@modelcontextprotocol/inspector 2.10.1 → 2.12.0

package/clients/mcpdo/build/{chunk-2E5EZYNU.js → chunk-LBQDT5VV.js}

@@ -2707,6 +2707,84 @@ function isJsonDocumentResponse(contentType) {
   const mediaType = contentType.split(";")[0].trim().toLowerCase();
   return mediaType === "application/json" || mediaType.endsWith("+json");
 }
+var SYNTHESIZED_METADATA_HEADER = "x-inspector-oauth-metadata-synthesized";
+var synthesizedResponses = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakSet();
+function isSynthesizedMetadataResponse(response) {
+  return synthesizedResponses.has(response);
+}
+var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
+var RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
+function continuesDiscovery(status) {
+  return status < 500 || status === 502;
+}
+function authorizationServerForFinalCandidate(url) {
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(url);
+  } catch {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  const { pathname } = parsed;
+  if (pathname === OIDC_WELL_KNOWN) return parsed.origin;
+  if (!pathname.endsWith(OIDC_WELL_KNOWN)) return void 0;
+  if (pathname.startsWith(`${RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN}/`) || pathname.startsWith(`${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN}/`)) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  return `${parsed.origin}${pathname.slice(0, -OIDC_WELL_KNOWN.length)}`;
+}
+function synthesizeAuthorizationServerMetadata(issuer, overrides) {
+  return {
+    issuer,
+    authorization_endpoint: overrides.authorizationUrl ?? new URL("/authorize", issuer).href,
+    token_endpoint: overrides.tokenUrl ?? new URL("/token", issuer).href,
+    registration_endpoint: new URL("/register", issuer).href,
+    response_types_supported: ["code"],
+    code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"]
+  };
+}
+function requestMethodOf(input, init) {
+  if (init?.method) return init.method.toUpperCase();
+  if (typeof input !== "string" && !(input instanceof URL)) {
+    return input.method.toUpperCase();
+  }
+  return "GET";
+}
+function acceptsJson(input, init) {
+  let accept = null;
+  if (init?.headers) {
+    accept = new Headers(init.headers).get("accept");
+  } else if (typeof input !== "string" && !(input instanceof URL)) {
+    accept = input.headers.get("accept");
+  }
+  if (!accept) return false;
+  const mediaTypes = accept.split(",").map((part) => part.split(";")[0].trim().toLowerCase());
+  return mediaTypes.includes("application/json") && !mediaTypes.includes("text/event-stream");
+}
+function synthesizedMetadataResponse(input, init, response, overrides) {
+  if (!continuesDiscovery(response.status)) return void 0;
+  if (requestMethodOf(input, init) !== "GET") return void 0;
+  if (!acceptsJson(input, init)) return void 0;
+  const issuer = authorizationServerForFinalCandidate(requestUrlOf(input));
+  if (!issuer) return void 0;
+  void response.body?.cancel().catch(() => {
+  });
+  console.warn(
+    `[oauth] ${issuer} publishes no authorization server metadata; using the configured endpoint override(s) in place of the SDK's /authorize and /token fallbacks.`
+  );
+  const synthesized = new Response(
+    JSON.stringify(synthesizeAuthorizationServerMetadata(issuer, overrides)),
+    {
+      status: 200,
+      statusText: "OK",
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        [SYNTHESIZED_METADATA_HEADER]: "endpoint-overrides"
+      }
+    }
+  );
+  synthesizedResponses.add(synthesized);
+  return synthesized;
+}
 function responseWithBody(response, body) {
   const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
   headers.delete("content-length");
@@ -2734,7 +2812,9 @@ function withOAuthEndpointOverrides(fetchFn, getOverrides) {
     const overrides = resolveOverrides();
     if (!overrides) return response;
     if (!isAuthorizationServerMetadataRequest(input)) return response;
-    if (!response.ok) return response;
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      return synthesizedMetadataResponse(input, init, response, overrides) ?? response;
+    }
     if (!isJsonDocumentResponse(response.headers.get("content-type")))
       return response;
     let parsed;
@@ -2910,8 +2990,8 @@ import {
   OAuthMetadataSchema,
   OpenIdProviderDiscoveryMetadataSchema
 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/core";
-var RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
-var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
+var RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN2 = "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
+var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2 = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
 var COMPAT_SOURCE_HEADER = "x-inspector-oauth-metadata-source";
 function oidcDiscoveryCandidates(rfc8414Url) {
   let url;
@@ -2920,16 +3000,16 @@ function oidcDiscoveryCandidates(rfc8414Url) {
   } catch {
     return [];
   }
-  if (!url.pathname.startsWith(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN)) return [];
-  const path7 = url.pathname.slice(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN.length);
+  if (!url.pathname.startsWith(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN2)) return [];
+  const path7 = url.pathname.slice(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN2.length);
   if (path7 !== "" && !path7.startsWith("/")) return [];
-  if (path7 === "") return [new URL(OIDC_WELL_KNOWN, url.origin).href];
+  if (path7 === "") return [new URL(OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2, url.origin).href];
   return [
-    new URL(`${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN}${path7}`, url.origin).href,
-    new URL(`${path7}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN}`, url.origin).href
+    new URL(`${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2}${path7}`, url.origin).href,
+    new URL(`${path7}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2}`, url.origin).href
   ];
 }
-function continuesDiscovery(status) {
+function continuesDiscovery2(status) {
   return status >= 400 && status < 500 || status === 502;
 }
 async function releaseBody(response) {
@@ -2955,7 +3035,7 @@ function discoveryHeaders(input, init) {
   }
   return new Headers();
 }
-function requestMethodOf(input, init) {
+function requestMethodOf2(input, init) {
   if (init?.method) return init.method.toUpperCase();
   if (typeof input !== "string" && !(input instanceof URL)) {
     return input.method.toUpperCase();
@@ -2966,8 +3046,8 @@ function withRfc8414OidcCompat(fetchFn) {
   return async (input, init) => {
     const response = await fetchFn(input, init);
     if (response.ok) return response;
-    if (!continuesDiscovery(response.status)) return response;
-    if (requestMethodOf(input, init) !== "GET") return response;
+    if (!continuesDiscovery2(response.status)) return response;
+    if (requestMethodOf2(input, init) !== "GET") return response;
     const candidates = oidcDiscoveryCandidates(requestUrlOf3(input));
     if (candidates.length === 0) return response;
     const headers = discoveryHeaders(input, init);
@@ -2997,7 +3077,7 @@ function withRfc8414OidcCompat(fetchFn) {
           releaseBodyDetached(response);
           throw callerSignal.reason;
         }
-        if (continuesDiscovery(probe.status)) continue;
+        if (continuesDiscovery2(probe.status)) continue;
         return response;
       }
       let parsed;
@@ -3017,6 +3097,16 @@ function withRfc8414OidcCompat(fetchFn) {
       }
       const source = probe.url || candidate;
       releaseBodyDetached(response);
+      if (isSynthesizedMetadataResponse(probe)) {
+        return new Response(body, {
+          status: 200,
+          statusText: "OK",
+          headers: {
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+            [SYNTHESIZED_METADATA_HEADER]: "endpoint-overrides"
+          }
+        });
+      }
       console.warn(
         `[oauth] ${source} returned RFC 8414 OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata, not an OpenID provider document. The MCP TypeScript SDK validates that path as OpenID Connect Discovery and would reject it (modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#2733), so the Inspector is handing it to discovery as the RFC 8414 document it is.`
       );
@@ -3087,6 +3177,13 @@ var BaseOAuthClientProvider = class {
   requestRefreshToken;
   /** Server-configured scope, for the #2068 `offline_access` distinction. */
   configuredScope;
+  /** Per-flow verifier store (#2726); absent → the shared storage slot. */
+  flowStore;
+  /**
+   * The authId of the flow this provider is driving: set by {@link state} on the
+   * redirect leg and by {@link resumeAuthorizationFlow} on the callback leg.
+   */
+  flowId;
   constructor(serverUrl, oauthConfig) {
     this.serverUrl = serverUrl;
     this.storage = oauthConfig.storage;
@@ -3096,6 +3193,7 @@ var BaseOAuthClientProvider = class {
     this.authorizationParams = oauthConfig.authorizationParams;
     this.requestRefreshToken = oauthConfig.requestRefreshToken ?? true;
     this.configuredScope = oauthConfig.configuredScope;
+    this.flowStore = oauthConfig.flowStore;
   }
   /**
    * Load persisted scope into {@link cachedScope} before SDK `auth()` (which
@@ -3166,7 +3264,24 @@ var BaseOAuthClientProvider = class {
     return metadata;
   }
   state() {
-    return generateOAuthState();
+    const state = generateOAuthState();
+    this.flowId = state;
+    return state;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Bind this provider to the flow a callback's `state` names, so
+   * {@link codeVerifier} reads that flow's verifier and no other (#2726). A
+   * `state` that is not one of ours binds nothing — and, with a flow store, a
+   * flow-less read then fails rather than reaching for the shared slot.
+   */
+  resumeAuthorizationFlow(state) {
+    this.flowId = parseOAuthState(state)?.authId;
+  }
+  /** Drop the bound flow's verifier once its exchange has completed. */
+  async clearAuthorizationFlow() {
+    if (this.flowStore && this.flowId) {
+      await this.flowStore.clearCodeVerifier(this.flowId);
+    }
   }
   async clientInformation(ctx) {
     const preregistered = await this.storage.getClientInformation(
@@ -3311,9 +3426,26 @@ var BaseOAuthClientProvider = class {
     }
   }
   async saveCodeVerifier(codeVerifier) {
+    if (this.flowStore && this.flowId) {
+      await this.flowStore.saveCodeVerifier(
+        this.flowId,
+        this.serverUrl,
+        codeVerifier
+      );
+      return;
+    }
     await this.storage.saveCodeVerifier(this.serverUrl, codeVerifier);
   }
   async codeVerifier() {
+    if (this.flowStore) {
+      const verifier2 = this.flowId ? await this.flowStore.getCodeVerifier(this.flowId, this.serverUrl) : void 0;
+      if (!verifier2) {
+        throw new Error(
+          "No code verifier saved for this authorization flow. It may have been started in another browser tab or already completed; please re-authenticate."
+        );
+      }
+      return verifier2;
+    }
     const verifier = await this.storage.getCodeVerifier(this.serverUrl);
     if (!verifier) {
       throw new Error("No code verifier saved for session");
@@ -3360,6 +3492,10 @@ var BaseOAuthClientProvider = class {
         await this.storage.clearTokens(this.serverUrl);
         return;
       case "verifier":
+        if (this.flowStore) {
+          await this.clearAuthorizationFlow();
+          return;
+        }
         await this.storage.clearCodeVerifier(this.serverUrl);
         return;
       case "discovery":
@@ -3497,7 +3633,10 @@ function parseAuthChallengeFromResponse(response, context) {
   if (status !== 401 && status !== 403) {
     return void 0;
   }
-  const wwwAuthenticate = response.headers.get("WWW-Authenticate") ?? void 0;
+  const wwwAuthenticate = response.headers.get("WWW-Authenticate") || void 0;
+  if (status === 403 && !wwwAuthenticate) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
   const bearer = wwwAuthenticate ? parseWwwAuthenticateBearer(wwwAuthenticate) : {};
   const requiredScopes = parseScopeString(bearer.scope);
   return {
@@ -4097,7 +4236,7 @@ function serializeOAuthPersistBlob(snapshot) {
 import { resolve as resolve5 } from "path";
 
 // ../../core/auth/node/oauth-secrets.ts
-import { randomUUID as randomUUID2 } from "crypto";
+import { createHmac, randomUUID as randomUUID2 } from "crypto";
 import { OAuthTokensSchema as OAuthTokensSchema3 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/core";
 var PERSIST_TOKENS_ENV = "MCP_INSPECTOR_PERSIST_TOKENS";
 var warnedPolicyValues = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
@@ -4130,6 +4269,29 @@ var LEGACY_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD = "registration-token";
 var PREREG_CLIENT_SECRET_FIELD = "prereg-client-secret";
 var PREREG_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD = "prereg-registration-token";
 var IDP_SESSION_FIELD = "idp-session";
+var clientCredentialStampField = (field) => `${field}#owner`;
+var credentialMac = (clientId, value) => createHmac("sha256", value).update(clientId).digest("hex");
+function clientCredentialStamp(clientId, value) {
+  return JSON.stringify({
+    client_id: clientId,
+    mac: credentialMac(clientId, value)
+  });
+}
+function stampedOwner(stamp, value) {
+  if (stamp === void 0) return void 0;
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(stamp);
+  } catch {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) return void 0;
+  const { client_id: clientId, mac } = parsed;
+  if (typeof clientId !== "string" || mac !== credentialMac(clientId, value)) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  return clientId;
+}
 function applyTokensPolicy(tokens, policy) {
   if (policy === "none") return void 0;
   if (policy === "access" && tokens.refresh_token !== void 0) {
@@ -4158,12 +4320,18 @@ function splitClientInformation(info, fields, secrets) {
   if (client_secret === void 0 && registration_access_token === void 0) {
     return info;
   }
-  if (client_secret !== void 0) {
-    secrets[fields.clientSecret] = client_secret;
-  }
-  if (registration_access_token !== void 0) {
-    secrets[fields.registrationToken] = registration_access_token;
-  }
+  const put = (field, value) => {
+    if (value === void 0) return;
+    secrets[field] = value;
+    if (fields.stamped && typeof info.client_id === "string") {
+      secrets[clientCredentialStampField(field)] = clientCredentialStamp(
+        info.client_id,
+        value
+      );
+    }
+  };
+  put(fields.clientSecret, client_secret);
+  put(fields.registrationToken, registration_access_token);
   return publicInfo;
 }
 function joinClientInformation(info, fields, secrets) {
@@ -4182,15 +4350,18 @@ function joinClientInformation(info, fields, secrets) {
 }
 var issuerClientInfoFields = (issuer) => ({
   clientSecret: issuerClientSecretField(issuer),
-  registrationToken: issuerRegistrationTokenField(issuer)
+  registrationToken: issuerRegistrationTokenField(issuer),
+  stamped: true
 });
 var LEGACY_CLIENT_INFO_FIELDS = {
   clientSecret: LEGACY_CLIENT_SECRET_FIELD,
-  registrationToken: LEGACY_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD
+  registrationToken: LEGACY_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD,
+  stamped: true
 };
 var PREREG_CLIENT_INFO_FIELDS = {
   clientSecret: PREREG_CLIENT_SECRET_FIELD,
-  registrationToken: PREREG_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD
+  registrationToken: PREREG_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD,
+  stamped: false
 };
 function splitServerOAuthState(state, policy) {
   const secrets = {};
@@ -4340,20 +4511,54 @@ function joinIdpSession(residue, secrets) {
   return stored ? { ...residue, ...stored } : { ...residue };
 }
 function serverSecretFields(state) {
+  const stamped = (field) => [
+    field,
+    clientCredentialStampField(field)
+  ];
   const fields = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
     LEGACY_TOKENS_FIELD,
-    LEGACY_CLIENT_SECRET_FIELD,
-    LEGACY_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD,
+    ...stamped(LEGACY_CLIENT_SECRET_FIELD),
+    ...stamped(LEGACY_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD),
     PREREG_CLIENT_SECRET_FIELD,
     PREREG_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_FIELD
   ]);
   for (const issuer of Object.keys(state?.byIssuer ?? {})) {
     fields.add(issuerTokensField(issuer));
-    fields.add(issuerClientSecretField(issuer));
-    fields.add(issuerRegistrationTokenField(issuer));
+    for (const field of stamped(issuerClientSecretField(issuer))) {
+      fields.add(field);
+    }
+    for (const field of stamped(issuerRegistrationTokenField(issuer))) {
+      fields.add(field);
+    }
   }
   return [...fields];
 }
+function clientCredentialOwners(state) {
+  const owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  const add = (info, fields) => {
+    if (typeof info?.client_id !== "string") return;
+    owners.set(fields.clientSecret, info.client_id);
+    owners.set(fields.registrationToken, info.client_id);
+  };
+  add(state.clientInformation, LEGACY_CLIENT_INFO_FIELDS);
+  for (const [issuer, slot] of Object.entries(state.byIssuer ?? {})) {
+    add(slot.clientInformation, issuerClientInfoFields(issuer));
+  }
+  return owners;
+}
+function restampClientCredentials(state, secrets) {
+  const out = { ...secrets };
+  for (const [field, clientId] of clientCredentialOwners(state)) {
+    const stampField = clientCredentialStampField(field);
+    const value = Object.hasOwn(out, field) ? out[field] : void 0;
+    if (value === void 0) {
+      delete out[stampField];
+    } else if (stampedOwner(out[stampField], value) === void 0) {
+      setOwnEntry(out, stampField, clientCredentialStamp(clientId, value));
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
 function clientInfoHasPlaintext(info) {
   return info !== void 0 && (info.client_secret !== void 0 || info.registration_access_token !== void 0);
 }
@@ -4394,6 +4599,44 @@ function coveredLocations(location, byLocation) {
     ([recorded]) => recorded === location || location === KEYRING_LOCATION && recorded.startsWith(FILE_LOCATION_PREFIX)
   ).map(([recorded, keys]) => ({ location: recorded, keys }));
 }
+var emptyKeys = () => ({
+  servers: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
+  idpSessions: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
+  owners: /* @__PURE__ */ new Map()
+});
+function candidateFields(location, byLocation) {
+  const fields = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const { keys } of coveredLocations(location, byLocation)) {
+    for (const [url, owned] of keys.owners) {
+      const kept = fields.get(url) ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+      for (const field of owned.keys()) kept.add(field);
+      fields.set(url, kept);
+    }
+  }
+  return fields;
+}
+function addMissingOwners(target, source) {
+  for (const [url, fields] of source) {
+    const kept = target.get(url) ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+    for (const [field, clientId] of fields) {
+      if (!kept.has(field)) kept.set(field, clientId);
+    }
+    if (kept.size > 0) target.set(url, kept);
+  }
+}
+function mergeOwners(target, source) {
+  let changed = false;
+  for (const [url, fields] of source) {
+    const kept = target.get(url) ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+    for (const [field, clientId] of fields) {
+      if (kept.get(field) === clientId) continue;
+      kept.set(field, clientId);
+      changed = true;
+    }
+    if (kept.size > 0) target.set(url, kept);
+  }
+  return changed;
+}
 var warnedLedgerFailures = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 function warnLedgerFailure(what, error) {
   const reason = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
@@ -4407,6 +4650,19 @@ function warnLedgerFailure(what, error) {
 function isRecord2(value) {
   return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
 }
+function parseOwners(value) {
+  const owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  if (!isRecord2(value)) return owners;
+  for (const [url, fields] of Object.entries(value)) {
+    if (!isRecord2(fields)) continue;
+    const byField = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+    for (const [field, clientId] of Object.entries(fields)) {
+      if (typeof clientId === "string") byField.set(field, clientId);
+    }
+    if (byField.size > 0) owners.set(url, byField);
+  }
+  return owners;
+}
 function stringsOf(value) {
   return Array.isArray(value) ? value.filter((item) => typeof item === "string") : [];
 }
@@ -4428,7 +4684,9 @@ function parseLedger(raw) {
       if (!isRecord2(keys)) continue;
       byLocation.set(location, {
         servers: new Set(stringsOf(keys.servers)),
-        idpSessions: new Set(stringsOf(keys.idpSessions))
+        idpSessions: new Set(stringsOf(keys.idpSessions)),
+        owners: parseOwners(keys.owners),
+        ...isValidSecretsNamespace(keys.owedTo) && { owedTo: keys.owedTo }
       });
     }
     if (byLocation.size > 0) ledger.set(namespace, byLocation);
@@ -4442,7 +4700,19 @@ function serializeLedger(ledger) {
       Object.fromEntries(
         [...byLocation].map(([location, keys]) => [
           location,
-          { servers: [...keys.servers], idpSessions: [...keys.idpSessions] }
+          {
+            servers: [...keys.servers],
+            idpSessions: [...keys.idpSessions],
+            ...keys.owners.size > 0 && {
+              owners: Object.fromEntries(
+                [...keys.owners].map(([url, fields]) => [
+                  url,
+                  Object.fromEntries(fields)
+                ])
+              )
+            },
+            ...keys.owedTo !== void 0 && { owedTo: keys.owedTo }
+          }
         ])
       )
     ])
@@ -4454,7 +4724,7 @@ async function writeLedger(stateFilePath, ledger) {
   if (ledger.size === 0) await deleteStoreFile(path7);
   else await writeStoreFile(path7, serializeLedger(ledger));
 }
-async function recordNamespaceKeys(stateFilePath, secretStore, namespace, servers, idpSessions) {
+async function recordNamespaceKeys(stateFilePath, secretStore, namespace, servers, idpSessions, owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map()) {
   try {
     const ledger = parseLedger(
       await readStoreFile(namespaceLedgerPath(stateFilePath))
@@ -4468,7 +4738,7 @@ async function recordNamespaceKeys(stateFilePath, secretStore, namespace, server
     let keys = byLocation.get(location);
     let changed = false;
     if (!keys) {
-      keys = { servers: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(), idpSessions: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set() };
+      keys = emptyKeys();
       byLocation.set(location, keys);
       changed = true;
     }
@@ -4482,12 +4752,105 @@ async function recordNamespaceKeys(stateFilePath, secretStore, namespace, server
       keys.idpSessions.add(issuer);
       changed = true;
     }
+    if (mergeOwners(keys.owners, owners)) changed = true;
     if (changed) await writeLedger(stateFilePath, ledger);
   } catch (error) {
     warnLedgerFailure("update", error);
   }
 }
-async function purgeSupersededNamespaces(stateFilePath, secretStore, current) {
+async function markUncarriedNamespaces(stateFilePath, secretStore, into) {
+  const ledger = parseLedger(
+    await readStoreFile(namespaceLedgerPath(stateFilePath))
+  );
+  const location = await secretStoreLocation(secretStore);
+  let changed = false;
+  for (const [namespace, byLocation] of ledger) {
+    if (namespace === into) continue;
+    for (const [recorded, keys] of byLocation) {
+      if (recorded === location || keys.owners.size === 0) continue;
+      if (keys.owedTo === into) continue;
+      keys.owedTo = into;
+      changed = true;
+    }
+  }
+  if (changed) await writeLedger(stateFilePath, ledger);
+}
+async function pendingCarries(stateFilePath, secretStore, current) {
+  const ledger = parseLedger(
+    await readStoreFile(namespaceLedgerPath(stateFilePath))
+  );
+  const location = await secretStoreLocation(secretStore);
+  const carries = [];
+  for (const [namespace, byLocation] of ledger) {
+    const owed = coveredLocations(location, byLocation).some(
+      ({ keys }) => keys.owedTo === current
+    );
+    if (owed) {
+      carries.push({
+        namespace,
+        fields: candidateFields(location, byLocation)
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  return carries.reverse();
+}
+async function carryOwed(stateFilePath, ledger, location, secretStore, namespace, current, recorded, now) {
+  let carried = true;
+  for (const [url, fields] of recorded) {
+    for (const field of fields) {
+      const clientId = now.get(url)?.get(field);
+      if (clientId === void 0) continue;
+      try {
+        const from = oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace);
+        const to = oauthSecretServerId(url, current);
+        const stampField = clientCredentialStampField(field);
+        const value = await secretStoreGetStrict(secretStore, from, field);
+        if (value === null) continue;
+        const stamp = await secretStoreGetStrict(secretStore, from, stampField);
+        if (stamp === null || stampedOwner(stamp, value) !== clientId) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        if (await secretStoreGetStrict(secretStore, to, field) !== null) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        let byLocation = ledger.get(current);
+        if (!byLocation) {
+          byLocation = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+          ledger.set(current, byLocation);
+        }
+        const target = byLocation.get(location) ?? emptyKeys();
+        byLocation.set(location, target);
+        const isNew = !target.servers.has(url);
+        target.servers.add(url);
+        const owner = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([[url, /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([[field, clientId]])]]);
+        if (mergeOwners(target.owners, owner) || isNew) {
+          await writeLedger(stateFilePath, ledger);
+        }
+        await secretStore.set(to, stampField, stamp);
+        await secretStore.set(to, field, value);
+      } catch (error) {
+        carried = false;
+        warnLedgerFailure(
+          "carry over a superseded namespace recorded in",
+          error
+        );
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return carried;
+}
+async function recordedNamespaces(stateFilePath) {
+  try {
+    const ledger = parseLedger(
+      await readStoreFile(namespaceLedgerPath(stateFilePath))
+    );
+    return [...ledger.keys()].reverse();
+  } catch (error) {
+    warnLedgerFailure("read", error);
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+async function purgeSupersededNamespaces(stateFilePath, secretStore, current, owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map()) {
   let ledger;
   let location;
   try {
@@ -4500,8 +4863,22 @@ async function purgeSupersededNamespaces(stateFilePath, secretStore, current) {
     return;
   }
   let changed = false;
-  for (const [namespace, byLocation] of ledger) {
+  for (const [namespace, byLocation] of [...ledger].reverse()) {
     if (namespace === current) continue;
+    if (current !== void 0 && coveredLocations(location, byLocation).some(
+      ({ keys }) => keys.owedTo === current
+    ) && !await carryOwed(
+      stateFilePath,
+      ledger,
+      location,
+      secretStore,
+      namespace,
+      current,
+      candidateFields(location, byLocation),
+      owners
+    )) {
+      break;
+    }
     for (const { location: recorded, keys } of coveredLocations(
       location,
       byLocation
@@ -4526,12 +4903,11 @@ async function purgeSupersededNamespaces(stateFilePath, secretStore, current) {
       if (!purged || recorded !== location) continue;
       byLocation.delete(recorded);
       if (recorded.startsWith(FILE_LOCATION_PREFIX)) {
-        const keyring = byLocation.get(KEYRING_LOCATION) ?? {
-          servers: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
-          idpSessions: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set()
-        };
+        const keyring = byLocation.get(KEYRING_LOCATION) ?? emptyKeys();
+        addMissingOwners(keyring.owners, keys.owners);
         for (const url of keys.servers) keyring.servers.add(url);
         for (const issuer of keys.idpSessions) keyring.idpSessions.add(issuer);
+        keyring.owedTo ??= keys.owedTo;
         byLocation.set(KEYRING_LOCATION, keyring);
       }
       changed = true;
@@ -4642,7 +5018,12 @@ async function adoptSecretsNamespace(filePath, secretStore, locked) {
   const existing = parseSecretsNamespace(raw);
   if (existing !== void 0) {
     if (locked) {
-      await purgeSupersededNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, existing);
+      await purgeSupersededNamespaces(
+        filePath,
+        secretStore,
+        existing,
+        snapshotClientOwners(parseOAuthPersistBlob(raw))
+      );
     }
     return existing;
   }
@@ -4650,42 +5031,53 @@ async function adoptSecretsNamespace(filePath, secretStore, locked) {
   if (raw !== null && snapshot === null) {
     throw new OAuthStateFileUnrecognizedError(filePath, "save");
   }
-  if (locked) {
-    await purgeSupersededNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, void 0);
-  }
   const namespace = newSecretsNamespace();
-  if (snapshot === null) return namespace;
-  const moves = [
-    ...Object.entries(snapshot.servers).map(([url, state]) => ({
-      legacyId: oauthSecretServerId(url),
-      scopedId: oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace),
-      fields: serverSecretFields(state)
-    })),
-    ...Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions).map((issuer) => ({
-      legacyId: oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer),
-      scopedId: oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, namespace),
-      fields: [IDP_SESSION_FIELD]
-    }))
-  ];
-  if (moves.length === 0) return namespace;
+  if (snapshot === null || Object.keys(snapshot.servers).length === 0 && Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions).length === 0) {
+    if (locked) {
+      await purgeSupersededNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, void 0);
+    }
+    return namespace;
+  }
   if (!locked) {
     throw new SecretStoreUnavailableError(
       `Could not save OAuth state: ${filePath} predates per-state-file secret namespaces, and migrating its secret-store entries needs the file lock, which is unavailable here (see the lock warning above). Migrating without it could lose credentials if two processes migrate at once. Nothing was changed; make the lock directory writable and retry \u2014 or, if you cannot, clear this file's stored OAuth state and re-authorize (clearing does not migrate, and the fresh state file mints its namespace without the lock).`
     );
   }
+  const values = await readEntrySecrets(
+    snapshot,
+    secretStore,
+    void 0,
+    await recordedNamespaces(filePath)
+  );
+  const owners = snapshotClientOwners(snapshot);
   await recordNamespaceKeys(
     filePath,
     secretStore,
     namespace,
     Object.keys(snapshot.servers),
-    Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions)
+    Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions),
+    writtenClientOwners(snapshot, (url) => values.servers.get(url) ?? {})
   );
+  await markUncarriedNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, namespace);
   const touched = [];
   try {
-    for (const { legacyId, scopedId, fields } of moves) {
-      for (const field of fields) {
-        const value = await secretStoreGetStrict(secretStore, legacyId, field);
-        if (value === null) continue;
+    const copies = [
+      // Restamped: a value read from the legacy ids predates stamps, and a
+      // fallback's stamp may belong to a value read from elsewhere (#2734).
+      ...[...values.servers].map(([url, secrets]) => ({
+        scopedId: oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace),
+        secrets: restampClientCredentials(
+          getOwnEntry(snapshot.servers, url) ?? {},
+          secrets
+        )
+      })),
+      ...[...values.idpSessions].map(([issuer, secrets]) => ({
+        scopedId: oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, namespace),
+        secrets
+      }))
+    ];
+    for (const { scopedId, secrets } of copies) {
+      for (const [field, value] of Object.entries(secrets)) {
         touched.push({ serverId: scopedId, field, value: null });
         await secretStore.set(scopedId, field, value);
       }
@@ -4695,7 +5087,14 @@ async function adoptSecretsNamespace(filePath, secretStore, locked) {
     await restoreSecretFields(secretStore, touched, warnRestoreFailure);
     throw error;
   }
-  for (const { legacyId } of moves) {
+  await purgeSupersededNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, namespace, owners);
+  const legacyIds = [
+    ...Object.keys(snapshot.servers).map((url) => oauthSecretServerId(url)),
+    ...Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions).map(
+      (issuer) => oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer)
+    )
+  ];
+  for (const legacyId of legacyIds) {
     try {
       await secretStore.deleteAllForServer(legacyId);
     } catch (error) {
@@ -4748,6 +5147,14 @@ function preserveNonDurableSecrets(diskSecrets, secrets) {
   return keep;
 }
 async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = defaultSecretStore()) {
+  await writeOAuthSectionsFrom(
+    filePath,
+    async () => snapshot,
+    sections,
+    secretStore
+  );
+}
+async function writeOAuthSectionsFrom(filePath, resolveSnapshot, sections, secretStore) {
   const policy = getPersistTokensPolicy();
   const durable = await secretStoreIsDurable(secretStore);
   await withOAuthStateLock(filePath, "save", async (locked) => {
@@ -4831,6 +5238,7 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
           unconfirmed = null;
           namespace = diskNamespace;
         }
+        const snapshot = await resolveSnapshot(disk, namespace);
         const effective = sections ? {
           servers: sections.servers && [...new Set(sections.servers)],
           idpSessions: sections.idpSessions && [
@@ -4856,7 +5264,22 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
           secretStore,
           namespace,
           Object.keys(merged.servers),
-          Object.keys(merged.idpSessions)
+          Object.keys(merged.idpSessions),
+          // Only the entries this save writes: another entry's secret in
+          // this store was written for whatever client it was written for,
+          // and relabeling it from the file would misattribute it (#2672).
+          writtenClientOwners(
+            {
+              servers: Object.fromEntries(
+                (effective.servers ?? []).flatMap((url) => {
+                  const entry = getOwnEntry(merged.servers, url);
+                  return entry === void 0 ? [] : [[url, entry]];
+                })
+              ),
+              idpSessions: {}
+            },
+            splitSecretsOf
+          )
         );
         for (const url of effective.servers ?? []) {
           const serverId = oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace);
@@ -4864,7 +5287,8 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
           const candidates = [
             .../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
               ...serverSecretFields(getOwnEntry(disk?.servers, url)),
-              ...serverSecretFields(next)
+              ...serverSecretFields(next),
+              ...[...restoreBaseline.values()].filter((prior) => prior.serverId === serverId).map(({ field }) => field)
             ])
           ];
           const entryPrior = await snapshotSecretFields(
@@ -4873,8 +5297,12 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
             candidates
           );
           priorSecrets.push(...entryPrior);
+          const entryPriorValue = new Map(
+            entryPrior.map(({ field, value }) => [field, value])
+          );
           if (next === void 0) {
             for (const field of candidates) {
+              if (entryPriorValue.get(field) === null) continue;
               ourWrites.set(priorKey({ serverId, field }), null);
             }
             await secretStore.deleteAllForServer(serverId);
@@ -4889,10 +5317,9 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
           }
           const { residue, secrets } = splitServerOAuthState(next, policy);
           for (const field of candidates) {
-            ourWrites.set(
-              priorKey({ serverId, field }),
-              secrets[field] ?? null
-            );
+            const value = secrets[field] ?? null;
+            if (value === entryPriorValue.get(field)) continue;
+            ourWrites.set(priorKey({ serverId, field }), value);
           }
           setOwnEntry(merged.servers, url, residue);
           if (!durable) {
@@ -5035,26 +5462,109 @@ function secretRequestsFor(snapshot, namespace) {
   }
   return requests;
 }
-async function joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, namespace) {
-  const requests = secretRequestsFor(snapshot, namespace);
-  const values = requests.length > 0 ? await secretStoreGetManyStrict(secretStore, requests) : {};
+function fillMissingSecrets(target, source) {
+  for (const [field, value] of Object.entries(source ?? {})) {
+    if (!Object.hasOwn(target, field)) setOwnEntry(target, field, value);
+  }
+}
+function writtenClientOwners(snapshot, secretsOf) {
+  const owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const [url, state] of Object.entries(snapshot.servers)) {
+    const secrets = secretsOf(url, state);
+    const fields = new Map(
+      [...clientCredentialOwners(state)].filter(
+        ([field]) => Object.hasOwn(secrets, field)
+      )
+    );
+    if (fields.size > 0) owners.set(url, fields);
+  }
+  return owners;
+}
+var splitSecretsOf = (_url, state) => splitServerOAuthState(state, "all").secrets;
+function snapshotClientOwners(snapshot) {
+  const owners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const [url, state] of Object.entries(snapshot?.servers ?? {})) {
+    const fields = clientCredentialOwners(state);
+    if (fields.size > 0) owners.set(url, fields);
+  }
+  return owners;
+}
+async function readEntrySecrets(snapshot, secretStore, namespace, fallbacks, carries = []) {
+  const servers = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  const idpSessions = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const url of Object.keys(snapshot.servers)) servers.set(url, {});
+  for (const issuer of Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions)) {
+    idpSessions.set(issuer, {});
+  }
+  for (const source of [namespace, ...fallbacks]) {
+    const requests = secretRequestsFor(snapshot, source);
+    if (requests.length === 0) break;
+    const values = await secretStoreGetManyStrict(secretStore, requests);
+    for (const [url, target] of servers) {
+      fillMissingSecrets(target, values[oauthSecretServerId(url, source)]);
+    }
+    for (const [issuer, target] of idpSessions) {
+      fillMissingSecrets(
+        target,
+        values[oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, source)]
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  const owners = snapshotClientOwners(snapshot);
+  for (const { namespace: from, fields: recorded } of carries) {
+    const requests = [];
+    for (const [url, fields] of recorded) {
+      const target = servers.get(url);
+      if (!target) continue;
+      const wanted = [...fields].filter(
+        (field) => owners.get(url)?.has(field) === true && !Object.hasOwn(target, field)
+      );
+      if (wanted.length > 0) {
+        requests.push({
+          serverId: oauthSecretServerId(url, from),
+          fields: wanted.flatMap((field) => [
+            field,
+            clientCredentialStampField(field)
+          ])
+        });
+      }
+    }
+    if (requests.length === 0) continue;
+    const values = await secretStoreGetManyStrict(secretStore, requests);
+    for (const [url, target] of servers) {
+      const found = values[oauthSecretServerId(url, from)] ?? {};
+      for (const [field, clientId] of owners.get(url) ?? []) {
+        const value = Object.hasOwn(found, field) ? found[field] : void 0;
+        const stampField = clientCredentialStampField(field);
+        if (value === void 0 || Object.hasOwn(target, field) || stampedOwner(found[stampField], value) !== clientId) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        setOwnEntry(target, field, value);
+        setOwnEntry(target, stampField, found[stampField]);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return { servers, idpSessions };
+}
+async function joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, namespace, fallbacks, carries = []) {
+  const values = await readEntrySecrets(
+    snapshot,
+    secretStore,
+    namespace,
+    fallbacks,
+    carries
+  );
   return {
     servers: Object.fromEntries(
       Object.entries(snapshot.servers).map(([url, state]) => [
         url,
-        joinServerOAuthState(
-          state,
-          values[oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace)] ?? {}
-        )
+        joinServerOAuthState(state, values.servers.get(url) ?? {})
       ])
     ),
     idpSessions: Object.fromEntries(
       Object.entries(snapshot.idpSessions).map(([issuer, session]) => [
         issuer,
-        joinIdpSession(
-          session,
-          values[oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, namespace)] ?? {}
-        )
+        joinIdpSession(session, values.idpSessions.get(issuer) ?? {})
       ])
     )
   };
@@ -5070,7 +5580,8 @@ async function migratePlaintextSecrets(filePath, secretStore) {
       secretStore,
       namespace,
       Object.keys(fresh.servers),
-      Object.keys(fresh.idpSessions)
+      Object.keys(fresh.idpSessions),
+      writtenClientOwners(fresh, splitSecretsOf)
     );
   }
   const migrateEntrySecrets = async (serverId, secrets) => {
@@ -5121,7 +5632,10 @@ async function readOAuthStore(filePath, secretStore = defaultSecretStore()) {
         warnMigrationFailure(error);
       }
     }
-    return joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, parseSecretsNamespace(raw));
+    const namespace = parseSecretsNamespace(raw);
+    const fallbacks = namespace === void 0 ? await recordedNamespaces(filePath) : [];
+    const carries = namespace === void 0 ? [] : await pendingCarries(filePath, secretStore, namespace);
+    return joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, namespace, fallbacks, carries);
   });
 }
 async function removeOAuthStore(filePath, secretStore = defaultSecretStore()) {
@@ -5748,6 +6262,11 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
   // rendered by the list panel instead of vanishing into an unhandled
   // rejection — which read as "this server has no tools" (#1953).
   error = null;
+  // Whether a fetch has committed a list this session. Until it has, the empty
+  // `items` mean "not loaded yet", not "the server has none" — a distinction a
+  // count of the list cannot make from `items` alone (#2607). Set and cleared
+  // just before the `*Change` dispatch, so a reader keyed on that event sees it.
+  loaded = false;
   config;
   // Debounce a burst of `list_changed` notifications into a single
   // refresh (or one indicator light) once it settles.
@@ -5783,6 +6302,7 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
           this.listChangedTimer = null;
         }
         this.items = [];
+        this.loaded = false;
         this.dispatchChange();
         this.setListChanged(false);
         this.setError(null);
@@ -5841,6 +6361,14 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
   getItems() {
     return [...this.items];
   }
+  /**
+   * Whether a fetch has committed a list since the last connect. False while
+   * the connect-time load is in flight, when it was deferred (paginated mode),
+   * and after a disconnect. Changes only alongside the `*Change` event (#2607).
+   */
+  isLoaded() {
+    return this.loaded;
+  }
   /** Whether a `list_changed` arrived since the last refresh (indicator on). */
   getListChanged() {
     return this.listChanged;
@@ -5934,6 +6462,7 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
   /** Commit a fetched list as the current one and notify subscribers. */
   applyItems(items) {
     this.items = items;
+    this.loaded = true;
     this.dispatchChange();
   }
   dispatchChange() {
@@ -5944,6 +6473,7 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
     this.unsubscribe?.();
     this.unsubscribe = null;
     this.items = [];
+    this.loaded = false;
   }
 };
 
@@ -6027,6 +6557,16 @@ var MessageLogState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
         return;
       }
     };
+    const onRequestFailed = (event) => {
+      const { id, reason } = event.detail;
+      const requestEntry = this.pendingRequestEntries.get(id);
+      if (!requestEntry) return;
+      this.pendingRequestEntries.delete(id);
+      requestEntry.clientError = reason;
+      requestEntry.duration = Date.now() - requestEntry.timestamp.getTime();
+      this.dispatchTypedEvent("message", requestEntry);
+      this.dispatchTypedEvent("messagesChange", this.getMessages());
+    };
     const onStatusChange = () => {
       if (isTerminalStatus(this.client?.getStatus())) {
         this.messages = [];
@@ -6036,11 +6576,13 @@ var MessageLogState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
     };
     this.client.addEventListener("message", onMessage);
     this.client.addEventListener("responseRejected", onResponseRejected);
+    this.client.addEventListener("requestFailed", onRequestFailed);
     this.client.addEventListener("statusChange", onStatusChange);
     this.unsubscribe = () => {
       if (this.client) {
         this.client.removeEventListener("message", onMessage);
         this.client.removeEventListener("responseRejected", onResponseRejected);
+        this.client.removeEventListener("requestFailed", onRequestFailed);
         this.client.removeEventListener("statusChange", onStatusChange);
       }
       this.client = null;
@@ -6400,6 +6942,12 @@ var DirectoryReadResultSchema = z2.looseObject({
   resources: z2.array(DirectoryChildSchema),
   nextCursor: z2.string().optional()
 });
+var ModernDirectoryReadResultSchema = DirectoryReadResultSchema.extend(
+  {
+    ttlMs: z2.int().min(0),
+    cacheScope: z2.enum(["public", "private"])
+  }
+);
 
 // ../../core/mcp/state/managedSkillsState.ts
 var REPEATED_CURSOR_MESSAGE = "Server repeated a pagination cursor in skills/list; stopped to avoid an infinite walk.";
@@ -7212,6 +7760,10 @@ function checkSkillNameCollisions(entries) {
 }
 
 // ../../core/mcp/skillsVerification.ts
+var DEFAULT_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT = {
+  raise: "with the server's skillCatalogMaxSkills / skillCatalogMaxBytes settings",
+  verifyOne: "by verifying this skill alone"
+};
 function reasonOf(err) {
   return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
 }
@@ -7273,7 +7825,7 @@ function responseBytes(result) {
   }
   return total;
 }
-async function verifySkills(client, entries, metadata) {
+async function verifySkills(client, entries, metadata, budgetHint = DEFAULT_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT) {
   const collisions = checkSkillNameCollisions(entries);
   const reports = [];
   const budget = resolveSkillCatalogBudget(client.getServerSettings?.());
@@ -7285,7 +7837,7 @@ async function verifySkills(client, entries, metadata) {
     const files = [];
     const declared = entry.resources === DYNAMIC_RESOURCES ? [] : entry.resources;
     const manifest = withinBudget ? boundedManifest(declared) : [];
-    let incomplete = !withinBudget ? `Not read: this run already reached its catalog budget of ${budget.maxSkills} skills / ${budget.maxBytes} bytes (raise it in the server's Skills settings). Nothing about this skill's files has been checked \u2014 verify it on its own with \`--method skills/get --uri <uri> --verify\`, where <uri> is this report's uri, to get a verdict.` : manifest.length < declared.length ? `Only ${manifest.length} of ${declared.length} manifest entries were read: the skill exceeds the ${SKILL_MAX_RESOURCE_ENTRIES}-entry / ${SKILL_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES}-byte interoperability limits, so the rest were not fetched and cannot be reported on.` : void 0;
+    let incomplete = !withinBudget ? `Not read: this run already reached its catalog budget of ${budget.maxSkills} skills / ${budget.maxBytes} bytes (raise it ${budgetHint.raise}). Nothing about this skill's files has been checked \u2014 verify it on its own ${budgetHint.verifyOne} to get a verdict.` : manifest.length < declared.length ? `Only ${manifest.length} of ${declared.length} manifest entries were read: the skill exceeds the ${SKILL_MAX_RESOURCE_ENTRIES}-entry / ${SKILL_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES}-byte interoperability limits, so the rest were not fetched and cannot be reported on.` : void 0;
     let receivedBytes = 0;
     const entryIdentity = skillUriIdentity(entry.uri);
     let selfAttempted = false;
@@ -7423,6 +7975,14 @@ function anySkillUnverifiable(reports) {
 }
 
 // ../../core/cli/handlers/skills-verify.ts
+var CLI_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT = {
+  raise: "with --skill-catalog-max-skills / --skill-catalog-max-bytes, or the server's skillCatalogMaxSkills / skillCatalogMaxBytes",
+  verifyOne: "with `--method skills/get --uri <uri> --verify`, where <uri> is this report's uri,"
+};
+var MCPDO_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT = {
+  raise: "with skillCatalogMaxSkills / skillCatalogMaxBytes in the connection's catalog entry",
+  verifyOne: "with `mcpdo @<conn> skills/get <uri> --verify`, where <uri> is this report's uri,"
+};
 function skillVerificationExitCode(reports, requireDigests) {
   if (allSkillsVerified(reports)) return void 0;
   if (anySkillFailed(reports)) return EXIT_CODES.SKILL_NONCONFORMANT;
@@ -7474,7 +8034,8 @@ function assertSkillsSupported(inspectorClient, method) {
   }
 }
 var resourceStreamRefs = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
-async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
+async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args, options = {}) {
+  const skillBudgetHint = options.skillBudgetHint ?? CLI_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT;
   let managedToolsState = null;
   let managedResourcesState = null;
   let managedResourceTemplatesState = null;
@@ -7539,7 +8100,8 @@ async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
       if (args.appInfo) {
         result = { ...appInfo };
       } else {
-        const invocation = args.task ? await inspectorClient.callToolStream(
+        const useTask = args.task === true || tool.execution?.taskSupport === "required";
+        const invocation = useTask ? await inspectorClient.callToolStream(
           tool,
           args.toolArg || {},
           args.metadata,
@@ -7770,7 +8332,8 @@ async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
         const reports = await verifySkills(
           inspectorClient,
           skills,
-          args.metadata
+          args.metadata,
+          skillBudgetHint
         );
         return {
           kind: "ndjson",
@@ -7799,7 +8362,8 @@ async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
         const reports = await verifySkills(
           inspectorClient,
           [skill],
-          args.metadata
+          args.metadata,
+          skillBudgetHint
         );
         return {
           kind: "ndjson",
@@ -9636,6 +10200,23 @@ function subscriptionFailureMessage(error) {
   return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
 }
 
+// ../../core/mcp/subscriptionRefusal.ts
+import { SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode3, SdkHttpError } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
+var REFUSAL_STATUSES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([400, 403, 404, 405]);
+function subscriptionListenRefusal(error) {
+  if (!SdkHttpError.isInstance(error) || error.code !== SdkErrorCode3.ClientHttpNotImplemented || !REFUSAL_STATUSES.has(error.status)) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  return {
+    status: error.status,
+    ...error.statusText ? { statusText: error.statusText } : {}
+  };
+}
+function subscriptionListenRefusalMessage(refusal) {
+  const status = refusal.statusText ? `${refusal.status} ${refusal.statusText}` : String(refusal.status);
+  return `The server refused subscriptions/listen (HTTP ${status}). Not retrying \u2014 the server would answer the same way again.`;
+}
+
 // ../../core/mcp/messageTrackingTransport.ts
 var MessageTrackingTransport = class {
   baseTransport;
@@ -9865,7 +10446,7 @@ var TaskProgressRouter = class {
 };
 
 // ../../core/extension/tasks/rawWireChannel.ts
-import { SdkError as SdkError3, SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode3 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
+import { SdkError as SdkError3, SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode4 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
 import { DispatchError as DispatchError2 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/ext-tasks/client";
 var RAW_WIRE_ID_PREFIX = "inspector-ext-";
 var RawWireChannel = class {
@@ -9938,8 +10519,8 @@ var RawWireChannel = class {
             `Raw MCP request "${message.method}" timed out after ${timeoutMs} ms`,
             false,
             {
-              cause: this.host.annotateTimeout(
-                new SdkError3(SdkErrorCode3.RequestTimeout, "Request timed out", {
+              cause: this.host.annotateError(
+                new SdkError3(SdkErrorCode4.RequestTimeout, "Request timed out", {
                   timeout: timeoutMs
                 }),
                 message.method
@@ -9979,7 +10560,7 @@ var RawWireChannel = class {
         if (!pending) return;
         pending.cleanup();
         reject(
-          this.host.annotateTimeout(
+          this.host.annotateError(
             error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)),
             message.method
           )
@@ -10712,12 +11293,33 @@ var ToolCallCancelledError = class extends Error {
 };
 
 // ../../core/mcp/connectionDiagnostics.ts
-import { SdkError as SdkError4, SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode4 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
+import { SdkError as SdkError4, SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode5 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
 function isRequestTimeoutData(value) {
   return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && typeof value.timeout === "number";
 }
 function isRequestTimeoutError(err) {
-  return SdkError4.isInstance(err) && err.code === SdkErrorCode4.RequestTimeout && isRequestTimeoutData(err.data);
+  return SdkError4.isInstance(err) && err.code === SdkErrorCode5.RequestTimeout && isRequestTimeoutData(err.data);
+}
+function describeSendFailure(err) {
+  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+  const status = httpStatusOf(err);
+  if (status === void 0 || message.includes(`HTTP ${status}`)) {
+    return message;
+  }
+  const statusText = httpStatusTextOf(err);
+  return `HTTP ${status}${statusText ? ` ${statusText}` : ""}: ${message}`;
+}
+function httpStatusOf(err) {
+  if (typeof err !== "object" || err === null || !("status" in err)) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  return typeof err.status === "number" ? err.status : void 0;
+}
+function httpStatusTextOf(err) {
+  if (typeof err !== "object" || err === null || !("statusText" in err)) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  return typeof err.statusText === "string" ? err.statusText : void 0;
 }
 function formatDuration(ms) {
   const clamped = Math.max(0, ms);
@@ -10779,11 +11381,108 @@ function annotateRequestTimeout(err, method, diagnostics) {
     diagnostics
   };
   const message = `Request timed out after ${formatDuration(err.data.timeout)} (${method}). ${describeConnectionDiagnostics(diagnostics)}`;
-  const annotated = new SdkError4(SdkErrorCode4.RequestTimeout, message, data);
+  const annotated = new SdkError4(SdkErrorCode5.RequestTimeout, message, data);
   annotated.cause = err;
   return annotated;
 }
 
+// ../../core/mcp/rateLimit.ts
+import {
+  SdkHttpError as SdkHttpError2
+} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
+var HTTP_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS = 429;
+function requestIdsOf(body) {
+  if (body === void 0) return [];
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(body);
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
+  const ids = [];
+  for (const message of messages) {
+    if (typeof message !== "object" || message === null) continue;
+    if (!("method" in message) || !("id" in message)) continue;
+    const { id } = message;
+    if (typeof id === "string" || typeof id === "number") ids.push(id);
+  }
+  return ids;
+}
+var MAX_UNCLAIMED_RATE_LIMITS = 100;
+var RateLimitLedger = class {
+  // `undefined` is a real value here: a 429 that carried no header.
+  byRequestId = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  /** File a tracked fetch, if it was a 429. Anything else is ignored. */
+  record(entry) {
+    if (entry.responseStatus !== HTTP_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS) return;
+    const retryAfter = findHeader(entry.responseHeaders, "retry-after");
+    for (const id of requestIdsOf(entry.requestBody)) {
+      this.byRequestId.delete(id);
+      this.byRequestId.set(id, retryAfter);
+      if (this.byRequestId.size > MAX_UNCLAIMED_RATE_LIMITS) {
+        const [oldest] = this.byRequestId.keys();
+        if (oldest !== void 0) this.byRequestId.delete(oldest);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  /** The `Retry-After` filed for `id`, removed as it is read. */
+  take(id) {
+    const retryAfter = this.byRequestId.get(id);
+    this.byRequestId.delete(id);
+    return retryAfter;
+  }
+  clear() {
+    this.byRequestId.clear();
+  }
+};
+var IMF_FIXDATE = /^[A-Z][a-z]{2}, \d{2} [A-Z][a-z]{2} \d{4} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2} GMT$/;
+function parseRetryAfter(value, now) {
+  if (value === void 0) return void 0;
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  if (/^\d+$/.test(trimmed)) return Number(trimmed) * 1e3;
+  if (!IMF_FIXDATE.test(trimmed)) return void 0;
+  const at = Date.parse(trimmed);
+  if (Number.isNaN(at) || new Date(at).toUTCString() !== trimmed) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  return Math.max(0, at - now);
+}
+function isRateLimitError(err) {
+  return SdkHttpError2.isInstance(err) && err.status === HTTP_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS;
+}
+function retryAfterOn(err) {
+  const value = err.data.retryAfter;
+  return typeof value === "string" ? value : void 0;
+}
+function attachRetryAfter(err, retryAfter) {
+  if (!isRateLimitError(err) || retryAfter === void 0) return;
+  if (retryAfterOn(err) !== void 0) return;
+  err.data.retryAfter = retryAfter;
+}
+function describeRetry(retryAfter, retryAfterMs) {
+  if (retryAfterMs !== void 0) {
+    return `The server asked to retry after ${formatDuration(retryAfterMs)}.`;
+  }
+  if (retryAfter !== void 0) {
+    return `The server sent an unparseable Retry-After (${retryAfter}).`;
+  }
+  return "The server sent no Retry-After header.";
+}
+function annotateRateLimit(err, method, now = Date.now()) {
+  if (!isRateLimitError(err)) return err;
+  const header = retryAfterOn(err);
+  const retryAfterMs = parseRetryAfter(header, now);
+  const data = {
+    ...err.data,
+    method,
+    ...header !== void 0 && { retryAfter: header },
+    ...retryAfterMs !== void 0 && { retryAfterMs }
+  };
+  const message = `Rate limited by the server (HTTP 429) on ${method}. ${describeRetry(header, retryAfterMs)} ${err.message}`;
+  return new SdkHttpError2(err.code, message, data, { cause: err });
+}
+
 // ../../core/auth/ema/clientConfigError.ts
 function emaClientNotConfiguredMessage(reason) {
   if (reason === "disabled") {
@@ -10881,10 +11580,10 @@ async function resolveIdpMetadata(issuer, storage, fetchFn) {
   }
   return discoverIdpMetadata(issuer, fetchFn);
 }
-var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2 = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
+var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN3 = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
 async function fetchOpenIdConfiguration(issuer, issuerUrl, fetchFn) {
   const url = new URL(
-    `${issuerUrl.pathname.replace(/\/$/, "")}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2}`,
+    `${issuerUrl.pathname.replace(/\/$/, "")}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN3}`,
     issuerUrl.origin
   );
   try {
@@ -11219,11 +11918,6 @@ async function mintEmaResourceTokens(config, resourceContext) {
       "EMA requires resource authorization server clientId (per-server oauth.clientId)"
     );
   }
-  if (!config.resourceClientSecret?.trim()) {
-    throw new Error(
-      "EMA requires resource authorization server client secret in server OAuth settings (Test Client secret from xaa.dev resource registration)"
-    );
-  }
   const idToken = await getValidIdToken({
     idp: config.idp,
     storage: config.storage,
@@ -11489,7 +12183,9 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
       requestRefreshToken: this.oauthConfig.requestRefreshToken,
       // #2068: lets the provider tell an `offline_access` the user asked for
       // from one inherited from a previous grant's persisted scope.
-      configuredScope: this.oauthConfig.scope
+      configuredScope: this.oauthConfig.scope,
+      // #2726: in-flight PKCE verifiers keyed by flow, not by server URL.
+      flowStore: this.oauthConfig.flowStore
     });
     provider.setEventTarget(this.params.getEventTarget());
     await provider.prepareForAuth();
@@ -11653,7 +12349,12 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
   recordAuthorizationRequestScope(authorizationUrl, requestedScope) {
     this.pendingAuthorizationScope = authorizationUrl.searchParams.get("scope")?.trim() || requestedScope;
   }
-  async completeOAuthFlow(authorizationCode, iss) {
+  /**
+   * `state` is the OAuth `state` the callback was redirected back with. It
+   * selects the flow whose PKCE verifier the exchange uses (#2726); without it
+   * a provider with a flow store has no verifier to send.
+   */
+  async completeOAuthFlow(authorizationCode, iss, state) {
     try {
       if (this.isEnterpriseManaged()) {
         const emaConfig = await this.getEmaFlowConfig();
@@ -11677,6 +12378,9 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
       }
       const provider = await this.createOAuthProvider();
       const serverUrl = this.getServerUrl();
+      if (state !== void 0) {
+        provider.resumeAuthorizationFlow(state);
+      }
       const result = await mcpAuth(provider, {
         serverUrl,
         authorizationCode,
@@ -11688,6 +12392,7 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
           `Expected AUTHORIZED after providing authorization code, got: ${result}`
         );
       }
+      await provider.clearAuthorizationFlow();
       const tokens = await provider.tokens();
       if (!tokens) {
         throw new Error("Failed to retrieve tokens after authorization");
@@ -11819,15 +12524,21 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
    * Re-read persisted OAuth state and determine whether `challenge` is already
    * satisfied without an authorization-server round-trip.
    *
-   * Returns `true` for `insufficient_scope` when stored + token scope cover the
-   * SEP-2350 union. For `token_expired`, returns `true` only when storage holds
-   * a *provably* unexpired token — a JWT whose `exp` is still in the future. An
-   * opaque token carries no local expiry evidence, so the resource server's
-   * verdict stands and re-authorization proceeds. `invalid_token` and
-   * `unauthorized` always return `false` — the resource server explicitly
-   * rejected the credential.
+   * For `token_expired` and `insufficient_scope`, returns `true` only when
+   * storage holds a *provably* unexpired token — a JWT whose `exp` is still in
+   * the future. An opaque token carries no local expiry evidence, so the
+   * resource server's verdict stands and re-authorization proceeds.
+   * `insufficient_scope` additionally requires stored + token scope to cover
+   * the SEP-2350 union: some resource servers answer an *expired* token with
+   * `insufficient_scope`, and a scope-only check would replay that dead token
+   * instead of refreshing it (#2724, the same gap #2051 closed for
+   * `token_expired`). `invalid_token` and `unauthorized` always return
+   * `false` — the resource server explicitly rejected the credential.
+   *
+   * A caller that has just completed a grant passes `scopeOnly` — see
+   * {@link CheckAuthChallengeSatisfiedOptions}.
    */
-  async checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(challenge) {
+  async checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(challenge, options) {
     const storage = this.oauthConfig.storage;
     if (!storage) {
       return false;
@@ -11840,6 +12551,14 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
     if (challenge.reason !== "insufficient_scope") {
       return challenge.reason === "token_expired" && isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired(tokens);
     }
+    if (!options?.scopeOnly && !isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired(tokens)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    return this.isStepUpScopeCovered(challenge, storage, tokens);
+  }
+  /** Stored + token scope cover the challenge's SEP-2350 union. */
+  async isStepUpScopeCovered(challenge, storage, tokens) {
+    const serverUrl = this.getServerUrl();
     const enriched = await this.enrichChallengeWithAuthorizationScopes(
       challenge,
       tokens.scope
@@ -11943,14 +12662,14 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
   }
   async handleEnterpriseManagedAuthChallenge(challenge, options) {
     const enriched = await this.enrichChallengeWithAuthorizationScopes(challenge);
-    if (enriched.reason === "insufficient_scope" && !options?.confirmedStepUp) {
+    if (enriched.reason === "insufficient_scope" && !options?.confirmedStepUp && !await this.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(enriched, { scopeOnly: true })) {
       return { kind: "step_up_confirm", challenge: enriched };
     }
     const config = await this.emaFlowConfigForChallenge(enriched);
     if (enriched.reason === "insufficient_scope") {
       const silent = await trySilentEmaAuth(config);
       if (silent.status === "success") {
-        if (await this.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(enriched)) {
+        if (await this.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(enriched, { scopeOnly: true })) {
           const minted = await this.requireStorage().getTokens(
             this.getServerUrl()
           );
@@ -12028,9 +12747,16 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
         fetchFn: this.params.effectiveAuthFetch,
         resourceMetadataUrl,
         ...enriched.reason === "insufficient_scope" && {
+          // Judge coverage the way checkAuthChallengeSatisfied does: a token
+          // response that omitted `scope` granted what was stored, so a
+          // covered challenge on an expired token refreshes rather than
+          // forcing interactive authorization (#2724).
           forceReauthorization: isStrictScopeSuperset(
             scopeForAuth,
-            tokens?.scope
+            resolveEffectiveGrantedScope(
+              await this.oauthConfig.storage?.getScope(serverUrl),
+              tokens?.scope
+            )
           )
         }
       });
@@ -12039,7 +12765,7 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
     }
     if (result === "AUTHORIZED") {
       if (enriched.reason === "insufficient_scope") {
-        if (await this.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(enriched)) {
+        if (await this.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(enriched, { scopeOnly: true })) {
           const freshTokens = await provider.tokens();
           const scopeToPersist = resolvePersistedScopeAfterGrant(
             freshTokens?.scope,
@@ -12141,7 +12867,7 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
     if (result !== "AUTHORIZED") {
       return null;
     }
-    if (await this.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(enriched)) {
+    if (await this.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(enriched, { scopeOnly: true })) {
       const freshTokens = await provider.tokens();
       const scopeToPersist = resolvePersistedScopeAfterGrant(
         freshTokens?.scope,
@@ -12171,7 +12897,11 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
 };
 
 // ../../core/mcp/remote/remoteClientTransport.ts
-import { SdkError as SdkError5, SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode5 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
+import {
+  SdkError as SdkError5,
+  SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode6,
+  SdkHttpError as SdkHttpError3
+} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
 
 // ../../core/mcp/remote/types.ts
 function oauthTokensToRemoteAuthState(tokens) {
@@ -12226,6 +12956,18 @@ function isConnectAuthChallenge(json) {
 function isConnectTransportError(json) {
   return typeof json === "object" && json !== null && "ok" in json && json.ok === false && "kind" in json && json.kind === "transport_error";
 }
+var SDK_ERROR_CODES = new Set(
+  Object.values(SdkErrorCode6)
+);
+function toSdkHttpError(message, http) {
+  const code = SDK_ERROR_CODES.has(http.code) ? http.code : SdkErrorCode6.ClientHttpNotImplemented;
+  return new SdkHttpError3(code, message, {
+    status: http.status,
+    ...http.statusText !== void 0 && { statusText: http.statusText },
+    ...http.text !== void 0 && { text: http.text },
+    ...http.retryAfter !== void 0 && { retryAfter: http.retryAfter }
+  });
+}
 function legacySessionId(json) {
   if (typeof json === "object" && json !== null && "sessionId" in json && typeof json.sessionId === "string" && !("ok" in json)) {
     return json.sessionId;
@@ -12657,7 +13399,7 @@ var RemoteClientTransport = class {
         timer = setTimeout(() => {
           this.sseResponseWaits.delete(requestId);
           reject(
-            new SdkError5(SdkErrorCode5.RequestTimeout, "Request timed out", {
+            new SdkError5(SdkErrorCode6.RequestTimeout, "Request timed out", {
               timeout: this.sseResponseTimeoutMs
             })
           );
@@ -12726,6 +13468,9 @@ var RemoteClientTransport = class {
       });
       return;
     }
+    if (json.http) {
+      throw toSdkHttpError(json.error, json.http);
+    }
     throw new Error(json.error);
   }
   async requestSend(message, options) {
@@ -12798,8 +13543,9 @@ var corePackageJson = {
   version: "0.0.0"
 };
 var MAX_URL_ELICITATION_RETRIES = 5;
-function connectionTimeoutMessage(timeoutMs) {
-  return `Connection timed out after ${timeoutMs} ms. To accommodate a slower server, you may increase the timeout value in Server Settings.`;
+var WEB_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY = "To accommodate a slower server, you may increase the timeout value in Server Settings.";
+function connectionTimeoutMessage(timeoutMs, remedy = WEB_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY) {
+  return `Connection timed out after ${timeoutMs} ms. ${remedy}`;
 }
 function createPendingAbortError() {
   return new Error("Pending request aborted");
@@ -12865,7 +13611,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
     transport: () => this.transport,
     defaultTimeoutMs: () => this.requestTimeout ?? DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MSEC,
     resetTimeoutOnProgress: () => this.resetTimeoutOnProgress,
-    annotateTimeout: (error, method) => annotateRequestTimeout(error, method, this.getConnectionDiagnostics())
+    annotateError: (error, method) => this.annotateRequestError(error, method)
   });
   dispatchTaskRequest = (request, options) => this.rawWire.dispatch(request, options);
   // Every outbound request still awaiting a response, keyed by JSON-RPC id.
@@ -12885,11 +13631,16 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
   // `GET` on Streamable HTTP). Both per-session, reset with the maps above.
   lastResponse;
   notificationStream;
+  // Each tracked `429`'s `Retry-After`, by the JSON-RPC id that drew it, until
+  // that id's failed send claims it (#2442). Per-session, reset with the
+  // diagnostics above.
+  rateLimits = new RateLimitLedger();
   /** True when the cached transport was built with an OAuth authProvider attached. */
   transportHasAuthProvider = false;
   /** Dedupes concurrent ambient auth challenges (reason + scopes). */
   ambientAuthChallengeInFlight = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   pipeStderr;
+  connectionTimeoutRemedy;
   initialLoggingLevel;
   // Modern-era per-request log level (#1629). On 2026-07-28 servers
   // `logging/setLevel` is gone; the client opts into logs per request via the
@@ -13028,6 +13779,10 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
   // site to the two failure handlers. Cleared by any user-initiated refresh (a
   // subscribe/unsubscribe is a fresh attempt, and the server may have changed).
   modernNeverAcknowledged = false;
+  // Set when the last `listen()` was refused at the HTTP layer with a status a
+  // retry cannot change (#2722) — the sibling of `modernNeverAcknowledged`,
+  // carried and cleared the same way, holding the HTTP answer the UI reports.
+  modernListenRefusal = null;
   /** Which in-flight task calls own each progress token (#2316). */
   taskProgress = new TaskProgressRouter();
   // Abort controller for the in-flight ordinary (non-task) tool call. Aborting
@@ -13127,6 +13882,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
     this.fetchFn = options.environment.fetch;
     this.logger = options.environment.logger ?? silentLogger;
     this.pipeStderr = options.pipeStderr ?? false;
+    this.connectionTimeoutRemedy = options.connectionTimeoutRemedy ?? WEB_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY;
     this.initialLoggingLevel = options.initialLoggingLevel;
     this.sample = options.sample ?? true;
     this.elicit = options.elicit ?? true;
@@ -13284,7 +14040,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
       this.clientInfo,
       Object.keys(clientOptions).length > 0 ? clientOptions : void 0
     );
-    this.annotateSdkRequestTimeouts(this.client);
+    this.annotateSdkRequestErrors(this.client);
     if (this.tasksCapabilityAdvertised) {
       this.bindReceiverTasks();
     }
@@ -13292,7 +14048,8 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
   /**
    * Decorate the SDK Client's `request` so a per-request timeout rejects with
    * the connection's state at that moment instead of a bare `Request timed
-   * out` (#2318).
+   * out` (#2318), and a `429` rejects as rate limiting with the server's
+   * `Retry-After` instead of a bare `Error POSTing to endpoint` (#2442).
    *
    * `Protocol.request` is the one funnel every SDK verb goes through —
    * `listTools`, `callTool`, `readResource`, the handshake's `initialize`,
@@ -13310,21 +14067,30 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
    * implementation signature serves both at runtime; the single cast on the
    * way back is what the overloads cost.
    */
-  annotateSdkRequestTimeouts(client) {
+  annotateSdkRequestErrors(client) {
     const sdkRequest = client.request.bind(client);
     const decorated = async (...args) => {
       try {
         return await sdkRequest(...args);
       } catch (err) {
-        throw annotateRequestTimeout(
-          err,
-          args[0].method,
-          this.getConnectionDiagnostics()
-        );
+        throw this.annotateRequestError(err, args[0].method);
       }
     };
     client.request = decorated;
   }
+  /**
+   * The one place a failed request's error is decorated, shared by the SDK
+   * funnel above and the raw-wire channel that bypasses it (modern-era tool
+   * calls and task operations), so a caller sees the same error whichever
+   * path its request took: a timeout with the connection's state (#2318), a
+   * `429` named as rate limiting (#2442), anything else untouched.
+   */
+  annotateRequestError(err, method) {
+    return annotateRateLimit(
+      annotateRequestTimeout(err, method, this.getConnectionDiagnostics()),
+      method
+    );
+  }
   /**
    * @param base - the composed OAuth-path fetch, deadline innermost (#2319).
    *
@@ -13368,9 +14134,14 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
       },
       trackSendFailure: (message, error) => {
         if (isRequestTimeoutError(error)) return;
+        attachRetryAfter(error, this.rateLimits.take(message.id));
         if (this.outstandingRequests.delete(message.id)) {
           this.dispatchConnectionDiagnosticsChange();
         }
+        this.dispatchTypedEvent("requestFailed", {
+          id: message.id,
+          reason: describeSendFailure(error)
+        });
       },
       trackResponse: (message, origin) => {
         const responseId = message.id;
@@ -13436,6 +14207,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
     };
     baseTransport.onerror = (error) => {
       if (this.status === "connecting") return;
+      if (subscriptionListenRefusal(error) !== void 0) return;
       this.status = "error";
       this.dispatchTypedEvent("statusChange", this.status);
       this.dispatchTypedEvent("error", error);
@@ -13681,6 +14453,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
     this.clearModernReconnectTimer();
     this.modernReconnectAttempts = 0;
     this.modernNeverAcknowledged = false;
+    this.modernListenRefusal = null;
     this.modernSubscription = null;
     this.setModernStreamState(INACTIVE_SUBSCRIPTION_STREAM_STATE);
     this.dispatchSubscriptionsChange();
@@ -13719,6 +14492,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
     this.taskProgress.clear();
     this.lastResponse = void 0;
     this.notificationStream = void 0;
+    this.rateLimits.clear();
     this.dispatchConnectionDiagnosticsChange();
     if (this.malformedListItems.size > 0) {
       this.malformedListItems.clear();
@@ -13821,6 +14595,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
           onFetchRequest: (entry) => {
             this.dispatchFetchRequest({ ...entry, category: "transport" });
             this.noteTransportStream(entry);
+            this.rateLimits.record(entry);
           },
           onFetchResponseBody: (id, body) => {
             this.dispatchFetchRequestBodyUpdate(id, body);
@@ -13868,9 +14643,10 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
         // for that upstream gap and should be deleted with it.
         //
         // Known, accepted side effect of turning intercept on with no stored
-        // tokens: `parseAuthChallengeFromResponse` treats 403 as a challenge
-        // too, so a probe answered 403 for a *non-auth* reason (a gateway
-        // rejecting the unknown `server/discover` method, say) now starts OAuth
+        // tokens: `parseAuthChallengeFromResponse` treats a 403 carrying
+        // `WWW-Authenticate` as a challenge too, so a probe answered that way
+        // for a *non-auth* reason (a gateway rejecting the unknown
+        // `server/discover` method, say) now starts OAuth
         // discovery instead of letting "auto" fall back to the legacy
         // `initialize`. The outcome is a surfaced `oauthError`, not a hang, and
         // it goes away with this clause.
@@ -13937,7 +14713,14 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
           const timeoutPromise = new Promise((_, reject) => {
             timer = setTimeout(() => {
               connectTimedOut = true;
-              reject(new Error(connectionTimeoutMessage(connectTimeoutMs)));
+              reject(
+                new Error(
+                  connectionTimeoutMessage(
+                    connectTimeoutMs,
+                    this.connectionTimeoutRemedy
+                  )
+                )
+              );
             }, connectTimeoutMs);
           });
           try {
@@ -16152,11 +16935,12 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
       // for page one.
       ...cursor !== void 0 ? { cursor } : {}
     };
+    const resultSchema = this.isModernEra() ? ModernDirectoryReadResultSchema : DirectoryReadResultSchema;
     try {
       return await this.invokeMcpClient(
         () => this.client.request(
           { method: RESOURCES_DIRECTORY_READ_METHOD, params },
-          DirectoryReadResultSchema,
+          resultSchema,
           this.getRequestOptions(this.progressTokenOf(metadata))
         ),
         { method: RESOURCES_DIRECTORY_READ_METHOD }
@@ -16611,6 +17395,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
       this.clearModernReconnectTimer();
       this.modernReconnectAttempts = 0;
       this.modernNeverAcknowledged = false;
+      this.modernListenRefusal = null;
     }
     const generation = ++this.modernListenGeneration;
     const previous = this.modernSubscription;
@@ -16629,8 +17414,11 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
         this.getRequestOptions()
       );
     } catch (error) {
-      if (generation === this.modernListenGeneration && isNeverAcknowledgedSubscriptionClose(error)) {
-        this.modernNeverAcknowledged = true;
+      if (generation === this.modernListenGeneration) {
+        if (isNeverAcknowledgedSubscriptionClose(error)) {
+          this.modernNeverAcknowledged = true;
+        }
+        this.modernListenRefusal = subscriptionListenRefusal(error) ?? null;
       }
       throw error;
     }
@@ -16711,6 +17499,10 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
    * its error either way — the retry is about the subscriptions, not the call.
    */
   reconcileModernStreamStateAfterFailedRefresh() {
+    if (this.modernListenRefusal) {
+      this.endModernStreamRefused(this.modernListenRefusal);
+      return;
+    }
     if (!this.wantsModernStream()) {
       this.setModernStreamState(INACTIVE_SUBSCRIPTION_STREAM_STATE);
       return;
@@ -16743,6 +17535,23 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
       honoredUris: []
     });
   }
+  /**
+   * Settle the stream on an HTTP refusal of the listen (#2722): the
+   * `"refused"` status carrying the HTTP answer, no reconnect, and a log line
+   * with the sentence the UI shows. Reported whatever `active` says — see
+   * `ResourceSubscriptionStreamState`.
+   */
+  endModernStreamRefused(refusal) {
+    this.clearModernReconnectTimer();
+    const message = subscriptionListenRefusalMessage(refusal);
+    this.logger.warn({ message }, "subscriptions/listen refused over HTTP");
+    this.setModernStreamState({
+      active: this.modernStreamActive(),
+      status: "refused",
+      honoredUris: [],
+      refusal
+    });
+  }
   /**
    * Schedule a reconnect re-listen after the current backoff delay (#1630).
    * `modernReconnectAttempts` reflects the number of *consecutive failed*
@@ -16780,6 +17589,10 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
       this.endModernStreamNeverAcknowledged();
       return;
     }
+    if (this.modernListenRefusal && !isTerminalStatus(this.status)) {
+      this.endModernStreamRefused(this.modernListenRefusal);
+      return;
+    }
     this.modernReconnectAttempts += 1;
     if (this.modernReconnectAttempts > MODERN_RECONNECT_MAX_ATTEMPTS || isTerminalStatus(this.status) || !this.wantsModernStream()) {
       this.setModernStreamState({
@@ -16934,8 +17747,11 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
    * Re-read OAuth storage and test whether a challenge is already satisfied.
    * See {@link OAuthManager.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied}.
    */
-  async checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(challenge) {
-    return this.ensureOAuthManager().checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(challenge);
+  async checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(challenge, options) {
+    return this.ensureOAuthManager().checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(
+      challenge,
+      options
+    );
   }
   /**
    * Push recovered OAuth auth state to the remote backend (same MCP session).
@@ -17099,8 +17915,12 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
    * Direct transports reconnect after token exchange so the live MCP session
    * picks up the new Bearer token (mirrors silent recovery reconnect).
    */
-  async completeOAuthFlow(authorizationCode, iss) {
-    await this.ensureOAuthManager().completeOAuthFlow(authorizationCode, iss);
+  async completeOAuthFlow(authorizationCode, iss, state) {
+    await this.ensureOAuthManager().completeOAuthFlow(
+      authorizationCode,
+      iss,
+      state
+    );
     if (this.usesDirectAuthRecovery()) {
       await this.reconnectAfterAuthRecovery();
     }
@@ -17124,7 +17944,11 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
    * Finish OAuth after a full-page redirect and reconnect (or reattach) the MCP session.
    */
   async resumeAfterOAuth(authorizationCode, options) {
-    await this.completeOAuthFlow(authorizationCode, options?.iss);
+    await this.completeOAuthFlow(
+      authorizationCode,
+      options?.iss,
+      options?.state
+    );
     const remoteSessionId = options?.remoteSessionId;
     const transport = this.baseTransport;
     if (remoteSessionId && transport instanceof RemoteClientTransport) {
@@ -17287,16 +18111,30 @@ function buildConfigFromOptions(options) {
   const target = options.target ?? [];
   const first = target[0];
   const rest = target.slice(1);
+  if (first && options.serverUrl) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Cannot combine a positional target (${first}) with --server-url (${options.serverUrl}). Pass one or the other.`
+    );
+  }
   const urlFromTarget = first && (first.startsWith("http://") || first.startsWith("https://")) ? first : null;
   const url = urlFromTarget ?? options.serverUrl ?? null;
   if (url) {
-    if (rest.length > 0 && urlFromTarget) {
+    if (rest.length > 0) {
       throw new Error("Arguments cannot be passed to a URL-based MCP server.");
     }
+    if (options.transport === "stdio") {
+      throw new Error(
+        `stdio transport cannot be used with a URL (${url}). Use --transport http or --transport sse, or pass a local command instead.`
+      );
+    }
     let transportType;
     const t = options.transport === "http" ? "streamable-http" : options.transport;
     if (t === "sse" || t === "streamable-http") {
       transportType = t;
+    } else if (t) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `Invalid transport type: ${t}. Valid types are: sse, http, stdio`
+      );
     } else {
       const u = new URL(url);
       if (u.pathname.endsWith("/mcp")) {
@@ -18665,7 +19503,11 @@ async function runRunnerInteractiveOAuth(options) {
         path: options.callbackListen.pathname,
         onCallback: async (params) => {
           try {
-            await options.client.completeOAuthFlow(params.code, params.iss);
+            await options.client.completeOAuthFlow(
+              params.code,
+              params.iss,
+              params.state
+            );
             flowResolve();
           } catch (err) {
             flowReject(toRunnerOAuthError(err));
@@ -18717,7 +19559,10 @@ async function runRunnerInteractiveOAuth(options) {
     }
     if (options.authChallenge) {
       const satisfied = await racingSignals(
-        options.client.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(options.authChallenge)
+        // The token exchange just completed, so only scope is in question.
+        options.client.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(options.authChallenge, {
+          scopeOnly: true
+        })
       );
       if (!satisfied) {
         return {
@@ -19078,6 +19923,26 @@ function readInspectorVersion(callerUrl) {
   );
 }
 
+// ../../core/cli/handlers/connect-timeout.ts
+var DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS = 15e3;
+var CLI_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY = "To accommodate a slower server, pass a larger --connect-timeout <ms>, or set connectionTimeout on the server's catalog or config entry.";
+function withConnectTimeout(settings, connectionTimeout) {
+  if (connectionTimeout === void 0) return settings;
+  if (settings) return { ...settings, connectionTimeout };
+  return {
+    headers: [],
+    metadata: {},
+    env: [],
+    connectionTimeout,
+    requestTimeout: 0,
+    taskTtl: DEFAULT_TASK_TTL_MS,
+    maxFetchRequests: DEFAULT_MAX_FETCH_REQUESTS,
+    autoRefreshOnListChanged: false,
+    paginatedLists: false,
+    roots: []
+  };
+}
+
 // src/connection/auth-helper.ts
 import { spawn } from "child_process";
 import { createHash as createHash2 } from "crypto";
@@ -19087,14 +19952,25 @@ import * as path6 from "path";
 // ../../core/node/openUrl.ts
 import open from "open";
 var OPEN_URL_TIMEOUT_MS = 5e3;
-function launched(child) {
-  return new Promise((resolve8, reject) => {
-    child.on("error", reject);
-    child.once("spawn", () => resolve8());
+var OPENABLE_PROTOCOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["http:", "https:"]);
+function toOpenableHref(href) {
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(href);
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error("refusing to open an invalid URL");
+  }
+  if (!OPENABLE_PROTOCOLS.has(parsed.protocol)) {
+    throw new Error(`refusing to open a non-http(s) URL (${parsed.protocol})`);
+  }
+  return parsed.href;
+}
+function absorbLateErrors(child) {
+  child.on("error", () => {
   });
 }
 async function openUrl(url, timeoutMs = OPEN_URL_TIMEOUT_MS) {
-  const href = typeof url === "string" ? url : url.href;
+  const href = toOpenableHref(typeof url === "string" ? url : url.href);
   let timer;
   const timeout = new Promise((_, reject) => {
     timer = setTimeout(
@@ -19103,8 +19979,7 @@ async function openUrl(url, timeoutMs = OPEN_URL_TIMEOUT_MS) {
     );
   });
   try {
-    const opened = Promise.resolve().then(() => open(href)).then(launched);
-    await Promise.race([opened, timeout]);
+    await Promise.race([open(href).then(absorbLateErrors), timeout]);
   } finally {
     clearTimeout(timer);
   }
@@ -19471,13 +20346,15 @@ async function runEmaIdpInteractiveFlow(active, storage, navigation) {
   );
   const redirectUrlProvider = new MutableRedirectUrlProvider();
   redirectUrlProvider.redirectUrl = formatRunnerOAuthRedirectUrl(callbackUrlConfig);
+  const fetchFn = createProxyFetch();
   await runRunnerInteractiveOAuth({
     client: {
       authenticate: async () => {
         const { authorizationUrl } = await startIdpOidcAuthorization({
           idp: active,
           redirectUrl: redirectUrlProvider.redirectUrl,
-          storage
+          storage,
+          fetchFn
         });
         navigation.navigateToAuthorization(authorizationUrl);
         return authorizationUrl;
@@ -19491,7 +20368,8 @@ async function runEmaIdpInteractiveFlow(active, storage, navigation) {
           authorizationCode,
           iss,
           redirectUrl: redirectUrlProvider.redirectUrl,
-          storage
+          storage,
+          fetchFn
         });
       },
       /* v8 ignore next 2 -- only reached when options.authChallenge is set, which this flow never does */
@@ -19511,7 +20389,13 @@ async function authorizeInFrontend(serverConfig, serverSettings, options) {
     return;
   }
   const environment = {
-    transport: createTransportNode
+    transport: createTransportNode,
+    // HTTPS_PROXY / HTTP_PROXY / NO_PROXY, as in the one-shot CLI (#2642):
+    // `InspectorClient` always hands the transport a defined fetch, so the
+    // transport's own proxy fallback never fires — the proxy has to sit here,
+    // at the bottom of the stack, for OAuth discovery and token requests to
+    // reach it. Undefined when no proxy variable is set.
+    fetch: createProxyFetch()
   };
   const redirectUrlProvider = new MutableRedirectUrlProvider();
   const callbackUrlConfig = parseRunnerOAuthCallbackUrl(
@@ -19545,6 +20429,8 @@ async function authorizeInFrontend(serverConfig, serverSettings, options) {
       name: "inspector-cli",
       version: readInspectorVersion(import.meta.url)
     },
+    // Same knobs as the daemon's connect: --connect-timeout or mcp.json (#2615).
+    connectionTimeoutRemedy: CLI_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY,
     initialLoggingLevel: "debug",
     progress: false,
     sample: false,
@@ -19754,9 +20640,15 @@ function tryReserveAuthFlow(lockPath) {
       if (!isStale(fs8.statSync(lockPath).mtimeMs)) return false;
       const claimPath = `${lockPath}.claim-${process.pid}`;
       fs8.renameSync(lockPath, claimPath);
-      const claimedFresh = !isStale(fs8.statSync(claimPath).mtimeMs);
+      if (!isStale(fs8.statSync(claimPath).mtimeMs)) {
+        try {
+          fs8.linkSync(claimPath, lockPath);
+        } finally {
+          fs8.rmSync(claimPath, { force: true });
+        }
+        return false;
+      }
       fs8.rmSync(claimPath, { force: true });
-      if (claimedFresh) return false;
       create();
       return true;
     } catch {
@@ -20411,7 +21303,13 @@ async function getLiveConnectionAuthInfo(connection) {
 }
 async function createConnectionClient(serverConfig, serverSettings) {
   const environment = {
-    transport: createTransportNode
+    transport: createTransportNode,
+    // HTTPS_PROXY / HTTP_PROXY / NO_PROXY, as in the one-shot CLI (#2642).
+    // `InspectorClient` builds its fetch chain on `environment.fetch ?? fetch`
+    // and always hands the transport the result, so the transport's own
+    // `createProxyFetch()` fallback is never reached — leave this out and the
+    // daemon connects direct. Undefined when no proxy variable is set.
+    fetch: createProxyFetch()
   };
   const redirectUrlProvider = new MutableRedirectUrlProvider();
   if (isOAuthCapableServerConfig(serverConfig)) {
@@ -20437,6 +21335,9 @@ async function createConnectionClient(serverConfig, serverSettings) {
       name: CONNECTION_CLIENT_NAME,
       version: readInspectorVersion(import.meta.url)
     },
+    // `mcpdo connect` takes the same --connect-timeout as the one-shot CLI, so
+    // a timeout names that rather than the web's Server Settings (#2615).
+    connectionTimeoutRemedy: CLI_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY,
     initialLoggingLevel: "debug",
     progress: false,
     sample: false,
@@ -20493,6 +21394,9 @@ function connectCancelledError() {
 }
 
 // src/daemon/server.ts
+var MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS = {
+  skillBudgetHint: MCPDO_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT
+};
 var autoCancelElicitationChannel = {
   request(frame) {
     return Promise.resolve({
@@ -20924,7 +21828,7 @@ var DaemonServer = class _DaemonServer {
     const clearAmbientSignal = client.setAmbientRequestSignal(signal);
     let outcome;
     try {
-      outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs);
+      outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs, MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS);
     } finally {
       clearAmbientSignal();
       signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
@@ -20968,7 +21872,10 @@ var DaemonServer = class _DaemonServer {
     const unwire = wireElicitationBridge(client, channel, requestId);
     const outcome = (async () => {
       try {
-        return toRpcResult(await runMethod(client, methodArgs), params.method);
+        return toRpcResult(
+          await runMethod(client, methodArgs, MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS),
+          params.method
+        );
       } finally {
         unwire();
       }
@@ -21087,7 +21994,7 @@ var DaemonServer = class _DaemonServer {
       params.interactive
     );
     const methodArgs = stripConnectionFields(params);
-    const outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs);
+    const outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs, MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS);
     if (outcome.kind !== "stream") {
       throw new CliExitCodeError(
         EXIT_CODES.USAGE,
@@ -21336,6 +22243,8 @@ export {
   resetNodeOAuthStorageCache,
   clearAllOAuthClientState,
   NodeOAuthStorage,
+  DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  withConnectTimeout,
   PLAIN,
   styleFromOpts,
   isCliAutoOpenForced,