@memberjunction/server 6.1.4 → 6.1.6

package/src/resolvers/RealtimeClientSessionResolver.ts

@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@
  * and **executes** every tool call the browser relays back. The three mutations here cover the MVP:
  *
  * 1. {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.StartRealtimeClientSession} — authorize, create the
- *    session (storing the target agent id server-side, authoritatively), mint the ephemeral config.
- * 2. {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool} — execute a relayed tool call,
- *    reading the target agent id from the session (NOT the client) so the browser can't swap targets.
+ *    session (storing the target agent id on it), mint the ephemeral config.
+ * 2. {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool} — execute a relayed tool call
+ *    for the target agent stored on the session, re-authorized for the caller on every call.
  * 3. {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.RelayRealtimeTranscript} — persist a transcript turn as a
  *    `Conversation Detail`.
  *
@@ -21,12 +21,19 @@
  * - **Start**: the caller must have `CanRun` on the *target* agent (the Realtime Co-Agent is an internal
  *   orchestration agent, so the meaningful gate is the agent doing the real work).
  * - **Execute / Relay**: inbound ownership — the session's `UserID` must equal `contextUser.ID`.
+ * - **Session `Config`**: the owner can edit it through the generic entity API, so nothing in it is
+ *   trusted. Execute re-checks `CanRun` on its target, direct actions never come from it, and its
+ *   run ids are used only when {@link SessionRunIDVerifier} finds them to be records of the session.
+ * - **Scope-limited callers** (anonymous and resource-scoped magic-link sessions, including public
+ *   web-widget guests): no direct actions. Their scope exists only as row-level filters, which an
+ *   action can read around, and a scoped anonymous caller's relay runs as the system user. They
+ *   reach the target agent only through `invoke-target-agent`.
  *
  * @module @memberjunction/server
  */
 import { Resolver, Mutation, Arg, Ctx, Int, Float, ObjectType, Field, PubSub, PubSubEngine } from 'type-graphql';
 import { AppContext, UserPayload } from '../types.js';
-import { AuthorizationEvaluator, UserInfo, IMetadataProvider, LogError, LogStatus, RunView } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { AuthorizationEvaluator, UserInfo, IMetadataProvider, LogError, LogStatus, RunView, BaseEntity } from '@memberjunction/core';
 import { UUIDsEqual, IsValidUUID } from '@memberjunction/global';
 import {
     MJAIAgentEntity,
@@ -48,6 +55,7 @@ import {
     FindIgnoredRealtimeConfigKeys,
     ParseRealtimeTypeConfiguration,
     ResolveEffectiveRealtimeConfig,
+    INVOKE_TARGET_AGENT_TOOL_NAME,
     RealtimeAllowedAgent,
     RealtimeDirectActionsConfig,
     REALTIME_ADVANCED_SESSION_CONTROLS_AUTHORIZATION,
@@ -62,6 +70,8 @@ import { ResolverBase } from '../generic/ResolverBase.js';
 import { PUSH_STATUS_UPDATES_TOPIC } from '../generic/PushStatusResolver.js';
 import { GetReadWriteProvider } from '../util.js';
 import { SessionManager } from '../agentSessions/index.js';
+import { SessionRunIDVerifier } from '../agentSessions/SessionRunIDVerifier.js';
+import { IsScopeLimitedPrincipal } from '../auth/scopeLimitedPrincipal.js';
 import { resolveWidgetGuestRunContext, ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser } from '../realtimeWidget/widgetGuestElevation.js';
 
 /**
@@ -137,9 +147,9 @@ const MAX_PRIOR_TRANSCRIPT_CHARS = 8_000;
 const MAX_PRIOR_TRANSCRIPT_LEGS = 5;
 
 /**
- * Authoritative shape persisted in `AIAgentSession.Config_` for a client-direct voice session.
- * The target agent id is stored here at start and read back on every relay — the browser never
- * re-supplies it, so it cannot swap targets mid-session.
+ * Shape persisted in `AIAgentSession.Config_` for a client-direct voice session. The server writes
+ * it, but the session owner can also edit it through the generic entity API, so relays re-check
+ * what they read from it (see the authorization model above).
  */
 interface RealtimeSessionConfig {
     /** The top-level target agent the co-agent voices on behalf of. */
@@ -375,6 +385,32 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
     // state on — otherwise that cleanup silently no-ops on a freshly-constructed instance.
     private readonly clientSessionService = new RealtimeClientSessionService();
     private readonly sessionManager = new SessionManager(this.clientSessionService);
+    private readonly runIDVerifier = new SessionRunIDVerifier();
+
+    /**
+     * The reason a `Save()`/`Delete()` returned false, for a log line. `CompleteMessage` renders
+     * `Message`, `Error` and every `Errors[]` entry (validation errors included, since `Save()`
+     * runs `Validate()` and records its errors there), so there is no separate `Validate()` call.
+     * When a subclass refused the write without recording anything, say so explicitly instead of
+     * "unknown error", which is what hid MJ#4791.
+     *
+     * Only a NULL `LatestResult` proves the refusal happened before the provider (nothing was
+     * registered at all). A SUCCESS `LatestResult` is an earlier save on the same instance — the
+     * refusal registered nothing — so its text must never be reported as this failure's reason.
+     */
+    private describeSaveFailure(entity: BaseEntity): string {
+        const latest = entity.LatestResult;
+        if (!latest) {
+            return `no failure detail recorded (LatestResult null; ResultHistory length ${entity.ResultHistory.length}) ` +
+                '— the write was refused before reaching the provider';
+        }
+        if (latest.Success) {
+            return 'no failure detail recorded (latest result entry is a prior success; ' +
+                `ResultHistory length ${entity.ResultHistory.length})`;
+        }
+        const detail = latest.CompleteMessage?.trim();
+        return detail || `no failure detail recorded (LatestResult empty; ResultHistory length ${entity.ResultHistory.length})`;
+    }
 
     /**
      * Start a client-direct realtime voice session targeting `targetAgentId`.
@@ -386,7 +422,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
      *    agent's `DefaultCoAgentID` → type-level `AIAgentCoAgent` default row → global Realtime Co-Agent) —
      *    see {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.resolveCoAgentID} for the full contract.
      * 3. Create the durable `AIAgentSession` (run by the co-agent), storing `targetAgentID` in its
-     *    config server-side — this is the authoritative target for all later relays.
+     *    config — the target later relays use, re-authorized for the caller on each relay.
      * 4. Mint the {@link import('@memberjunction/ai').ClientRealtimeSessionConfig} via the service.
      *    On failure the just-created session is closed so no half-open session leaks.
      *
@@ -501,8 +537,10 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
      * Execute a single tool call the browser relayed from its provider socket and return the
      * serialized result for the browser to relay back to the model.
      *
-     * Ownership-gated; the target agent id is read from the **session config** (authoritative), never
-     * from the client. Heartbeats the session on success.
+     * Ownership-gated. The target agent id is read from the session config and `CanRun` on it is
+     * checked for the caller on every call, because the owner can edit the config. A direct-action
+     * call from a scope-limited caller is refused before any elevation. Heartbeats the session on
+     * success.
      *
      * @returns The serialized tool result JSON.
      */
@@ -518,13 +556,23 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         const { contextUser, provider } = this.requireUserAndProvider(userPayload, providers);
         const session = await this.loadOwnedActiveSession(agentSessionId, contextUser, provider);
         const config = this.readSessionConfig(session);
+        await this.assertCanRunTarget(config.targetAgentID, contextUser, provider);
+        if (toolName !== INVOKE_TARGET_AGENT_TOOL_NAME && IsScopeLimitedPrincipal(contextUser)) {
+            return this.refuseDirectAction(agentSessionId, toolName);
+        }
 
         // SCOPED-ANONYMOUS ELEVATION (issue #3371): once ownership is proven above, the delegated
         // run + its AI-run-entity writes execute as the system user for a scoped anonymous caller
         // (the caller's role deliberately holds no grants on the run entities). The lead
-        // targetAgentID comes from the session config and was CanRun-gated at start; the colleague
-        // union is gated just below, against the CALLER, so elevation never widens agent authority.
+        // targetAgentID is CanRun-gated against the CALLER just above, and the colleague union
+        // just below, so elevation never widens agent authority.
         const runUser = ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser);
+        const runIDs = await this.runIDVerifier.Verify(
+            session.ID,
+            { CoAgentRunID: config.coAgentRunID, PendingFeedbackRunID: config.pendingFeedbackRunID },
+            runUser,
+            provider,
+        );
         if (runUser !== contextUser) {
             LogStatus(
                 `ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool: dispatching relayed tool '${toolName}' for session ${agentSessionId} ` +
@@ -542,16 +590,17 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
                 // Multi-target (Move 4): the session's persisted allowed-agent union — a model-named
                 // colleague in the call is validated against this; absent ⇒ single-target behavior.
                 AllowedAgents: await this.filterAllowedAgentsByCanRun(config.allowedAgents, contextUser),
-                DirectActions: config.directActions,
+                // No DirectActions: the service takes them from the session's start-time projection
+                // or the target agent's metadata, never from the owner-editable config.
                 // Attribution follows the VISITOR even when `runUser` is elevated: the delegated run
                 // row and its context-memory scope must stay the person's, not the system user's.
                 AttributionUserID: contextUser.ID,
                 // Nest the delegated target-agent run under the co-agent observability run (when present).
-                ParentRunID: config.coAgentRunID,
+                ParentRunID: runIDs.CoAgentRunID,
                 Call: { CallID: callId, ToolName: toolName, Arguments: argsJson },
                 OnProgress: this.buildDelegationProgressCallback(pubSub, userPayload, agentSessionId, callId),
                 // Resume a previously-paused delegated run (if any) with the user's answer.
-                ResumeRunID: config.pendingFeedbackRunID,
+                ResumeRunID: runIDs.PendingFeedbackRunID,
             },
             runUser,
             provider,
@@ -561,7 +610,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
             `ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool: completed relayed tool '${toolName}' (callId: ${callId}) in ${durationMs}ms`,
         );
 
-        if (toolName !== 'invoke-target-agent') {
+        if (toolName !== INVOKE_TARGET_AGENT_TOOL_NAME) {
             await this.persistDirectActionTurn(
                 session,
                 callId,
@@ -581,7 +630,9 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         // Junction-link any artifacts the delegated run produced into the session's conversation
         // history (best-effort) — so chat, session review, and resume carryover can all see them.
         // Runs as `runUser`: the junction entity is not among an anonymous caller's relay grants.
-        await this.linkDelegatedArtifactsToConversation(session, Artifacts, runUser, provider);
+        // The hidden anchor detail it may need to create, though, is written by the CALLER (#4791)
+        // — same reason `persistDirectActionTurn` is: the System user is not the conversation owner.
+        await this.linkDelegatedArtifactsToConversation(session, Artifacts, runUser, contextUser, provider);
 
         await this.sessionManager.Heartbeat(agentSessionId, contextUser, provider);
         return ResultJson;
@@ -616,6 +667,19 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         };
     }
 
+    /**
+     * The tool result for a direct-action call from a scope-limited caller (see the authorization
+     * model above). It has the broker's result shape, so the model hears that the tool is not
+     * available and can ask the target agent through `invoke-target-agent` instead.
+     */
+    private refuseDirectAction(agentSessionId: string, toolName: string): string {
+        LogStatus(`ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool: refused direct action '${toolName}' for a scope-limited caller on session ${agentSessionId}.`);
+        return JSON.stringify({
+            success: false,
+            output: `The tool '${toolName}' is not available in this session. Ask the agent to do it with ${INVOKE_TARGET_AGENT_TOOL_NAME}.`,
+        });
+    }
+
     /**
      * Rolls the session's `pendingFeedbackRunID` forward after a relayed tool call. The id we just
      * consumed (resumed or none) is dropped; a new paused run id is stored only when the run paused
@@ -645,7 +709,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         session.Config_ = JSON.stringify(next);
         if (!(await session.Save())) {
             LogError(
-                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.updatePendingFeedbackRunID save failed: ${session.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.updatePendingFeedbackRunID save failed for session ${session.ID}: ${this.describeSaveFailure(session)}`,
             );
         }
     }
@@ -686,14 +750,15 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         // conversation (run-viewer observability parity). Best-effort — never fails the transcript relay.
         // The prompt-run write runs as the scoped-anonymous elevated user (issue #3371) — the visible
         // Conversation Detail above deliberately stays on the caller.
-        const promptRunID = this.readPromptRunID(session);
+        const runUser = ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser);
+        const promptRunID = await this.readPromptRunID(session, runUser, provider);
         if (promptRunID) {
             await this.clientSessionService.AppendPromptRunMessage(
                 promptRunID,
                 this.mapTranscriptRoleToChatRole(role),
                 text,
                 replacesPrevious ?? false,
-                ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser),
+                runUser,
                 provider,
             );
         }
@@ -891,7 +956,8 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
             provider,
         );
 
-        const promptRunID = this.readPromptRunID(session);
+        const runUser = ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser);
+        const promptRunID = await this.readPromptRunID(session, runUser, provider);
         if (!promptRunID) {
             return false;
         }
@@ -900,7 +966,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
             'assistant',
             this.formatToolTurn(toolName, argsJson, resultJson),
             false,
-            ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser),
+            runUser,
             provider,
         );
     }
@@ -992,16 +1058,15 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
             return true; // nothing to add — a no-op flush is a success, not a failure
         }
 
-        const promptRunID = this.readPromptRunID(session);
+        // Runs as the scoped-anonymous elevated user (issue #3371) — the caller's role holds no prompt-run grants.
+        const runUser = ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser);
+        const promptRunID = await this.readPromptRunID(session, runUser, provider);
         if (!promptRunID) {
             return false; // no observability prompt run for this session — logged in the helper
         }
         // Delegate to the service so usage writes share the per-run serialization with transcript-message
         // appends — otherwise the frequent usage save clobbers freshly-appended Messages (and vice-versa).
-        // Runs as the scoped-anonymous elevated user (issue #3371) — the caller's role holds no prompt-run grants.
-        return this.clientSessionService.AccumulatePromptRunUsage(
-            promptRunID, inputDelta, outputDelta, ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser), provider,
-        );
+        return this.clientSessionService.AccumulatePromptRunUsage(promptRunID, inputDelta, outputDelta, runUser, provider);
     }
 
     /** Clamps a relayed token delta: negative / non-finite values become 0. */
@@ -1028,24 +1093,40 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
 
     /**
      * Reads the co-agent `AIPromptRun` id from the session config WITHOUT the relay path's
-     * throw-on-missing-target semantics — usage relay is best-effort, so a missing/malformed
-     * config or absent id just logs and returns `null`.
+     * throw-on-missing-target semantics, and keeps it only when it is the prompt run of the
+     * session's co-agent run (the owner can edit the config). Usage relay is best-effort, so a
+     * missing/malformed config, an absent id, or an id of another session just logs and returns `null`.
+     *
+     * @param runUser The user the prompt-run write runs as; the check runs as the same user.
      */
-    private readPromptRunID(session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity): string | null {
-        try {
-            const config = this.readSessionConfig(session);
-            if (config.promptRunID) {
-                return config.promptRunID;
-            }
+    private async readPromptRunID(
+        session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
+        runUser: UserInfo,
+        provider: IMetadataProvider,
+    ): Promise<string | null> {
+        const config = this.tryReadSessionConfig(session);
+        if (!config) {
+            LogError(`RelayRealtimeUsage: session ${session.ID} has no parseable config — usage delta dropped.`);
+            return null;
+        }
+        if (!config.promptRunID) {
             LogStatus(
                 `RelayRealtimeUsage: session ${session.ID} has no co-agent promptRunID (observability run ` +
                     'creation was skipped or failed) — usage delta dropped.',
             );
             return null;
-        } catch {
-            LogError(`RelayRealtimeUsage: session ${session.ID} has no parseable config — usage delta dropped.`);
+        }
+        const verified = await this.runIDVerifier.Verify(
+            session.ID,
+            { CoAgentRunID: config.coAgentRunID, PromptRunID: config.promptRunID },
+            runUser,
+            provider,
+        );
+        if (!verified.PromptRunID) {
+            LogError(`RelayRealtimeUsage: session ${session.ID} names a promptRunID that is not its co-agent prompt run — ignored.`);
             return null;
         }
+        return verified.PromptRunID;
     }
 
     /**
@@ -1195,8 +1276,10 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
     }
 
     /**
-     * Authorization gate for {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.StartRealtimeClientSession}: the
-     * caller must be able to run the **target** agent. Denial throws (no session is created).
+     * Authorization gate for the **target** agent: the caller must be able to run it. Denial throws.
+     * {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.StartRealtimeClientSession} runs it before any session is
+     * created, and {@link RealtimeClientSessionResolver.ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool} runs it on every
+     * relayed call, because the owner can edit the target in the session config.
      */
     private async assertCanRunTarget(
         targetAgentId: string,
@@ -1725,6 +1808,9 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
                 // (allowed-agent union); the snapshot is injected into the system prompt at mint.
                 ApplicationID: applicationId,
                 AppContext: appContext,
+                // Scope-limited callers get no direct actions (see the authorization model above), so
+                // the model is not given tools that the relay refuses.
+                ExcludeDirectActions: IsScopeLimitedPrincipal(contextUser),
             },
             // SCOPED-ANONYMOUS ELEVATION (issue #3371): the prepare creates the co-agent
             // observability AIAgentRun/AIPromptRun/run-step, which a scoped anonymous caller's role
@@ -1766,9 +1852,10 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
 
     /**
      * Writes the co-agent observability run ids into the session's `Config_` alongside the
-     * authoritative `targetAgentID`, then saves the session. These ids are read back on close to
-     * finalize the runs (and on relay to nest delegated runs). Best-effort: a save failure is logged,
-     * not thrown — the voice session still proceeds, it just won't carry the run ids.
+     * `targetAgentID`, then saves the session. These ids are read back on close to
+     * finalize the runs (and on relay to nest delegated runs). Relays never read the direct actions
+     * from it. Best-effort: a save failure is logged, not thrown — the voice session still proceeds,
+     * it just won't carry the run ids.
      */
     private async persistObservabilityRunIDs(
         session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
@@ -1797,7 +1884,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         const saved = await session.Save();
         if (!saved) {
             LogError(
-                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistObservabilityRunIDs save failed: ${session.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistObservabilityRunIDs save failed for session ${session.ID}: ${this.describeSaveFailure(session)}`,
             );
         }
     }
@@ -1915,7 +2002,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         if (!saved) {
             LogError(
                 `SaveSessionChannelState: save failed for session ${agentSessionID} / channel ${channelID}: ` +
-                    `${row.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                    `${this.describeSaveFailure(row)}`,
             );
         }
         return saved;
@@ -2200,7 +2287,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         artifact.UserID = contextUser.ID;
         artifact.Visibility = 'Always';
         if (!(await artifact.Save())) {
-            const message = `SaveSessionChannelArtifact: artifact save failed: ${artifact.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`;
+            const message = `SaveSessionChannelArtifact: artifact save failed for session ${session.ID}: ${this.describeSaveFailure(artifact)}`;
             LogError(message);
             return { Success: false, ErrorMessage: message, ConversationDetailLinked: false };
         }
@@ -2212,7 +2299,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         version.Content = contentJson;
         version.UserID = contextUser.ID;
         if (!(await version.Save())) {
-            const message = `SaveSessionChannelArtifact: artifact version save failed: ${version.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`;
+            const message = `SaveSessionChannelArtifact: artifact version save failed for session ${session.ID} (artifact ${artifact.ID}): ${this.describeSaveFailure(version)}`;
             LogError(message);
             return { Success: false, ErrorMessage: message, ArtifactID: artifact.ID, ConversationDetailLinked: false };
         }
@@ -2270,13 +2357,22 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
      * queries (which scan junctions across ALL details) still surface the artifact. This is the
      * least-invasive correct anchor — no fake visible message, no orphaned artifact.
      *
+     * TWO PRINCIPALS, deliberately: the lookup (`findLatestSessionDetailID`) and the junction row
+     * itself (`saveDetailArtifactJunction`, `MJ: Conversation Detail Artifacts`) run as `runUser`
+     * (elevated for a scoped-anonymous caller) — that junction entity is outside an anonymous
+     * caller's relay grants. The hidden ANCHOR `Conversation Detail` this may need to create runs as
+     * `callerUser` instead: like every other `MJ: Conversation Details` write, the System user is
+     * refused because it is not the conversation's owner (see {@link persistDirectActionTurn},
+     * issue #4791) — only the actual caller can create it.
+     *
      * Strictly best-effort: every failure path logs and returns; a relayed tool call NEVER fails
      * because history linking did.
      */
     private async linkDelegatedArtifactsToConversation(
         session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
         artifacts: DelegatedRunArtifact[] | undefined,
-        contextUser: UserInfo,
+        runUser: UserInfo,
+        callerUser: UserInfo,
         provider: IMetadataProvider,
     ): Promise<void> {
         if (!artifacts || artifacts.length === 0 || !session.ConversationID) {
@@ -2284,13 +2380,13 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         }
         try {
             const detailID =
-                (await this.findLatestSessionDetailID(session, contextUser, provider)) ??
-                (await this.createHiddenSessionAnchorDetail(session, contextUser, provider));
+                (await this.findLatestSessionDetailID(session, runUser, provider)) ??
+                (await this.createHiddenSessionAnchorDetail(session, callerUser, provider));
             if (!detailID) {
                 return; // anchor unavailable — logged in the helpers
             }
             for (const artifact of artifacts) {
-                await this.saveDetailArtifactJunction(detailID, artifact.ArtifactVersionID, contextUser, provider);
+                await this.saveDetailArtifactJunction(detailID, artifact.ArtifactVersionID, runUser, provider);
             }
         } catch (error) {
             LogError(`ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool: delegated-artifact history link failed: ${(error as Error).message}`);
@@ -2331,25 +2427,25 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
      */
     private async createHiddenSessionAnchorDetail(
         session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
-        contextUser: UserInfo,
+        callerUser: UserInfo,
         provider: IMetadataProvider,
     ): Promise<string | null> {
-        const detail = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJConversationDetailEntity>(CONVERSATION_DETAIL_ENTITY, contextUser);
+        const detail = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJConversationDetailEntity>(CONVERSATION_DETAIL_ENTITY, callerUser);
         detail.NewRecord();
         detail.ConversationID = session.ConversationID;
         detail.Role = 'AI';
         detail.HiddenToUser = true;
         detail.Message = 'Artifacts produced during a realtime session (system anchor).';
         detail.AgentSessionID = session.ID;
-        // Attribute the anchor to the SESSION owner, not the (possibly elevated) writer — identical
-        // for every non-elevated caller, whose ownership of the session is already proven.
+        // Attribute to the SESSION owner — the caller writing this row, whose ownership
+        // `loadOwnedActiveSession` already proved.
         detail.UserID = session.UserID;
         if (await detail.Save()) {
             return detail.ID;
         }
         LogError(
             `ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool: hidden anchor detail save failed for session ${session.ID}: ` +
-                `${detail.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                `${this.describeSaveFailure(detail)}`,
         );
         return null;
     }
@@ -2376,7 +2472,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         if (!saved) {
             LogError(
                 `RealtimeClientSessionResolver: artifact junction save failed for detail ${conversationDetailID} / version ${artifactVersionID}: ` +
-                    `${junction.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                    `${this.describeSaveFailure(junction)}`,
             );
         }
         return saved;
@@ -2416,7 +2512,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
             if (!(await row.Save())) {
                 LogError(
                     `SaveSessionChannelArtifact: LastActiveAt stamp failed for session ${agentSessionID} / channel ${channelID}: ` +
-                        `${row.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                        `${this.describeSaveFailure(row)}`,
                 );
             }
         } catch (error) {
@@ -2501,9 +2597,10 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
     }
 
     /**
-     * Parses the session's persisted config, returning the authoritative `targetAgentID` plus any
-     * observability run ids (`coAgentRunID`/`promptRunID`). Throws when the config is missing/malformed
-     * or carries no target — a relay cannot proceed without a target.
+     * Parses the session's persisted config, returning its `targetAgentID` plus any observability run
+     * ids (`coAgentRunID`/`promptRunID`). Throws when the config is missing/malformed or carries no
+     * target — a relay cannot proceed without a target. The owner can edit the config, so callers
+     * re-check what they act on.
      */
     private readSessionConfig(session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity): RealtimeSessionConfig {
         const raw = session.Config_;
@@ -2560,12 +2657,6 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         return minutes && minutes > 0 ? minutes * 60 : undefined;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Persists a single transcript turn as a `Conversation Detail` stamped with the session's
-     * conversation, the mapped role, the turn text, the session id, and the owning user.
-     *
-     * @returns The boolean save result (logs `CompleteMessage` on failure).
-     */
     /**
      * Stamps `RecordingStartedAt` (the recording `t0` alignment origin) + `RecordingMedia` on a
      * just-started session when the browser captured WITH consent. Best-effort: a parse/save failure
@@ -2592,11 +2683,18 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         session.RecordingMedia = 'Audio';
         if (!(await session.Save())) {
             LogError(
-                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.stampRecordingStart save failed: ${session.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.stampRecordingStart save failed for session ${session.ID}: ${this.describeSaveFailure(session)}`,
             );
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Persists a single transcript turn as a `Conversation Detail` stamped with the session's
+     * conversation, the mapped role, the turn text, the session id, and the owning user.
+     *
+     * @returns The boolean save result. On failure it logs the session, the write user and the
+     * reason from {@link describeSaveFailure}.
+     */
     private async persistTranscriptTurn(
         session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
         role: string,
@@ -2626,7 +2724,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         const saved = await detail.Save();
         if (!saved) {
             LogError(
-                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistTranscriptTurn save failed: ${detail.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistTranscriptTurn save failed for session ${session.ID} (write user ${contextUser.ID}): ${this.describeSaveFailure(detail)}`,
             );
         }
         return saved;
@@ -2667,8 +2765,13 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         // ⚠️ ELEVATING INSTEAD WAS TRIED AND IS A TRAP. `ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser` returns
         // `UserCache.GetSystemUser()`, which on this deployment resolves to the unconfigured
         // placeholder `not.set@nowhere.com` ("Configured provisioning user not found; falling back
-        // to an Owner"). Saving as a user that does not exist returns false with a NULL
-        // `LatestResult` — indistinguishable from a permission denial, and just as silent.
+        // to an Owner"). That user EXISTS — it is not a missing/invalid principal — and even carries
+        // full CRUD on `MJ: Conversation Details`. It is refused anyway:
+        // `MJConversationDetailEntityExtended`'s owner gate accepts only the conversation's OWNER or
+        // an Edit/Owner Resource Permission grantee, and the System user is neither. Measured on
+        // MJ#4791 (before the core-entities fix that now records the denial): `Save()` → `false`,
+        // `LatestResult` null — indistinguishable from a permission denial, and just as silent. The
+        // denial itself still happens; that fix only made it stop being silent.
         const writeUser = contextUser;
         const rv = RunView.FromMetadataProvider(provider);
         const result = await rv.RunView<MJConversationDetailEntity>(
@@ -2689,8 +2792,8 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
         //
         // `ResultType: 'entity_object'` hands back hydrated entities, but they do not carry the
         // context user the way `GetEntityObject(entity, user)` does — so `Save()` ran with no
-        // principal and failed with an EMPTY message ("unknown error"), which is what the elevation
-        // fix above looked like when it was still broken. The insert path beside this one has
+        // principal and failed with an EMPTY message ("unknown error"), which is what an empty-message
+        // failure here looked like before the re-load. The insert path beside this one has
         // always used `GetEntityObject`; this now matches it, which is also why they now succeed
         // and fail for the same reasons.
         const previous = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJConversationDetailEntity>(
@@ -2722,7 +2825,7 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
                 `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.replacePreviousTranscriptTurn save failed for session `
                 + `${session.ID} — the ${mappedRole} turn keeps its PREVIOUS, shorter text and the `
                 + `transcript now understates what was said: `
-                + `${previous.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage || JSON.stringify(previous.LatestResult ?? null)}`,
+                + `${this.describeSaveFailure(previous)}`,
             );
         }
         return saved;
@@ -2742,6 +2845,23 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
      * Stored as stable facts (Role: 'AI', HiddenToUser: true, ExternalID: callId, CompletionTime: durationMs,
      * Message: JSON-serialized tool facts) so that session review can reconstruct the action card dynamically
      * on load (Option 1) without polluting user-facing speech chat bubbles.
+     *
+     * Writes as the CALLER, never the elevated run user (issue #4791). Owning the session
+     * (`loadOwnedActiveSession`'s gate has already run on every path here) does NOT imply owning
+     * the conversation: the conversation id was client-supplied at session start. What authorizes
+     * this write is the save itself, evaluated for the caller — the conversation owner gate in
+     * `MJConversationDetailEntityExtended`, plus the caller's own entity permission and Create RLS
+     * on `MJ: Conversation Details` (for the magic-link role that RLS scopes by the invite's
+     * `ScopeResourceID`, and the role belongs to a downstream app, not MJ core). That is why
+     * writing as the caller is safe even though the conversation id originated client-side.
+     * Elevating to the System user would bypass RLS entirely, and the owner gate refuses it anyway
+     * because the System user is not the conversation owner. Measured on MJ#4791 (before the
+     * core-entities fix that now records the denial): `Save()` returned `false` with a NULL `LatestResult` and an empty
+     * `ResultHistory` — indistinguishable from any other silent failure. Elevating this write is
+     * what silently dropped both hidden tool-execution turns of a real magic-link session; the
+     * denial itself still happens today, only its silence was fixed separately.
+     * `ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser` elevates AI-**run**-entity writes only (prompt runs, agent
+     * runs, the relayed dispatch itself) — never this one.
      */
     private async persistDirectActionTurn(
         session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
@@ -2757,10 +2877,9 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
             return false;
         }
         try {
-            const writeUser = ResolveScopedAnonymousRunUser(contextUser);
             const detail = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJConversationDetailEntity>(
                 CONVERSATION_DETAIL_ENTITY,
-                writeUser,
+                contextUser,
             );
             detail.NewRecord();
             detail.ConversationID = session.ConversationID;
@@ -2802,13 +2921,13 @@ export class RealtimeClientSessionResolver extends ResolverBase {
             const saved = await detail.Save();
             if (!saved) {
                 LogError(
-                    `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistDirectActionTurn save failed: ${detail.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+                    `RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistDirectActionTurn save failed for session ${session.ID} (tool '${toolName}', call ${callId ?? 'n/a'}, write user ${contextUser.ID}): ${this.describeSaveFailure(detail)}`,
                 );
             }
             return saved;
         } catch (error) {
             const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
-            LogError(`RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistDirectActionTurn unexpected error: ${message}`);
+            LogError(`RealtimeClientSessionResolver.persistDirectActionTurn unexpected error for session ${session.ID}: ${message}`);
             return false;
         }
     }