI use, not native
43
+ interception in this repository.
44
+
45
+ Agent Guard is not a sandbox against a malicious agent or harness with the
46
+ same OS privileges. A hook can govern only calls that reach it. No-hook
47
+ channels, untested tools or versions, arbitrary subagents, hidden harness
48
+ uploads, and general prompt-injection resistance are **not** release claims.
49
+ See the [threat model](threat-model.md) and
50
+ [compatibility contract](compatibility.md).
51
+
52
+ New `check.py` results, audit events, and compensation metadata replace the
53
+ raw command with `<redacted>` and carry a `check_id` for correlation. Its
54
+ agent-visible result omits raw policy notes and dynamic exception text;
55
+ `status --json` also masks free-form fields in legacy audit records. This
56
+ does **not** rewrite historical append-only records or recovery manifests:
57
+ older local files may still contain commands, and recovery metadata must
58
+ retain target paths to restore them. The original command can also appear
59
+ in the harness's own logs or process arguments outside Agent Guard's control.
60
+ Review local evidence before sharing it, and do not put credentials in
61
+ command arguments.
62
+
63
+ The offline `guard-lab` honeytoken experiment, comprehensive audit/output
64
+ redaction, trusted file-read interception, and universal harness adaptation
65
+ are future work. The root npm manifest remains private and DSH-oriented as
66
+ an entry point; this GitHub Release is **not** an npm package announcement.
67
+
68
+ ## Start here
69
+
70
+ Use the [quick start](../README.md#quick-start-with-your-coding-agent) and
71
+ the [adapter matrix](harness-capabilities.md). Configure only the entry path
72
+ your host actually supports, then verify it with harmless, bounded probes.
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
1
+ # Agent Guard 0.2.1 — source and release notes
2
+
3
+ These notes describe the `0.2.1` source. Check
4
+ [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/releases) for
5
+ publication status; a version in the repository does not by itself mean a
6
+ tag or Release has been published. The root npm manifest remains private.
7
+
8
+ ## What changed since 0.2.0
9
+
10
+ - Claude Code and Kimi Code now have POSIX shell bridges in their documented
11
+ hook commands. When the bridge starts, it converts a sampled pre-adapter
12
+ Python startup failure into a refusal instead of silently allowing that
13
+ call. The host must still load and run the bridge for this to help.
14
+ - Kimi Code 0.42.0 keeps its host-specific `ASK` → hard-refusal mapping;
15
+ malformed Kimi and Claude `PreToolUse` payloads are refused once their
16
+ adapters run. The shared Core policy remains harness-neutral.
17
+ - `doctor.py kimi|claude [--config PATH] [--probe] [--json]` checks one selected
18
+ configuration file and can run harmless local bridge/adapter probes without
19
+ a model call. It reports `configuration`, `local_probe`, and
20
+ `host_interception` separately. The last is always `UNVERIFIED`:
21
+ a local PASS does not establish that a running host loaded the hook.
22
+ - The [README integration matrix](../README.md#integration-and-validation-matrix)
23
+ links each documented host path and its tested-version boundary. The
24
+ [unlisted-host guide](../adapters/INTEGRATION.md) gives an agent a safe
25
+ self-adaptation and evidence checklist, not automatic support.
26
+ - POSIX command classification no longer loses destructive operations behind
27
+ common wrappers and options such as `env`, `sudo`, `nice`, `xargs`, or Git
28
+ global options. Shell substitution and scripts piped to an interpreter fail
29
+ closed when their effects cannot be enumerated. Repository-changing Git
30
+ options such as `-C`, `-c`, `--git-dir`, and `--work-tree` are refused
31
+ instead of applying compensation to a possibly different repository.
32
+ - DSH's model-facing restore tool can only perform a non-overwriting restore.
33
+ The destructive `--force` path remains available only through the explicit
34
+ human CLI and is no longer exposed in the model tool schema.
35
+ - Enforced ASK and mutation-capable ALLOW paths now require a durable audit
36
+ intent before authorization. Audit failure blocks execution; partial
37
+ compensation reports a transaction id and bounded status/count fields so
38
+ the user can locate and restore already-moved content.
39
+
40
+ ## Evidence and limits
41
+
42
+ The [Claude report](test-report-claude-code-harness.md) covers real CLI/hook
43
+ sessions on 2.1.270 and 2.1.273 with a scripted model endpoint, including
44
+ sampled allow/block/ask and interpreter-failure paths. It is not a real
45
+ Claude-model or Windows startup-failure test.
46
+
47
+ The [Kimi report](test-report-kimi-code-block.md) covers Kimi Code 0.42.0
48
+ and bounded root/single-child Bash refusals, recoverable deletion/restore,
49
+ ASK denial, and a pre-adapter Python-failure trial. Two request model IDs
50
+ were sampled; backend identity and future versions are not guaranteed.
51
+ Two same-turn child calls were observed but did not exercise simultaneous
52
+ hook execution.
53
+
54
+ `doctor` checks selected file shape, not effective merged settings or a live
55
+ session. Hook absence, matcher mismatch, bridge-spawn failure, host timeout,
56
+ other tools, and arbitrary subagents remain outside the demonstrated
57
+ fail-closed boundary. A malicious model or harness with the same OS
58
+ privileges can bypass this reliability layer. DSH 0.1.5-rc.1 still lacks a
59
+ confirmed current-version plugin-load and execution-level refusal trial;
60
+ real Windows host end-to-end coverage is also open. See the
61
+ [capability matrix](harness-capabilities.md) and [threat model](threat-model.md).
62
+ The optional Kimi doctor needs Python 3.11+ for TOML parsing; the Core and
63
+ hook adapter continue to support Python 3.9+.
64
+
65
+ The offline `guard-lab` honeytoken experiment, universal native-hook
66
+ adaptation, comprehensive output/audit redaction, and a public npm package
67
+ are **not** part of 0.2.1.
68
+
69
+ ## Verification and start point
70
+
71
+ The local source passes `npm test`: 415 Python tests plus the DSH adapter
72
+ smoke test. This is regression evidence, not a substitute for the bounded
73
+ real-host observations above or CI on the published commit.
74
+
75
+ Use the [quick start](../README.md#quick-start-with-your-coding-agent),
76
+ then follow the adapter guide for your actual host and version. Do not use a
77
+ destructive command to test installation. Report both the protected path
78
+ and the unverified paths to the user.
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
1
+ # Agent Guard 0.2.2 — source and release notes
2
+
3
+ These notes describe the `0.2.2` source candidate. Check
4
+ [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/releases) and the
5
+ npm registry independently: a version in this repository is not proof that a
6
+ GitHub Release or npm package has been published.
7
+
8
+ ## Host drift and live evidence
9
+
10
+ - `doctor.py kimi|claude --check-drift` compares the installed host version
11
+ with a small adapter-owned compatibility profile and fingerprints only the
12
+ normalized Agent Guard hook fields and enforcement runtime. It makes no
13
+ model call and never upgrades `host_interception` from `UNVERIFIED`.
14
+ - Optional create-new baselines contain only the parsed version and SHA-256
15
+ fingerprints. They are written as `0600`, never overwrite an existing file,
16
+ and detect later configuration/runtime/profile drift without copying the
17
+ host configuration.
18
+ - Explicit `--live-sentinel` may spend one configured model call in a private
19
+ blank fixture. PASS requires an exact hashed hook receipt, matching Core
20
+ audit, host block feedback, and an absent marker. Missing evidence is
21
+ `INCONCLUSIVE`; an executed marker is a `CRITICAL` failure. Raw host/model
22
+ output is counted and hashed, then discarded.
23
+ - The sentinel is a narrow reliability canary for one root-agent `Bash` call.
24
+ It does not prove subagent, concurrency, other-tool or malicious-host
25
+ containment.
26
+
27
+ See the [host drift guide](host-drift.md) for the status and alarm contracts.
28
+
29
+ ## DSH package acceptance
30
+
31
+ - DSH `0.1.5-rc.1` now has current, execution-level host evidence without a
32
+ model call. A benign `bash` invocation continued; a synthetic stdin-shell
33
+ shape was denied before execution; its bypass-only marker remained absent;
34
+ and Core wrote `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` to the isolated audit.
35
+ - The same behavior passed after `npm pack` and installation through DSH's own
36
+ plugin manager, exercising the package bundle rather than a mocked service.
37
+ A separate fault injection confirmed fail-closed behavior when an already
38
+ registered adapter could not obtain parseable Core output.
39
+ - The DSH adapter no longer imports the host-internal `defineTool` helper at
40
+ runtime. It registers plain public Tool Definition objects and performs its
41
+ small argument validation locally, avoiding accidental reliance on DSH's
42
+ internal dependency layout.
43
+
44
+ The exact observations and limits are in the
45
+ [DSH 0.1.5-rc.1 report](test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md). Model/Agent execution,
46
+ subagents, concurrency, ASK UI, non-`bash` tools, pre-registration failure and
47
+ future host versions remain unverified.
48
+
49
+ ## Universal npm artifact candidate
50
+
51
+ - The package identity is now `@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard@0.2.2`, matching the
52
+ maintainer scope and avoiding the unrelated unscoped package.
53
+ - One package carries the harness-neutral Core, all Skills, Claude/Kimi/DSH
54
+ adapters, the unlisted-host integration guide, documentation, `doctor.py`
55
+ and `live_sentinel.py`. DSH remains the JavaScript default export; it does
56
+ not redefine the project as a DSH-only plugin.
57
+ - Nine Python-backed npm binaries expose the doctor, live sentinel, delete
58
+ guard and cooperative exfil/config-view entry points. Their package targets
59
+ are checked for presence, executable mode and Python shebang.
60
+ - `prepublishOnly` runs the full suite and `publishConfig.access` is public.
61
+ No production dependency was added.
62
+ - The release workflow follows the project's unprefixed `X.Y.Z` tag convention,
63
+ verifies the exact scoped name and version, runs the release tests, packs
64
+ once, attaches that tarball and its SHA-256 to the GitHub Release, and
65
+ publishes the same artifact to npm with public access and provenance. A
66
+ manual preflight can validate `NPM_TOKEN` without publishing.
67
+ - The README documents a pinned scoped-package setup route and links a bilingual
68
+ contribution guide that recommends scoped Issues and focused Pull Requests.
69
+ - The post-documentation candidate contains 77 files. Its extracted inventory
70
+ contains no `.internal`/bytecode files, repository-local absolute paths,
71
+ recognized credential shapes, or identifiers from the maintainer's private
72
+ Kimi providers. All checked relative links across the repository's Markdown
73
+ files resolve.
74
+
75
+ The artifact remains universal rather than host-specific. npm keeps its own
76
+ credential and version gates, while the exact `0.2.2` tag publishes one packed
77
+ artifact to both the GitHub Release and npm. A retry may fill a missing side,
78
+ but never replaces an npm version that already exists.
79
+
80
+ ## Kimi and Claude status
81
+
82
+ Kimi Code's current official `2.1.1` CLI was installed from its checksum-
83
+ verified Linux ARM64 release during this candidate cycle. Its current
84
+ `[[hooks]]` / `PreToolUse` / `Bash` / exit-2 contract still matches the thin
85
+ adapter, and both Kimi's config doctor and Agent Guard's local bridge probe
86
+ passed. After OAuth login, an available official model completed the revised
87
+ root-Bash live sentinel. Official K3, accessed through a trusted relay that
88
+ the maintainer confirms is a pass-through, independently completed the same
89
+ probe. For both routes, exact receipt, Core audit and host block feedback all
90
+ matched, while the bypass-only marker remained absent. Both results are
91
+ `PASS / HOOK_ENFORCEMENT_OBSERVED`; `2.1.1` is now in the tested-version
92
+ profile. The client evidence proves the requested routes and hook behavior,
93
+ not opaque remote weights or relay internals.
94
+
95
+ That repeat also found and fixed a sentinel-side relative-path bug: an explicit
96
+ relative evidence directory is now resolved before the host changes cwd, so
97
+ the hook receives absolute create-only receipt and workspace paths. Kimi 2.x
98
+ prompt mode now requests `stream-json` directly; it does not append the
99
+ incompatible `--auto`/`--yolo` flags. A second result-integrity fix prevents
100
+ complete hook evidence from overriding a host timeout: timeout is always
101
+ `INCONCLUSIVE`. The K3 prompt now forbids retrying after a block. The evidence
102
+ remains limited to one root `Bash` call per route; 2.1.1 subagents, ASK,
103
+ concurrency and fault injection were not tested.
104
+
105
+ A real Claude-model canary was not run because no Claude model entitlement was
106
+ available. The previously documented scripted-model CLI evidence remains
107
+ version-bounded and is not silently promoted.
108
+
109
+ ## Verification gate
110
+
111
+ The current candidate passes `npm test`: 434 Python tests plus the DSH adapter
112
+ smoke test. Package-manifest, doctor/live-sentinel and DSH adapter targeted
113
+ suites pass, as do the scoped-tarball DSH Core-block and failure probes. The
114
+ Markdown-link, package-inventory, credential/host-path and Git whitespace
115
+ checks also pass. The authenticated Kimi 2.1.1 root-Bash repeat now passes and
116
+ has been added to the bounded compatibility claim. These checks do not
117
+ authorize a commit, push, tag, GitHub Release or npm publication by themselves.
118
+
119
+ The offline `guard-lab` honeytoken experiment is planned for `0.2.3` and is
120
+ not part of `0.2.2`.