@lumoauth/api-client 1.0.0 → 1.2.0

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Files changed (151) hide show
  1. package/.openapi-generator/FILES +16 -0
  2. package/.openapi-generator-ignore +1 -1
  3. package/README.md +12 -2
  4. package/api/aauth-api.ts +5 -5
  5. package/api/admin-mcp-api.ts +5 -5
  6. package/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.ts +118 -0
  7. package/api/agents-api.ts +5 -5
  8. package/api/authorization-api.ts +5 -26
  9. package/api/mcp-api.ts +130 -0
  10. package/api/well-known-api.ts +10 -10
  11. package/dist/api/aauth-api.d.ts +5 -5
  12. package/dist/api/aauth-api.js +4 -4
  13. package/dist/api/admin-mcp-api.d.ts +5 -5
  14. package/dist/api/admin-mcp-api.js +4 -4
  15. package/dist/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.d.ts +65 -0
  16. package/dist/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.js +77 -0
  17. package/dist/api/agents-api.d.ts +5 -5
  18. package/dist/api/agents-api.js +4 -4
  19. package/dist/api/authorization-api.d.ts +5 -5
  20. package/dist/api/authorization-api.js +4 -18
  21. package/dist/api/mcp-api.d.ts +73 -0
  22. package/dist/api/mcp-api.js +82 -0
  23. package/dist/api/well-known-api.d.ts +10 -10
  24. package/dist/api/well-known-api.js +8 -8
  25. package/dist/esm/api/aauth-api.d.ts +5 -5
  26. package/dist/esm/api/aauth-api.js +4 -4
  27. package/dist/esm/api/admin-mcp-api.d.ts +5 -5
  28. package/dist/esm/api/admin-mcp-api.js +4 -4
  29. package/dist/esm/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.d.ts +65 -0
  30. package/dist/esm/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.js +78 -1
  31. package/dist/esm/api/agents-api.d.ts +5 -5
  32. package/dist/esm/api/agents-api.js +4 -4
  33. package/dist/esm/api/authorization-api.d.ts +5 -5
  34. package/dist/esm/api/authorization-api.js +4 -18
  35. package/dist/esm/api/mcp-api.d.ts +73 -0
  36. package/dist/esm/api/mcp-api.js +83 -1
  37. package/dist/esm/api/well-known-api.d.ts +10 -10
  38. package/dist/esm/api/well-known-api.js +8 -8
  39. package/dist/esm/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.d.ts +7 -1
  40. package/dist/esm/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.d.ts +12 -0
  41. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.d.ts +30 -0
  42. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.js +14 -0
  43. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.d.ts +25 -0
  44. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.js +14 -0
  45. package/dist/esm/models/attest-response.d.ts +2 -1
  46. package/dist/esm/models/attest-response.js +1 -0
  47. package/dist/esm/models/authentication-settings.d.ts +1 -1
  48. package/dist/esm/models/authorization-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  49. package/dist/esm/models/authorize-mcp-request.d.ts +1 -1
  50. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-effective.d.ts +112 -0
  51. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-effective.js +31 -0
  52. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.d.ts +30 -0
  53. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.js +14 -0
  54. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result.d.ts +76 -0
  55. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result.js +14 -0
  56. package/dist/esm/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.d.ts +1 -1
  57. package/dist/esm/models/index.d.ts +8 -0
  58. package/dist/esm/models/index.js +8 -0
  59. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.d.ts +38 -0
  60. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.js +22 -0
  61. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.d.ts +31 -0
  62. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.js +14 -0
  63. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.d.ts +36 -0
  64. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.js +14 -0
  65. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server.d.ts +18 -0
  66. package/dist/esm/models/open-id-configuration.d.ts +2 -2
  67. package/dist/esm/models/protected-resource-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  68. package/dist/esm/models/push-enrollment-started.d.ts +7 -1
  69. package/dist/esm/models/single-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  70. package/dist/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.d.ts +7 -1
  71. package/dist/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.d.ts +12 -0
  72. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.d.ts +30 -0
  73. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.js +15 -0
  74. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.d.ts +25 -0
  75. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.js +15 -0
  76. package/dist/models/attest-response.d.ts +2 -1
  77. package/dist/models/attest-response.js +1 -0
  78. package/dist/models/authentication-settings.d.ts +1 -1
  79. package/dist/models/authorization-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  80. package/dist/models/authorize-mcp-request.d.ts +1 -1
  81. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-effective.d.ts +112 -0
  82. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-effective.js +34 -0
  83. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.d.ts +30 -0
  84. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.js +15 -0
  85. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result.d.ts +76 -0
  86. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result.js +15 -0
  87. package/dist/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.d.ts +1 -1
  88. package/dist/models/index.d.ts +8 -0
  89. package/dist/models/index.js +8 -0
  90. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.d.ts +38 -0
  91. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.js +25 -0
  92. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.d.ts +31 -0
  93. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.js +15 -0
  94. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.d.ts +36 -0
  95. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.js +15 -0
  96. package/dist/models/mcp-server.d.ts +18 -0
  97. package/dist/models/open-id-configuration.d.ts +2 -2
  98. package/dist/models/protected-resource-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  99. package/dist/models/push-enrollment-started.d.ts +7 -1
  100. package/dist/models/single-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  101. package/docs/AAuthApi.md +1 -1
  102. package/docs/AdminAgentsApi.md +1 -1
  103. package/docs/AdminAgentsGenerateTokenRequest.md +3 -1
  104. package/docs/AdminAgentsGenerateTokenResponseData.md +4 -0
  105. package/docs/AdminClientsCimdCheckRequest.md +22 -0
  106. package/docs/AdminClientsCimdCheckResponse.md +20 -0
  107. package/docs/AdminMcpApi.md +1 -1
  108. package/docs/AdminOAuthClientsApi.md +57 -0
  109. package/docs/AgentsApi.md +4 -3
  110. package/docs/AuthenticationSettings.md +1 -1
  111. package/docs/AuthorizationApi.md +8 -8
  112. package/docs/AuthorizationServerMetadata.md +1 -1
  113. package/docs/AuthorizeMcpRequest.md +1 -1
  114. package/docs/CimdCheckResult.md +37 -0
  115. package/docs/CimdCheckResultEffective.md +45 -0
  116. package/docs/CimdCheckResultShadowClient.md +23 -0
  117. package/docs/EnrollAuthenticator201Response.md +3 -1
  118. package/docs/GetProtectedResourceMetadataRoot200Response.md +1 -1
  119. package/docs/GetProtectedResourceMetadataRootResponse1ResourcesItem.md +1 -1
  120. package/docs/McpApi.md +64 -0
  121. package/docs/McpServer.md +6 -0
  122. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest.md +22 -0
  123. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeRequestSubject.md +22 -0
  124. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse.md +24 -0
  125. package/docs/OpenIdConfiguration.md +2 -2
  126. package/docs/ProtectedResourceMetadata.md +1 -1
  127. package/docs/PushEnrollmentStarted.md +3 -1
  128. package/docs/SingleServerMetadata.md +1 -1
  129. package/docs/WellKnownApi.md +4 -4
  130. package/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.ts +7 -1
  131. package/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.ts +12 -0
  132. package/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.ts +36 -0
  133. package/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.ts +33 -0
  134. package/models/attest-response.ts +2 -1
  135. package/models/authentication-settings.ts +1 -1
  136. package/models/authorization-server-metadata.ts +1 -1
  137. package/models/authorize-mcp-request.ts +1 -1
  138. package/models/cimd-check-result-effective.ts +120 -0
  139. package/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.ts +36 -0
  140. package/models/cimd-check-result.ts +84 -0
  141. package/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.ts +1 -1
  142. package/models/index.ts +8 -0
  143. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.ts +46 -0
  144. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.ts +39 -0
  145. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.ts +42 -0
  146. package/models/mcp-server.ts +18 -0
  147. package/models/open-id-configuration.ts +2 -2
  148. package/models/protected-resource-metadata.ts +1 -1
  149. package/models/push-enrollment-started.ts +7 -1
  150. package/models/single-server-metadata.ts +1 -1
  151. package/package.json +1 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration)
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  */
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  attest: (orgId: string, agentId: string, attestRequest: AttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {string} orgId
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  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
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  */
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  attest(orgId: string, agentId: string, attestRequest: AttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>>;
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {string} orgId
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  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?
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  */
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  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>;
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
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  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ export interface AgentsApiInterface {
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  */
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  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>;
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
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  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ export declare class AgentsApi extends BaseAPI implements AgentsApiInterface {
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  */
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  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<AttestResponse, any, {}>>;
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
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  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ export const AgentsApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
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  };
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  }),
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {string} orgId
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  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ export const AgentsApiFp = function (configuration) {
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  });
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  },
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {string} orgId
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  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ export const AgentsApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
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  return localVarFp.attest(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.agentId, requestParameters.attestRequest, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
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  },
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
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  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ export class AgentsApi extends BaseAPI {
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  return AgentsApiFp(this.configuration).attest(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.agentId, requestParameters.attestRequest, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
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  }
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
659
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
660
660
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
661
661
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
662
662
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ export declare const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configu
152
152
  */
153
153
  listAttributeDefinitions: (orgId: string, type?: ListAttributeDefinitionsType, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
154
154
  /**
155
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
155
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
156
156
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
157
157
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
158
158
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ export declare const AuthorizationApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
303
303
  */
304
304
  listAttributeDefinitions(orgId: string, type?: ListAttributeDefinitionsType, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse>>;
305
305
  /**
306
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
306
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
307
307
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
308
308
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
309
309
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ export declare const AuthorizationApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, ba
450
450
  */
451
451
  listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters: AuthorizationApiListAttributeDefinitionsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse>;
452
452
  /**
453
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
453
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
454
454
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
455
455
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
456
456
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ export interface AuthorizationApiInterface {
608
608
  */
609
609
  listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters: AuthorizationApiListAttributeDefinitionsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse>;
610
610
  /**
611
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
611
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
612
612
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
613
613
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
614
614
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ export declare class AuthorizationApi extends BaseAPI implements AuthorizationAp
954
954
  */
955
955
  listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters: AuthorizationApiListAttributeDefinitionsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse, any, {}>>;
956
956
  /**
957
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
957
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
958
958
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
959
959
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
960
960
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
53
53
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
54
54
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
55
55
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
56
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
57
- yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
58
56
  // authentication BearerAuth required
59
57
  // http bearer authentication required
60
58
  yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -87,8 +85,6 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
87
85
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
88
86
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
89
87
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
90
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
91
- yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
92
88
  // authentication BearerAuth required
93
89
  // http bearer authentication required
94
90
  yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -439,8 +435,6 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
439
435
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'GET' }, baseOptions), options);
440
436
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
441
437
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
442
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
443
- yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
444
438
  // authentication BearerAuth required
445
439
  // http bearer authentication required
446
440
  yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -481,8 +475,6 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
481
475
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'GET' }, baseOptions), options);
482
476
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
483
477
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
484
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
485
- yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
486
478
  // authentication BearerAuth required
487
479
  // http bearer authentication required
488
480
  yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -516,8 +508,6 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
516
508
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'GET' }, baseOptions), options);
517
509
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
518
510
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
519
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
520
- yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
521
511
  // authentication BearerAuth required
522
512
  // http bearer authentication required
523
513
  yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -533,7 +523,7 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
533
523
  };
534
524
  }),
535
525
  /**
536
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
526
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
537
527
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
538
528
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
539
529
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -595,8 +585,6 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
595
585
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'PUT' }, baseOptions), options);
596
586
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
597
587
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
598
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
599
- yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
600
588
  // authentication BearerAuth required
601
589
  // http bearer authentication required
602
590
  yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -637,8 +625,6 @@ export const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
637
625
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'PUT' }, baseOptions), options);
638
626
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
639
627
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
640
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
641
- yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
642
628
  // authentication BearerAuth required
643
629
  // http bearer authentication required
644
630
  yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -897,7 +883,7 @@ export const AuthorizationApiFp = function (configuration) {
897
883
  });
898
884
  },
899
885
  /**
900
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
886
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
901
887
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
902
888
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
903
889
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -1101,7 +1087,7 @@ export const AuthorizationApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios)
1101
1087
  return localVarFp.listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.type, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
1102
1088
  },
1103
1089
  /**
1104
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
1090
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
1105
1091
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
1106
1092
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
1107
1093
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -1297,7 +1283,7 @@ export class AuthorizationApi extends BaseAPI {
1297
1283
  return AuthorizationApiFp(this.configuration).listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.type, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
1298
1284
  }
1299
1285
  /**
1300
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
1286
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
1301
1287
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
1302
1288
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
1303
1289
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import type { GetProtectedResourceMetadataRoot200Response } from '../models';
16
16
  import type { GetServerChallengeResponse } from '../models';
17
17
  import type { GetServerResponse } from '../models';
18
18
  import type { ListServersResponse } from '../models';
19
+ import type { McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest } from '../models';
20
+ import type { McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse } from '../models';
19
21
  import type { ProtectedResourceMetadata } from '../models';
20
22
  /**
21
23
  * McpApi - axios parameter creator
@@ -65,6 +67,16 @@ export declare const McpApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration) =>
65
67
  * @throws {RequiredError}
66
68
  */
67
69
  listServers: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
70
+ /**
71
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
72
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
73
+ * @param {string} orgId
74
+ * @param {string} serverId
75
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
76
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
77
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
78
+ */
79
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize: (orgId: string, serverId: string, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
68
80
  /**
69
81
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
70
82
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -123,6 +135,16 @@ export declare const McpApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
123
135
  * @throws {RequiredError}
124
136
  */
125
137
  listServers(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>>;
138
+ /**
139
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
140
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
141
+ * @param {string} orgId
142
+ * @param {string} serverId
143
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
144
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
145
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
146
+ */
147
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId: string, serverId: string, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>>;
126
148
  /**
127
149
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
128
150
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -178,6 +200,14 @@ export declare const McpApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?: s
178
200
  * @throws {RequiredError}
179
201
  */
180
202
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>;
203
+ /**
204
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
205
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
206
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
207
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
208
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
209
+ */
210
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>;
181
211
  /**
182
212
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
183
213
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -238,6 +268,15 @@ export interface McpApiInterface {
238
268
  * @memberof McpApiInterface
239
269
  */
240
270
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>;
271
+ /**
272
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
273
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
274
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
275
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
276
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
277
+ * @memberof McpApiInterface
278
+ */
279
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>;
241
280
  /**
242
281
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
243
282
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -331,6 +370,31 @@ export interface McpApiListServersRequest {
331
370
  */
332
371
  readonly orgId: string;
333
372
  }
373
+ /**
374
+ * Request parameters for mcpServerToolAuthorize operation in McpApi.
375
+ * @export
376
+ * @interface McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
377
+ */
378
+ export interface McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest {
379
+ /**
380
+ *
381
+ * @type {string}
382
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
383
+ */
384
+ readonly orgId: string;
385
+ /**
386
+ *
387
+ * @type {string}
388
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
389
+ */
390
+ readonly serverId: string;
391
+ /**
392
+ *
393
+ * @type {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest}
394
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
395
+ */
396
+ readonly mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest;
397
+ }
334
398
  /**
335
399
  * Request parameters for postServerChallenge operation in McpApi.
336
400
  * @export
@@ -402,6 +466,15 @@ export declare class McpApi extends BaseAPI implements McpApiInterface {
402
466
  * @memberof McpApi
403
467
  */
404
468
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<ListServersResponse, any, {}>>;
469
+ /**
470
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
471
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
472
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
473
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
474
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
475
+ * @memberof McpApi
476
+ */
477
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse, any, {}>>;
405
478
  /**
406
479
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
407
480
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, ge
23
23
  import globalAxios from 'axios';
24
24
  // Some imports not used depending on template conditions
25
25
  // @ts-ignore
26
- import { DUMMY_BASE_URL, assertParamExists, setApiKeyToObject, setBearerAuthToObject, setSearchParams, toPathString, createRequestFunction } from '../common';
26
+ import { DUMMY_BASE_URL, assertParamExists, setApiKeyToObject, setBearerAuthToObject, setSearchParams, serializeDataIfNeeded, toPathString, createRequestFunction } from '../common';
27
27
  // @ts-ignore
28
28
  import { BASE_PATH, BaseAPI, operationServerMap } from '../base';
29
29
  /**
@@ -202,6 +202,49 @@ export const McpApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
202
202
  options: localVarRequestOptions,
203
203
  };
204
204
  }),
205
+ /**
206
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
207
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
208
+ * @param {string} orgId
209
+ * @param {string} serverId
210
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
211
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
212
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
213
+ */
214
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize: (orgId_1, serverId_1, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest_1, ...args_1) => __awaiter(this, [orgId_1, serverId_1, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest_1, ...args_1], void 0, function* (orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options = {}) {
215
+ // verify required parameter 'orgId' is not null or undefined
216
+ assertParamExists('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'orgId', orgId);
217
+ // verify required parameter 'serverId' is not null or undefined
218
+ assertParamExists('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'serverId', serverId);
219
+ // verify required parameter 'mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest' is not null or undefined
220
+ assertParamExists('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest', mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest);
221
+ const localVarPath = `/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize`
222
+ .replace(`{${"orgId"}}`, encodeURIComponent(String(orgId)))
223
+ .replace(`{${"serverId"}}`, encodeURIComponent(String(serverId)));
224
+ // use dummy base URL string because the URL constructor only accepts absolute URLs.
225
+ const localVarUrlObj = new URL(localVarPath, DUMMY_BASE_URL);
226
+ let baseOptions;
227
+ if (configuration) {
228
+ baseOptions = configuration.baseOptions;
229
+ }
230
+ const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
231
+ const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
232
+ const localVarQueryParameter = {};
233
+ // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
234
+ yield setApiKeyToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
235
+ // authentication BearerAuth required
236
+ // http bearer authentication required
237
+ yield setBearerAuthToObject(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
238
+ localVarHeaderParameter['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
239
+ setSearchParams(localVarUrlObj, localVarQueryParameter);
240
+ let headersFromBaseOptions = baseOptions && baseOptions.headers ? baseOptions.headers : {};
241
+ localVarRequestOptions.headers = Object.assign(Object.assign(Object.assign({}, localVarHeaderParameter), headersFromBaseOptions), options.headers);
242
+ localVarRequestOptions.data = serializeDataIfNeeded(mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, localVarRequestOptions, configuration);
243
+ return {
244
+ url: toPathString(localVarUrlObj),
245
+ options: localVarRequestOptions,
246
+ };
247
+ }),
205
248
  /**
206
249
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
207
250
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -330,6 +373,24 @@ export const McpApiFp = function (configuration) {
330
373
  return (axios, basePath) => createRequestFunction(localVarAxiosArgs, globalAxios, BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
331
374
  });
332
375
  },
376
+ /**
377
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
378
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
379
+ * @param {string} orgId
380
+ * @param {string} serverId
381
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
382
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
383
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
384
+ */
385
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options) {
386
+ return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, function* () {
387
+ var _a, _b, _c;
388
+ const localVarAxiosArgs = yield localVarAxiosParamCreator.mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options);
389
+ const localVarOperationServerIndex = (_a = configuration === null || configuration === void 0 ? void 0 : configuration.serverIndex) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : 0;
390
+ const localVarOperationServerBasePath = (_c = (_b = operationServerMap['McpApi.mcpServerToolAuthorize']) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b[localVarOperationServerIndex]) === null || _c === void 0 ? void 0 : _c.url;
391
+ return (axios, basePath) => createRequestFunction(localVarAxiosArgs, globalAxios, BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
392
+ });
393
+ },
333
394
  /**
334
395
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
335
396
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -406,6 +467,16 @@ export const McpApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
406
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  listServers(requestParameters, options) {
407
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  return localVarFp.listServers(requestParameters.orgId, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
408
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  },
470
+ /**
471
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
472
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
473
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
474
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
475
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
476
+ */
477
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters, options) {
478
+ return localVarFp.mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.serverId, requestParameters.mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
479
+ },
409
480
  /**
410
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  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
411
482
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -480,6 +551,17 @@ export class McpApi extends BaseAPI {
480
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  listServers(requestParameters, options) {
481
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  return McpApiFp(this.configuration).listServers(requestParameters.orgId, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
482
553
  }
554
+ /**
555
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
556
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
557
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
558
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
559
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
560
+ * @memberof McpApi
561
+ */
562
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters, options) {
563
+ return McpApiFp(this.configuration).mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.serverId, requestParameters.mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
564
+ }
483
565
  /**
484
566
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
485
567
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import type { OpenIdConfiguration } from '../models';
22
22
  */
23
23
  export declare const WellKnownApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
24
24
  /**
25
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
25
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. RFC 8414 clients read it from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 (the issuer\'s path-inserted location) and, on a verified custom domain, from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
26
26
  * @summary OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata (RFC 8414)
27
27
  * @param {string} orgId
28
28
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ export declare const WellKnownApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configurati
38
38
  */
39
39
  getJwks: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
40
40
  /**
41
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
41
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. The same document is served at the RFC 8414 location /.well-known/openid-configuration/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 and, on a verified custom domain (whose issuer is the bare domain), at /.well-known/openid-configuration.
42
42
  * @summary OpenID Provider configuration (OIDC Discovery 1.0)
43
43
  * @param {string} orgId
44
44
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export declare const WellKnownApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configurati
60
60
  */
61
61
  export declare const WellKnownApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
62
62
  /**
63
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
63
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. RFC 8414 clients read it from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 (the issuer\'s path-inserted location) and, on a verified custom domain, from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
64
64
  * @summary OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata (RFC 8414)
65
65
  * @param {string} orgId
66
66
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ export declare const WellKnownApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
76
76
  */
77
77
  getJwks(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<JsonWebKeySet>>;
78
78
  /**
79
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
79
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. The same document is served at the RFC 8414 location /.well-known/openid-configuration/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 and, on a verified custom domain (whose issuer is the bare domain), at /.well-known/openid-configuration.
80
80
  * @summary OpenID Provider configuration (OIDC Discovery 1.0)
81
81
  * @param {string} orgId
82
82
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ export declare const WellKnownApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
98
98
  */
99
99
  export declare const WellKnownApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?: string, axios?: AxiosInstance) => {
100
100
  /**
101
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
101
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. RFC 8414 clients read it from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 (the issuer\'s path-inserted location) and, on a verified custom domain, from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
102
102
  * @summary OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata (RFC 8414)
103
103
  * @param {WellKnownApiGetAuthorizationServerMetadataRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
104
104
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ export declare const WellKnownApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePa
114
114
  */
115
115
  getJwks(requestParameters: WellKnownApiGetJwksRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<JsonWebKeySet>;
116
116
  /**
117
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
117
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. The same document is served at the RFC 8414 location /.well-known/openid-configuration/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 and, on a verified custom domain (whose issuer is the bare domain), at /.well-known/openid-configuration.
118
118
  * @summary OpenID Provider configuration (OIDC Discovery 1.0)
119
119
  * @param {WellKnownApiGetOpenidConfigurationRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
120
120
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ export declare const WellKnownApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePa
137
137
  */
138
138
  export interface WellKnownApiInterface {
139
139
  /**
140
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
140
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. RFC 8414 clients read it from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 (the issuer\'s path-inserted location) and, on a verified custom domain, from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
141
141
  * @summary OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata (RFC 8414)
142
142
  * @param {WellKnownApiGetAuthorizationServerMetadataRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
143
143
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export interface WellKnownApiInterface {
155
155
  */
156
156
  getJwks(requestParameters: WellKnownApiGetJwksRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<JsonWebKeySet>;
157
157
  /**
158
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
158
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. The same document is served at the RFC 8414 location /.well-known/openid-configuration/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 and, on a verified custom domain (whose issuer is the bare domain), at /.well-known/openid-configuration.
159
159
  * @summary OpenID Provider configuration (OIDC Discovery 1.0)
160
160
  * @param {WellKnownApiGetOpenidConfigurationRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
161
161
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ export interface WellKnownApiGetSsfConfigurationRequest {
233
233
  */
234
234
  export declare class WellKnownApi extends BaseAPI implements WellKnownApiInterface {
235
235
  /**
236
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
236
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. RFC 8414 clients read it from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 (the issuer\'s path-inserted location) and, on a verified custom domain, from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
237
237
  * @summary OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata (RFC 8414)
238
238
  * @param {WellKnownApiGetAuthorizationServerMetadataRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
239
239
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ export declare class WellKnownApi extends BaseAPI implements WellKnownApiInterfa
251
251
  */
252
252
  getJwks(requestParameters: WellKnownApiGetJwksRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<JsonWebKeySet, any, {}>>;
253
253
  /**
254
- * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active.
254
+ * Public, CORS-enabled and cacheable (Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600). Endpoint URLs are rewritten to the organization\'s custom domain when one is active. The same document is served at the RFC 8414 location /.well-known/openid-configuration/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1 and, on a verified custom domain (whose issuer is the bare domain), at /.well-known/openid-configuration.
255
255
  * @summary OpenID Provider configuration (OIDC Discovery 1.0)
256
256
  * @param {WellKnownApiGetOpenidConfigurationRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
257
257
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.