@locker/cli 0.28.9 → 0.28.10

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.cjs.js CHANGED
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
2
2
  * Copyright (C) 2026 salesforce.com, inc.
3
3
  */
4
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  'use strict';
5
- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
5
+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
package/dist/index.mjs.js CHANGED
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
2
2
  * Copyright (C) 2026 salesforce.com, inc.
3
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  */
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- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@
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  const PromiseResolve$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.resolve.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
1548
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  const PromiseReject$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.reject.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
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  toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1());
1550
- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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1551
 
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2663,7 +2663,7 @@
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  const XhrProtoResponseTextGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'responseText');
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  const XhrProtoStatusGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'status');
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  ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(XhrProto$LWS, 'withCredentials');
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- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2831,7 +2831,7 @@
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  }
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  return sanitized$LWS;
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2907,7 +2907,7 @@
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  // swallow
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  }
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  const trusted = createPolicy('trusted', policyOptions);
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- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3216,7 +3216,7 @@
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  }
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  return getSanitizerForConfig$LWS(sandboxKey$LWS, 'STRING_BLOB_HTML');
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3425,7 +3425,7 @@
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  ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoSetAttributeNS$LWS, targetElement$LWS, [attributeNamespaceURI$LWS, attributeName$LWS, src$LWS]);
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  };
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -12897,7 +12897,7 @@
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  const UIEventProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['rangeParent'];
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  const WindowBlockedProperties$LWS = ['find', 'requestFileSystem', 'webkitRequestFileSystem'];
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  const XSLTProcessorProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['transformToDocument', 'transformToFragment'];
12900
- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2021 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -12906,7 +12906,7 @@
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  function getPdpSchema$LWS() {
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  return pdpSchema$LWS;
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
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12911
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -15044,40 +15044,22 @@
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  const thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS = isApplyTrap$LWS ? thisArgOrArgs$LWS : argsOrNewTarget$LWS;
15045
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  let combinedOffset$LWS = 2;
15046
15046
  const combinedArgs$LWS = new ArrayCtor$LWS(length$LWS + combinedOffset$LWS);
15047
- // Use `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` (via `ReflectDefineProperty`) rather than
15048
- // `[[Set]]` (`combinedArgs[i] = value`) to populate the combined arguments.
15049
- // A plain array still inherits from `Array.prototype`, so a `[[Set]]` on a
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- // numeric index would invoke an inherited accessor if sandboxed code has
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- // installed one (e.g. `Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, '2', { set })`).
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- // Such a setter can observe and overwrite the pointers marshalled here —
15053
- // including `combinedArgs[0]`, the foreign target pointer — redirecting the
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- // call to a different foreign callable. Defining own data properties bypasses
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- // the prototype chain entirely and is immune to prototype pollution.
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- ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(combinedArgs$LWS, 0, {
15057
- __proto__: null,
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- value: foreignTargetPointer$LWS
15059
- });
15047
+ combinedArgs$LWS[0] = foreignTargetPointer$LWS;
15060
15048
  let pointerOrPrimitive$LWS;
15061
15049
  try {
15062
- ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(combinedArgs$LWS, 1, {
15063
- __proto__: null,
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- value: typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'object' && thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS !== null || typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'function' ? getTransferablePointer$LWS(thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS) :
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- // Intentionally ignoring `document.all`.
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- // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/all
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- // https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
15068
- typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS
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- });
15050
+ combinedArgs$LWS[1] = typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'object' && thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS !== null || typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'function' ? getTransferablePointer$LWS(thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS) :
15051
+ // Intentionally ignoring `document.all`.
15052
+ // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/all
15053
+ // https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
15054
+ typeof thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : thisArgOrNewTarget$LWS;
15070
15055
  for (let i$LWS = 0; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
15071
15056
  const arg$LWS = args$LWS[i$LWS];
15072
15057
  // Inlining `getTransferableValue()`.
15073
- ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(combinedArgs$LWS, combinedOffset$LWS++, {
15074
- __proto__: null,
15075
- value: typeof arg$LWS === 'object' && arg$LWS !== null || typeof arg$LWS === 'function' ? getTransferablePointer$LWS(arg$LWS) :
15076
- // Intentionally ignoring `document.all`.
15077
- // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/all
15078
- // https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
15079
- typeof arg$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : arg$LWS
15080
- });
15058
+ combinedArgs$LWS[combinedOffset$LWS++] = typeof arg$LWS === 'object' && arg$LWS !== null || typeof arg$LWS === 'function' ? getTransferablePointer$LWS(arg$LWS) :
15059
+ // Intentionally ignoring `document.all`.
15060
+ // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/all
15061
+ // https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-IsHTMLDDA-internal-slot
15062
+ typeof arg$LWS === 'undefined' ? undefined : arg$LWS;
15081
15063
  }
15082
15064
  pointerOrPrimitive$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS(foreignCallableApplyOrConstruct$LWS, undefined, combinedArgs$LWS);
15083
15065
  } catch (error) {
@@ -15660,36 +15642,10 @@
15660
15642
  // Replace pending traps with live traps that can work with the
15661
15643
  // target without taking snapshots.
15662
15644
  this.deleteProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDeletePropertyTrap;
15645
+ this.defineProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDefinePropertyTrap;
15663
15646
  this.preventExtensions = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruPreventExtensionsTrap;
15664
15647
  this.set = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruSetTrap;
15665
- // `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` is passthru for DATA descriptors
15666
- // (the expando capability live targets actually need) but
15667
- // accessor descriptors are scoped to the shadow target. The
15668
- // passthru variant calls `foreignCallableDefineProperty` on the
15669
- // RAW foreign target; for an accessor that plants a
15670
- // sandbox-authored getter/setter directly onto a host-shared
15671
- // object. Because the descriptor's functions are marshalled as
15672
- // pointers back into the sandbox, any later access from the
15673
- // primary realm (a confused deputy reading the planted key)
15674
- // would execute sandbox code with the RAW object as `this` and
15675
- // read raw-global-only state through it. Data expandos carry no
15676
- // such callback, so they remain passthru; only accessors are
15677
- // contained. See `liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap`.
15678
- this.defineProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap;
15679
- // `[[SetPrototypeOf]]` is the one live trap we do not
15680
- // passthru. The passthru variant calls `ReflectSetPrototypeOf`
15681
- // on the RAW foreign target, which lets sandbox code splice a
15682
- // foreign prototype (e.g. the primary-realm global) onto a live
15683
- // target and then read foreign globals through inherited
15684
- // lookups: live reads resolve against the RAW prototype chain
15685
- // (`hybridGetTrap` -> `lookupForeignDescriptor`), never the
15686
- // shadow target. It also lets sandbox code wipe a host-shared
15687
- // object's prototype to `null`. Scoping the proto change to the
15688
- // shadow target makes both observably inert while leaving
15689
- // `set`/`deleteProperty` passthru (the capabilities live targets
15690
- // actually need) untouched. No legitimate live target re-parents
15691
- // itself across the membrane.
15692
- this.setPrototypeOf = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.staticSetPrototypeOfTrap;
15648
+ this.setPrototypeOf = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruSetPrototypeOfTrap;
15693
15649
  } : noop$LWS;
15694
15650
  this.makeProxyStatic = IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function () {
15695
15651
  // Reset all traps except apply and construct for static proxies
@@ -16041,25 +15997,6 @@
16041
15997
  if (IS_NOT_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS && (key$LWS === LOCKER_NEAR_MEMBRANE_SYMBOL$LWS || key$LWS === LOCKER_NEAR_MEMBRANE_SERIALIZED_VALUE_SYMBOL$LWS)) {
16042
15998
  throw new TypeErrorCtor$LWS(ERR_ILLEGAL_PROPERTY_ACCESS$LWS);
16043
15999
  }
16044
- // `x.__proto__ = value` triggers the `Object.prototype.__proto__`
16045
- // accessor, whose setter performs `[[SetPrototypeOf]]` on the
16046
- // target. This is the live target's `set` trap, and its passthru
16047
- // below would forward the write to the RAW foreign target,
16048
- // running the raw realm's `__proto__` setter and reparenting the
16049
- // raw object. That reintroduces the `setPrototypeOf` isolation
16050
- // leak (W-23623814) through property-assignment syntax: a
16051
- // subsequent inherited read would resolve foreign members
16052
- // against the spliced prototype. Confine an own `__proto__`
16053
- // write to the shadow target by delegating to `ReflectSet` on
16054
- // it, exactly as static proxies do via `staticSetTrap`; the red
16055
- // realm's own `__proto__` accessor then applies the correct
16056
- // ordinary semantics (primitive no-op, Object/Null reparent)
16057
- // scoped to the shadow target. A non-own write
16058
- // (`proxy !== receiver`) targets the other receiver, not the
16059
- // raw foreign target, so it is left to the passthru path.
16060
- if (IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS && key$LWS === '__proto__' && proxy$LWS === receiver$LWS) {
16061
- return ReflectSet$LWS(shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, value$LWS, shadowTarget$LWS);
16062
- }
16063
16000
  const isFastPath$LWS = proxy$LWS === receiver$LWS;
16064
16001
  let result$LWS = false;
16065
16002
  try {
@@ -16294,76 +16231,6 @@
16294
16231
  }
16295
16232
  return result$LWS;
16296
16233
  } : alwaysFalse$LWS;
16297
- // `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` trap for LIVE targets. Data descriptors are the
16298
- // expando capability live targets rely on and stay passthru to the RAW
16299
- // foreign target via `passthruDefinePropertyTrap`. Accessor descriptors
16300
- // (a `get` and/or `set`), however, would install sandbox-authored
16301
- // functions onto a host-shared object; a subsequent access from the
16302
- // primary realm would run that sandbox code with the RAW target as
16303
- // receiver and expose raw-global-only state. We contain accessors on the
16304
- // inert shadow target instead. This mirrors the `staticSetPrototypeOfTrap`
16305
- // contract: the operation is observably inert from every side. A live
16306
- // `get` resolves against the RAW foreign target (`lookupForeignDescriptor`
16307
- // reads the raw own descriptor and walks the RAW prototype chain; it only
16308
- // ever writes the shadow target, never reads its own properties), so the
16309
- // sandbox reads back `undefined` for a shadow-scoped accessor too. The
16310
- // security-relevant guarantee is that no sandbox-authored callback ever
16311
- // reaches the raw host-shared object.
16312
- //
16313
- // The shadow-scoped copy is always written with `configurable: true`,
16314
- // regardless of what the sandbox asked for. A live proxy's `has`,
16315
- // `ownKeys`, and `getOwnPropertyDescriptor` traps are NOT overridden by
16316
- // `makeProxyLive()` (see `hybridHasTrap`, `passthruOwnKeysTrap`,
16317
- // `passthruGetOwnPropertyDescriptorTrap`): they all resolve against the
16318
- // RAW foreign target and never consult the shadow target's own
16319
- // properties. `Object.defineProperty` defaults `configurable` to
16320
- // `false`, so the common `{ get() {...} }` shape would otherwise leave
16321
- // the shadow target — the proxy's actual `[[ProxyTarget]]` — holding a
16322
- // NON-CONFIGURABLE own key that those raw-resolving traps can never
16323
- // mirror. The engine's proxy invariants then throw on the very next
16324
- // `has`/`ownKeys`/`getOwnPropertyDescriptor` (`in`, `Object.keys`,
16325
- // spread, `JSON.stringify`, `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor`, ...)
16326
- // because a non-configurable target key must be reported by those traps
16327
- // and it never can be. Since the accessor is invisible through the
16328
- // proxy either way (reads resolve against the raw target), forcing
16329
- // `configurable: true` is not observable to the sandbox, and it keeps
16330
- // every read-side invariant satisfiable. An explicit `configurable:
16331
- // false` request cannot be honored while preserving that invisibility;
16332
- // it now fails fast with a native TypeError raised by the engine's own
16333
- // `defineProperty` trap-result invariant check (requested
16334
- // non-configurable vs. an actually-configurable target descriptor) at
16335
- // the `defineProperty` call site itself, rather than deferring the
16336
- // detonation to a later, unrelated read.
16337
- BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap = IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function (shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
16338
- // A descriptor is an accessor iff it carries a `get` or `set`.
16339
- // Read membership before detaching the prototype so a poisoned
16340
- // `Object.prototype` getter cannot forge the answer.
16341
- const isAccessorDescriptor$LWS = 'get' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS || 'set' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS;
16342
- if (isAccessorDescriptor$LWS) {
16343
- lastProxyTrapCalled$LWS = 4 /* ProxyHandlerTraps.DefineProperty */;
16344
- // Build a fresh descriptor rather than writing the
16345
- // sandbox's `unsafePartialDesc` object directly, and
16346
- // force `configurable: true` on the shadow-scoped copy
16347
- // (see the block comment above).
16348
- const shadowDesc$LWS = {
16349
- __proto__: null
16350
- };
16351
- if ('get' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
16352
- shadowDesc$LWS.get = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.get;
16353
- }
16354
- if ('set' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
16355
- shadowDesc$LWS.set = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.set;
16356
- }
16357
- if ('enumerable' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
16358
- shadowDesc$LWS.enumerable = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.enumerable;
16359
- }
16360
- shadowDesc$LWS.configurable = true;
16361
- // Scope the accessor to the shadow target: observably
16362
- // defined for the sandbox, never planted on the raw object.
16363
- return ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, shadowDesc$LWS);
16364
- }
16365
- return ReflectApply$LWS(BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDefinePropertyTrap, this, [shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, unsafePartialDesc$LWS]);
16366
- } : alwaysFalse$LWS;
16367
16234
  BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruGetTrap = IS_NOT_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function (_shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, receiver$LWS) {
16368
16235
  // Only allow accessing handshake property values if the
16369
16236
  // "has" trap has been triggered immediately BEFORE and
@@ -16664,17 +16531,7 @@
16664
16531
  const pointerOrPrimitive$LWS = args$LWS[i$LWS];
16665
16532
  if (typeof pointerOrPrimitive$LWS === 'function') {
16666
16533
  pointerOrPrimitive$LWS();
16667
- // Use `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` rather than `[[Set]]` (`args[i] = ...`).
16668
- // `args` is a rest-parameter array that still inherits from
16669
- // `Array.prototype`, so a plain assignment to a numeric index would
16670
- // invoke an inherited accessor installed by sandboxed code (e.g.
16671
- // `Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, '2', { set })`). Such a
16672
- // setter could observe and overwrite the un-marshalled arguments
16673
- // before they reach the target function. See W-23789302.
16674
- ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(args$LWS, i$LWS, {
16675
- __proto__: null,
16676
- value: selectedTarget$LWS
16677
- });
16534
+ args$LWS[i$LWS] = selectedTarget$LWS;
16678
16535
  selectedTarget$LWS = undefined;
16679
16536
  }
16680
16537
  }
@@ -18441,7 +18298,7 @@
18441
18298
  // tools from mistaking the regexp or the replacement string for an
18442
18299
  // actual source mapping URL.
18443
18300
  /\/\/# sandbox(?=MappingURL=.*?\s*$)/, '//# source']);
18444
- sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.9"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
18301
+ sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.10"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
18445
18302
  return sourceType$LWS === 1 /* SourceType.Module */ && indexOfPragma$LWS(sourceText$LWS, 'use strict') === -1 ?
18446
18303
  // Append "'use strict'" to the extracted function body so it is
18447
18304
  // evaluated in strict mode.
@@ -19121,7 +18978,7 @@
19121
18978
  }
19122
18979
  toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1());
19123
18980
  toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1(['lightning/platformResourceLoader', 'lightning:platformResourceLoader', 'lightningmobileruntime/platformResourceLoader', 'lightningmobileruntime:platformResourceLoader']));
19124
- /*! version: 0.28.9 */
18981
+ /*! version: 0.28.10 */
19125
18982
 
19126
18983
  // Expose evaluateInSandbox on the window global so the browser harness page
19127
18984
  // (eval.html / component.html) can invoke it against source delivered by the
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@locker/cli",
3
- "version": "0.28.9",
3
+ "version": "0.28.10",
4
4
  "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.txt",
5
5
  "author": "Salesforce UI Security Team",
6
6
  "description": "Lightning Web Security CLI",
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
27
27
  },
28
28
  "dependencies": {
29
29
  "@babel/parser": "7.28.0",
30
- "@locker/rollup-plugin": "0.28.9",
31
- "@locker/sandbox": "0.28.9",
32
- "@locker/shared": "0.28.9",
30
+ "@locker/rollup-plugin": "0.28.10",
31
+ "@locker/sandbox": "0.28.10",
32
+ "@locker/shared": "0.28.10",
33
33
  "@lwc/engine-dom": "8.21.1",
34
34
  "@lwc/rollup-plugin": "8.21.1",
35
35
  "@rollup/plugin-commonjs": "21.1.0",
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@
43
43
  "rollup-plugin-ts": "3.4.5",
44
44
  "yargs": "17.7.2"
45
45
  },
46
- "gitHead": "095edff28376a4ba18a23403eb66515fab860328"
46
+ "gitHead": "ef1441ff6cd49da0350bb68bda90da454d3368c9"
47
47
  }