@kya-os/checkpoint-shared 1.5.1 → 1.6.0

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Files changed (161) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +217 -0
  2. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.mts +36 -0
  3. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  4. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts +36 -0
  5. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  6. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.js +305 -0
  7. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.mjs +294 -0
  8. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  9. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts +40 -0
  10. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts +40 -0
  12. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/beacon-types/index.js +53 -5
  14. package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs +49 -6
  15. package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  16. package/dist/browser-posture-BuChqmH5.d.mts +169 -0
  17. package/dist/browser-posture-BuChqmH5.d.mts.map +1 -0
  18. package/dist/browser-posture-DIaVLuW3.d.ts +169 -0
  19. package/dist/browser-posture-DIaVLuW3.d.ts.map +1 -0
  20. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.mts +4 -2
  21. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.mts.map +1 -0
  22. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.ts +4 -2
  23. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.ts.map +1 -0
  24. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.mjs.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.mts +18 -0
  26. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.mts.map +1 -0
  27. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.ts +18 -0
  28. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.ts.map +1 -0
  29. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.js +66 -0
  30. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.mjs +63 -0
  31. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.mjs.map +1 -0
  32. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts +59 -2
  33. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts +59 -2
  35. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/browser-posture-report.js +1 -1
  37. package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs +1 -1
  38. package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs.map +1 -1
  39. package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts +2 -85
  40. package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts +2 -85
  41. package/dist/browser-posture.js +207 -45
  42. package/dist/browser-posture.mjs +195 -45
  43. package/dist/browser-posture.mjs.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/browser.d.mts +0 -8
  45. package/dist/browser.d.mts.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/browser.d.ts +0 -8
  47. package/dist/browser.d.ts.map +1 -1
  48. package/dist/browser.js +1 -1
  49. package/dist/browser.mjs +1 -1
  50. package/dist/browser.mjs.map +1 -1
  51. package/dist/clearance.d.mts +1 -1
  52. package/dist/clearance.d.ts +1 -1
  53. package/dist/clearance.js +2 -2
  54. package/dist/clearance.mjs +2 -2
  55. package/dist/{client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs → client-ip-B2Xeo-GK.mjs} +2 -2
  56. package/dist/{client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs.map → client-ip-B2Xeo-GK.mjs.map} +1 -1
  57. package/dist/{client-ip-1y2iXAYW.js → client-ip-CW6pRyLf.js} +1 -1
  58. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.mts +41 -0
  59. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.mts.map +1 -0
  60. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.ts +41 -0
  61. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
  62. package/dist/consent-handoff.js +1 -0
  63. package/dist/consent-handoff.mjs +2 -0
  64. package/dist/consent-handoff.mjs.map +1 -0
  65. package/dist/errors/index.d.mts +155 -0
  66. package/dist/errors/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/errors/index.d.ts +155 -0
  68. package/dist/errors/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  69. package/dist/errors/index.js +513 -9
  70. package/dist/errors/index.mjs +513 -10
  71. package/dist/errors/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  72. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.mts} +2 -2
  73. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts.map → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.mts.map} +1 -1
  74. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.ts} +2 -2
  75. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts.map → external-B7WI9FyQ.d.ts.map} +1 -1
  76. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.mts +1 -1
  77. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.ts +1 -1
  78. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.js +2 -2
  79. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.mjs +2 -2
  80. package/dist/index.d.mts +6375 -1532
  81. package/dist/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  82. package/dist/index.d.ts +6375 -1532
  83. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  84. package/dist/index.js +5629 -697
  85. package/dist/index.mjs +5341 -683
  86. package/dist/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  87. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts +1 -1
  88. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  89. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts +1 -1
  90. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  91. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.js +58 -49
  92. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs +58 -49
  93. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  94. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.mts +3 -2
  95. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  96. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.ts +3 -2
  97. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  98. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.mts +41 -0
  99. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  100. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.ts +41 -0
  101. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  102. package/dist/posture-origins/index.js +441 -0
  103. package/dist/posture-origins/index.mjs +430 -0
  104. package/dist/posture-origins/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  105. package/dist/posture-origins-LFkX80oF.js +627 -0
  106. package/dist/posture-origins-Pn-ii-Pp.mjs +533 -0
  107. package/dist/posture-origins-Pn-ii-Pp.mjs.map +1 -0
  108. package/dist/{project-verification-key-CgSVX9_m.mjs → project-verification-key-66N4edKn.mjs} +2 -2
  109. package/dist/{project-verification-key-CgSVX9_m.mjs.map → project-verification-key-66N4edKn.mjs.map} +1 -1
  110. package/dist/{project-verification-key-C3L5rd8a.js → project-verification-key-BccT12tQ.js} +1 -1
  111. package/dist/rules.json +0 -1
  112. package/dist/{schemas-DxY-dk9y.mjs → schemas-7qodsG-Z.mjs} +49 -2
  113. package/dist/schemas-7qodsG-Z.mjs.map +1 -0
  114. package/dist/{schemas-BmjNLAE7.js → schemas-YhagYDx_.js} +59 -0
  115. package/dist/signals/index.d.mts +75 -55
  116. package/dist/signals/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  117. package/dist/signals/index.d.ts +75 -55
  118. package/dist/signals/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  119. package/dist/signals/index.js +246 -2
  120. package/dist/signals/index.mjs +236 -3
  121. package/dist/signals/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  122. package/fixtures/browser-integrity/captured-java-0.2.1-missing-score.json +10 -0
  123. package/fixtures/browser-integrity/null-score.json +11 -0
  124. package/fixtures/browser-integrity/numeric-score.json +11 -0
  125. package/fixtures/browser-posture-claims.json +168 -0
  126. package/fixtures/browser-posture-headers.json +6 -0
  127. package/fixtures/cli-registration.v2.json +115 -0
  128. package/fixtures/detection/reason-codes.json +1 -1
  129. package/fixtures/kya-http/README.md +34 -25
  130. package/fixtures/kya-http/consent-handoff.codes.json +34 -0
  131. package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.full.json +14 -5
  132. package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.invalid-issuer.json +51 -0
  133. package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.no-issuer.json +32 -0
  134. package/fixtures/reviewer-grant-revocation.v1.json +285 -0
  135. package/fixtures/workbench/a2a-signed-request.v1.json +255 -0
  136. package/fixtures/workbench/artifact-bindings.v1.json +1003 -0
  137. package/fixtures/workbench/delegation-management.v1.json +507 -0
  138. package/fixtures/workbench/didcomm-task-source.v1.json +191 -0
  139. package/fixtures/workbench/graph-interfaces.v1.json +1887 -0
  140. package/fixtures/workbench/identity-provisioning.v1.json +643 -0
  141. package/fixtures/workbench/linear-installation.v1.json +484 -0
  142. package/fixtures/workbench/management-session.v1.json +716 -0
  143. package/fixtures/workbench/model-credentials.v1.json +630 -0
  144. package/fixtures/workbench/source-claim-pooled.v1.json +50 -0
  145. package/fixtures/workbench/task-grant.v1.json +695 -0
  146. package/fixtures/workbench/task-status-projection.v1.json +591 -0
  147. package/fixtures/workbench/workload-enrollment.v1.json +580 -0
  148. package/package.json +24 -5
  149. package/src/data/compiled/merged-rules.json +2 -9
  150. package/src/data/default-rules.json +0 -1
  151. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts +0 -5
  152. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts.map +0 -1
  153. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts +0 -5
  154. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts.map +0 -1
  155. package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts.map +0 -1
  156. package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts.map +0 -1
  157. package/dist/patterns-CkRVOdtV.js +0 -243
  158. package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs +0 -173
  159. package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs.map +0 -1
  160. package/dist/schemas-DxY-dk9y.mjs.map +0 -1
  161. package/fixtures/kya-http/protected-resource-metadata.global.json +0 -28
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,222 @@
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1
  # @kya-os/checkpoint-shared
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2
 
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+ ## Unreleased - `CheckpointEvents` moves here; `AGENTSHIELD_WASM_PATH` is removed
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+
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+ - **Added:** `CheckpointEvents`, the event-handler map the Checkpoint SDKs accept, moved from `@kya-os/checkpoint`.
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+ `@kya-os/checkpoint-nextjs` types its `events` option with it, so it no longer depends on `@kya-os/checkpoint`.
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+ - **Removed:** `DEFAULT_ENV_VARS.AGENTSHIELD_WASM_PATH`, the path to the retired `agentshield_wasm` binary.
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+ Nothing reads it.
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+ Shipped under a minor because nothing consumes it yet.
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+
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+ RELEASE ORDER: publish this first; the `@kya-os/checkpoint-nextjs` release that drops `@kya-os/checkpoint` needs `CheckpointEvents`.
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+
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+ ## Unreleased - zero-evidence requests and the `no_evidence` policy category
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+
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+ The engine now sends a zero-evidence request as `IncompleteData` with `metadata.detection_basis = "no_evidence"`, and
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+ composed policies see it as the category `no_evidence`. `withNoEvidenceExclusion(cedar)` is the serve-time rewrite that
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+ makes such a visitor read as `human` in a deployed rule: in each `forbid` or `permit` statement it replaces every read of
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+ the category, ignoring text in strings and comments, with
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+ `(if <read> == "no_evidence" then "human" else <read>)`, where `<read>` is the read as written. A direct read of the
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+ category is rewritten: `principal.category`, `principal["category"]`, the same with the principal in parentheses
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+ (`(principal).category`, `((principal))["category"]`), and a bracket key written with escapes
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+ (`principal["cat\u{65}gory"]`, `\x65` or an underscored `\u{6_5}`), with whitespace or a `//` comment between any of
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+ the tokens. A statement that reads the category through a computed value holding the principal, such as an `if` or a record that carries
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+ `principal` (`(if c then principal else principal).category`, `{p: principal}.p.category`), is left as written and sees
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+ `no_evidence`. A `principal` that is an attribute name or a record key (`context has principal`, `{principal: x}`) is
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+ never rewritten, so the output is valid Cedar whenever the input is. Apart from those computed reads, a statement is left byte-identical only when it compares the principal's category to the literal
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+ `"no_evidence"`: with `==` or `!=`, with the literal on either side, through any of those reads; with `like`, only when a
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+ segment of the pattern, split on `*`, spells the whole name and the pattern can match it (`"no_evidence*"` and `"*no_evidence"`
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+ do, `"no_*"` and `"*evidence"` do not); as a member of a list passed to `.contains(...)`, `.containsAny(...)` or
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+ `.containsAll(...)` with the category on the other side, with a trailing comma allowed. A literal written with escapes
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+ counts. The word `no_evidence` anywhere else in a statement, such as `resource.path != "/no_evidence"` or
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+ `principal.name == "no_evidence"`, does not exempt it. Text that already carries the rewrite comes back unchanged.
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+ Whitespace is exactly the 25 characters of Unicode `White_Space` that the Cedar 4.12.0 lexer accepts (U+0009 to U+000D,
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+ U+0020, U+0085, U+00A0, U+1680, U+2000 to U+200A, U+2028, U+2029, U+202F, U+205F, U+3000), not the JavaScript `\s` class, and a
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+ `//` comment ends only at a line feed or a carriage return, so a lone `\r` ends one. The dashboard serves the stored policy
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+ text, so a release that predates the rewrite reads it as before; `@kya-os/checkpoint-wasm-runtime` and the .NET and Java
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+ SDKs apply it inside the compile, which
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+ their caches run once per distinct policy text on a miss and not on a hit, so text from a custom fetcher behaves the same
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+ at no per-request cost. The three implementations scan in linear time and are tested against one shared vector file.
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+ The inverse, `withoutNoEvidenceExclusion`, is internal to the package and not exported: `requiredScopesForRequest`,
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+ `approvalQuorumForRequest` and the deny-rule analysis read the `@scopes`, `@approvers` and `@quorum` annotations and the
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+ rule bodies from the text with the rewrite undone, and memoize that text per source, so a rule means the same whether or
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+ not it was served rewritten. New exports: `withNoEvidenceExclusion`, `NO_EVIDENCE_CATEGORY` (`no_evidence`),
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+ `NO_EVIDENCE_EXCLUSION_TERM` (`principal.category != "no_evidence"`) and `NO_EVIDENCE_EQUALITY_TERM`
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+ (`principal.category == "no_evidence"`).
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+
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+ The deny-rule checks now parse each Cedar condition and evaluate each statement for a `human` and a `no_evidence` visitor
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+ instead of scanning the text, and ignore text inside strings and comments: `isUnnarrowedDenyBlock`,
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+ `pathHasUnnarrowedDenyRule` and `lintUnnarrowedDenyRules` can report different results for the same policy, and the lint
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+ messages now mention `no_evidence` visitors. A statement the rewrite changes is evaluated with a `no_evidence` visitor
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+ read as `human`, and one it leaves alone is evaluated literally, so the analysis matches what is served. A
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+ comparison, set call or `like` that mentions the class being probed is evaluated with the category read as a value
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+ that names no class, so it decides the rule only through the rest of the condition; a `like` mentions a class only
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+ when a segment of its pattern spells the whole name and the pattern matches it; and `if ... then ... else` is
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+ evaluated three-valued. A rule that reads `getTag` is undecided, because Cedar fails closed when the tag is absent;
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+ escaped entity ids in a rule's principal scope are decoded; the unnamed-category placeholder is a lone surrogate, which
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+ no Cedar string literal can hold; and a lint finding names the visitors a rule reaches (humans, zero-evidence visitors,
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+ or both). A condition the
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+ parser cannot read, or one nested or chained more than 48 deep, is treated as undecidable and counts as reaching the
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+ visitor; a set that holds a set is read as unknown. Set membership, `containsAny`, `containsAll` and set equality run in
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+ linear time, and a lint finding's line number is found in one pass over the text. A `forbid` statement that carries
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+ `@verdict("ALLOW")` counts as a deny like any other, a `containsAny` between the category and a list is read like
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+ `.contains`, and an annotation named `forbid` or `permit` never starts a statement. New exports:
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+ `analyzePolicySource(cedar)`, which parses the policy once and returns a `PolicyHazardAnalysis` (also exported) whose
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+ `unnarrowedDenyFor(path, probe)`, `explicitDenyFor(path, probe)`, `humanHazard(path)`, `noEvidenceHazard(path)` and
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+ `noEvidenceNamed(path)` (a rule names `no_evidence` on the path) answer
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+ per path without parsing again; `pathHasUnnarrowedDenyRuleFor(cedar, path, probe)` and
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+ `pathHasExplicitDenyRuleFor(cedar, path, probe)` (`probe` is the new `ProbeClass`, `human` or `no_evidence`), which
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+ parse on every call; `lintMissingBaselinePermit` (warns when a policy has no baseline permit, so unmatched visitors are
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+ denied), `parseCedarStatements`, `statementApplies(statement, facts)` and `statementId`; and `ByteBoundedMemo`, a map that
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+ evicts its oldest entries to stay under a byte budget and does not keep a value larger than the budget, which the gateway
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+ worker uses to memoize one analysis per policy hash. A `like` pattern is now matched segment by segment, split on `*`, with `\*` read as a literal
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+ star, instead of by a regular expression built from the policy text, and `pathLiteralMatches` splits a path literal on `*`
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+ and matches the segments the same way, with the same results.
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+
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+ `AdminOrganizationSessionAnalytics.comparison` gains the optional `incompleteDataSessions`, the `incomplete_data`
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+ sessions that complete the split beside AI agent, bot and human. A client that constructs the type does not have to set
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+ it, and one that ignores unknown fields is unaffected. The optional `incompleteDataPercentage` joins the admin session
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+ comparison (`SessionComparison`) the same way; `DashboardStatsResponse` gains an optional
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+ `sessionBreakdown { botSessions, humanSessions, incompleteDataSessions }`, and `AnalyticsOverview` gains
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+ `uniqueIncompleteDataSessions`. `ShopifyStatsResponseSchema` gains the optional `unidentifiedSessions`: sessions with no
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+ AI agent, bot or human detection and at least one incomplete-data detection carrying the `no_evidence` basis. Those
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+ visitors were counted as human before, including a visit that also sent a request with suspicious headers, so they are
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+ counted in `totalRequests` and `humanSessions`; sessions whose incomplete data all comes from other reasons, such as
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+ suspicious headers, are in no counter.
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+
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+ ### Security
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+
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+ `verifySignedApprovalQuorum` now checks a grant's `approverDid` against `quorum.approvers` before it resolves the
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+ approver's key. Before, it resolved the request-supplied DID first and checked the allowlist after, so a did:web
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+ `approverDid` made the host fetch a URL the caller chose. A grant from an approver outside the list is dropped as
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+ before and the result is unchanged (`quorum_not_met:k/n`); it just never reaches the `ApproverKeyResolver`.
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+ `verifyApprovalGrant` on its own still resolves whatever DID it is given, so a caller with an allowlist must check it
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+ first.
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+
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+ ## 1.5.2
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+
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+ ### Changed
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+
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+ `requestPresentedCredential(headers)` identifies KYA signatures, delegation-proof headers, and structurally recognized VC-JWTs. Opaque bearer tokens and unrelated JWTs do not count as delegation credentials. The helper only selects when callers resolve configured trusted roots; the engine verifies credential claims and trust chains.
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+
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+ ### Changed
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+
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+ - `PolicyFetcher` can expose fast origin failures as `POLICY_UNAVAILABLE` with
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+ `throwOnUnavailable`; its default continues to return `DEFAULT_POLICY` on
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+ ordinary fetch errors.
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+
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+ `BrowserPostureSchema` gains an optional `detection` claim (`class` `ai_agent` or `bot`, `name` of 1 to 64 characters with no control characters, integer `confidence` 0 to 100); a malformed claim makes the token `invalid-claims`. `postureUpgrade(posture)` returns the reader upgrade with first-match precedence: `detection`, `automation_disclosed`, an `agent-driven` verdict, then `automation_corroborated`. `KNOWN_AGENT_PATTERNS` adds `meta-muse` (`Meta Muse`).
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+
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+ `computeSessionFingerprintHash` keeps its published behavior and nothing in this
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+ repo calls it any more; use `computeDeviceFingerprint`. The new
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+ function hashes only the client attributes `CLIENT_ATTRIBUTE_CLASSIFICATION`
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+ marks `include` (stable device properties every browser lane emits, and the
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+ persistent `device.id`; never counters, timings, probe verdicts or lazy-chunk
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+ attributes), folds synonymous names such as `platform.timezone` onto
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+ `browser.timezone` first, and returns a different digest for the same
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+ attributes, so a stored old digest never equals a new one. New exports:
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+ `CLIENT_ATTRIBUTE_CLASSIFICATION`, `isChurningClientAttribute`,
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+ `isStatsRecordableClientAttribute`,
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+ `deviceFingerprintComponents`, `canonicalizeClientAttributes`,
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+ `DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_VERSION` and `DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_PREFIX` (`fp2:`, the prefix
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+ a caller puts on the stored, salted value so a later definition can be told
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+ apart from this one).
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+
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+ `ManagementErrorSchema`'s `error` gains an optional `reason`, and `ManagementErrorReasonSchema` lists its value `management_issuer_unconfigured`. A deployment without `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` set to its https origin still answers management sign-in with `503` and `error.code: temporarily_unavailable`; the body now also carries `error.reason`. A client that ignores unknown fields is unaffected.
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+
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+ `ManagementPostureSchema` no longer models browser posture as something a project turns on. Every project has a posture key, so `enabled` is the constant `true` (kept on the wire so a CLI that still requires the field keeps parsing) and `keyId` and `publicJwk` are no longer nullable. A body with `enabled: false` or a null key is now refused.
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+
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+ `BrowserPostureConfig.origins` lists further allowed page origins beside the
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+ required `origin`. A posture token is accepted only when its `origin` claim
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+ matches `origin` or an `origins` entry (exact, or a leftmost wildcard that
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+ never matches the apex, same rules as `posture-origins`) and its `aud`
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+ contains that claim. `validateBrowserPostureConfig` rejects an invalid entry
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+ or more than 20. A config without `origins` behaves as before.
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+
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+ `postureOutcomeFromRequest` and `inspectBrowserPosture` report why a token was
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+ refused (`BROWSER_POSTURE_REJECTION_REASONS`) instead of only returning
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+ nothing, and `BrowserPostureOutcomeSchema` is the wire shape of
139
+ `postureOutcome` on a detection report. `verifyBrowserPosture` and
140
+ `postureFromRequest` are unchanged. Every token part must now be base64url.
141
+
142
+ `BrowserPostureReportIngestSchema`, exported from `@kya-os/checkpoint-shared/browser-posture`, is `BrowserPostureReportSchema` with an omitted `score` read as `null`. The dashboard's log-detection boundary uses it so a reporter that drops a null score (the Java and .NET SDKs did) is no longer refused with `400 invalid_union`; the stored shape is unchanged because the parsed value carries `score: null`. `BrowserPostureReportSchema` itself still requires the key.
143
+
144
+ `AgentShieldConfigSchema` now rejects `allowedIps`, `blockedIps`,
145
+ `allowedAgents`, `blockedAgents`, `customRules`, `customPatterns` and every
146
+ `network` setting (`enabled`, `checkCloudProviders`, `checkDataCenters`,
147
+ `checkVpn`, `checkProxy`, `customIpRanges`) with an error naming the setting,
148
+ and the fields are typed `?: undefined`. The schema accepted them but no
149
+ runtime ever read them, so a caller who set an allow/block list or a network
150
+ check was unprotected. Any defined value is rejected, `false` and `[]`
151
+ included, so a parsed config that carried the old `network` defaults can no
152
+ longer be fed back through the schema; the parsed `network` object is now
153
+ empty. The same applies to `ExpressMiddlewareOptionsSchema`,
154
+ `NextMiddlewareOptionsSchema` and `validateConfig` in `@kya-os/checkpoint`.
155
+
156
+ `RuleLoader.loadRules({ cdnUrl })` now throws instead of fetching. It accepted
157
+ any schema-valid document from the URL with no signature check, and its
158
+ default endpoints pointed at retired domains. Remote delivery of vendor IP
159
+ ranges and key expiry is a signed rule bundle verified inside the engine
160
+ (`@kya-os/checkpoint-wasm-runtime`'s `createRuleBundleUpdater`). Removed the
161
+ `RULE_CDN` and `RULE_CACHE` constants and the `RULE_ERRORS.CDN_UNAVAILABLE` /
162
+ `CACHE_EXPIRED` messages; `cdnUrl` stays on `RuleLoadOptions` as
163
+ `@deprecated`.
164
+
165
+ Additive. `./browser-posture` gains `postureFromRequest`,
166
+ `postureRequestFromHeaders`, `POSTURE_HEADER` (`kya-posture`) and
167
+ `POSTURE_SESSION_HEADER` (`kya-posture-session`): posture read from the
168
+ `KYA-Posture` and `KYA-Posture-Session` request headers, each winning over its
169
+ cookie, for a page on another host or one that blocks cookies. A header sent
170
+ twice, or comma-joined, is trusted by no one. `postureFromCookies` is
171
+ unchanged.
172
+
173
+ Additive. `./beacon-types` gains `BeaconReceipt` and two `BeaconConfig`
174
+ options, `browserSessionId` and `onReceipt`, both kept by
175
+ `parseBeaconConfig` (an invalid value warns and is dropped). Consumed by
176
+ `@kya-os/checkpoint-beacon`'s receipt hook and session resume.
177
+
178
+ `TrafficTimeSeriesPoint.uniqueIPs` is now `number | null`. It is `null` for a
179
+ bucket served from `analytics_daily_rollup`, which records no client IPs; the
180
+ admin traffic-patterns route previously reported those buckets as `0`.
181
+
182
+ `TrafficTopPage.bounceRate` is removed. No code path computed it, and the
183
+ route set it to `0` on every page.
184
+
185
+ Additive. Extends the `ERROR_CODES` registry with every code the v1
186
+ projects, deploy, shopify and pixel/track routes emit that was still
187
+ route-local: `ANALYTICS_ERRORS` and `DEPLOY_ERRORS` are new groups, and
188
+ `RATE_LIMIT_ERRORS`, `PERMISSION_ERRORS`, `INTERNAL_ERRORS`, `PIXEL_ERRORS`
189
+ and `BARE_ERRORS` gained new codes. No wire string changed. The four
190
+ service-computed deploy codes (`DEPLOY_FAILED`, `WFP_NOT_CONFIGURED`,
191
+ `NATIVE_ISSUER_PROVISIONING_BUSY`, `NATIVE_ISSUER_PROVISIONING_FAILED`)
192
+ carry no fixed status, like `PROJECT_NOT_FOUND`.
193
+
194
+ Additive. Extends the `ERROR_CODES` registry with every code the v1 bouncer,
195
+ delegation OAuth, native HTTP and audit ingest routes emit that was still
196
+ route-local, as six new groups: `BOUNCER_LOWERCASE_ERRORS`,
197
+ `OAUTH_LOWERCASE_ERRORS`, `BOUNCER_UPPERCASE_ERRORS`, `AUDIT_ERRORS`,
198
+ `AUDIT_PROTOCOL_ERRORS` (the `@kya-os/mcp` audit vocabulary, hand-copied
199
+ because this package does not depend on it) and `KYAOS_PROTOCOL_ERRORS`
200
+ (the `kyaos/*` strings, keyed `KYAOS_SLASH_*`). No wire string changed.
201
+ `invalid_grant` and `kyaos/profile-violation` carry no fixed status because
202
+ their emitters disagree. `INVALID_REQUEST_BODY` (400),
203
+ `MCPI_CONFIG_NOT_FOUND` (404) and `CONSENT_CONFIG_NOT_FOUND` (404) are pinned,
204
+ which lets `v1ErrorResponse` resolve the three `new Error('<code>')` sites in
205
+ the bouncer config validate and consent-config routes to their intended
206
+ status instead of a 500 `INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR`.
207
+
208
+ Handoff and session changes. New exports: `issueHandoffToken`, `handoffTokenAuthentic` and
209
+ `HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN` from `@kya-os/checkpoint-shared/beacon-nonce` (a handoff token is 16 random
210
+ bytes plus a 16 byte HMAC tag under the nonce secret, 43 base64url characters, and one canonical
211
+ spelling), and `SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS` from `beacon-types` (six hours). `sessionTimeout` no
212
+ longer defaults to 30 minutes: `parseBeaconConfig` (in `beacon-types` and in `browser.ts`),
213
+ `DEFAULT_CONFIG` and `PixelInstallConfigSchema` leave it unset, so the idle gap is one hour on
214
+ phones and six hours elsewhere, and `PixelInstallConfigSchema.sessionTimeout` is optional. Added
215
+ fields: `deviceId` and `handoffToken` on the beacon batch types, `handoffToken` (at most 2,048
216
+ characters, dropped when invalid) on the pixel request schema, `handoff` (`status` is `adopted`,
217
+ `rejected` or `unavailable`) on the pixel response schema, and `requireConsent` on the beacon
218
+ config.
219
+
3
220
  ## 1.5.1
4
221
 
5
222
  Adds `POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS` and `BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH` to `./beacon-types`,
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
1
+ //#region src/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts
2
+ export declare const HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN: RegExp;
3
+ export declare const BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS: number;
4
+ export declare const BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;
5
+ export declare const BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = 64;
6
+ export type BeaconNonceVerdict = 'verified' | 'forged' | 'unverified';
7
+ export type BeaconNonceVerification = {
8
+ verdict: 'verified';
9
+ } | {
10
+ verdict: 'forged';
11
+ reason: 'signature';
12
+ } | {
13
+ verdict: 'unverified';
14
+ reason: 'malformed' | 'expired' | 'future' | 'no_secret' | 'context';
15
+ };
16
+ export interface BeaconNonceBinding {
17
+ projectId: string;
18
+ sessionId: string;
19
+ context: string;
20
+ }
21
+ export declare function beaconNonceContext(client: {
22
+ ip?: string;
23
+ userAgent?: string;
24
+ }): string;
25
+ export declare function isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce: string | undefined): nonce is string;
26
+ export declare function issueSignedBeaconNonce(secret: string, binding: BeaconNonceBinding, issuedAtMs: number): Promise<string>;
27
+ export declare function verifySignedBeaconNonce(secret: string | undefined, binding: BeaconNonceBinding, nonce: string | undefined, nowMs: number): Promise<BeaconNonceVerification>;
28
+ export declare function issueHandoffToken(secret: string, projectId: string): Promise<string>;
29
+ export declare const HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN: RegExp;
30
+ export declare function splitHandoffToken(raw: string): {
31
+ token: string;
32
+ userHash?: string;
33
+ };
34
+ export declare function handoffTokenAuthentic(secrets: readonly string[], projectId: string, token: unknown): Promise<boolean>;
35
+ //#endregion
36
+ //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.mts.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"index.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-nonce/index.ts"],"mappings":";qBA4Da,uBAAqB;qBAGrB;qBAEA;qBAEA;YAED;YAEA;EACN;;EACA;EAAmB;;EAEnB;EACA;;iBAGW;EACf;EACA;EAEA;;wBA2Cc,mBAAmB;EAAU;EAAa;;wBAkG1C,oBAAoB,4BAA4B;wBAS1C,uBACpB,gBACA,SAAS,oBACT,qBACC;wBAkBmB,wBACpB,4BACA,SAAS,oBACT,2BACA,gBACC,QAAQ;wBA6DW,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,oBAAoB;qBAS/D,2BAAyB;wBAGtB,kBAAkB;EAAgB;EAAe;;wBAS3C,sBACpB,4BACA,mBACA,iBACC"}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
1
+ //#region src/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts
2
+ export declare const HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN: RegExp;
3
+ export declare const BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS: number;
4
+ export declare const BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;
5
+ export declare const BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = 64;
6
+ export type BeaconNonceVerdict = 'verified' | 'forged' | 'unverified';
7
+ export type BeaconNonceVerification = {
8
+ verdict: 'verified';
9
+ } | {
10
+ verdict: 'forged';
11
+ reason: 'signature';
12
+ } | {
13
+ verdict: 'unverified';
14
+ reason: 'malformed' | 'expired' | 'future' | 'no_secret' | 'context';
15
+ };
16
+ export interface BeaconNonceBinding {
17
+ projectId: string;
18
+ sessionId: string;
19
+ context: string;
20
+ }
21
+ export declare function beaconNonceContext(client: {
22
+ ip?: string;
23
+ userAgent?: string;
24
+ }): string;
25
+ export declare function isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce: string | undefined): nonce is string;
26
+ export declare function issueSignedBeaconNonce(secret: string, binding: BeaconNonceBinding, issuedAtMs: number): Promise<string>;
27
+ export declare function verifySignedBeaconNonce(secret: string | undefined, binding: BeaconNonceBinding, nonce: string | undefined, nowMs: number): Promise<BeaconNonceVerification>;
28
+ export declare function issueHandoffToken(secret: string, projectId: string): Promise<string>;
29
+ export declare const HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN: RegExp;
30
+ export declare function splitHandoffToken(raw: string): {
31
+ token: string;
32
+ userHash?: string;
33
+ };
34
+ export declare function handoffTokenAuthentic(secrets: readonly string[], projectId: string, token: unknown): Promise<boolean>;
35
+ //#endregion
36
+ //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-nonce/index.ts"],"mappings":";qBA4Da,uBAAqB;qBAGrB;qBAEA;qBAEA;YAED;YAEA;EACN;;EACA;EAAmB;;EAEnB;EACA;;iBAGW;EACf;EACA;EAEA;;wBA2Cc,mBAAmB;EAAU;EAAa;;wBAkG1C,oBAAoB,4BAA4B;wBAS1C,uBACpB,gBACA,SAAS,oBACT,qBACC;wBAkBmB,wBACpB,4BACA,SAAS,oBACT,2BACA,gBACC,QAAQ;wBA6DW,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,oBAAoB;qBAS/D,2BAAyB;wBAGtB,kBAAkB;EAAgB;EAAe;;wBAS3C,sBACpB,4BACA,mBACA,iBACC"}
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
1
+ Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: 'Module' });
2
+ //#region src/beacon-nonce/index.ts
3
+ /**
4
+ * Stateless, client-bound beacon nonce, issued and verified by both the
5
+ * origin (`apps/web/lib/services/nonce.service.ts`) and the beacon-ingest
6
+ * edge Worker.
7
+ *
8
+ * Every pixel/beacon response hands the browser a per-session nonce that its
9
+ * next post must echo. A queue-only edge returns its receipt before the
10
+ * origin has seen the batch, so the nonce cannot depend on origin state:
11
+ * it is an HMAC-SHA256 under a secret shared by origin and edge. The origin
12
+ * verifies it at synchronous ingest, or on replay using the edge's
13
+ * acceptance time as the clock.
14
+ *
15
+ * Web Crypto only (`crypto.subtle`, `crypto.getRandomValues`): this runs
16
+ * unchanged in Cloudflare Workers, Node ≥ 20 and the browser bundle.
17
+ *
18
+ * Wire format (56 chars, inside the schema's 64-char cap):
19
+ *
20
+ * n2.<issuedAt base36 seconds>.<random 8 bytes b64url>.<HMAC 16 bytes b64url>.<ctx tag 8 bytes b64url>
21
+ *
22
+ * The first HMAC binds the format version + project + session + issue time +
23
+ * random. The trailing context tag additionally binds the requester's
24
+ * network prefix and User-Agent (`beaconNonceContext`), so a nonce lifted
25
+ * from one client does not verify from another. The version is inside the
26
+ * MAC, so a nonce cannot be relabelled to dodge the context tag.
27
+ *
28
+ * Verdict semantics — three states, never two:
29
+ * - `verified`: signature matches THIS project+session, the context matches,
30
+ * and it is within TTL.
31
+ * - `forged`: well-formed but the MAC does not match this session/secret.
32
+ * The only outcome that counts as evidence against the client.
33
+ * - `unverified`: nothing could be proven — not signed-format (absent, or
34
+ * a value from before signing existed), expired, from the future, this
35
+ * side has no secret, or the session signature is genuine but the
36
+ * requester's network/User-Agent differs from the one it was issued to (a
37
+ * roaming phone and a replay from elsewhere look the same, so neither is
38
+ * treated as fabrication). Staleness is not forgery: an edge that stopped
39
+ * issuing (secret unset) leaves clients echoing old values, and that must
40
+ * degrade to "unknown", never to "failed".
41
+ *
42
+ * Any unexpired signature for the session verifies, so a nonce is not
43
+ * single-use within its TTL. Multi-tab sessions need no window at all.
44
+ */
45
+ const NONCE_VERSION = "n2";
46
+ const MAC_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:${NONCE_VERSION}`;
47
+ const CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:ctx:${NONCE_VERSION}`;
48
+ const RANDOM_BYTES = 8;
49
+ const MAC_BYTES = 16;
50
+ const CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES = 8;
51
+ const MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH = 512;
52
+ const IPV4_PATTERN = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/;
53
+ const IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/;
54
+ const ISSUED_AT_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-z]{1,16}$/;
55
+ const BASE64URL_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
56
+ const HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX = "checkpoint-handoff-token:v1";
57
+ const HANDOFF_ID_BYTES = 16;
58
+ const HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES = 16;
59
+ const HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
60
+ /** How long an issued nonce stays verifiable. */
61
+ const BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;
62
+ /** Edge and origin clocks may disagree; a nonce this far "in the future" still verifies. */
63
+ const BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;
64
+ /** The beacon wire schema's `nonce: z.string().max(64)`. */
65
+ const BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = 64;
66
+ function ipv4Prefix(ip) {
67
+ const match = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(ip);
68
+ return match ? `${match[1]}.${match[2]}.${match[3]}` : null;
69
+ }
70
+ /**
71
+ * The first three groups (a /48) of an IPv6 address, expanded so compressed
72
+ * forms agree with their spelled-out equivalents. An IPv4-mapped address
73
+ * (`::ffff:a.b.c.d` or its hex spelling) is a v4 client and keys on its /24.
74
+ * `null` for anything that is not a well-formed address.
75
+ */
76
+ function ipv6Prefix(ip) {
77
+ const bare = ip.toLowerCase().split("%")[0];
78
+ const lastColon = bare.lastIndexOf(":");
79
+ const embedded = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(bare.slice(lastColon + 1));
80
+ const halves = (embedded ? `${bare.slice(0, lastColon + 1)}${(Number(embedded[1]) << 8 | Number(embedded[2])).toString(16)}:${(Number(embedded[3]) << 8 | Number(embedded[4])).toString(16)}` : bare).split("::");
81
+ if (halves.length > 2) return null;
82
+ const head = halves[0] ? halves[0].split(":") : [];
83
+ const tail = halves.length === 2 && halves[1] ? halves[1].split(":") : [];
84
+ const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;
85
+ if (halves.length === 1 ? missing !== 0 : missing < 1) return null;
86
+ const groups = [
87
+ ...head,
88
+ ...Array(halves.length === 2 ? missing : 0).fill("0"),
89
+ ...tail
90
+ ];
91
+ if (!groups.every((group) => IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN.test(group))) return null;
92
+ const words = groups.map((group) => parseInt(group, 16));
93
+ if (words.slice(0, 5).every((word) => word === 0) && words[5] === 65535) return `${words[6] >> 8}.${words[6] & 255}.${words[7] >> 8}`;
94
+ return words.slice(0, 3).map((word) => word.toString(16)).join(":");
95
+ }
96
+ /**
97
+ * The requester facts a nonce is bound to: the network prefix (IPv4 /24,
98
+ * IPv6 /48, so NAT and DHCP churn inside one access network still verify)
99
+ * and the User-Agent. Empty when neither is known, which binds nothing.
100
+ */
101
+ function beaconNonceContext(client) {
102
+ const ip = client.ip?.trim() ?? "";
103
+ const prefix = ipv4Prefix(ip) ?? (ip.includes(":") ? ipv6Prefix(ip) : null) ?? "";
104
+ const userAgent = (client.userAgent ?? "").slice(0, MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH);
105
+ return prefix || userAgent ? `${prefix}|${userAgent}` : "";
106
+ }
107
+ const encoder = new TextEncoder();
108
+ const keyCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
109
+ function hmacKey(secret) {
110
+ let key = keyCache.get(secret);
111
+ if (!key) {
112
+ key = crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", encoder.encode(secret), {
113
+ name: "HMAC",
114
+ hash: "SHA-256"
115
+ }, false, ["sign"]);
116
+ keyCache.set(secret, key);
117
+ }
118
+ return key;
119
+ }
120
+ function base64url(bytes) {
121
+ let binary = "";
122
+ for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);
123
+ return btoa(binary).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
124
+ }
125
+ /**
126
+ * Length-prefixed canonical encoding (`<byteLength>:<field>`), never a bare
127
+ * delimiter join: `sessionId` is caller-controlled at the edge, so a value
128
+ * that embeds the delimiter must not be able to shift the field boundaries
129
+ * and re-bind the MAC to another session (Cursor Bugbot, PR #5255).
130
+ */
131
+ function canonical(fields) {
132
+ const chunks = fields.map((field) => {
133
+ const bytes = encoder.encode(field);
134
+ return [encoder.encode(`${bytes.length}:`), bytes];
135
+ });
136
+ const total = chunks.reduce((sum, [len, bytes]) => sum + len.length + bytes.length, 0);
137
+ const out = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(total));
138
+ let offset = 0;
139
+ for (const [len, bytes] of chunks) {
140
+ out.set(len, offset);
141
+ offset += len.length;
142
+ out.set(bytes, offset);
143
+ offset += bytes.length;
144
+ }
145
+ return out;
146
+ }
147
+ async function mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random) {
148
+ const input = canonical([
149
+ MAC_INPUT_PREFIX,
150
+ binding.projectId,
151
+ binding.sessionId,
152
+ issuedAt,
153
+ random
154
+ ]);
155
+ const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
156
+ return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, MAC_BYTES));
157
+ }
158
+ async function contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random) {
159
+ const input = canonical([
160
+ CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX,
161
+ binding.projectId,
162
+ binding.sessionId,
163
+ issuedAt,
164
+ random,
165
+ binding.context
166
+ ]);
167
+ const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
168
+ return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES));
169
+ }
170
+ function constantTimeEqual(left, right) {
171
+ if (left.length !== right.length) return false;
172
+ let diff = 0;
173
+ for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left.charCodeAt(i) ^ right.charCodeAt(i);
174
+ return diff === 0;
175
+ }
176
+ /** True when `nonce` is in the signed wire format (not necessarily valid). */
177
+ function isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce) {
178
+ return typeof nonce === "string" && nonce.startsWith(`${NONCE_VERSION}.`);
179
+ }
180
+ /**
181
+ * Mint a nonce for `binding` at `issuedAtMs`. Throws when `secret` is
182
+ * empty — issuing an unsigned value would be indistinguishable from a
183
+ * real one on the wire, so the caller must decide to issue nothing.
184
+ */
185
+ async function issueSignedBeaconNonce(secret, binding, issuedAtMs) {
186
+ if (!secret) throw new Error("beacon nonce secret is required to issue a signed nonce");
187
+ const issuedAt = Math.floor(issuedAtMs / 1e3).toString(36);
188
+ const random = base64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(RANDOM_BYTES)));
189
+ return [
190
+ NONCE_VERSION,
191
+ issuedAt,
192
+ random,
193
+ await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random),
194
+ await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random)
195
+ ].join(".");
196
+ }
197
+ /**
198
+ * Verify `nonce` against `binding` as of `nowMs`. Never throws; every
199
+ * failure mode is a verdict (see the module doc for why expiry is
200
+ * `unverified` rather than `forged`).
201
+ */
202
+ async function verifySignedBeaconNonce(secret, binding, nonce, nowMs) {
203
+ if (!isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce)) return {
204
+ verdict: "unverified",
205
+ reason: "malformed"
206
+ };
207
+ const parts = nonce.split(".");
208
+ if (parts.length !== 5 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) return {
209
+ verdict: "unverified",
210
+ reason: "malformed"
211
+ };
212
+ const [, issuedAt, random, providedMac, providedContextTag] = parts;
213
+ if (!ISSUED_AT_PATTERN.test(issuedAt) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(random) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedMac) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedContextTag)) return {
214
+ verdict: "unverified",
215
+ reason: "malformed"
216
+ };
217
+ if (!secret) return {
218
+ verdict: "unverified",
219
+ reason: "no_secret"
220
+ };
221
+ if (!constantTimeEqual(providedMac, await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) return {
222
+ verdict: "forged",
223
+ reason: "signature"
224
+ };
225
+ const issuedAtSeconds = parseInt(issuedAt, 36);
226
+ const nowSeconds = Math.floor(nowMs / 1e3);
227
+ if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAtSeconds)) return {
228
+ verdict: "unverified",
229
+ reason: "malformed"
230
+ };
231
+ if (issuedAtSeconds - nowSeconds > 60) return {
232
+ verdict: "unverified",
233
+ reason: "future"
234
+ };
235
+ if (nowSeconds - issuedAtSeconds > 600) return {
236
+ verdict: "unverified",
237
+ reason: "expired"
238
+ };
239
+ if (!constantTimeEqual(providedContextTag, await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) return {
240
+ verdict: "unverified",
241
+ reason: "context"
242
+ };
243
+ return { verdict: "verified" };
244
+ }
245
+ async function handoffTag(secret, projectId, idBytes) {
246
+ const input = canonical([
247
+ HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX,
248
+ projectId,
249
+ base64url(idBytes)
250
+ ]);
251
+ const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
252
+ return new Uint8Array(signature, 0, HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES);
253
+ }
254
+ function base64urlDecode(text) {
255
+ const padded = text.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/").padEnd(Math.ceil(text.length / 4) * 4, "=");
256
+ return Uint8Array.from(atob(padded), (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));
257
+ }
258
+ function bytesEqual(left, right) {
259
+ if (left.length !== right.length) return false;
260
+ let diff = 0;
261
+ for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left[i] ^ right[i];
262
+ return diff === 0;
263
+ }
264
+ async function issueHandoffToken(secret, projectId) {
265
+ if (!secret) throw new Error("beacon nonce secret is required to issue a handoff token");
266
+ const id = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES));
267
+ const token = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32);
268
+ token.set(id, 0);
269
+ token.set(await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id), HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
270
+ return base64url(token);
271
+ }
272
+ const HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{8}$/;
273
+ const HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR = "~";
274
+ function splitHandoffToken(raw) {
275
+ const parts = raw.split(HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR);
276
+ const [token, userHash] = parts;
277
+ if (parts.length > 2 || userHash !== void 0 && !HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN.test(userHash)) return { token: raw };
278
+ return {
279
+ token,
280
+ ...userHash === void 0 ? {} : { userHash }
281
+ };
282
+ }
283
+ async function handoffTokenAuthentic(secrets, projectId, token) {
284
+ if (typeof token !== "string" || !HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN.test(token)) return false;
285
+ const bytes = base64urlDecode(token);
286
+ if (bytes.length !== 32) return false;
287
+ if (base64url(bytes) !== token) return false;
288
+ const id = bytes.slice(0, HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
289
+ const providedTag = bytes.slice(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
290
+ return (await Promise.all(secrets.filter((secret) => secret.length > 0).map(async (secret) => bytesEqual(providedTag, await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id))))).includes(true);
291
+ }
292
+
293
+ //#endregion
294
+ exports.BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS;
295
+ exports.BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH;
296
+ exports.BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS;
297
+ exports.HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN = HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN;
298
+ exports.HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN = HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN;
299
+ exports.beaconNonceContext = beaconNonceContext;
300
+ exports.handoffTokenAuthentic = handoffTokenAuthentic;
301
+ exports.isSignedBeaconNonce = isSignedBeaconNonce;
302
+ exports.issueHandoffToken = issueHandoffToken;
303
+ exports.issueSignedBeaconNonce = issueSignedBeaconNonce;
304
+ exports.splitHandoffToken = splitHandoffToken;
305
+ exports.verifySignedBeaconNonce = verifySignedBeaconNonce;