@locker/cli 0.28.9 → 0.28.10
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs.js +1 -1
- package/dist/index.mjs.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lws-sandbox.js +24 -167
- package/package.json +5 -5
package/dist/index.cjs.js
CHANGED
package/dist/index.mjs.js
CHANGED
package/dist/lws-sandbox.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@
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const PromiseResolve$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.resolve.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
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const PromiseReject$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.reject.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
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toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1());
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -2663,7 +2663,7 @@
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const XhrProtoResponseTextGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'responseText');
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const XhrProtoStatusGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'status');
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ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(XhrProto$LWS, 'withCredentials');
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -2831,7 +2831,7 @@
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}
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return sanitized$LWS;
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}
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -2907,7 +2907,7 @@
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// swallow
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}
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const trusted = createPolicy('trusted', policyOptions);
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -3216,7 +3216,7 @@
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}
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return getSanitizerForConfig$LWS(sandboxKey$LWS, 'STRING_BLOB_HTML');
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}
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -3425,7 +3425,7 @@
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ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoSetAttributeNS$LWS, targetElement$LWS, [attributeNamespaceURI$LWS, attributeName$LWS, src$LWS]);
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};
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}
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3428
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -12897,7 +12897,7 @@
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const UIEventProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['rangeParent'];
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const WindowBlockedProperties$LWS = ['find', 'requestFileSystem', 'webkitRequestFileSystem'];
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const XSLTProcessorProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['transformToDocument', 'transformToFragment'];
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12900
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2021 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -12906,7 +12906,7 @@
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function getPdpSchema$LWS() {
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return pdpSchema$LWS;
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12908
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}
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12909
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-
/*! version: 0.28.
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12909
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+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
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/*!
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* Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
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@@ -15044,40 +15044,22 @@
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const thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS = isApplyTrap$LWS ? thisArgOrArgs$LWS : argsOrNewTarget$LWS;
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15045
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let combinedOffset$LWS = 2;
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15046
15046
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const combinedArgs$LWS = new ArrayCtor$LWS(length$LWS + combinedOffset$LWS);
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15047
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-
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-
// `[[Set]]` (`combinedArgs[i] = value`) to populate the combined arguments.
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15049
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-
// A plain array still inherits from `Array.prototype`, so a `[[Set]]` on a
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-
// numeric index would invoke an inherited accessor if sandboxed code has
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15051
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-
// installed one (e.g. `Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, '2', { set })`).
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15052
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-
// Such a setter can observe and overwrite the pointers marshalled here —
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15053
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// including `combinedArgs[0]`, the foreign target pointer — redirecting the
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15054
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-
// call to a different foreign callable. Defining own data properties bypasses
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15055
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-
// the prototype chain entirely and is immune to prototype pollution.
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15056
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-
ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(combinedArgs$LWS, 0, {
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15057
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-
__proto__: null,
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15058
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-
value: foreignTargetPointer$LWS
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15059
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-
});
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15047
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+
combinedArgs$LWS[0] = foreignTargetPointer$LWS;
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15048
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let pointerOrPrimitive$LWS;
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15061
15049
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try {
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15062
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-
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15063
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-
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15064
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-
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15065
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-
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15066
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-
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-
// https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
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15068
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-
typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS
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15069
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-
});
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15050
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+
combinedArgs$LWS[1] = typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'object' && thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS !== null || typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'function' ? getTransferablePointer$LWS(thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS) :
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15051
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+
// Intentionally ignoring `document.all`.
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15052
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// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/all
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15053
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+
// https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
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15054
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+
typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS;
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15070
15055
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for (let i$LWS = 0; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
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15071
15056
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const arg$LWS = args$LWS[i$LWS];
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15072
15057
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// Inlining `getTransferableValue()`.
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15073
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-
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15074
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-
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15075
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-
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15076
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-
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15077
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-
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15078
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-
// https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
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15079
|
-
typeof arg$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : arg$LWS
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15080
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-
});
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15058
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+
combinedArgs$LWS[combinedOffset$LWS++] = typeof arg$LWS === 'object' && arg$LWS !== null || typeof arg$LWS === 'function' ? getTransferablePointer$LWS(arg$LWS) :
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15059
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+
// Intentionally ignoring `document.all`.
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15060
|
+
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/all
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15061
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+
// https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
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15062
|
+
typeof arg$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : arg$LWS;
|
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15081
15063
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}
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|
15082
15064
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pointerOrPrimitive$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS(foreignCallableApplyOrConstruct$LWS, undefined, combinedArgs$LWS);
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15083
15065
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} catch (error) {
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@@ -15660,36 +15642,10 @@
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15660
15642
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// Replace pending traps with live traps that can work with the
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15661
15643
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// target without taking snapshots.
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15662
15644
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this.deleteProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDeletePropertyTrap;
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15645
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+
this.defineProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDefinePropertyTrap;
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15663
15646
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this.preventExtensions = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruPreventExtensionsTrap;
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15664
15647
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this.set = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruSetTrap;
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15665
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-
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15666
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-
// (the expando capability live targets actually need) but
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15667
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-
// accessor descriptors are scoped to the shadow target. The
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15668
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-
// passthru variant calls `foreignCallableDefineProperty` on the
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15669
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-
// RAW foreign target; for an accessor that plants a
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15670
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-
// sandbox-authored getter/setter directly onto a host-shared
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15671
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-
// object. Because the descriptor's functions are marshalled as
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15672
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-
// pointers back into the sandbox, any later access from the
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15673
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-
// primary realm (a confused deputy reading the planted key)
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15674
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-
// would execute sandbox code with the RAW object as `this` and
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15675
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-
// read raw-global-only state through it. Data expandos carry no
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15676
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-
// such callback, so they remain passthru; only accessors are
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15677
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-
// contained. See `liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap`.
|
|
15678
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-
this.defineProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap;
|
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15679
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-
// `[[SetPrototypeOf]]` is the one live trap we do not
|
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15680
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-
// passthru. The passthru variant calls `ReflectSetPrototypeOf`
|
|
15681
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-
// on the RAW foreign target, which lets sandbox code splice a
|
|
15682
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-
// foreign prototype (e.g. the primary-realm global) onto a live
|
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15683
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-
// target and then read foreign globals through inherited
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|
15684
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-
// lookups: live reads resolve against the RAW prototype chain
|
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15685
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-
// (`hybridGetTrap` -> `lookupForeignDescriptor`), never the
|
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15686
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-
// shadow target. It also lets sandbox code wipe a host-shared
|
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15687
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-
// object's prototype to `null`. Scoping the proto change to the
|
|
15688
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-
// shadow target makes both observably inert while leaving
|
|
15689
|
-
// `set`/`deleteProperty` passthru (the capabilities live targets
|
|
15690
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-
// actually need) untouched. No legitimate live target re-parents
|
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15691
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-
// itself across the membrane.
|
|
15692
|
-
this.setPrototypeOf = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.staticSetPrototypeOfTrap;
|
|
15648
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+
this.setPrototypeOf = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruSetPrototypeOfTrap;
|
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15693
15649
|
} : noop$LWS;
|
|
15694
15650
|
this.makeProxyStatic = IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function () {
|
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15695
15651
|
// Reset all traps except apply and construct for static proxies
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@@ -16041,25 +15997,6 @@
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|
|
16041
15997
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if (IS_NOT_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS && (key$LWS === LOCKER_NEAR_MEMBRANE_SYMBOL$LWS || key$LWS === LOCKER_NEAR_MEMBRANE_SERIALIZED_VALUE_SYMBOL$LWS)) {
|
|
16042
15998
|
throw new TypeErrorCtor$LWS(ERR_ILLEGAL_PROPERTY_ACCESS$LWS);
|
|
16043
15999
|
}
|
|
16044
|
-
// `x.__proto__ = value` triggers the `Object.prototype.__proto__`
|
|
16045
|
-
// accessor, whose setter performs `[[SetPrototypeOf]]` on the
|
|
16046
|
-
// target. This is the live target's `set` trap, and its passthru
|
|
16047
|
-
// below would forward the write to the RAW foreign target,
|
|
16048
|
-
// running the raw realm's `__proto__` setter and reparenting the
|
|
16049
|
-
// raw object. That reintroduces the `setPrototypeOf` isolation
|
|
16050
|
-
// leak (W-23623814) through property-assignment syntax: a
|
|
16051
|
-
// subsequent inherited read would resolve foreign members
|
|
16052
|
-
// against the spliced prototype. Confine an own `__proto__`
|
|
16053
|
-
// write to the shadow target by delegating to `ReflectSet` on
|
|
16054
|
-
// it, exactly as static proxies do via `staticSetTrap`; the red
|
|
16055
|
-
// realm's own `__proto__` accessor then applies the correct
|
|
16056
|
-
// ordinary semantics (primitive no-op, Object/Null reparent)
|
|
16057
|
-
// scoped to the shadow target. A non-own write
|
|
16058
|
-
// (`proxy !== receiver`) targets the other receiver, not the
|
|
16059
|
-
// raw foreign target, so it is left to the passthru path.
|
|
16060
|
-
if (IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS && key$LWS === '__proto__' && proxy$LWS === receiver$LWS) {
|
|
16061
|
-
return ReflectSet$LWS(shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, value$LWS, shadowTarget$LWS);
|
|
16062
|
-
}
|
|
16063
16000
|
const isFastPath$LWS = proxy$LWS === receiver$LWS;
|
|
16064
16001
|
let result$LWS = false;
|
|
16065
16002
|
try {
|
|
@@ -16294,76 +16231,6 @@
|
|
|
16294
16231
|
}
|
|
16295
16232
|
return result$LWS;
|
|
16296
16233
|
} : alwaysFalse$LWS;
|
|
16297
|
-
// `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` trap for LIVE targets. Data descriptors are the
|
|
16298
|
-
// expando capability live targets rely on and stay passthru to the RAW
|
|
16299
|
-
// foreign target via `passthruDefinePropertyTrap`. Accessor descriptors
|
|
16300
|
-
// (a `get` and/or `set`), however, would install sandbox-authored
|
|
16301
|
-
// functions onto a host-shared object; a subsequent access from the
|
|
16302
|
-
// primary realm would run that sandbox code with the RAW target as
|
|
16303
|
-
// receiver and expose raw-global-only state. We contain accessors on the
|
|
16304
|
-
// inert shadow target instead. This mirrors the `staticSetPrototypeOfTrap`
|
|
16305
|
-
// contract: the operation is observably inert from every side. A live
|
|
16306
|
-
// `get` resolves against the RAW foreign target (`lookupForeignDescriptor`
|
|
16307
|
-
// reads the raw own descriptor and walks the RAW prototype chain; it only
|
|
16308
|
-
// ever writes the shadow target, never reads its own properties), so the
|
|
16309
|
-
// sandbox reads back `undefined` for a shadow-scoped accessor too. The
|
|
16310
|
-
// security-relevant guarantee is that no sandbox-authored callback ever
|
|
16311
|
-
// reaches the raw host-shared object.
|
|
16312
|
-
//
|
|
16313
|
-
// The shadow-scoped copy is always written with `configurable: true`,
|
|
16314
|
-
// regardless of what the sandbox asked for. A live proxy's `has`,
|
|
16315
|
-
// `ownKeys`, and `getOwnPropertyDescriptor` traps are NOT overridden by
|
|
16316
|
-
// `makeProxyLive()` (see `hybridHasTrap`, `passthruOwnKeysTrap`,
|
|
16317
|
-
// `passthruGetOwnPropertyDescriptorTrap`): they all resolve against the
|
|
16318
|
-
// RAW foreign target and never consult the shadow target's own
|
|
16319
|
-
// properties. `Object.defineProperty` defaults `configurable` to
|
|
16320
|
-
// `false`, so the common `{ get() {...} }` shape would otherwise leave
|
|
16321
|
-
// the shadow target — the proxy's actual `[[ProxyTarget]]` — holding a
|
|
16322
|
-
// NON-CONFIGURABLE own key that those raw-resolving traps can never
|
|
16323
|
-
// mirror. The engine's proxy invariants then throw on the very next
|
|
16324
|
-
// `has`/`ownKeys`/`getOwnPropertyDescriptor` (`in`, `Object.keys`,
|
|
16325
|
-
// spread, `JSON.stringify`, `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor`, ...)
|
|
16326
|
-
// because a non-configurable target key must be reported by those traps
|
|
16327
|
-
// and it never can be. Since the accessor is invisible through the
|
|
16328
|
-
// proxy either way (reads resolve against the raw target), forcing
|
|
16329
|
-
// `configurable: true` is not observable to the sandbox, and it keeps
|
|
16330
|
-
// every read-side invariant satisfiable. An explicit `configurable:
|
|
16331
|
-
// false` request cannot be honored while preserving that invisibility;
|
|
16332
|
-
// it now fails fast with a native TypeError raised by the engine's own
|
|
16333
|
-
// `defineProperty` trap-result invariant check (requested
|
|
16334
|
-
// non-configurable vs. an actually-configurable target descriptor) at
|
|
16335
|
-
// the `defineProperty` call site itself, rather than deferring the
|
|
16336
|
-
// detonation to a later, unrelated read.
|
|
16337
|
-
BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap = IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function (shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
|
|
16338
|
-
// A descriptor is an accessor iff it carries a `get` or `set`.
|
|
16339
|
-
// Read membership before detaching the prototype so a poisoned
|
|
16340
|
-
// `Object.prototype` getter cannot forge the answer.
|
|
16341
|
-
const isAccessorDescriptor$LWS = 'get' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS || 'set' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS;
|
|
16342
|
-
if (isAccessorDescriptor$LWS) {
|
|
16343
|
-
lastProxyTrapCalled$LWS = 4 /* ProxyHandlerTraps.DefineProperty */;
|
|
16344
|
-
// Build a fresh descriptor rather than writing the
|
|
16345
|
-
// sandbox's `unsafePartialDesc` object directly, and
|
|
16346
|
-
// force `configurable: true` on the shadow-scoped copy
|
|
16347
|
-
// (see the block comment above).
|
|
16348
|
-
const shadowDesc$LWS = {
|
|
16349
|
-
__proto__: null
|
|
16350
|
-
};
|
|
16351
|
-
if ('get' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
|
|
16352
|
-
shadowDesc$LWS.get = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.get;
|
|
16353
|
-
}
|
|
16354
|
-
if ('set' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
|
|
16355
|
-
shadowDesc$LWS.set = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.set;
|
|
16356
|
-
}
|
|
16357
|
-
if ('enumerable' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
|
|
16358
|
-
shadowDesc$LWS.enumerable = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.enumerable;
|
|
16359
|
-
}
|
|
16360
|
-
shadowDesc$LWS.configurable = true;
|
|
16361
|
-
// Scope the accessor to the shadow target: observably
|
|
16362
|
-
// defined for the sandbox, never planted on the raw object.
|
|
16363
|
-
return ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, shadowDesc$LWS);
|
|
16364
|
-
}
|
|
16365
|
-
return ReflectApply$LWS(BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDefinePropertyTrap, this, [shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, unsafePartialDesc$LWS]);
|
|
16366
|
-
} : alwaysFalse$LWS;
|
|
16367
16234
|
BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruGetTrap = IS_NOT_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function (_shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, receiver$LWS) {
|
|
16368
16235
|
// Only allow accessing handshake property values if the
|
|
16369
16236
|
// "has" trap has been triggered immediately BEFORE and
|
|
@@ -16664,17 +16531,7 @@
|
|
|
16664
16531
|
const pointerOrPrimitive$LWS = args$LWS[i$LWS];
|
|
16665
16532
|
if (typeof pointerOrPrimitive$LWS === 'function') {
|
|
16666
16533
|
pointerOrPrimitive$LWS();
|
|
16667
|
-
|
|
16668
|
-
// `args` is a rest-parameter array that still inherits from
|
|
16669
|
-
// `Array.prototype`, so a plain assignment to a numeric index would
|
|
16670
|
-
// invoke an inherited accessor installed by sandboxed code (e.g.
|
|
16671
|
-
// `Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, '2', { set })`). Such a
|
|
16672
|
-
// setter could observe and overwrite the un-marshalled arguments
|
|
16673
|
-
// before they reach the target function. See W-23789302.
|
|
16674
|
-
ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(args$LWS, i$LWS, {
|
|
16675
|
-
__proto__: null,
|
|
16676
|
-
value: selectedTarget$LWS
|
|
16677
|
-
});
|
|
16534
|
+
args$LWS[i$LWS] = selectedTarget$LWS;
|
|
16678
16535
|
selectedTarget$LWS = undefined;
|
|
16679
16536
|
}
|
|
16680
16537
|
}
|
|
@@ -18441,7 +18298,7 @@
|
|
|
18441
18298
|
// tools from mistaking the regexp or the replacement string for an
|
|
18442
18299
|
// actual source mapping URL.
|
|
18443
18300
|
/\/\/# sandbox(?=MappingURL=.*?\s*$)/, '//# source']);
|
|
18444
|
-
sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.
|
|
18301
|
+
sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.10"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
|
|
18445
18302
|
return sourceType$LWS === 1 /* SourceType.Module */ && indexOfPragma$LWS(sourceText$LWS, 'use strict') === -1 ?
|
|
18446
18303
|
// Append "'use strict'" to the extracted function body so it is
|
|
18447
18304
|
// evaluated in strict mode.
|
|
@@ -19121,7 +18978,7 @@
|
|
|
19121
18978
|
}
|
|
19122
18979
|
toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1());
|
|
19123
18980
|
toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1(['lightning/platformResourceLoader', 'lightning:platformResourceLoader', 'lightningmobileruntime/platformResourceLoader', 'lightningmobileruntime:platformResourceLoader']));
|
|
19124
|
-
/*! version: 0.28.
|
|
18981
|
+
/*! version: 0.28.10 */
|
|
19125
18982
|
|
|
19126
18983
|
// Expose evaluateInSandbox on the window global so the browser harness page
|
|
19127
18984
|
// (eval.html / component.html) can invoke it against source delivered by the
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@locker/cli",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.28.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.28.10",
|
|
4
4
|
"license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.txt",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": "Salesforce UI Security Team",
|
|
6
6
|
"description": "Lightning Web Security CLI",
|
|
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
|
|
|
27
27
|
},
|
|
28
28
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
29
29
|
"@babel/parser": "7.28.0",
|
|
30
|
-
"@locker/rollup-plugin": "0.28.
|
|
31
|
-
"@locker/sandbox": "0.28.
|
|
32
|
-
"@locker/shared": "0.28.
|
|
30
|
+
"@locker/rollup-plugin": "0.28.10",
|
|
31
|
+
"@locker/sandbox": "0.28.10",
|
|
32
|
+
"@locker/shared": "0.28.10",
|
|
33
33
|
"@lwc/engine-dom": "8.21.1",
|
|
34
34
|
"@lwc/rollup-plugin": "8.21.1",
|
|
35
35
|
"@rollup/plugin-commonjs": "21.1.0",
|
|
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@
|
|
|
43
43
|
"rollup-plugin-ts": "3.4.5",
|
|
44
44
|
"yargs": "17.7.2"
|
|
45
45
|
},
|
|
46
|
-
"gitHead": "
|
|
46
|
+
"gitHead": "ef1441ff6cd49da0350bb68bda90da454d3368c9"
|
|
47
47
|
}
|