@kya-os/checkpoint-shared 1.5.1 → 1.6.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +217 -0
- package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.mts +36 -0
- package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts +36 -0
- package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.js +305 -0
- package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.mjs +294 -0
- package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts +40 -0
- package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts +40 -0
- package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/beacon-types/index.js +53 -5
- package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs +49 -6
- package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-BuChqmH5.d.mts +169 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-BuChqmH5.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-DIaVLuW3.d.ts +169 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-DIaVLuW3.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.mts +4 -2
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.mts +18 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-proof.js +66 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-proof.mjs +63 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-proof.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts +59 -2
- package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts +59 -2
- package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-report.js +1 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts +2 -85
- package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts +2 -85
- package/dist/browser-posture.js +207 -45
- package/dist/browser-posture.mjs +195 -45
- package/dist/browser-posture.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser.d.mts +0 -8
- package/dist/browser.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser.d.ts +0 -8
- package/dist/browser.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/browser.js +1 -1
- package/dist/browser.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/browser.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/clearance.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/clearance.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/clearance.js +2 -2
- package/dist/clearance.mjs +2 -2
- package/dist/{client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs → client-ip-B2Xeo-GK.mjs} +2 -2
- package/dist/{client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs.map → client-ip-B2Xeo-GK.mjs.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/{client-ip-1y2iXAYW.js → client-ip-CW6pRyLf.js} +1 -1
- package/dist/consent-handoff.d.mts +41 -0
- package/dist/consent-handoff.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/consent-handoff.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/consent-handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/consent-handoff.js +1 -0
- package/dist/consent-handoff.mjs +2 -0
- package/dist/consent-handoff.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/errors/index.d.mts +155 -0
- package/dist/errors/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/errors/index.d.ts +155 -0
- package/dist/errors/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/errors/index.js +513 -9
- package/dist/errors/index.mjs +513 -10
- package/dist/errors/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.mts} +2 -2
- package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts.map → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.mts.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.ts} +2 -2
- package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts.map → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.ts.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/gateway-client-ip.js +2 -2
- package/dist/gateway-client-ip.mjs +2 -2
- package/dist/index.d.mts +6375 -1532
- package/dist/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +6375 -1532
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +5629 -697
- package/dist/index.mjs +5341 -683
- package/dist/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.js +58 -49
- package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs +58 -49
- package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.mts +3 -2
- package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.mts +41 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins/index.js +441 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins/index.mjs +430 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins/index.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins-LFkX80oF.js +627 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins-Pn-ii-Pp.mjs +533 -0
- package/dist/posture-origins-Pn-ii-Pp.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{project-verification-key-CgSVX9_m.mjs → project-verification-key-66N4edKn.mjs} +2 -2
- package/dist/{project-verification-key-CgSVX9_m.mjs.map → project-verification-key-66N4edKn.mjs.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/{project-verification-key-C3L5rd8a.js → project-verification-key-BccT12tQ.js} +1 -1
- package/dist/rules.json +0 -1
- package/dist/{schemas-DxY-dk9y.mjs → schemas-7qodsG-Z.mjs} +49 -2
- package/dist/schemas-7qodsG-Z.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{schemas-BmjNLAE7.js → schemas-YhagYDx_.js} +59 -0
- package/dist/signals/index.d.mts +75 -55
- package/dist/signals/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/signals/index.d.ts +75 -55
- package/dist/signals/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/signals/index.js +246 -2
- package/dist/signals/index.mjs +236 -3
- package/dist/signals/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/fixtures/browser-integrity/captured-java-0.2.1-missing-score.json +10 -0
- package/fixtures/browser-integrity/null-score.json +11 -0
- package/fixtures/browser-integrity/numeric-score.json +11 -0
- package/fixtures/browser-posture-claims.json +168 -0
- package/fixtures/browser-posture-headers.json +6 -0
- package/fixtures/cli-registration.v2.json +115 -0
- package/fixtures/detection/reason-codes.json +1 -1
- package/fixtures/kya-http/README.md +34 -25
- package/fixtures/kya-http/consent-handoff.codes.json +34 -0
- package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.full.json +14 -5
- package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.invalid-issuer.json +51 -0
- package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.no-issuer.json +32 -0
- package/fixtures/reviewer-grant-revocation.v1.json +285 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/a2a-signed-request.v1.json +255 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/artifact-bindings.v1.json +1003 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/delegation-management.v1.json +507 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/didcomm-task-source.v1.json +191 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/graph-interfaces.v1.json +1887 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/identity-provisioning.v1.json +643 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/linear-installation.v1.json +484 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/management-session.v1.json +716 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/model-credentials.v1.json +630 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/source-claim-pooled.v1.json +50 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/task-grant.v1.json +695 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/task-status-projection.v1.json +591 -0
- package/fixtures/workbench/workload-enrollment.v1.json +580 -0
- package/package.json +24 -5
- package/src/data/compiled/merged-rules.json +2 -9
- package/src/data/default-rules.json +0 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts +0 -5
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts +0 -5
- package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/patterns-CkRVOdtV.js +0 -243
- package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs +0 -173
- package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs.map +0 -1
- package/dist/schemas-DxY-dk9y.mjs.map +0 -1
- package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.global.json +0 -28
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//#region src/beacon-nonce/index.ts
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/**
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* Stateless, client-bound beacon nonce, issued and verified by both the
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* origin (`apps/web/lib/services/nonce.service.ts`) and the beacon-ingest
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* edge Worker.
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*
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* Every pixel/beacon response hands the browser a per-session nonce that its
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* next post must echo. A queue-only edge returns its receipt before the
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* origin has seen the batch, so the nonce cannot depend on origin state:
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* it is an HMAC-SHA256 under a secret shared by origin and edge. The origin
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* verifies it at synchronous ingest, or on replay using the edge's
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* acceptance time as the clock.
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*
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* Web Crypto only (`crypto.subtle`, `crypto.getRandomValues`): this runs
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* unchanged in Cloudflare Workers, Node ≥ 20 and the browser bundle.
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*
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* Wire format (56 chars, inside the schema's 64-char cap):
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*
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* n2.<issuedAt base36 seconds>.<random 8 bytes b64url>.<HMAC 16 bytes b64url>.<ctx tag 8 bytes b64url>
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*
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* The first HMAC binds the format version + project + session + issue time +
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* random. The trailing context tag additionally binds the requester's
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* network prefix and User-Agent (`beaconNonceContext`), so a nonce lifted
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* from one client does not verify from another. The version is inside the
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* MAC, so a nonce cannot be relabelled to dodge the context tag.
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*
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* Verdict semantics — three states, never two:
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* - `verified`: signature matches THIS project+session, the context matches,
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* and it is within TTL.
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* - `forged`: well-formed but the MAC does not match this session/secret.
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* The only outcome that counts as evidence against the client.
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* - `unverified`: nothing could be proven — not signed-format (absent, or
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* a value from before signing existed), expired, from the future, this
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* side has no secret, or the session signature is genuine but the
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* requester's network/User-Agent differs from the one it was issued to (a
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* roaming phone and a replay from elsewhere look the same, so neither is
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* treated as fabrication). Staleness is not forgery: an edge that stopped
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* issuing (secret unset) leaves clients echoing old values, and that must
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* degrade to "unknown", never to "failed".
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*
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* Any unexpired signature for the session verifies, so a nonce is not
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* single-use within its TTL. Multi-tab sessions need no window at all.
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*/
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const NONCE_VERSION = "n2";
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const MAC_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:${NONCE_VERSION}`;
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const CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:ctx:${NONCE_VERSION}`;
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const RANDOM_BYTES = 8;
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const MAC_BYTES = 16;
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const CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES = 8;
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const MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH = 512;
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const IPV4_PATTERN = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/;
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const IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/;
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const ISSUED_AT_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-z]{1,16}$/;
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const BASE64URL_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
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const HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX = "checkpoint-handoff-token:v1";
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const HANDOFF_ID_BYTES = 16;
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const HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES = 16;
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const HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
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/** How long an issued nonce stays verifiable. */
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const BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;
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/** Edge and origin clocks may disagree; a nonce this far "in the future" still verifies. */
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const BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;
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/** The beacon wire schema's `nonce: z.string().max(64)`. */
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const BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = 64;
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function ipv4Prefix(ip) {
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const match = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(ip);
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return match ? `${match[1]}.${match[2]}.${match[3]}` : null;
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}
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/**
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* The first three groups (a /48) of an IPv6 address, expanded so compressed
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* forms agree with their spelled-out equivalents. An IPv4-mapped address
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* (`::ffff:a.b.c.d` or its hex spelling) is a v4 client and keys on its /24.
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* `null` for anything that is not a well-formed address.
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*/
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function ipv6Prefix(ip) {
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const bare = ip.toLowerCase().split("%")[0];
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const lastColon = bare.lastIndexOf(":");
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const embedded = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(bare.slice(lastColon + 1));
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const halves = (embedded ? `${bare.slice(0, lastColon + 1)}${(Number(embedded[1]) << 8 | Number(embedded[2])).toString(16)}:${(Number(embedded[3]) << 8 | Number(embedded[4])).toString(16)}` : bare).split("::");
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if (halves.length > 2) return null;
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const head = halves[0] ? halves[0].split(":") : [];
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const tail = halves.length === 2 && halves[1] ? halves[1].split(":") : [];
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const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;
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if (halves.length === 1 ? missing !== 0 : missing < 1) return null;
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const groups = [
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...head,
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...Array(halves.length === 2 ? missing : 0).fill("0"),
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...tail
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];
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if (!groups.every((group) => IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN.test(group))) return null;
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const words = groups.map((group) => parseInt(group, 16));
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if (words.slice(0, 5).every((word) => word === 0) && words[5] === 65535) return `${words[6] >> 8}.${words[6] & 255}.${words[7] >> 8}`;
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return words.slice(0, 3).map((word) => word.toString(16)).join(":");
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}
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/**
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* The requester facts a nonce is bound to: the network prefix (IPv4 /24,
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* IPv6 /48, so NAT and DHCP churn inside one access network still verify)
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* and the User-Agent. Empty when neither is known, which binds nothing.
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*/
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function beaconNonceContext(client) {
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const ip = client.ip?.trim() ?? "";
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const prefix = ipv4Prefix(ip) ?? (ip.includes(":") ? ipv6Prefix(ip) : null) ?? "";
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const userAgent = (client.userAgent ?? "").slice(0, MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH);
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return prefix || userAgent ? `${prefix}|${userAgent}` : "";
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}
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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const keyCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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function hmacKey(secret) {
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let key = keyCache.get(secret);
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if (!key) {
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key = crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", encoder.encode(secret), {
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name: "HMAC",
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hash: "SHA-256"
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}, false, ["sign"]);
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keyCache.set(secret, key);
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}
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return key;
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}
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function base64url(bytes) {
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let binary = "";
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for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);
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return btoa(binary).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
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}
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/**
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* Length-prefixed canonical encoding (`<byteLength>:<field>`), never a bare
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* delimiter join: `sessionId` is caller-controlled at the edge, so a value
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* that embeds the delimiter must not be able to shift the field boundaries
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* and re-bind the MAC to another session (Cursor Bugbot, PR #5255).
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*/
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function canonical(fields) {
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const chunks = fields.map((field) => {
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const bytes = encoder.encode(field);
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return [encoder.encode(`${bytes.length}:`), bytes];
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});
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const total = chunks.reduce((sum, [len, bytes]) => sum + len.length + bytes.length, 0);
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const out = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(total));
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let offset = 0;
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for (const [len, bytes] of chunks) {
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out.set(len, offset);
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offset += len.length;
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out.set(bytes, offset);
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offset += bytes.length;
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}
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return out;
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}
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async function mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random) {
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const input = canonical([
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MAC_INPUT_PREFIX,
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binding.projectId,
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binding.sessionId,
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issuedAt,
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random
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]);
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const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
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return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, MAC_BYTES));
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}
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async function contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random) {
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const input = canonical([
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CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX,
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binding.projectId,
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binding.sessionId,
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issuedAt,
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random,
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binding.context
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]);
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const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
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return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES));
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}
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function constantTimeEqual(left, right) {
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if (left.length !== right.length) return false;
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let diff = 0;
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for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left.charCodeAt(i) ^ right.charCodeAt(i);
|
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return diff === 0;
|
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}
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/** True when `nonce` is in the signed wire format (not necessarily valid). */
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function isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce) {
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return typeof nonce === "string" && nonce.startsWith(`${NONCE_VERSION}.`);
|
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}
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/**
|
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* Mint a nonce for `binding` at `issuedAtMs`. Throws when `secret` is
|
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* empty — issuing an unsigned value would be indistinguishable from a
|
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* real one on the wire, so the caller must decide to issue nothing.
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*/
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async function issueSignedBeaconNonce(secret, binding, issuedAtMs) {
|
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if (!secret) throw new Error("beacon nonce secret is required to issue a signed nonce");
|
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const issuedAt = Math.floor(issuedAtMs / 1e3).toString(36);
|
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const random = base64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(RANDOM_BYTES)));
|
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return [
|
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NONCE_VERSION,
|
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issuedAt,
|
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random,
|
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|
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await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random),
|
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|
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await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random)
|
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|
+
].join(".");
|
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|
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}
|
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/**
|
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* Verify `nonce` against `binding` as of `nowMs`. Never throws; every
|
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* failure mode is a verdict (see the module doc for why expiry is
|
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|
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* `unverified` rather than `forged`).
|
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|
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*/
|
|
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|
+
async function verifySignedBeaconNonce(secret, binding, nonce, nowMs) {
|
|
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|
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if (!isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce)) return {
|
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|
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verdict: "unverified",
|
|
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|
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reason: "malformed"
|
|
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|
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};
|
|
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|
+
const parts = nonce.split(".");
|
|
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|
+
if (parts.length !== 5 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) return {
|
|
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|
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verdict: "unverified",
|
|
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|
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reason: "malformed"
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
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|
+
const [, issuedAt, random, providedMac, providedContextTag] = parts;
|
|
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|
+
if (!ISSUED_AT_PATTERN.test(issuedAt) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(random) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedMac) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedContextTag)) return {
|
|
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|
+
verdict: "unverified",
|
|
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|
+
reason: "malformed"
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
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|
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if (!secret) return {
|
|
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|
+
verdict: "unverified",
|
|
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|
+
reason: "no_secret"
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
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|
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if (!constantTimeEqual(providedMac, await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) return {
|
|
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|
+
verdict: "forged",
|
|
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|
+
reason: "signature"
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
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|
+
const issuedAtSeconds = parseInt(issuedAt, 36);
|
|
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|
+
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(nowMs / 1e3);
|
|
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|
+
if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAtSeconds)) return {
|
|
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|
+
verdict: "unverified",
|
|
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|
+
reason: "malformed"
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
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|
+
if (issuedAtSeconds - nowSeconds > 60) return {
|
|
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|
+
verdict: "unverified",
|
|
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|
+
reason: "future"
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
234
|
+
if (nowSeconds - issuedAtSeconds > 600) return {
|
|
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|
+
verdict: "unverified",
|
|
236
|
+
reason: "expired"
|
|
237
|
+
};
|
|
238
|
+
if (!constantTimeEqual(providedContextTag, await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) return {
|
|
239
|
+
verdict: "unverified",
|
|
240
|
+
reason: "context"
|
|
241
|
+
};
|
|
242
|
+
return { verdict: "verified" };
|
|
243
|
+
}
|
|
244
|
+
async function handoffTag(secret, projectId, idBytes) {
|
|
245
|
+
const input = canonical([
|
|
246
|
+
HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX,
|
|
247
|
+
projectId,
|
|
248
|
+
base64url(idBytes)
|
|
249
|
+
]);
|
|
250
|
+
const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
|
|
251
|
+
return new Uint8Array(signature, 0, HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES);
|
|
252
|
+
}
|
|
253
|
+
function base64urlDecode(text) {
|
|
254
|
+
const padded = text.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/").padEnd(Math.ceil(text.length / 4) * 4, "=");
|
|
255
|
+
return Uint8Array.from(atob(padded), (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));
|
|
256
|
+
}
|
|
257
|
+
function bytesEqual(left, right) {
|
|
258
|
+
if (left.length !== right.length) return false;
|
|
259
|
+
let diff = 0;
|
|
260
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left[i] ^ right[i];
|
|
261
|
+
return diff === 0;
|
|
262
|
+
}
|
|
263
|
+
async function issueHandoffToken(secret, projectId) {
|
|
264
|
+
if (!secret) throw new Error("beacon nonce secret is required to issue a handoff token");
|
|
265
|
+
const id = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES));
|
|
266
|
+
const token = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32);
|
|
267
|
+
token.set(id, 0);
|
|
268
|
+
token.set(await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id), HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
|
|
269
|
+
return base64url(token);
|
|
270
|
+
}
|
|
271
|
+
const HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{8}$/;
|
|
272
|
+
const HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR = "~";
|
|
273
|
+
function splitHandoffToken(raw) {
|
|
274
|
+
const parts = raw.split(HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR);
|
|
275
|
+
const [token, userHash] = parts;
|
|
276
|
+
if (parts.length > 2 || userHash !== void 0 && !HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN.test(userHash)) return { token: raw };
|
|
277
|
+
return {
|
|
278
|
+
token,
|
|
279
|
+
...userHash === void 0 ? {} : { userHash }
|
|
280
|
+
};
|
|
281
|
+
}
|
|
282
|
+
async function handoffTokenAuthentic(secrets, projectId, token) {
|
|
283
|
+
if (typeof token !== "string" || !HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN.test(token)) return false;
|
|
284
|
+
const bytes = base64urlDecode(token);
|
|
285
|
+
if (bytes.length !== 32) return false;
|
|
286
|
+
if (base64url(bytes) !== token) return false;
|
|
287
|
+
const id = bytes.slice(0, HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
|
|
288
|
+
const providedTag = bytes.slice(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
|
|
289
|
+
return (await Promise.all(secrets.filter((secret) => secret.length > 0).map(async (secret) => bytesEqual(providedTag, await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id))))).includes(true);
|
|
290
|
+
}
|
|
291
|
+
|
|
292
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
293
|
+
export { BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH, BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS, HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN, HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN, beaconNonceContext, handoffTokenAuthentic, isSignedBeaconNonce, issueHandoffToken, issueSignedBeaconNonce, splitHandoffToken, verifySignedBeaconNonce };
|
|
294
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-nonce/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Stateless, client-bound beacon nonce, issued and verified by both the\n * origin (`apps/web/lib/services/nonce.service.ts`) and the beacon-ingest\n * edge Worker.\n *\n * Every pixel/beacon response hands the browser a per-session nonce that its\n * next post must echo. A queue-only edge returns its receipt before the\n * origin has seen the batch, so the nonce cannot depend on origin state:\n * it is an HMAC-SHA256 under a secret shared by origin and edge. The origin\n * verifies it at synchronous ingest, or on replay using the edge's\n * acceptance time as the clock.\n *\n * Web Crypto only (`crypto.subtle`, `crypto.getRandomValues`): this runs\n * unchanged in Cloudflare Workers, Node ≥ 20 and the browser bundle.\n *\n * Wire format (56 chars, inside the schema's 64-char cap):\n *\n * n2.<issuedAt base36 seconds>.<random 8 bytes b64url>.<HMAC 16 bytes b64url>.<ctx tag 8 bytes b64url>\n *\n * The first HMAC binds the format version + project + session + issue time +\n * random. The trailing context tag additionally binds the requester's\n * network prefix and User-Agent (`beaconNonceContext`), so a nonce lifted\n * from one client does not verify from another. The version is inside the\n * MAC, so a nonce cannot be relabelled to dodge the context tag.\n *\n * Verdict semantics — three states, never two:\n * - `verified`: signature matches THIS project+session, the context matches,\n * and it is within TTL.\n * - `forged`: well-formed but the MAC does not match this session/secret.\n * The only outcome that counts as evidence against the client.\n * - `unverified`: nothing could be proven — not signed-format (absent, or\n * a value from before signing existed), expired, from the future, this\n * side has no secret, or the session signature is genuine but the\n * requester's network/User-Agent differs from the one it was issued to (a\n * roaming phone and a replay from elsewhere look the same, so neither is\n * treated as fabrication). Staleness is not forgery: an edge that stopped\n * issuing (secret unset) leaves clients echoing old values, and that must\n * degrade to \"unknown\", never to \"failed\".\n *\n * Any unexpired signature for the session verifies, so a nonce is not\n * single-use within its TTL. Multi-tab sessions need no window at all.\n */\n\nconst NONCE_VERSION = 'n2';\nconst MAC_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:${NONCE_VERSION}`;\nconst CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:ctx:${NONCE_VERSION}`;\nconst RANDOM_BYTES = 8;\nconst MAC_BYTES = 16;\nconst CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES = 8;\nconst MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH = 512;\nconst IPV4_PATTERN = /^(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})$/;\nconst IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/;\n// Each wire part has a closed alphabet and is rejected as malformed before any\n// MAC work when it strays outside it — a nonce is no place for `\\0` or `.`.\nconst ISSUED_AT_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-z]{1,16}$/;\nconst BASE64URL_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;\nconst HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX = 'checkpoint-handoff-token:v1';\nconst HANDOFF_ID_BYTES = 16;\nconst HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES = 16;\n\nexport const HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;\n\n/** How long an issued nonce stays verifiable. */\nexport const BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 10 * 60;\n/** Edge and origin clocks may disagree; a nonce this far \"in the future\" still verifies. */\nexport const BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;\n/** The beacon wire schema's `nonce: z.string().max(64)`. */\nexport const BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = 64;\n\nexport type BeaconNonceVerdict = 'verified' | 'forged' | 'unverified';\n\nexport type BeaconNonceVerification =\n | { verdict: 'verified' }\n | { verdict: 'forged'; reason: 'signature' }\n | {\n verdict: 'unverified';\n reason: 'malformed' | 'expired' | 'future' | 'no_secret' | 'context';\n };\n\nexport interface BeaconNonceBinding {\n projectId: string;\n sessionId: string;\n /** `beaconNonceContext(...)` of the request being issued to or verified. */\n context: string;\n}\n\nfunction ipv4Prefix(ip: string): string | null {\n const match = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(ip);\n return match ? `${match[1]}.${match[2]}.${match[3]}` : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * The first three groups (a /48) of an IPv6 address, expanded so compressed\n * forms agree with their spelled-out equivalents. An IPv4-mapped address\n * (`::ffff:a.b.c.d` or its hex spelling) is a v4 client and keys on its /24.\n * `null` for anything that is not a well-formed address.\n */\nfunction ipv6Prefix(ip: string): string | null {\n const bare = ip.toLowerCase().split('%')[0];\n const lastColon = bare.lastIndexOf(':');\n const embedded = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(bare.slice(lastColon + 1));\n const text = embedded\n ? `${bare.slice(0, lastColon + 1)}${((Number(embedded[1]) << 8) | Number(embedded[2])).toString(16)}:${((Number(embedded[3]) << 8) | Number(embedded[4])).toString(16)}`\n : bare;\n const halves = text.split('::');\n if (halves.length > 2) return null;\n const head = halves[0] ? halves[0].split(':') : [];\n const tail = halves.length === 2 && halves[1] ? halves[1].split(':') : [];\n const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;\n if (halves.length === 1 ? missing !== 0 : missing < 1) return null;\n const groups = [...head, ...Array<string>(halves.length === 2 ? missing : 0).fill('0'), ...tail];\n if (!groups.every((group) => IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN.test(group))) return null;\n const words = groups.map((group) => parseInt(group, 16));\n const mapped = words.slice(0, 5).every((word) => word === 0) && words[5] === 0xffff;\n if (mapped) return `${words[6] >> 8}.${words[6] & 0xff}.${words[7] >> 8}`;\n return words\n .slice(0, 3)\n .map((word) => word.toString(16))\n .join(':');\n}\n\n/**\n * The requester facts a nonce is bound to: the network prefix (IPv4 /24,\n * IPv6 /48, so NAT and DHCP churn inside one access network still verify)\n * and the User-Agent. Empty when neither is known, which binds nothing.\n */\nexport function beaconNonceContext(client: { ip?: string; userAgent?: string }): string {\n const ip = client.ip?.trim() ?? '';\n const prefix = ipv4Prefix(ip) ?? (ip.includes(':') ? ipv6Prefix(ip) : null) ?? '';\n const userAgent = (client.userAgent ?? '').slice(0, MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH);\n return prefix || userAgent ? `${prefix}|${userAgent}` : '';\n}\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder();\n\nconst keyCache = new Map<string, Promise<CryptoKey>>();\n\nfunction hmacKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n let key = keyCache.get(secret);\n if (!key) {\n key = crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n encoder.encode(secret),\n { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n false,\n ['sign']\n );\n keyCache.set(secret, key);\n }\n return key;\n}\n\nfunction base64url(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n let binary = '';\n for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n return btoa(binary).replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Length-prefixed canonical encoding (`<byteLength>:<field>`), never a bare\n * delimiter join: `sessionId` is caller-controlled at the edge, so a value\n * that embeds the delimiter must not be able to shift the field boundaries\n * and re-bind the MAC to another session (Cursor Bugbot, PR #5255).\n */\nfunction canonical(fields: readonly string[]): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n const chunks = fields.map((field) => {\n const bytes = encoder.encode(field);\n return [encoder.encode(`${bytes.length}:`), bytes] as const;\n });\n const total = chunks.reduce((sum, [len, bytes]) => sum + len.length + bytes.length, 0);\n const out = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(total));\n let offset = 0;\n for (const [len, bytes] of chunks) {\n out.set(len, offset);\n offset += len.length;\n out.set(bytes, offset);\n offset += bytes.length;\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nasync function mac(\n secret: string,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n issuedAt: string,\n random: string\n): Promise<string> {\n const input = canonical([\n MAC_INPUT_PREFIX,\n binding.projectId,\n binding.sessionId,\n issuedAt,\n random,\n ]);\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', await hmacKey(secret), input);\n return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, MAC_BYTES));\n}\n\nasync function contextTag(\n secret: string,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n issuedAt: string,\n random: string\n): Promise<string> {\n const input = canonical([\n CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX,\n binding.projectId,\n binding.sessionId,\n issuedAt,\n random,\n binding.context,\n ]);\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', await hmacKey(secret), input);\n return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES));\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqual(left: string, right: string): boolean {\n if (left.length !== right.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left.charCodeAt(i) ^ right.charCodeAt(i);\n return diff === 0;\n}\n\n/** True when `nonce` is in the signed wire format (not necessarily valid). */\nexport function isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce: string | undefined): nonce is string {\n return typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce.startsWith(`${NONCE_VERSION}.`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a nonce for `binding` at `issuedAtMs`. Throws when `secret` is\n * empty — issuing an unsigned value would be indistinguishable from a\n * real one on the wire, so the caller must decide to issue nothing.\n */\nexport async function issueSignedBeaconNonce(\n secret: string,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n issuedAtMs: number\n): Promise<string> {\n if (!secret) throw new Error('beacon nonce secret is required to issue a signed nonce');\n const issuedAt = Math.floor(issuedAtMs / 1000).toString(36);\n const random = base64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(RANDOM_BYTES)));\n return [\n NONCE_VERSION,\n issuedAt,\n random,\n await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random),\n await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random),\n ].join('.');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify `nonce` against `binding` as of `nowMs`. Never throws; every\n * failure mode is a verdict (see the module doc for why expiry is\n * `unverified` rather than `forged`).\n */\nexport async function verifySignedBeaconNonce(\n secret: string | undefined,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n nonce: string | undefined,\n nowMs: number\n): Promise<BeaconNonceVerification> {\n if (!isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce)) return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n const parts = nonce.split('.');\n if (parts.length !== 5 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n }\n const [, issuedAt, random, providedMac, providedContextTag] = parts;\n if (\n !ISSUED_AT_PATTERN.test(issuedAt) ||\n !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(random) ||\n !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedMac) ||\n !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedContextTag)\n ) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n }\n if (!secret) return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'no_secret' };\n\n const expectedMac = await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random);\n if (!constantTimeEqual(providedMac, expectedMac))\n return { verdict: 'forged', reason: 'signature' };\n\n const issuedAtSeconds = parseInt(issuedAt, 36);\n const nowSeconds = Math.floor(nowMs / 1000);\n if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAtSeconds)) return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n if (issuedAtSeconds - nowSeconds > BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'future' };\n }\n if (nowSeconds - issuedAtSeconds > BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'expired' };\n }\n if (!constantTimeEqual(providedContextTag, await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'context' };\n }\n return { verdict: 'verified' };\n}\n\nasync function handoffTag(\n secret: string,\n projectId: string,\n idBytes: Uint8Array\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n const input = canonical([HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX, projectId, base64url(idBytes)]);\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', await hmacKey(secret), input);\n return new Uint8Array(signature, 0, HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES);\n}\n\nfunction base64urlDecode(text: string): Uint8Array {\n const padded = text\n .replace(/-/g, '+')\n .replace(/_/g, '/')\n .padEnd(Math.ceil(text.length / 4) * 4, '=');\n return Uint8Array.from(atob(padded), (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n\nfunction bytesEqual(left: Uint8Array, right: Uint8Array): boolean {\n if (left.length !== right.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left[i] ^ right[i];\n return diff === 0;\n}\n\nexport async function issueHandoffToken(secret: string, projectId: string): Promise<string> {\n if (!secret) throw new Error('beacon nonce secret is required to issue a handoff token');\n const id = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES));\n const token = new Uint8Array(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES + HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES);\n token.set(id, 0);\n token.set(await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id), HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);\n return base64url(token);\n}\n\nexport const HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{8}$/;\nconst HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR = '~';\n\nexport function splitHandoffToken(raw: string): { token: string; userHash?: string } {\n const parts = raw.split(HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR);\n const [token, userHash] = parts;\n if (parts.length > 2 || (userHash !== undefined && !HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN.test(userHash))) {\n return { token: raw };\n }\n return { token, ...(userHash === undefined ? {} : { userHash }) };\n}\n\nexport async function handoffTokenAuthentic(\n secrets: readonly string[],\n projectId: string,\n token: unknown\n): Promise<boolean> {\n if (typeof token !== 'string' || !HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN.test(token)) return false;\n const bytes = base64urlDecode(token);\n if (bytes.length !== HANDOFF_ID_BYTES + HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES) return false;\n if (base64url(bytes) !== token) return false;\n const id = bytes.slice(0, HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);\n const providedTag = bytes.slice(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);\n const matches = await Promise.all(\n secrets\n .filter((secret) => secret.length > 0)\n .map(async (secret) => bytesEqual(providedTag, await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id)))\n );\n return matches.includes(true);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA2CA,MAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,MAAM,mBAAmB,2BAA2B;AACpD,MAAM,uBAAuB,+BAA+B;AAC5D,MAAM,eAAe;AACrB,MAAM,YAAY;AAClB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAC1B,MAAM,gCAAgC;AACtC,MAAM,eAAe;AACrB,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAG3B,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAC1B,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAC1B,MAAM,6BAA6B;AACnC,MAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAE1B,MAAa,wBAAwB;;AAGrC,MAAa,2BAA2B;;AAExC,MAAa,kCAAkC;;AAE/C,MAAa,0BAA0B;AAmBvC,SAAS,WAAW,IAA2B;CAC7C,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,KAAK,EAAE;CAClC,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO;AACzD;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAS,WAAW,IAA2B;CAC7C,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;CACzC,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,YAAY,GAAG;CACtC,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;CAI5D,MAAM,UAHO,WACT,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,KAAM,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,IAAK,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,EAAC,CAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,IAAK,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,IAAK,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,EAAC,CAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MACnK,KACe,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI;CAC9B,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO;CAC9B,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACjD,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACxE,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK;CACvC,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO;CAC9D,MAAM,SAAS;EAAC,GAAG;EAAM,GAAG,MAAc,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG;EAAG,GAAG;CAAI;CAC/F,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO;CACrE,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;CAEvD,IADe,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,OACjE,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,IAAK,GAAG,MAAM,MAAM;CACtE,OAAO,MACJ,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CACX,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAChC,KAAK,GAAG;AACb;;;;;;AAOA,SAAgB,mBAAmB,QAAqD;CACtF,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;CAChC,MAAM,SAAS,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,SAAS;CAC/E,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,aAAa,GAAE,CAAE,MAAM,GAAG,6BAA6B;CACjF,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,cAAc;AAC1D;AAEA,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY;AAEhC,MAAM,2BAAW,IAAI,IAAgC;AAErD,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAoC;CACnD,IAAI,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM;CAC7B,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK;EACR,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAClB,OACA,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,GACrB;GAAE,MAAM;GAAQ,MAAM;EAAU,GAChC,OACA,CAAC,MAAM,CACT;EACA,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;CAC1B;CACA,OAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,UAAU,OAA2B;CAC5C,IAAI,SAAS;CACb,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI;CAC5D,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAC/E;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAS,UAAU,QAAoD;CACrE,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU;EACnC,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK;EAClC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK;CACnD,CAAC;CACD,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;CACrF,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC;CACjD,IAAI,SAAS;CACb,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ;EACjC,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM;EACnB,UAAU,IAAI;EACd,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;EACrB,UAAU,MAAM;CAClB;CACA,OAAO;AACT;AAEA,eAAe,IACb,QACA,SACA,UACA,QACiB;CACjB,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAU;EACtB;EACA,QAAQ;EACR,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;CACF,CAAC;CACD,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;CAC/E,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AAC1D;AAEA,eAAe,WACb,QACA,SACA,UACA,QACiB;CACjB,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAU;EACtB;EACA,QAAQ;EACR,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;EACA,QAAQ;CACV,CAAC;CACD,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;CAC/E,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAClE;AAEA,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAc,OAAwB;CAC/D,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;CACzC,IAAI,OAAO;CACX,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;CACxF,OAAO,SAAS;AAClB;;AAGA,SAAgB,oBAAoB,OAA4C;CAC9E,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,cAAc,EAAE;AAC1E;;;;;;AAOA,eAAsB,uBACpB,QACA,SACA,YACiB;CACjB,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,yDAAyD;CACtF,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa,GAAI,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE;CAC1D,MAAM,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;CAC7E,OAAO;EACL;EACA;EACA;EACA,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,UAAU,MAAM;EAC3C,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,UAAU,MAAM;CACpD,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG;AACZ;;;;;;AAOA,eAAsB,wBACpB,QACA,SACA,OACA,OACkC;CAClC,IAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAY;CACrF,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;CAC7B,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,GAC9D,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAY;CAEtD,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,QAAQ,aAAa,sBAAsB;CAC9D,IACE,CAAC,kBAAkB,KAAK,QAAQ,KAChC,CAAC,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM,KAC9B,CAAC,kBAAkB,KAAK,WAAW,KACnC,CAAC,kBAAkB,KAAK,kBAAkB,GAE1C,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAY;CAEtD,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAY;CAGjE,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,aAAa,MADV,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,UAAU,MAAM,CAChB,GAC7C,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAU,QAAQ;CAAY;CAElD,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS,UAAU,EAAE;CAC7C,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAI;CAC1C,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAY;CAC3F,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBACpB,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAS;CAEnD,IAAI,aAAa,uBACf,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAU;CAEpD,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,oBAAoB,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC,GAC5F,OAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAc,QAAQ;CAAU;CAEpD,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,WAAW;AAC/B;AAEA,eAAe,WACb,QACA,WACA,SACqB;CACrB,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAU;EAAC;EAA4B;EAAW,UAAU,OAAO;CAAC,CAAC;CACnF,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;CAC/E,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG,iBAAiB;AACvD;AAEA,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAA0B;CACjD,MAAM,SAAS,KACZ,QAA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@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ export interface BeaconDispatchTriggers {
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66
66
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untrusted?: boolean;
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67
67
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posture?: boolean;
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68
68
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unload?: boolean;
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69
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+
navigation?: boolean;
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69
70
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}
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70
71
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export interface BeaconConfig {
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72
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projectId: string;
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@@ -77,12 +78,15 @@ export interface BeaconConfig {
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77
78
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debug?: boolean;
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78
79
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logLevel?: 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug';
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79
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respectDoNotTrack?: boolean;
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81
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+
requireConsent?: boolean;
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80
82
|
anonymizeIp?: boolean;
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81
83
|
stripUrlFragment?: boolean;
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scrubQueryParams?: string[];
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85
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dropQueryParams?: boolean;
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sessionTimeout?: number;
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sessionCookieName?: string;
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+
browserSessionId?: string;
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+
onReceipt?: (receipt: BeaconReceipt) => void;
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90
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batchSize?: number;
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91
|
flushInterval?: number;
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evidenceGrowthFactor?: number;
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@@ -202,6 +206,9 @@ export interface TransportOptions {
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202
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priority?: 'low' | 'normal' | 'high' | 'critical';
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207
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retry?: boolean;
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208
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timeout?: number;
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+
publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
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210
|
+
deviceId?: string;
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+
handoffToken?: string;
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212
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}
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export interface TransportResponse {
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success: boolean;
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@@ -390,15 +397,33 @@ export interface OfflineQueueEntry {
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397
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retryCount: number;
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398
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size: number;
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392
399
|
}
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400
|
+
export interface EcPublicJwk {
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401
|
+
kty: 'EC';
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402
|
+
crv: 'P-256';
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403
|
+
x: string;
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404
|
+
y: string;
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|
405
|
+
}
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406
|
+
export interface BeaconReceipt {
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407
|
+
sessionId?: string;
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408
|
+
browserSessionId: string;
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409
|
+
posture?: {
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410
|
+
token: string;
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411
|
+
expiresAt: number;
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412
|
+
};
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413
|
+
postureStatus?: string;
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|
414
|
+
}
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393
415
|
export interface BeaconBatch {
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|
394
416
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projectId: string;
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|
395
417
|
events: BeaconEvent[];
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|
396
418
|
sessionId: string;
|
|
419
|
+
handoffToken?: string;
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|
420
|
+
deviceId?: string;
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|
397
421
|
batchId: string;
|
|
398
422
|
timestamp: number;
|
|
399
423
|
anonymizeIp?: boolean;
|
|
400
424
|
nonce?: string;
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|
401
425
|
nonceEcho?: boolean;
|
|
426
|
+
publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
|
|
402
427
|
}
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|
403
428
|
export interface BeaconCollectorData {
|
|
404
429
|
userAgent?: string;
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@@ -449,6 +474,21 @@ export declare class AgentShieldBeacon implements IAgentShieldBeacon {
|
|
|
449
474
|
destroy(): Promise<void>;
|
|
450
475
|
}
|
|
451
476
|
export declare const BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH = 100;
|
|
477
|
+
export declare const SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS = 21600000;
|
|
478
|
+
export declare const BEACON_MAX_BATCH_ID_LENGTH = 255;
|
|
479
|
+
export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CONTRACT_VERSION = 1;
|
|
480
|
+
export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CAPABILITIES: readonly ["batch-replay-v1", "receipt-status-v1", "receipt-posture-v1"];
|
|
452
481
|
export declare const POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS = 120;
|
|
482
|
+
export interface CachedPosture {
|
|
483
|
+
token: string;
|
|
484
|
+
expiresAt: number;
|
|
485
|
+
}
|
|
486
|
+
export interface PostureAnswer {
|
|
487
|
+
posture?: CachedPosture;
|
|
488
|
+
postureStatus?: string;
|
|
489
|
+
sessionId?: string;
|
|
490
|
+
answeredAtMs?: number;
|
|
491
|
+
}
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export declare function parsePostureAnswer(value: unknown): PostureAnswer;
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//#endregion
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//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.mts.map
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@@ -1 +1 @@
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1
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-
{"version":3,"file":"index.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-types/index.ts"],"mappings":";YAOY;YACA,YAAY,gBAAgB;GAAiB,cAAc;;YAC3D,kBAAkB;YAClB,kBAAkB;YAClB,mBAAmB,eAAe;YAClC,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;YACtC;
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1
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+
{"version":3,"file":"index.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-types/index.ts"],"mappings":";YAOY;YACA,YAAY,gBAAgB;GAAiB,cAAc;;YAC3D,kBAAkB;YAClB,kBAAkB;YAClB,mBAAmB,eAAe;YAClC,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;YACtC;wBA4KI,iBAAiB,iBAAiB,SAAS;iBA+C1C,+BAA+B;EAC9C;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe,wCAAwC;EACvD,aAAa;EACb,gBAAgB;EAChB,mBAAmB;EACnB;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe,iCAAiC;EAChD;EACA;IACE;;;iBAIa;EACf,gBAAgB;EAChB,aAAa;;iBAGE,+BAA+B;EAC9C;IACE,aACE,cACA;MACE,mBAAmB;MACnB,gBAAgB;QAEjB;;;iBAIU;EACf;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe,8BAA8B;EAC7C,SAAS;EACT,uCAAuC;;iBAGxB,oCAAoC;EACnD;EACA;;iBAiBe;EAKf;;iBAIe;EAEf;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EASA;;iBAGe;EAEf;EAOA,WAAW;EAaX;EAGA;EAGA,OAAO;EAQP;EAOA;EAOA;EAOA;EASA;EAOA;EAcA;EAcA;EAUA;EAMA;EASA;EAWA;EASA,aAAa,SAAS;EAOtB;EASA;EAUA;EAUA;EAOA,WAAW;EAkBX;EAUA;EAWA;EAUA;EASA;EAMA;EAWA;EAOA;EAOA;EAOA;EASA;EAUA;EAMA;EAQA;EAOA,eAAe;EAEf;;iBAOe;EAEf,MAAM;EAGN,MAAM;EAGN,UAAU;;iBAGK;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA,WAAW;GAGV;;iBAOc;EAIf,QAAQ,mBAAmB,OAAO,gBAAgB;EAKlD,WAAW,mBAAmB,YAAY,gBAAgB;EAK1D,cAAc,WAAW,gBAAgB;EAKzC,mBAAmB;EAKnB,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ;EAK9B,WAAW;;iBAOI;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;IACE;IACA;;;iBAQa;EAEf;IACE;IACA;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;IACA;;;iBAQa;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;IACA;;;iBAQa;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;;iBAOe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAEA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,YAAY;EACZ;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;iBAUK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;YAOU;YACA;YAWA;YAQA;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA,UAAU;EACV;EACA;EACA,WAAW;EACX;;YAGU;YAUA;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,cAAc;EACd;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf,MAAM;EACN;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,UAAU;;iBAGK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;;EAEF;IACE;IACA;;;iBAIa;EACf;EACA;EACA,MAAM;EACN;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;IACE;IACA;IACA;;EAEF;IACE;IACA;;EAEF;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;;EAEF;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,gBAAgB;EAChB;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;YAWA;iBAEK;EACf,MAAM;EACN,OAAO;EACP,UAAU;EACV;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAWA;;iBAOe;EACf;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAOe;EACf;EACA,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAUe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAIe;EAOf;EAKA;EAEA;IAAY;IAAe;;EAE3B;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EAIA,YAAY;;iBAGG;EAEf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAGA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAGA;EACA;GAGC;;YAGS;wBAaI,mBAAmB,iBAAiB;wBAWpC,0BAA0B,iBAAiB;wBAS3C,uBAAuB,iBAAiB;wBA2BxC,yBAAyB,iBAAiB;wBA8C1C,mBAAmB,iBAAiB;wBAkBpC,iBAAiB,iBAAiB;wBAclC,sBAAsB,iBAAiB;wBAcvC,mBAAmB,iBAAiB;qBAUvC;gBAAA;;qBAIA;gBAAA;;wBAIG,wBAAwB,iBAAiB;wBAiCzC,kBACd,gBACA,UAAU,2BACT;qBA6HkB,6BAA6B;EACpC,YAAA,QAAQ;EACpB,QAAQ,mBAAmB,OAAO,gBAAgB;EAClD,WAAW,mBAAmB,YAAY,gBAAgB;EAC1D,cAAc,WAAW,gBAAgB;EACzC,mBAAmB;EACnB,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ;EAC9B,WAAW;;qBAQA;qBAEA;qBACA;qBAEA;qBAEA;qBAWA;iBAEI;EACf;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf,UAAU;EACV;EACA;EACA;;wBAGc,mBAAmB,iBAAiB"}
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@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ export interface BeaconDispatchTriggers {
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66
66
|
untrusted?: boolean;
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67
67
|
posture?: boolean;
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68
68
|
unload?: boolean;
|
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69
|
+
navigation?: boolean;
|
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70
|
}
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70
71
|
export interface BeaconConfig {
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72
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projectId: string;
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@@ -77,12 +78,15 @@ export interface BeaconConfig {
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78
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debug?: boolean;
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79
|
logLevel?: 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug';
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79
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|
respectDoNotTrack?: boolean;
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81
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+
requireConsent?: boolean;
|
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82
|
anonymizeIp?: boolean;
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83
|
stripUrlFragment?: boolean;
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scrubQueryParams?: string[];
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83
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dropQueryParams?: boolean;
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|
sessionTimeout?: number;
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85
87
|
sessionCookieName?: string;
|
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88
|
+
browserSessionId?: string;
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89
|
+
onReceipt?: (receipt: BeaconReceipt) => void;
|
|
86
90
|
batchSize?: number;
|
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87
91
|
flushInterval?: number;
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88
92
|
evidenceGrowthFactor?: number;
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@@ -202,6 +206,9 @@ export interface TransportOptions {
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priority?: 'low' | 'normal' | 'high' | 'critical';
|
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207
|
retry?: boolean;
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208
|
timeout?: number;
|
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209
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+
publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
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210
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+
deviceId?: string;
|
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211
|
+
handoffToken?: string;
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205
212
|
}
|
|
206
213
|
export interface TransportResponse {
|
|
207
214
|
success: boolean;
|
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@@ -390,15 +397,33 @@ export interface OfflineQueueEntry {
|
|
|
390
397
|
retryCount: number;
|
|
391
398
|
size: number;
|
|
392
399
|
}
|
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400
|
+
export interface EcPublicJwk {
|
|
401
|
+
kty: 'EC';
|
|
402
|
+
crv: 'P-256';
|
|
403
|
+
x: string;
|
|
404
|
+
y: string;
|
|
405
|
+
}
|
|
406
|
+
export interface BeaconReceipt {
|
|
407
|
+
sessionId?: string;
|
|
408
|
+
browserSessionId: string;
|
|
409
|
+
posture?: {
|
|
410
|
+
token: string;
|
|
411
|
+
expiresAt: number;
|
|
412
|
+
};
|
|
413
|
+
postureStatus?: string;
|
|
414
|
+
}
|
|
393
415
|
export interface BeaconBatch {
|
|
394
416
|
projectId: string;
|
|
395
417
|
events: BeaconEvent[];
|
|
396
418
|
sessionId: string;
|
|
419
|
+
handoffToken?: string;
|
|
420
|
+
deviceId?: string;
|
|
397
421
|
batchId: string;
|
|
398
422
|
timestamp: number;
|
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399
423
|
anonymizeIp?: boolean;
|
|
400
424
|
nonce?: string;
|
|
401
425
|
nonceEcho?: boolean;
|
|
426
|
+
publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
|
|
402
427
|
}
|
|
403
428
|
export interface BeaconCollectorData {
|
|
404
429
|
userAgent?: string;
|
|
@@ -449,6 +474,21 @@ export declare class AgentShieldBeacon implements IAgentShieldBeacon {
|
|
|
449
474
|
destroy(): Promise<void>;
|
|
450
475
|
}
|
|
451
476
|
export declare const BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH = 100;
|
|
477
|
+
export declare const SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS = 21600000;
|
|
478
|
+
export declare const BEACON_MAX_BATCH_ID_LENGTH = 255;
|
|
479
|
+
export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CONTRACT_VERSION = 1;
|
|
480
|
+
export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CAPABILITIES: readonly ["batch-replay-v1", "receipt-status-v1", "receipt-posture-v1"];
|
|
452
481
|
export declare const POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS = 120;
|
|
482
|
+
export interface CachedPosture {
|
|
483
|
+
token: string;
|
|
484
|
+
expiresAt: number;
|
|
485
|
+
}
|
|
486
|
+
export interface PostureAnswer {
|
|
487
|
+
posture?: CachedPosture;
|
|
488
|
+
postureStatus?: string;
|
|
489
|
+
sessionId?: string;
|
|
490
|
+
answeredAtMs?: number;
|
|
491
|
+
}
|
|
492
|
+
export declare function parsePostureAnswer(value: unknown): PostureAnswer;
|
|
453
493
|
//#endregion
|
|
454
494
|
//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-types/index.ts"],"mappings":";YAOY;YACA,YAAY,gBAAgB;GAAiB,cAAc;;YAC3D,kBAAkB;YAClB,kBAAkB;YAClB,mBAAmB,eAAe;YAClC,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;YACtC;
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-types/index.ts"],"mappings":";YAOY;YACA,YAAY,gBAAgB;GAAiB,cAAc;;YAC3D,kBAAkB;YAClB,kBAAkB;YAClB,mBAAmB,eAAe;YAClC,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;YACtC;wBA4KI,iBAAiB,iBAAiB,SAAS;iBA+C1C,+BAA+B;EAC9C;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe,wCAAwC;EACvD,aAAa;EACb,gBAAgB;EAChB,mBAAmB;EACnB;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe,iCAAiC;EAChD;EACA;IACE;;;iBAIa;EACf,gBAAgB;EAChB,aAAa;;iBAGE,+BAA+B;EAC9C;IACE,aACE,cACA;MACE,mBAAmB;MACnB,gBAAgB;QAEjB;;;iBAIU;EACf;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe,8BAA8B;EAC7C,SAAS;EACT,uCAAuC;;iBAGxB,oCAAoC;EACnD;EACA;;iBAiBe;EAKf;;iBAIe;EAEf;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EASA;;iBAGe;EAEf;EAOA,WAAW;EAaX;EAGA;EAGA,OAAO;EAQP;EAOA;EAOA;EAOA;EASA;EAOA;EAcA;EAcA;EAUA;EAMA;EASA;EAWA;EASA,aAAa,SAAS;EAOtB;EASA;EAUA;EAUA;EAOA,WAAW;EAkBX;EAUA;EAWA;EAUA;EASA;EAMA;EAWA;EAOA;EAOA;EAOA;EASA;EAUA;EAMA;EAQA;EAOA,eAAe;EAEf;;iBAOe;EAEf,MAAM;EAGN,MAAM;EAGN,UAAU;;iBAGK;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA,WAAW;GAGV;;iBAOc;EAIf,QAAQ,mBAAmB,OAAO,gBAAgB;EAKlD,WAAW,mBAAmB,YAAY,gBAAgB;EAK1D,cAAc,WAAW,gBAAgB;EAKzC,mBAAmB;EAKnB,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ;EAK9B,WAAW;;iBAOI;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;IACE;IACA;;;iBAQa;EAEf;IACE;IACA;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;;EAIF;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;IACA;;;iBAQa;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;IACA;;;iBAQa;EAEf;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;EAGA;;iBAOe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAEA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,YAAY;EACZ;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;iBAUK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;YAOU;YACA;YAWA;YAQA;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA,UAAU;EACV;EACA;EACA,WAAW;EACX;;YAGU;YAUA;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,cAAc;EACd;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf,MAAM;EACN;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,UAAU;;iBAGK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;;EAEF;IACE;IACA;;;iBAIa;EACf;EACA;EACA,MAAM;EACN;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;IACE;IACA;IACA;;EAEF;IACE;IACA;;EAEF;IACE;IACA;IACA;IACA;;EAEF;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,gBAAgB;EAChB;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;YAWA;iBAEK;EACf,MAAM;EACN,OAAO;EACP,UAAU;EACV;EACA;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAWA;;iBAOe;EACf;EACA;EACA;;YAGU;iBAEK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAOe;EACf;EACA,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAUe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;;iBAIe;EAOf;EAKA;EAEA;IAAY;IAAe;;EAE3B;;iBAGe;EACf;EACA,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAEA;EAEA;EAEA;EAIA,YAAY;;iBAGG;EAEf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAGA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EAGA;EACA;GAGC;;YAGS;wBAaI,mBAAmB,iBAAiB;wBAWpC,0BAA0B,iBAAiB;wBAS3C,uBAAuB,iBAAiB;wBA2BxC,yBAAyB,iBAAiB;wBA8C1C,mBAAmB,iBAAiB;wBAkBpC,iBAAiB,iBAAiB;wBAclC,sBAAsB,iBAAiB;wBAcvC,mBAAmB,iBAAiB;qBAUvC;gBAAA;;qBAIA;gBAAA;;wBAIG,wBAAwB,iBAAiB;wBAiCzC,kBACd,gBACA,UAAU,2BACT;qBA6HkB,6BAA6B;EACpC,YAAA,QAAQ;EACpB,QAAQ,mBAAmB,OAAO,gBAAgB;EAClD,WAAW,mBAAmB,YAAY,gBAAgB;EAC1D,cAAc,WAAW,gBAAgB;EACzC,mBAAmB;EACnB,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ;EAC9B,WAAW;;qBAQA;qBAEA;qBACA;qBAEA;qBAEA;qBAWA;iBAEI;EACf;EACA;;iBAGe;EACf,UAAU;EACV;EACA;EACA;;wBAGc,mBAAmB,iBAAiB"}
|