@lumoauth/api-client 1.0.0 → 1.2.0

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Files changed (151) hide show
  1. package/.openapi-generator/FILES +16 -0
  2. package/.openapi-generator-ignore +1 -1
  3. package/README.md +12 -2
  4. package/api/aauth-api.ts +5 -5
  5. package/api/admin-mcp-api.ts +5 -5
  6. package/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.ts +118 -0
  7. package/api/agents-api.ts +5 -5
  8. package/api/authorization-api.ts +5 -26
  9. package/api/mcp-api.ts +130 -0
  10. package/api/well-known-api.ts +10 -10
  11. package/dist/api/aauth-api.d.ts +5 -5
  12. package/dist/api/aauth-api.js +4 -4
  13. package/dist/api/admin-mcp-api.d.ts +5 -5
  14. package/dist/api/admin-mcp-api.js +4 -4
  15. package/dist/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.d.ts +65 -0
  16. package/dist/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.js +77 -0
  17. package/dist/api/agents-api.d.ts +5 -5
  18. package/dist/api/agents-api.js +4 -4
  19. package/dist/api/authorization-api.d.ts +5 -5
  20. package/dist/api/authorization-api.js +4 -18
  21. package/dist/api/mcp-api.d.ts +73 -0
  22. package/dist/api/mcp-api.js +82 -0
  23. package/dist/api/well-known-api.d.ts +10 -10
  24. package/dist/api/well-known-api.js +8 -8
  25. package/dist/esm/api/aauth-api.d.ts +5 -5
  26. package/dist/esm/api/aauth-api.js +4 -4
  27. package/dist/esm/api/admin-mcp-api.d.ts +5 -5
  28. package/dist/esm/api/admin-mcp-api.js +4 -4
  29. package/dist/esm/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.d.ts +65 -0
  30. package/dist/esm/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.js +78 -1
  31. package/dist/esm/api/agents-api.d.ts +5 -5
  32. package/dist/esm/api/agents-api.js +4 -4
  33. package/dist/esm/api/authorization-api.d.ts +5 -5
  34. package/dist/esm/api/authorization-api.js +4 -18
  35. package/dist/esm/api/mcp-api.d.ts +73 -0
  36. package/dist/esm/api/mcp-api.js +83 -1
  37. package/dist/esm/api/well-known-api.d.ts +10 -10
  38. package/dist/esm/api/well-known-api.js +8 -8
  39. package/dist/esm/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.d.ts +7 -1
  40. package/dist/esm/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.d.ts +12 -0
  41. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.d.ts +30 -0
  42. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.js +14 -0
  43. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.d.ts +25 -0
  44. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.js +14 -0
  45. package/dist/esm/models/attest-response.d.ts +2 -1
  46. package/dist/esm/models/attest-response.js +1 -0
  47. package/dist/esm/models/authentication-settings.d.ts +1 -1
  48. package/dist/esm/models/authorization-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  49. package/dist/esm/models/authorize-mcp-request.d.ts +1 -1
  50. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-effective.d.ts +112 -0
  51. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-effective.js +31 -0
  52. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.d.ts +30 -0
  53. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.js +14 -0
  54. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result.d.ts +76 -0
  55. package/dist/esm/models/cimd-check-result.js +14 -0
  56. package/dist/esm/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.d.ts +1 -1
  57. package/dist/esm/models/index.d.ts +8 -0
  58. package/dist/esm/models/index.js +8 -0
  59. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.d.ts +38 -0
  60. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.js +22 -0
  61. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.d.ts +31 -0
  62. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.js +14 -0
  63. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.d.ts +36 -0
  64. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.js +14 -0
  65. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server.d.ts +18 -0
  66. package/dist/esm/models/open-id-configuration.d.ts +2 -2
  67. package/dist/esm/models/protected-resource-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  68. package/dist/esm/models/push-enrollment-started.d.ts +7 -1
  69. package/dist/esm/models/single-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  70. package/dist/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.d.ts +7 -1
  71. package/dist/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.d.ts +12 -0
  72. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.d.ts +30 -0
  73. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.js +15 -0
  74. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.d.ts +25 -0
  75. package/dist/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.js +15 -0
  76. package/dist/models/attest-response.d.ts +2 -1
  77. package/dist/models/attest-response.js +1 -0
  78. package/dist/models/authentication-settings.d.ts +1 -1
  79. package/dist/models/authorization-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  80. package/dist/models/authorize-mcp-request.d.ts +1 -1
  81. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-effective.d.ts +112 -0
  82. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-effective.js +34 -0
  83. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.d.ts +30 -0
  84. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.js +15 -0
  85. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result.d.ts +76 -0
  86. package/dist/models/cimd-check-result.js +15 -0
  87. package/dist/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.d.ts +1 -1
  88. package/dist/models/index.d.ts +8 -0
  89. package/dist/models/index.js +8 -0
  90. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.d.ts +38 -0
  91. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.js +25 -0
  92. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.d.ts +31 -0
  93. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.js +15 -0
  94. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.d.ts +36 -0
  95. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.js +15 -0
  96. package/dist/models/mcp-server.d.ts +18 -0
  97. package/dist/models/open-id-configuration.d.ts +2 -2
  98. package/dist/models/protected-resource-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  99. package/dist/models/push-enrollment-started.d.ts +7 -1
  100. package/dist/models/single-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  101. package/docs/AAuthApi.md +1 -1
  102. package/docs/AdminAgentsApi.md +1 -1
  103. package/docs/AdminAgentsGenerateTokenRequest.md +3 -1
  104. package/docs/AdminAgentsGenerateTokenResponseData.md +4 -0
  105. package/docs/AdminClientsCimdCheckRequest.md +22 -0
  106. package/docs/AdminClientsCimdCheckResponse.md +20 -0
  107. package/docs/AdminMcpApi.md +1 -1
  108. package/docs/AdminOAuthClientsApi.md +57 -0
  109. package/docs/AgentsApi.md +4 -3
  110. package/docs/AuthenticationSettings.md +1 -1
  111. package/docs/AuthorizationApi.md +8 -8
  112. package/docs/AuthorizationServerMetadata.md +1 -1
  113. package/docs/AuthorizeMcpRequest.md +1 -1
  114. package/docs/CimdCheckResult.md +37 -0
  115. package/docs/CimdCheckResultEffective.md +45 -0
  116. package/docs/CimdCheckResultShadowClient.md +23 -0
  117. package/docs/EnrollAuthenticator201Response.md +3 -1
  118. package/docs/GetProtectedResourceMetadataRoot200Response.md +1 -1
  119. package/docs/GetProtectedResourceMetadataRootResponse1ResourcesItem.md +1 -1
  120. package/docs/McpApi.md +64 -0
  121. package/docs/McpServer.md +6 -0
  122. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest.md +22 -0
  123. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeRequestSubject.md +22 -0
  124. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse.md +24 -0
  125. package/docs/OpenIdConfiguration.md +2 -2
  126. package/docs/ProtectedResourceMetadata.md +1 -1
  127. package/docs/PushEnrollmentStarted.md +3 -1
  128. package/docs/SingleServerMetadata.md +1 -1
  129. package/docs/WellKnownApi.md +4 -4
  130. package/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.ts +7 -1
  131. package/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.ts +12 -0
  132. package/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-request.ts +36 -0
  133. package/models/admin-clients-cimd-check-response.ts +33 -0
  134. package/models/attest-response.ts +2 -1
  135. package/models/authentication-settings.ts +1 -1
  136. package/models/authorization-server-metadata.ts +1 -1
  137. package/models/authorize-mcp-request.ts +1 -1
  138. package/models/cimd-check-result-effective.ts +120 -0
  139. package/models/cimd-check-result-shadow-client.ts +36 -0
  140. package/models/cimd-check-result.ts +84 -0
  141. package/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.ts +1 -1
  142. package/models/index.ts +8 -0
  143. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.ts +46 -0
  144. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.ts +39 -0
  145. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.ts +42 -0
  146. package/models/mcp-server.ts +18 -0
  147. package/models/open-id-configuration.ts +2 -2
  148. package/models/protected-resource-metadata.ts +1 -1
  149. package/models/push-enrollment-started.ts +7 -1
  150. package/models/single-server-metadata.ts +1 -1
  151. package/package.json +1 -1
@@ -35,6 +35,45 @@ const base_1 = require("../base");
35
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  */
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  const AdminOAuthClientsApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
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  return {
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+ /**
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+ * Fetches and validates the metadata document at `client_id` exactly as the authorization server does (SSRF guard, domain allow-list, size and content-type limits, schema rules) and returns the effective client: redirect URIs, grant types and scopes after the organization policy is applied, plus what the document asked for that was dropped. Works even while CIMD is switched off for the organization (`enabled: false`), so a document can be validated before the switch is flipped. Nothing is registered or stored. `refresh: true` discards the cached copy first.
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+ * @summary Check a Client ID Metadata Document
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+ * @param {string} orgId
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+ * @param {AdminClientsCimdCheckRequest} adminClientsCimdCheckRequest
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+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
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+ * @throws {RequiredError}
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+ */
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+ adminClientsCimdCheck: (orgId_1, adminClientsCimdCheckRequest_1, ...args_1) => __awaiter(this, [orgId_1, adminClientsCimdCheckRequest_1, ...args_1], void 0, function* (orgId, adminClientsCimdCheckRequest, options = {}) {
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+ // verify required parameter 'orgId' is not null or undefined
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+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('adminClientsCimdCheck', 'orgId', orgId);
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+ // verify required parameter 'adminClientsCimdCheckRequest' is not null or undefined
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+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('adminClientsCimdCheck', 'adminClientsCimdCheckRequest', adminClientsCimdCheckRequest);
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+ const localVarPath = `/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/admin/clients/cimd/check`
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+ .replace(`{${"orgId"}}`, encodeURIComponent(String(orgId)));
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+ // use dummy base URL string because the URL constructor only accepts absolute URLs.
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+ const localVarUrlObj = new URL(localVarPath, common_1.DUMMY_BASE_URL);
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+ let baseOptions;
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+ if (configuration) {
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+ baseOptions = configuration.baseOptions;
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+ }
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+ const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
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+ const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
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+ const localVarQueryParameter = {};
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+ // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
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+ yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
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+ // authentication BearerAuth required
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+ // http bearer authentication required
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+ yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
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+ localVarHeaderParameter['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
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+ (0, common_1.setSearchParams)(localVarUrlObj, localVarQueryParameter);
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+ let headersFromBaseOptions = baseOptions && baseOptions.headers ? baseOptions.headers : {};
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+ localVarRequestOptions.headers = Object.assign(Object.assign(Object.assign({}, localVarHeaderParameter), headersFromBaseOptions), options.headers);
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+ localVarRequestOptions.data = (0, common_1.serializeDataIfNeeded)(adminClientsCimdCheckRequest, localVarRequestOptions, configuration);
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+ return {
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+ url: (0, common_1.toPathString)(localVarUrlObj),
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+ options: localVarRequestOptions,
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+ };
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+ }),
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  /**
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  *
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  * @summary Create an OAuth client
@@ -455,6 +494,23 @@ exports.AdminOAuthClientsApiAxiosParamCreator = AdminOAuthClientsApiAxiosParamCr
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  const AdminOAuthClientsApiFp = function (configuration) {
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  const localVarAxiosParamCreator = (0, exports.AdminOAuthClientsApiAxiosParamCreator)(configuration);
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  return {
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+ /**
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+ * Fetches and validates the metadata document at `client_id` exactly as the authorization server does (SSRF guard, domain allow-list, size and content-type limits, schema rules) and returns the effective client: redirect URIs, grant types and scopes after the organization policy is applied, plus what the document asked for that was dropped. Works even while CIMD is switched off for the organization (`enabled: false`), so a document can be validated before the switch is flipped. Nothing is registered or stored. `refresh: true` discards the cached copy first.
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+ * @summary Check a Client ID Metadata Document
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+ * @param {string} orgId
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+ * @param {AdminClientsCimdCheckRequest} adminClientsCimdCheckRequest
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+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
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+ * @throws {RequiredError}
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+ */
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+ adminClientsCimdCheck(orgId, adminClientsCimdCheckRequest, options) {
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+ return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, function* () {
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+ var _a, _b, _c;
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+ const localVarAxiosArgs = yield localVarAxiosParamCreator.adminClientsCimdCheck(orgId, adminClientsCimdCheckRequest, options);
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+ const localVarOperationServerIndex = (_a = configuration === null || configuration === void 0 ? void 0 : configuration.serverIndex) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : 0;
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+ const localVarOperationServerBasePath = (_c = (_b = base_1.operationServerMap['AdminOAuthClientsApi.adminClientsCimdCheck']) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b[localVarOperationServerIndex]) === null || _c === void 0 ? void 0 : _c.url;
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+ return (axios, basePath) => (0, common_1.createRequestFunction)(localVarAxiosArgs, axios_1.default, base_1.BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
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+ });
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+ },
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  /**
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  *
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  * @summary Create an OAuth client
@@ -650,6 +706,16 @@ exports.AdminOAuthClientsApiFp = AdminOAuthClientsApiFp;
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  const AdminOAuthClientsApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
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  const localVarFp = (0, exports.AdminOAuthClientsApiFp)(configuration);
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  return {
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+ /**
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+ * Fetches and validates the metadata document at `client_id` exactly as the authorization server does (SSRF guard, domain allow-list, size and content-type limits, schema rules) and returns the effective client: redirect URIs, grant types and scopes after the organization policy is applied, plus what the document asked for that was dropped. Works even while CIMD is switched off for the organization (`enabled: false`), so a document can be validated before the switch is flipped. Nothing is registered or stored. `refresh: true` discards the cached copy first.
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+ * @summary Check a Client ID Metadata Document
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+ * @param {AdminOAuthClientsApiAdminClientsCimdCheckRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
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+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
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+ * @throws {RequiredError}
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+ */
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+ adminClientsCimdCheck(requestParameters, options) {
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+ return localVarFp.adminClientsCimdCheck(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.adminClientsCimdCheckRequest, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
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+ },
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  /**
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  *
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  * @summary Create an OAuth client
@@ -770,6 +836,17 @@ exports.AdminOAuthClientsApiFactory = AdminOAuthClientsApiFactory;
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  * @extends {BaseAPI}
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  */
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  class AdminOAuthClientsApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
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+ /**
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+ * Fetches and validates the metadata document at `client_id` exactly as the authorization server does (SSRF guard, domain allow-list, size and content-type limits, schema rules) and returns the effective client: redirect URIs, grant types and scopes after the organization policy is applied, plus what the document asked for that was dropped. Works even while CIMD is switched off for the organization (`enabled: false`), so a document can be validated before the switch is flipped. Nothing is registered or stored. `refresh: true` discards the cached copy first.
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+ * @summary Check a Client ID Metadata Document
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+ * @param {AdminOAuthClientsApiAdminClientsCimdCheckRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
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+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
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+ * @throws {RequiredError}
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+ * @memberof AdminOAuthClientsApi
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+ */
847
+ adminClientsCimdCheck(requestParameters, options) {
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+ return (0, exports.AdminOAuthClientsApiFp)(this.configuration).adminClientsCimdCheck(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.adminClientsCimdCheckRequest, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
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+ }
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  /**
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  *
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  * @summary Create an OAuth client
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration)
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  */
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  attest: (orgId: string, agentId: string, attestRequest: AttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {string} orgId
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  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
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  */
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  attest(orgId: string, agentId: string, attestRequest: AttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>>;
138
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  /**
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- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {string} orgId
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  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?
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  */
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  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>;
221
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  /**
222
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
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  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
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  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
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  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ export interface AgentsApiInterface {
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  */
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  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>;
300
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  /**
301
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
301
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
302
302
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
303
303
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
304
304
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ export declare class AgentsApi extends BaseAPI implements AgentsApiInterface {
552
552
  */
553
553
  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<AttestResponse, any, {}>>;
554
554
  /**
555
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
555
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
556
556
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
557
557
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
558
558
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ const AgentsApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
118
118
  };
119
119
  }),
120
120
  /**
121
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
121
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
122
122
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
123
123
  * @param {string} orgId
124
124
  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ const AgentsApiFp = function (configuration) {
417
417
  });
418
418
  },
419
419
  /**
420
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
420
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
421
421
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
422
422
  * @param {string} orgId
423
423
  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ const AgentsApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
562
562
  return localVarFp.attest(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.agentId, requestParameters.attestRequest, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
563
563
  },
564
564
  /**
565
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
565
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
566
566
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
567
567
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
568
568
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ class AgentsApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
662
662
  return (0, exports.AgentsApiFp)(this.configuration).attest(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.agentId, requestParameters.attestRequest, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
663
663
  }
664
664
  /**
665
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
665
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
666
666
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
667
667
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
668
668
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ export declare const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configu
152
152
  */
153
153
  listAttributeDefinitions: (orgId: string, type?: ListAttributeDefinitionsType, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
154
154
  /**
155
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
155
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
156
156
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
157
157
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
158
158
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ export declare const AuthorizationApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
303
303
  */
304
304
  listAttributeDefinitions(orgId: string, type?: ListAttributeDefinitionsType, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse>>;
305
305
  /**
306
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
306
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
307
307
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
308
308
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
309
309
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ export declare const AuthorizationApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, ba
450
450
  */
451
451
  listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters: AuthorizationApiListAttributeDefinitionsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse>;
452
452
  /**
453
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
453
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
454
454
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
455
455
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
456
456
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ export interface AuthorizationApiInterface {
608
608
  */
609
609
  listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters: AuthorizationApiListAttributeDefinitionsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse>;
610
610
  /**
611
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
611
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
612
612
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
613
613
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
614
614
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ export declare class AuthorizationApi extends BaseAPI implements AuthorizationAp
954
954
  */
955
955
  listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters: AuthorizationApiListAttributeDefinitionsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<ListAttributeDefinitionsResponse, any, {}>>;
956
956
  /**
957
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
957
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
958
958
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
959
959
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
960
960
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -56,8 +56,6 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
56
56
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
57
57
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
58
58
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
59
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
60
- yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
61
59
  // authentication BearerAuth required
62
60
  // http bearer authentication required
63
61
  yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -90,8 +88,6 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
90
88
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
91
89
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
92
90
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
93
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
94
- yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
95
91
  // authentication BearerAuth required
96
92
  // http bearer authentication required
97
93
  yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -442,8 +438,6 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
442
438
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'GET' }, baseOptions), options);
443
439
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
444
440
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
445
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
446
- yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
447
441
  // authentication BearerAuth required
448
442
  // http bearer authentication required
449
443
  yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -484,8 +478,6 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
484
478
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'GET' }, baseOptions), options);
485
479
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
486
480
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
487
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
488
- yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
489
481
  // authentication BearerAuth required
490
482
  // http bearer authentication required
491
483
  yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -519,8 +511,6 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
519
511
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'GET' }, baseOptions), options);
520
512
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
521
513
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
522
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
523
- yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
524
514
  // authentication BearerAuth required
525
515
  // http bearer authentication required
526
516
  yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -536,7 +526,7 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
536
526
  };
537
527
  }),
538
528
  /**
539
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
529
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
540
530
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
541
531
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
542
532
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -598,8 +588,6 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
598
588
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'PUT' }, baseOptions), options);
599
589
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
600
590
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
601
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
602
- yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
603
591
  // authentication BearerAuth required
604
592
  // http bearer authentication required
605
593
  yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -640,8 +628,6 @@ const AuthorizationApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
640
628
  const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'PUT' }, baseOptions), options);
641
629
  const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
642
630
  const localVarQueryParameter = {};
643
- // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
644
- yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
645
631
  // authentication BearerAuth required
646
632
  // http bearer authentication required
647
633
  yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
@@ -901,7 +887,7 @@ const AuthorizationApiFp = function (configuration) {
901
887
  });
902
888
  },
903
889
  /**
904
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
890
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
905
891
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
906
892
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
907
893
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -1106,7 +1092,7 @@ const AuthorizationApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
1106
1092
  return localVarFp.listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.type, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
1107
1093
  },
1108
1094
  /**
1109
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
1095
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
1110
1096
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
1111
1097
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
1112
1098
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -1303,7 +1289,7 @@ class AuthorizationApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
1303
1289
  return (0, exports.AuthorizationApiFp)(this.configuration).listAttributeDefinitions(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.type, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
1304
1290
  }
1305
1291
  /**
1306
- * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions
1292
+ * GET /api/v1/authz/permissions Inventory endpoint: a bearer access token needs the `authz:read` scope (the check endpoints stay open to any authenticated token).
1307
1293
  * @summary List the caller\'s effective permissions
1308
1294
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
1309
1295
  * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import type { GetProtectedResourceMetadataRoot200Response } from '../models';
16
16
  import type { GetServerChallengeResponse } from '../models';
17
17
  import type { GetServerResponse } from '../models';
18
18
  import type { ListServersResponse } from '../models';
19
+ import type { McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest } from '../models';
20
+ import type { McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse } from '../models';
19
21
  import type { ProtectedResourceMetadata } from '../models';
20
22
  /**
21
23
  * McpApi - axios parameter creator
@@ -65,6 +67,16 @@ export declare const McpApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration) =>
65
67
  * @throws {RequiredError}
66
68
  */
67
69
  listServers: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
70
+ /**
71
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
72
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
73
+ * @param {string} orgId
74
+ * @param {string} serverId
75
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
76
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
77
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
78
+ */
79
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize: (orgId: string, serverId: string, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
68
80
  /**
69
81
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
70
82
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -123,6 +135,16 @@ export declare const McpApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
123
135
  * @throws {RequiredError}
124
136
  */
125
137
  listServers(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>>;
138
+ /**
139
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
140
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
141
+ * @param {string} orgId
142
+ * @param {string} serverId
143
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
144
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
145
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
146
+ */
147
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId: string, serverId: string, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>>;
126
148
  /**
127
149
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
128
150
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -178,6 +200,14 @@ export declare const McpApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?: s
178
200
  * @throws {RequiredError}
179
201
  */
180
202
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>;
203
+ /**
204
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
205
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
206
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
207
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
208
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
209
+ */
210
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>;
181
211
  /**
182
212
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
183
213
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -238,6 +268,15 @@ export interface McpApiInterface {
238
268
  * @memberof McpApiInterface
239
269
  */
240
270
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>;
271
+ /**
272
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
273
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
274
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
275
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
276
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
277
+ * @memberof McpApiInterface
278
+ */
279
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>;
241
280
  /**
242
281
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
243
282
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -331,6 +370,31 @@ export interface McpApiListServersRequest {
331
370
  */
332
371
  readonly orgId: string;
333
372
  }
373
+ /**
374
+ * Request parameters for mcpServerToolAuthorize operation in McpApi.
375
+ * @export
376
+ * @interface McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
377
+ */
378
+ export interface McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest {
379
+ /**
380
+ *
381
+ * @type {string}
382
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
383
+ */
384
+ readonly orgId: string;
385
+ /**
386
+ *
387
+ * @type {string}
388
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
389
+ */
390
+ readonly serverId: string;
391
+ /**
392
+ *
393
+ * @type {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest}
394
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
395
+ */
396
+ readonly mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest;
397
+ }
334
398
  /**
335
399
  * Request parameters for postServerChallenge operation in McpApi.
336
400
  * @export
@@ -402,6 +466,15 @@ export declare class McpApi extends BaseAPI implements McpApiInterface {
402
466
  * @memberof McpApi
403
467
  */
404
468
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<ListServersResponse, any, {}>>;
469
+ /**
470
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
471
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
472
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
473
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
474
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
475
+ * @memberof McpApi
476
+ */
477
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse, any, {}>>;
405
478
  /**
406
479
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
407
480
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -205,6 +205,49 @@ const McpApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
205
205
  options: localVarRequestOptions,
206
206
  };
207
207
  }),
208
+ /**
209
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
210
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
211
+ * @param {string} orgId
212
+ * @param {string} serverId
213
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
214
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
215
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
216
+ */
217
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize: (orgId_1, serverId_1, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest_1, ...args_1) => __awaiter(this, [orgId_1, serverId_1, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest_1, ...args_1], void 0, function* (orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options = {}) {
218
+ // verify required parameter 'orgId' is not null or undefined
219
+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'orgId', orgId);
220
+ // verify required parameter 'serverId' is not null or undefined
221
+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'serverId', serverId);
222
+ // verify required parameter 'mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest' is not null or undefined
223
+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest', mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest);
224
+ const localVarPath = `/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize`
225
+ .replace(`{${"orgId"}}`, encodeURIComponent(String(orgId)))
226
+ .replace(`{${"serverId"}}`, encodeURIComponent(String(serverId)));
227
+ // use dummy base URL string because the URL constructor only accepts absolute URLs.
228
+ const localVarUrlObj = new URL(localVarPath, common_1.DUMMY_BASE_URL);
229
+ let baseOptions;
230
+ if (configuration) {
231
+ baseOptions = configuration.baseOptions;
232
+ }
233
+ const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
234
+ const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
235
+ const localVarQueryParameter = {};
236
+ // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
237
+ yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
238
+ // authentication BearerAuth required
239
+ // http bearer authentication required
240
+ yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
241
+ localVarHeaderParameter['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
242
+ (0, common_1.setSearchParams)(localVarUrlObj, localVarQueryParameter);
243
+ let headersFromBaseOptions = baseOptions && baseOptions.headers ? baseOptions.headers : {};
244
+ localVarRequestOptions.headers = Object.assign(Object.assign(Object.assign({}, localVarHeaderParameter), headersFromBaseOptions), options.headers);
245
+ localVarRequestOptions.data = (0, common_1.serializeDataIfNeeded)(mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, localVarRequestOptions, configuration);
246
+ return {
247
+ url: (0, common_1.toPathString)(localVarUrlObj),
248
+ options: localVarRequestOptions,
249
+ };
250
+ }),
208
251
  /**
209
252
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
210
253
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -334,6 +377,24 @@ const McpApiFp = function (configuration) {
334
377
  return (axios, basePath) => (0, common_1.createRequestFunction)(localVarAxiosArgs, axios_1.default, base_1.BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
335
378
  });
336
379
  },
380
+ /**
381
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
382
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
383
+ * @param {string} orgId
384
+ * @param {string} serverId
385
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
386
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
387
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
388
+ */
389
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options) {
390
+ return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, function* () {
391
+ var _a, _b, _c;
392
+ const localVarAxiosArgs = yield localVarAxiosParamCreator.mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options);
393
+ const localVarOperationServerIndex = (_a = configuration === null || configuration === void 0 ? void 0 : configuration.serverIndex) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : 0;
394
+ const localVarOperationServerBasePath = (_c = (_b = base_1.operationServerMap['McpApi.mcpServerToolAuthorize']) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b[localVarOperationServerIndex]) === null || _c === void 0 ? void 0 : _c.url;
395
+ return (axios, basePath) => (0, common_1.createRequestFunction)(localVarAxiosArgs, axios_1.default, base_1.BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
396
+ });
397
+ },
337
398
  /**
338
399
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
339
400
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -411,6 +472,16 @@ const McpApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
411
472
  listServers(requestParameters, options) {
412
473
  return localVarFp.listServers(requestParameters.orgId, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
413
474
  },
475
+ /**
476
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
477
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
478
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
479
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
480
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
481
+ */
482
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters, options) {
483
+ return localVarFp.mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.serverId, requestParameters.mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
484
+ },
414
485
  /**
415
486
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
416
487
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -486,6 +557,17 @@ class McpApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
486
557
  listServers(requestParameters, options) {
487
558
  return (0, exports.McpApiFp)(this.configuration).listServers(requestParameters.orgId, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
488
559
  }
560
+ /**
561
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
562
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
563
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
564
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
565
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
566
+ * @memberof McpApi
567
+ */
568
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters, options) {
569
+ return (0, exports.McpApiFp)(this.configuration).mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.serverId, requestParameters.mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
570
+ }
489
571
  /**
490
572
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
491
573
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)