@kernhq/module-hr 0.16.0 → 0.17.1

package/migrations/meta/_journal.json

@@ -71,6 +71,13 @@
       "when": 1787851246006,
       "tag": "0010_approval_timeouts",
       "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 11,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1787858088123,
+      "tag": "0011_privacy",
+      "breakpoints": true
     }
   ]
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@kernhq/module-hr",
-  "version": "0.16.0",
+  "version": "0.17.1",
   "description": "Kern HR module: people, offices, org chart, calendars",
   "license": "AGPL-3.0-only",
   "type": "module",

package/src/contract/index.ts

@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@ export * from './leave.js'
 export * from './models.js'
 export * from './permissions.js'
 export * from './policies.js'
+export * from './privacy.js'
 export * from './router.js'
 export * from './settings.js'

package/src/contract/models.ts

@@ -71,6 +71,21 @@ export const Person = z.object({
    * from data the directory does not even fetch. So the one place that does the nulling says so.
    */
   personnelHidden: z.boolean().default(false),
+  /**
+   * When this person's record was erased on request, or null.
+   *
+   * Erasure is redaction, not deletion: the identifying columns are cleared and the rows a payroll
+   * audit needs survive against a person who is no longer nameable. So an erased record still
+   * appears — in a headcount, behind a ledger entry, as the subject of an approval from two years
+   * ago — and a screen that cannot tell it apart from an ordinary one shows a blank name and lets
+   * the reader conclude the record is broken.
+   *
+   * The date rather than a boolean, because the two questions a reader has are "is this erased" and
+   * "when", and the first is `!== null`. `erasedBy` and `erasureReason` are deliberately *not* here:
+   * they answer an administrator's question, not a directory's, and putting them on the model every
+   * screen fetches would spread them further than the act they describe.
+   */
+  erasedAt: Timestamp.nullable(),
   createdAt: Timestamp,
   updatedAt: Timestamp,
 })

package/src/contract/permissions.ts

@@ -304,6 +304,27 @@ export const hrPermissions = definePermissions([
     dangerous: false,
   },
 
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------- privacy
+  {
+    key: 'hr.privacy.manage',
+    label: 'Handle privacy requests: export, erase and retention',
+    description:
+      'Subject access requests, erasure and retention horizons under GDPR and KVKK. An export ' +
+      'contains decrypted bank and identity details, and an erasure cannot be undone. Grant to a ' +
+      'named data-protection owner, not to a role.',
+    scope: 'workspace',
+    // Nobody by default, like `hr.person.view_sensitive` and for the same reason: whether anybody
+    // below an owner may erase a colleague is the workspace's decision, and it has to be made
+    // deliberately rather than inherited by everyone who happens to be an admin.
+    defaultRoles: [],
+    dangerous: true,
+  },
+  // One key, four procedures, one commit — `privacy.subjectAccess`, `privacy.erase`,
+  // `privacy.retention.get` and `privacy.retention.set` all ship gated on it. Four screens suggest
+  // four keys and the temptation is real; the cost of taking it is recorded twice in this repository
+  // already, at the removed `hr.overtime.*` keys above and at `directoryVisibleToMembers` in
+  // `settings.ts`. A separate `hr.privacy.view` arrives when a procedure asks for it and not before.
+
   // ---------------------------------------------------------------- fields
   {
     key: 'hr.field.manage',
@@ -352,4 +373,5 @@ export const HR_PERMISSIONS = {
   periodManage: 'hr.period.manage',
   approvalManage: 'hr.approval.manage',
   approvalDelegate: 'hr.approval.delegate',
+  privacyManage: 'hr.privacy.manage',
 } as const

package/src/contract/privacy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+import { Timestamp, WorkspaceId } from '@kernhq/contracts'
+import { z } from 'zod'
+import { ApprovalDecision, ApprovalRequest, ApprovalStep, Delegation } from './approvals.js'
+import { AttendanceDay, Punch, Regularization } from './attendance.js'
+import { LeaveLedgerEntry, LeaveRequest, LeaveType } from './leave.js'
+import { Employment, IsoDate, OfficeAssignment, Person, PersonDocument, PersonSensitive } from './models.js'
+import { ResolvedPolicy } from './policies.js'
+
+/**
+ * Subject access, erasure and retention — the three things a data-protection law asks a personnel
+ * system for, and the one part of HR whose whole job is to say what it did.
+ *
+ * Three positions hold this file together, and each of them is a decision the rest of the module
+ * already made somewhere else:
+ *
+ * - **Erasure is redaction, never deletion.** `leave_ledger` is append-only because a balance is the
+ *   sum of it and nothing else; `punches` is append-only because an attendance record somebody can
+ *   quietly rewrite is worth nothing in the dispute it exists for; `employments` is effective-dated
+ *   so March is still answerable in June. Deleting an erased person's rows would break all three and
+ *   would answer a payroll audit with "she left, so we deleted her file". So erasure clears the
+ *   columns that identify a person and leaves every record that a wage, an entitlement or an
+ *   authorisation was computed from. Afterwards the ledger still has somebody to attribute a day
+ *   to, and nobody has a name.
+ * - **It says what it kept, per class, and why.** The `kept` half of the report is not a courtesy:
+ *   an erasure that silently retains is the same failure as an export that silently omits, and the
+ *   only difference is which of the two the subject finds out about later.
+ * - **Nothing here is a capability.** A workspace that could switch privacy off would be a workspace
+ *   that stopped honouring subject requests, which fails the capability registry's own second rule —
+ *   a switch must be reversible without destroying data, and this one would not even be a switch
+ *   anybody should be offered. One permission key, `hr.privacy.manage`, gates all four procedures,
+ *   and it ships in the same change as them.
+ */
+
+const ws = { workspaceId: WorkspaceId }
+
+// =====================================================================================
+// retention
+// =====================================================================================
+
+/**
+ * A horizon in days, or null.
+ *
+ * **Null is the shipped value for every class and it means "keep indefinitely".** "Seven years" is a
+ * fact about one country and one document class, not about the world, so no number here is a
+ * default: the suggested figures live in the help text on the settings screen, beside the sentence
+ * saying Kern gives no legal advice. The workspace owner sets them, and where their legal entities
+ * differ they set them per entity — which this shape cannot yet express, and says so below.
+ */
+const RetentionDays = z.number().int().min(1).max(36_500).nullable().default(null)
+
+/**
+ * The classes retention is expressed in.
+ *
+ * They follow the redact/retain split rather than the table list, because that is the split a
+ * retention decision is actually made in: "how long do we keep the evidence behind a day sheet" is
+ * one question whatever tables it lands in.
+ */
+export const RetentionClass = z.enum([
+  /** Where a punch happened, on what device, and what was typed on it. */
+  'punchDetail',
+  /** The punch rows themselves — the evidence behind a day sheet. */
+  'punches',
+  /** The derived day sheet: hours, overtime, lateness. This is pay. */
+  'attendanceDays',
+  /** Ledger movements and the requests behind them. Also pay. */
+  'leave',
+  /** The audit trail. At the horizon the values go and the rows stay — see `privacy.erase`. */
+  'personHistory',
+  /** Contracts, payslips, identity scans. */
+  'personDocuments',
+  /** People who have left, and have not been erased. */
+  'terminatedPeople',
+  /** Who read somebody's identity, birth date or bank details. Itself personal data. */
+  'sensitiveAccessLog',
+])
+export type RetentionClass = z.infer<typeof RetentionClass>
+
+/**
+ * How long HR keeps each class, per workspace.
+ *
+ * A table rather than module settings, and the reason is mechanical: `core.settings.setModule`
+ * validates the merged blob against the module's declared zod schema and a zod object strips what it
+ * does not declare — so a retention key stored beside `country` and `employeeNumberPrefix` would be
+ * deleted by the next unrelated settings write, silently, from a screen that never mentions
+ * retention. Extending `HrSettings` instead is the other honest route and is a change to a shared
+ * shape; this one keeps the numbers where nothing can quietly drop them.
+ *
+ * Workspace-wide for now. The honest end state is per legal entity — a Dutch entity and a Turkish
+ * one have different obligations, which is exactly why `periods` is already per legal entity — and
+ * the row carries a jsonb config so that move is an added column rather than a new table.
+ */
+export const HrRetention = z.object({
+  punchDetail: RetentionDays,
+  punches: RetentionDays,
+  attendanceDays: RetentionDays,
+  leave: RetentionDays,
+  personHistory: RetentionDays,
+  personDocuments: RetentionDays,
+  terminatedPeople: RetentionDays,
+  sensitiveAccessLog: RetentionDays,
+})
+export type HrRetention = z.infer<typeof HrRetention>
+
+/** One class, its horizon, and what has already passed it. */
+export const RetentionClassState = z.object({
+  class: RetentionClass,
+  /** Null means "kept indefinitely", which is what every class ships as. */
+  days: z.number().int().nullable(),
+  /**
+   * How many rows are already older than the horizon — the dry run, asked for with `withCounts`.
+   *
+   * Null when no horizon is set (nothing to be past) or when the caller did not ask for counts. A
+   * retention screen that cannot say what a sweep would touch before it runs is a data-loss button
+   * with no confirmation, so this is the number that belongs beside every horizon on it.
+   */
+  dueNow: z.number().int().nullable(),
+})
+export type RetentionClassState = z.infer<typeof RetentionClassState>
+
+export const RetentionSettings = z.object({
+  ...ws,
+  classes: z.array(RetentionClassState),
+  updatedAt: Timestamp.nullable(),
+  updatedBy: z.uuid().nullable(),
+  /**
+   * Whether anything in HR deletes on these horizons yet. **It is false, and saying so is the
+   * point.**
+   *
+   * The horizons are read in two places today: here, to count what has passed one, and by
+   * `privacy.erase`, to say under which horizon each surviving class was kept. No timed sweep acts
+   * on them. An unattended job that prunes personnel records is the one act in this module that
+   * cannot be undone by re-running anything, so it ships off, with a dry run and a per-run report
+   * naming every person it touched — and until it exists this field must not claim otherwise.
+   */
+  sweepEnabled: z.literal(false),
+})
+export type RetentionSettings = z.infer<typeof RetentionSettings>
+
+// =====================================================================================
+// erasure
+// =====================================================================================
+
+/** The units erasure reports in. One per group of columns that survive or go together. */
+export const ErasureClass = z.enum([
+  'identity',
+  'sensitive',
+  'history',
+  'documents',
+  'punches',
+  'attendance',
+  'leaveRequests',
+  'leaveLedger',
+  'employment',
+  'officeAssignments',
+  'approvals',
+  'approvalDecisions',
+  'regularizations',
+  'delegations',
+  'headship',
+])
+export type ErasureClass = z.infer<typeof ErasureClass>
+
+/** A class the erasure cleared, and exactly which columns it cleared. */
+export const ErasureRedaction = z.object({
+  class: ErasureClass,
+  table: z.string(),
+  /** Rows that still had something to clear. Zero on a replay, which is what makes it replayable. */
+  rows: z.number().int(),
+  columns: z.array(z.string()),
+})
+export type ErasureRedaction = z.infer<typeof ErasureRedaction>
+
+/**
+ * Why a record survived an erasure.
+ *
+ * An enum rather than a sentence: a reason composed on the server is English for every reader, and
+ * this one is read by the person who asked to be forgotten. The client renders it.
+ */
+export const RetentionBasis = z.enum([
+  /** A wage, an entitlement or the hours behind one. Statutory wherever Kern ships a country pack. */
+  'payRecord',
+  /** What changed, when, and who authorised it. Erasing the trail and erasing the data differ. */
+  'auditTrail',
+  /** The workspace set a horizon for this class and it has not passed. */
+  'retentionHorizon',
+  /** HR cannot remove it: the bytes belong to another module. See `caveats`. */
+  'notRemovable',
+  /** It is somebody else's record. Erasing A is not authority to rewrite what A did to B's row. */
+  'anotherPersonsRecord',
+])
+export type RetentionBasis = z.infer<typeof RetentionBasis>
+
+export const ErasureRetained = z.object({
+  class: ErasureClass,
+  table: z.string(),
+  rows: z.number().int(),
+  basis: RetentionBasis,
+  /** The horizon in force for the retention class covering this, when the workspace set one. */
+  retentionDays: z.number().int().nullable(),
+})
+export type ErasureRetained = z.infer<typeof ErasureRetained>
+
+/**
+ * Things the response has to state in words, as keys the client renders.
+ *
+ * Each one is a promise this module would otherwise be making and not keeping.
+ */
+export const ErasureCaveat = z.enum([
+  /**
+   * `person_documents` rows and their files both survive. `core.files.get` is the only file
+   * procedure a module can reach — there is no `files.delete` — so an erasure claiming to remove
+   * employee documents would null a row and leave the passport scan in the bucket. The rows stay
+   * because they are also the only remaining record of which files those are.
+   */
+  'documentFilesRemain',
+  /** The profile photo pointer was cleared; the object behind it is in `filesRemaining`. */
+  'photoFileOrphaned',
+  /** Sick notes attached to leave requests, same reason and same list. */
+  'leaveDocumentFilesRemain',
+  /** The national identity number was kept, because the caller asked for it to be. */
+  'nationalIdKeptForAudit',
+  /**
+   * History rows where this person was the **actor** on somebody else's record keep their values.
+   * Erasing A is not authority to rewrite the trail of what A did to B.
+   */
+  'actorHistoryKept',
+  /** At least one attendance day or punch sits in a locked period and was left exactly as it is. */
+  'lockedPeriodUntouched',
+])
+export type ErasureCaveat = z.infer<typeof ErasureCaveat>
+
+/**
+ * What an erasure did, or would do.
+ *
+ * The same shape either way, because a preview computed differently from the thing it previews is a
+ * preview that eventually lies — the rule `accrual.preview` is written under.
+ */
+export const ErasureReport = z.object({
+  ...ws,
+  personId: z.uuid(),
+  /** True when nothing was written. See `privacy.erase` for why this is what the default gives you. */
+  dryRun: z.boolean(),
+  /**
+   * When this person was erased. Null on a dry run of a person who has not been.
+   *
+   * On a replay it carries the **first** erasure's timestamp: the second run finds nothing left to
+   * clear, reports zero rows everywhere, and does not restamp the tombstone.
+   */
+  erasedAt: Timestamp.nullable(),
+  /** The pseudonym the directory shows now. Never a name, never empty — `displayName` is not null. */
+  displayName: z.string(),
+  redacted: z.array(ErasureRedaction),
+  kept: z.array(ErasureRetained),
+  caveats: z.array(ErasureCaveat),
+  /**
+   * File objects in core's storage that this erasure could not delete, and which are recorded on the
+   * person row so a later release can finish the job rather than losing them.
+   */
+  filesRemaining: z.array(z.uuid()),
+})
+export type ErasureReport = z.infer<typeof ErasureReport>
+
+// =====================================================================================
+// the sensitive read log
+// =====================================================================================
+
+/**
+ * How a sensitive record was reached.
+ *
+ * Derived from the principal, never taken from the caller — a client-supplied value is one the
+ * reader controls, and this log exists to say what happened rather than what the reader claimed.
+ * `export` is the exception and is not reachable from a request: it is passed by the one server-side
+ * path that takes a bulk copy of a record, which is `privacy.subjectAccess`.
+ *
+ * There is no `mcp` and no `service`, and both omissions are the same rule rather than an oversight.
+ * Core's MCP proxy forwards a plain bearer token, so an assistant's read arrives as an ordinary
+ * `kind: 'user'` principal that nothing here can honestly tell from a browser; and a service
+ * principal carries no user id at all, so the read is refused before a row is built. A value nothing
+ * can ever write is the same lie as a permission key nothing asks about. See `services/audit.ts`.
+ */
+export const SensitiveAccessVia = z.enum(['ui', 'api', 'export'])
+export type SensitiveAccessVia = z.infer<typeof SensitiveAccessVia>
+
+/**
+ * One read of somebody's identity, birth date or bank details.
+ *
+ * Written in the same transaction as the read, in HR's own schema. `mod_core.activity_events` also
+ * gets a best-effort copy so the workspace's single audit console shows that HR sensitive data was
+ * touched — but it cannot be the record, for two reasons: it is read behind `core.audit.view`,
+ * which owners and admins hold by default and `hr.person.view_sensitive` deliberately nobody does,
+ * so publishing the read there inverts the model the sensitive split exists to create; and the
+ * cross-service call is allowed to fail, which is right for a notification and wrong for evidence.
+ * A subject-access response that answers "who looked at my data" out of a log with silent holes is
+ * worse than one that says it cannot answer.
+ */
+export const SensitiveAccess = z.object({
+  id: z.uuid(),
+  /** Whose record was read. */
+  personId: z.uuid(),
+  /**
+   * The account the disclosure is recorded against. Never null: a reader nobody can be named for is
+   * refused before the record is loaded, because "somebody read your bank details" is not an answer
+   * to give a subject.
+   */
+  actorUserId: z.uuid(),
+  /** The reader's own HR record, when they have one. Plenty of accounts are not employees. */
+  actorPersonId: z.uuid().nullable(),
+  /**
+   * Only the fields that actually came back with a value.
+   *
+   * Logging "read the record" when three of the four were empty overstates what happened, and this
+   * log is itself read by the subject.
+   */
+  fields: z.array(z.string()),
+  /** Why, when the caller said. Shown to the subject in their own bundle — nowhere else. */
+  purpose: z.string().max(500).nullable(),
+  via: SensitiveAccessVia,
+  at: Timestamp,
+})
+export type SensitiveAccess = z.infer<typeof SensitiveAccess>
+
+// =====================================================================================
+// the subject-access bundle
+// =====================================================================================
+
+/** `person_history`, with the values. Redacting it in a subject's own bundle defeats the purpose. */
+export const PersonHistoryEntry = z.object({
+  id: z.uuid(),
+  field: z.string(),
+  from: z.unknown(),
+  to: z.unknown(),
+  at: Timestamp,
+  actorId: z.uuid().nullable(),
+  source: z.string(),
+})
+export type PersonHistoryEntry = z.infer<typeof PersonHistoryEntry>
+
+/** A request exploded into days — what the balance was actually charged for. */
+export const LeaveRequestDay = z.object({
+  id: z.uuid(),
+  requestId: z.uuid(),
+  date: IsoDate,
+  fraction: z.number(),
+  counted: z.boolean(),
+  status: z.string(),
+})
+export type LeaveRequestDay = z.infer<typeof LeaveRequestDay>
+
+/** A section that hit the row cap. Named, with its numbers, so nothing is short by surprise. */
+export const BundleTruncation = z.object({
+  section: z.string(),
+  returned: z.number().int(),
+  cap: z.number().int(),
+})
+
+/** Something this bundle does not contain, and why. */
+export const BundleExclusion = z.object({
+  section: z.string(),
+  reason: z.enum([
+    /**
+     * The bytes of a file. HR holds the metadata and the id; the object lives in core's storage and
+     * a module can only ask for a download URL for one file at a time.
+     */
+    'fileContentsNotExportable',
+    /** The caller asked for the fast path. */
+    'notRequested',
+  ]),
+})
+
+export const SubjectAccessManifest = z.object({
+  ...ws,
+  personId: z.uuid(),
+  generatedAt: Timestamp,
+  generatedBy: z.uuid().nullable(),
+  /** From `packageVersion(import.meta.url)`, never a literal — the literals drifted for months. */
+  moduleVersion: z.string(),
+  truncated: z.array(BundleTruncation),
+  excluded: z.array(BundleExclusion),
+})
+export type SubjectAccessManifest = z.infer<typeof SubjectAccessManifest>
+
+/**
+ * Everything HR holds about one person, including the parts they cannot reach through the product.
+ *
+ * Structured JSON rather than a zip of files, and one person at a time. Both are deliberate:
+ *
+ * - **The rows are not the problem; documents are.** Five years of four punches a day is about nine
+ *   thousand rows and two to three megabytes — large for a response and bounded. A contract PDF,
+ *   three payslips a year and an identity scan has no upper bound at all, which is why the file
+ *   bytes are named in `manifest.excluded` instead of being streamed through a request handler.
+ *   Every section is capped and every cap that bites is named in `manifest.truncated`.
+ * - **There is no workspace-wide variant, and there will not be.** Five hundred people is two and a
+ *   half million rows with decrypted bank details in flight. `personId` is required and there is no
+ *   filter.
+ *
+ * `sensitive` is decrypted here, which makes this the most dangerous object the module produces —
+ * so producing it writes a `sensitive_access_log` row with `via: 'export'` before it is returned. An
+ * export is a bulk read of that record, not a smaller one.
+ */
+export const SubjectAccessBundle = z.object({
+  manifest: SubjectAccessManifest,
+  /**
+   * The whole row, not the directory card.
+   *
+   * `forViewer` narrows `personalEmail`, `phone`, `hiredOn` and `terminatedOn` for a reader who may
+   * not see somebody's personnel record. Those four are the subject's own; they are not narrowed
+   * here.
+   */
+  person: Person,
+  sensitive: PersonSensitive,
+  employment: z.array(Employment),
+  offices: z.array(OfficeAssignment),
+  history: z.array(PersonHistoryEntry),
+  /** Metadata and file ids. The bytes are named in `manifest.excluded`. */
+  documents: z.array(PersonDocument),
+  leave: z.object({
+    types: z.array(LeaveType),
+    requests: z.array(LeaveRequest),
+    days: z.array(LeaveRequestDay),
+    ledger: z.array(LeaveLedgerEntry),
+    /** The running balance down the ledger, so "why is my balance this number" is answered here. */
+    closingBalanceMinutes: z.number().int(),
+  }),
+  attendance: z.object({
+    punches: z.array(Punch),
+    days: z.array(AttendanceDay),
+  }),
+  regularizations: z.array(Regularization),
+  approvals: z.object({
+    /** Requests this person raised. */
+    raised: z.array(ApprovalRequest),
+    /** Steps they were named on as an approver, with the decisions filed against them. */
+    approverOn: z.array(ApprovalStep),
+    /** Their own decisions, wherever they were filed. */
+    decisions: z.array(ApprovalDecision),
+  }),
+  /** Both directions: what they handed over, and what was handed to them. */
+  delegations: z.object({
+    given: z.array(Delegation),
+    received: z.array(Delegation),
+  }),
+  /**
+   * The accrual, overtime and rounding policy resolved for this person today, with the rung that
+   * answered. Included whatever the `leave_accrual` capability is set to: it is the subject's own
+   * data, and "why does she accrue differently from her team" is the commonest follow-up a subject
+   * access request produces.
+   */
+  policiesInForce: z.array(ResolvedPolicy),
+  /** Who read their identity, birth date or bank details. A bundle without it is incomplete. */
+  accessLog: z.array(SensitiveAccess),
+})
+export type SubjectAccessBundle = z.infer<typeof SubjectAccessBundle>

package/src/contract/router.ts

@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ import {
   PolicySubjectKind,
   ResolvedPolicy,
 } from './policies.js'
+import {
+  ErasureReport,
+  HrRetention,
+  RetentionSettings,
+  SensitiveAccess,
+  SubjectAccessBundle,
+} from './privacy.js'
 
 const ws = z.object({ workspaceId: WorkspaceId })
 const t = ['hr'] as const
@@ -1259,5 +1266,119 @@ export const hrContract = {
       .input(ws.extend({ fieldId: z.uuid() }))
       .output(ok),
   },
+
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------- privacy
+  /**
+   * Subject access, erasure and retention. All four behind `hr.privacy.manage`, which is granted to
+   * nobody by default and ships in the same change as these — see `privacy.ts` for why there is one
+   * key rather than four, and why none of this is a capability.
+   */
+  privacy: {
+    /**
+     * Everything HR holds about one person, in one response.
+     *
+     * `personId` is required and there is no filter: a workspace-wide export is two and a half
+     * million rows with decrypted bank details in flight, and it is not offered.
+     *
+     * The decrypt makes this a bulk read of the sensitive record, so it writes a
+     * `sensitive_access_log` row with `via: 'export'` in the same transaction.
+     */
+    subjectAccess: baseContract
+      .route({ method: 'GET', path: '/people/{personId}/privacy/subject-access', tags: t })
+      .input(
+        ws.extend({
+          personId: z.uuid(),
+          /** Recorded on the access-log row and shown to the subject in their own bundle. */
+          purpose: z.string().max(500).nullish(),
+        }),
+      )
+      .output(SubjectAccessBundle),
+
+    /**
+     * Redact a person, and say what survived.
+     *
+     * **`dryRun` defaults to true**, which is the opposite of every other write in this module and
+     * deliberate. This is the one irreversible act HR offers, so a caller that forgets the flag has
+     * to get the preview rather than the erasure. It matters more than it reads: core generates an
+     * MCP tool from every hosted module's OpenAPI document, so a procedure with a REST route is
+     * agent-callable the day it ships, and the call made with no arguments has to be the harmless
+     * one. The preview runs the same predicates the run does and returns the same shape.
+     *
+     * Nothing is deleted. The identifying columns are cleared and every record a wage, an
+     * entitlement or an authorisation was computed from stays, listed in `kept` with the basis it
+     * survived under. Running it twice is safe and reports zero rows the second time: each step
+     * matches only rows that still have something to clear.
+     */
+    erase: baseContract
+      .route({ method: 'POST', path: '/people/{personId}/privacy/erase', tags: t })
+      .input(
+        ws.extend({
+          personId: z.uuid(),
+          dryRun: z.boolean().default(true),
+          /** Recorded on the person row. The only place this reason is kept. */
+          reason: z.string().max(500).nullish(),
+          /**
+           * Keep the national identity number.
+           *
+           * The one decision in here that is not the module's to make. A Turkish payroll audit may
+           * want it; a GDPR erasure request wants it gone first. The default clears it, the response
+           * says which was done, and `caveats` carries `nationalIdKeptForAudit` when it did not.
+           */
+          keepNationalIdForAudit: z.boolean().default(false),
+        }),
+      )
+      .output(ErasureReport),
+
+    /**
+     * Who read somebody's identity, birth date or bank details.
+     *
+     * **About yourself this carries no permission**, which is why it has no `requires()` and sits in
+     * `module.test.ts`'s `SELF_SERVICE` allowlist. Reading your own access log is a thing nobody may
+     * lack, exactly like `people.me`; a grantable key here could only ever be one somebody could be
+     * denied, and being denied sight of who has been looking at your bank details is not a state
+     * this product should be able to express.
+     *
+     * About anybody else it needs `hr.privacy.manage`, and the handler is what asks — a `personId`
+     * that is not the caller's own, or an `actorUserId` at all. The second is not a smaller question
+     * than the first: "what has this account been looking at" is an investigation into a colleague,
+     * and it is the query that makes this log something to be careful with rather than only
+     * something to be reassured by.
+     */
+    accessLog: {
+      list: baseContract
+        .route({ method: 'GET', path: '/privacy/access-log', tags: t })
+        .input(
+          ws.extend({
+            ...PageInput.shape,
+            /** Whose record. Defaults to the caller's own, which is the self-service case. */
+            personId: z.uuid().optional(),
+            /** Whose reading. Always an investigation, so always `hr.privacy.manage`. */
+            actorUserId: z.uuid().optional(),
+          }),
+        )
+        .output(page(SensitiveAccess)),
+    },
+
+    retention: {
+      /**
+       * The horizons, and — with `withCounts` — how much is already past each one.
+       *
+       * The counts are the dry run. They cost a query per class that has a horizon set, so they are
+       * asked for rather than always computed; a retention screen should ask for them.
+       */
+      get: baseContract
+        .route({ method: 'GET', path: '/privacy/retention', tags: t })
+        .input(ws.extend({ withCounts: z.boolean().default(false) }))
+        .output(RetentionSettings),
+      /**
+       * Set them. A field left out is unchanged; a field sent as `null` goes back to "keep
+       * indefinitely", which is what every class ships as.
+       */
+      set: baseContract
+        .route({ method: 'PUT', path: '/privacy/retention', tags: t })
+        .input(ws.extend({ retention: HrRetention.partial() }))
+        .output(RetentionSettings),
+    },
+  },
 }
 export type HrContract = typeof hrContract