@maronn-openid-connect/cli 0.7.1 → 0.8.0

package/dist/frameworks/nextjs/token.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1337 @@
+import { DEFAULT_FEATURES } from '../../features.js';
+import { EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE } from '../hono/templates.js';
+const EXPERIMENTAL_NOTICE = ` * Backed by ${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}, whose API is NOT stable: it may change in
+ * a breaking way between releases. Do not build production code on it without
+ * pinning the version.`;
+export function nextJsTokenRouteTemplate(corePkg, features = DEFAULT_FEATURES) {
+    const refresh = features.refreshToken;
+    const experimentalGrants = [
+        ...(features.tokenExchange ? ['token exchange (token-exchange.ts)'] : []),
+        ...(features.idJag ? ['ID-JAG issuance and redemption (id-jag.ts)'] : []),
+        ...(features.deviceAuthorizationGrant ? ['device_code (device-code.ts)'] : []),
+        ...(features.ciba ? ['CIBA (ciba.ts)'] : []),
+    ];
+    const experimentalGrantDoc = experimentalGrants.length > 0
+        ? `
+ *
+ * The experimental grants live in the modules next to this file, each
+ * dispatched right after client authentication and before core's
+ * validateGrantTypeSupported (which does not know their URNs):
+${experimentalGrants.map((grant) => ` * - ${grant}`).join('\n')}`
+        : '';
+    const coreImports = [
+        'validateGrantTypeSupported',
+        'resolveAuthenticatedTokenClient',
+        'validateClientGrantType',
+        'resolveAuthorizationCode',
+        'validateAuthorizationCodeUnused',
+        'validateAuthorizationCodeClient',
+        'validateAuthorizationCodeExpiration',
+        'validateAuthorizationCodeRedirectUri',
+        'verifyAuthorizationCodePkce',
+        'consumeAuthorizationCode',
+        'buildValidatedAuthorizationCodeRequest',
+        ...(refresh
+            ? [
+                'resolveRefreshToken',
+                'validateRefreshTokenUnused',
+                'validateRefreshTokenClient',
+                'validateRefreshTokenExpiration',
+                'validateRefreshTokenIdleTimeout',
+                'validateRefreshTokenScope',
+                'validateRefreshTokenSession',
+                'clientAllowsRefreshTokenGrant',
+                'buildValidatedRefreshTokenRequest',
+            ]
+            : []),
+        'buildAccessTokenPayload',
+        'computeAtHash',
+        'resolveAcrAmr',
+        'buildIdTokenPayload',
+        'generateIdToken',
+        ...(refresh ? ['generateRandomString'] : []),
+        'buildAccessTokenAudience',
+        'extractClientCredentials',
+        'validateClientAuthMethod',
+        'verifyClientSecret',
+        'TokenError',
+        'TokenErrorCode',
+        'type AuthorizationCodeData',
+        'type TokenRequestParams',
+        'type ValidatedTokenRequest',
+    ];
+    const experimentalImports = [
+        ...(features.tokenExchange
+            ? [`import { TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE, TokenExchangeError } from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/token-exchange';`]
+            : []),
+        ...(features.idJag
+            ? [`import {
+  IdJagError,
+  JWT_BEARER_GRANT_TYPE,${features.tokenExchange ? '' : '\n  ID_JAG_TOKEN_TYPE,\n  TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE,'}
+  matchesIdJagIssuanceRequest,
+} from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/id-jag';`]
+            : []),
+        ...(features.deviceAuthorizationGrant
+            ? [`import {
+  DEVICE_CODE_GRANT_TYPE,
+  DeviceAuthorizationError,
+} from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/device-authorization-grant';`]
+            : []),
+        ...(features.ciba
+            ? [`import { CIBA_GRANT_TYPE, CibaGrantError } from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/ciba';`]
+            : []),
+    ];
+    const grantModuleImports = [
+        ...(features.tokenExchange ? [`import { exchangeToken } from './token-exchange';`] : []),
+        ...(features.idJag ? [`import { issueIdJag, redeemIdJag } from './id-jag';`] : []),
+        ...(features.deviceAuthorizationGrant ? [`import { redeemDeviceCode } from './device-code';`] : []),
+        ...(features.ciba ? [`import { redeemCibaRequest } from './ciba';`] : []),
+    ];
+    const importBlock = [...experimentalImports, ...grantModuleImports];
+    const experimentalImportBlock = importBlock.length > 0 ? `\n${importBlock.join('\n')}` : '';
+    const experimentalDispatch = [
+        ...(features.idJag
+            ? [`    // EXPERIMENTAL — ID-JAG issuance (Cross-App Access, draft §4.3): a token
+    // exchange whose requested_token_type is the ID-JAG URN. Checked BEFORE the
+    // plain token exchange, which shares the grant_type URN.
+    if (matchesIdJagIssuanceRequest(params)) {
+      return await issueIdJag(params, tokenClient, keys);
+    }
+${features.tokenExchange ? '' : `
+    // Generated without --enable token-exchange: the exchange grant exists only to
+    // issue ID-JAGs, so any other requested_token_type is answered with a pointer
+    // instead of falling through to unsupported_grant_type (discovery does
+    // advertise the exchange grant in this build).
+    if (params.grant_type === TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE) {
+      return oauthError(
+        'invalid_request',
+        \`This authorization server only supports requested_token_type \${ID_JAG_TOKEN_TYPE} for token exchange\`,
+      );
+    }
+`}
+    // EXPERIMENTAL — ID-JAG redemption on the jwt-bearer grant (draft §4.4).
+    if (params.grant_type === JWT_BEARER_GRANT_TYPE) {
+      return await redeemIdJag(params, tokenClient, keys);
+    }
+`]
+            : []),
+        ...(features.tokenExchange
+            ? [`    // EXPERIMENTAL — OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693 §2.1).
+    if (params.grant_type === TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE) {
+      return await exchangeToken(params, tokenClient, keys);
+    }
+`]
+            : []),
+        ...(features.deviceAuthorizationGrant
+            ? [`    // EXPERIMENTAL — OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628 §3.4).
+    if (params.grant_type === DEVICE_CODE_GRANT_TYPE) {
+      return await redeemDeviceCode(params, tokenClient, keys);
+    }
+`]
+            : []),
+        ...(features.ciba
+            ? [`    // EXPERIMENTAL — CIBA grant (CIBA Core 1.0 §10.1, poll mode).
+    if (params.grant_type === CIBA_GRANT_TYPE) {
+      return await redeemCibaRequest(params, tokenClient, keys);
+    }
+`]
+            : []),
+    ];
+    const experimentalDispatchBlock = experimentalDispatch.length > 0
+        ? `\n${experimentalDispatch.join('\n')}`
+        : '';
+    const experimentalErrorClasses = [
+        ...(features.idJag ? ['IdJagError'] : []),
+        ...(features.tokenExchange ? ['TokenExchangeError'] : []),
+        ...(features.deviceAuthorizationGrant ? ['DeviceAuthorizationError'] : []),
+        ...(features.ciba ? ['CibaGrantError'] : []),
+    ];
+    const experimentalErrorMapping = experimentalErrorClasses.length > 0
+        ? `    if (
+${experimentalErrorClasses.map((name) => `      error instanceof ${name}`).join(' ||\n')}
+    ) {
+      // The experimental grants answer in the RFC 6749 §5.2 shape and always with
+      // 400: a 401 can only come from client authentication, which runs before
+      // them and throws core's TokenError.
+      return oauthError(error.code, error.errorDescription, error.statusCode);
+    }
+`
+        : '';
+    const resolverNames = [
+        'authorizationCodeResolver',
+        ...(refresh ? ['refreshTokenResolver', 'authenticationSessionResolver'] : []),
+    ];
+    const storeNames = ['authCodeStore', 'accessTokenStore', ...(refresh ? ['refreshTokenStore'] : [])];
+    const grantTypeSupportedStep = refresh
+        ? `    // RFC 6749 §5.2: is the grant_type offered by this OP at all?
+    // (defaults to ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'])
+    const grantType = validateGrantTypeSupported(params.grant_type);
+`
+        : `    // The refresh_token feature is disabled: the OP only offers the
+    // authorization_code grant, so refresh_token requests are rejected with
+    // unsupported_grant_type (RFC 6749 §5.2).
+    const grantType = validateGrantTypeSupported(params.grant_type, ['authorization_code']);
+`;
+    const grantValidationStep = refresh
+        ? `    // Grant-specific validation. Each security rule is a separate core call so
+    // it can be removed, replaced, or surrounded with experiment-specific logic.
+    let validatedRequest: ValidatedTokenRequest;
+    if (grantType === 'refresh_token') {
+      // Resolve the presented refresh token and retain its stored grant context.
+      const { refreshTokenInfo } = await resolveRefreshToken(params, refreshTokenResolver);
+
+      // OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1: reject rotation reuse and revoke the token family.
+      await validateRefreshTokenUnused(refreshTokenInfo, refreshTokenResolver);
+
+      // Bind the refresh token to the authenticated client.
+      validateRefreshTokenClient(refreshTokenInfo, authenticatedClientId);
+
+      // Absolute lifetime: expiresAt <= now is expired.
+      validateRefreshTokenExpiration(refreshTokenInfo);
+
+      // Optional inactivity policy. Replace undefined with your timeout in seconds
+      // to enable it, or remove this step if your experiment has no idle lifetime.
+      validateRefreshTokenIdleTimeout(refreshTokenInfo, undefined);
+
+      // online refresh token（sessionId を持つ RT）は、束縛先のログインセッションが
+      // 生きている間だけ使える。ログアウト・別ユーザーでの再ログインでセッションが
+      // 消えれば invalid_grant になる。offline_access が付与された RT は sessionId を
+      // 持たないため、このステップを素通りしてログアウト後も使い続けられる。
+      await validateRefreshTokenSession(refreshTokenInfo, authenticationSessionResolver);
+
+      // RFC 6749 §6: requested scope may only narrow the original grant.
+      const effectiveScope = validateRefreshTokenScope(params.scope, refreshTokenInfo.scope);
+
+      validatedRequest = buildValidatedRefreshTokenRequest(
+        refreshTokenInfo,
+        authenticatedClientId,
+        effectiveScope,
+      );
+    } else {
+      // Resolve the presented authorization code and retain the non-optional code.
+      const { code, authorizationCode } = await resolveAuthorizationCode(
+        params,
+        authorizationCodeResolver,
+      );
+
+      // OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2: reject reuse and revoke tokens from the compromised grant.
+      await validateAuthorizationCodeUnused(authorizationCode, authorizationCodeResolver);
+
+      // Bind the authorization code to the authenticated client and its lifetime.
+      validateAuthorizationCodeClient(authorizationCode, authenticatedClientId);
+      validateAuthorizationCodeExpiration(authorizationCode);
+
+      // OIDC Core 1.0 §3.1.3.2: bind the token request redirect_uri.
+      validateAuthorizationCodeRedirectUri(authorizationCode, params.redirect_uri);
+
+      // RFC 7636: validate the S256 verifier when the code carries a PKCE binding.
+      const codeVerified = await verifyAuthorizationCodePkce(
+        authorizationCode,
+        params.code_verifier,
+      );
+
+      // Mark used (do not physically delete) so a later replay remains detectable.
+      await consumeAuthorizationCode(code, authorizationCodeResolver);
+
+      validatedRequest = buildValidatedAuthorizationCodeRequest(
+        code,
+        authorizationCode,
+        authenticatedClientId,
+        codeVerified,
+      );
+    }
+`
+        : `    // Grant-specific validation (authorization_code only in this configuration).
+    // Every security rule remains an independent customization point.
+    const { code, authorizationCode } = await resolveAuthorizationCode(
+      params,
+      authorizationCodeResolver,
+    );
+    await validateAuthorizationCodeUnused(authorizationCode, authorizationCodeResolver);
+    validateAuthorizationCodeClient(authorizationCode, authenticatedClientId);
+    validateAuthorizationCodeExpiration(authorizationCode);
+    validateAuthorizationCodeRedirectUri(authorizationCode, params.redirect_uri);
+    const codeVerified = await verifyAuthorizationCodePkce(
+      authorizationCode,
+      params.code_verifier,
+    );
+    await consumeAuthorizationCode(code, authorizationCodeResolver);
+    // The cast widens the result back to the ValidatedTokenRequest union: TypeScript
+    // narrows a const to its initializer type, which would make the shared
+    // refresh_token branches below unreachable (never) even though they compile.
+    const validatedRequest = buildValidatedAuthorizationCodeRequest(
+      code,
+      authorizationCode,
+      authenticatedClientId,
+      codeVerified,
+    ) as ValidatedTokenRequest;
+`;
+    const refreshIssuanceDecision = refresh
+        ? `    // --- Refresh Token を発行するかの判定 -------------------------------------
+    //
+    // RFC 7591 §2 / OIDC Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 §2: grant_types の既定は
+    // ["authorization_code"]。refresh_token を登録していないクライアントへ RT を渡しても、
+    // 次に grant_type=refresh_token を出した瞬間 validateClientGrantType が
+    // unauthorized_client で拒否する。一度も使えない長期資格情報を保存させるだけなので
+    // （RFC 9700 §4.14）、登録が無ければ発行しない。
+    const clientAllowsRefreshGrant = clientAllowsRefreshTokenGrant(tokenClient);
+
+    // RFC 6749 §6 / OIDC Core 1.0 §11: refresh 時の scope 縮小は当該リクエストの access token /
+    // ID Token の権限縮小として扱い、refresh token rotation の可否とは切り離す。rotation 可否は
+    // 「元の grant が offline_access を持っていたか」で判断する。
+    // - authorization_code grant: 今回付与された scope に offline_access があるか。
+    // - refresh_token grant: 元 refresh token の grant が offline_access を持っていたか
+    //   (validatedRequest.hadOfflineAccess)。縮小後 scope から offline_access を落としても
+    //   元 grant の権限は失われないため rotation を継続する。
+    const grantHasOfflineAccess =
+      clientAllowsRefreshGrant &&
+      (validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token'
+        ? validatedRequest.hadOfflineAccess
+        : validatedRequest.scope.includes('offline_access'));
+
+    // online refresh token の束縛先セッション。
+    // OIDC Core 1.0 §11 は offline_access を「End-User が居ない（not logged in）ときにも
+    // 使える Refresh Token」と定義したうえで、Refresh Token の利用がその用途に限られない
+    // ことも明示している（"The Authorization Server MAY grant Refresh Tokens in other
+    // contexts"）。この OP はその other contexts を online refresh token として実装し、
+    // ログインセッションへ束縛する。offline_access がある grant は束縛しない。
+    // - authorization_code grant: 認可コードが持つ sessionId（ログイン時に確立したもの）。
+    // - refresh_token grant: 元 RT の束縛をそのまま引き継ぎ、rotation で外れないようにする。
+    const boundSessionId = grantHasOfflineAccess ? undefined : validatedRequest.sessionId;
+
+    // 束縛先が分からなければ online refresh token は発行しない。ブラウザセッションを
+    // 持たない経路（device authorization grant）が該当する。ログアウトで止まる保証を
+    // 付けられない RT を配らないための fail-closed。
+    const issueRefreshToken =
+      clientAllowsRefreshGrant &&
+      (grantHasOfflineAccess ||
+        (config.onlineRefreshTokenEnabled && boundSessionId !== undefined));
+
+`
+        : '';
+    const refreshTokenValue = refresh
+        ? 'issueRefreshToken ? generateRandomString(32) : undefined'
+        : 'undefined /* the refresh_token feature is disabled: never issue one */';
+    const refreshTokenPersistence = refresh
+        ? `    // Store the new refresh token for rotation (OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1). grantId /
+    // audience / authTime / nonce / acr / amr / azp propagate through rotations,
+    // so descendants can be revoked on code reuse, the audience never expands,
+    // and refresh で再発行する ID Token は OIDC Core 1.0 §12.1 に従い初回認証時の値を保持する。
+    if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
+      // authTime はここで必ず確定する: authorization_code 経由は authCode.authTime、
+      // refresh_token 経由は validatedRequest.authTime（前段で代入済み）。
+      const rtAuthTime = authTime;
+      if (rtAuthTime === undefined) {
+        throw new TokenError(
+          TokenErrorCode.InvalidGrant,
+          'authTime is required to issue a refresh token',
+        );
+      }
+      // OAuth 2.1 §6.1: refresh token は initial issuance からの absolute lifetime のみで失効する。
+      // rotation を跨いで originalIssuedAt を引き継ぎ、expiresAt はそこからの絶対的な期限で固定する。
+      // sliding expiry は持たないため、リフレッシュを繰り返しても失効時刻は前に進まず、
+      // 漏洩 RT の長期 abuse を防ぐ。
+      const originalIssuedAt =
+        validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token'
+          ? validatedRequest.originalIssuedAt
+          : issuedAt;
+      // RFC 6749 §6: 縮小後 scope（validatedRequest.scope）から offline_access が落ちても、
+      // grant が offline_access を持つ限り次回以降の rotation を継続できるよう、永続化する
+      // refresh token の scope には offline_access を保持する。access token は
+      // validatedRequest.scope をそのまま使うため、当該リクエストの権限は縮小されたままになる。
+      const refreshTokenScope =
+        grantHasOfflineAccess && !validatedRequest.scope.includes('offline_access')
+          ? [...validatedRequest.scope, 'offline_access']
+          : validatedRequest.scope;
+      await refreshTokenStore.set(tokenResponse.refresh_token, {
+        subject,
+        clientId: validatedRequest.clientId,
+        scope: refreshTokenScope,
+        expiresAt: originalIssuedAt + config.refreshTokenAbsoluteLifetime,
+        originalIssuedAt,
+        used: false,
+        grantId: validatedRequest.grantId,
+        iat: issuedAt,
+        issuer: config.issuer,
+        audience: effectiveAudience,
+        authTime: rtAuthTime,
+        nonce,
+        // OIDC Core 1.0 §12.1: refresh で再発行する ID Token は初回認証時の acr / amr を保持する。
+        acr: validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token' ? validatedRequest.acr : resolvedAcr,
+        amr: validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token' ? validatedRequest.amr : resolvedAmr,
+        azp: validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token' ? validatedRequest.azp : undefined,
+        // online refresh token の束縛。undefined なら offline refresh token として
+        // セッションから独立し、ログアウト後も使える。
+        sessionId: boundSessionId,
+      });
+    }
+
+    // OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1: ローテーションは新トークン保存成功後に旧 RT を失効する。
+    // 失敗時にユーザーがリフレッシュ不能になることを防ぐため、必ずこの順序にする。
+    if (validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token' && params.refresh_token) {
+      await refreshTokenResolver.revokeRefreshToken(params.refresh_token);
+    }
+
+`
+        : '';
+    return `/**
+ * Token Endpoint (OIDC Core 1.0 §3.1.3).
+ *
+ * Authenticates the client, validates the grant it presents and answers with
+ * the token response: authorization_code and refresh_token here.${experimentalGrantDoc}
+ */
+import {
+${coreImports.map((name) => `  ${name},`).join('\n')}
+} from '${corePkg}';${experimentalImportBlock}
+import type { RegisteredClient } from '../_oidc-provider/config';
+import {
+  accessTokenIssuer,
+  acrResolver,
+  clientResolver,
+  config,
+  loadSigningKeys,
+  resolvers,
+  selectIdTokenSigningKey,
+  stores,
+} from '../_oidc-provider/provider';
+import {
+  clientCors,
+  corsPreflight,
+  isFormUrlEncoded,
+  noStoreJson,
+  oauthError,
+  signingKeysUnavailable,
+  uniqueParams,
+  withCors,
+} from '../_oidc-provider/http';
+
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+
+const { ${resolverNames.join(', ')} } = resolvers;
+const { ${storeNames.join(', ')} } = stores;
+
+export async function POST(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
+  return withCors(request, clientCors, await token(request));
+}
+
+export function OPTIONS(request: Request): Response {
+  return corsPreflight(request, clientCors);
+}
+
+async function token(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
+  const keys = await loadSigningKeys().catch(() => null);
+  if (!keys) return signingKeysUnavailable();
+
+  // RFC 6749 §4.1.3 / OIDC Core 1.0 §3.1.3.1: the Token Request body MUST be
+  // application/x-www-form-urlencoded; anything else is rejected unparsed.
+  if (!isFormUrlEncoded(request)) {
+    return oauthError('invalid_request', 'Token requests must use application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
+  }
+
+  // RFC 6749 §3.2: token endpoint request parameters MUST NOT be repeated.
+  const { params: rawParams, duplicateKey } = uniqueParams(new URLSearchParams(await request.text()));
+  if (duplicateKey !== undefined) {
+    return oauthError('invalid_request', \`Parameter "\${duplicateKey}" must not be repeated\`);
+  }
+  if (!isTokenRequestParams(rawParams)) {
+    return oauthError('invalid_request', 'Missing required parameter: grant_type');
+  }
+  const params = rawParams;
+
+  try {
+    // --- Client authentication pipeline -------------------------------------
+    // OAuth 2.1 §2.3 / OIDC Core 1.0 §9: client_secret_basic / client_secret_post.
+    // Each step below is an independent core function, called in the same order
+    // as core's authenticateClient(). Replace verifyClientSecret with your own
+    // assertion check (e.g. private_key_jwt) without touching the rest.
+
+    // Read the presented credentials and which method was actually used.
+    const presentedCredentials = extractClientCredentials({
+      params,
+      authorizationHeader: request.headers.get('Authorization') ?? '',
+    });
+
+    // RFC 6749 §5.2: the presented client_id must resolve to a registered client.
+    const tokenClient = await resolveAuthenticatedTokenClient(
+      presentedCredentials.clientId,
+      clientResolver,
+    );
+
+    // OIDC Core 1.0 §9: the method used must match the registered
+    // token_endpoint_auth_method (blocks auth method downgrade / public-client mixups).
+    validateClientAuthMethod(tokenClient, presentedCredentials);
+
+    // OAuth 2.1 §7.4.1: constant-time client_secret comparison.
+    await verifyClientSecret(tokenClient, presentedCredentials.clientSecret);
+
+    const authenticatedClientId = presentedCredentials.clientId;
+${experimentalDispatchBlock}
+    // --- Token request validation pipeline --------------------------------
+    // Each step below is an independent core function, called in the same order
+    // as core's validateTokenRequest(). Delete a call to drop that validation,
+    // or insert your own logic between steps.
+
+${grantTypeSupportedStep}
+    // RFC 6749 §5.2: per-client grant_type authorization (unauthorized_client).
+    validateClientGrantType(tokenClient, grantType);
+
+${grantValidationStep}
+    // T-022: the ID Token is signed with the registered ID Token key whose alg
+    // matches the client's id_token_signed_response_alg (RS256 by default).
+    const idTokenAlg = (tokenClient as RegisteredClient).idTokenSignedResponseAlg;
+    const idTokenKey = selectIdTokenSigningKey(keys, idTokenAlg);
+    if (!idTokenKey) {
+      return oauthError(
+        'server_error',
+        \`No ID Token signing key registered for alg "\${idTokenAlg ?? 'RS256'}"\`,
+        500,
+      );
+    }
+
+    let subject: string;
+    let authTime: number | undefined;
+    let nonce: string | undefined;
+
+    if (validatedRequest.grantType === 'authorization_code') {
+      // The store holds what the consent step stored: createAuthorizationCode()'s
+      // record, which also carries the authenticated subject and auth_time.
+      const authCode = (await authCodeStore.get(validatedRequest.code)) as
+        | AuthorizationCodeData
+        | undefined;
+      if (!authCode?.subject || !authCode.authTime) {
+        throw new TokenError(
+          TokenErrorCode.InvalidGrant,
+          'Authorization code missing required subject context',
+        );
+      }
+      subject = authCode.subject;
+      authTime = authCode.authTime;
+      nonce = validatedRequest.nonce;
+    } else {
+      // refresh_token grant.
+      // OIDC Core 1.0 §12.2: the re-issued ID Token retains iss/sub/aud/exp/iat/
+      // auth_time/azp/acr/amr — nonce is NOT in that list. nonce binds an
+      // Authentication Request to its ID Token (§2); a refresh has no such
+      // request, so carrying the old nonce adds no replay protection. Major OPs
+      // (Google, Auth0) omit it on refresh, and so does this one. auth_time is
+      // still preserved per §12.1.
+      subject = validatedRequest.subject;
+      authTime = validatedRequest.authTime;
+      nonce = undefined;
+    }
+
+    // アクセストークンの audience を決定する（合成ポリシーは core の buildAccessTokenAudience に集約）。
+    // RFC 9068 §3: JWT access token の aud は非空でなければならない。
+    // このアクセストークンは常に OP 自身の UserInfo エンドポイントで使用できるため、UserInfo
+    // エンドポイント（discovery が広告する userinfo_endpoint と同じ URL）を aud の恒久メンバとして
+    // 必ず含める。resource 指定（validatedRequest.audience）があれば末尾に追加し、UserInfo
+    // エンドポイントを取り除くことはしない。重複は除去される。
+    // refresh では保存済み aud（既に UserInfo を含む）を引き継ぐため、再計算しても同一集合になる。
+    const effectiveAudience = buildAccessTokenAudience({
+      userInfoEndpoint: \`\${config.issuer}/userinfo\`,
+      requested: validatedRequest.audience,
+      issuer: config.issuer,
+    });
+
+${refreshIssuanceDecision}    // --- Token response pipeline --------------------------------------------
+    // Each step below is an independent core function, called in the same order
+    // as core's generateTokenResponse(). Add your own ID Token claims by editing
+    // idTokenPayload before it is signed.
+
+    // One timestamp for the whole response so the issued tokens and the stored
+    // token metadata agree on iat / exp.
+    const issuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+
+    // RFC 9068 §2.2: iss / sub / aud / exp / iat / scope / client_id.
+    // Add access token claims here before the payload is signed.
+    const accessTokenPayload = buildAccessTokenPayload({
+      issuer: config.issuer,
+      subject,
+      clientId: validatedRequest.clientId,
+      scope: validatedRequest.scope,
+      audience: effectiveAudience,
+      expiresIn: config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+      issuedAt,
+    });
+
+    // JWT or opaque, as chosen by config.accessTokenFormat (provider.ts).
+    const accessToken = await accessTokenIssuer.issue({
+      payload: accessTokenPayload,
+      privateKey: keys.general.active.privateKey,
+      keyId: keys.general.active.keyId,
+    });
+
+    // OIDC Core 1.0 §12: refresh_token grant でも id_token は MAY。
+    // openid scope を持つ場合は §12.1 に従い初回認証時と同じ auth_time / acr / amr / azp で再発行する。
+    // （§12.2 は nonce を再発行 ID Token の保持クレームに挙げないため nonce は refresh では undefined）
+    let idToken: string | undefined;
+    let resolvedAcr: string | undefined = undefined;
+    let resolvedAmr: string[] | undefined = undefined;
+    if (validatedRequest.scope.includes('openid')) {
+      // OIDC Core 1.0 §3.1.3.6: at_hash binds the ID Token to this access token.
+      // The hash function follows the ID Token signing alg.
+      const atHash = await computeAtHash(accessToken, idTokenKey.privateKey);
+
+      // T-015: acr / amr.
+      // - authorization_code: ask acrResolver (provider.ts); acr_values and the
+      //   claims request are forwarded so it can honor them.
+      // - refresh_token: the stored acr / amr are reused so OIDC Core 1.0 §12.1
+      //   "preserve initial auth context" holds; the resolver is bypassed.
+      ({ acr: resolvedAcr, amr: resolvedAmr } = await resolveAcrAmr({
+        subject,
+        clientId: validatedRequest.clientId,
+        acr: validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token' ? validatedRequest.acr : undefined,
+        amr: validatedRequest.grantType === 'refresh_token' ? validatedRequest.amr : undefined,
+        acrResolver: validatedRequest.grantType === 'authorization_code' ? acrResolver : undefined,
+        requestedAcrValues:
+          validatedRequest.grantType === 'authorization_code' ? validatedRequest.acrValues : undefined,
+        // OIDC Core 1.0 §5.5: the parsed claims request lets the resolver satisfy
+        // id_token member requests (e.g. acr.values).
+        claims: validatedRequest.grantType === 'authorization_code' ? validatedRequest.claims : undefined,
+      }));
+
+      const idTokenPayload = buildIdTokenPayload({
+        issuer: config.issuer,
+        subject,
+        clientId: validatedRequest.clientId,
+        scope: validatedRequest.scope,
+        expiresIn: config.idTokenExpiresIn,
+        issuedAt,
+        atHash,
+        nonce,
+        authTime,
+        acr: resolvedAcr,
+        amr: resolvedAmr,
+      });
+
+      // Add your own ID Token claims here, e.g.:
+      //   idTokenPayload.tenant_id = await lookupTenant(subject);
+
+      idToken = await generateIdToken({
+        payload: idTokenPayload,
+        privateKey: idTokenKey.privateKey,
+        keyId: idTokenKey.keyId,
+      });
+    }
+
+    // OIDC Core 1.0 §3.1.3.3 / RFC 6749 §5.1: the token response body.
+    const tokenResponse = {
+      access_token: accessToken,
+      token_type: 'Bearer' as const,
+      expires_in: config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+      id_token: idToken,
+      scope: validatedRequest.scope.join(' '),
+      refresh_token: ${refreshTokenValue},
+    };
+
+    // Store the access token for the UserInfo / Introspection / Revocation
+    // endpoints. iat / nbf / audience / issuer are kept so RFC 7662
+    // introspection can echo them; grantId ties the token to its authorization
+    // grant so it is revoked with its siblings on code reuse (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2).
+    await accessTokenStore.set(tokenResponse.access_token, {
+      sub: subject,
+      clientId: validatedRequest.clientId,
+      scope: validatedRequest.scope,
+      expiresAt: issuedAt + config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+      grantId: validatedRequest.grantId,
+      iat: issuedAt,
+      // RFC 7519 §4.1.5 / RFC 7662 §2.2: persist nbf (= iat) for JWT and opaque
+      // tokens alike so introspection reports a not-yet-valid token inactive.
+      nbf: issuedAt,
+      audience: effectiveAudience,
+      issuer: config.issuer,
+      // RFC 9068 §2.2 / RFC 7662 §2.2: the token identifier core minted for this
+      // issuance. It also keeps two same-second issuances distinct (RS256 is
+      // deterministic), so this store key never collides across grants.
+      jti: accessTokenPayload.jti,
+      // OIDC Core 1.0 §5.5: the authorization request's claims parameter, so the
+      // UserInfo endpoint can honor claims.userinfo members independently of scope.
+      claims: validatedRequest.grantType === 'authorization_code' ? validatedRequest.claims : undefined,
+    });
+
+${refreshTokenPersistence}    return noStoreJson(tokenResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+${experimentalErrorMapping}    if (error instanceof TokenError) {
+      // RFC 6750 §3 / OAuth 2.1 §5.2: a 401 carries WWW-Authenticate.
+      return oauthError(
+        error.error,
+        error.errorDescription,
+        error.statusCode,
+        error.wwwAuthenticate ? { 'WWW-Authenticate': error.wwwAuthenticate } : undefined,
+      );
+    }
+    return oauthError('server_error', undefined, 500);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Narrows raw body params to TokenRequestParams: grant_type is required. */
+function isTokenRequestParams(params: unknown): params is TokenRequestParams {
+  if (typeof params !== 'object' || params === null) return false;
+  return typeof (params as Record<string, unknown>)['grant_type'] === 'string';
+}
+`;
+}
+export function nextJsTokenExchangeGrantTemplate(corePkg) {
+    return `/**
+ * EXPERIMENTAL — OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693 §2.1).
+ *
+ * Generated because the OP was created with \`--enable token-exchange\`.
+${EXPERIMENTAL_NOTICE}
+ *
+ * Known limitation: RFC 8693 §2.1 permits repeated \`resource\` / \`audience\`
+ * parameters, but the token endpoint rejects any repeated parameter (RFC 6749
+ * §3.2), so only a single value of each is supported.
+ */
+import {
+  buildAccessTokenAudience,
+  buildAccessTokenPayload,
+  type TokenClientInfo,
+} from '${corePkg}';
+import {
+  buildTokenExchangeResponse,
+  processTokenExchangeRequest,
+  type ExchangedAccessTokenInfo,
+} from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/token-exchange';
+import {
+  accessTokenIssuer,
+  config,
+  resolvers,
+  stores,
+  type ProviderSigningKeys,
+} from '../_oidc-provider/provider';
+import { noStoreJson } from '../_oidc-provider/http';
+
+/**
+ * Token Exchange settings.
+ *
+ * - allowedTargets: the audience / resource values a client may ask an
+ *   exchanged token to be issued for. Empty by default (fail safe): with an
+ *   empty list every exchange that names a target is rejected with
+ *   invalid_target, and only scope-narrowing / lifetime-shortening exchanges
+ *   succeed. Add the identifiers of your downstream services here.
+ */
+export const tokenExchangeConfig = {
+  allowedTargets: [] as string[],
+};
+
+/**
+ * Exchange the subject_token for a new access token. Errors are thrown as
+ * TokenExchangeError and answered by the token route.
+ */
+export async function exchangeToken(
+  params: Record<string, string>,
+  client: TokenClientInfo,
+  keys: ProviderSigningKeys,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  // Validate the request and derive the issuing material. Each check inside is
+  // also exported as its own step function, so you can call them one by one
+  // instead and drop or replace individual rules.
+  const grant = await processTokenExchangeRequest({
+    params,
+    client,
+    accessTokenResolver: resolvers.accessTokenResolver,
+    allowedTargets: tokenExchangeConfig.allowedTargets,
+    configuredExpiresIn: config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+  });
+
+  // Same aud policy as the standard grants: the UserInfo endpoint stays a
+  // permanent member (RFC 9068 §3), so an exchanged token still passes the
+  // UserInfo endpoint's audience check.
+  const audience = buildAccessTokenAudience({
+    userInfoEndpoint: \`\${config.issuer}/userinfo\`,
+    requested: grant.requestedAudience,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+  });
+
+  const issuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  const payload = buildAccessTokenPayload({
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    subject: grant.subject,
+    clientId: grant.clientId,
+    scope: grant.scope,
+    audience,
+    expiresIn: grant.expiresIn,
+    issuedAt,
+  });
+  const accessToken = await accessTokenIssuer.issue({
+    payload: {
+      ...payload,
+      // RFC 8693 §4.1: a delegation exchange records the current actor in the
+      // act claim (chains already nested by processTokenExchangeRequest).
+      // Impersonation exchanges carry no act claim.
+      ...(grant.actor === undefined ? {} : { act: grant.actor }),
+    },
+    privateKey: keys.general.active.privateKey,
+    keyId: keys.general.active.keyId,
+  });
+
+  const metadata: ExchangedAccessTokenInfo = {
+    // RFC 8693 §1.1: the exchanged token acts as the same subject, but is bound
+    // to the client that requested the exchange.
+    sub: grant.subject,
+    clientId: grant.clientId,
+    scope: grant.scope,
+    expiresAt: issuedAt + grant.expiresIn,
+    // Inherit the subject token's grant so revoking the grant (e.g. on code
+    // reuse detection) also kills every token exchanged from it.
+    grantId: grant.grantId,
+    iat: issuedAt,
+    nbf: issuedAt,
+    audience,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    // RFC 9068 §2.2 / RFC 7662 §2.2: the exchanged token gets its own jti, so it
+    // is a distinct store record even when exchanged twice within one second.
+    jti: payload.jti,
+    // Persisting act lets a later exchange that presents THIS token as its
+    // subject_token pick up the chain (RFC 8693 §4.1 nesting).
+    ...(grant.actor === undefined ? {} : { act: grant.actor }),
+    // The subject token's stored claims parameter (OIDC Core 1.0 §5.5) is
+    // deliberately NOT inherited: an exchanged token yields scope-based claims
+    // only at the UserInfo endpoint.
+  };
+  await stores.accessTokenStore.set(accessToken, metadata);
+
+  // RFC 8693 §2.2.1: access_token / issued_token_type / token_type are
+  // REQUIRED; expires_in and scope are always included here.
+  return noStoreJson(buildTokenExchangeResponse({
+    accessToken,
+    expiresIn: grant.expiresIn,
+    scope: grant.scope,
+  }));
+}
+`;
+}
+export function nextJsIdJagGrantTemplate(corePkg, features = DEFAULT_FEATURES) {
+    const refreshSubjects = features.refreshToken;
+    const refreshConfigDoc = refreshSubjects
+        ? `
+ * - allowRefreshTokenSubjects: whether a refresh token this OP issued may stand
+ *   in for the ID Token as the subject_token (draft §4.3 MAY), so a client can
+ *   request a fresh ID-JAG after its ID Token expired without a new SSO round
+ *   trip. Validated exactly like the standard refresh_token grant (rotation
+ *   reuse revokes the token family; online tokens require the login session to
+ *   be alive); the refresh token is NOT consumed. Grants without the openid
+ *   scope are refused — their refresh token replaces no identity assertion.`
+        : '';
+    const refreshConfigField = refreshSubjects
+        ? `
+  allowRefreshTokenSubjects: true,`
+        : '';
+    const refreshSubjectArgs = refreshSubjects
+        ? `
+    ...(idJagConfig.allowRefreshTokenSubjects
+      ? {
+          refreshTokenResolver: resolvers.refreshTokenResolver,
+          authenticationSessionResolver: resolvers.authenticationSessionResolver,
+        }
+      : {}),`
+        : '';
+    const resolversImport = refreshSubjects ? '\n  resolvers,' : '';
+    return `/**
+ * EXPERIMENTAL — Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant (ID-JAG), the
+ * Cross-App Access flow (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-04).
+ *
+ * Generated because the OP was created with \`--enable id-jag\`. The OP plays
+ * both roles:
+ * - as the IdP it issues ID-JAGs on the token-exchange grant (issueIdJag);
+ * - as a resource authorization server it redeems ID-JAGs from trusted IdPs on
+ *   the jwt-bearer grant (redeemIdJag).
+ *
+${EXPERIMENTAL_NOTICE} The underlying specification is an IETF draft and may
+ * itself change.
+ */
+import {
+  buildAccessTokenAudience,
+  buildAccessTokenPayload,
+  selectSigningKeyByAlg,
+  type JwkSet,
+  type SigningKey,
+  type TokenClientInfo,
+} from '${corePkg}';
+import {
+  TOKEN_TYPE_ID_TOKEN,
+  processIdJagIssuanceRequest,
+  processIdJagRedemptionRequest,
+  resolveIdJagActor,
+  type IdJagAccessTokenInfo,
+  type IdJagActorTokenResolver,
+  type IdJagTrustedIdentityProvider,
+} from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/id-jag';
+import {
+  accessTokenIssuer,
+  config,
+  idTokenHintJwks,${resolversImport}
+  stores,
+  type ProviderSigningKeys,
+} from '../_oidc-provider/provider';
+import { noStoreJson, oauthError } from '../_oidc-provider/http';
+
+/**
+ * Cross-App Access settings.
+ *
+ * Issuing side (this OP as the IdP, draft §4.3):
+ * - allowedAudiences: resource authorization server issuers this IdP may issue
+ *   an ID-JAG for. Empty by default (fail safe): every issuance request is
+ *   rejected with invalid_target until you list the peer AS issuers here.
+ *   Adding an entry grants that cross-app connection on behalf of every user —
+ *   there is no per-user consent screen in this flow.
+ * - idJagLifetimeSeconds: ID-JAG lifetime. Keep it short (draft example: 300);
+ *   clients are expected to request a fresh one instead of holding it.
+ * - allowedScopes: optional cap on the scopes an ID-JAG may carry. undefined
+ *   passes the requested scopes through (the resource AS applies its own
+ *   policy again on redemption).${refreshConfigDoc}
+ * - allowActorTokens: whether an actor_token (identifying who acts on the
+ *   subject's behalf) is accepted and recorded as the ID-JAG's act claim
+ *   (RFC 8693 §4.1). The draft defines no normative actor processing (§9.7
+ *   sketches extensions), so this is an opt-in extension and defaults to
+ *   false — an actor_token is rejected until you flip it, whatever else is
+ *   configured. Every token type identifier RFC 8693 §3 defines is accepted
+ *   the same way; the type alone decides nothing.
+ * - actorTokenResolver: validates the actor_token's CONTENT (signature,
+ *   revocation, whose token it is) — for every accepted type, this OP's own
+ *   ID Tokens included. The library only checks the request structure and the
+ *   shape of what you return. Return the act value ({ sub, act? }) for a valid
+ *   token, null for an invalid one (answered with a fixed invalid_request), or
+ *   throw IdJagError to pick the response yourself. The default below handles
+ *   ID Tokens this OP issued to the authenticated client; extend or replace it
+ *   to cover the other types. Clearing it rejects every actor_token.
+ *
+ * Consuming side (this OP as the resource authorization server, draft §4.4):
+ * - trustedIdentityProviders: the IdPs whose ID-JAGs are accepted on the
+ *   jwt-bearer grant. Empty by default (fail safe). Keys come from the inline
+ *   \`jwks\` when present, otherwise from \`jwksUri\` (fetched and cached below).
+ *   Never derive the key source from the assertion itself.
+ */
+const defaultIdJagActorTokenResolver: IdJagActorTokenResolver = async ({
+  actorToken,
+  actorTokenType,
+  clientId,
+  issuer,
+  jwks,
+}) =>
+  actorTokenType === TOKEN_TYPE_ID_TOKEN
+    ? resolveIdJagActor({ actorToken, issuer, clientId, jwks })
+    : null;
+
+export const idJagConfig = {
+  allowedAudiences: [] as string[],
+  idJagLifetimeSeconds: 300,
+  allowedScopes: undefined as string[] | undefined,${refreshConfigField}
+  allowActorTokens: false,
+  actorTokenResolver: defaultIdJagActorTokenResolver as IdJagActorTokenResolver | undefined,
+  trustedIdentityProviders: [] as Array<{ issuer: string; jwksUri?: string; jwks?: JwkSet }>,
+};
+
+/**
+ * Issue an ID-JAG (draft §4.3): the subject_token must be an ID Token this OP
+ * issued to the authenticated client, and the answer is a signed grant JWT for
+ * the resource authorization server named by \`audience\` — not an access token
+ * (the response carries token_type N_A). Errors are thrown as IdJagError and
+ * answered by the token route.
+ */
+export async function issueIdJag(
+  params: Record<string, string>,
+  client: TokenClientInfo,
+  keys: ProviderSigningKeys,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  // Signed with a registered RS256 key so the peer AS can verify it against
+  // this OP's JWKS endpoint (same key-selection contract as JARM: RS256 is
+  // pinned, the active key may be a different alg).
+  let signingKey: SigningKey;
+  try {
+    signingKey = selectSigningKeyByAlg(keys.general.registered, 'RS256');
+  } catch {
+    return oauthError('server_error', 'No RS256 signing key registered for ID-JAG issuance', 500);
+  }
+
+  const response = await processIdJagIssuanceRequest({
+    params,
+    client,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    // The subject_token is verified against the keys id_token_hint uses (this
+    // OP's own ID Token keys); draft §4.3.3 requires its audience to be the
+    // authenticated client, which processIdJagIssuanceRequest checks.
+    jwks: await idTokenHintJwks(keys),
+    signingKey,
+    allowedAudiences: idJagConfig.allowedAudiences,
+    allowedScopes: idJagConfig.allowedScopes,
+    lifetimeSeconds: idJagConfig.idJagLifetimeSeconds,
+    // Extension (draft §9.7): when enabled, an actor_token is recorded as the
+    // ID-JAG's act claim. Every accepted token type goes through the same
+    // resolver, which owns the content validation.
+    allowActorTokens: idJagConfig.allowActorTokens,
+    ...(idJagConfig.actorTokenResolver === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { actorTokenResolver: idJagConfig.actorTokenResolver }),${refreshSubjectArgs}
+  });
+
+  // The ID-JAG itself is not persisted: it is a self-contained signed grant the
+  // peer AS verifies by signature and exp.
+  return noStoreJson(response);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Redeem an ID-JAG on the jwt-bearer grant (RFC 7523 §2.1 / draft §4.4). The
+ * assertion must be issued by one of idJagConfig.trustedIdentityProviders for
+ * THIS issuer and the authenticated client; this OP then issues its own access
+ * token. No ID Token (this is not an OIDC authentication) and no refresh token
+ * (draft §4.4.3 SHOULD NOT — the still-valid ID-JAG can be presented again).
+ */
+export async function redeemIdJag(
+  params: Record<string, string>,
+  client: TokenClientInfo,
+  keys: ProviderSigningKeys,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  const grant = await processIdJagRedemptionRequest({
+    params,
+    client,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    identityProviders: await resolveTrustedIdentityProviders(),
+    configuredExpiresIn: config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+  });
+
+  // Same aud policy as the standard grants: the UserInfo endpoint stays a
+  // permanent member (RFC 9068 §3); the ID-JAG's resource claim (RFC 8707)
+  // contributes the requested resources.
+  const audience = buildAccessTokenAudience({
+    userInfoEndpoint: \`\${config.issuer}/userinfo\`,
+    requested: grant.requestedResources,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+  });
+
+  const issuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  const payload = buildAccessTokenPayload({
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    subject: grant.subject,
+    clientId: grant.clientId,
+    scope: grant.scope,
+    audience,
+    expiresIn: grant.expiresIn,
+    issuedAt,
+  });
+  const accessToken = await accessTokenIssuer.issue({
+    payload: {
+      ...payload,
+      // RFC 8693 §4.1: an act claim carried by the ID-JAG is preserved, so
+      // downstream services still see WHO acts on the subject's behalf
+      // (dropping it would silently turn the delegation into impersonation).
+      ...(grant.actor === undefined ? {} : { act: grant.actor }),
+    },
+    privateKey: keys.general.active.privateKey,
+    keyId: keys.general.active.keyId,
+  });
+
+  const metadata: IdJagAccessTokenInfo = {
+    // draft §4.4.1: the ID-JAG's sub is used as the local subject directly
+    // (subject resolution by identical sub; JIT provisioning is out of scope).
+    sub: grant.subject,
+    clientId: grant.clientId,
+    scope: grant.scope,
+    expiresAt: issuedAt + grant.expiresIn,
+    // Each redemption is its own grant: revoking one issued token must not
+    // affect tokens from other redemptions of the same (re-presentable) ID-JAG,
+    // so the payload's own jti doubles as the grant id.
+    grantId: payload.jti,
+    iat: issuedAt,
+    nbf: issuedAt,
+    audience,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    jti: payload.jti,
+    // The actor is persisted too, so opaque-token introspection and store-based
+    // tooling can surface it just like the JWT claim.
+    ...(grant.actor === undefined ? {} : { act: grant.actor }),
+  };
+  await stores.accessTokenStore.set(accessToken, metadata);
+
+  return noStoreJson({
+    access_token: accessToken,
+    token_type: 'Bearer' as const,
+    expires_in: grant.expiresIn,
+    scope: grant.scope.join(' '),
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * jwks_uri cache for trusted identity providers. A fetched JWKS is reused for
+ * 300 seconds, so a key rotation at the IdP can take up to that long to be
+ * picked up. The fetch target comes exclusively from idJagConfig above — never
+ * from request or assertion content — which keeps this endpoint SSRF-free.
+ */
+const idJagJwksCache = new Map<string, { jwks: JwkSet; expiresAt: number }>();
+const ID_JAG_JWKS_CACHE_TTL_MS = 300_000;
+
+async function resolveTrustedIdentityProviders(): Promise<IdJagTrustedIdentityProvider[]> {
+  const resolved: IdJagTrustedIdentityProvider[] = [];
+  for (const entry of idJagConfig.trustedIdentityProviders) {
+    if (entry.jwks !== undefined) {
+      resolved.push({ issuer: entry.issuer, jwks: entry.jwks });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (entry.jwksUri === undefined) {
+      // An entry with neither jwks nor jwksUri can never verify anything; skip
+      // it so the assertion is answered with the fixed untrusted description.
+      continue;
+    }
+    const cached = idJagJwksCache.get(entry.jwksUri);
+    if (cached !== undefined && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
+      resolved.push({ issuer: entry.issuer, jwks: cached.jwks });
+      continue;
+    }
+    // A failed fetch propagates: the token route turns it into server_error,
+    // which is honest — the assertion was never evaluated, so invalid_grant
+    // would wrongly blame the client for an outage on this side.
+    const response = await fetch(entry.jwksUri);
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      throw new Error(\`Fetching the JWKS of trusted IdP \${entry.issuer} failed with status \${response.status}\`);
+    }
+    const jwks = (await response.json()) as JwkSet;
+    idJagJwksCache.set(entry.jwksUri, { jwks, expiresAt: Date.now() + ID_JAG_JWKS_CACHE_TTL_MS });
+    resolved.push({ issuer: entry.issuer, jwks });
+  }
+  return resolved;
+}
+`;
+}
+function approvedGrantTokens(input) {
+    return `  // T-022: the ID Token follows the same key-selection rule as the standard
+  // grants — the registered ID Token key whose alg matches the client's
+  // id_token_signed_response_alg, not the general-purpose active key.
+  const idTokenAlg = (client as RegisteredClient).idTokenSignedResponseAlg;
+  const idTokenKey = selectIdTokenSigningKey(keys, idTokenAlg);
+  if (!idTokenKey) {
+    return oauthError(
+      'server_error',
+      \`No ID Token signing key registered for alg "\${idTokenAlg ?? 'RS256'}"\`,
+      500,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Same aud policy as the standard grants: the UserInfo endpoint stays a
+  // permanent member (RFC 9068 §3). ${input.audienceNote}
+  const audience = buildAccessTokenAudience({
+    userInfoEndpoint: \`\${config.issuer}/userinfo\`,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+  });
+
+  const issuedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  const accessTokenPayload = buildAccessTokenPayload({
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    subject: ${input.grant}.subject,
+    clientId: ${input.grant}.clientId,
+    scope: ${input.grant}.scope,
+    audience,
+    expiresIn: config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+    issuedAt,
+  });
+  const accessToken = await accessTokenIssuer.issue({
+    payload: accessTokenPayload,
+    privateKey: keys.general.active.privateKey,
+    keyId: keys.general.active.keyId,
+  });
+
+  // ${input.idTokenNote}
+  const { acr, amr } = await resolveAcrAmr({
+    subject: ${input.grant}.subject,
+    clientId: ${input.grant}.clientId,
+    acrResolver,
+  });
+  const idToken = await generateIdToken({
+    payload: buildIdTokenPayload({
+      issuer: config.issuer,
+      subject: ${input.grant}.subject,
+      clientId: ${input.grant}.clientId,
+      scope: ${input.grant}.scope,
+      expiresIn: config.idTokenExpiresIn,
+      issuedAt,
+      atHash: await computeAtHash(accessToken, idTokenKey.privateKey),
+      authTime: ${input.grant}.authTime,
+      acr,
+      amr,
+    }),
+    privateKey: idTokenKey.privateKey,
+    keyId: idTokenKey.keyId,
+  });
+
+  await stores.accessTokenStore.set(accessToken, {
+    sub: ${input.grant}.subject,
+    clientId: ${input.grant}.clientId,
+    scope: ${input.grant}.scope,
+    expiresAt: issuedAt + config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+    // ${input.grantIdNote}
+    grantId: ${input.grant}.grantId,
+    iat: issuedAt,
+    nbf: issuedAt,
+    audience,
+    issuer: config.issuer,
+    jti: accessTokenPayload.jti,
+  });
+
+${input.refreshTokens ? `  // OIDC Core 1.0 §11: offline_access survived the request endpoint's policy
+  // check only if this client may hold refresh tokens, and ${input.offlineNote}
+  // IS the explicit consent §11 asks for. Nothing further to gate on here.
+  const refreshToken = ${input.grant}.scope.includes('offline_access')
+    ? generateRandomString(32)
+    : undefined;
+  if (refreshToken) {
+    await stores.refreshTokenStore.set(refreshToken, {
+      subject: ${input.grant}.subject,
+      clientId: ${input.grant}.clientId,
+      scope: ${input.grant}.scope,
+      // OAuth 2.1 §6.1: absolute lifetime from initial issuance; rotations
+      // inherit originalIssuedAt so the deadline never slides forward.
+      expiresAt: issuedAt + config.refreshTokenAbsoluteLifetime,
+      originalIssuedAt: issuedAt,
+      used: false,
+      grantId: ${input.grant}.grantId,
+      iat: issuedAt,
+      issuer: config.issuer,
+      audience,
+      authTime: ${input.grant}.authTime,
+      // ${input.nonceNote}
+      nonce: undefined,
+      acr,
+      amr,
+      azp: undefined,
+    });
+  }
+
+` : ''}  return noStoreJson({
+    access_token: accessToken,
+    token_type: 'Bearer' as const,
+    expires_in: config.accessTokenExpiresIn,
+    id_token: idToken,
+    scope: ${input.grant}.scope.join(' '),${input.refreshTokens ? `
+    refresh_token: refreshToken,` : ''}
+  });`;
+}
+export function nextJsDeviceCodeGrantTemplate(corePkg, features = DEFAULT_FEATURES) {
+    const randomStringImport = features.refreshToken ? '\n  generateRandomString,' : '';
+    return `/**
+ * EXPERIMENTAL — the device_code grant of the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization
+ * Grant (RFC 8628 §3.4 / §3.5).
+ *
+ * Generated because the OP was created with \`--enable device-authorization-grant\`.
+${EXPERIMENTAL_NOTICE}
+ */
+import {
+  buildAccessTokenAudience,
+  buildAccessTokenPayload,
+  buildIdTokenPayload,
+  computeAtHash,
+  generateIdToken,${randomStringImport}
+  resolveAcrAmr,
+  type TokenClientInfo,
+} from '${corePkg}';
+import { processDeviceCodeGrant } from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/device-authorization-grant';
+import type { RegisteredClient } from '../_oidc-provider/config';
+import {
+  accessTokenIssuer,
+  acrResolver,
+  config,
+  deviceAuthorizationStore,
+  selectIdTokenSigningKey,
+  stores,
+  type ProviderSigningKeys,
+} from '../_oidc-provider/provider';
+import { noStoreJson, oauthError } from '../_oidc-provider/http';
+
+/**
+ * Redeem an approved device authorization for tokens. Every state but
+ * "approved" is thrown as DeviceAuthorizationError — authorization_pending /
+ * slow_down / access_denied / expired_token, plus invalid_request /
+ * invalid_grant / unauthorized_client from §3.4 — and answered by the token
+ * route.
+ */
+export async function redeemDeviceCode(
+  params: Record<string, string>,
+  client: TokenClientInfo,
+  keys: ProviderSigningKeys,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  const deviceGrant = await processDeviceCodeGrant({
+    params,
+    client,
+    store: deviceAuthorizationStore,
+  });
+
+${approvedGrantTokens({
+        grant: 'deviceGrant',
+        refreshTokens: features.refreshToken,
+        audienceNote: 'RFC 8628 has no resource parameter, so nothing else is\n  // requested.',
+        idTokenNote: `The device authorization endpoint requires the openid scope, so an ID Token
+  // is always issued. It carries no nonce (RFC 8628 defines no such parameter,
+  // and OIDC Core 1.0 §2 only requires nonce when the authentication request
+  // carried one) and no c_hash (there is no code).`,
+        grantIdNote: 'Inherit the grantId minted at approval so revoking the grant kills\n    // every token issued from this device authorization.',
+        offlineNote: 'the approval screen the user\n  // just went through',
+        nonceNote: 'RFC 8628 has no nonce parameter, so the re-issued ID Token has none\n      // to preserve either.',
+    })}
+}
+`;
+}
+export function nextJsCibaGrantTemplate(corePkg, features = DEFAULT_FEATURES) {
+    const randomStringImport = features.refreshToken ? '\n  generateRandomString,' : '';
+    return `/**
+ * EXPERIMENTAL — the CIBA grant (OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel
+ * Authentication Core 1.0 §10.1, poll mode).
+ *
+ * Generated because the OP was created with \`--enable ciba\`.
+${EXPERIMENTAL_NOTICE}
+ */
+import {
+  buildAccessTokenAudience,
+  buildAccessTokenPayload,
+  buildIdTokenPayload,
+  computeAtHash,
+  generateIdToken,${randomStringImport}
+  resolveAcrAmr,
+  type TokenClientInfo,
+} from '${corePkg}';
+import { processCibaGrant } from '${EXPERIMENTAL_PACKAGE}/ciba';
+import type { RegisteredClient } from '../_oidc-provider/config';
+import {
+  accessTokenIssuer,
+  acrResolver,
+  cibaAuthenticationRequestStore,
+  config,
+  selectIdTokenSigningKey,
+  stores,
+  type ProviderSigningKeys,
+} from '../_oidc-provider/provider';
+import { noStoreJson, oauthError } from '../_oidc-provider/http';
+
+/**
+ * Redeem an approved backchannel authentication request for tokens. Every
+ * state but "approved" is thrown as CibaGrantError — authorization_pending /
+ * slow_down / access_denied / expired_token, plus invalid_request /
+ * invalid_grant (CIBA §11) — and answered by the token route.
+ */
+export async function redeemCibaRequest(
+  params: Record<string, string>,
+  client: TokenClientInfo,
+  keys: ProviderSigningKeys,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  const cibaGrant = await processCibaGrant({
+    params,
+    client,
+    store: cibaAuthenticationRequestStore,
+  });
+
+${approvedGrantTokens({
+        grant: 'cibaGrant',
+        refreshTokens: features.refreshToken,
+        audienceNote: 'CIBA §7.1 has no resource parameter, so nothing else is\n  // requested.',
+        idTokenNote: `The backchannel authentication endpoint requires the openid scope, so an ID
+  // Token is always issued. It carries no nonce (CIBA §7.1 defines no such
+  // parameter, and OIDC Core 1.0 §2 only requires nonce when the authentication
+  // request carried one) and no c_hash (there is no code). Poll mode adds no
+  // CIBA-specific claims either — the auth_req_id claim of §10.3.1 belongs to
+  // the push-mode token delivery message.`,
+        grantIdNote: 'Inherit the grantId minted at approval so revoking the grant kills\n    // every token issued from this backchannel authentication.',
+        offlineNote: 'the approval screen the user\n  // just went through',
+        nonceNote: 'CIBA §7.1 defines no nonce parameter, so the re-issued ID Token has\n      // none to preserve either.',
+    })}
+}
+`;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=token.js.map